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access to Contemporary Southeast Asia
M. TAYLOR FRAVEL
This article examines China's behaviour in the South China Sea disputes
through the lens of its strategy for managing its claims. Since the
mid-1990s, China has pursued a strategy of delaying the resolution of
the dispute. The goal of this strategy is to consolidate China's claims,
especially to maritime rights or jurisdiction over these waters, and to
deter other states from strengthening their own claims at China's expense,
including resource development projects that exclude China. Since the
mid-2000s, the pace of China's efforts to consolidate its claims and deter
others has increased through diplomatic, administrative and military
means. Although China's strategy seeks to consolidate its own claims, it
threatens weaker states in the dispute and is inherently destabilizing. As
a result, the delaying strategy includes efforts to prevent the escalation
of tensions while nevertheless seeking to consolidate China's claims.
Keywords: China, Spratly Islands, South China Sea, territorial disputes, str
292
Figure 1
Claims to the South China Sea Islands in the People's Daily
(1970-2010)
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Fishing
To exercise its maritime rights, China in the last decade has
strengthened its ability to supervise fishing within the waters that
it claims. The principal actor tasked with this mission is the South
Sea Region Fisheries Administration Bureau (SSRFAB, nanhaiqu
yuzhengju ), which is part of the Bureau of Fisheries Administration
within the Ministry of Agriculture. The fisheries administration
Hydrocarbon Exploration
A similar dynamic to as
waters where China clai
activities of oil compani
of offshore oil and na
few threats from China
2006 and 2008. In the first half of 2011, China interfered with
seismic surveys conducted by Vietnam and the Philippines within
their claimed EEZs. In this series of confrontations, the principal
state actor has been the Marine Surveillance Force (MSF, haijian
budui) under the State Oceanographic Administration. Similar to the
fisheries administration, one mission of the MSF is to "safeguard
maritime rights and interests" in addition to enforcing Chinese laws
regarding maritime affairs.45 The South China Sea branch of the MSF
was established in 1999 with responsibility for the waters adjacent
to Macau, Hong Kong, Guangdong, Hainan and the disputed islands,
and it now has thirteen ships. According to the State Oceanographic
Administration, the MSF started regular (dingqi) law enforcement
cruises to "protect rights" in 2006. 46 In April 2010, for example,
MSF vessels conducted a cruise in the southern portion of the South
China Sea, dropping a sovereignty marker on James Shoal.47
The scope and frequency of MSF patrols in the South China Sea
are not available in open sources. In the first half of 2011, however,
MSF ships were involved in two separate incidents in which they
challenged and disrupted seismic survey activities by Vietnam and
the Philippines. A third incident involved Chinese fishing boats and
SSRFAB vessels. The first incident occurred in March, when two
MSF vessels "expelled" ( ganqu ) the Veritas Voyager , a vessel which
was conducting a seismic survey for Forum Energy in a Philippine
exploration block near Reed Bank in the northwestern portion of the
Spratly Islands. According to Philippine reports, the MSF vessels
aggressively manoeuvred around the ship and forced it to leave the
area.48 The second incident occurred in late May, when an MSF
ship cut across the stern of the seismic survey vessel Binh Minh 2
owned by PetroVietnam and severed its towed cable. According
to Vietnamese sources, three MSF vessels had been shadowing the
Birth Minh 2 , which was operating 120 nautical miles off the coast
of central Vietnam.49 A third related incident occurred in early
June, but accounts differ. According to Vietnam, a Chinese fishing
boat with a "specialized cable-slashing device" became ensnared
in the towed cables of the Viking II, a Norwegian ship that was
The first way in which China's military forces have been used to
consolidate China's claim is the strengthening of the PLAN'S Sout
Sea Fleet (SSF), which includes the South China Sea in its area
of operations. Although the equipment in the SSF was inferior to
both the North Sea Fleet and the East Sea Fleet for many decades,
the SSF now boasts some of the PLAN'S most capable surface
combatants, including five of the seven modern destroyers that
China has developed indigenously in the last ten years.54 The SSF
is also home to the Kunlunshan , China's first modern amphibious
landing platform dock (LPD) displacing 20,000 tons and capable of
transporting one battalion of marines.55 All six ships have participated
in at least one escort mission in the Gulf of Aden since 2008 (in
addition to modern Jiangkai II class frigates from the SSF). Reflecting
its relative capabilities within the PLAN, the SSF has organized half
of the more than ten flotillas to the Gulf of Aden.
In addition to receiving some of the PLAN'S most modern vessels,
the SSF's infrastructure has also been upgraded. Most noteworthy
has been the expansion of the Yulin naval base at Sanya on Hainan
Island. Although the base was expanded to accommodate the ne
Jin class SSBNs developed at the end of the last decade, it also
includes new docks for surface combatants, most of which are
based at the SSF's headquarters at Zhanjiang in Guangzhou. For
many observers in the region, enlargement of the base symbolized
the expansion of China's naval forces and its focus on projecting
naval power throughout the South China Sea.56 The main reason for
the expansion of the Yulin naval base, however, was to strengthen
China's nuclear deterrent (by serving as a base for SSBNs) and to
house its expanding submarine fleet (which would play a crucial
role in a Taiwan conflict). Nevertheless, given its location on Hainan
Island, China's southernmost province, it also reflected the new
capabilities that China could bring to bear in the South China Sea
disputes and cast a long shadow over the region.
NOTES
28 Greg Torode, "Oil giant is warned over Vietnam deal; Beijing asserts S Ch
Sea claims", South China Morning Post, 20 July 2009.
29 Ramsey al-Rikabi, "China warned firms off South China Sea exploration:
Wikileaks", International Oil Daily 10, no. 176 (7 September 2011).
30 Ibid.
52 Ben Bland and Kathrin Hille, "Vietnam and China oil clashes intensify",
Financial Times, 27 May 2011. A report from Vietnam, however, suggested that
such incidents had not occurred in the past. See "Russian captain condemns
cable destruction", VietnamNet, 2 June 2011.
53 "Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Jiang Yu's Regular Press Conference on
May 31, 2011", Ministry of Foreign Affairs (China), 1 June 2011, <http://www.
fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/2511/t827089.htm>.
54 These include the only Luhai class destroyer (which entered service in 1997)
and all four Luyang I and II class destroyers (which entered service between
2002 and 2003).
56 Richard D. Fisher, "Secret Sanya: China's new nuclear naval base revealed",
fane's Intelligence Review, April 2008.
57 "Tehun biandui lijian nanZhongguhai [Task force sharpens its sword in the
South China Sea]", Renmin Haijun, 17 May 2006.
58 Wei Gang, Li Yanlin and Wu Chao, "Haijun jianting biandui shouci huan
nanZhongguohai yuanhang xunlian [Naval task force circumnavigates the South
China Sea for the first time and conducts long-distance training]", Renmin
Haijun, 2 December 2008.
59 International Institute for Strategic Studies, "Chinese navy's new strategy in
action", Strategic Comments 16 (May 2010); Greg Torode, "Exercises show PLA
Navy's strength", South China Morning Post, 18 April 2010.
60 Quoted in "Chinese navy's new strategy in action", op. cit.
61 Zhong Jijun, "Zhuoyan shengcheng tixi zuozhan nengli, jiji tuijin junshi
xunlian zhuanbian [Grasp generating systems operations, actively promote the
transformation in military training]", Jiefangjun Bao, 29 July 2010.
62 Deng Ping and Liu Fengan, "Nanhai jiandui zuzhi 'jiaolong-2010' shibing shidan
yanxi [South Sea Fleet organizies 'Jiac,long-2010' live fire exercise]", Jiefangjun
Bao, 4 November 2010.