Bhartrhari and Wittgenstein have both contributed to the philosophy of language and reality.

Bhartrhari believed that language and reality share the same logical structure, and that language
is the only way to know and express reality 1. Wittgenstein, on the other hand, believed that the
meaning of a word is determined by its use in a language game, and that the meaning of a
sentence is determined by its use in a particular context 1. Both Bhartrhari and Wittgenstein
agree that there is no one-to-one relationship between words and objects, and that the meaning of
a word is not determined by its reference to an external object 1. However, Bhartrhari believed
that language can be explained as an enlightened lamp, which is almost like picture theory, while
Wittgenstein believed that the meaning of a word is determined by its use in a language game 1.
Bhartrhari also believed that the realm of ‘showable’ is beyond any expression, and that his
transcendental reality (Shabdadvaita) is beyond any expression 1. Wittgenstein, on the other
hand, rejected the idea of a private language, and believed that the meaning of a word is
determined by its use in a particular context 1.
Bhartrhari’s philosophy of language and reality is based on the idea that language and reality are
inseparable. He believed that language is the only way to know and express reality, and that the
structure of language is the same as the structure of reality 1. According to Bhartrhari, language
is not just a tool for communication, but it is also a means of understanding the world around us
1. He believed that the meaning of a word is not determined by its reference to an external
object, but rather by its relationship to other words in the language 1. Bhartrhari also believed
that language can be explained as an enlightened lamp, which is almost like picture theory 1. He
believed that language is a way of illuminating the world, and that it is the only way to know and
express reality 1.
Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language and reality is based on the idea that the meaning of a word
is determined by its use in a language game, and that the meaning of a sentence is determined by
its use in a particular context 1. According to Wittgenstein, the meaning of a word is not
determined by its reference to an external object, but rather by its use in a particular context 1.
He believed that the meaning of a word is not fixed, but rather it is constantly changing
depending on the context in which it is used 1. Wittgenstein also rejected the idea of a private
language, and believed that the meaning of a word is determined by its use in a particular context
1. He believed that language is a social activity, and that it is impossible to understand the
meaning of a word without understanding the social context in which it is used 1.
In conclusion, Bhartrhari and Wittgenstein had different views on the relationship between
language and reality, but both contributed significantly to the philosophy of language and reality.
While Bhartrhari believed that language and reality share the same logical structure, and that
language is the only way to know and express reality, Wittgenstein believed that the meaning of
a word is determined by its use in a language game, and that the meaning of a sentence is
determined by its use in a particular context. Both Bhartrhari and Wittgenstein agreed that there
is no one-to-one relationship between words and objects, and that the meaning of a word is not
determined by its reference to an external object. However, Bhartrhari believed that language can
be explained as an enlightened lamp, which is almost like picture theory, while Wittgenstein
believed that the meaning of a word is determined by its use in a language game. Bhartrhari also
believed that the realm of ‘showable’ is beyond any expression, and that his transcendental
reality (Shabdadvaita) is beyond any expression. Wittgenstein, on the other hand, rejected the
idea of a private language, and believed that the meaning of a word is determined by its use in a
particular context.

152
BHARTṚHARI ON LANGUAGE AND REALITY: SOME PHILOSOPHICAL
OBSERVATIONS!
ABIR DAS
It is a well known fact that the concept of language is one of the important
issues with which philosophy deals. Language reveals reality to us. There is a serious
philosophical debate among the linguistic philosophers regarding the nature of
language and reality, and also about the relationship between them. Different views
have been proposed by different philosophers on these issues. Most of the linguistic
philosophers maintain that language and reality are purely different. One is expresser
and another is expressed. But interestingly enough, Bhartṛhari, one of the greatest
linguistic philosophers and also a monist, claims that language and reality are same.
They are like the two sides of one and the same coin. Consequently, one cannot be
separated from another. Even though language reveals reality but Reality for him, is
Brahman and language is Śabda. Language is reality and reality is language. Reality
is not independent of language and vice-versa. As reality and language are
intertwined both of the terms Śabda and Brahman have been coined and called as
Śabdabrahman to designate both of them. For him, Śabdabrahman, on the one hand,
is the ultimate reality and on the other hand, this Śabdabrahman itself is the inner
meaning revealing language. Bhartṛhari claims that Śabdabrahman is the ultimate
reality out of which knowing souls, known objects and knowledge come into being.
Bhartṛhari is known as monist as he believes in one ultimate reality i.e the
Śabdabrahman. The Śabdabrahman, according to him, is without beginning and end
and it is also beyond all sorts of change and modifications though the whole world is
manifested from it through the process called evolution.1 Śabdabrahman creates the
root sound Aum, which is modified into the manifold world. It is modified into the
world of objects with the aid of time. Śabdabrahman is one but it appears as many.
This manyness or plurality is false. Plurality is simply imaginary. In fact, everything
in this world is actually the manifestation of one and the same Śabdabrahman and the
manifold differences of the manifested worldly objects are due to our ignorance.
Sabdabrahman is one but plurality is imposed upon it due to our avidyā (ignorance).
! I am thankful to my supervisor Dr. Nirmal Kumar Roy for his valuable guidance in framing
this paper.
153
One has to transcend it through the process of self realisation. An analysis and
reflection on the nature of the self is a means of knowing Śabdabrahman which is
known as the ultimate reality in Bhartṛhari’s philosophy.
Bhartṛhari holds that reality is one and he interprets the creation of this world
in terms of time (kāla). But it is important to note that the Kālaśakti is the inseparable
power of Śabdabrahman. Bhartṛhari says that Śabdabrahman(Reality) is revealed
through language and it is manifested into speech without affecting the true essence
of reality. Reality and Śabda both are intertwined each other and that is why the
object is not different from the word, as it is the word which has turned into the object
.
2 But it is important to point out here that Bhartṛhari technically uses the term Śabda
or language. He has given emphasise on the internal aspect of language, i.e. the
essence of language and following Bhartṛhari it can be said that the essence of
language is all about of reality. This is the reason why he says that the reality i.e. the
Śabdabrahman and language are inseparably related. In fact, language itself is reality.
It is language through which reality is revealed and it is revealed not as a separate
entity but as an integral part of language. In this sense Bhartṛhari claims that language
is reality.
According to Bhartṛhari there are five kinds of Pramāna i.e. Pratyakṣa,
Anumāna, Śabda, Adṛṣta, and Abhyāsa.
3Among them Śabda pramāna is most
important. Bhartṛhari observes that if knowledge does not assume the form of word
then it cannot be claimed as a knowledge.4 In this world no comprehension is possible
in isolation of speech. No knowledge will shine in the form of a recollection without
speech. It is a speech i.e. the word which makes recollection possible.5 According to
Bhartṛhari language is not just a conveyor rather it constitutes a vital part of thought,
because the cognitive faculty operates necessarily with the verbal faculty. For him, all
knowledge must culminate in verbal knowledge. So, language is the only window to
the world. The usage of language shapes our knowledge of reality. It is worthy to
note that the Vākyapadiya begins with a declaration that there is no world beyond
language and it ends up with a note that reality transcends language. In the second
kānda of Vākyapadiya Bhartṛhari refers to the keen relationship between language
and reality.6 He claims that a word is mere indicator like a lamp which reveals an
object. In the third kānda of Vākyapadiya Bhartṛhari shows how our analytical minds
154
sees diverse properties in a single object and accordingly manifest them in language.7
So, although language is just the one window to manifest the world, yet it is too small
to give us a complete picture of reality. The reality transcends or goes beyond the
range of language. Reality is never understood by an ordinary person; only Ŗsis are
capable of knowing it. Whatever the sages understand or perceive, they do it with
their senses and mind and use words according to figures existent in their mind.8
Language has thus no power enough to hold reality.
In the third kānda of Vākyapadiya, Bhartṛhari describes the vital role of
intellect in creating and shaping this reality. Thought at this buddhi or differentiated
stage of word sequences, perhaps is best understood as internal speaking. Madhyamā
vāk is chiefly associated with that intellect. Bhartṛhari claims that cognition of a
complete reality is not possible. So, it can be said that words based on such cognition
present objects different from their own form.9 There is no difference between a wise
person and an ignorant person as far as the cognition and the expression are
concerned.
Bhartṛhari says that due to the inherent incompetence of language and limited
nature of cognition language fails to reflect in its own form. Reality is so higher in
level that cannot be described by language. Thus language can never reach reality,
because when it ends, reality starts. So, it can be said that when Bhartṛhari claims that
language itself is a reality i.e. Śabdabrahman then by the term ‘language’ he means
the inner meaning revealing language and when our ignorance goes away after
exercising grammar then that inner meaning revealing language reveals as a reality
i.e. Śabdabrahman.
As far as our observation of Bhartṛhari’s philosophy is concerned we think
that Bhartṛhari’s philosophy suffers from some serious problems. There is no scope to
deal with all the problems in this paper. We are citing only the three problems out of
them. Bhartṛhari claims that the reality transcends the range of language. But he also
holds that language and reality are one and the same. Both of the statements cannot
be true at the same time. If reality and language are identical i.e. one and the same
then how one can transcend another and again if one transcend another then how one
can be identical with another? Secondly, if reality transcends language and both of
155
them are true then monism, the metaphysical position of Bhartṛhari cannot be
maintained.
Both of these problems appear to be serious. But we think these problems can
be resolved through the careful analysis of the Philosophy of Bhartṛhari. The
language as it is understood by Bhartṛhari, has altogether three layers- paśyanti,
madhyamā and vaikhari. Sometimes, Bhartṛhari distinguishes his language into two
halfs- internal and external. Internal language which is called by him as inner
meaning revealing language consists of two layers- paśyanti and madhyamā. The
external language which is described by him as verbal language is nothing but the
vaikhari level of language. Problems crop up only because he uses the term
‘language’ in different contexts in different senses. Sometimes he means inner-
meaning revealing language, sometimes verbal language and again sometimes both of
them taken together by using the same term ‘language’. When he says that language
and reality are identical then he uses the term language in the third sense mentioned.
But when he says that reality transcends language then he uses the term ‘language’ in
the second sense i.e. verbal noise. The moment we understand the different senses of
language in which it is used in the Philosophy of Bhartṛhari the problems resolve.
In the first śloka of Vākyapadiya one of the terms called akṣaram has been
used. A controversy is seen among the scholars exactly in which sense that term has
been used. According to some, the term akṣaram has been used to mean that
Śabdabrahman is something which is beyond destruction. But some of the thinkers
do not agree with them. They argue that the term anādinidhanaṁ already used in this
śloka states that Śabdabrahman is beyond both the creation and destruction.
Therefore, the term akṣaram cannot be used in the same sense. They hold that here
the term akṣaram has been used in the sense of alphabet. But it is important to point
out that here the alphabet (varna) stands for both the word and sentence. I think the
first alternative answer is more consistent and acceptable than the second one. The
term śabdatattva used in the first śloka clearly implies that the Brahman, the ultimate
reality, stands for śabda designating word, sentence, language etc. So, if the term
akṣaram is used in the same sense then it would be a mere repetition. But if the term
akṣaram is used to designate something beyond change and modification then it
would be more consistent and rational. I think the term anādinidhanaṁ and akṣaram
156
are not synonymous. Anādinidhanaṁ means something without having creation as
well as destruction. But the term akṣaram means something which is beyond the
change and modification. Though it is true that a thing which is without having the
creation and destruction must be beyond change and modification yet the two terms
are not synonymous. It is true that a father must be married yet the term father cannot
be synonymous with the term married. The same is true in the case of the two terms
anādinidhanaṁ and akṣaram used in that śloka. Actually, the two terms refer to one
and the same thing but their meanings are different. Thus it is proved that the first
alternative is more rational and consistent than the second one.
References
1. anādinidhanaṁ brahma śabdatattvaṁ yad akṣaram/ vivartate’rthabhāvena prakriyā
jagato yataḥ//
2. Bhartṛhari, Vākyapadiya, I.123.
3. VP.I. 35-40
4. VP.I.123: na so’sti pratyayolake ya śabdānugamāt ṛte/ anubiddham iva jñānam
sarvam śabdena bhāṣate//
5. Ibid.124: vāgrūpatā cet niṣkrāmet avabodhasya śāśvatī/ na prakāśaḥ prakāśeta sā hi
pratyavamarśīnī//
6. VP.II. 434
7. VP.III.14.571
8. VP.III. 3.53, rṣinām darśanaṁ yat ca tattve kimcid avasthitam/ na tena vyavahāro’sti
na tat śabdanibandhanam//
9. VP.III.3.54: akṛtṣnaviṣayābhāsam śabdaḥ pratyayamāśriṭaḥ/ artham āhanyarūpeṇa
svarūpeṇānirūpaṇam//
Bibliography:
! Bhattacharya Bishnupada: A study in Language and Meaning, Calcutta progressive
Publishers, Calcutta, 1962.
! Bhate Saroja and Kar Yashodhara: Word index to the Vākyapadiya of Bhartrhari,
Pratibha Prakashan, Delhi, 1992.
! Alston P.William: Philosophy of Language, Eastern Economy Edition, Prentice-Hall,
Inc.Engle Wood Cliffs, 1964.
! Chakravarty P.K: The Linguistic Speculations of the Hindus, Calcutta, University of
Calcutta, 1933.
! Chatterjee Satishchandra: The Nyāya Theory of Knowledge, University of Calcutta,
Calcutta, 1965.
! Bloomfield Leonard: Language, Motilal Banarasidass, New York, 1933.
! Das Karunasindhu: A Pāninian Approach to Philosophy of Language, Sanskrit
Pustak Bhandar 38, Calcutta, 1990.
! Coward Harold G: Sphota Theory of Language, Motilal Banarsidass Publication,
Delhi, 1980.
! Jha V.N: Studies in Language, Logic, and Epistemology, Pratibha Prakashan, 1986.
! Matilal B.K: Logic, Language and Reality, Motilal Banarsidass Publication, New
Delhi, 1985.
! Mazumdar Pradip Kumar: The Philosophy of Language, Sanskrit Pustak Bhandar,
Calcutta, 1977.

Ludwig Wittgenstein: Analysis of Language

 Wittgenstein
Life and Works
. . Picture Theory
. . Fact and Value
. . New Methods
. . Language Games
. . Private Language
Bibliography
Internet Sources

The direction of analytic philosophy in the twentieth century was altered not once but twice
by the enigmatic Austrian-British philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein. By his own philosophical
work and through his influence on several generations of other thinkers, Wittgenstein
transformed the nature of philosophical activity in the English-speaking world. From two distinct
approaches, he sought to show that traditional philosophical problems can be avoided entirely by
application of an appropriate methodology, one that focuses on analysis of language.

The "early" Wittgenstein worked closely with Russell and shared his conviction that the use
of mathematical logic held great promise for an understanding of the world. In the tightly-
structured declarationss of the Logische-Philosophische Abhandlung (Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus) (1922), Wittgenstein tried to spell out precisely what a logically constructed
language can (and cannot) be used to say. Its seven basic propositions simply state that language,
thought, and reality share a common structure, fully expressible in logical terms.

On Wittgenstein's view, the world consists entirely of facts. (Tractatus 1.1) Human beings
are aware of the facts by virtue of our mental representations or thoughts, which are most
fruitfully understood as picturing the way things are. (Tractatus 2.1) These thoughts are, in turn,
expressed in propostitions, whose form indicates the position of these facts within the nature of
reality as a whole and whose content presents the truth-conditions under which they correspond
to that reality. (Tractatus 4) Everything that is true—that is, all the facts that constitute the world
—can in principle be expressed by atomic sentences. Imagine a comprehensive list of all the true
sentences. They would picture all of the facts there are, and this would be an adequate
representation of the world as a whole.

The tautological expressions of logic occupy a special role in this language-scheme. Because
they are true under all conditions whatsoever, tautologies are literally nonsense: they convey no
information about what the facts truly are. But since they are true under all conditions
whatsoever, tautologies reveal the underlying structure of all language, thought, and reality.
(Tractatus 6.1) Thus, on Wittgenstein's view, the most significant logical features of the world are
not themselves additional facts about it.

What Cannot be Said

This is the major theme of the Tractatus as a whole: since propositions merely express facts
about the world, propositions in themselves are entirely devoid of value. The facts are just the
facts. Everything else, everything about which we care, everything that might render the world
meaningful, must reside elsewhere. (Tractatus 6.4) A properly logical language, Wittgenstein
held, deals only with what is true. Aesthetic judgments about what is beautiful and ethical
judgments about what is good cannot even be expressed within the logical language, since they
transcend what can be pictured in thought. They aren't facts. The achievement of a wholly
satisfactory description of the way things are would leave unanswered (but also unaskable) all of
the most significant questions with which traditional philosophy was concerned. (Tractatus 6.5)

Thus, even the philosophical achievements of the Tractatus itself are nothing more than
useful nonsense; once appreciated, they are themselves to be discarded. The book concludes with
the lone statement:

"Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent."

(Tractatus 7) This is a stark message indeed, for it renders literally unspeakable so much of
human life. As Wittgenstein's friend and colleague Frank Ramsey put it,
"What we can't say we can't say, and we can't whistle it either."

It was this carefully-delineated sense of what a logical language can properly express that
influenced members of the Vienna Circle in their formulation of the principles of logical
positivism. Wittgenstein himself supposed that there was nothing left for philosophers to do.
True to this conviction, he abandoned the discipline for nearly a decade.

New Directions
 By the time Wittgenstein returned to Cambridge in 1928, however, he had begun to
question the truth of his earlier pronouncements. The problem with logical analysis is that it
demands too much precision, both in the definition of words and in the representation of logical
structure. In ordinary language, applications of a word often bear only a "family resemblance" to
each other, and a variety of grammatical forms may be used to express the same basic thought.
But under these conditions, Wittgenstein now realized, the hope of developing an ideal formal
language that accurately pictures the world is not only impossibly difficult but also wrong-
headed.

During this fertile period, Wittgenstein published nothing, but worked through his new
notions in classroom lectures. Students who witnessed these presentations tried to convey both
the style and the content in their shared notes, which were later published as The Blue and Brown
Books (1958). G.E. Moore also sat in on Wittgenstein's lectures during the early thirties and
later published a summary of his own copious notes. What appears in these partial records is the
emergence of a new conception of philosophy.

The picture theory of meaning and logical atomism are untenable, Wittgenstein now
maintained, and there is no reason to hope that any better versions of these basic positions will
ever come along. Claims to have achieved a correct, final analysis of language are invariably
mistaken. Since philosophical problems arise from the intellectual bewilderment induced by the
misuse of language, the only way to resolve them is to use examples from ordinary language to
deflate the pretensions of traditional thought. The only legitimate role for philosophy, then, is as
a kind of therapy—a remedy for the bewitchment of human thought by philosophical language.
Careful attention to the actual usage of ordinary language should help avoid the conceptual
confusions that give rise to traditional difficulties.

Language as Game

On this conception of the philosophical enterprise, the vagueness of ordinary usage is not a
problem to be eliminated but rather the source of linguistic riches. It is misleading even to
attempt to fix the meaning of particular expressions by linking them referentially to things in the
world. The meaning of a word or phrase or proposition is nothing other than the set of (informal)
rules governing the use of the expression in actual life.

Like the rules of a game, Wittgenstein argued, these rules for the use of ordinary language
are neither right nor wrong, neither true nor false: they are merely useful for the particular
applications in which we apply them. The members of any community—cost accountants,
college students, or rap musicians, for example—develop ways of speaking that serve their needs
as a group, and these constitute the language-game (Moore's notes refer to the "system" of
language) they employ. Human beings at large constitute a greater community within which
similar, though more widely-shared, language-games get played. Although there is little to be
said in general about language as a whole, therefore, it may often be fruitful to consider in detail
the ways in which particular portions of the language are used.

Even the fundamental truths of arithmetic, Wittgenstein now supposed, are nothing more
than relatively stable ways of playing a particular language-game. This account rejects both
logicist and intuitionist views of mathematics in favor of a normative conception of its use. 2 + 3
= 5 is nothing other than a way we have collectively decided to speak and write, a handy, shared
language-game. The point once more is merely to clarify the way we use ordinary language
about numbers.

Pain and Private Language

One application of the new analytic technique that Wittgenstein himself worked out appears
in several connected sections of the posthumously-published Philosophical Investigations
(1953). In discussions of the concept of "understanding," traditional philosophers tended to
suppose that the operation of the human mind involves the continuous operation of an inner or
mental process of pure thinking. But Wittgenstein pointed out that if we did indeed have private
inner experiences, it would be possible to represent them in a corresponding language. On
detailed examination, however, he concluded that the very notion of such a private language is
utterly nonsensical.

If any of my experiences were entirely private, then the pain that I feel would surely be
among them. Yet other people commonly are said to know when I am in pain. Indeed,
Wittgenstein pointed out that I would never have learned the meaning of the word "pain" without
the aid of other people, none of whom have access to the supposed private sensations of pain that
I feel. For the word "pain" to have any meaning at all presupposes some sort of external
verification, a set of criteria for its correct application, and they must be accessible to others as
well as to myself. Thus, the traditional way of speaking about pain needs to be abandoned
altogether.

Notice that exactly the same kind of argument will work with respect to every other attempt
to speak about our supposedly inner experiences. There is no systematic way to coordinate the
use of words that express sensations of any kind with the actual sensations that are supposed to
occur within myself and other agents. Wittgenstein proposed that we imagine that each human
being carries a tiny box whose contents is observed only by its owner: even if we all agree to use
the word "beetle" to refer to what is in the box, there is no way to establish a non-linguistic
similarity between the contents of my own box and that of anyone else's. Just so, the use of
language for pains or other sensations can only be associated successfully with dispositions to
behave in certain ways. Pain is whatever makes someone (including me) writhe and groan.
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language and reality. some aspects of realism in the philosophy of language

VIOREL GHENEA

Taking into account these Wittgenstein’s ideas, I shall discuss the details of the problem of
the relation between language and reality in the case of two known philosophical points of view,
which are represented directly or indirectly by some critics of Realism

In the

philosophy; to which one can associate the tendency to tackle almost any philosophical
theme from the philosophy of language perspective. The problem of the relation between
language and reality is one of the fundamental themes of the philosophy of language and it refers
to many particular aspects such as the relation between meaning and reference, between truth
and information, the inscrutability of the reference, the ontological relativity and the problem of
the universal language.1

In the analytical philosophy we can see the presence of two poles, of two opposite
perspectives of the relation between language and reality.2 One of them represented among the
others,

1 For a good perspective of the main themes of the actual philosophy of language see Ion
Ceapraz, Probleme actuale ale filosofiei limbajului, Annals of the University of Craiova,
Filosofie-Sociologie-Ştiinţe Politice, No.1-2/1999-2000, pp.5-24.

2 Hugli, Anton, Lubcke, Poul (coord.), Filosofia în secolul XX, Vol 2 Teoria ştiinţei,
Filosofia analitică, Editura All, Bucureşti, 2003, p.396.

157
 20-th century we witness a true “linguistic turn” in

by Frege and Wittgenstein in his early philosophy, states that language is a means of
presenting and representing the reality and the main function of philosophy is to explain the way
in which the language represents the reality. The other perspective, which transpares from
Wittgenstein’s late philosophy, as well as from Austin, Strawson and Searle, states that the
language must not represent at first a reflection of the reality but point out different actions and
forms of social interaction. According to these philosophers, language must not be opposed to
reality, but it must be seen as a part of it and, thus, the philosophy of language must be the study
to describe the different functions of the language.

Wittgenstein’s case is a good example for sustaining both perspectives of philosophical

approach. On the one hand, in his early philosophy Wittgenstein sustains the existence of an
isomorphism between language and reality, and in his late philosophy, on the contrary, he states
that our language is made up of a series of language games. As John Searle observes, according
to Wittgenstein, we are not engaged into a single language game in which there are universal
standards of rationality and where everything is intelligible to anybody, but into a series of
language games, each of them having its own standards of understanding.3 In Tractatus logico-
philosophicus, both language and reality have a similar structure.4 Language consists of
propositions, compound of what is called “elementary propositions”, and these are compound of
names, which represent the last elements of our language. In its turn the world is made up of all
facts; facts are made up of “states of affairs” and these states are made up of objects. Each level
from the structure of the language corresponds to a level from the structure of the world. Thus,
the last elements of the world (the simple objects) correspond to the last elements of the language
(the names). By

3 Searle, John, Mind, Language and Society. Philosophy in the Real World, Phoenix,
London, 2000, p.4.

4 See A.C.Grayling, Wittgenstein, Editura Humanitas, Bucureşti, 2006, p.56 and next; see
also Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Editura Humanitas, Bucureşti, 2001;

158

combining the names results the elementary propositions. In the structure of the world, the
states of affaires correspond to these elementary propositions. The next level deals with
combining theme in propositions, i.e. facts. Thus, language appears as a representation (picture)
of reality. To this point of view one can associate a theory of meaning: “the meaning of a
sentence is its criterion of truth” this principle is the basis for the first perspective mentioned in
the philosophy of language. But, if in Tractatus Wittgenstein states that the meaning of a word
refers to the object it denotes, in the late philosophy –especially in Philosophical Investigations –
he considers that the understanding of a word represent its use in one of the language games.5
This principle could be re-formulated in: “the meaning of a word is its use” and it could be the
basis for the second perspective mentioned. Naturally these two principles are not compatible.

Taking into account these Wittgenstein’s ideas, we shall discuss the details of the problem of
the relation between language and reality in the case of two known philosophical points of view,
which are represented directly or indirectly by some critics of Realism, too. One of the critics of
Realism from the perspective of the philosophy of language is Michael Dummet. His theory is
different from the others in the sense that it is built on the two principles mentioned above.
According to Dummet the division between Realists and Anti-realists occurs inside the theory of
meaning. According to Realists the meaning of a sentence depends on the correspondence to a
state of affairs in the world, which might transcend our ability to detect it. According to the Anti-
realists the meaning of an assertoric sentence is given by the reference of a recognizable situation
that warrants its use.6 This is a epistemic theory of meaning. Although, Dummet seems to have a
neutral attitude towards the debates between realists and anti-

5 Ion Ceapraz, Similarities and Differences between L. Wittgenstein’s and W.V.O. Quine’s
Philosophy, in Mircea Flonta, Gheorghe Ştefanov (eds.), Ludwig Wittgenstein în filosofia
secolului XX, Polirom, Iaşi, 2002.

6 Michael Dummet, Realism in Michael J. Loux (ed), Metaphysics, Contemporary readings,

Rutledge, Taylor & Francis Group, London-New York, 2001, p.460.

159

realists, his point of view changes, suggesting that we should take seriously the anti-realist’s
theory of meaning. First Dummet defines the Realism of the theory of meaning on the basis of
three theses about the concept of meaning: the thesis of objectivity, the thesis of the truth
conditions and the thesis of Realism.7 The last one sustains that each statement has a very well
determinated truth value and that it doesn’t depend on the fact that we know or we could know
that a sentence has this quality. This thesis is contested by the Anti-realists because, to them, the
truth value of a statement depends only on the achievement of our truth criterion. Secondly, in
order to sustain the anti-realist’s arguments, Dummet uses Wittgenstein’s idea from his late
philosophy about the relationship between meaning and use. According to him, the meaning
consist of the understanding which the speaker has for a certain expression and it depends on his
capacity of using that expression. Rephrasing this principle of Wittgenstein’s, Dummet will
criticize Realism from a semantic perspective. First, he traces the difference between two kinds
of statements: effective decidable statements and undecidable statements. For the former type of
statements we can state, at least in principle, their value of truth. A statement such as: “My
neighbour’s dog weighs seven kilos” can be checked in a very simple way: we go to our
neighbour, we ask him to give us his dog and we weigh it. If the statement confirms our truth
conditions, then it is true, otherwise it is false. But statements such as: “Caesar had five skin-
spots”, “John has got a tooth-ache” or “If Hitler had invaded England in 1940, then Germany
would have won the war” –they can not be checked because we don’t have a criterion to decide
their truth value. These are called undecidable statements. According to Dummet, this distinction
between effective decidable and undecidable statements creates difficulties for realism of the
theory of meaning. If in the case of effective decidable statements we can say that we have the
right to consider that a statement is true or false, if it satisfies or not certain conditions of truth,
we can’t say the same

7 Hugli, Anton, Lubcke, Poul, op. cit., p.399. 160

thing in the case of the undecidables. That is why Dummet asks the Realists which are the
practical capacities which make him to attribute the truth value to some statements about which
we can’t say that they satisfy or not certain truth conditions.

Although it would seem that Realism is at deadlock, in the case of undecidables, there are
authors who consider that Dummet’s theory can’t be sustained because it is based on certain
wrong suppositions. Michael Devitt and Kim Sterelny sustain that, in fact, Dummet wrongly
identified the dispute of realism.8 He uses, as the positivists did, the principle of the verifiability
for the replacing the metaphysical problem of realism with a problem of language and to
demonstrate that realism is false. Although Dummet identifies the dispute of realism with a
semantic one, a definition such as: “the physical entities of the common sense are objectively
mind independent” given by the realists does not imply anything about language. It does not state
anything about linguistic entities either, it is a doctrine about “what it is and haw it is” and not a
theory of language.9 Under these conditions, we could say that Dummet has an absolutely
different vision about realism. All the above mentioned authors consider that is a mistake to
reduce the dispute of the realism to one about meaning, because, in the end, it will became one
about the nature of reality.10 On the other hand, Dummet tries to imply the idea that statements
don’t have other conditions of truth than those which can be verified. According to current of the
verifying, the competent speaker must be able to verify the statements he (she) uses and to
identify what the words refer to. For example, if we look at the word “Băsescu”, in order to be
capable to verify a sentence such as „Băsescu is bald”, we must identify Băsescu first. To this
idea based on a theory of identification the mentioned authors come with an opposite

8 Michael Devitt, Kim Sterelny, Limbaj şi realitate.O introducere în filosofia limbajului

Polirom, Iaşi, 2000, p.222 and next.
 9 In other words, it is an ontological theory and not a semantic one. Thus, it should be
remarked this tendency to reject the arguments against realism not only by bringing counter-
arguments, but also by eliminating them under the motivation that they are based on confusion:
Realism does not presuppose them!

10 Michael Devitt, Kim Sterelny, op.cit., p.224 161

argument: a person can use a word even when (s)he makes a mistake or when (s)he is totally
ignorant about the referent of it. So, I can refer to Băsescu when I use the word “Băsescu”
without knowing him or have ever seen him, not even on TV.

Another theory, which, through its consequences, could break the fundamentals of realism,
belongs to W.V.O. Quine and it is about the inscrutability of the reference and the radical
translation. If Dummet wanted to reject the realism in the case of the undecidables, Quine’s ideas
could represent a greater challenge to realism. Quine’s problem goes beyond the case of
undecidables by referring to everything we think or say. His theory about language begins with
Dewey’s ideas that language is a creation of society and we can get it through the observation of
the other’s behavior. Under these conditions “Meaning...is not a psychic existence: it is primarily
propriety of behaviour”.11 The first consequence of this idea would be that we can not accept a
semantics for which they are determinate, unique meanings of some words. Quine associates to
such an “uncritical” semantics the myth of a museum in which the exhibits are meanings and the
words are labels.12 If you want to change the language, you only have to change the labels.
Quine criticize this type of semantics in a behavioristic manner. According to him, we must not
see the meanings as something able to be determinated into our mind, something which could be
implied into our overt behavior. On the contrary, the meanings must be understood in terms of
our behaviour. In order to sustain these ideas, Quine shows us how we can get to know a word.
According to him, this process has got two stages: one during which we can become familiar
with the sound of the word and be able to reproduce it (the phonetic part) and the second, during
which we know how to use that word (the semantic part). The last part is more complex than the
former one, especially in the case of

11 John Dewey, Experience and Nature, La Salle, III: Open Court, 1925; repr. 1958, p. 179,
apud W.V.Quine, „Ontological Relativity” in Michael J. Loux (ed), Metaphysics, Contemporary
readings, Rutledge, Taylor & Francis Group, London-New York, 2001, p. 479.

12 W.V.Quine, „Ontological Relativity” în Michael J. Loux (ed), op.cit, p. 480. 162

 the words to which we can’t directly ascribing observable traits to things. In this case the
process of learning becomes more complex and more obscure, because the learner has no other
data but those of the overt behaviour of other speakers.

In order to sustain his ideas, Quine uses a well known example: a linguist must translate the
language of a newly discovered people. The only evidence that the linguist has access to is the
publicly accessible behaviour of the native speakers. But this is not enough to translate
everything the native speakers say. The radical translation is not determined in the sense that
different and incompatible translations of the native speakers’ language are compatible with the
behaviour evidence to which the linguist has access.13 The reference is, thus, inscrutable in the
case of the radical translation, because the linguist is not able to settle or to determine precisely
the reference of the different expressions of the native speakers’ language.14 Similarly,
Wittgenstein talks about the radical translation of a language totally different from ours as about
a heuristic procedure use to fully understand the language concepts, meaning and
understanding.15 In Philosophical Investigations he writes: “Suppose you came as an explorer
into an unknown country with a language quite strange to you. In what circumstances would you
say that the people there gave orders, understood them, obeyed them, and rebelled against them,
and so on? The common behaviour of mankind is the system of reference by means which we
interpret an unknown language”16 We can see that Wittgenstein also underlines the behavioristic
idea of learning a language as well as of using a language, but he rejects Quine’s behavioristic
method, which states that “the given” for the field linguist are the sensorial stimuli and the
responses to them. For

13 W.V.Quine, op.cit.p.481.

14 Quine gives the example the famous imaginary word gavagai , which can be understood
in various ways by a linguist, but its determined reference coming from the native speakers is not
accessible to him.

15 Ion Ceapraz, op.cit. p. 237.

16 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, G.E.M. Anscombe and R.Rhees

(eds.), Blackwell, Oxford, 1958, § 206, apud Ion Ceapraz, p.237; see also the Romanian
translation Ludwig Wittgenstein, Cercetări filosofice, Humanitas, Bucureşti, 2004, p.201.

163

such a linguist of Wittgenstein’s, this “given” represents the human forms of life. He can be
able to understand the native speakers’ language only trough connections with the rest of their
lives.17
 There are some important consequences of Quine’s example. It is possible that the same
empirical content to bear distinct organizations of a linguistic network.18 It is also possible for a
conceptual schema, which an individual has, because he speaks a language, to suffer successive
transformations although the empirical content of such a schema remains the same and it is also
possible for two speakers who use the same language and maybe the same words (let’s say in a
conversation) to differ their conceptual schemas considerably despite the fact that they have
added to their conceptual schemas the same empirical content.

We must admit the relevance of Quine’s theory as far as a language learning is concerned
and as the different confusions that can appear during an ordinary conversation, but we must also
pint out the fact that a behavioristic theory about meaning does not eliminate Realism. It can,
indeed, breakdown the metaphor of the museum used to determine the meaning, but referring to
the idea that words do not have unique, determined meanings, we can’t draw the conclusion that
there are no real objects to correspond to such words.

References

Ceapraz, Ion, Similarities and Differences between L. Wittgenstein’s and W.V.O. Quine’s
Philosophy, in Mircea Flonta, Gheorghe Ştefanov (eds.), Ludwig Wittgenstein în filosofia
secolului XX, Polirom, Iaşi, 2002;

Ceapraz, Ion, Probleme actuale ale filosofiei limbajului, Annals of the University of Craiova,
Filosofie-Sociologie-Ştiințe Politice, No.1-2/1999-2000;

Devitt, Michael, Sterelny, Kim, Limbaj şi realitate. O introducere în filosofia limbajului,

Polirom, Iaşi, 2000;

Dumitru, Mircea, Explorări logico-filozofice, Editura Humanitas, Bucureşti, 2004; Dummet,

Michael, Originile filosofiei analitice, Editura Dacia, Cluj-Napoca, 2004;

17 Ion Ceapraz, op.cit. p. 238.

18 Emil Ionescu, Adevăr şi limbă naturală, Editura All, Bucureşti, 1997, p.32 and next.

164

Dummet, Michael, Realism în Loux, Michael J. (ed), Metaphysics, Contemporary readings,

Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, London-New York, 2001;

Grayling, A.C., Wittgenstein, Humanitas, Bucureşti, 2006;

 Hugli, Anton, Lubcke, Poul (coord.), Filosofia în secolul XX, Vol 2 Teoria ştiinței, Filosofia
analitică, Editura All, Bucureşti, 2003;

Ionescu, Emil, Adevăr şi limbă naturală. O introducere în programul lui Donald Davidson,
Editura All, Bucureşti, 1997;

Miller, A., Realism, in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://plato.standford.edu/

realism;

Putnam, Hillary, A problem about Reference, în Loux, Michael J. (ed), Metaphysics,

Contemporary readings, Routledge,Taylor&Francis Group, London-New York, 2001;

Putnam, Hillary, Rațiune, adevăr şi istorie, Editura Tehnică, Bucureşti, 2005; Quine, W.V.,
Ontological Relativity, în Loux, Michael J. (ed), Metaphysics, Contemporary readings,
Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, London-New York, 2001;

Searle, John, Realitatea ca proiect social, Editura Polirom, Iaşi, 2000;

Searle, John, Mind, Language and Society. Philosophy in the Real World, Pheonix, London,
2000;

Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, G.E.M. Anscombe and R.Rhees (eds.),

Blackwell, Oxford, 1958;

Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Cercetări filosofice, Editura Humanitas, Bucureşti, 2004;

Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Editura Humanitas, Bucureşti, 2001;

Ludwig Wittgenstein and Bhartrhari are two philosophers who have made significant
contributions to the philosophy of language and reality. Wittgenstein’s work on language
and reality is divided into two main periods: the early and the later. In his early work,
Wittgenstein believed that language is a means of presenting and representing reality,
and the main function of philosophy is to explain the way in which language represents
reality. In his later work, Wittgenstein rejected the idea that language is somehow
separate and corresponding to reality, and he argued that concepts do not need clarity
for meaning 123.
Bhartrhari, on the other hand, holds the Tractarian thesis that the language and reality
share the same logical structure as he maintains that language is the only way to know
and express reality. There is no possibility of knowledge except as accompanied by
language. That is, “No object which is not expressed in words exists” 4. Bhartrhari also
talks about ‘usage’ and ‘context’ of an expression as determinant factors of meaning,
similar to Wittgenstein 4.
I found a paper that provides a comparative analysis of Wittgenstein and Bhartrhari’s
thoughts on language and reality. The paper is titled “Language and Reality: a
Wittgensteinian Reading of Bhartrhari” and is available at 4. The paper deconstructs
Bhartrhari’s thoughts on language and reality in a Wittgensteinian framework and
discusses issues such as one-to-one relationship between language and reality, use,
context, and language-games, and the inexpressible and privacy of language. The
paper also shows how Bhartrhari’s transcendental reality (Shabdadvaita) is beyond any
expression and how Bhartrhari supports Wittgenstein in his rejection of private language
even though Wittgenstein denies any role of ‘a flash of insight’ in determination of
meaning of an expression 4.
I hope this helps!

Next, we find that K J shah has written the similarities between the philosophy of
language of Wittgenstein and Bhartrihari. This has been published in Sibajiban
Bhattacharyya’s Word and Sentence; Two Perspectives:Bhartrhari and Wittgenstein.The
basic issues, in this context, are: (1) the one to one relationship between language and
reality, (2) use, context, and language-games, and (3) The Inexpressible and privacy of
language. Bhartrhari’s thought, in which language can be explained as an enlightened
lamp is similar to the picture theory of meaning. Moreover, like Wittgenstein, Bhartrhari
also talks about ‘usage’ and ‘context’ of an 2 expression as determinant factors of
meaning. Further, like the realm of ‘showable’ of Wittgenstein, Bhartrhari’s
transcendental reality (Shabdadvaita) is beyond any expression. There is a possibility to
show that Bhartrhari supports the idea of the rejection of private language, even though
Wittgenstein denies any role of ‘a flash of insight’ in determination of meaning of an
expression. Moreover, it would be enlightening to show as to whether Wittgenstein
would supportAbhihitanvayavada or Anvitabhidhanavada?

Certainly! Here is a schema that compares the thoughts of Bhartrhari and Wittgenstein
on language and reality:
Table

Aspect Bhartrhari Wittgenstein

Language and Reality Bhartrhari holds the Wittgenstein’s work
Tractarian thesis that on language and
the language and reality is divided into
reality share the same two main periods: the
logical structure as early and the later. In
he maintains that his early work,
language is the only Wittgenstein believed
way to know and that language is a
express reality. There means of presenting
is no possibility of and representing
knowledge except as reality, and the main
accompanied by function of
language. That is, philosophy is to
“No object which is explain the way in
not expressed in which language
words exists” 1. represents reality. In
his later work,
One-to-one Bhartrhari and Wittgenstein rejected
relationship between Wittgenstein both the idea that
language and reality reject the idea of a language is somehow
one-to-one separate and
relationship between corresponding to
language and reality. reality, and he argued
Bhartrhari talks about that concepts do not
‘usage’ and ‘context’ need clarity for
of an expression as meaning 234.
Inexpressible and Bhartrhari’s Wittgenstein rejected
privacy of language transcendental reality the idea of a private
(Shabdadvaita) is language 234.
beyond any
expression and how
Bhartrhari supports
Wittgenstein in his
rejection of private
language even
though Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein’s early philosophy is characterized by his views
on the relationship between language and reality. He believed
that language is not a reflection of reality, but rather a tool for
describing it. Wittgenstein’s view was that language is a
system of signs that are used to represent objects in the
world. He believed that the meaning of a word is determined
by its use in a particular context, and that the meaning of a
sentence is determined by the way its words are related to
one another1.
Wittgenstein’s early philosophy also emphasized the
importance of clarity in language. He believed that many
philosophical problems arise from the misuse of language,
and that these problems can be resolved by analyzing the
way language is used. Wittgenstein’s approach to language
analysis is known as the “language game” approach, which
involves examining the rules and conventions that govern
the use of language in different contexts1.
I hope this helps! Let me know if you have any other
questions.

Ludwig Wittgenstein, an Austrian-British philosopher, is

known for his contributions to the philosophy of language
and logic. Wittgenstein’s philosophy can be divided into two
periods: the early Wittgenstein and the later Wittgenstein.
The early Wittgenstein, as presented in his book “Tractatus
Logico-Philosophicus,” believed that language was a logical
system that could be used to represent the world. He
believed that the meaning of a sentence was derived from its
logical structure, and that this structure could be
represented by a picture. Wittgenstein believed that the
world was made up of atomic facts, and that these facts
could be represented by atomic propositions. He believed
that the logical structure of language mirrored the logical
structure of the world.
The later Wittgenstein, as presented in his book
“Philosophical Investigations,” rejected many of the ideas he
had put forth in the “Tractatus.” He believed that language
was not a logical system, but rather a collection of language
games. Wittgenstein believed that the meaning of a word was
derived from its use in a particular context, and that the
meaning of a sentence was derived from its use in a
particular language game. He believed that the meaning of a
sentence was not determined by its logical structure, but
rather by its use in a particular context.
In summary, the early Wittgenstein believed that language
was a logical system that could be used to represent the
world, while the later Wittgenstein believed that language
was a collection of language games and that the meaning of
a sentence was derived from its use in a particular context.
Both the early and later Wittgenstein contributed
significantly to the philosophy of language and logic, and
their ideas continue to be studied and debated by
philosophers today.

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244𝗒 IJRAR- International Journal of Research and Analytical Reviews ResearchPaper

How Language Expresses the World after Early Wittgenstein

NOOR BANU KHATUN
Research Scholar in Philosophy, University of Gour Banga, Mokdumpur, Malda,
West Bengal. India
Received: May 25, 2018 Accepted: July 15, 2018
ABSTRACT In twentieth century philosophy, Ludwig Wittgenstein holds a unique position as
far as his development of linguistic philosophy is concerned. We know his philosophy as early
(T.L.P) and later (P.I) Wittgenstein. His both philosophy is very important for us. Language is the
universal medium of communication. Only language can reveal the world. Ludwig Wittgenstein
is the most proponent of ideal language philosophy. He proposes the ideal language in his early
philosophy in Tractatus logico-Philosophicus. He says that language is the picture of the world or
reality. Wittgenstein also holds that language always is corresponding to the world and he also
prefers in T.L.P the semantic relationship between picture and reality, where picture is a model of
reality. Keywords:Language, world (reality), Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (T.L.P).
Introduction
During twentieth century philosophy, most of the analytic philosophers conceived that
philosophical problems are linguistic, because philosophical problems arise due to the
misinterpretation of language or misuse of language or ambiguity of the words or expressions or
definitions of language. Since Ludwig Wittgenstein emphasizes on language. Language is the
most important medium of our communication in our life. Only language can express the world.
There are two types of language viz. ideal language and ordinary language. However, in
twentieth century philosophy, most proponents of ideal language philosopher are …viz. Frege,
Russell, Carnap and Early Wittgenstein and so on. On the other hand, the most campaigners of
ordinary language philosopher are…viz. Strawson, Moore, Austin, Gilbert Ryle and later
Wittgenstein and so on. Wittgenstein emphasizes in his early position on ideal language. Because
he thinks that the ordinary language is ambiguous and vague. That is why he admits ideal
language in his TLP. He says that ideal language is best language for resolve all philosophical
problems. Because, this type of language is completely free from ambiguity or vagueness. The
ideal language is logical best language. How Language Expresses the World How do we know
the world? In response to the question Ludwig Wittgenstein argues that only through the
language we can know the world. But the question is how does language enable us to present the
world? In the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, he said language ought to represent the world.
Besides it is said that what is uttered should be logical and consistent. But it should also produce
the picture of the world. It is called picture theory of meaning. Wittgenstein was inspired and
influenced by a model which was used in a court to represent a traffic accident. Picture theory
takes the semantic relationship between the model and the situation (accident). This theory of
meaning requires that elements of the model should correspond to the elements of the situation.
However, this theory attempts to locate the connection between language and the world in
relation of picturing. For him, the basic goal of a linguistic act is to represent the world (reality)
accurately. He believes that language also acted as a picture or model or mirror. Beyond the
picture, there is no other cognitive meaning in language. A proposition is either true or false. If it
is true, it depicts state of affairs correctly. In saying, ‘The cat is on the mat’, I am trying such that
there is a cat is on the mat. This relationship (one to one) is also called as Isomorphism. It can be
also define as relation of mapping orrelation of resemblance. Isomorphism (one to one
corresponds) is established between languageand the world, and this is the essence of the picture
theory of meaning. Language overall is equal to the set of possible propositions, which in turn
corresponds to the totality of possible facts-“the world”. Here, the relation between language and
reality is as follows:
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ResearchPaper IJRAR- International Journal of Research and Analytical Reviews 245𝗒

Reality is expresses through the language and this language consists of propositions and in turn a
proposition consists of elementary proposition. A proposition corresponds to a fact and where as
an
elementary proposition denotes a state of affairs. Again a state of affairs consists of objects.
Object is
denoted by a name. However, an object is the ultimate ingredient of reality. On the other hand
name is the
ultimate ingredient of language. Both are unanalysable. In order to be meaningful at all, the
proposition
must mirror the logical properties of the possible state of affairs; it must share its internal
structure. Every
picture, Wittgenstein claims is also a logical picture. For a picture must have something in
common with
what it pictures in order to be capable of representing it at all – rightly and falsely – and this
common
property is termed “logical from”. For the picture is itself “fact”.
In order to say that picture theory of meaning or picture theory of language plays a main role in
Tractatus
Logico-Philosophicus. Wittgenstein describes in his T.L.P one to one correspondence relation
between
language and reality (world). According to him, a picture is a proposition. A proposition pictures
a fact.
Proposition is the constituent of language and fact is the constituent of reality. So Wittgenstein
picture
theory set to be a representational model of reality. For him the relationship between proposition
and fact is
to establish relationship between language and reality. An elementary proposition corresponds to
state of
affairs, which are combined by names. Again the proposition corresponds to facts, which is
combined to
form the reality. And finally language corresponds to reality, which is composed by proposition.
Thus the
language describes the world as well as we understand the world through language. According to
him
without language world cannot be expressed. It is also relevant to say that world cannot be the
totality of
things, but the totality of facts. For T.L.P, fact is a something which makes a proposition as either
true or
false. Fact is constituted by states of affair as well as states of affair are constituted by objects.
Fact has a
definite structure and proposition also has a definite structure. When fact is exist correspondingly
proposition is true otherwise it is to be a false proposition. In this way a proposition pictures a
fact. There is
a logical space as well as a specific similarity between the elements of the proposition and the
elements of
the fact. It is also say that there is a one to one correspondence relation between the elements of
the
proposition as well as the elements of the fact. However, there is a one to one correspondence
relation in
every of the structure of reality. In T.L.P Wittgenstein also says that a picture depicts reality by
representing
a possibility of existence or non-existence of states of affairs. The some totality of existence and
non-
existence of states of affairs is called reality. He also says that a picture is a model of reality.
Conclusion
From the above discussion it is clear that Wittgenstein explained the relationship between
language and
reality very well. Tractatus shows the representational view of the world through logical analysis
of
language. He clears the vagueness of words. But his logical and ideal position was so much rigid
that he
understood it himself. So he went for use theory of meaning and preferred ordinary language in
his later
position. Therefore he had taken a different approach by departing from ideal language to the
language
which is used in community or form of life. In Philosophical Investigations Wittgentein holds the
pragmatic
view. In this view a sentence or word is meaningful if it is used in ordinary day-to-day life. Here
meaningfulness is in terms of using. That is why; this view is so much supported and popular
among the
common people. In order to discuss the criteria of meaningfulness, he mentioned some notable
concepts in
his later position like language game, forms of life etc. Forms of life denote the habitual
activities of common
people in which word or sentence becomes meaningful. In this position he vehemently criticized
his own
previous conception regarding the language and meaning. He started to believe make other
believe so that
private language is not a language in proper.
The method changed, though the query regarding the relationship between language and reality
did not
stop. Wittgenstein has taken in his later work in Philosophical Investigations language as a game,
as an
activity which is governed by rules. Here language becomes meaningful not by corresponding to
the fact,
rather by its use in community, society or in Wittgenstein term ‘form of life’. According to
Wittgenstein there
is no philosophical problem as such, only due to the misinterpretation the confusion arises. In
later
Wittgenstein, the task of philosophy is to treat illness; it is more of a therapeutic use. However,
he is well
and unique in holding two different and totally opposite views in his own life.
References:
1. Black, Max, “Wittgenstein’s View About Language”, Indian Review of Philosophy, Vol. I,
January 1972.
2. Das, K.L., Philosophical Relevance of Language: A Methodological Reflection, Northern
Book Centre, New Delhi,
2006.
3. Kenny, Anthony, Wittgenstein, Penguin Press, 1973.
[VOLUME 5IISSUE 3 I JULY– SEPT 2018]E ISSN 2348 –1269, PRINT ISSN 2349-5138
246𝗒 IJRAR- International Journal of Research and Analytical Reviews ResearchPaper

4. Max Black, Wittgenstein’s Tractatus: A Guide, 1940, Cornel University Press.

5. Pitcher, G., The philosophy of Wittgenstein, Prentice-Hall of India Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi, 1985.
6. Pradhan, R. C., Recent Developments in Analytic Philosophy, Indian Council of Philosophical
Research, New
Delhi, 2001.
7. Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, tr. D.F. P ears & B.F. McGuinness,
London, Routedge,
1961.

Bhartrhari and Wittgenstein both believed that language and

reality are closely intertwined, but they had different views
on the relationship between them.
Bhartrhari believed that language and reality share the same
logical structure 1. He argued that language is the only way to
know and express reality, and that there is no possibility of
knowledge except as accompanied by language 1.
Bhartrhari’s thought may be characterized as part of the
shabdadvaita (word monistic) school of thought, which
asserts that cognition and language at an ultimate level are
ontologically identical concepts that refer to one supreme
reality, Brahman 2. Bhartrhari believed that the meaning of a
word is determined by its use in a particular context, and that
the meaning of a sentence is determined by the use of its
constituent words 1. Bhartrhari also believed that language is
not a mere reflection of reality, but rather an active
participant in shaping it 1.
Wittgenstein, on the other hand, believed that language and
reality are not one-to-one, but rather that language is a game
that we play with reality 3. He believed that the meaning of a
word is determined by its use in a particular language-game,
and that the meaning of a sentence is determined by the use
of its constituent words in that language-game 3.
Wittgenstein also believed that language is not a mirror of
reality, but rather a tool that we use to navigate it 3.
In summary, while both Bhartrhari and Wittgenstein believed
that language and reality are closely intertwined, Bhartrhari
believed that they share the same logical structure and that
language is the only way to know and express reality, while
Wittgenstein believed that language is a game that we play
with reality and that it is a tool that we use to navigate it.

According to Wittgenstein, a language-game is a concrete

social activity that involves the use of specific forms of
language 12. Wittgenstein believed that the meaning of a word
is determined by its use in a particular language-game, and
that the meaning of a sentence is determined by the use of
its constituent words in that language-game 1. Wittgenstein
also believed that language is not a mirror of reality, but
rather a tool that we use to navigate it 13.
In summary, Wittgenstein’s concept of a language-game
refers to the idea that language is not a fixed and universal
system, but rather a dynamic and context-dependent activity
that is shaped by its use in specific social contexts 123.N