EXECUTIVE POLICY BRIEF

Missile Proliferation in the Indo-Pacific:

Opportunities and Challenges for Philippine Deterrence
Erick Nielson Javier

23 March 2023
Issue Number 2023-01
EPB ISSN 2945-4689
INTRODUCTION
One of the notable trends in the Indo-
Pacific is the intensifying rush in the
procurement of various types of long-range
missiles, that is, land-or-sea based
surface-to-surface missiles with range
greater than 100km1, as part of the general
increase in armaments in the region
observed since the early 2010s2. Some
scholars regarded such a trend as a
manifestation of an arms race dynamics in
the region, while others disputed such a
claim, at least among the Southeast Asian
states.
There is a noted tendency among
observers to express alarm3 over these
developments and hypothesize their
implications on the likelihood of conflict.
This paper seeks to delve deeper into the
underlying rationales, driving forces, and
strategic implications of these weapons
systems. If it is to be sound and effective,
informed policy needs to be based on a
grounded analysis of these rationales.
This Executive Policy Brief (EPB) aims to
answer the following questions: 1) What
are the relevant drivers of development
and procurement of long-range missile
systems? 2) What are the impacts of such
weapons for the deterrence requirements
of small states like the Philippines?
This paper is divided into the following
sections: first, an overview of the state of
missile procurement in the Indo-Pacific,
both in Southeast Asia and relevant
powers in the region; second, a brief
discussion on the value of such weapons
for and relevance to for deterrence in
general; and third, some recommendations
for the Philippines, specifically for the
Department of National Defense (DND)
and the broader defense sector including
the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP).
MISSILE PROCUREMENT IN AN AGE OF
GREAT POWER COMPETITION
Increased stockpiling of long-range
missiles has been observed in several
countries in the Indo-Pacific region over the
past decades. The People’s Republic of
China leads the way in this regard, having
been observed to have been steadily
building up a sophisticated arsenal of
ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges
measuring in thousands of kilometers, as
seen in Figure 1 (see page 7).
The United States and several states in the
Indo-Pacific region have also been building
up their missile capabilities. Japan4 and
Australia5 have begun build-ups or
developments of various high-technology
anti-ship and land-attack missiles, with the
former planning up to ten new types of land-
attack/anti-ship missiles to be launched from
a mix of land, sea, and even air platforms.
India and the Republic of Korea already
have a growing arsenal of indigenous and
foreign-design anti-ship and land-attack
missiles, with both countries are beginning to
export their designs abroad. Taiwan as well
has been developing its own long-range
missile capabilities.6
In Southeast Asia, there is a more nuanced
but nonetheless noteworthy increase in the
number and sophistication of missile
arsenals among certain states. Figure 2
(see page 7) shows a simplified chart that
lists down the relevant missile capabilities
in the region. Currently, eight of the ten
ASEAN member states have, or will soon
have, long-range surface-to-surface
missiles; the majority are anti-ship missiles
designed for combatting hostile ships,
which is unsurprising as most ASEAN
states except for Laos have significant
coastlines and maritime spaces to defend,
though some of these types are also
“universal” weapons capable of engaging
land as well as sea targets.
EPB Issue Number 2023-02 | 1
THE IMPORTANCE OF MISSILE TRENDS can reach Guam. Their avowed purpose is
“defensive,” in the sense that China seeks to
ward off US “intervention” against them via
Long-range missile capabilities are just one
the US Navy’s carrier battlegroups and
element of a comprehensive military
amphibious forces. These ballistic missiles,
modernization, but they attract attention and
along with other, more numerous weapons
interest for several reasons.
such as long-range anti-ship and land-attack
cruise missiles, can also allow remote raids
The ability to allow strikes from hundreds of
against other countries, particularly those
kilometers is desirable from a military
allied with the US, that are geographically
perspective, as stand-off range provides
within reach of these missiles, giving China
relative safety to shooters compared to the
a powerful regional offensive tool with which
prospect of having to close into gunfire or
to coerce its neighbors and other countries
bombing range and incur greater risks of
as far afield as Australia.
destruction. The farther one can hold
enemies at risk, the more potential
In turn, US allies and other states threatened
adversaries must tread carefully when
by expanding Chinese military power have
attempting to invade or otherwise conduct
little recourse but to expand their own missile
incursions.
capabilities. The US itself has had to play
catch-up in this regard – the kinds of
Increased precision is made possible with
intermediate-range conventional missiles
advances in seeker and communications
suitable for an Indo-Pacific contingency
technology, which in turn has led to greater
were prohibited to both the US and Russia
effectiveness of conventional (i.e., non-
because of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear
nuclear or other Weapons of Mass
Forces (INF) Treaty. Said treaty has since
Destruction, WMD) missiles in terms of their
been rendered defunct in 2019, reportedly
ability to hit distant targets accurately. This is
due to Russian violations of the treaty, as
coupled with advances in materials and
well as increasing US concern over Chinese
propulsion technologies to create new types
intermediate-range weapons. In the case of
of long-range missiles, such as hypersonic
South Korea and Japan, the threat from
cruise and boost-glide missile or “post-
nuclear-armed North Korea has provided an
ballistic”7 technologies that have a better
added incentive to develop long-range
probability of penetrating current missile
missile capabilities, with South Korea having
defenses both at land and at sea. Such
articulated a retaliation and punishment
capabilities, however, mean that target
strategy hinged on precision conventional
states are now more vulnerable to attacks
weapons to deter North Korean nuclear
from such missiles.
attacks.9 The development of sovereign
missile capabilities also aims to serve as
As noted above, China is undergoing a
hedges against American withdrawal or
large-scale modernization and expansion of
abandonment, as the reliability of US
its substantive long-range missile arsenal as
security guarantees sometimes comes into
part of its overall military modernization. Its
question because of perceptions that the US
expansive missile arsenal has been
may not come to their aid due to Chinese or
hypothesized to support several objectives,
North Korean nuclear threats.
particularly establishing an “anti-
access/area denial” (A2/AD) strategy to
The rationales for Southeast Asian
deter US intervention, which explains the
procurement are partly affected by
development of “carrier-killers”8 like the well-
perceptions of the threat from China,
known DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile, as
particularly from those states most affected
well as intermediate-range and hypersonic
by Chinese actions and aggression in the
weapons such as the DF-26 and DF-17 that

EPB Issue Number 2023-02 | 2

South China Sea such as Viet Nam,
Indonesia, and the Philippines. As Figure 2
notes, these three countries have procured
long-range supersonic cruise missiles, with
the Philippines notably being India’s first
overseas customer for the well-known
BrahMos missile. But at the same time, it
has been observed that these
procurements have not been accompanied
by massive increases in defense spending.
The Southeast Asian procurements may
well be simply the states conducting
prudent modernizations of their forces,
both for prestige reasons as well as a
recapitalization of old assets and shrinking
forces.10 In the case of the Philippines,
spending in 2022 shrank compared to the
last recorded high in 2018.11 In fact, it is
well known that the Philippines has
traditionally underspent in defense relative
to its neighbors and that the AFP
Modernization Program continues to face
challenges in its implementation.12 Indeed,
the increasing number of incursions from
Chinese military and paramilitary forces,
even despite the ongoing COVID-19
pandemic and repeated shows of good
faith from the previous Duterte
administration and the current Marcos Jr
administration, show that the “cost of
access” for China to enter the Philippine
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), and even
possibly its territorial waters, is very cheap,
which in turn increases the need for
weapons like the BrahMos. Figure 3 (see
page 8) shows a possible deployment
pattern for BrahMos in the Philippines,
which covers much of the West Philippine
Sea EEZ. Such weapons give the
Philippines decent reach to respond to
threats in the EEZ, especially when cued-
in with a robust working intelligence-
surveillance-reconnaissance (ISR) and
command and control (C2) network.
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
The trend of missile proliferation is unlikely
to abate because of the abovementioned
military-technical and geostrategic drivers.
The missile threat from the PRC is a fact of
life at this point, further brought to attention
when China began stationing anti-ship
missiles in the reclaimed features back in
2017.13
Build-up of missile arsenals is also attractive
to countries that wish to economize their
armed forces in the long-term. Some of the
largest portions of annual military
expenditure are in personnel expenses; the
Philippines currently spends 57.7% of its
240.7 billion PhP FY2023 defense budget on
personnel.14 Such expenditure, while
understandable due to the country’s focus
on domestic concerns and internal security,
does not translate to deterrent power against
external threats; wars such as the 1991 and
2003 Gulf Wars have shown the folly of low-
technology, high manpower armed forces
when faced against sophisticated
adversaries. Other countries in the region,
such as China and Japan, will rely on
missiles to compensate for demographic
concerns that further disincentivize reliance
on masses of manpower and traditional
platforms.15
Advocating for restraint and confidence
building measures as part of foreign
policy is an option to try and manage the
proliferation of advanced land-attack
missiles.16 In an ideal world, ASEAN and its
platforms would be a good starting point.
Recent events such as the war in Ukraine
and increasing geopolitical tensions,
however, preclude an idealistic overreliance
on such measures; small countries that
choose not to arm themselves especially
while still embroiled in various sovereignty
and territorial disputes run risks of self-
deterrence and ultimately defeat. Further,
ASEAN’s platforms have historically shied
away from hard-power security concerns.
The DND and AFP must prepare for a
regional security environment with a greater
proliferation of strike weapons such as
missiles and loitering drones. The following
EPB Issue Number 2023-02 | 3
considerations may help in ensuring defense
and security under such conditions:
Building up AFP’s own stock of long-
range anti-ship and land-attack weapons.
A potential adversary that can conduct
offensive actions with zero risk to their forces
and operating bases is an adversary that will
be easily incentivized to use military
coercion. An independent retaliatory
capability should be considered, as such will
improve the Philippines’ ability to increase
risk to aggressors. The BrahMos
procurement should be expanded beyond
the initial plans for the Philippine Marine
Corps and Philippine Army batteries and
supplemented with weapons of similar, if not
greater range.
As the Philippines builds up its arsenal, it
would be prudent as well for it to invest in
strategic communications to assure allies,
partners and other states that this build-up is
indeed defensive. Such strategic
communications would also be needed to
assure domestic audiences that the build-up
is consistent with the 1987 Constitution. It
should be noted that Article II Section 2 of
the Constitution does not prohibit the
procurement of anti-ship or even land-attack
missiles. Rather, it expressly “renounces
war as an instrument of national policy”, in
essence rejecting the idea of first strike. A
second-strike posture and the requisite
capability to conduct such retaliation should
be permissible under the Constitution.
Investing in air and missile defense. In
addition to, or in lieu of, building an arsenal
of long-range weapons of its own, the
Philippines may consider investing in missile
defense systems. They are less likely to
immediately draw scrutiny and ire from
aggressors and neighbors alike because of
their inherent defensive nature. The
Philippines has procured SPYDER-MR air
defense systems from Israel, with the first
two out of three batteries delivered in 2022
and the last battery to be delivered in 2023.
Relying on a purely defensive strategy of
attempting to intercept enemy attack comes
with certain pitfalls that defense planners
should consider. During the Cold War,
technology for missile defense was often
considered ruinously expensive relative to
the cost of simply purchasing more offensive
missiles or warheads, in what is called the
“cost-exchange ratio.”17 While technologies
have advanced since then, the experience of
Ukraine indicates that a modern defensive
campaign can still cost more than the attack
that it seeks to stop,18 because of the cost of
defensive munitions and sophisticated
sensors and command and control, as well
as the need to cast as wide a protective
network as possible and regenerate forces
in the face of losses.
Inviting US missile and/or missile
defense forces. As any investment in
Philippine missile and/or missile defense
forces will inevitably prove expensive, an
alternative would be to invite the Philippines’
treaty ally, the United States, to rotate anti-
ship missile and missile defense batteries in
the Philippines. The US has a number of
land-based land-attack and anti-ship missile
systems, from the Guided Multiple Launch
Rocket System (GMLRS) fired from the
famous HIMARS artillery in Ukraine, to the
Naval Strike Missile (NSM) and the Long-
Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW), that, if
based in the Philippines, could provide the
necessary deterrence and combat capability
against Chinese threats both from the
reclaimed features and the Chinese
mainland. Alternatively, high-performance
missile defenses such as the famed Patriot
Air Defense System, which has been
brought to the Philippines for Balikatan 37-
2022 exercises,19 and the Theatre High
Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) could be
invited to provide critical air defense
capabilities to supplement those of the AFP.
While this would provide an immediate
solution for Philippine A2/AD and missile
defense concerns at little fiscal cost to the
Philippine Government, such options come
EPB Issue Number 2023-02 | 4
with significant political and strategic risks.
First is the obvious lack of sovereign control
over such capabilities, which does not bode
well for an independent defense. The
temporary and rotational nature of any US
presence in the Philippines as mandated by
the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) and the
Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement
(EDCA) means that there will be gaps when
said forces are rotated out. The presence of
such strategic US units also invites
unintended entanglements, as China will
inevitably see them as threats to its designs
on Taiwan; this is a major reason why such
deployments are politically contentious in
not only the Philippines but also other
American allies such as Japan, South Korea,
and Australia.20 Incidentally, these other
countries have chosen to invest in sovereign
missile strike capabilities in addition to
strengthening their alliances; it could be
taken that said investment is intended to
provide deterrents without the
political/strategic baggage of US
intermediate-range weapons.
Even hosting defensive missiles may not be
exempted from great power dynamics, as
seen in the 2017 diplomatic row between
China and South Korea over the latter
country’s hosting of US THAAD units to
counter North Korean threats.21
Increase resilience of Philippine defense
and critical infrastructure with passive
defenses. The ability of Philippine military
and civil installations to survive large-scale
precision strikes launched via land-attack
missiles, such as those seen in the ongoing
war in Ukraine, is questionable. Such a lack
of resilience weakens the credibility of
Philippine defense, increases the burden on
limited air defense assets, and tempts
potential adversaries to strike a knockout
blow in the event of a conflict, as well as
inflict suffering upon the civilian population to
exert unwanted political pressures on the
Philippine Government to capitulate to
aggressors’ demands.
Reducing the chances of a knockout blow
can be done through a variety of passive
measures such as structure hardening,
redundancy via additional bases and
operating locations, camouflage and
concealment, among other means. Apart
from self-funding, the Philippines can
harness cooperation with its allies and
partners; the expansion of EDCA on 02
February 2022 with an additional four (4)
Agreed Locations22 provides an
opportunity to improve these operating
locations in terms of not only their basic
infrastructure but also these locations’
resiliency and usability in the aftermath of
an enemy attack. This is an area where
both countries will benefit; the US itself has
similar concerns in increasing the
resilience of its infrastructure and forces
against large-scale missile attacks.23
CONCLUSION
Since the Cold War, long-range land-attack
and anti-ship guided missiles are known
commodities in modern warfare, with their
effectiveness demonstrated in multiple
conflicts from the Arab-Israeli wars of the
1960s, to the First Persian Gulf War of 1991,
up to the present war in Ukraine. This latter
war drew renewed attention to the
importance of long-range precision weapons
to mount campaigns of coercion or to
counter aggressors’ advances, as well as
the difficulty of defending against them. As
technology advances, the relevance of such
weapons – and by extension, their
desirability to militaries – will only increase.
As the Philippines pursues its
military modernization, it must be fully
cognizant of the challenges and
opportunities that the spread of this
technology poses. Indeed, to fully realize
an independent foreign policy, the country
must be capable of holding potential
aggressors at arm’s length, ideally at
several hundred kilometers, before they
can cause damage and loss of life.
EPB Issue Number 2023-02 | 5
Endnotes
1
Dimitri Stefanovich, “Missile Trends in Southeast
Asia,” New Defense Order: Strategy, Issue No.1, Vol
72, p.71, 2022; Mr Stefanovich describes land and
sea-based long-range missile systems as those that
exceed a range of 100km. Such weapons are
believed to “have the greatest impact in the balance
of power.”
2
Brijesh Khemlani, “Southeast Asia’s Arms Race,”
Royal United Services Institute, 13 January 2011,
https://rusi.org/explore-our-
research/publications/commentary/southeast-asias-
arms-race
3
Reuters, “Factbox: an intensifying arms race in
Asia,” 21 September 2021,
https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-
defense/an-intensifying-arms-race-asia-2021-09-21/
4
The Yomiuri Shimbun, “Development of 10 long-
range missiles being mulled,” The Japan News, 01
December 2022,
https://japannews.yomiuri.co.jp/politics/defense-
security/20221201-74256/
5
Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Australia –
Long Range Anti-Ship Missiles,” 07 February 2020,
https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-
sales/australia-long-range-anti-ship-missiles-lrasms
6
For an introduction to Taiwan’s missile capabilities,
see “Missiles of Taiwan,” Missiles of the World,
Center for Strategic and International Studies, 10
August 2021,
https://missilethreat.csis.org/country/taiwan/
7
Luo Xi, “A Looming Strategic Arms Race in the
Asia-Pacific Region: From a Chinese Perspective,”
Asia-Pacific Leadership Network, December 2020,
p.9-10, https://cms.apln.network/wp-
content/uploads/2021/10/Luo-Xi_Strategic-Arms-
Race_APLN-Special-Report.pdf
8
Otto Kreisher, “China’s Carrier Killer: Threat and
Theatrics,” US Air Force Magazine, December 2013,
p.44-47
9
Ian Bowers and Henrik Stalhane Hiim,
"Conventional Counterforce Dilemmas: South Korea's
Deterrence Strategy and Stability on the Korean
Peninsula," International Security Vol 45 Issue 3, p.7-
39, 2021, doi:10.1162/isec_a_00399.
10
Koh Swee Lean Collin, “Commentary: Is there an
arms race among navies in Southeast Asia?”
Channel News Asia Commentaries, 06 May 2017,
https://www.channelnewsasia.com/commentary/com
mentary-there-arms-race-among-navies-southeast-
asia-1014181
11
James Guild, “Is There an Arms Race in Southeast
Asia?” The Diplomat, 08 February 2022,
https://thediplomat.com/2022/02/is-there-an-arms-
race-underway-in-southeast-asia/
12
Frances Mangosing, “Military modernization stalled
again,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, 12 August 2022,
https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1645329/military-
modernization-program-stalled-again
13
Amanda Macias, "China quietly installed defensive
missile systems on strategic Spratlys Islands in hotly
contested South China Sea," CNBC, 02 May 2018,
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/05/02/china-added-
missile-systems-on-spratly-islands-in-south-china-
sea.html
14
Congressional Policy and Budget Research
Center, Agency Budget Notes for the Department of
National Defense, 13 September 2022, p.3,
https://cpbrd.congress.gov.ph/images/PDF%20Attach
ments/ABN/ABN2022-22_DND_FY_2023.pdf
15
Thomas X Hammes, “Rising Dominance of the
Tactical Defense,” Future of War Conference,
Amsterdam, the Netherlands, 07 October 2022
16
Sitakanta Mishra, “The Geopolitics of Missile,
Missile Defense and Control Regime in the Indo-
Pacific,” presented at the 18th Heneral Luna
Colloquium on Missile Proliferation in the Indo-
Pacific:Trends and Issues, 03 November 2022 held
via Zoom.
17
Alwyn Young, “Ballistic Missile Defense,
Capabilities and Constraints,” The Fletcher Forum,
Vol 8, No. 1, p.147 Winter 1984.
18
Daniel Boffey, “Financial toll of Ukraine downing
drones ‘vastly exceeds Russian costs,’” The
Guardian, 19 October 2022,
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/oct/19/finan
cial-toll-ukraine-downing-drones-vastly-exceeds-
russia-costs
19
Frances Mangosing, “A first for Balikatan, US
Patriot Missiles in PH,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, 02
April 2022, https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1577746/a-
first-for-balikatan-us-patriot-missiles-in-ph
20
Ken Moriyasu, “US faces uphill battle to place
ground-based missiles in Asia,” Nikkei Asian Review,
01 June 2022,
https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-
relations/Indo-Pacific/U.S.-faces-uphill-battle-to-
place-ground-based-missiles-in-Asia
21
“THAAD Missile System,” Reuters, 02 May 2017,
http://fingfx.thomsonreuters.com/gfx/rngs/SOUTHKO
REA-THAAD/0100403L07J/index.html
22
Department of National Defense, “PH-US bond
strengthened further with Galvez-Austin meet,” 02
February 2023,
https://www.dnd.gov.ph/Postings/Post/PH-
US%20bond%20strengthened%20further%20with%2
0Galvez-Austin%20meet/
23
Stacie L Pettyjohn, “Spiking the Problem:
Developing a Resilient Posture in the Indo-Pacific
with Passive Defenses,” War on the Rocks, 10
January 2022,
https://warontherocks.com/2022/01/spiking-the-
problem-developing-a-resilient-posture-in-the-indo-
pacific-with-passive-defenses/
EPB Issue Number 2023-02 | 6
 Figure 1
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) 2021 infographic illustrating the ranges
of PRC missiles in the region.24

Figure 2
Listing of Southeast Asian Missile Suppliers and Operators
Source: Stefanovich 202225

EPB Issue Number 2023-02 | 7

 Figure 3
Map showing possible coverage from selected sites using BrahMos missiles
Source: Zach Abdi @ThrustWR 202226

24
CSIS, “Missiles of China,” Missiles of the World, 12 April 2021, accessed at
https://missilethreat.csis.org/country/china/
25
Stefanovich, “Missile Trends in Southeast Asia”, p.75
26
Zach Abdi, Zach@ThrustWR, twitter.com, 13 February 2022, accessed at
https://twitter.com/ThrustWR/status/1492656151401578497

EPB Issue Number 2023-02 | 8

NDCP Executive Policy Brief
The Executive Policy Brief (EPB) is a publication series on national defense and security
issues by the Research and Special Studies Division (RSSD) of the National Defense
College of the Philippines (NDCP). The views expressed in this policy brief are those of
the author alone and do not necessarily reflect the views of the NDCP. The readers are
free to reproduce copies mechanically, or to quote any part provided proper citations are
made.

Copyright © National Defense College of the Philippines (NDCP) 2023. All rights reserved.

Author
Mr Erick Nielson Javier is a Defense Research Officer II at the Research and Special
Studies Division (RSSD) of the National Defense College of the Philippines (NDCP). His
research interests include geopolitics, geoeconomics, great power competition, revolutions
in military affairs, and the future of warfare. His work experience includes strategic studies
research on defense economics, scenario building, and military wargaming. He may be
reached through email at ericknielson.javier@ndcp.edu.ph.

NDCP Editorial Board

LtGen Ferdinand M Cartujano PAF (Ret)
President

Capt Aldrin C Cuña PN (Res), MNSA

Executive Vice President

Mr Manmar C Francisco
Acting Chief, Research and Special Studies Division

Ms Arielle Ann Nicole Lopez

Senior Defense Research Officer

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