The Philippines and China: The West Philippine Sea dispute

Submitted to the
Ramon V. Del Rosario College of Business
De La Salle University - Manila

In partial fulfillment
Of the course requirements in
BNG 520M Business Law
Monday Class 1800 – 2115 Section GMA Term 1, A.Y. 2017-2018

Submitted by:

Verdan, Joseph Paul T.

11671262
(+63) 9178068916
josephpaul.verdan@dlsu.edu.ph

Submitted to:

Atty. Ligon, Antonio A.

Assistant Professor
COMMERCIAL LAW

Date Submitted:
 December 15, 2017

Introduction

Background of the Study

The South China Sea is emerging as a major source due to its abundance in maritime resources with potentially
large amounts of oil and gas deposits. It is also geographically strategic in terms of international trading routes as
well as on a military standpoint. These characteristics could be vital for any developing country that made it the
subject of disputes and conflicts among its bordering six countries (China, Philippines, Vietnam, Brunei,
Malaysia, and Taiwan). The dispute is complex in terms of its nature covering various issues such as sovereignty
of the islands, maritime delimitation, resources utilization as well as matters concerning national and
international security. The fundamental framework of this study focuses on the conflicting territorial claims
particularly China and Philippines on the West Philippine Sea. Carpio (2017) argued that the Philippines is
fighting for sovereignty over the West Philippine Sea which is a part of the South China Sea, while Johnson
(2012) claims that China is fighting for sovereignty over the entire South China Sea. The sovereignty of the
Philippines over its territory and its components are found in Article 1 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution
stating that:

“The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago, with all the islands and waters embraced therein,
and all other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction, consisting of its terrestrial,
fluvial and aerial domains, including its territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular shelves, and other
submarine areas. The waters around, between, and connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless of their
breadth and dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the Philippines.”

On the other hand, China’s assertion on its 9-dashed lines claim to all the islands and waters enclosed by these
lines could be found in its 2009 Notes Verbales stating:

“China has indisputable sovereignty over the islands in the South China Sea and the adjacent waters, and enjoys
sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the relevant waters as well as the seabed and subsoil thereof (see attached
map). The above position is consistently held by the Chinese government, and is widely known by the international
community.”

Carpio (2014) states that China’s 9-dashed lines encloses 85.7% of the entire South China Sea. This is equivalent
to 3 million square kilometers out of the 3.5 million square kilometers surface area of the South China Sea. In
recent years, to cement its position and further its ambition, China has built seven artificial islets over
uninhabited reefs and shoals as well as exerted significant military control over the area surrounding them. This
prompted the Philippines to bring a court case by utilizing the dispute settlement mechanism in UNCLOS as
both parties are bound by the Convention. At stake in the arbitration before an UNCLOS Annex VII tribunal
is whether the Philippines will keep or lose 80% of its exclusive economic zone and 100% of its extended
continental shelf in the West Philippines Sea.

This research paper aims to evaluate the international legal standards in the perspective of the claims from both
Philippine and China in the South China Sea dispute particularly in the West Philippine Sea. The paper also
highlights the evolution of the dispute and current developments within the South China Sea
Statement of the Problem

This paper is an analysis from a bilateral perspective of the complex territorial dispute issues between
Philippines and China in the South China Sea particularly in the West Philippine Sea. It also assesses the basis of
each claim as defined in the international law and examines how each party engaged in diplomatic and military
policies. Specifically it seeks to the following questions:

1. What are the bases of the Philippine claim on the disputed territories under international law?
2. What is the China's claim over the South China Sea including West Philippine Sea?
3. What are the implications on both Philippines and China after the Hague ruling?

Methodology

This paper will make use of the data available at the De La Salle Makati Extension Campus Library and different
websites which have relevance on the topic. The. The technical information will be gathered from the websites
of UNCLOS and Permanent Court of Arbitration as well as the 1987 Philippine Constitution. The Asian
Center and Institute for Maritime Affairs and Law of the Sea will prove to be an important source of inputs for
this study. The references were carefully selected as it pertains to understanding the bilateral views of
Philippines and China regarding their territorial dispute in the South China Sea particularly in the West
Philippine Sea.
Review of Related Literature

West Philippine Sea

The West Philippine Sea refers to the part of the South China Sea that is closest, and of vital interest, to the
Philippines. On September 5, 2012, President Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III issued Administrative Order No.
29, with Section 1 stating that the “maritime areas on the western side of the Philippine archipelago are hereby
named as the West Philippine Sea.” It includes “the Luzon Sea, as well as the waters around, within and adjacent
to the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG), and Bajo de Masinloc also known as Scarborough Shoal.” (Baviera and
Batongbacal, 2013)
The Map shows the Philippine Maritime Entitlement adapted from Baviera and Batongbacal (2013).

South China Sea

The South China Sea is the much broader expanse of water, often described as a semi enclosed sea, bounded by
China/Taiwan in the north, by the Philippines in the east, and by Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and
Brunei in the west and south. The Gulf of Tonkin and Gulf of Thailand also about the South China Sea.
Scattered over the South China Sea are various geographic features, the most prominent of which are known
internationally as the Spratlys, the Paracels, Macclesfield Bank and Pratas Island. (Baviera and Batongbacal,
2013)
The map above shows the entirety of 3.5 million square kilometers surface area of the South China Sea according to
Energy Information Administration (2013)

UNCLOS

The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which came into force in 1994, is an international
treaty that established a “legal order” for the world’s seas and oceans. UNCLOS provides a regulatory
framework for addressing, among other things, sovereignty, territorial sea limits, legal status of resources on the
seabed beyond the limits of national jurisdiction and a binding procedure for settlement of disputes between
States. (UNCLOS, 1998)

Archipelago

UNCLOS defines Archipelagic States as follows:

(a) "archipelagic State" means a State constituted wholly by one or more archipelagos and may include other
islands; (b)"archipelago" means a group of islands, including parts of islands, interconnecting waters and other
natural features which are so closely interrelated that such islands, waters and other natural features form an
intrinsic geographical, economic and political entity, or which historically have been regarded as such.

Territorial Dispute

A territorial dispute refers to conflicting claims of sovereignty over (1) continental land; (2) island, whether
capable of human habitation of its own or not; or (3) rock above water at high tide. (Carpio, 2017)

Maritime Dispute
A maritime dispute refers to overlapping maritime zones (territorial sea, EEZ, and CS); and
dispute on the interpretation or application of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS), which is the constitution for the oceans and seas of our planet. (Carpio, 2017)

Freedom of Navigation

This is a principle of customary international law that ships flying the flag of any sovereign state shall not suffer
interference from other states, apart from the exceptions provided for in international law. This right is now
also codified as article 87(1)a of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. (UNCLOS, 1998)

Contiguous Zone

This zone extends the 12nm jurisdiction from territorial sea to up to 12nm more, with
limited exercise of sovereignty, when there is no conflict with another state’s jurisdiction. This
could be more or less if it overlaps with another state’s contiguous zone. In this zone, coastal
states can implement certain rights to prevent certain violations and enforce their police powers. (UNCLOS,
1998)

Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)

This confers “sovereign right” to a coastal state to exploit, develop and manage all
economic resources below the surface of the sea up to 200 nm from the outer limit of its
territorial sea. However, the coastal state does not have full sovereignty to the EEZ. The surface
waters are still regarded as international waters. (UNCLOS, 1998)

Continental Shelf

The continental shelf is a natural prolongation of the land territory to the continental margin’s outer edge. The
continental shelf may extend up to 200nm or can exceed up to 350nm from the coastline if it is a natural
prolongation, whichever is greater. Coastal states have exclusive rights to resources attached to its continental
shelf. (UNCLOS, 1998)

Territorial Sea

Though the right of coastal states to extend sovereign control over waters beyond their coastlines was always
recognized under international law, the scope and limit of this control was always in contention. Under
UNCLOS, a coastal state has sovereignty to set laws, regulate use and exploit resources, up to 12 nautical miles
(nm) from its coastlines. This is regarded as sovereign territory of the state and extends to the airspace and
seabed within this region. If this zone conflicts with another state’s territorial sea, the median point of both
state’s territorial sea is taken as the border, or it can otherwise be negotiated by the respective states. (UNCLOS
1998)

Nine Dash Line

Gewirtz (2016) stated that the nine-dash line originated in a 1947 map (where it was actually an eleven dash line
with a slightly different shape) prepared by the KMT Chinese government before the success of the Communist
revolution in 1949, but it has remained part of China’s claims since then. The map does not appear to be part of
any official Chinese government document until it was attached to a note verbale that China submitted to the
United Nations in 2009. Carpio (2017) added that China’s nine-dashed line claim, through which China is
aggressively asserting “indisputable sovereignty over the islands in the South China Sea and the adjacent waters”
and “sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the relevant waters as well as the seabed and subsoil” enclosed
by the dashes, is the main driver of the South China Sea dispute.

The map showing the nine-dash line which China attached in its note verbal in 2009

Carpio (2017) emphasized the effect of the nine dash line if upheld by UNCLOS would be as follows: The
Philippines loses about 80% of its EEZ facing the West Philippine Sea, including part of the Malampaya gas
field. Malaysia loses also about 80% of its EEZ in Sabah and Sarawak facing the South China Sea, as well as most
of its active gas and oil fields in the same area. Vietnam loses about 50% of its total EEZ. Brunei loses about 90%
of its total EEZ. Indonesia loses about 20% of its EEZ facing the South China Sea in Natuna Island whose
surrounding waters comprise the largest gas field in Southeast Asia.
Bajo de Masinloc/Scarborough Shoal

Bajo de Masinloc is a large coral reef which lies off the coast of the Province of Zambales. It is nearest to the
Municipality of Palauig. Although uninhabited, with only some rocks visible above water, the shoal has been
considered part of the Philippines from Spanish colonial times. Bajo de Masinloc is an area of fishing, navigation
and other activities by Filipinos as well as other nationalities. The 1734 Pedro Murillo Velarde map shows the
shoal designated as Panacot (meaning ‘to terrify’) , while an 1899 “Mapa General, Islas Filipinas” by the
Observatorio de Manila marks it as Bajo de Masinloc (Shoal of Masinloc). It is also locally known as Panatag and
Karburo. Its international name ‘Scarborough Shoal’ came into use after the British tea trading ship
Scarborough was shipwrecked in the area in 1748, as documented in the journals of the Malaspina Expedition
(1789-1794). In 2009, when the Philippine Legislature passed Republic Act No. 9522, Bajo de Masinloc and
the KIG were explicitly mentioned to be under Philippine sovereignty and jurisdiction. In 2012, Bajo de
Masinloc became the subject of a heated dispute with China. (Baviera and Batongbacal, 2013)

A picture of Scarborough Shoal adapted from The South China Sea Dispute by Antonio Carpio (2017).

The Kalayaan Island Group of Islands

The Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) is a group of over fifty features and their surrounding waters that belong to
the Philippines, located in what is internationally known as the Spratly Islands. The KIG is not the same as the
Spratlys, however, as there are features in the Spratlys that are not part of the KIG. The KIG has been the
subject of the Philippines’ official and private interests since before it became an independent republic. The
islands, reefs and rocks of the KIG are nearest the Philippine main archipelago, and are believed to be both
economically valuable and strategically important for purposes of national security. The KIG was formally
incorporated as a municipality of Palawan province in 1978 during the administration of President Ferdinand
E. Marcos through Presidential Decree No. 1596. Nine (9) of its islands and reefs presently host Philippine
civilians and troops.
Philippine sovereignty over the KIG is contested by some states in the region. (Baviera and Batongbacal, 2013)

A picture of Kalayaan Group of Islands adapted from The West Philippine Sea primer by Baviera and
Batongbacal (2013)

Territorial Sovereignty

Under international law there are five principles that guide assessment of claiming territorial sovereignty. First
principle is discovery and occupation exhibiting control. Second principle is prescription which denotes
peaceful transfer of sovereignty under international law and continued occupation over a long period of time
when it actually belonged to another. Third principle is conquest and annexation. Fourth is cession, which is
the territory is transferred from one to another state. Last principle is accretion and avulsion where a new
territory is added when natural causes happens (Southeast Asian Affairs 2000).

Maritime boundaries are essential and necessary parts of the international State system, demarcating with some
degree of precision the area of waters over which a State exercises effective sovereign control. Such boundary
takes on a more crucial and important role in the international order when one considers the fact that it is in
effect a boundary between the coastal State and of the interests of the rest of the world upon the high seas
(UNCLOS 1998)
Discussion

China's claim over the South China Sea, including the West Philippine Sea

China’s claims are based on the assertion of historical sovereignty and occupation over the South China Sea
imposed by its nine-dash line (Gonzales 2014).

According to the United States Department of State Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and
Scientific Affairs (2014), there are three-fold possible interpretations for the nine-dash line of China which are
as follows:

1. Dashed Line as a Claim to Islands

Under this possible interpretation, the dashed line indicates only the islands over which China claims
sovereignty. However, China’s sovereignty claims over the islands in the South China Sea are disputed. China
has not yet clarified its maritime claims in relation to certain geographic features in the South China Sea. There
is an overlap with the generated coastlines of the states of Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, and
Brunei.

2. Dashed Line as a National Boundary

Under this possible interpretation, the dashed line that appears on Chinese maps is intended to indicate a
national boundary between China and neighboring States. However, maritime boundaries under international
law are created by agreement (or judicial decision between neighboring States, one country may not be able to
establish a maritime boundary with another country.

3. Dashed Line as a Historic Claim

Under this possible interpretation, the dashed line that appears on Chinese maps is intended to indicate a so-
called “historic” claim. A historic claim might be one of sovereignty over the maritime space (“historic waters”
or “historic title”) or, alternatively, some lesser set of rights (“historic rights”) to the maritime space. However, a
State making a historic claim must give the international notoriety to such a claim. In line with this, there was
no Chinese law, declaration, proclamation, or other official statement describing or informing the international
community of a historic claim to the waters enclosed within the dash line.

China has never clarified the legal nature of the basis in terms of the nine-dash line. China’s claim is also
contrary to the international law that sets the following conditions to be valid:

1. First, the state actually exercised authority over the area where it claims historic rights;
2. Second, the state exercised that authority continuously and for a long period of time; and
3. Third, other states either acquiesced in or failed to oppose the exercise of such authority.

China has not clarified its maritime claims associated with the dashed-line maps in a manner
consistent with international law.
The Philippines' claim over the West Philippine Sea

The Philippines's main argument is that China's 9-dash line, published map showing 9 dashes encircling the
entire South China Sea, contradicts the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea or the UNCLOS, it
important to note that the UNCLOS was signed by many countries including the Philippines and China.
Under the UNCLOS a country is given 200 nautical miles of sea as an exclusive economic zone, as well as an
additional 150 miles of ECS. This being said the Philippines should have sovereignty over the West Philippine
Sea and its neighbouring islands, including Scarborough shoal (Carpio 2017).

Carpio (2017) summarizes the 2014 UNCLOS Arbitration case of Philippines to China as follows:

The Philippine arbitration case against China does not involve a territorial dispute but exclusively maritime
disputes involving the interpretation or application of UNCLOS, particularly:

1. Whether China’s nine-dashed line claim, supposedly based on historic rights, can generate maritime
entitlements that can encroach on or overlap with the 200 NM Philippine EEZ;
2. Whether certain geologic features, within Philippine EEZ, are (1) mere rocks above water at high tide
that generate no EEZ but only a territorial sea; or (2) LTEs that are not entitled to a territorial sea and
thus form part of the continental shelf of Philippine EEZ;
3. Whether certain geologic features, outside Philippine EEZ, are (1) mere rocks above water at high tide
that generate no EEZ but only a territorial sea; or (2) LTEs that generate no territorial sea and thus
form part of the continental shelf;
 4. Whether China violated the Whether China violated the sovereign rights and jurisdiction of the
Philippines within Philippine EEZ.

Based on the Permanent court of Arbitration, the summary of the Philippines claims are as follows:

1. China’s maritime entitlements may not extend beyond those permitted by UNCLOS.
2. China’s “nine-dash line” claim is contrary to UNCLOS.
3. Scarborough Shoal generates no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf.
4. Mischief Reef, Second Thomas Shoal, and Subi Reef are all low tide elevations. As such, they are not
subject to appropriation.
5. Mischief Reef and Second Thomas Shoal are within the exclusive economic zone and continental shelf
of the Philippines.
6. Gaven Reef and McKennan Reefs are low tide elevations. They generate no maritime entitlements, but
may be used to measure baselines.
7. Johnson Reef, Cuarteron Reef, and Fiery Cross Reef generate no maritime entitlements to an exclusive
economic zone or continental shelf.
8. China has interfered with the Philippines exercise of sovereign rights over resources located in the
Philippines’ maritime entitlement zones.
9. China has failed to prevent Chinese nationals and Chinese flagged vessels from exploiting living
resources in the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone.
10. China prevents Philippine fishermen from pursuing their livelihoods around Scarborough Shoal.
11. China has violated environmental obligations under UNCLOS to protect Scarborough Shoal and
Second Thomas Shoal.
12. Chinese occupation of and construction on Mischief Reef violates UNCLOS provisions on artificial
islands and environmental protections, and are unlawful acts of attempted appropriation.
13. China has breached UNCLOS obligations by dangerous operation of law enforcement vessels around
Scarborough Shoal.
14. China has unlawfully aggravated and extended the dispute by interfering with the Philippines’ right to
navigation around Second Thomas Shoal, preventing the resupply of Philippine personnel at Second
Thomas Shoal and endangering the health of those personnel.
15. China shall desist from further unlawful claims and activities.

The Permanent Court of Arbitration Jurisdiction Award

Carpio (2017) stated that the Permanent Court of Arbitration issued its award on the arbitration case between
Philippines and China over the West Philippine Sea (South China Sea) dispute. In a 501-page award, the
Tribunal decided in favor of the Philippines and said that China does not have historic rights to the South
China Sea and that their “nine-dash line” claim has no legal basis.
 1. Historic Rights and the ‘Nine-Dash Line’

The Tribunal concluded that, to the extent China had historic rights to resources in the waters of the South
China Sea, such rights were extinguished to the extent they were incompatible with the exclusive economic
zones provided for in the Convention. The Tribunal also noted that, although 2 Chinese navigators and
fishermen, as well as those of other States, had historically made use of the islands in the South China Sea, there
was no evidence that China had historically exercised exclusive control over the waters or their resources. The
Tribunal concluded that there was no legal basis for China to claim historic rights to resources within the sea
areas falling within the ‘nine-dash line’.

2. Status of Features

The Tribunal noted that the reefs have been heavily modified by land reclamation and construction, recalled
that the Convention classifies features on their natural condition, and relied on historical materials in evaluating
the features. The Tribunal found historical evidence to be more relevant and noted that the Spratly Islands were
historically used by small groups of fishermen and that several Japanese fishing and guano mining enterprises
were attempted. The Tribunal concluded that such transient use does not constitute inhabitation by a stable
community and that all of the historical economic activity had been extractive. Accordingly, the Tribunal
concluded that none of the Spratly Islands is capable of generating extended maritime zones. The Tribunal also
held that the Spratly Islands cannot generate maritime zones collectively as a unit. Having found that none of
the features claimed by China was capable of generating an exclusive economic zone, the Tribunal found that it
could—without delimiting a boundary—declare that certain sea areas are within the exclusive economic zone of
the Philippines, because those areas are not overlapped by any possible entitlement of China

3. Lawfulness of Chinese Actions

Having found that certain areas are within the exclusive economic zone of the Philippines, the Tribunal found
that China had violated the Philippines’ sovereign rights in its exclusive economic zone by (a) interfering with
Philippine fishing and petroleum exploration, (b) constructing artificial islands and (c) failing to prevent
Chinese fishermen from fishing in the zone. The Tribunal also held that fishermen from the Philippines (like
those from China) had traditional fishing rights at Scarborough Shoal and that China had interfered with these
rights in restricting access. The Tribunal further held that Chinese law enforcement vessels had unlawfully
created a serious risk of collision when they physically obstructed Philippine vessels.

4. Harm to Marine Environment

The Tribunal considered the effect on the marine environment of China’s recent large-scale land reclamation
and construction of artificial islands at seven features in the Spratly Islands and found that China had caused
severe harm to the coral reef environment and violated its obligation to preserve and protect fragile ecosystems
and the habitat of depleted, threatened, or endangered species. The Tribunal also found that Chinese
authorities were aware that Chinese fishermen have harvested endangered sea turtles, coral, and giant clams on a
substantial scale in the South China Sea (using methods that inflict severe damage on the coral reef
environment) and had not fulfilled their obligations to stop such activities

5. Aggravation of Dispute

Finally, the Tribunal considered whether China’s actions since the commencement of the arbitration had
aggravated the dispute between the Parties. The Tribunal found that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the
implications of a stand-off between Philippine marines and Chinese naval and law enforcement vessels at
Second Thomas Shoal, holding that this dispute involved military activities and was therefore excluded from
compulsory settlement. The Tribunal found, however, that China’s recent large-scale land reclamation and
construction of artificial islands was incompatible with the obligations on a State during dispute resolution
proceedings, insofar as China has inflicted irreparable harm to the marine environment, built a large artificial
island in the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone, and destroyed evidence of the natural condition of features
in the South China Sea that formed part of the Parties’ dispute.

Aftermath

According to Carpio (2017), the enforcement of the award should be the priority of the Philippines. There is a
menu of options available to the Philippines to enforce the Award, such as:

1. The Philippines can sue in a jurisdiction that ratified UNCLOS in case China installs oil or gas platforms
within Philippine EEZ. The Philippines can ask the court having jurisdiction to attach the assets, located in its
jurisdiction, owned by Chinese entities involved in installing or operating these platforms.
2. The Philippines can recover damages from China in the proper forum for severe harm to the marine
environment in the Spratlys as ruled in the Award.
3. The Philippines can move before the ISA for the suspension of China’s exploration permits in the Area until
China complies with the Award, on the ground that China is accepting benefits from the seabed provisions of
the Convention but is refusing to comply with its obligations under the dispute settlement provisions of the
Convention. The framers call UNCLOS a “package deal” of rights and obligations. A state party cannot cherry
pick, that is, avail of the rights without complying with the obligations.
4. The Philippines can likewise move before the U.N. Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf
(CLCS) for the suspension of China’s application for an ECS in the East China Sea until China complies with
the Award.
5. The Philippines can negotiate its maritime boundaries with Malaysia (EEZ and ECS) and Vietnam (ECS),
applying the Arbitral Tribunal’s ruling that no geologic feature in the Spratlys generates an EEZ and that the
nine-dashed line has no legal effect on maritime entitlements. This will result in state practice adopting the
rulings in the Award.
6. The Philippines can delineate its ECS from Luzon and file its claim with the CLCS, there being no legal
impediment from the nine-dashed line. China, the only opposite coastal state, can raise two grounds to oppose
the Philippine ECS claim. First, China can again raise its nine-dashed line claim but the CLCS is bound by the
Award of the Arbitral Tribunal. Second, China can claim that the Philippine ECS overlaps with China’s ECS,
but this means China accepts that the Philippines has an EEZ from Luzon. If China does not oppose the
Philippine claim to an ECS, then the CLCS will recommend to the Philippines the adoption of its ECS. This is
the dilemma that China will face if the Philippines files an ECS claim.
7. Philippine navy and coast guard vessels and aircraft can continue to patrol Philippine EEZ in the West
Philippine Sea. Under the Philippine-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT), any armed attack on a Philippine
public vessel (navy or coast guard) in the Pacific area (clarified to include the South China Sea) is a ground to
invoke the MDT. Thus, the MDT covers Philippine navy and coast guard vessels and aircraft patrolling
Philippine EEZ in the West Philippine Sea. The U.S. has declared that China must comply with the ruling of
the Arbitral Tribunal, recognizing the right of the Philippines to patrol the West Philippine Sea.

Conclusion/Recommendation

The UNCLOS arbitration tribunal’s decision vindicated the Philippines’ position that it is entitled to a full
200nm EEZ and continental shelf within the SCS, and exclusive rights to explore and exploit the resources
therein, despite China’s claims to sovereignty and jurisdiction within the area of the nine-dash line. The
UNCLOS III is vital to the future of the peace of the planet. The lands of the earth have already been
apportioned and boundaries have been more or less settled during the immediate post-colonial period. The
world is now familiar with the expansionist designs of China in the South China Sea. China’s creeping invasion
of the islands, rocks and reefs, as well as of the waters of the South China Sea grows in force and aggressiveness
each day as China’s naval forces assume greater superiority over those of other coastal states. The Philippines is
particularly vulnerable to Chinese bullying because the Philippines has the weakest navy among all the major
disputant states in the South China Sea. China has been dangling to the Philippines and other claimant states its
offer for joint development of the disputed areas while shelving the sovereignty issues. However, acceptance of
China’s joint development offer means a complete surrender to China’s outlandish “indisputable sovereignty”
claims.

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