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The Spratly Islands Conflict: Implications to China and the Philippines

Conference Paper · October 2012

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 The Spratly Islands Conflict: Implications to China and the Philippines
Christine Marie S. Yeneza1 and Ferdinand T. Abocejo2
1University of San Jose–Recoletos and 2Cebu Normal University and Cebu City, Philippines

Abstract

This study endeavored to assess the conflict on the Spratly islands between the
Philippines and China in view of sovereignty, maritime jurisdiction, economic, strategic and
political interests of the two claimant countries. It anchored its framework on the theory of
political realism by Morgenthau (as quoted in Williams, 2007) which explains that the primary
end of any political relation and action is holding on to power either in the domestic or
international arena. In the international relations perspective, nations are primary agents
which ultimately strive to maximize their power. Bilateral negotiation between China the
Philippines were discussed. The study employed a qualitative-descriptive and critical analysis
of the gathered information from refereed journals. The findings revealed that the six countries
advance their claims over the Spratly islands on the bases of sovereignty and maritime
jurisdiction, economic and strategic interests. The Spratly islands are seen to have rich fishing
grounds and are believed to have guano and oil deposits with strong potential for commercial
fuel explorations. The Chinese government has been continually upgrading and strengthening
its naval capabilities while regularly patrolling over the disputed Spratly islands to assert its
dominance in the disputed maritime area. China and the Philippines have reached and signed
bilateral agreements concerning the Spratly islands in the UNCLOS but implementation was
not made possible because of difference in interpretation of agreements based on the vague
wordings of the Convention. The situation was complicated as both countries were unwilling
to change their position on the issue revolving the Spratly islands. This attitude illustrates the
arguments of the theory of political realism in international relations where countries seek and
formulate foreign policies with the nature of putting forward their own interests. At the
moment, the resolution of the conflict over the Spratly islands looks gloom unless a mutually
beneficial bilateral agreement between the two countries can be effected.

Keywords: Sptratly islands, sovereignty, maritime jurisdiction, claimant country, Philippines,

China, bilateral negotiations

1.0 Introduction

The Spratly islands in the South China Sea are composed of more than hundreds of
islets sparse over 340 thousand square miles, mostly made up of coral reefs, rocks, sand
banks, shoal, sea mounts, atolls and cays between the countries of Vietnam and the
Philippines, located almost 1,000 miles from mainland China (Marlay, 1997). Although, they
don’t have natural harbors and situated in a typhoon track, the Spratly islands have been the
central issue with overlapping claims from six countries - Malaysia, Taiwan, Brunei
Darussalam, Vietnam, People’s Republic of China, and the Philippines - regarding territorial
sovereignty and maritime rights.

Emmers (2005) noted that, on the one hand, the bases of the claims over the Spratly
islands are rooted on historical grounds of discovery and occupation on the other hand, the
claimants insist for the extension of sovereign jurisdiction according to the interpretations
of the provisions stipulated in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas
(UNCLOS). Notably, all of the countries which claim ownership of the Spratly islands are
signatories to the third UNCLOS. As agreed in this Conference, all signing countries are
permitted to establish an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) within 200 miles around an
inhabited island, in this paper, the disputed Spratly islands (Chung, 1999). This indicates that
the sovereignty over the claimed Spratly islands is conferred upon the country (Marlay,
1997) and with it the legality and the right to develop the island supportive to economic
development (Chung, 1997)

The Philippines has a long account of history as basis for its claim over the Spratly
islands which date back to 1947 when a Filipino national, in the name of Tomas Cloma”
claimed to have discovered the Spratly islands and name them “Kalayaan” – Archipelago of
Freedomland where he proclaimed himself as the “government leader” over his newly
discovered islands (Chung, 1999). Another related account (Marlay, 1997) reported the
later date to be in 1956 of the same Tomas Cloma, a Filipino industrialist who desired to
develop some of “his” discovered islands for guano deposit exploitation. The personal claim
of Cloma and his occupation over the Spratly islands eventually led the Philippines to
officially claimed part of the disputed islands in 1971 (Marlay, 1997). As to proximity, the
Spratly islands are closer to Palawan than to Vietnam and much more than to China.

Meanwhile, the Chinese government’s basis for its claims on the Spratly islands
started in August 1951 when the then Chinese premier Zhou Enlai issued the Allied Peace
Treaty negotiations with the Japanese government (Fravel, 2011) declaring China’s
sovereignty over the Spratly islands. In September 1958, China’s claim was reaffirmed when
it asserted its territorial waters over the Spratly islands (Townsend-Gault, 1998). Since the
middle of the 1970s until the present, the Chinese government has maintained its sovereign
claim saying that “China has indisputable sovereignty over the Spratly islands and adjacent
waters (Fravel, 2011).

One of the central issues revolving around the Spratly islands conflict is the presence
of fuel deposits and other natural resources in addition to their strategic location (Phy,
2009). As reported (Stinnett, 2000), oil deposits had been found on the Spratlys in 1969 and
since then the area has become very essential to the six country claimants in advancing their
territorial claims. Each of the six countries have given utmost value to their territorial claims
with strong disagreements about the distribution of the Spratly islands (Phy, 2009). Because
of economic and strategic location benefits that can be derived from gaining control over the
area, all claimants have put their claims on grounds of historical and/or local testimonies
(Fravel, 2011)

This paper assesses the Spratly islands conflict from the perspective of sovereignty,
maritime jurisdiction, economic, strategic and political interests of the claimant countries. It
also discuses the bilateral negotiations between China and the Philippines, provides
synthesis of the implications of the conflict with the end view of easing tensions through
policy recommendations for considerations by both countries.
2.0 Theoretical Background

This study anchors its framework from the Theory of Political Realism in
International Relations advocated in 1948 by Morgenthau (as quoted in Williams, 2007) in
his first published book on Politics Among Nations. As a theory of political philosophy, the
Theory of Politcal Realism (Morgenthau as quoted in Williams, 2007) explains, models and
prescribed political relations with the assumption that the primary end of any political action
is power holding true either for domestic or international arena. At the international scene,
it ought to be that nations are primary agents which strive to maximize their power.

In this regards, nations and politicians ought to pursue power for their interests. The
theory then assumes that political interests have to be maintained through the exercise of
power, and characteristically, every country of the world operates through competing power
bases. In essence, realism is concerned with power rather than morality or material
interests. Morgenthau (1948) advocated his strong assumptions “about human nature that
humans are not naturally good and conflict is the natural outcome of the search for power,
not of misunderstanding”. Ultimately, the Theory of Political Realism (Morgenthau, as
quoted in Williams, 2007) assumes that any country is necessarily self seeking and
formulates foreign policies from which it can realize gain, and by its very nature can never
sets aside its own interests.

3.0 Brief Literature Review

The conflict over the Spratly Islands has long been standing since the early 20th
century. Several literature (Marlay, 1997; Townsend-Gault, 1998; Storey, 1999; Chung,
1999; Stinnett, 2000; Phy, 2009; Fravel, 2011) affirmed that among the controversial and
legal issues surrounding the Spratly islands conflict are sovereignty and jurisdiction. They
noted that to clearly and better understand the issues on the Spratly islands conflict, there is
a need to grasp the basic rules involving maritime jurisdiction which can be drawn and
define with conciseness. In like manner, Townsend-Gault (1998) affirmed that the debate on
the South China Sea revolves around maritime boundaries and it has been a long hope that
once boundary lines are eventually drawn, these claimant countries will interpret their work
as done and will lay their case settled.

One development occurred in 1995 during the leadership of the then Philippine
President Fidel V. Ramos. The Philippines and China agreed to meet in Manila for a vice-
ministerial talk on 8-12 August 1995 with hopes to settle their dispute over the Spratly island
(Dzurek, 1996). As reported by Dzurek (1996), both countries agreed to abide by a code of
conduct in the Spratlys to evade military confrontation, however concrete agreements were
never reached. He added that both countries set up panels to talk about confidence building
processes like cooperation in the conservation, disaster relief, search and rescue operations,
navigations including environmental protection concerns.

In August 1995, China and the Philippines came up with an agreement after a month
of bilateral talks wherein a joint statement was released at the conclusion of both countries
bilateral talks (Marlay, 1997). The joint statement outlined the following principles:
resolution of the Spratly's conflict in a friendly manner, pursuance of confidence-building
measures without using force, and settlement of the conflict with reference to international
law (Phy, 2009). During the Estrada administration, the Philippines pursued confidence-
building measures through bilateral interactions with China (Phy, 2009). This was
emphasized in the official state visits of President Joseph Ejercito–Estrada in 2000 and
President Gloria Macapagal–Arroyo to China in 2001 (Baker, 2004).

Aside from this, the Philippines brought the Spratly’s conflict to the international
arena through the United Nations (UN), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and with its
partners in the ASEAN (Encomienda, 2011). However, China tried blocking the efforts of the
Philippines in the UN and ARF, yet the Philippines was able to gain support from the ASEAN
member countries (Baker, 2004). Such support was due to the released outlined principles
in the 1995 joint statement (Fravel, 2011). The status of the Philippines in the ASEAN allows
the Philippines to solicit support from its member countries.

4.0 Research Methodology

This study employed a descriptive-qualitative research design with data sourced

from online refereed journals. Other secondary data sources were also gathered. The
qualitative and critical analysis was focused on the Philippines and China, international laws,
military budget and expenditures, and on official statements of both countries which
transpired from their bilateral talks and during the UNCLOS Convention. This paper also
reviewed naval force capability of China and the Philippines on the Spratly islands.

Secondary textual data were retrieved and evaluated while vital information from the
UNCLOWS were also examined. In like manner, the strong relation of the Philippines in the
ASEAN was taken into account. It is evident that there are six country claimants over the
Spratly islands, but this paper only put emphasis on discussing the implications of the claims
with respect to China and the Philippines. The analysis revolve around historical and
territorial issues put forward by the two countries, the claim’s repercussion over bilateral
and diplomatic relations between the two countries and their allegiance to the UNCLOS.

5.0 Results and Discussions

Sovereignty and Maritime jurisdiction as bases of the claim on the Spratly islands

Considering the UNCLOS III definition, it becomes operationally contestable whether

maritime zones can be established in the Spratly islands. According to Article 21 of the 1982
UNCLOS Convention, an island is “a naturally-form area of land, surrounded by water, which
is above water at high tide”. In biological sense, an island has also to be capable of naturally
supporting life. On the contrary, UNCLOS stipulated that “rocks which cannot sustain human
habitation or economic life of their own shall have no exclusive economic zone (EEZ) or
continental shelf”. In this regard, features which are unable to support human life and any
artificial island shall be “entitled only to a 12-nautical-mile territorial sea as well as a 500-
meter safety zone” (Emmers, 2005). It should be noted that these terms which are
articulated in the 1982 Convention will qualify to be applied to most of the Spratly islands.
In effect, the features of the disputed Spratly islands do not conform for a legitimate basis of
maritime jurisdiction bringing to surface one limitation of the 1982 Convention.

Commercial vessels can

navigate freely in the South China
Sea which is very essential for
regional and international trade
(Emmers, 2005). In addition, it is
confirmed that the area has
explorable oil deposits with rich
fishing grounds (Catley and Keliat,
1997). Apparently, these are
important dimensional features of
the Spratly islands which are of
interest to the country claimants. If
in case China will succeed in realizing
its territorial claims, it can
essentially widen its maritime
boundaries some one thousand miles
from its mainland thereby extend
command to the maritime heart of
Southeast Asia for a strategic far-
reaching maritime jurisdiction. Source: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc.
Arriving this end is a situation where
all ASEAN countries are unlikely to Figure 1. Geographic map of the Spratly islands
welcome, especially for the
government of the Philippines.

In 1982, the United Nations convened the UNCLOS in response to growing concerns
by coastal states regarding encroachments by foreign vessels on their natural resources,
with the end view of clarifying the issue on international sea boundaries (Marlay, 1997) by
defining a set of norms and standards. The UNCLOS was created to prevent conflict among
states regarding their respective jurisdiction. The UNCLOS could then be an answer to the
issue between China and the Philippines with respect to the Spratly islands conflict. If this
law would be taken into consideration, the conflict should have been settled. However,
amidst the existence of this law, the conflict remained unresolved.

In response, a resolution has been reached declaring that a coastal country can claim
200 nautical miles of jurisdiction beyond its land boundaries (Marlay, 1997). By distance,
Palawan is about 163 nautical miles from the Spratlys, thereby within the 200 nautical miles
set by the UNCLOS. Following the maritime jurisdiction, the Philippines can have maritime
jurisdiction over the Spratly islands. However, UNCLOS failed to address the issue of how to
adjudicate on overlapping claims (Marlay, 1997) and so the future of the Spratly islands
remains obscure. Now it remains to be as to why and how come the UNCLOS was not able to
articulate specific provisions on the matter.
Economic and strategic interests of the claiming countries over the Spratly Islands

Meanwhile, China’s ascends to being the second largest world economic power after
the United States of America (USA) is seen to solicit ways on how it can sustain its expanding
population and economic growth such that gaining control over the Spratly islands is deem
crucial. China seems convince that economic and strategic benefits must go hand in hand in
its claim over the Spratly islands. The area is well noted for rich marine resources, good
fishing grounds (Emmers, 2005) and confirmed to have guano deposits. However, the most
valued treasures are the potentially good deposits of oil and gas which are seen to exist
around the Spratly islands (Marlay, 1997) and oil exploratory researches are underway. The
Chinese Department of Geology and Mineral Resources reported that there are about 17.7
billion tons of oil deposits in the Spratly Islands, a huge reserves far above than those in
Kuwait (Marlay, 1997). Notwithstanding as to how China was able to arrive at these
estimates, the information can arouse enormous interests among the country claimants for
highly valued economic features of the area. Certainly, these derivable economic benefits and
strategic location of the Spratly islands are among the important considerations and
common interests for China and the Philippines and all of the Spratly islands claimants.

Strategically, if one country party can manage to get exclusive control of the area, that
country can enjoy substantial or entire control of any economic development and trade
routes in the region. Japan for instance is strongly interested in preserving the open
navigation in the area as about 400 ships navigate the South China Sea daily (Marlay, 1997)
where many tankers from the middle east pass by the area enroute to Japan for oil trans-
shipment. Townsend-Gault (1998) also reported that about a quarter of the global trade
shipment passes through the South China Sea. Indeed the strategic location of the Spratly
islands ever draws attention by the globalized world, most especially among their country
claimants. In another point of view, military dominance over the Spratly islands also offers
strategic advantages in case of war against any nation in the region.

China’s Huge Military Power and the Philippines Small Military Force

The Philippines evidently cannot be at par with China in terms of military capability.
Its military force is way small than that of China whose military forces are the largest in the
world. Added to this capability, China officially announced in 2012 and showed the entire
world its acquisition of the first Chinese aircraft carrier (named Liaoning). This even more
put the Philippines way behind from China in view of military build up. Marlay (1997)
quoted a Philippine Official who said that the Philippines is powerless to force China out from
the Spratly islands as the country cannot even participate in regional air exercise due to its
only single interceptor squadron consisting of seven outdated F-5 fighter planes.

While upgrading and modernizing its naval capabilities, China continues to display its
expanding military build-up and regularly conduct patrols and training exercises in the
South China Sea. It wants to show its capability to defend its claimed islands thereby deter
other claimants from challenging its strong hold over the disputed islands. This
assertiveness over the Spratly islands always lead to creating tensions and threatens the
security in the region. Yet China ever assures the world that its claims over the Spratly
islands is a peaceful one, and it does not aim to be a hegemonic power.

Bilateral Negotiations Between China and the Philippines through the UNCLOS

China and the Philippines somehow have reached agreement upon signing a
ratification of agreement in the UNCLOS in August 1995 (Marlay, 1997). As a result, the two
countries were supposed be clarified with set of norms, principles, and rules regarding
oceanic boundaries. Both countries could have determined their respective entitlement to
the living and non-living resources in the South China sea (Marlay, 1997) and the UNCLOS is
supposed to serve as a guide in settling boundary disputes, which is very much relevant to
the Spratly’s conflict.

However, UNCLOS involvement in the conflict has been limited since there were
differing arguments between China and the Philippines relative to their claims over the
Spratly islands (Phy, 2009). The two countries came out with different interpretations of the
UNCLOS, plus the impreciseness due to vague wordings of the Convention (Fravel, 2011).
This resulted to the freezing of enactment of the Convention thereby preventing the UNCLOS
to serve as a guide with respect to the behaviour of both countries. It was evident since the
beginning of the Convention that China and the Philippines were unwillingness to change
their claims, nor to adhere to the norms, principles, and rules stipulated the UNCLOS. In spite
of the large scope of the convention, coupled with its contribution in successfully resolving
oceanic disputes, the concepts in the UNCLOS are still not able to resolve the Spratly Islands
issue especially between the China and the Philippines.

This was complicated by the unwillingness of the Philippines and China to change
their positions on the issue, amidst the existence of the Convention, as presented in their
respective declarations. Operationally, China has been unwilling to subscribe for multilateral
negotiations with other claimants and prefers only to bend for bilateral negotiations with its
weaker and smaller rival country over the Spratly islands like the Philippines.

5.0 Conclusion and Recommendations

The case of Spratly islands conflict indeed manifest the arguments of political realism
where each country upholds its claim being pushed by primary motivations to hold onto
power over the South China Sea. China, with its need for a strategic strong hold in the area,
is poised to exhaust every available diplomatic approach to keep its best interests over the
Spratly islands. Indeed, this is concrete illustration of the political realism in international
relations not only for China and the Philippines but also to all of the claimant countries over
the Spratly islands dispute.

Meanwhile keeping strong relationship with the ASEAN offers the Philippines to gain
favour from member counties as a push factor in holding to its claims over the Spratly’s. The
Spratly islands conflict will remain as long as China and the Philippines and the other four
country claimants continue their stance over the disputed islands. Between China and the
Philippines, unless one or both countries find windows of common grounds for settling the
case, the conflict is likely to continue without any resolve.

The resolution of the Spratly islands conflict may be reached through diplomatic
process, but seems far from reality as of the moment. The only positive way to arrive at
certain mutually beneficial agreement could be through open dialogue between the two
claimant countries. Nonetheless, continued peaceful and bilateral negotiations between
China and the Philippines offer possible ways for resolving the conflict. This could ease the
tension as China is more resolve to bilateral negotiations than the multinational process
involving all the Spratly islands claimants. Another way is for the Philippines and China to
subscribe to a diversion process. In other words, the two countries need to consider pursuing
their diplomatic ties through mutual cooperation and initiative in connection with the
Spratly islands aimed at stabilizing the bilateral relationship of both countries.

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