Process Safety and Environmental Protection 134 (2020) 95–107

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Process Safety and Environmental Protection

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/psep

A risk-based approach to determination of optimal inspection

intervals for buried oil pipelines
Rustam Abubakirov a , Ming Yang a,b,∗ , Nima Khakzad c
a
Safety and Risk Engineering Group (SREG), Department of Chemical and Materials Engineering, School of Engineering, Nazarbayev University, 53
Kabanbay Batyr, Astana, 010000, Kazakhstan
b
The Environment and Resource Efficiency Cluster (EREC), Nazarbayev University, 53 Kabanbay Batyr, Astana, 010000, Kazakhstan
c
School of Occupational and Public Health, Ryerson University, Canada

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: Corrosion is a significant concern causing tremendous losses to all pipeline operators. To combat this
Received 5 August 2019 operational issue, new methods and tools are needed to analyze and model degradation, to predict fail-
Received in revised form ure, and finally to develop strategies for prevention, control, and mitigation of corrosion in pipelines. A
21 November 2019
practical inspection and maintenance program is crucial to prevent pipeline failures due to corrosion.
Accepted 26 November 2019
Risk-based inspection (RBI) is an increasingly popular and trusted method to assess and develop inspec-
Available online 29 November 2019
tion plans. However, the determination of optimal inspection intervals is still challenging in RBI. The
present study aims to develop a dynamic Bayesian network (DBN)-based approach for optimization of
Keywords:
Pipeline
inspection intervals. Based on inline inspection data and analytical corrosion propagation models, DBN is
Corrosion applied for the estimation of both the internal and external corrosion damage as well as the probability
Inspection planning of failure (PoF). The cost of failure (CoF) is estimated based on typical cost categories relevant to pipeline
Risk-based methodology accidents. Risk is calculated as the product of PoF and CoF. A utility function to combine both the risk
and the annual cost of the inspection program is also developed. The optimal interval can be found based
on the curve of the utility function. The proposed approach is demonstrated through a real-world case
study on an operating pipeline.
© 2019 Institution of Chemical Engineers. Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction
Corrosion in crude oil pipelines causes tremendous losses in the
petroleum industry. FHWA (2002) reports that in the U.S. alone,
the annual direct cost of corrosion mitigation measures in oil and
gas production is determined to be $1.4 billion, with $0.6 billion
attributed to piping and its related installations. Corrosion is not
the only possible mode for pipeline failure; however, its share in
the total number of pipeline failures is significant, which accounts
for about 36 % (Liu et al., 2018; Seo et al., 2015). It is crucial to
develop a practical inspection and maintenance program to pre-
vent the pipeline failures caused by corrosion. How to determine
an optimal inspection and maintenance (IM) interval is a critical
problem in establishing the inspection and maintenance program.
This is a challenging task; because it requires the operator to min-
∗ Corresponding author at: Safety and Risk Engineering Group (SREG), Depart-
ment of Chemical and Materials Engineering, School of Engineering, Nazarbayev
University, 53 Kabanbay Batyr, Astana, 010000, Kazakhstan.
E-mail address: ming.yang@nu.edu.kz (M. Yang).
imize the cost and the operational risk at the same time (Hameed
et al., 2016).
There are two general categories of approaches for IM planning
in the petrochemical industry: (a) the risk/reliability-based fitness-
for-service (FFS) and (b) risk-based inspection (RBI) (Bai and Bai,
2014). The RBI provides a general framework for risk assessment
and helps to establish the linkage between damage mechanisms
and associated failure modes. It also helps to estimate the resultant
probability of failure (PoF) and the consequence of failure (CoF),
and, by that means, to evaluate the operational risk, which is a prod-
uct of these two parameters (API RP 580, 2016; API RP 581, 2016;
DNV-RP-G101, 2010). RBI approaches usually adopt data from his-
torical databases (PARLOC, 2012; OREDA, 2015). However, this data
is often not entirely available for quantitative risk assessment; thus,
making qualitative and semi-quantitative approaches more com-
monly used in RBI (Bai and Bai, 2014). The FFS assessment can
provide a robust quantitative framework for risk analysis. In the
FFS assessment, the PoF is determined by the system’s remaining
strength factor (RSF). For a corroded pipeline, the RSF is defined as
the ratio of the collapse pressure of a damaged segment to that of
an undamaged one (API 579-1/ASME FFS-1, 2016). Later, the RSF is

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.psep.2019.11.031
0957-5820/© 2019 Institution of Chemical Engineers. Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
96 R. Abubakirov, M. Yang and N. Khakzad / Process Safety and Environmental Protection 134 (2020) 95–107
calibrated for different values of PoF to define the system’s relia-
bility. Together with CoF estimation, the PoF is used to define the
system’s risk in the way similar to RBI (Buchheim, 2001; Bai and
Bai, 2014). In the final step of both approaches, the system’s cor-
rosion rate is used to model its dynamic risk over time, based on
which the decision on the next inspection will be made. RBI and
FFS approaches can be considered complementary to each other.
A rigorous quantitative FFS framework may also be used for PoF
estimation in a broader scope of RBI (Buchheim, 2001).
Recent years have seen an increasing number of studies ded-
icated to quantitative risk assessment and inspection planning
for pipelines in the scope of RBI and FFS (Shin et al., 2018; Liu
et al., 2018; Shekari et al., 2016; Afangide et al., 2018; Amaya-
Gómez et al., 2019). These studies mainly focus on the estimation
of pipeline reliability or PoF. The commonly accepted approach for
PoF estimation, in these studies, has been the use of remaining
strength capacity, the ratio between the corroded pipeline’s maxi-
mum allowable operating pressure (MAOP) and its burst pressure.
In this approach, there are two key parameters to be estimated:
the dimension of corrosion defects and the defected pipeline’s burst
pressure (Pburst ). There are many design codes for the burst pressure
estimation available in the literature. Terán et al. (2017) have per-
formed a comparative study of the widely-accepted ones, including
B31 G (ASME B31G, 2009), RSTRENG-1 (Kiefner and Vieth, 1989),
Shell-92 (Klever et al., 1995), and DNV (DNVGL-RP-F101, 2017)
design codes. The study has shown that the obtained values of
the burst pressure might vary from one design code to another,
thus, introducing uncertainty into models for PoF estimation. Some
studies have discussed the applicability of these models, depending
on the toughness of pipeline material (Amaya-Gómez et al., 2019).
However, accurate estimation of the defect dimensions and the rate
of its development play not less a critical role in PoF estimation and
the consequent inspection planning. De Waard et al. (1991) and
NORSOK (2005) have developed CO2 corrosion models in the form
of dose-response relationships between the operating parameters
and expected corrosion rates. Pots et al. (2002) have updated de
Waard-Milliams model (De Waard et al., 1991) by adding H2 S and
other corrosion mechanisms. This helps to enhance its applicabil-
ity by considering the effects of multiple corrosion mechanisms on
the corrosion rate. Alternatively, probabilistic models for corrosion
damage estimation have been proposed. Ayello et al. (2014) have
developed a quantitative analytical model for the prediction of cor-
rosion damage in oil and gas pipelines using the Bayesian Network
(BN) approach. The model incorporates probabilistic cause-effect
relationships between the system’s physical parameters and the
resulted corrosion rates.
Similarly, Shabarchin and Tesfamariam (2016) have employed
BN to predict corrosion defect dimensions, and later, to identify vul-
nerable pipeline sections by calculating their burst pressure. The
main advantage of BN over empirical dose-response relationship-
based models is its capability of handling all possible defect states
and its development rates in corrosion modeling by express-
ing them as a joint probability distribution function of operating
parameters. This takes account of the uncertainty of corrosion
models more adequately and provides a more accurate predic-
tion of corrosion damage (Arzaghi et al., 2017; Friis-Hansen,
2000). Dynamic Bayesian Network (DBN) was introduced to model
the time-varying phenomena, expanding the capabilities of BN.
For example, in Arzaghi et al. (2018), DBN is used to model
the time-dependent variation of growth rates of pitting and
corrosion-fatigue degradation processes. A similar approach has
been reported in (Nielsen and Sørensen, 2010), where the main-
tenance planning of wind turbines was made based on the PoF and
associated utility calculations using DBN.
In the present study, a risk-based approach to optimization
of inspection interval is developed for crude oil pipelines. This
methodology consolidates the DBN for corrosion damage estima-
tion on both internal and external surfaces of the pipeline. The main
distinctive feature of the proposed methodology lies in the use of
DBN for incorporating historical and analytical knowledge on cor-
rosion causation into a single probabilistic model that describes the
propagation of corrosion defect through a series of time steps. In
this approach, the models’ outputs, i.e., defect depth and length,
as well as any other uncertain parameters, are represented as ran-
dom variables. The output of the model provides all possible states
of the defect with their probabilities of occurrence. The results are
then used to establish the risk profile, which helps to determine
the optimal inspection interval. The proposed methodology is illus-
trated through an example of a real-world buried pipeline section.
The DBN models developed for that case utilize the available Inline
Inspection (ILI) data to predict the future state of the defect. Several
failure pressure models are used to calculate the pipeline’s maxi-
mum safe pressure, which by stochastic comparison with the given
MAOP, leads to a quantitative PoF for the pipeline. The estimated
PoF profile is later used to quantify the economic risk associated
with the pipeline’s loss of integrity. Finally, a utility function inter-
relating the operational risk with the cost of the inspection program
will be introduced for the identification of the optimal inspection
interval.
In the next section, the basics of the Bayesian network and
dynamic Bayesian network are briefly presented.
2. Dynamic Bayesian Network
Bayesian Network (BN) is a graphical technique used for reason-
ing under uncertainty by considering causal dependencies among
many random variables (Pearl, 1988). In corrosion analysis, where
a vast number of variables and their interdependencies need to be
considered to characterize the corrosion that can potentially lead to
a pipeline failure, this technique is particularly useful. By utilizing
the chain rule and the concept of conditional independence, the
BN establishes the relationship of a set of prime factors (nodes)
to the set of basic events through the set of intermediate child
nodes. Mathematically, it can be expressed as a joint probability
distribution P(U) of variables U={A1 ,. . ., An }:

n
P (U) = P(Ai |Pa(Ai )) (1)
i=1
where Pa(Ai ) is a parent set of Ai (Nielsen and Jensen, 2007).
To quantify the causal relationships between the interconnected
nodes, i.e., P(Ai |Pa(Ai )), Conditional Probability Tables (CPTs) are
assigned to each of them. The source of information for this pro-
cess can be physical models, expert opinion, and field data. Each
of the sources is associated with a widely varying degree of uncer-
tainty (Ayello et al., 2014). As more information, called evidence E,
becomes available, the prior probability of an event can be updated
using Bayes’ rule:
P (U, E) P (U, E)
P (UE) = =  (2)
P (E) P (U, E)
U
Dynamic Bayesian Network (DBN) is an extension of BN able
to model time-variant phenomena. DBN represents a generalized
Markov process in which a BN model in time slice i is connected by
directed links to the same model in time slice i + 1 (Straub, 2009). In
this process, the probabilities of the nodes at state k in the slice i to
evolve into the state k + 1 in the successive time slice is represented
in the form of one-step transition probability matrix (Liu and Jie,
2008). In the studies of pipeline corrosion, this dynamic feature can
be used to represent the pit growth process as shown in Fig. 1. The
 R. Abubakirov, M. Yang and N. Khakzad / Process Safety and Environmental Protection 134 (2020) 95–107
Fig. 1. Pit growth process.
probability of pit propagation from the state k to the state k + 1
in the time period tk,k+1 , i.e. Pk,k+1 , as indicated in Fig. 1, is depen-
dent on two main categories of parameters: the corrosivity of the
medium and the pit initial state. Also, the DBN allows characteriz-
ing these parameters in probabilistic terms, i.e., by including all the
possible states and corrosion rates in the model, thus, improving
the accuracy of the corrosion prediction.
3. The proposed methodology
Fig. 2 presents the proposed method for determination of opti-
mal inspection interval. The following sections describe each of the
main steps in this framework.
3.1. Internal corrosion model
Internal corrosion is a general term referred to as a wall thin-
ning process that occurs on the inner surface of a pipeline during
its operation. It results in thinning of the wall or in a formation of
localized defects, i.e., pits, which can seriously endanger the over-
all integrity of the pipeline (Bai and Bai, 2010). In the oil and gas
pipeline systems, the internal corrosion can be categorized into
two main types: sweet (CO2 induced) and sour (H2 S induced) cor-
rosions. Both of them have complex mechanisms depending on
the fluid composition, flow characteristics, presence of water, and
a range of other parameters as well. The DBN model presented
in Fig. 3 has been constructed to predict corrosion defect growth
under the joint impact of both sweet and sour corrosions.
The proposed model is developed on the knowledge of corro-
sion causation in pipelines and the mitigation measures commonly
applied in the industry. The “Defect Length” and “Defect Depth”
nodes are the leaf nodes and represent the physical dimensions
of corrosion defect in terms of a probability distribution of several
defect states. Three factors define the probability of the defect to
evolve into the next state in a unit time slice: a) corrosivity of the
medium (including collateral environment impact), b) efficiency of
mitigation measures, and c) the state of the defect in the current
time slice (the latter denoted by the arcs from “defect length” and
“defect depth” to themselves).
The first factor, i.e., the corrosivity of the medium represented
by “Axial CR” and “Radial CR” nodes, considers the properties of
corrosion-erosion degradation mechanism in terms of expected
corrosion rate. Eight root nodes “pH”, “Temperature”, “Flow Char-
acteristics”, “O2 ”, “CO2 ”, “H2 S”, “H2 O”, “Solid Particles” determining
the main physical and chemical properties of the transported fluid
have been introduced to characterize this mechanism. The dis-
cretization ranges for the fluid properties (Table 1) are based on
the common values of the properties used in the operation of crude
oil pipelines. They have been adopted from Ayello et al. (2014). In
this case, conditional dependencies between the root nodes and
the expected corrosivity were established by the experts and also
based on the models proposed by Shabarchin and Tesfamariam
(2016); Ayello et al. (2014), and Yang et al. (2017). The conditional
probabilities may be derived by performing a sensitivity analysis of
analytical corrosion models, e.g., De Waard et al. (1991); Pots et al.
(2002), and NORSOK (2005). The magnifying impact of the collat-
eral degradation mechanisms, such as Stress Corrosion Cracking
97
(SCC), Sulfide Stress Cracking (SSC), and Corrosion Fatigue, is rep-
resented by “Environment damage” node related to the combined
effect of mechanical loading and embrittlement of the material,
which is common in the sour operations of pipelines.
The second major factor influencing defect propagation is the
efficiency of corrosion protection. Two standard corrosion mitiga-
tion measures were included in the model: corrosion inhibitor and
internal coating. Their impact on the defect propagation is equally
related to the probability of failure of each of them. Generalized val-
ues for such probabilities can be found in historic databases such as
OREDA (2015) and PARLOC (2012) or from the literature concern-
ing fault tree or BN analysis of the oil pipeline corrosion (Yang et al.,
2017; Wang et al., 2017). An alternative way to obtain the unknown
values is the application of the Bayesian inference when more infor-
mation on the defect propagation becomes available. This property
of the BN is practically essential for the whole model, as it allows
a certain degree of flexibility in the cases where not all parameters
are known for the system.
The last aspect influencing the propagation of the defect, which
was included in the model along with the environment corrosivity
and the efficiency of corrosion mitigation measures, is the current
extent of the defect. The corrosion rates usually vary as the defect
evolves through nucleation, propagation, and passivation stages.
For the practical application of the model, it means that the likeli-
hood of a new defect to propagate into the next state in the same
time interval is different from such a propagation tendency for the
old defect. Generally, for this case, pit evolution through time can
be simplified to the form of power law (Eq. 3) where the pit depth y
is a function of time t with ˛ and ␤ defined as corrosivity and shape
coefficients (Dundulis et al., 2016; Velázquez et al., 2017). Thus, the
transitional probability of a defect to propagate into the next state
is proportional to the pit growth rate at the pits current state at
time ti (Eq. 4). Moreover, as more information on the defect prop-
agation dynamics becomes available, the transitional probability
and its model, like any other parameter in DBN, can be updated by
the Bayesian inference.
y(t) = ˛t ˇ (3)
 
d ˛t ˇ
P k,k+1 ∼ ; t = ti (4)
dt
A transitional probability matrix for the change of defect depth
and length can be defined based on the assessment of the fac-
tors influencing the defect’s state transition. An example of such
a matrix for the defect length is presented in Table 2. The defect
length is set to evolve through K states being exposed to the corro-
sive environment of State i and being protected by the mitigation
measure of State j. The probability of the defect to propagate from
State k to the State k+1 in a unit time slice is denoted by P(k,j,i)
in Table 2. Its dynamics through time as the defect approaches
State K should correlate with the defect evolution model accepted
for the studied system. Additional factors representing the lateral
degradation mechanisms can be incorporated into this procedure
by specifying their impact on the defect propagation dynamics at its
specific states. The resulting CPT represents a set of user-prescribed
one-step transition probabilities as a function of influencing factors.
98 R. Abubakirov, M. Yang and N. Khakzad / Process Safety and Environmental Protection 134 (2020) 95–107

Fig. 2. The proposed method for optimization of inspection interval.

Fig. 3. Internal corrosion DBN model. Note: The nodes descriptions are presented in Table 1.

3.2. External corrosion model a way similar to the internal corrosion growth. Its lifetime can be
divided into nucleation, propagation, and termination phases with
In this study, the soil is considered as the external environment their specific corrosion patterns and rates. Following the same pro-
for the pipeline. In general, the corrosion defect in soil grows in cedure as in the previous part, the DBN in Fig. 4 for external defect
 R. Abubakirov, M. Yang and N. Khakzad / Process Safety and Environmental Protection 134 (2020) 95–107 99

Table 1
Discretization table for the internal corrosion model input parameters. (adopted from Ayello et al. (2014)).

Node Relevance and effect State Quantitative measurements

Low 0 – 0.1 bar

Hydrates to carbonic acid, which
CO2 partial pressure Medium 0.1 – 1 bar
drives sweet corrosion of mild steel.
High 1 – 10 bar
A weak acid. Drives sour corrosion Low 0 – 100 ppm
H2 S content mechanism. Source of H+ ions causing Medium 100 – 1000 ppm
the material embrittlement. High 1000 – 10000 ppm
Low 0 – 10 ppb
A highly corrosive agent. Enhances
O2 content Medium 10 – 100 ppb
the corrosion rates.
High 100 – 1000 ppb
Low 20 – 40 C
Main factor affecting kinetics of the
Temperature Medium 40 – 60 C
corrosion.
High 60 – 80 C
None 0%
Determines the presence of corrosive Low 0–1%
H2 O content
medium. Medium 1–5%
High 5 – 20 %
A measure of the medium acidity. Low 6–7
Impact of pH Low pH potentially leads to higher Medium 5–6
corrosivity. High 4–5
Stratified smooth n/a
Determines the surface wetting. One
Flow characteristics Transitional n/a
of the driving factors of erosion.
Monophasic n/a
No n/a
Suspended solid particles One of the driving factors of erosion. Traces n/a
Present n/a
Contribute to collateral degradation No n/a
Loading mechanisms such as SCC, SSC, Low n/a
Corrosion Fatigue. High n/a

Table 2
One-step transition probability matrix for the change of defect length.

Corrosion rate State i ...

Mitigation efficiency State j State j+1 ...

Self [t-1] State k State k+1 State K State k State k+1 State K ...
State k 1 - P(k,j,i) 0 0 1 - P(k,j+1,i) 0 0 ...
State k+1 P(k,j,i) 1 - P(k+1,j,i) 0 P(k,j+1,i) 1 - P(k+1,j+1,i) 0 ...
State K 0 P(k+1,j,i) 1 0 P(k+1,j+1,i) 1 ...

Fig. 4. External corrosion DBN model. Note: The node descriptions are presented in Table 3
100 R. Abubakirov, M. Yang and N. Khakzad / Process Safety and Environmental Protection 134 (2020) 95–107

Table 3
Discretization table for the external corrosion model input parameters. Adopted from AWWA/ANSI (1999) and Taghipour et al. (2016).

Node Relevance and effect State Quantitative measurements

Determined by the presence of Low > 2100 Ohm cm

soluble salts and moisture content. Medium 1800 – 2100 Ohm cm
Resistivity
Low resistivity values lead to high High 1500 – 1800 Ohm cm
corrosivity. Very High < 1500 Ohm cm
Low 4 – 8.5
Impact of pH Indicator of the medium acidity. Medium 2 – 4 and >8.5
High 0–2
A measure of the soil aeration degree. Low > 100 mV
Redox potential High corrosion rates may be observed Medium 0 – 100 mV
in poorly aerated (reducing) soils. High < 0 mV
Low < 150 ppm
High salinity of the surrounding
Medium 150 - 1500 ppm
Sulfates content medium enhances the corrosion.
High 1500 – 10000 ppm
Might be interchanged to chlorides.
Very High > 10000 ppm
Good Generally dry
Drainage Directly linked to the corrosion rate. Fair Generally moist
Poor Generally wet

modeling has been constructed. “Defect Depth” and “Defect Length” Table 4
The methodology for calculation of the burst pressure of a defected pipeline section.
nodes are central and represent the state of the modeled defect.
Five root nodes “pH”, “Resistivity”, “Redox Potential”, “Sulfate level”,
 2
M= 1 + 0.893 LDt
and “Drainage” are used to characterize the rate of the defect devel- ASME B31G (ASME  2y

1−
B31G, 2009) Pburst = 1.1 2YSt 3t
for √L ≤ 4.479
opment and their discretization ranges, which are illustrated in
 
D 2y 1 Dt
1−
3t M
Table 3, mainly adopted from the ten-point system (AWWA/ANSI, Pburst = 1.1 2YSt 1− y
for √L ≥ 4.479
1999). This methodology is based on five primary factors and
 D
2
t Dt

M= 1 + 0.31 LDt
gives a clear representation of their individual effects on the over-
DNV-RP-F101
(DNV-RP-F101, 2017)
 y

2UTSt 1− t
Pburst =
all corrosivity. Thus, the conditional dependencies between the y

D−t 1− t 1
M
expected corrosion rates and soil parameters can be easily derived. M= 1 + 0.805 LDt
2

Finally, two corrosion mitigation measures have been included in

Shell-92 (Klever et al.,
 
1995) 1.8UTSt 1− t
y
Pburst = y
the model: galvanic protection and external coating. The external D 1− t 1
M

coating was set to exhibit dynamic behavior, i.e., deterioration of

its properties through time.
The proposed DBN models in Figs. 3 and 4 provide a probabilis-
tic tool to characterize the corrosion defect propagation dynamics.
It provides a methodology to predict the propagation of a set of
known defects present in the system at time t1 to evolve to time t2 .
In this paper, the DBN models are applied using the ILI data from
the latest inspection of an operating pipeline to predict the point
of time when the risks associated with the observed defects prevail
over the costs of inspection and maintenance programs. The fol-
lowing sections present the proposed method for quantifying the
risks associated with the present defects.
3.3. PoF estimation
The defect-induced pipeline burst is considered as the ultimate
failure mode. The criterion for the failure to occur is defined by a
limit state function (LSF) known as estimated repair factor (ERF):
MAOP MAOP
ERF (t) = = (5)
Psafe (t) F × Pburst (t)
The applied burst pressure models contain assumptions and
simplifications on the defect geometry. Depending on the particu-
lar code, the defects are usually idealized to rectangular, parabolic,
or mixed geometry, reducing the accuracy and introducing uncer-
tainty into the obtained results (Seo et al., 2015; Amaya-Gómez
et al., 2019). This partially justifies the use of the design factor in
the ERF function, as it accounts for the uncertainty in the calculated
burst pressure and the possible impact of unexpected loads. For
more accurate burst pressure estimation, a finite element method
can be applied (Terán et al., 2017; Amaya-Gómez et al., 2019).
Within the developed methodology, the burst is considered as a
random event with the frequency of n in N independent initiating
corrosion sampling events. In this case, the probability of the failure
event is solely dependent on the distribution of corrosion defects at
time T, and LSF defines the condition of failure to happen. The limit
state condition will be stochastically tested for the given defect
distribution, finally leading to the quantitative value of PoF at time
T.

The rise of the time-dependent LSF over the magnitude of 1, i.e.,
when MAOP exceeds Psafe (t), leads to the system’s state of failure.
The design factor (F in Eq. 5) is specified according to proximity to
the critical equipment and environmentally sensitive areas. For all
land liquids pipelines, the design factor of 0.72 is applicable (ASME
B31G, 2009). In the present study, the burst pressure is estimated
by using the empirical design codes such as ASME B31 G, DNV-
RP-F101, and Shell-92. The length (L) and the maximum depth
(y) of the set of considered defects are the input parameters for
these codes. The procedure of the burst pressure calculation is the
same for internal and external defects’ locations. The correspond-
ing methodology for the burst pressure calculation is presented in
Table 4, where D - pipeline internal diameter, t - thickness, YS, and
UTS - material’s yield and ultimate tensile strengths, respectively.
3.4. CoF estimation
In RBI methodologies, the estimation of the potential conse-
quences of the process failure is based on an evaluation of the harm
to personnel, the environmental impacts, and economic losses for
the company. It can be expressed in a monetary term as cost, which
is a useful indicator for decision-making. For the CoF estimation
of the pipelines, API RP 581 (2016) is applicable. It provides a
methodology for estimation of the failure consequence based on
the calculation of expected fluid release rate, type, affected area,
and consequences of the events associated with it, e.g., fire. How-
ever, the methodology should be applied with an understanding
that the obtained cost is often the best estimate rather than an
exact cost.
 R. Abubakirov, M. Yang and N. Khakzad / Process Safety and Environmental Protection 134 (2020) 95–107
Fig. 5. Corrosion defect distribution progression from 2010 to 2015 with the discrete states defined for the defect length and depth: (a) The defects on internal surface, (b)
The defects on the external surfaces of the pipeline.
In the present framework, the CoF represents the cost asso-
ciated with the most expected failure scenario derived from the
knowledge of the studied system parameters, its location, and the
characteristics of the damage mechanisms. It comprises several
cost categories typical for the piping accidents and includes:
• Product loss (Cprod )
• Emergency response procedures (Cemer )
• Replacement of the damaged equipment (Crepl )
• Litigation and fines (Cfines )
The CoF is evaluated assuming the current market conditions,
and mathematically it can be expressed as the present value of its
components:
CoF = Cprod + Cemer + Crepl + Cfines
3.5. Inspection interval planning
A utility function (UF) was introduced for the planning of the
inspection interval. It combines the function of the risk associated
with the operation of the pipeline at time t with the costs of an
inspection program to be performed within the same time inter-
val t on a periodical basis. The risk component of the function is
101
defined as the product of the CoF and the time-dependent PoF for
the system:
Risk(t) = CoF × PoF(t) (7)
While the net present cost of the inspection program is esti-
mated for the entire studied pipeline length l, having the costs of
the inline inspection per unit length C’insp and an estimate on the
planned maintenance procedures needed C main :

Cinsp = Cinsp × l + Cmain (8)
The resultant UF for any point of time t represents the future
value of the risk and the equivalent annual (alternatively – monthly
or any periodical) cost of the inspection program to be performed
at that time:
(6)
Utility(t) = (F/Risk(t), r, t) + (A/Cinsp , r, t) (9)
where r is the interest rate of the assessed period.
The point with the lowest utility value on the assessed interval
is considered to be an optimal inspection point if the risk at that
point does not exceed the maximum acceptable risk (MAR). The
MAR can be defined by the operators based on their risk tolerance
level and relevant government legislation. In case the chosen point
does not comply with the MAR requirement, the inspection interval
102 R. Abubakirov, M. Yang and N. Khakzad / Process Safety and Environmental Protection 134 (2020) 95–107

Table 5 Table 6
The general information on the pipeline used in the case study. The input parameters for the internal corrosion DBN model.

Pipeline data Node Value Probability (%)

Nominal diameter 24 inch / 609.6 mm

Grade API 5 L X60
pH 4–5
Wall thickness nominal 7.30 mm
MAOP 6.7 MPa
Length 92.4 km 5–6
Built in 2002 6–7
Pipeline product condensate
Inspection history July 2010, May 2015
Temperature 20 – 40 C

should be reassessed, and the broadest possible interval satisfying 40 – 60 C

60 – 80 C
the MAR criterion should be chosen.

O2 0 – 10 ppb
4. Application of the methodology

10 – 100 ppb
4.1. Target pipeline information
100 – 1000 ppb

The application of the proposed methodology is illustrated

CO2 0 – 0.1 bar
through a case study on an operating condensate pipeline installed
in 2002. Table 5 provides general information about the pipeline.
– 1 bar
Two inspections have been performed in 2010 and 2015 using 1 – 10 bar
ROSEN Electronic Geometry Tool and HiRes MFL-XYZ Inspection
Tool. The operating conditions since the installation did not show
H2 S 0 – 100 ppm
significant changes, and therefore, were assumed to be constant.
100 – 1000 ppm
4.2. Inline inspection data 1000 – 10000 ppm

The results of the two inline inspections indicated the presence

and active propagation of the corrosion defects. In total, only 6 H2 O 0%

defects on the external surface of the pipeline were identified in

2010, while its number reached 205 in 2015. A similar trend is 0–1%
inherent to the internal surface: 289 in 2010 versus 508 defects 1–5%
observed in 2015. Fig. 5 presents the distributions of the identified 5 – 20 %
defect parameters (depth in % of the wall thickness and length in
mm). Flow characteristics Stratified smooth
The distribution of defect depth and length was discretized into
six states, increasing in size. This intends to avoid statistical errors Transitional
at the states in which the number of defects in the data is small. Monophasic
The applied ILI methodology did consider the defects less than 5 %
depth, so the ranges of the lowest states in the model were assigned Solid particles No
accordingly to this fact. The obtained discrete distributions for the
defect length and depth from the two inspections were used as Traces
input data for the corrosion DBN models. Present

4.3. Defect propagation modeling Loading No

The developed DBN models are applied to model the growth of
previously identified defects through time. Tables 6 and 7 present
the input values for the operating environment parameters in the
corresponding models. Some of the values were taken as uncertain
either as their true values were not provided or to represent their
variation within the length of the studied pipeline. It was assumed
that at the beginning of the operation, there were no significant
defects, i.e., their dimensions did not exceed the upper boundary
of State 1. The ILI data from 2010 and 2015 was used to update the
model parameters. Having the known defect distribution for the
two points in time, we set the failure rate of the mitigations mea-
sures in the external corrosion model as a target node to update.
No corrosion inhibitor and internal coating have been used during
the pipeline operation. Therefore, the axial and radial defect prop-
agation rates have been chosen as the target nodes for updating.
The pipeline defect distributions for the time of the last inspection
in May 2015, with the 19 most severe defects removed during the
planned maintenance was set as the model’s initial values. Once
Low
High
the models were initialized, the projections on the future defect
propagation were performed. Figs. 6 and 7 present the results.
5. Results and discussions
The results of the DBN models represent the discrete distribu-
tion of the pipeline defects evolving through several time-steps. The
LSF criterion (Eq. 5) relating the pipeline’s MAOP to the burst pres-
sure was stochastically tested for the given defect depth and length
distributions to obtain the PoF progression through time. Three
different codes for determination of the burst pressure (Table 4)
were used in the PoF determination on a comparative basis. The
obtained PoFs were used as the input to the risk and utility pro-
 R. Abubakirov, M. Yang and N. Khakzad / Process Safety and Environmental Protection 134 (2020) 95–107 103

Fig. 6. The projected time-evolution of internal defects: (a) the defect’s length state probability change, (b) the defect’s depth state probability change (reference point –
May 2015).

Fig. 7. The projected time-evolution of external defects: (a) the defect’s length state probability change, (b) the defect’s depth state probability change (reference point –
May 2015).
104 R. Abubakirov, M. Yang and N. Khakzad / Process Safety and Environmental Protection 134 (2020) 95–107

Fig. 8. The utility function and risk profile achieved using ASME B31 G methodology (reference point – May 2015).

Fig. 9. The utility function and risk profile achieved using Shell - 92 methodology (reference point – May 2015).

Fig. 10. The utility function and risk profile achieved using DNV-RP-F101 methodology (reference point – May 2015).

jections together with a list of assumed CoF and other cost values
presented in Table 8. Figs. 8–10 illustrate the obtained projections.
As illustrated in Figs. 8–10, the final decision on the optimal
inspection point differs between the cases in which the different
burst pressure calculation methodologies are applied. It varies from
80 to 88 months since the last performed inspection and planned
maintenance. The decisions in all three cases were based on the
minimal utility as the operational risk at the inspection points did
not exceed the MAR value defined by the operator. The risk profile
in the corresponding case is presented in Fig. 11. Once the planned
inspection and maintenance is performed, the operational risk is
expected to reduce. The magnitude of the risk reduction is directly
proportional to the quality level of the performed procedures API
RP 581 (2016). This inspection efficiency or human error may be
introduced into the modeling of inspection and maintenance proce-
dures. A discussion of its effect on posterior risk profile and accuracy
of the further risk predictions can be found in Hameed et al. (2016).
The obtained inspection interval may be considered conserva-
tive since the remaining risk capacity is already too high at the
planned point. For this instance, the planned interval may be pro-
 R. Abubakirov, M. Yang and N. Khakzad / Process Safety and Environmental Protection 134 (2020) 95–107 105

Fig. 11. Impact of the planned inspection on the operational risk based on ASME B31 G burst pressure model.

Table 7 Table 8
The input parameters for the external corrosion DBN model. The values of economic parameters used in estimation of the UF.

Node Value Probability (%) Assumed economic data

Interest rate r (annual) 2%

Net CoF CoF $10, 000, 000

Resistivity > 2100 Ohm cm
Cost of the planned maintenance program C main $50, 000
Cost of the inspection for the entire pipeline C insp $320, 000
Maximum acceptable risk MAR $3000 / month
1800 – 2100 Ohm cm
1500 – 1800 Ohm cm
< 1500 Ohm cm

pH 4 – 8.5 tion may be lower for the prolonged interval, the overall utility for
it may be higher due to the stronger increase of the operational risk
2 – 4 and >8.5 at that period.
0–2 The uncertainties present in the performed analysis can signif-
icantly affect the obtained results and thus influence the decision.
Redox potential > 100 mV These uncertainties can be divided into aleatory and epistemic
uncertainties. In the proposed methodology, the aleatory uncer-
0 – 100 mV tainties, which are caused by natural randomness of the measured
< 0 mV parameters, can present the variation of the operational or envi-
ronmental parameters with time. To deal with this problem, the
system may be divided into several homogeneous segments, or its
Sulfates < 150 ppm
variation may be represented by a probabilistic distribution. The
impact of epistemic uncertainties is even more significant. It is
150 - 1500 ppm mainly due to the lack of information (e.g., a limited number or low
1500 – 10000 ppm quality of observations), which is common in inspection planning.
> 10000 ppm In some circumstances, a small variation in some parameters can
considerably affect the results. Therefore, the identification of such
Drainage Generally dry critical nodes is an essential step of the proposed methodology.
Fig. 12 presents a hierarchical sensitivity of the utility’s value on the
Generally moist model’s input parameters relative to the MAOP node, which has the
Generally wet most substantial influence on the UF. The cumulative CoF, the state
of the corrosion mitigation measures, and some of the environmen-
tal factors demonstrated a considerable influence on the results.
longed at the cost of higher utility or, as API RP 581 (2016) suggests, Separate categories for the environmental, human exposure, and
the inspection may remain at the planned point so that the risk the company’s reputational loss may be added to the proposed total
reassessment may be performed within the safe operating range. CoF estimation. The assumed interest rate through the assessment
In this case, the preference should be given for the latest option as period should be clearly justified within the company’s policies,
it provides a potential for further operational risk reduction, which and several scenarios for the rate may be applied on a comparative
is the main aim of RBI. This choice is also economically justified by basis. An example of such an approach can be found in Xie and Tian
the introduced UF: even though the apparent costs of the inspec- (2018).
106 R. Abubakirov, M. Yang and N. Khakzad / Process Safety and Environmental Protection 134 (2020) 95–107

Table 9
A comparative analysis of the common frameworks for inspection planning in terms uncertainty handling capacity.

Methodology References Main input parameters Type of the inputs Capability of uncertainty
propagation

2-parameter Weibull (API RP 581, 2016) Shape and scale Deterministic Low
parameters (␤ and ␮).
FFS (required thickness and (API 579-1/ASME FFS-1, Furnished thickness and Deterministic Low
maximum allowable 2016) corrosion rate
working pressure)
GFF (API RP 581, 2016) Component’s gff, damage Deterministic Average*
factor (as a function of
furnished thickness,
corrosion rate and number
of inspections and their
effectiveness)
BN (Ayello et al., 2014), Thickness, corrosion rate Probabilistic Above average**
(Shabarchin and
Tesfamariam, 2016)
DBN The present study Thickness, time-dependent Probabilistic High
corrosion rate

Notes:
*
Higher than “Low” due to the effect of inspection parameters.
**
Lower than “High” due to the incapability to capture state-dependent / time-dependent CR.

updating provides a useful tool to propagate and reduce uncer-

tainty. The generic failure frequency (GFF) method in API RP 581
is also capable of uncertainty reduction. In API RP 581, to esti-
mate the thinning damage factor, the uncertainty of corrosion rates
of the prescribed damage states is updated based on inspections
number and their effectiveness. However, the inputs of this model,
e.g., corrosion rate and furnished thickness, have definitive nature
and may not account for epistemic uncertainties in them, even
though the guidelines for the proper value selection are given.
The natural time-variation of the parameters is another essential
aspect addressed by this paper. The time-dependent degradation of
the coating materials dramatically affects the degradation rate of
the base material towards its acceleration. Variations of the cor-
rosion rates through the defect propagation are considered and
have been discussed in the methodology section. The application of
DBN enables the incorporation of these variations into the degra-
dation model and propagate their uncertainties. This makes the
DBN-based model more effective than the static models.
Table 9 presents a summary of the comparative analysis of the
aspects mentioned above of the representative methodologies used
for inspection planning. The authors refer to the standard method-
ologies prescribed in the corresponding codes and literature and
have not accounted for their possible updates or modifications
regarding uncertainty handling.

Fig. 12. Results of sensitivity analysis of the model’s basic parameters relative to
MAOP.
(Note: the influence of MAOP on the UF is taken as 100 %)
The epistemic uncertainty is inherent to the methodology. For
example, in the proposed procedures, it can primarily arise from
the assigned CPTs. In this case, the introduction of additional
knowledge of the corrosion causation into the models, or the DBN
updating, is a way to minimize its impact. A similar approach
applies to the other sources of errors, e.g., to the burst pressure
calculation models by application of the finite element methods.
The capability of uncertainty propagation, i.e., the ability to handle
the uncertain inputs to propagate their uncertainty to the outputs,
is another important measure of the models’ performance. This
is the strength of the probabilistic frameworks like BN or DBN,
which propose a flexible and transparent way to do that (Ayello
et al., 2014). Depending on the models’ structure and quality of the
inputs, the uncertainty can be both increased and reduced; how-
ever, with the initial information preserved. For example, Bayesian
6. Conclusions
Developing a cost-effective inspection plan is a challenging task.
The existing methods, such as FFS and RBI, have been developed
to reduce operational risk. These methods rely on historical data
and analytical models to predict the corrosion, assess the associ-
ated risk, and estimate the asset’s remaining life. However, the data
and information required by these studies may not be often avail-
able. This turns them into either qualitative or semi-quantitative
analysis. This paper proposes a systematic quantitative risk-based
approach to the determination of optimal inspection intervals. In
this approach, the DBN for corrosion modeling incorporates both
the historical and analytical knowledge/information on corrosion
behavior, along with the observations on the existing defects to
model and predict the defects’ propagation. The results of the DBN
model were used for assessing the system’s PoF, coupled with the
estimated CoF, and yield the risk profile. The utility function, which
associates the risk profile with the costs of the required inspection
program, was used to determine the optimal inspection interval.
 R. Abubakirov, M. Yang and N. Khakzad / Process Safety and Environmental Protection 134 (2020) 95–107
The advantage of the proposed method is its capability of han-
dling the uncertainty of the estimation. The use of DBN models
enables the representation of any uncertain parameter of the model
in the form of a chance node with an assigned probability distribu-
tion at each time-slice. By this means, the output of the proposed
corrosion model describes all the possible defect states in a prob-
abilistic manner. These states include the extreme defect states
with high potential to cause pipeline failure if they occurred. This
leads to a more accurate assessment of PoF than the conventional
approaches based on deterministic data.
Consideration of the damage mechanisms besides thinning cor-
rosion in the degradation model is essential as well, mainly if
a similar probabilistic methodology is applied to process com-
ponents exposed to a severe environment. For such cases, the
development of a clear picture of the nature of each individual
damage mechanism, its resultant failure modes and rates becomes
critical. It is recommended to study how to incorporate the fac-
tors mentioned above into a risk model that makes a reliable
assessment. This is a critical step for successful asset integrity man-
agement, which remains to be addressed.
Declaration of Competing Interest
The research being report in this paper titled “A risk-based
approach to determination of optimal inspection intervals for
buried oil pipelines” was supported by Nazarbayev University. The
authors of this paper has the IP ownership related to the research
being reported. The terms of this arrangement have been reviewed
and approved by the Nazarbayev University in accordance with its
policy on objectivity in research.
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