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IV. Amish Devgan v Union of India

Case Brief

Case Name: - Amish Devgan v Union of India

Court: - Supreme Court of India
Judge Bench: - Justice S. Abdul Nazeer, Sanjeev Khanna
Case Type: - Criminal, Original Jurisdiction
Subject: - Criminal, Original Jurisdiction
Final decision: - writ petition disposed

The decision of 2 Judge Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court comprising of Justice S. Abdul
Nazeer and Justice Sanjiv Khanna in this case distinguished between free speech and hate
speech while stressing the need to balance fundamental rights and freedom of speech. This
was evident in the cases of “Ramji Lal Modi vs The State Of U.P (1975) and Maneka Gandhi
vs Union Of India (1978)”. The court also consolidated complaints from various FIRs and
dismissed the petitioner's argument regarding the offense's triviality, deferring judgment on
the offense's nature to legal authorities.

The Further observations of the Supreme Court have been listed below:-

(i) Cause of Action

- In paragraph 13, the Supreme Court decisively dismissed the petitioner's argument, contending
that criminal proceedings stemming from the disputed FIRs should be annulled on the grounds of
lacking a ‘cause of action’ in the registered jurisdictions. The Court invoked Section 179 of the
Criminal Code to underscore that an offense can be adjudicated in the vicinity where the act
occurred or its consequences transpired. Additionally, the Court made reference to Section
156(1), explicitly accentuating that any officer in charge of a police station possesses the authority
to investigate a cognizable case. Consequently, the Court arrived at the determination that the
challenged FIRs were devoid of any jurisdictional deficiencies.

(ii) Defence of causing slight harm

- In paragraph 14, the Supreme Court firmly declined to entertain the petitioner's plea asserting
that minimal harm had been caused at this preliminary stage. It elucidated that Section 95 of the
Penal Code is designed to shield against the punishment of trifling wrongs or inconsequential
offenses. Whether an act qualifies as an offense hinges on a medley of factors, including the
extent of harm incurred, the intent underpinning the act, and other pertinent circumstances. The
Court stressed that these facets should be meticulously examined during the course of the
investigation, leaving the petitioner's defense open without imparting any definitive stance.

(iii) Hate Speech

- In paragraph 15, the Supreme Court invoked the wisdom of Benjamin Franklin while broaching
the intricacies surrounding the demarcation of the boundaries of freedom of speech and
expression. It underscored that the constitutional and statutory treatment of 'hate speech' hinges
on the values being propagated, the perceived harm, and the significance of these harms. The
Court embarked on a deep dive into the interpretation of Section 153A of the Penal Code,
underscoring the pivotal role of intent and emphasizing that mens rea constitutes an
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indispensable element of the offense under this section.

(iv) Interpretation of the statutory provisions

- In paragraph 60, the Supreme Court interprets Section 153A of the Penal Code, which
addresses the promotion of enmity between different groups based on various grounds,
including religion, race, and language. This section has a historical background, originating in
the Indian Penal Code (Amendment) Act of 1898, based on the recommendations of the Select
Committee. The original section pertained to spoken or written words, signs, or visible
representations promoting enmity and carried a maximum penalty of two years' imprisonment
or a fine, or both.

- Paragraph 61 continues to discuss Section 153A, noting that the court is not examining clause
(c) of subsection (1) in this case. The court mentions previous interpretations of this section in
cases such as Manzar Sayeed Khan and Balwant Singh. It also highlights the amendments made
to Section 153A over time, with clauses (a) and (b) added by the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act
of 1969 and clause (c) inserted later by the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act of 1972.

(v) Validity of First Information Reports (FIRs)

- In paragraph 73, the Supreme Court lucidly elucidated the validity of First Information Reports
(FIRs). It elucidated that an FIR is not intended to be a comprehensive document but rather serves
as the initial stepping stone for the commencement of an inquiry into cognizable offenses. The
Court underscored that the litmus test for a valid FIR hinges on whether it reveals the commission
of a cognizable offense, with finer details open to subsequent investigation.

(vi) Conclusion and relief

- In paragraph 75, the Supreme Court made a reference to the precedent set in the case of Pirthi
Chand, where it underscored the exceptional nature of the exercise of inherent power by the High
Court. The Court emphatically underscored that the High Court should only invoke its inherent
power when such an invocation would serve the cause of justice and prevent any misuse of the
court's processes.

- In paragraph 76, the Supreme Court referred to its earlier decision in the matter of Arnab Ranjan
Goswami and elucidated that the petitioner ought to pursue efficacious remedies available under
the Criminal Code instead of seeking recourse under Article 32 of the Constitution.

- In paragraph 78, the Supreme Court delved into a comprehensive analysis of the petitioner's
statements within the context of the debate. The Court stressed that disputed factual elements
such as 'variable content,' 'intent,' and 'harm/impact' should be subject to thorough evaluation
during the police investigation.

- In paragraph 79, the Supreme Court opted not to quash the FIRs at this juncture. Nevertheless, it
extended interim protection against arrest during the ongoing investigation, contingent on the
petitioner's cooperation.

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- In paragraph 83, the Supreme Court offered a clarifying exposition regarding the application of
Section 179 and Section 186 of the Criminal Code in cases involving multiple FIRs arising from the
same incident.

- In paragraph 85, the Supreme Court accepted the petitioner's request to transfer all pending FIRs
related to the telecast or episode to P.S. Dargah, Ajmer, Rajasthan, where the initial FIR had been
registered.

- In paragraph 86, the Supreme Court issued a directive to the States of Uttar Pradesh and
Rajasthan to evaluate the perceived threat to the petitioner and his family members
comprehensively, mandating the adoption of suitable measures as warranted.

- In paragraph 87, the Supreme Court succinctly encapsulated its operative directives,
encompassing the rejection of the petitioner's plea for FIR annulment, the grant of interim
protection against arrest, the transfer of pending FIRs, and the instruction for threat assessments
by the respective state authorities.

Details:-
S.No. Particular Details
1.
Case Name Amish Devgan ...Appellant
Versus
Union of India …Respondents

2.
Relevant  Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 160 of 2020
Citations
3.
Statue Referred  Constitution of India,
(Indian Constitution – Article 32, 19.)
 Indian Penal Code 1860,
(Indian Penal Code 1860 – sec. 153A,
295A, and 505(2),34)
 Criminal Procedure Code,
(sec. 482, 179, 156.)
 Information Technology Act,
(sec. 66-F.)
 2000 Place of Worship Act, 1991

4.
Relevant Facts A brief narration of the facts
and Issues
1. The case involves a television journalist, the petitioner, who
made derogatory remarks about Hazrat Moinuddin Chishti, a

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Muslim saint, during his debate show "Aar Paar" on June 15,
2020. He used offensive language, which, when translated,
implied that "Terrorist Chishti came. Robber Chishti came –
thereafter the religion changed." These comments offended a
particular community, inciting religious hatred and undermining
national unity and dignity.
2. Following the telecast, the petitioner received death threats and
online abuse via various social media platforms. In response to
fearing for his life, he filed FIR No. 539 of 2020 at a Noida police
station in Uttar Pradesh on June 20, 2020. He also provided
evidence of the threats received through social media.
3. The petitioner filed a writ petition in the Supreme Court, seeking
the dismissal of all seven FIRs against him through Section 482 of
the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. The hearing took place on
June 26, 2020, and the court issued a notice, directing the
petitioner to include the informants in the case. On June 17,
2020, the petitioner issued a video apology, clarifying that he
had mistakenly referred to Pir Hazrat Moinuddin Chishti instead
of Alauddin Khilji and expressing regret to anyone hurt by his
speech.
4. An interim order was issued, staying any further action on the
FIRs mentioned in the writ petition until the next hearing. The
petition was later amended, requesting:
 Quashing of the FIRs or any future criminal complaints
related to the June 15, 2020 telecast.
 Transfer and consolidation of the FIRs with the first FIR, FIR
No. 78 at a Rajasthan police station.
 Issuance of a writ of mandamus to prevent coercive actions
against the petitioner in relation to the broadcast.
 Requesting the Union of India to provide adequate security
to the petitioner, his family, and colleagues across the
country.

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5. Issues raised 1. Whether the words used in speech are of such a nature that may
create hatred towards a community in the minds of other people?
2. Whether the words are of such a nature that they may damage
unity and integrity of nation?
3. Whether right to speech under article 19(a) should be provided
with restrictions on few words?

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6. Held in the case The Supreme Court held:

(i) Cause of Action

- In paragraph 13, the Supreme Court decisively dismissed the
petitioner's argument, contending that criminal proceedings
stemming from the disputed FIRs should be annulled on the
grounds of lacking a ‘cause of action’ in the registered jurisdictions.
The Court invoked Section 179 of the Criminal Code to underscore
that an offense can be adjudicated in the vicinity where the act
occurred or its consequences transpired. Additionally, the Court
made reference to Section 156(1), explicitly accentuating that any
officer in charge of a police station possesses the authority to
investigate a cognizable case. Consequently, the Court arrived at
the determination that the challenged FIRs were devoid of any
jurisdictional deficiencies.

(ii) Defence of causing slight harm

- In paragraph 14, the Supreme Court firmly declined to entertain

the petitioner's plea asserting that minimal harm had been caused
at this preliminary stage. It elucidated that Section 95 of the Penal
Code is designed to shield against the punishment of trifling
wrongs or inconsequential offenses. Whether an act qualifies as an
offense hinges on a medley of factors, including the extent of harm
incurred, the intent underpinning the act, and other pertinent
circumstances. The Court stressed that these facets should be
meticulously examined during the course of the investigation,
leaving the petitioner's defense open without imparting any
definitive stance.

(iii) Hate Speech

- In paragraph 15, the Supreme Court invoked the wisdom of
Benjamin Franklin while broaching the intricacies surrounding the
demarcation of the boundaries of freedom of speech and
expression. It underscored that the constitutional and statutory
treatment of 'hate speech' hinges on the values being propagated,
the perceived harm, and the significance of these harms. The Court
embarked on a deep dive into the interpretation of Section 153A of
the Penal Code, underscoring the pivotal role of intent and
emphasizing that mens rea constitutes an indispensable element of
the offense under this section.

(iv) Interpretation of the statutory provisions

- In paragraph 60, the Supreme Court interprets Section 153A of

the Penal Code, which addresses the promotion of enmity
between different groups based on various grounds, including
7
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religion, race, and language. This section has a historical

background, originating in the Indian Penal Code (Amendment)
Act of 1898, based on the recommendations of the Select
Committee. The original section pertained to spoken or written
words, signs, or visible representations promoting enmity and
carried a maximum penalty of two years' imprisonment or a fine,
or both.

- Paragraph 61 continues to discuss Section 153A, noting that the

court is not examining clause (c) of subsection (1) in this case.
The court mentions previous interpretations of this section in
cases such as Manzar Sayeed Khan and Balwant Singh. It also
highlights the amendments made to Section 153A over time,
with clauses (a) and (b) added by the Criminal Law (Amendment)
Act of 1969 and clause (c) inserted later by the Criminal Law
(Amendment) Act of 1972.

(v) Validity of First Information Reports (FIRs)

- In paragraph 73, the Supreme Court lucidly elucidated the validity

of First Information Reports (FIRs). It elucidated that an FIR is not
intended to be a comprehensive document but rather serves as the
initial stepping stone for the commencement of an inquiry into
cognizable offenses. The Court underscored that the litmus test for
a valid FIR hinges on whether it reveals the commission of a
cognizable offense, with finer details open to subsequent
investigation.

(vi) Conclusion and relief

- In paragraph 75, the Supreme Court made a reference to the

precedent set in the case of Pirthi Chand, where it underscored the
exceptional nature of the exercise of inherent power by the High
Court. The Court emphatically underscored that the High Court
should only invoke its inherent power when such an invocation
would serve the cause of justice and prevent any misuse of the
court's processes.

- In paragraph 76, the Supreme Court referred to its earlier decision

in the matter of Arnab Ranjan Goswami and elucidated that the
petitioner ought to pursue efficacious remedies available under the
Criminal Code instead of seeking recourse under Article 32 of the
Constitution.

- In paragraph 78, the Supreme Court delved into a comprehensive

analysis of the petitioner's statements within the context of the
8
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debate. The Court stressed that disputed factual elements such as

'variable content,' 'intent,' and 'harm/impact' should be subject to
thorough evaluation during the police investigation.

- In paragraph 79, the Supreme Court opted not to quash the FIRs at
this juncture. Nevertheless, it extended interim protection against
arrest during the ongoing investigation, contingent on the
petitioner's cooperation.

- In paragraph 83, the Supreme Court offered a clarifying exposition

regarding the application of Section 179 and Section 186 of the
Criminal Code in cases involving multiple FIRs arising from the same
incident.

- In paragraph 85, the Supreme Court accepted the petitioner's

request to transfer all pending FIRs related to the telecast or
episode to P.S. Dargah, Ajmer, Rajasthan, where the initial FIR had
been registered.

- In paragraph 86, the Supreme Court issued a directive to the States

of Uttar Pradesh and Rajasthan to evaluate the perceived threat to
the petitioner and his family members comprehensively,
mandating the adoption of suitable measures as warranted.

- In paragraph 87, the Supreme Court succinctly encapsulated its

operative directives, encompassing the rejection of the petitioner's
plea for FIR annulment, the grant of interim protection against
arrest, the transfer of pending FIRs, and the instruction for threat
assessments by the respective state authorities.

6.
International Mr. Justice Holmes in Schenek v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (52), has
Reference described the test as:

“The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present
danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has
a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree.” 395 U.S. 444
(1969) 341 U.S. 494

Dixon, C.J., in Canada (Human Rights Commission) v. Taylor,64 had

observed:

“...messages of hate propaganda undermine the dignity and self-worth

of targeted group members and, more generally, contribute to
disharmonious (1990) 3 SCR 892 relations among various racial, cultural
and religious groups, as a result eroding the tolerance and open-
mindedness that must flourish in a multicultural society which is
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committed to the idea of equality.”

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Other cases Cases which were looked into by the Judges’
which were
looked into 1) Arnab Ranjan Goswami v Union of India 2020 14 SCC 12
2) Balwant Singh and Another v State of Punjab SC 462 (1995).

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