PASSAGE - 1

The National Company Law Tribunal, Chandigarh Bench, comprising of Shri Harnam
Singh Thakur (Judicial Member) and Shri Subrata Kumar Dash (Technical Member),
while adjudicating a petition under Section 7 of Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016
(“IBC”) in Jammu Kashmir Bank Limited vs Ace Engineering (India) Pvt Ltd. has held
that even if, either the principal borrower or guarantor has been discharged then the
other party would not stand discharged automatically till the liability is met out or
discharged. Ace Engineering (India) Pvt. Ltd ("Corporate Debtor") availed credit loan
facilities and a secured overdraft facility from Jammu and Kashmir Bank Limited
("Financial Creditor"). The Corporate Debtor contended that the Financial Creditor had
already received payment in full and issued release letters to the guarantors. The
Financial Creditor countered that the Corporate Debtor still owed an outstanding
amount of 10.90 crores as of 30.06.2019. The Financial Creditor claimed that the
agreement with the Corporate Debtor and the deed of guarantee with the guarantors
were separate legal contracts, and that the letter dated 05.01.2018 did not absolve the
Corporate Debtor of its entire debt. The Tribunal relying on the judgment of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Lalit Kumar Jain vs UOI & Ors observed that the contract with the
principal borrower and the contract with the surety/guarantor stand on a completely
different footing under the provisions of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. It was further
observed that even though a civil suit has been filed between the parties, it would not
affect the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (“CIRP”) in view of the Decision of
the NCLAT in Harkirat S. Bedi vs Oriental Bank of Commerce, Company Appeal (AT)
(Ins) No. 499 of 2019 and Karan Goel vs. M/s. Pashupati Jwellers & Anr-Company
Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 1021 of 2019.
The Tribunal further held that the liability of the principal borrower and guarantor is
joint and several in a contract of guarantee. Hence even if either of them has been
discharged, the other party doesn’t stand automatically discharged till the liability is
met out or discharged. The Tribunal observed that in light of all the documents placed
before it, it was evident from the record that an amount of 10.11 crores was outstanding
with further interest from 31.10.2018 which amounts to debt and default. With the
aforesaid observations, the Tribunal admitted the petition and initiated CIRP
proceedings against the Corporate Debtor.
Source: Discharge Of Liability Of The Principal Burrower Or Guarantor Does Not
Automatically Discharge The Other In A Contract Of Guarantee: NCLT Chandigarh,
Live Law, March 20, 2023.

Q.1) Thomas owns a construction company called BuildFast Pvt. Ltd., which has taken a
loan and a secured overdraft facility from Mountain Bank. David, a wealthy
businessman, and James, another construction company owner, act as guarantors for
BuildFast's loan. BuildFast faces financial difficulties and fails to repay the loan in full. In
response, Mountain Bank issues release letters to David and James, stating that they are
no longer responsible for BuildFast's debt. BuildFast contends that Mountain Bank has
received payment in full and that the release letters absolve it of any further liability.
Mountain Bank, however, claims that BuildFast still owes an outstanding amount of 15
crores. Both the agreement with BuildFast and the deed of guarantee with David and
James are separate legal contracts. BuildFast and Mountain Bank are also involved in a
civil suit over the debt. Does the issuance of release letters to the guarantors absolve
BuildFast Pvt. Ltd. of its entire debt?
 A) Yes, because the release letters to the guarantors indicate that the loan has been
repaid in full.
B) No, because the release letters to the guarantors do not affect the separate
legal contracts between BuildFast and Mountain Bank.
C) Yes, because the release letters to the guarantors constitute a settlement
agreement between BuildFast and Mountain Bank.
D) No, because the release letters to the guarantors only discharge the guarantors,
not BuildFast.

Explanation: Option B is correct because the passage states that the agreement with the
Corporate Debtor and the deed of guarantee with the guarantors are separate legal
contracts. The release letters to the guarantors do not impact the separate legal
contracts between BuildFast and Mountain Bank. Option A is incorrect because the
passage states that the release letters to the guarantors do not automatically imply that
the loan has been repaid in full. The release letters only relate to the guarantors' liability.
Option C is incorrect because the passage does not mention any settlement agreement
between the parties, and the release letters to the guarantors do not constitute a
settlement agreement. Option D is incorrect because, although the release letters only
discharge the guarantors, they do not automatically absolve BuildFast of its entire debt.
The liability of the principal borrower and guarantor is joint and several in a contract of
guarantee, as mentioned in the passage.

Q.2) Anna runs a textile manufacturing company called FabriCo Pvt. Ltd., which has
taken a loan from Ocean Bank with two separate legal contracts – one between FabriCo
and Ocean Bank, and another between the guarantors, Emma and George, and Ocean
Bank. FabriCo encounters financial issues and is unable to repay the loan. Ocean Bank
releases Emma and George from their guarantee obligations but still claims that FabriCo
owes them an outstanding amount. In the meantime, FabriCo files a civil suit against
Ocean Bank, disputing the outstanding debt. Ocean Bank decides to initiate Corporate
Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) against FabriCo. Can the civil suit filed by FabriCo
against Ocean Bank impact the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP)?

A) Yes, the civil suit will halt the CIRP until the dispute is resolved.
B) No, the civil suit has no impact on the CIRP and will proceed independently.
C) Yes, the civil suit takes precedence over the CIRP, and the CIRP cannot be initiated
until the civil suit is resolved.
D) No, the civil suit will only impact the CIRP if FabriCo can prove that the loan has
been repaid in full.

Explanation: Option B is correct because the passage cites the decisions of the NCLAT in
Harkirat S. Bedi vs. Oriental Bank of Commerce and Karan Goel vs. M/s. Pashupati
Jwellers & Anr, which establish that a civil suit filed between the parties does not impact
the CIRP. The CIRP will proceed independently of the civil suit. Option A is incorrect
because the passage states that even though a civil suit has been filed between the
parties, it would not affect the CIRP. Option C is incorrect because the passage explicitly
states that the civil suit does not take precedence over the CIRP, and the CIRP can still be
initiated despite the ongoing civil suit. Option D is incorrect because the passage does
not mention any requirement for FabriCo to prove that the loan has been repaid in full
for the civil suit to impact the CIRP.
Q.3) Rachel operates a software development company called SoftServe Pvt. Ltd., which
has taken a loan from River Bank. Michael and Sarah act as guarantors for the loan. The
legal contracts between SoftServe and River Bank and the deed of guarantee with
Michael and Sarah are separate. SoftServe experiences financial trouble and cannot
repay the loan in full. River Bank seeks to recover the outstanding amount from
SoftServe, Michael, and Sarah. SoftServe argues that the Indian Contract Act, 1872, does
not apply to their contracts. Does the Indian Contract Act, 1872, apply to the contracts
between the principal borrower (SoftServe) and the surety/guarantor (Michael and
Sarah)?

A) Yes, the Indian Contract Act, 1872, applies to the contracts between the
principal borrower and the surety/guarantor.
B) No, the Indian Contract Act, 1872, does not apply to the contracts between the
principal borrower and the surety/guarantor.
C) Yes, but only if the contracts between the principal borrower and the
surety/guarantor are explicitly mentioned in the Indian Contract Act, 1872.
D) No, the Indian Contract Act, 1872, only applies to the contracts between the
principal borrower and the financial creditor.

Explanation: Option A is correct because the passage states that the Tribunal, relying on
the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Lalit Kumar Jain vs. UOI & Ors, observed
that the contract with the principal borrower and the contract with the
surety/guarantor stand on a completely different footing under the provisions of the
Indian Contract Act, 1872. This implies that the Indian Contract Act, 1872, applies to the
contracts between the principal borrower and the surety/guarantor. Option B is
incorrect because, as established in the passage, the Indian Contract Act, 1872, applies
to these contracts. Option C is incorrect because the passage does not mention any
requirement for the contracts between the principal borrower and the surety/guarantor
to be explicitly mentioned in the Indian Contract Act, 1872, for the Act to apply. Option D
is incorrect because the passage states that the Indian Contract Act, 1872, applies to the
contracts between the principal borrower and the surety/guarantor, not just the
contracts between the principal borrower and the financial creditor.

Q.4) Evelyn operates a pharmaceutical company called PharmaPro Pvt. Ltd., which has
taken a loan from Star Bank. Noah and Olivia act as guarantors for the loan. The legal
contracts between PharmaPro and Star Bank and the deed of guarantee with Noah and
Olivia are separate. PharmaPro faces financial difficulties and is unable to repay the loan
in full. Star Bank decides to recover the outstanding amount from PharmaPro and the
guarantors. PharmaPro argues that since Noah and Olivia have been discharged from
their guarantee obligations, PharmaPro should also be automatically discharged from its
liability. If either the principal borrower or the guarantor is discharged, would the other
party be automatically discharged from their liability?

A) Yes, if either the principal borrower or guarantor is discharged, the other party
would be automatically discharged from their liability.
B) Yes, but only if the discharge of the principal borrower or guarantor is based on a
mutual agreement between all parties involved.
 C) No, the other party would not be automatically discharged from their
liability until the liability is met out or discharged.
D) No, the other party would only be discharged from their liability if the principal
borrower or guarantor can prove that their discharge was legally justified.

Explanation: Option C is correct because the passage states that the other party would
not be automatically discharged from their liability till the liability is met out or
discharged. The Tribunal held that the liability of the principal borrower and guarantor
is joint and several in a contract of guarantee.Option A is incorrect because the passage
states that even if either the principal borrower or guarantor has been discharged, the
other party would not stand discharged automatically. Option B is incorrect because the
passage does not mention any requirement for a mutual agreement between all parties
involved for the automatic discharge of the other party when either the principal
borrower or guarantor is discharged. Option D is incorrect because the passage does not
mention any requirement for the principal borrower or guarantor to prove that their
discharge was legally justified for the other party to be discharged from their liability.

Q.5) In a contract of guarantee, if a guarantor has been discharged, can the creditor still
initiate CIRP against the principal borrower?

A) Yes, because the liability of the principal borrower and guarantor is joint
and several.
B) No, because the discharge of one party automatically discharges the other party.
C) It depends on the nature of the discharge and the terms of the contract.
D) It is not relevant to the initiation of CIRP proceedings.

Explanation: Option A is correct because the principle stated in the passage is that the
liability of the principal borrower and guarantor is joint and several in a contract of
guarantee, which means that each is liable for the entire debt. Therefore, if the
guarantor has been discharged, the creditor can still initiate CIRP proceedings against
the principal borrower as the latter is still liable for the outstanding debt. Option B is
incorrect because the principle stated in the passage is that the discharge of one party
does not automatically discharge the other party. In a contract of guarantee, the liability
of the principal borrower and guarantor is joint and several, which means that both
parties are equally liable for the debt, and the discharge of one party does not affect the
liability of the other. Option C is incorrect because the discharge of the guarantor may or
may not affect the liability of the principal borrower depending on the nature of the
discharge and the terms of the contract. However, the passage does not provide any
information on the nature of the discharge or the terms of the contract, so it is not
possible to determine the answer based on this information alone. Option D is incorrect
because the initiation of CIRP proceedings is directly relevant to the liability of the
principal borrower and guarantor in a contract of guarantee. If there is outstanding debt
and default, the creditor can initiate CIRP proceedings against the principal borrower,
even if the guarantor has been discharged. Therefore, this option is not a correct answer.

Q.6) In a contract of guarantee, can a civil suit between the parties affect the Corporate
Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP)?
A) Yes, because a civil suit between the parties may determine the liability of the
principal borrower and guarantor.
 B) It depends on the outcome of the civil suit and the terms of the contract.
C) It is not relevant to the initiation of CIRP proceedings.
D) No, because the contract with the principal borrower and the contract with
the guarantor stand on a completely different footing.

Explanation: Option D is correct because the principle stated in the passage is that the
contract with the principal borrower and the contract with the guarantor stand on a
completely different footing. Therefore, a civil suit between the parties would not affect
the CIRP, as the terms and conditions of the contract with the guarantor are different
from those of the contract with the principal borrower. Option A is incorrect because the
passage states that even if a civil suit has been filed between the parties, it would not
affect the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) in view of the Decision of the
NCLAT in Harkirat S. Bedi vs Oriental Bank of Commerce, Company Appeal (AT) (Ins)
No. 499 of 2019 and Karan Goel vs. M/s. Pashupati Jwellers & Anr-Company Appeal (AT)
(Insolvency) No. 1021 of 2019. Therefore, a civil suit between the parties would not
affect the CIRP in a contract of guarantee, and this option is not a correct answer. Option
B is incorrect because the passage does not provide any information on the outcome of
the civil suit or the terms of the contract. Therefore, it is not possible to determine the
answer based on this information alone. Option C is incorrect because the initiation of
CIRP proceedings is directly relevant to the liability of the principal borrower and
guarantor in a contract of guarantee. If there is outstanding debt and default, the
creditor can initiate CIRP proceedings against the principal borrower, even if there is a
civil suit between the parties. Therefore, this option is not a correct answer.
Passage – 2
Pawan Khera, the chairman of the media and publicity department of the All India
Congress Committee, was granted interim bail by the Supreme Court after being
arrested by Assam Police for alleged hate speech. The FIRs registered against Khera
across different states cited various offences, including promoting enmity between
religions, criminal conspiracy, and assertions prejudicial to national integration. The
invocation of such laws is often criticised for restricting free speech and misusing legal
processes for political purposes. Section 153A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) penalises
"promoting enmity between different groups on grounds of religion, race, place of birth,
residence, language, etc., and doing acts prejudicial to maintenance of harmony." This
provision was enacted in 1898 and made cognisable in 1969. Hate speech laws have
been invoked by all political parties to suppress criticism of public functionaries and to
arrest individuals. The rate of conviction for Section 153A is very low, and the
registration of multiple FIRs across different states drains the accused's resources to
secure legal representation. The Supreme Court has laid down guidelines to curb
indiscriminate arrests and has mandated prior sanction from the government for
initiating prosecution under Sections 153A and 153B. The SC has also required the state
to prove intent to secure a conviction under Section 153A. In releasing Khera on interim
bail, the Supreme Court expressed disillusionment over the words used by Khera against
Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Khera's release on interim bail was granted "in order to
protect the petitioner until such date as he applies for regular bail before the
jurisdictional court upon the FIRs being transferred to one and the same jurisdiction."
Khera expressed gratitude to the Supreme Court for upholding his liberties and accused
Assam Police of arresting him illegally without serving any notice. He stated that he was
fighting for his country, his rights as a citizen, and the Constitution. The Supreme Court's
2021 ruling required the prosecution to prove the existence of mens rea, the intention to
cause disorder or incite people to violence, for securing a conviction under Section
153A. The court further stated that the words used in the alleged criminal speech
should be judged from the standards of reasonable, strong-minded, firm, and
courageous men, and not those of weak and vacillating minds. The court also clarified
that the standard of an ordinary reasonable man, or "the man on the top of a Clapham
omnibus," should be applied. Hate speech laws have been criticised for their broad
wording, leading to their misuse. While safeguards exist to prevent their misuse, the
process itself can become a punishment due to the registration of multiple FIRs and the
drain on the accused's resources.
Source: Pawan Khera arrest | Section 153A: its use and misuse, Indian Express,
Feb 25, 2023.

Q.1) Arjun, a well-known political analyst, posts a video on social media criticizing the
policies of the ruling party and the Prime Minister's leadership. In his video, he uses
strong language and points out what he believes are the major flaws in the government's
approach to various issues. Soon after, members of the ruling party file multiple FIRs
against Arjun across different states, accusing him of promoting enmity between
religions, criminal conspiracy, and assertions prejudicial to national integration under
Section 153A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). Considering the factual situation, is the
invocation of hate speech laws against Arjun justified, or is it a misuse of legal processes
for political purposes?
 A) Justified, because Arjun's criticism of the ruling party and the Prime Minister is
sufficient to warrant the invocation of Section 153A of the IPC.
B) Justified, because Arjun's use of strong language against the government is likely
to incite violence and disorder among the public.
C) Misuse of legal processes, because the ruling party is using the hate speech
laws to suppress criticism of public functionaries.
D) Misuse of legal processes, because the ruling party is using the hate speech laws
to harass Arjun by filing multiple FIRs across different states.

Explanation: Option C is correct because the passage states that the invocation of such
laws is often criticized for restricting free speech and misusing legal processes for
political purposes, which aligns with the ruling party's intentions to suppress criticism
of public functionaries in this factual situation. Option A is incorrect because the
passage states that hate speech laws have been invoked by all political parties to
suppress criticism of public functionaries and to arrest individuals, implying that
criticism alone is not enough to warrant the invocation of Section 153A. Option B is
incorrect because the passage states that the Supreme Court requires the prosecution to
prove the existence of mens rea, the intention to cause disorder or incite people to
violence, for securing a conviction under Section 153A, and there is no mention of
Arjun's intention in the factual situation. Option D is incorrect because, while the
passage acknowledges the registration of multiple FIRs across different states drains the
accused's resources, it does not specifically state that this practice is a misuse of legal
processes in itself.

Q.2) Rohit, a journalist, publishes an article in a national newspaper, highlighting issues

of discrimination against a particular religious group. In response, a local political leader
files a complaint against Rohit under Section 153A of the IPC, accusing him of promoting
enmity between different groups on grounds of religion. The local police, without
obtaining prior sanction from the government, arrest Rohit and initiate prosecution.
Herein, is the arrest and prosecution of Rohit in compliance with the Supreme Court's
guidelines and requirements for initiating prosecution under Sections 153A and 153B of
the IPC?

A) Yes, because Rohit's article highlights issues of discrimination, which could be

considered as promoting enmity between different groups on grounds of
religion.
B) No, because the police arrested Rohit without obtaining prior sanction
from the government, which is a requirement as per the Supreme Court's
guidelines.
C) Yes, because the arrest of Rohit is in the public interest to maintain harmony
between different religious groups.
D) No, because Rohit's article does not specifically mention any intent to cause
disorder or incite people to violence, as required by the Supreme Court's
guidelines.

Explanation: Option B is correct because the passage states that the Supreme Court has
laid down guidelines to curb indiscriminate arrests and has mandated prior sanction
from the government for initiating prosecution under Sections 153A and 153B, which
was not followed in Rohit's case.Option A is incorrect because the passage states that
the Supreme Court has mandated prior sanction from the government for initiating
prosecution under Sections 153A and 153B, regardless of the content of the alleged hate
speech. Option C is incorrect because, although maintaining harmony is important, the
passage states that the Supreme Court's guidelines require prior sanction from the
government for initiating prosecution under Sections 153A and 153B, which was not
obtained in this case. Option D is incorrect because, while the Supreme Court does
require the state to prove intent to secure a conviction under Section 153A, the question
pertains to the arrest and initiation of prosecution, not the conviction itself.

Q.3) Meera, a political activist, organizes a protest against the government's policies
affecting a particular ethnic group. During the protest, Meera delivers a passionate
speech that some attendees interpret as promoting enmity between different groups on
grounds of ethnicity. Consequently, Meera is arrested and charged under Section 153A
of the IPC. However, there is no concrete evidence of Meera's intention to cause disorder
or incite people to violence. Given the factual situation, is the prosecution likely to
secure a conviction against Meera under Section 153A of the IPC, considering the
Supreme Court's requirement for the state to prove intent?

A) Yes, because Meera's passionate speech at the protest can be interpreted as

promoting enmity between different groups on grounds of ethnicity.
B) No, because there is no concrete evidence of Meera's intention to cause
disorder or incite people to violence, as required by the Supreme Court.
C) Yes, because the protest organized by Meera demonstrates her intention to
challenge the government's policies and create unrest.
D) No, because the Supreme Court only requires the state to prove intent when
there are multiple FIRs filed against the accused.

Explanation: Option B is correct because the passage states that the Supreme Court
requires the state to prove intent to cause disorder or incite people to violence for
securing a conviction under Section 153A, and there is no concrete evidence of Meera's
intention in the factual situation. Option A is incorrect because, while the passage
acknowledges that Section 153A penalizes promoting enmity between different groups,
the Supreme Court requires the state to prove intent to cause disorder or incite people
to violence in order to secure a conviction under Section 153A. Option C is incorrect
because the passage states that the Supreme Court requires the state to prove intent to
cause disorder or incite people to violence, not merely challenging government policies
or creating unrest. Option D is incorrect because the passage does not limit the Supreme
Court's requirement for the state to prove intent only to cases with multiple FIRs.

Q.4) Suresh, a comedian, performs a satirical stand-up routine in which he makes fun of
various political leaders and their policies. While the majority of the audience finds his
performance humorous, a small group of people feel offended and believe that Suresh's
jokes promote enmity between different groups on grounds of political ideology.
Subsequently, Suresh is charged under Section 153A of the IPC. During the trial, the
court assesses the content of Suresh's performance. In determining whether Suresh's
satirical stand-up routine constitutes criminal speech under Section 153A of the IPC,
should the court apply the standard of an ordinary reasonable man or "the man on the
top of a Clapham omnibus" as per the Supreme Court's clarification?
 A) Yes, because the Supreme Court clarified that the standard of an ordinary
reasonable man should be applied when judging the words used in alleged
criminal speech.
B) No, because the Supreme Court's standard of "the man on the top of a Clapham
omnibus" only applies to cases involving promoting enmity on grounds of
religion, race, or other protected categories.
C) Yes, because the court must consider the perspective of a reasonable person who
understands the satirical nature of Suresh's performance.
D) No, because Suresh's stand-up routine is meant for entertainment purposes and
should not be subject to the same standard as other forms of speech.

Explanation: Option A is correct because the passage states that the court clarified that
the standard of an ordinary reasonable man, or "the man on the top of a Clapham
omnibus," should be applied when judging the words used in alleged criminal speech.
Option B is incorrect because the passage does not limit the application of the "the man
on the top of a Clapham omnibus" standard only to cases involving specific protected
categories. Option C is incorrect because, although it touches upon the reasonable
person's perspective, it does not directly reference the Supreme Court's clarification
regarding the standard to be applied. Option D is incorrect because the passage does not
mention any exceptions to the standard for different forms of speech or for
entertainment purposes.

Q.5) Based on the Supreme Court's guidelines and the 2021 ruling, which of the
following elements is essential for securing a conviction under Section 153A of the
Indian Penal Code?

A) The accused must have prior criminal records.

B) The prosecution must prove the existence of mens rea.
C) The accused must be a public functionary.
D) The words used in the alleged speech must be offensive to the majority of people.

Explanation: Option B is correct because the passage states that the Supreme Court's
2021 ruling requires the prosecution to prove the existence of mens rea, the intention to
cause disorder or incite people to violence, for securing a conviction under Section
153A. Option A is incorrect because the passage does not mention that having a prior
criminal record is a requirement for securing a conviction under Section 153A. The
focus is on proving the intention to cause disorder or incite violence. Option C is
incorrect because the passage does not specify that the accused must be a public
functionary. Section 153A applies to anyone who promotes enmity between different
groups based on religion, race, place of birth, residence, language, etc. Option D is
incorrect because the passage states that the words used in the alleged criminal speech
should be judged from the standards of reasonable, strong-minded, firm, and
courageous men, and not those of weak and vacillating minds, rather than the majority
of people.

Q.6) According to the passage, which of the following safeguards has the Supreme Court
mandated to curb the indiscriminate arrests under Sections 153A and 153B of the
Indian Penal Code?
 A) Mandating prior sanction from the government for initiating prosecution.
B) Requiring a 72-hour notice before arresting the accused.
C) Ensuring the accused has sufficient resources to secure legal representation.
D) Granting automatic interim bail to the accused upon arrest.

Explanation: Option A is correct because the passage states that the Supreme Court has
mandated prior sanction from the government for initiating prosecution under Sections
153A and 153B as a safeguard against misuse of hate speech laws. Option B is incorrect
because the passage does not mention a 72-hour notice requirement before arresting
the accused. Instead, it focuses on prior government sanction and proving intent to
secure a conviction under Section 153A. Option C is incorrect because the passage does
not mention ensuring the accused has sufficient resources to secure legal representation
as a safeguard. It does, however, mention the drain on the accused's resources due to
multiple FIRs as a challenge. Option D is incorrect because the passage does not state
that granting automatic interim bail is a safeguard. It does mention Khera's interim bail,
but it was granted in his specific case to protect him until he applies for regular bail.
PASSAGE – 3
The Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh High Court has quashed a criminal complaint filed
under the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 against the directors of a company on the
ground that the complaint did not spell out how the accused were in charge or
responsible for the company. The court noted that there is no provision in the Penal
Code to attach vicarious liability to the managing director, directors, or employees of a
company. The bench observed that no vicarious liability can be attached to officers of a
company unless the statute specifically provides so. The court also explained that when
a company commits an offence, every person in charge of the business at the time of the
contravention is deemed to be guilty. However, the complaint did not specify how the
accused were in charge or responsible for the company. The court concluded that the
complaint was an abuse of process of law and quashed the complaint and the
cognizance order passed by the court of the judicial magistrate against the petitioner-
directors. The court cited the principle that the state of mind of managers is the state of
mind of the company and is treated by the law as such. However, the court clarified that
one cannot presume that officers of a company are responsible for all acts committed by
or on behalf of the company as it depends on the respective roles assigned to the officers
or employees of the company.
The court further observed that if a group of persons responsible for the business of the
company commit an offence, the criminal intent of the group of persons is imputed to
the company and the directors or proprietors of the company are the "alter ego" of the
company. However, in this case, there was nothing in the complaint to suggest that the
accused were responsible for the acts committed on behalf of the company. The court
explained that although the company is a corporate entity that performs its functions
through its officers, including the chairman, managing director, and directors, no
vicarious liability can be attached to these officers unless the statute specifically
provides so. The court referred to Section 10 of the Essential Commodities Act, which
postulates that when a company commits an offence, every person who, at the time the
contravention was committed, was in charge of the conduct of the business is deemed to
be guilty of the contravention. However, the court noted that the complaint did not
specify how or in what manner the accused were in charge of or responsible for the
company. Therefore, the court held that the complaint was an abuse of process of law
and quashed it. In view of the same the court found merit in the petition and quashed
the complaint and discharged the petitioners.
Source: When Company Is An Offender, No Vicarious Liability Can Be Attached To
Its Officers Unless Statute Specifically Provides So: Jammu & Kashmir High Court,
Live Law, March 13, 2023.

Q.1) ABC Corp, a company involved in the production and distribution of essential
commodities, is accused of violating the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. The directors
of ABC Corp include Jack, the managing director, Jill, the marketing director, and Jane,
the finance director. The violation allegedly occurred during a time when Jack was on
vacation, and Jill and Jane were responsible for overseeing the company's operations.
The government filed a criminal complaint against Jack, Jill, and Jane, alleging that they
were vicariously liable for the company's actions. However, the complaint did not
explain how Jack, Jill, and Jane were in charge or responsible for the company during the
contravention. Herein, which of the following statements best explains the legal position
of Jack, Jill, and Jane regarding their vicarious liability?
 A) Jack, Jill, and Jane are automatically liable for the company's actions because they
are directors of the company.
B) Jack, Jill, and Jane can only be held liable if the statute specifically provides
for vicarious liability for officers of the company, and if it is proven that
they were in charge or responsible for the company during the
contravention.
C) Jack, Jill, and Jane are not liable for the company's actions because they were not
the ones who directly committed the violation.
D) Jack, Jill, and Jane are liable for the company's actions because the state of mind
of the directors is the state of mind of the company.

Explanation: Option B is correct because the passage states that no vicarious liability
can be attached to officers of a company unless the statute specifically provides so, and
the court noted that the complaint did not specify how the accused were in charge or
responsible for the company. Option A is incorrect because the passage states that one
cannot presume that officers of a company are responsible for all acts committed by or
on behalf of the company as it depends on the respective roles assigned to the officers or
employees of the company. Option C is incorrect because the passage states that when a
company commits an offence, every person in charge of the business at the time of the
contravention is deemed to be guilty. The issue here is not about direct involvement but
rather about whether they were in charge or responsible for the company during the
contravention. Option D is incorrect because the passage explains that the principle that
the state of mind of managers is the state of mind of the company is a factor to consider,
but it does not automatically make the officers liable for the company's actions. The
liability depends on the respective roles assigned to the officers or employees of the
company and whether the statute specifically provides for vicarious liability for officers.

Q.2) DEF Corp, a company involved in the pharmaceutical industry, is accused of

violating the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. The board of directors of DEF Corp
includes Tom, the CEO, Tim, the COO, and Tina, the CFO. During a period when Tim and
Tina were on a business trip, Tom was overseeing the company's operations. The
government filed a criminal complaint against Tom, Tim, and Tina, alleging that they
were vicariously liable for the company's actions. The complaint mentioned that the
accused were directors of the company but did not provide details on their roles or how
they were in charge or responsible for the company during the contravention. Herein,
what is the legal position of the criminal complaint filed against Tom, Tim, and Tina?

A) The complaint is valid because it names the accused and their positions within
the company.
B) The complaint is valid because it alleges that the accused were vicariously liable
for the company's actions.
C) The complaint is invalid because it does not explain how or in what manner
the accused were in charge or responsible for the company.
D) The complaint is invalid because it did not mention the specific provisions of the
Essential Commodities Act that were violated.

Explanation: Option C is correct because the passage clearly states that the complaint
must specify how or in what manner the accused were in charge of or responsible for
the company. In this case, the complaint did not provide details on their roles or how
they were in charge or responsible for the company during the contravention. Option A
is incorrect because the passage states that the complaint must specify how the accused
were in charge or responsible for the company, and simply naming the accused and their
positions within the company is not enough. Option B is incorrect because the passage
emphasizes that a valid complaint must explain how the accused were in charge or
responsible for the company during the contravention, not just allege that they were
vicariously liable. Option D is incorrect because, although specifying the provisions of
the Essential Commodities Act that were violated is essential, the main issue in this
question and passage is the requirement to explain how the accused were in charge or
responsible for the company during the contravention.

Q.3) GHI Corp, a company involved in the agricultural sector, is accused of violating the
Essential Commodities Act, 1955. The board of directors of GHI Corp includes Larry, the
CEO, Laura, the COO, and Linda, the CFO. During a period when GHI Corp allegedly
committed the violation, Larry, Laura, and Linda were actively involved in overseeing
the company's operations. The government filed a criminal complaint against them,
alleging that they were vicariously liable for the company's actions. The complaint
provided details of their respective roles and how they were in charge or responsible for
the company during the contravention. The defense argued that the accused had no
knowledge of the violation and had no intention to commit the offense. Herein, can the
state of mind of Larry, Laura, and Linda be considered the state of mind of GHI Corp, and
can they be held vicariously liable for the company's actions?

A) Yes, because the state of mind of managers is always the state of mind of the
company.
B) No, because the accused had no knowledge of the violation and had no intention
to commit the offense.
C) Yes, because the complaint provided details of their respective roles and
how they were in charge or responsible for the company during the
contravention.
D) No, because vicarious liability cannot be attached to officers of a company unless
the statute specifically provides so.

Explanation: Option C is correct because the passage emphasizes that the complaint
must specify how the accused were in charge or responsible for the company, and in this
case, the complaint provided details of their respective roles and how they were in
charge or responsible for the company during the contravention. The state of mind of
the managers may be considered the state of mind of the company in this situation.
Option A is incorrect because the passage states that the principle that the state of mind
of managers is the state of mind of the company is a factor to consider, but it does not
automatically make the officers liable for the company's actions. Option B is incorrect
because, according to the passage, when a company commits an offence, every person in
charge of the business at the time of the contravention is deemed to be guilty. The issue
here is not about knowledge or intention but rather about whether they were in charge
or responsible for the company during the contravention. Option D is incorrect because
the passage states that no vicarious liability can be attached to officers of a company
unless the statute specifically provides so, but in this case, the complaint provided
details of their respective roles and how they were in charge or responsible for the
company during the contravention, which satisfies the requirement for attaching
vicarious liability.

Q.4) JKL Corp, a company involved in the food industry, is accused of violating the
Essential Commodities Act, 1955. The board of directors of JKL Corp includes Mark, the
CEO, Mary, the COO, and Mike, the CFO. During a period when JKL Corp allegedly
committed the violation, Mark, Mary, and Mike were actively involved in overseeing the
company's operations and were directly responsible for the business decisions that led
to the violation. The government filed a criminal complaint against them, alleging that
they were vicariously liable for the company's actions. The complaint provided details of
their respective roles and how they were in charge or responsible for the company
during the contravention. Herein, can Mark, Mary, and Mike be considered the "alter
ego" of JKL Corp and held vicariously liable for the company's actions?

A) Yes, because they were directly responsible for the business decisions that
led to the violation.
B) No, because the concept of "alter ego" does not apply to the directors or
proprietors of a company.
C) Yes, because the complaint provided details of their respective roles and how
they were in charge or responsible for the company during the contravention.
D) No, because the state of mind of managers is not always the state of mind of the
company.

Explanation: Option A is correct because the passage states that if a group of persons
responsible for the business of the company commits an offence, the criminal intent of
the group of persons is imputed to the company, and the directors or proprietors of the
company are the "alter ego" of the company. In this case, Mark, Mary, and Mike were
directly responsible for the business decisions that led to the violation. Option B is
incorrect because the passage specifically mentions the concept of "alter ego" in relation
to the directors or proprietors of a company when they are responsible for the business
decisions that led to the violation. Option C is incorrect because, although the complaint
provided details of their respective roles and how they were in charge or responsible for
the company during the contravention, the main reason they can be considered the
"alter ego" of JKL Corp is that they were directly responsible for the business decisions
that led to the violation. Option D is incorrect because the passage explains that the
principle that the state of mind of managers is the state of mind of the company is a
factor to consider, but the main reason Mark, Mary, and Mike can be considered the
"alter ego" of JKL Corp is that they were directly responsible for the business decisions
that led to the violation.

Q.5) In the context of the passage, under what circumstances can the managing director,
directors, or employees of a company be held vicariously liable for an offence committed
by the company under the Essential Commodities Act, 1955?

A) If the company commits an offence, the officers are automatically liable.

B) The officers are liable only if the statute specifically provides for it and they
were in charge of the business at the time of the contravention.
C) The officers are liable if they had prior knowledge of the offence committed by
the company.
 D) The officers are liable if they were negligent in their supervision of the company.

Explanation: Option B is correct because the court observed that no vicarious liability
can be attached to officers of a company unless the statute specifically provides so.
Furthermore, the court referred to Section 10 of the Essential Commodities Act, which
states that when a company commits an offence, every person who, at the time the
contravention was committed, was in charge of the conduct of the business is deemed to
be guilty of the contravention. Option A is incorrect because the passage states that one
cannot presume that officers of a company are responsible for all acts committed by or
on behalf of the company. Vicarious liability depends on the respective roles assigned to
the officers or employees of the company and any specific provisions in the statute.
Option C is incorrect because the passage does not mention any requirement of prior
knowledge for the officers to be held liable for the company's offences. Option D is
incorrect because negligence is not the criterion mentioned in the passage for attaching
vicarious liability to officers of a company.

Q.6) According to the passage, what was the main reason that led the court to determine
that the criminal complaint filed against the petitioner-directors was an abuse of
process of law?

A) The complaint alleged that the directors were guilty of negligence.

B) The directors had no knowledge of the contravention.
C) The company did not actually commit an offence.
D) The complaint did not specify how or in what manner the accused were in
charge of or responsible for the company.

Explanation: Option D is correct because the court emphasized that the complaint did
not specify how or in what manner the accused were in charge of or responsible for the
company. This lack of specificity led the court to conclude that the complaint was an
abuse of process of law and quashed the complaint and the cognizance order passed by
the court of the judicial magistrate against the petitioner-directors. Option A is incorrect
because the passage does not mention negligence as the basis for the court's decision.
Option B is incorrect because the passage does not discuss the directors' knowledge of
the contravention as a reason for quashing the complaint. Option C is incorrect because
the issue at hand was not whether the company committed an offence or not, but rather
the manner in which the complaint was filed and the information it contained.
PASSAGE - 4
The doctrine of double jeopardy is enshrined in the Indian Constitution under Article 20
(2), which says, “No person shall be prosecuted and punished for the same offence more
than once.” It guarantees immunity from double punishment and bars a second
prosecution only where the accused has been both prosecuted and punished for the
same offence previously, as held by the Supreme Court in its 1954 ruling in
‘Venkataraman SA vs. Union of India’. However, in its 1996 ruling in ‘AA Mulla vs State of
Maharashtra’, the apex court held that Article 20(2) does not bar subsequent trials if the
ingredients of the offences in the previous and subsequent trials are distinct. Moreover,
there are certain conditions for the application of Article 20 (2). The conditions for the
application of Article 20(2) are –
1) There must have been previous proceedings before a court of law or a judicial
tribunal of competent jurisdiction.
2) The person must have been prosecuted in the previous proceedings.
3) The conviction or acquittal in the previous proceeding must be in force at the time of
the second trial.
4) The offence which is a subject matter of the second proceeding must be the same as
that of the first proceeding for which the accused was prosecuted and punished.
5) The “offence” must be an offence as defined in Section 3(38) of the General Clauses
Act which defines it as any act or omission made punishable by any law for the time
being in force. The prosecution must also be valid and not null, void, or abortive.
6) The subsequent proceeding must be a fresh proceeding where an accused is being
prosecuted for the same offence twice. Hence, this clause does not apply when the later
proceedings are a continuation of the previous proceedings, nor does it bar a retrial on
appeal with a direction to frame charges, provided the retrial is for the same offence or
offence as the original trial.
The Prevention of Money Laundering Act does not provide for a limitation period for
money laundering. This indicates that the law laid down in Section 468 of the CrPC,
which states that there is no limitation period for offences punishable with three years
imprisonment or more, will apply. In this case, the court observed that the accused were
nearing the completion of their sentence when the “ED suddenly filed the present
complaint under the PMLA Act” on March 30, 2021, for the commission of offences
under Section 4 read with Section 3. The former deals with punishment for money
laundering, stipulating a minimum of three years imprisonment, while the latter defines
“money laundering”.
Source: After CBI case, two ex-Delhi Jal Board officials sentenced under ED case:
Why ‘double jeopardy’ did not apply here, The Indian Express, March 21, 2023.

Q.1) Mr. A is accused of committing a series of financial crimes in 2021. He is first

prosecuted and convicted for embezzlement and is currently serving a three-year
sentence. While nearing the end of his sentence, the Enforcement Directorate discovers
that Mr. A is also involved in money laundering activities connected to the
embezzlement case. The ED files a new case against Mr. A under the Prevention of
Money Laundering Act (PMLA) for offenses under Section 4 read with Section 3. Mr. A
argues that this new case constitutes double jeopardy, as he has already been
prosecuted and punished for the embezzlement offense. Does the new case filed by the
Enforcement Directorate against Mr. A under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act
(PMLA) for offenses under Section 4 read with Section 3 constitute double jeopardy
under Article 20(2) of the Indian Constitution?
 A) Yes, because Mr. A has already been prosecuted and punished for embezzlement,
which is related to the money laundering activities.
B) No, because the ingredients of the offenses in the embezzlement and money
laundering cases are distinct.
C) Yes, because the Enforcement Directorate filed the new case after Mr. A had
already served most of his sentence for embezzlement.
D) No, because the Prevention of Money Laundering Act does not have a limitation
period.

Explanation: Option B is correct because the offenses in the embezzlement and money
laundering cases have distinct ingredients, as the former is related to the
misappropriation of funds, and the latter is related to the conversion or concealment of
the proceeds of crime. Option A is incorrect because the passage states that Article
20(2) does not bar subsequent trials if the ingredients of the offenses in the previous
and subsequent trials are distinct. Option C is incorrect because the passage does not
mention the timing of the filing of the new case as a relevant factor in determining
double jeopardy. Option D is incorrect because, while the passage states that the
Prevention of Money Laundering Act does not have a limitation period, this fact alone
does not determine whether the new case constitutes double jeopardy.

Q.2) Ms. B, a high-ranking government official, is accused of accepting bribes in

exchange for awarding lucrative contracts to a particular company. The authorities
initiate an investigation against her and subsequently charge her with corruption.
However, before the trial begins, the case is dismissed due to procedural errors
committed by the investigating authorities. A few months later, new evidence is
discovered, and the authorities decide to initiate fresh proceedings against Ms. B for the
same bribery charges. Do the fresh proceedings against Ms. B for the same bribery
charges constitute double jeopardy under Article 20(2) of the Indian Constitution?

A) No, because the previous proceedings were dismissed before the trial
began and Ms. B was never prosecuted in those proceedings.
B) Yes, because Ms. B was already charged with corruption in the previous
proceedings.
C) Yes, because the authorities had initiated an investigation against Ms. B in the
previous proceedings.
D) No, because the new evidence discovered allows for fresh proceedings to be
initiated.

Explanation: Option A is correct because the previous proceedings were dismissed

before the trial began, and Ms. B was never prosecuted in those proceedings; therefore,
Article 20(2) does not apply. Option B is incorrect because the passage states that a
person must have been prosecuted in the previous proceedings for Article 20(2) to
apply, and merely being charged does not amount to being prosecuted. Option C is
incorrect because the passage requires the person to be prosecuted in the previous
proceedings, not just investigated, for Article 20(2) to apply. Option D is incorrect
because the passage does not mention the discovery of new evidence as a relevant
factor in determining double jeopardy.
Q.3) Mr. C is accused of committing a robbery and is subsequently tried and convicted
for the crime. He appeals the conviction, and during the appeal process, the higher court
sets aside his conviction and orders a retrial due to errors in the lower court's judgment.
During the retrial, the prosecution discovers that Mr. C had also committed another
robbery around the same time as the first robbery, and they decide to include the
second robbery as an additional charge in the retrial. Does the inclusion of the second
robbery charge in the retrial constitute double jeopardy under Article 20(2) of the
Indian Constitution?

A) Yes, because Mr. C had already been tried and convicted for the first robbery in
the previous proceeding.
B) Yes, because the retrial was ordered due to errors in the lower court's judgment,
which means the previous proceeding was still in force.
C) No, because the conviction in the previous proceeding was set aside by the
higher court, and a retrial was ordered.
D) No, because the second robbery charge is a distinct offense from the first robbery
charge.

Explanation: Option C is correct because the conviction in the previous proceeding was
not in force at the time of the retrial, as it was set aside by the higher court, and a retrial
was ordered. Option A is incorrect because the passage states that the conviction or
acquittal in the previous proceeding must be in force at the time of the second trial for
Article 20(2) to apply, and in this case, the conviction was set aside by the higher court.
Option B is incorrect because the passage requires the conviction or acquittal in the
previous proceeding to be in force at the time of the second trial, and in this case, the
conviction was set aside. Option D is incorrect because, although the second robbery
charge is a distinct offense, the passage does not require the offenses to be distinct for
Article 20(2) to not apply in this context, as the focus is on the status of the conviction or
acquittal in the previous proceeding.

Q.4) Mr. D is accused of causing a road accident while driving under the influence of
alcohol. He is prosecuted and convicted for causing death by negligence under Section
304A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and serves his sentence. After completing his
sentence, the authorities discover that Mr. D was also driving without a valid license at
the time of the accident. They initiate a new case against him for driving without a valid
license under Section 3 read with Section 181 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Does the new
case filed against Mr. D for driving without a valid license constitute double jeopardy
under Article 20(2) of the Indian Constitution?

A) Yes, because Mr. D has already been prosecuted and punished for causing death
by negligence, which is related to the road accident.
B) No, because the offenses in the first and second proceedings are distinct –
one is causing death by negligence under IPC, and the other is driving
without a valid license under the Motor Vehicles Act.
C) Yes, because Mr. D has already served his sentence for the road accident and
cannot be tried for another offense related to the same incident.
D) No, because Mr. D was not prosecuted and punished for driving without a valid
license in the first proceeding.
Explanation: Option A is incorrect because the passage states that Article 20(2) applies
only when the offense in the second proceeding is the same as the offense in the first
proceeding for which the accused was prosecuted and punished. Option B is correct
because the offenses in the first and second proceedings are distinct – one is causing
death by negligence under IPC, and the other is driving without a valid license under the
Motor Vehicles Act – which means that Article 20(2) does not apply. Option C is
incorrect because the passage requires the offense in the second proceeding to be the
same as the offense in the first proceeding for which the accused was prosecuted and
punished, not merely related to the same incident. Option D is incorrect because,
although Mr. D was not prosecuted and punished for driving without a valid license in
the first proceeding, the correct reason for Article 20(2) not applying is that the offenses
in the first and second proceedings are distinct.

Q.5) In the context of the passage, which of the following scenarios would not trigger
the protection of Article 20(2) of the Indian Constitution against double jeopardy?

A) The accused was previously acquitted in the first trial, and the acquittal is still in
force.
B) The subsequent trial is a continuation of the previous proceedings.
C) The accused was previously prosecuted in a non-judicial tribunal.
D) The accused was previously prosecuted for a different offense in the first
trial.

Explanation: Option D is correct because Article 20(2) only bars prosecution for the
same offense more than once. If the accused was previously prosecuted for a different
offense in the first trial, the protection against double jeopardy would not be triggered.
Option A is incorrect because, according to the passage, one of the conditions for the
application of Article 20(2) is that "the conviction or acquittal in the previous
proceeding must be in force at the time of the second trial." If the acquittal is still in
force, the protection of Article 20(2) would apply. Option B is incorrect because the
passage states that the protection of Article 20(2) does not apply when "the later
proceedings are a continuation of the previous proceedings." In this scenario, Article
20(2) would not be triggered as it does not bar retrial or appeal with direction to frame
charges for the same offense. Option C is incorrect because one of the conditions for the
application of Article 20(2) is that "there must have been previous proceedings before a
court of law or a judicial tribunal of competent jurisdiction." In this scenario, since the
first trial was not before a judicial tribunal, the protection of Article 20(2) would not
apply.

Q.6) According to the passage, which of the following is not a condition for the
application of Article 20(2) of the Indian Constitution?

A) The accused must have been previously prosecuted in a court of law or a judicial
tribunal of competent jurisdiction.
B) The prosecution in the previous proceeding must be valid and not null, void, or
abortive.
C) The subsequent proceeding must involve a different charge than the one in
the previous proceeding.
D) The offense must be defined as per Section 3(38) of the General Clauses Act.
Explanation: Option C is correct because the passage actually states the opposite: "The
offence which is a subject matter of the second proceeding must be the same as that of
the first proceeding for which the accused was prosecuted and punished." This means
that the condition for the application of Article 20(2) requires the same charge, not a
different one. Option A is incorrect because, according to the passage, one of the
conditions for the application of Article 20(2) is that "there must have been previous
proceedings before a court of law or a judicial tribunal of competent jurisdiction."
Option B is incorrect because the passage states that another condition for the
application of Article 20(2) is that "the prosecution must also be valid and not null, void,
or abortive." Option D is incorrect because the passage states that "the “offence” must be
an offence as defined in Section 3(38) of the General Clauses Act which defines it as any
act or omission made punishable by any law for the time being in force." This is one of
the conditions for the application of Article 20(2).
PASSAGE - 5
The Supreme Court on Tuesday (March 14) dismissed the Union government’s
curative petition seeking more compensation from Union Carbide (now Dow
Chemicals) for victims of the Bhopal gas tragedy of 1984. The Centre had wanted to
reopen discussions on a settlement that had been reached with the company. A
settlement, the Supreme Court said, can only be set aside on account of fraud. In this
case, LiveLaw reported, the Union government has not claimed that fraud has taken
place. The bench of Justices Sanjay Kishan Kaul, Sanjiv Khanna, Abhay S. Oka, Vikram
Nath and J.K. Maheshwari said that reopening the settlement would likely only work
in the company’s favour, and also told the government to use Rs 50 crore lying with
the Reserve Bank of India to address any pending claims. “The method to impose
greater liability on UCC is not warranted. We are disappointed in the union for not
having addressed this. Nearly 6 times compensation has been disbursed to the
victims compared to the pro rata. Centre to use ₹50 crores lying with RBI to address
the needs of the claimants in the Bhopal gas tragedy case. If it is reopened, then it will
only work in favour of UCC by opening a pandora’s box and will be to the detriment of
the claimants,” the court said, according to Bar and Bench.
The court also noted that despite its directive, the Union government had failed to
take out insurance policies: “The Union has filed the curative petition seeking to
reopen the settlement. The responsibility was placed on the Union of India, being a
welfare state, to make good the deficiency( in the compensation) and to take out the
relevant insurance policy. Surprisingly, we are informed that no such insurance
policy was taken out. This is gross negligence on the part of Union and in breach of
the judgment of this Court. The Union cannot be negligent on this aspect and then
seek a prayer from this Court to fix such responsibility on the UCC.” On January 12
this year, the bench had reserved its judgment in the case. However, comments made
by the judges during the hearing had suggested that the court was unhappy with the
Centre’s petition. “The settlement was arrived at a particular stage of time. 10-20
years later can we open it up again on the basis of some fresh documents? It was by
two parties. One of them is the Union of India, not a weak party. What has been
troubling us is the scope of this after the period of time. Maybe you are right that
settlement was not the best. But can we reopen it?” the judges had said.
Source: Bhopal Gas Tragedy: Supreme Court Dismisses Union Govt's Petition
Seeking to Reopen Settlement, The Wire, March 14, 2023.

Q.1) In the small town of Fictionville, the residents experienced a chemical disaster
from a factory owned by ChemiCorp in 2000, leading to numerous casualties and
long-term health issues for survivors. In 2005, the Fictionville government reached a
settlement with ChemiCorp for compensation to the victims. However, in 2023, the
Fictionville government filed a curative petition seeking to reopen the settlement,
claiming that it was insufficient. The government has not claimed any fraud in
reaching the settlement. The High Court of Fictionville had previously directed the
government to take out an insurance policy to cover any deficiency in compensation,
but the government failed to do so. The court discovered that there are additional
funds lying with the Fictionville Central Bank that could be used to address the
victims' needs. In the case of the Fictionville chemical disaster, can the High Court of
Fictionville reopen the settlement between the Fictionville government and
ChemiCorp based on the government's claim of insufficient compensation and failure
to take out insurance policies as directed by the court?
 A) Yes, because the government has claimed fraud in the settlement.
B) Yes, because the settlement can be reopened due to the government's failure
to take out insurance policies.
C) No, because the government has not claimed fraud and reopening the
settlement might work in favor of ChemiCorp.
D) No, because there are additional funds lying with the Fictionville Central Bank
that could be used to address the victims' needs.

Explanation: Option C is correct because the passage states that reopening the
settlement is not warranted in the absence of a fraud claim, and it might work in
favor of ChemiCorp instead of the victims. Option A is incorrect because the passage
states that the Fictionville government has not claimed that fraud has taken place in
reaching the settlement. Option B is incorrect because the passage states that a
settlement can only be set aside on account of fraud, and the failure to take out
insurance policies is not a ground for reopening the settlement. Option D is incorrect
because the passage states that the availability of additional funds with the
Fictionville Central Bank is a separate issue and not a valid reason to prevent the
reopening of the settlement.

Q.2) In light of the facts in the previous question, considering the High Court of
Fictionville's directive to the Fictionville government to take out insurance policies
and the government's failure to do so, can the court impose the responsibility for the
insurance policies' deficiency on ChemiCorp?

A) Yes, because the government's negligence in taking out insurance policies is a

valid reason to impose responsibility on ChemiCorp.
B) No, because the court has not found any fraud in the settlement process,
which is necessary to set aside the settlement and impose responsibility
on ChemiCorp.
C) Yes, because ChemiCorp is responsible for the chemical disaster and should be
held accountable for the insurance policies' deficiency.
D) No, because the responsibility was placed on the Fictionville government as a
welfare state, and it was negligent in taking out the insurance policies.

Explanation: Option B is correct because the passage states that a settlement can only
be set aside on account of fraud, and without setting aside the settlement, the court
cannot impose the responsibility for the insurance policies' deficiency on ChemiCorp.
Option A is incorrect because the passage states that the failure to take out insurance
policies is not a valid reason to impose responsibility on ChemiCorp. Option C is
incorrect because the passage states that the responsibility for the insurance policies'
deficiency was placed on the Fictionville government, not ChemiCorp. Option D is
incorrect because, although it states that the responsibility was placed on the
Fictionville government, it does not address the requirement of fraud to set aside the
settlement and impose responsibility on ChemiCorp.

Q.3) In light of the facts in the previous question, regarding the High Court of
Fictionville's discovery of additional funds lying with the Fictionville Central Bank, can
the court order the government to utilize these funds to address the needs of the
chemical disaster victims?

A) Yes, because the court has the authority to order the government to use the
available funds to address the victims' needs.
B) No, because the government's failure to take out insurance policies prevents the
court from ordering the utilization of the additional funds.
C) Yes, because the funds lying with the Fictionville Central Bank are specifically
earmarked for the compensation of the chemical disaster victims.
D) No, because the court cannot order the government to use the funds without
reopening the settlement.

Explanation: Option A is correct because the passage states that the court told the
government to use the available funds to address any pending claims, implying that the
court has the authority to order the government to utilize the funds for the victims'
needs. Option B is incorrect because the passage states that the court told the
government to use the available funds to address any pending claims, irrespective of the
government's failure to take out insurance policies. Option C is incorrect because the
passage does not state that the funds lying with the Fictionville Central Bank are
specifically earmarked for the compensation of the chemical disaster victims. Option D
is incorrect because the passage states that the court told the government to use the
available funds to address any pending claims without reopening the settlement.

Q.4) In light of the facts in the previous question, is the High Court of Fictionville
justified in expressing disappointment in the Fictionville government for not addressing
the issue of imposing greater liability on ChemiCorp in light of the government's failure
to take out insurance policies?

A) Yes, because the government's failure to take out insurance policies has resulted
in the inability to reopen the settlement and impose greater liability on
ChemiCorp.
B) No, because the court's disappointment is unrelated to the government's failure
to take out insurance policies.
C) Yes, because the government, as a welfare state, should have addressed the
issue of imposing greater liability on ChemiCorp while also taking out
insurance policies.
D) No, because the court's disappointment is based on the government's inability to
prove fraud, which is necessary to set aside the settlement.

Explanation: Option C is correct because the passage states that the court is
disappointed in the government for not having addressed the issue of imposing greater
liability on ChemiCorp, and as a welfare state, the government should have taken
necessary steps, including taking out insurance policies. Option A is incorrect because
the passage states that the court's disappointment is related to the government's failure
to address the issue of imposing greater liability on ChemiCorp, not specifically the
inability to reopen the settlement. Option B is incorrect because the passage states that
the court's disappointment is related to the government's failure to address the issue of
imposing greater liability on ChemiCorp. Option D is incorrect because, although the
passage mentions that fraud is necessary to set aside the settlement, the court's
disappointment is related to the government's failure to address the issue of imposing
greater liability on ChemiCorp, not the inability to prove fraud.

Q.5) What was the primary reason for the Supreme Court's dismissal of the Union
government's curative petition seeking more compensation from Union Carbide (now
Dow Chemicals) for the victims of the Bhopal gas tragedy?

A) The Union government failed to prove fraud in the settlement

B) The Union government failed to take out insurance policies
C) The Supreme Court believed reopening the settlement would likely work in the
company's favor
D) The compensation had already been disbursed to the victims

Explanation: Option A is correct because the passage states that the Supreme Court said
a settlement can only be set aside on account of fraud, and in this case, the Union
government has not claimed that fraud has taken place. Option B is incorrect because,
although the Supreme Court did note the Union government's failure to take out
insurance policies, this was not the primary reason for dismissing the curative petition.
Option C is incorrect because, while the Supreme Court did express concern that
reopening the settlement would likely work in the company's favor, this was not the
main reason for the dismissal. Option D is incorrect because, although the court
mentioned that nearly 6 times the pro rata compensation had been disbursed to the
victims, this was not the primary reason for the dismissal.

Q.6) In the view of the Supreme Court, what would be the likely consequence of
reopening the settlement between the Union government and Union Carbide (now Dow
Chemicals)?

A) It would lead to a fairer distribution of compensation to the victims

B) It would impose greater liability on Union Carbide (now Dow Chemicals)
C) It would work in favor of Union Carbide (now Dow Chemicals) and
potentially harm the claimants
D) It would have no significant impact on the case

Explanation: Option C is correct because the passage quotes the court as saying that
reopening the settlement would only work in favor of Union Carbide (now Dow
Chemicals) by opening a pandora's box and would be to the detriment of the claimants.
Option A is incorrect because the Supreme Court did not express the belief that
reopening the settlement would lead to a fairer distribution of compensation. Option B
is incorrect because the court specifically said that the method to impose greater
liability on Union Carbide (now Dow Chemicals) was not warranted. Option D is
incorrect because the Supreme Court clearly believed that reopening the settlement
would have negative consequences for the claimants.
PASSSAGE - 6
Tribal women from communities that do not follow any custom or practice relating to
inheritance would be eligible for protection under the Hindu Succession Act of 1956, the
Madras High Court has held, while also underlining that prohibitions mentioned in the
law regarding Scheduled Tribes (ST) were not absolute in nature. The Hindu Succession
Act lays down a comprehensive system of laws for cases relating to conditions like
intestate (dying without a will), or unwilled succession, among Hindus, Buddhists, Jains,
and Sikhs. However, tribal women were considered excluded from the scope of the Act,
as section 2 (2) of the Act states that the provisions will not apply to the Scheduled
Tribes (as defined under the Constitution), unless the central government directs
otherwise “by notification”. In a judgment delivered last month, Justice S.M.
Subramaniam used the ‘Golden Rule of Interpretation’ — a departure from the literal
interpretation — to establish that tribals are not completely excluded from the Act, and
the law intended to provide such communities an opportunity to adopt customs and
practices. “But in the absence of any such proof to establish that such custom or practice
(relating to inheritance) existed, the Hindu Succession Act should be applied,”
Subramaniam said in the verdict, while expanding the ambit of the law.
According to the court, negative interpretation (of the law), which denies tribal women
equal rights, cannot be adopted and the interpretation which favours equal rights must
be preferred. With this view, the court upheld a trial court order of 2017 that held that
tribal women are entitled to share in family property on a par with male members.
While dismissing an appeal against the lower court order, the high court emphasised
that the spirit of the provision of the 1956 Act was to give effect to the customs and
practices followed by tribal communities, but in the absence of the same the provisions
of the Act would apply to those from the Scheduled Tribes. Upholding the tribal
women’s right to equal share in property, the Madras High Court also directed the Tamil
Nadu government to issue the required notification under Section 2 of the Hindu
Succession Act, allowing application of the Act. The ruling comes on the heels of a
Supreme Court judgment passed last year, in which the apex court had directed the
Centre to re-examine provisions of the Hindu Succession Act, which denied a tribal
woman the right of succession to her family property. Justices M.R. Shah and Krishna
Murari had noted that there was no reason to deny a tribal woman the “right of
survivorship”, when a non-tribal woman was entitled to the same.
Source: No proof inheritance custom existed — why Madras HC held tribal women
covered under Hindu Succession Act, The Print, March 10, 2023.

Q.1) Radha, a tribal woman from the Todas community in Tamil Nadu, has two brothers,
Arun and Karthik. Their father passed away without leaving a will, and the family does
not follow any specific custom or practice relating to inheritance. After their father's
death, Arun and Karthik refuse to share the family property with Radha, claiming that
she is not entitled to any share as per their community's norms. Radha approaches the
court for her rightful share in the family property. Based on the judgment of the Madras
High Court, is Radha entitled to an equal share of the family property along with her
brothers, Arun and Karthik, under the Hindu Succession Act, considering that they
belong to a tribal community that does not follow any custom or practice relating to
inheritance?

A) No, Radha is not entitled to an equal share in the property because the Hindu
Succession Act does not apply to Scheduled Tribes.
 B) Yes, Radha is entitled to an equal share in the property because the Tamil Nadu
government has issued a notification allowing the application of the Hindu
Succession Act to Scheduled Tribes.
C) No, Radha is not entitled to an equal share in the property because the judgment
of the Madras High Court is not binding on her case.
D) Yes, Radha is entitled to an equal share in the property because the Golden
Rule of Interpretation allows for the application of the Hindu Succession
Act to tribal women.

Explanation: Option D is correct because the passage states that Justice S.M.
Subramaniam used the 'Golden Rule of Interpretation' to establish that tribal women are
not completely excluded from the Hindu Succession Act. In the absence of any custom or
practice relating to inheritance, the Act should be applied. Since Radha's community
does not follow any specific custom or practice relating to inheritance, she is entitled to
an equal share in the property under the Hindu Succession Act. Option A is incorrect
because the passage states that the Madras High Court held that the prohibition
mentioned in the Hindu Succession Act regarding Scheduled Tribes was not absolute in
nature. The court emphasized that in the absence of any custom or practice relating to
inheritance, the provisions of the Act would apply to those from the Scheduled Tribes.
Option B is incorrect because, although the passage mentions that the Madras High
Court directed the Tamil Nadu government to issue the required notification under
Section 2 of the Hindu Succession Act, the verdict itself supports the application of the
Act to tribal women in the absence of any custom or practice relating to inheritance.
This means that Radha is entitled to an equal share in the property under the Act,
regardless of whether the Tamil Nadu government has issued the notification. Option C
is incorrect because the passage states that the Madras High Court upheld a trial court
order of 2017 that held that tribal women are entitled to share in family property on a
par with male members. This indicates that the court's judgment supports Radha's
claim to an equal share in the property under the Hindu Succession Act.

Q.2) Sita, a tribal woman from the Irula community in Tamil Nadu, has a brother,
Ramesh. Their father passed away without leaving a will, and the family does not follow
any custom or practice relating to inheritance. Ramesh argues that Sita should not get
any share of the family property based on the negative interpretation of the Hindu
Succession Act that excludes tribal women. Sita disagrees and decides to take legal
action to claim her share in the family property. Based on the Madras High Court's
judgment, should the court adopt a negative interpretation of the Hindu Succession Act
that denies tribal women equal rights, or should it prefer an interpretation that favors
equal rights when considering Sita's claim to a share in the family property?

A) The court should adopt a negative interpretation, as the Hindu Succession Act
specifically excludes tribal women from its scope.
B) The court should prefer an interpretation that favors equal rights, as it
aligns with the spirit of the provision of the 1956 Act.
C) The court should adopt a negative interpretation, as it is the responsibility of the
central government to issue a notification regarding the applicability of the Act to
Scheduled Tribes.
D) The court should prefer an interpretation that favors equal rights, as this would
uphold the precedent set by the Supreme Court.
Explanation: Option B is correct because the passage states that the Madras High Court
emphasized that the spirit of the provision of the 1956 Act was to give effect to the
customs and practices followed by tribal communities, but in the absence of the same,
the provisions of the Act would apply. The court held that a negative interpretation,
which denies tribal women equal rights, cannot be adopted, and the interpretation that
favors equal rights must be preferred. Option A is incorrect because the passage states
that the Madras High Court held that the prohibition mentioned in the Hindu Succession
Act regarding Scheduled Tribes was not absolute in nature, and that the court
emphasized the provisions of the Act would apply to those from the Scheduled Tribes in
the absence of any custom or practice relating to inheritance. Option C is incorrect
because the passage states that the Madras High Court used the 'Golden Rule of
Interpretation' to establish that tribal women are not completely excluded from the Act,
and the law intended to provide such communities an opportunity to adopt customs and
practices. The court held that in the absence of any custom or practice relating to
inheritance, the Hindu Succession Act should be applied. Option D is incorrect because,
although the passage mentions that the Supreme Court directed the Centre to re-
examine provisions of the Hindu Succession Act, the correct reasoning for preferring an
interpretation that favors equal rights is based on the Madras High Court's judgment,
which emphasized the spirit of the provision of the 1956 Act and rejected the adoption
of a negative interpretation that denies tribal women equal rights.

Q.3) Pooja, a tribal woman from the Kani community in Tamil Nadu, has two sisters,
Geeta and Neha. Their father passed away without leaving a will, and the family does not
follow any custom or practice relating to inheritance. Pooja, Geeta, and Neha are unsure
about their rights to the family property under the Hindu Succession Act. They learn
about the Madras High Court's judgment and wonder if the central government has
issued any notification that directs the applicability of the Act to their community. In the
absence of a central government notification directing the applicability of the Hindu
Succession Act to Scheduled Tribes, are Pooja, Geeta, and Neha entitled to a share in the
family property under the Act, given that they do not follow any custom or practice
relating to inheritance?

A) Yes, because the Madras High Court has ruled that tribal women are
entitled to a share in the family property under the Act, regardless of any
central government notification.
B) No, because without a central government notification, the Hindu Succession Act
does not apply to Scheduled Tribes.
C) Yes, because the Tamil Nadu government has issued a notification allowing the
application of the Hindu Succession Act to Scheduled Tribes.
D) No, because the Madras High Court's ruling only applies to Tamil Nadu, and not
other states in India.

Explanation: Option A is correct because the passage states that Justice S.M.
Subramaniam used the 'Golden Rule of Interpretation' to establish that tribal women are
not completely excluded from the Act, and the law intended to provide such
communities an opportunity to adopt customs and practices. The court held that in the
absence of any custom or practice relating to inheritance, the Hindu Succession Act
should be applied, regardless of any central government notification. Option B is
incorrect because the passage states that the Madras High Court held that the
prohibition mentioned in the Hindu Succession Act regarding Scheduled Tribes was not
absolute in nature, and that the court emphasized the provisions of the Act would apply
to those from the Scheduled Tribes in the absence of any custom or practice relating to
inheritance. Option C is incorrect because, although the passage mentions that the
Madras High Court directed the Tamil Nadu government to issue the required
notification under Section 2 of the Hindu Succession Act, the verdict itself supports the
application of the Act to tribal women in the absence of any custom or practice relating
to inheritance. This means that Pooja, Geeta, and Neha are entitled to a share in the
family property under the Act, regardless of whether the Tamil Nadu government has
issued the notification. Option D is incorrect because the passage does not mention any
restriction on the applicability of the Madras High Court's ruling to other states in India.
The ruling clarifies the interpretation of the Hindu Succession Act, which is a central
legislation and applicable across the country.

Q.4) Kavita, a tribal woman from the Kurumba community in Tamil Nadu, has a brother,
Rajesh. Their father passed away without leaving a will, and the family does not follow
any custom or practice relating to inheritance. After learning about the Supreme Court's
judgment directing the Centre to re-examine provisions of the Hindu Succession Act,
Kavita is unsure about her rights to the family property and decides to claim her share
in the property. Based on the Supreme Court's judgment and the Madras High Court's
ruling, is Kavita entitled to an equal share in the family property under the Hindu
Succession Act, given that her community does not follow any custom or practice
relating to inheritance?

A) Yes, because the Supreme Court's judgment supports the Madras High
Court's ruling, which held that tribal women are entitled to an equal share
in the family property under the Act.
B) No, because the Supreme Court's judgment only directed the Centre to re-
examine the provisions, and it did not directly grant rights to tribal women.
C) Yes, because the Supreme Court's judgment has led to a change in the Hindu
Succession Act, granting rights to tribal women.
D) No, because the Supreme Court's judgment is not binding on Kavita's case and
does not directly grant her any rights.

Explanation: Option A is correct because the passage states that the Supreme Court's
judgment directed the Centre to re-examine provisions of the Hindu Succession Act that
denied a tribal woman the right of succession to her family property. Although the
Supreme Court did not directly grant rights to tribal women, it influenced the Madras
High Court's ruling, which held that tribal women are entitled to an equal share in the
family property under the Act, especially when there is no custom or practice relating to
inheritance. Option B is incorrect because, while the Supreme Court's judgment directed
the Centre to re-examine provisions, it still had an impact on the Madras High Court's
ruling. The Madras High Court held that tribal women are entitled to an equal share in
the family property under the Act, regardless of any central government notification or
the absence of custom or practice relating to inheritance. Option C is incorrect because
the passage does not mention any change in the Hindu Succession Act as a result of the
Supreme Court's judgment. However, the Supreme Court's judgment influenced the
Madras High Court's ruling, which clarified the interpretation of the Act and held that
tribal women are entitled to an equal share in the family property. Option D is incorrect
because, although the Supreme Court's judgment does not directly grant Kavita any
rights, it influenced the Madras High Court's ruling, which held that tribal women are
entitled to an equal share in the family property under the Hindu Succession Act. The
Madras High Court's ruling supports Kavita's claim to an equal share in the property.

Q.5) Which of the following is true regarding the interpretation of laws according to the
Madras High Court judgment discussed in the passage?

A) Negative interpretation that denies equal rights must be preferred.

B) The interpretation that favors equal rights must be preferred.
C) Customary interpretation must be preferred.
D) Laws should not be interpreted for tribal women.

Explanation: The Madras High Court held that negative interpretation that denies tribal
women equal rights cannot be adopted, and the interpretation that favors equal rights
must be preferred. The court expanded the ambit of the law to protect tribal women
from communities that do not follow any custom or practice relating to inheritance
under the Hindu Succession Act of 1956, which excludes Scheduled Tribes (ST) unless
directed otherwise by the central government. Therefore, option B is correct. Option A is
incorrect because the passage clearly states that negative interpretation must not be
adopted. Option C is incorrect because customary interpretation was not discussed in
the passage. Option D is incorrect because the Madras High Court expanded the ambit of
the law to protect tribal women's rights under the Hindu Succession Act of 1956.

Q.6) What is the significance of the Madras High Court judgment discussed in the
passage for achieving gender equality and social justice?

A) It upholds the exclusion of tribal women from the scope of the Hindu Succession
Act of 1956.
B) It emphasizes the need for the central government's intervention in tribal
women's inheritance rights.
C) It expands the ambit of the Hindu Succession Act of 1956 to protect tribal
women's rights.
D) It emphasizes the need for tribal women to adopt customs and practices relating
to inheritance.

Explanation: The Madras High Court judgment discussed in the passage expands the
ambit of the Hindu Succession Act of 1956 to protect tribal women's rights by holding
that tribal women from communities that do not follow any custom or practice relating
to inheritance are eligible for protection under the Act. The court also directed the Tamil
Nadu government to issue the required notification under Section 2 of the Act, allowing
the application of the Act. This ruling upholds tribal women's right to an equal share in
property, thereby promoting gender equality and social justice. Therefore, option C is
correct. Option A is incorrect because the judgment expands the ambit of the Act instead
of upholding tribal women's exclusion. Option B is incorrect because the judgment
emphasizes the need for the central government's intervention only in case of
notification under Section 2 of the Act, not for tribal women's inheritance rights in
general. Option D is incorrect because the judgment does not emphasize the need for
tribal women to adopt customs and practices relating to inheritance, but rather protects
their rights under the Act in the absence of such proof.
PASSAGE - 7
The Supreme Court on Tuesday (March 21) asked the Centre to defend the law that
allows hanging by the neck as a mode of execution. Attorney General for India (AG) A R
Venkataramani agreed to seek instructions from the government before the court sets
up a committee to examine the issue. A bench led by Chief Justice of India (CJI) D Y
Chandrachud is essentially reopening a decades- old debate over whether there can be a
more humane and dignified way of executing the death penalty. In 2017, Rishi Malhotra,
an advocate, filed a public interest petition (PIL) seeking a more dignified way to
execute the capital punishment. He argued that a convict whose life has to end because
of the conviction and the sentence should not be compelled to suffer the pain of hanging.
The plea in the PIL challenged the constitutional validity of Section 354(5) of the Code
of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), 1973. This provision reads: “When any person is
sentenced to death, the sentence shall direct that he be hanged by the neck till he is
dead.” In the landmark 1982 ruling in ‘Bachan Singh v State of Punjab’, a five-judge
Bench of the Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of the death sentence by
a 4:1 majority ruling.
The SC had agreed to hear the 2017 PIL, and had issued notice to the Centre. Court
records show that in January 2018, the Centre filed an affidavit defending the current
position of law, but the case had not been listed since then. CJI Chandrachud was one of
the three judges along with then CJI Dipak Misra and Justice A M Khanwilkar (retd) who
had agreed to hear the case. In its 2018 affidavit, the government had argued that death
by hanging was the only “viable” option to execute a death warrant. However, the
government also sought additional time to examine the methods followed in other
countries.
In its 187th report in 2003, the Law Commission of India recommended that Section
354(5) of the CrPC should be amended by providing an alternative mode of execution of
death sentence by “lethal injection until the accused is dead”. The report suggested that
it should be the discretion of the judge to pass appropriate orders regarding the mode of
execution of death sentence and to hear the convict on the question of mode of
execution of death sentence before passing the discretionary order.
Source: Hanging, or something else as death penalty? Before Supreme Court, a
case around the mode of capital punishment, The Indian Express, March 22, 2023.

Q.1) Alice has been convicted of multiple heinous crimes and is sentenced to death by a
trial court. Her sentence is upheld by the appellate courts, and the President of India
rejects her mercy petition. Alice's lawyer argues that the prescribed method of
execution, hanging by the neck, is unconstitutional and violates her fundamental rights.
The lawyer suggests that an alternative, more humane method of execution should be
used instead. Based on the passage, is Alice's lawyer's argument that the method of
execution prescribed under Section 354(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC),
1973, is unconstitutional and violates her fundamental rights valid?

A) Yes, because the passage states that a public interest petition was filed in 2017
seeking a more dignified way to execute the death penalty.
B) Yes, because the passage states that the Law Commission of India recommended
amending Section 354(5) of the CrPC in its 187th report in 2003.
C) No, because the passage states that in the landmark 1982 ruling in ‘Bachan
Singh v State of Punjab’, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutional
validity of the death sentence by a 4:1 majority ruling.
 D) No, because the passage states that in its 2018 affidavit, the government argued
that death by hanging was the only "viable" option to execute a death warrant.

Explanation: Option C is correct because the passage states that in the landmark 1982
ruling in ‘Bachan Singh v State of Punjab’, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutional
validity of the death sentence, implying that the prescribed method of execution under
Section 354(5) is constitutional. Option A is incorrect because the passage states that
the public interest petition was filed, but it does not necessarily mean that the method
of execution is unconstitutional. Option B is incorrect because the passage states that
the Law Commission of India recommended amending Section 354(5), but it does not
necessarily mean that the current method is unconstitutional. Option D is incorrect
because the passage states that in its 2018 affidavit, the government argued that death
by hanging was the only "viable" option to execute a death warrant, but it does not
necessarily mean that the method is constitutional.

Q.2) Bob has been convicted of a series of heinous crimes, and his death sentence has
been upheld by the appellate courts. The President of India also rejects his mercy
petition. Bob's lawyer argues that an alternative, more humane method of execution
should be considered, such as lethal injection, instead of hanging by the neck as
prescribed under Section 354(5) of the CrPC, 1973. can Bob's lawyer successfully argue
for a more humane method of execution, such as lethal injection, instead of hanging by
the neck as prescribed under Section 354(5) of the CrPC, 1973?

A) Yes, because the passage states that the Supreme Court is reopening a decades-
old debate over whether there can be a more humane and dignified way of
executing the death penalty.
B) No, because the passage states that the Supreme Court upheld the constitutional
validity of the death sentence in the landmark 1982 ruling in ‘Bachan Singh v
State of Punjab’.
C) No, because the passage states that in its 2018 affidavit, the government argued
that death by hanging was the only "viable" option to execute a death warrant.
D) Yes, because the passage states that the Law Commission of India
recommended amending Section 354(5) of the CrPC in its 187th report in
2003 to provide for alternative modes of execution.

Explanation: Option D is correct because the passage states that the Law Commission of
India recommended amending Section 354(5) of the CrPC in its 187th report in 2003 to
provide for alternative modes of execution. Bob's lawyer can use this recommendation
to argue for a more humane method of execution in his case. Option A is incorrect
because the passage states that the Supreme Court is reopening the debate, but it does
not necessarily provide a legal basis for Bob's lawyer to successfully argue for an
alternative method of execution in his specific case. Option B is incorrect because the
passage states that the Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of the death
sentence, but it does not specifically address the issue of alternative methods of
execution or whether Bob's lawyer can successfully argue for a different method in his
case. Option C is incorrect because the passage states that the government argued that
death by hanging was the only "viable" option, but it also sought additional time to
examine the methods followed in other countries, which indicates that alternative
methods could be considered and potentially used in Bob's case.
Q.3) Caroline has been convicted of a series of heinous crimes, and her death sentence
has been upheld by the appellate courts. The President of India also rejects her mercy
petition. Caroline's lawyer files a petition to request that the judge choose a more
humane method of execution, such as lethal injection, instead of hanging by the neck as
prescribed under Section 354(5) of the CrPC, 1973. The petition is based on the Law
Commission of India's recommendations. Herein, can Caroline's lawyer successfully
argue that the judge should have the discretion to choose a more humane method of
execution, such as lethal injection, instead of hanging by the neck as prescribed under
Section 354(5) of the CrPC, 1973?

A) Yes, because the passage states that the Law Commission of India
recommended that the judge should have discretion in choosing the mode
of execution in its 187th report in 2003.
B) Yes, because the passage states that the Supreme Court is reopening a decades-
old debate over whether there can be a more humane and dignified way of
executing the death penalty.
C) No, because the passage states that the Supreme Court upheld the constitutional
validity of the death sentence in the landmark 1982 ruling in ‘Bachan Singh v
State of Punjab’.
D) No, because the passage states that in its 2018 affidavit, the government argued
that death by hanging was the only "viable" option to execute a death warrant.

Explanation: Option A is correct because the passage states that the Law Commission of
India recommended in its 187th report in 2003 that the judge should have discretion in
choosing the mode of execution for the death penalty, which supports Caroline's
lawyer's argument based on the factual situation. Option B is incorrect because the
passage states that the Supreme Court is reopening the debate, but it does not
specifically address the issue of the judge's discretion in choosing the mode of execution
in the context of the factual situation. Option C is incorrect because the passage states
that the Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of the death sentence, but it
does not specifically address the issue of the judge's discretion in choosing the mode of
execution in the context of the factual situation. Option D is incorrect because the
passage states that the government argued that death by hanging was the only "viable"
option, but it also sought additional time to examine the methods followed in other
countries, indicating that alternative methods and the judge's discretion could be
considered in the context of the factual situation.

Q.4) David has been convicted of a series of heinous crimes, and his death sentence has
been upheld by the appellate courts. The President of India also rejects his mercy
petition. David's lawyer files a petition to request that the government consider an
alternative method of execution, such as lethal injection, instead of hanging by the neck
as prescribed under Section 354(5) of the CrPC, 1973. The lawyer cites the
government's 2018 affidavit in which they sought additional time to examine methods
followed in other countries. Herein, can David's lawyer successfully argue that the
government should consider alternative methods of execution, such as lethal injection,
instead of hanging by the neck as prescribed under Section 354(5) of the CrPC, 1973?
 A) Yes, because the passage states that the Supreme Court is reopening a decades-
old debate over whether there can be a more humane and dignified way of
executing the death penalty.
B) Yes, because the passage states that in its 2018 affidavit, the government
sought additional time to examine the methods followed in other countries
for executing the death penalty.
C) No, because the passage states that the Supreme Court upheld the constitutional
validity of the death sentence in the landmark 1982 ruling in ‘Bachan Singh v
State of Punjab’.
D) No, because the passage states that in its 2018 affidavit, the government argued
that death by hanging was the only "viable" option to execute a death warrant.

Explanation: Option B is correct because the passage states that in its 2018 affidavit, the
government sought additional time to examine the methods followed in other countries
for executing the death penalty, which supports David's lawyer's argument based on the
factual situation. Option A is incorrect because the passage states that the Supreme
Court is reopening the debate, but it does not specifically address the issue of the
government considering alternative methods of execution in the context of the factual
situation. Option C is incorrect because the passage states that the Supreme Court
upheld the constitutional validity of the death sentence, but it does not specifically
address the issue of the government considering alternative methods of execution in the
context of the factual situation. Option D is incorrect because the passage states that the
government argued that death by hanging was the only "viable" option, but it also
sought additional time to examine the methods followed in other countries, indicating
that alternative methods could be considered in the context of the factual situation.

Q.5) Based on the information in the passage, what could be a potential consequence of
the Supreme Court finding that hanging by the neck is an inhumane method of executing
the death penalty?

A) The death penalty would be abolished in India

B) The government would be required to amend Section 354(5) of the CrPC to
allow for an alternative mode of execution
C) The Supreme Court would establish a committee to examine the issue further
D) The government would be required to provide additional time to examine
alternative methods of execution

Explanation: Option B is correct because if the Supreme Court finds that hanging by the
neck is an inhumane method of executing the death penalty, the government would be
required to amend Section 354(5) of the CrPC to allow for an alternative mode of
execution. The Law Commission of India has already recommended lethal injection until
the accused is dead as an alternative mode of execution. Option A is incorrect because
the Supreme Court is only examining the method of execution, not the validity of the
death penalty itself. Option C is incorrect because the Supreme Court has already
established a committee to examine the issue. Option D is incorrect because the
government has already been provided additional time to examine alternative methods
of execution.
Q.6) Based on the principle established in the 1982 Bachan Singh v State of Punjab
ruling, which of the following statements is true?

A) The death penalty is a constitutionally valid punishment

B) Hanging by the neck is the only viable method of executing the death penalty
C) The judge has discretion to choose the mode of execution of death sentence
D) The death penalty should be abolished as an inhumane punishment

Explanation: Option A is correct because the 1982 Bachan Singh v State of Punjab ruling
upheld the constitutional validity of the death sentence by a 4:1 majority ruling. Option
B is incorrect because the government argued in its 2018 affidavit that death by hanging
was the only "viable" option to execute a death warrant, but the Law Commission of
India has recommended lethal injection until the accused is dead as an alternative mode
of execution. Option C is partially correct because the Law Commission of India
recommended that it should be the discretion of the judge to pass appropriate orders
regarding the mode of execution of death sentence and to hear the convict on the
question of mode of execution of death sentence before passing the discretionary order.
However, this recommendation has not been implemented yet. Option D is incorrect
because the 1982 ruling upheld the constitutionality of the death penalty as a valid
punishment
PASSAGE - 8
The AAP government in Punjab has cancelled 813 gun licenses across the state to clamp
down on the “gun culture,” according to Punjab Urban Housing and Development
Minister Aman Arora. Random checks will be carried out in different areas, with a ban
on carrying and displaying weapons in public events such as religious places, marriage
ceremonies, and other events. The government plans to implement a “complete ban on
those glorifying violence and weapons.” There are a total of 3,73,053 arms licenses in
Punjab, but the government is continuously taking action to end the gun culture. The
move to suspend licenses is part of a series of similar measures undertaken by the state.
On November 13, 2022, the Punjab government ordered a complete ban on the public
display of weapons and songs glorifying violence. The Department of Home Affairs and
Justice, headed by Chief Minister Bhagwant Mann, issued a letter to the state DGP, all
district magistrates, commissioners, and SSPs forbidding the public display of firearms
and songs glorifying weapons. The order also called for a review of all licenses issued
within three months and barred the issuance of new licenses for the next three months,
except in extraordinary circumstances. The Indian Arms Act of 1959 allows Indian
citizens aged 21 years and above to get Non-Prohibited Bore (NPB) guns.
The Act bars one person from carrying more than three firearms, except if the person is
a licensed dealer, belongs to the armed forces of the Union, or is a member of a rifle club
or association licensed or recognised by the Centre. Prohibited Bore guns can only be
issued to defence personnel or persons facing imminent threats to life. A license can
only be granted for purposes of self-defence, crop protection, or sports. Section 9 of the
Act prevents persons of unsound mind or those out on bond from getting such a license.
An amendment to the Act in December 2019 reduced the number of permitted firearms
from three to one and provided a period of one year to deposit the excess firearms with
the officer-in-charge of the nearest police station or with a licensed firearm dealer or
unit armoury. The amendment also increased the duration of validity of a firearm
license, from three to five years. In 2016, the Centre issued new Arms Rules, 2016,
superseding the Arms Rules, 1962, whereby applying for an arms license, rifle club,
association, or firing range required one to complete a safety training course involving
safe handling and carrying procedures. Provisions for granting restricted categories of
arms to those living in militancy-hit areas and a decision on applications for arms
licenses within two months were part of the rules issued by the Centre.
Source: Punjab govt cancels 813 gun licenses in state: Who can possess firearms
under the Indian Arms Act?, The Indian Express, March 14, 2023.

Q.1) Ravi, a resident of Punjab, possesses a Non-Prohibited Bore (NPB) gun license for
self-defense purposes. On November 1, 2022, Ravi took part in a public event in his
locality, displaying his firearm. He recently received a notice from the Punjab
government stating that his gun license has been cancelled due to his participation in
the event. Herein, is the cancellation of Ravi's gun license justified under the measures
taken by the Punjab government to clamp down on gun culture?

A) Yes, because Ravi displayed his firearm in a public event.

B) No, because Ravi possesses a Non-Prohibited Bore (NPB) gun license for self-
defense purposes.
C) Yes, because Ravi's display of the firearm violated the Indian Arms Act of 1959.
D) No, because Ravi has not violated any provisions of the Indian Arms Act of 1959.
Explanation: Option A is correct because the passage states that the Punjab government
has taken measures to clamp down on gun culture by banning the public display of
weapons and cancelling gun licenses. Ravi's display of his firearm at a public event
directly violates these measures, justifying the cancellation of his license. Option B is
incorrect because, although Ravi possesses a Non-Prohibited Bore (NPB) gun license for
self-defense purposes, the Punjab government's measures to clamp down on gun culture
supersede his individual license. Option C is incorrect because the passage does not
explicitly state that Ravi's display of the firearm violated the Indian Arms Act of 1959.
The cancellation is based on the measures taken by the Punjab government, not the Act
itself. Option D is incorrect because, even though Ravi has not violated any provisions of
the Indian Arms Act of 1959, the cancellation of his license is based on the measures
taken by the Punjab government to clamp down on gun culture, not on the Act itself.

Q.2) Karan, a popular Punjabi singer, is known for his songs that glorify weapons and
violence. After the Punjab government implements the complete ban on such songs,
Karan releases a new album with tracks that indirectly reference weapons and violence
without explicitly mentioning them. Herein, has Karan violated the complete ban on
glorifying violence and weapons implemented by the Punjab government?

A) No, because Karan's new album does not explicitly mention weapons or violence.
B) Yes, because his new album indirectly references weapons and violence.
C) Yes, because Karan has a history of releasing songs that glorify weapons and
violence.
D) No, because the ban only applies to songs that explicitly glorify weapons and
violence.

Explanation: Option B is correct because the passage states that the Punjab government
plans to implement a "complete ban on those glorifying violence and weapons." Even
though Karan's new album does not explicitly mention weapons or violence, the indirect
references still fall under the category of glorifying violence and weapons, which
violates the ban. Option A is incorrect because, while Karan's new album does not
explicitly mention weapons or violence, the passage states that there is a "complete ban
on those glorifying violence and weapons," which includes indirect references as well.
Option C is incorrect because Karan's history of releasing songs that glorify weapons
and violence is not the primary reason for violating the ban. It is the content of his new
album that leads to the violation. Option D is incorrect because the passage states that
there is a "complete ban on those glorifying violence and weapons," which implies that
both explicit and indirect references to violence and weapons are prohibited.

Q.3) Simran, a resident of Punjab, has recently faced threats to her life due to a property
dispute. She decides to apply for a firearm license for self-defense purposes. However,
the Punjab government has just announced that they are barring the issuance of new
licenses for the next three months. Herein, can Simran obtain a firearm license during
the three-month period when the issuance of new licenses is barred?

A) Yes, because Simran is facing threats to her life.

B) No, because the issuance of new licenses is barred for the next three months.
C) Yes, because Simran's situation qualifies as an extraordinary circumstance.
 D) No, because Simran's situation does not qualify as an extraordinary
circumstance.

Explanation: Option C is correct because the passage states that new licenses can be
issued during the three-month period in extraordinary circumstances. Simran's
situation, facing threats to her life due to a property dispute, would likely qualify as an
extraordinary circumstance, allowing her to obtain a firearm license. Option A is
incorrect because the passage states that the issuance of new licenses is barred for the
next three months, except in extraordinary circumstances. The mere fact that Simran is
facing threats to her life does not automatically qualify her for a license. Option B is
incorrect because, although the issuance of new licenses is generally barred for the next
three months, the passage does allow for exceptions in extraordinary circumstances.
Option D is incorrect because Simran's situation, facing threats to her life, is likely to be
considered an extraordinary circumstance as per the passage, which would make her
eligible to obtain a firearm license during the three-month period.

Q.4) Arjun is a law-abiding citizen of Punjab who has three firearms, all legally
registered under the Indian Arms Act of 1959. In December 2019, an amendment to the
Act reduced the number of permitted firearms from three to one. Arjun, however,
missed the deadline to deposit his excess firearms within the one-year period provided
by the amendment. Herein, is Arjun in violation of the amendment to the Indian Arms
Act of 1959 that reduces the number of permitted firearms from three to one?

A) Yes, because Arjun did not deposit his excess firearms within the one-year
period.
B) No, because Arjun's firearms were legally registered before the amendment.
C) Yes, because Arjun should have been aware of the changes to the law.
D) No, because the amendment does not apply to previously registered firearms.

Explanation: Option A is correct because the passage states that the amendment to the
Indian Arms Act of 1959 reduced the number of permitted firearms from three to one
and provided a period of one year to deposit excess firearms. Arjun missed the deadline
to deposit his excess firearms, which puts him in violation of the amendment. Option B
is incorrect because, although Arjun's firearms were legally registered before the
amendment, the passage states that the amendment applies to all firearm owners,
regardless of when their firearms were registered. Option C is incorrect because, even
though Arjun should have been aware of the changes to the law, the primary reason for
his violation is that he missed the deadline to deposit his excess firearms, not his lack of
awareness. Option D is incorrect because the passage states that the amendment applies
to all firearm owners, including those with previously registered firearms. Arjun's
failure to deposit his excess firearms within the one-year period puts him in violation of
the amendment.

Q.5) Based on the passage, what is one of the potential consequences for license holders
under the amended Indian Arms Act of 1959?

A) The number of permitted firearms per person has increased to five.

B) The duration of validity of a firearm license has decreased from five to three
years.
 C) The number of permitted firearms per person has been reduced from three
to one.
D) Restricted categories of arms can no longer be granted to those living in
militancy-hit areas.

Explanation: Option C is correct because the passage mentions that an amendment to

the Act in December 2019 reduced the number of permitted firearms from three to one.
Option A is incorrect because the passage states that the amendment reduced the
number of permitted firearms from three to one, not increased it to five. Option B is
incorrect because the amendment increased the duration of validity of a firearm license
from three to five years, not decreased it. Option D is incorrect because the passage
explains that provisions for granting restricted categories of arms to those living in
militancy-hit areas were part of the rules issued by the Centre in 2016, and there is no
mention of these provisions being revoked or changed.

Q.6) Based on the passage, what is one of the measures taken by the Punjab government
to address the "gun culture"?

A) A ban on carrying and displaying weapons in public events.

B) Issuing additional gun licenses to promote responsible gun ownership.
C) Encouraging the formation of more rifle clubs and associations.
D) Increasing the age requirement for obtaining Non-Prohibited Bore (NPB) guns.

Explanation: Option A is correct because the passage states that the Punjab government
is implementing a ban on carrying and displaying weapons in public events such as
religious places, marriage ceremonies, and other events. Option B is incorrect because
the passage does not mention issuing additional gun licenses as a measure to address
the gun culture. Instead, it talks about suspending licenses and reviewing all issued
licenses. Option C is incorrect because the passage does not mention encouraging the
formation of more rifle clubs or associations as a measure to address the gun culture.
Option D is incorrect because the passage does not mention increasing the age
requirement for obtaining Non-Prohibited Bore (NPB) guns. It only states the existing
age requirement, which is 21 years and above.