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To cite this article: MICHAEL TOOLEY (1977) The Nature of Laws, Canadian Journal of
Philosophy, 7:4, 667-698
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CANADIAN jOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
Volume VII, Number 4, December 1977
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The thesis that relations among universals are the truth-makers for
laws may strike some philosophers as rather unappealing, for a variety
of reasons. Perhaps the two most important are these. First, it entails a
strong version of realism with regard to universals. Secondly,
traditional semantical accounts of the concept of truth have generally
been nominalistic in flavor. Not in the sense that acceptance of them
involves commitment to nominalism, but in the sense that they involve
no reference to universals. This seems, in part, an historical accident.
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3 See, for example, the incisive discussions by Jonathan Bennett in his article,
"Counterfactuals and Possible Worlds," Canadian journal of Philosophy, 4
(1974), pages 381-402, and, more recently, by Frank Jackson in his article, "A
Causal Theory of Counterfactuals", Australasian journal of Philosophy, 55
(1977), pages 3-21.
4 F. P. Ramsey, "General Propositions and Causality," in The Foundations of
Mathematics, edited by R. B. Braithwaite, Paterson, New Jersey, 1960, page 242.
The view described in the passage is one which Ramsey had previously held,
rather than the view he was setting out in the paper itself. For a sympathetic
discussion of Ramsey's earlier position, see f:tages 72-77 of David Lewis's
Counterfactuals, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1973.
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out a plausible case for this view. However the requirement can be
weakened slightly. One might, for example, take the view that P; is
definable even where there is more than one n-tuple that satisfies
T(x1, x2, ... , xn), provided that every n-tuple has the same ith element.
A second objection is that replacing predicates and functors by
names is not automatic, as Lewis supposes. For unless there are
disjunctive properties, negative properties, etc., there is no reason for
thinking that there will be a one-to-one correspondence between
predicates on the one hand, and properties and relations on the other.
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This point is surely correct. However it shows only that the initial
paraphrase has to be carried out in a metaphysically more
sophisticated way.
A slightly more serious difficulty becomes apparent if one
considers some very attenuated theories. Suppose, for example, that T
consists of a single statement (x)( Mx => Px), where M is theoretical and
P is observational. This theory will have the peculiarity that the
corresponding Ramsey sentence is logically true, 6 and given Lewis's
approach, this means that the property M-hood exists only if it is
identical with P-hood.
One response is to refuse to count a set of sentences as a theory if,
like T here, it has no observational consequences. However this
requirement seems overly stringent. Even if a theory does not entail
any observational statements, it may have probabilistic implications:
the likelihood of R given Q together with T may differ from the
likelihood of R given Q alone, where Q and R are observational
statements, even though there are no observational statements
entailed by T.
An alternative response is to adopt the view that the Ramsey
sentence for a theory should be replaced by a slightly different
sentence which asserts not merely that there is some ordered n-tuple
(x1, x2, ... ,xn) that satisfies the formula T(x1, x2, ... , xn), but that there is
some n-tuple that satisfies the formula and whose existence is not
entailed simply by the existence of the observable properties involved
in the theory. Then, if there is a unique ordered n-tuple with those two
properties, one can define the theoretical terms P1, P2, ... , Pn.
In any case, I believe that one is justified in thinking that difficulties
such as the above can be dealt with, and I shall, in my attempt to state
truth conditions for laws, assume that theoretical statements can be
adequately analyzed along the Lewis-type lines outlined above.
There are three further ideas that are needed for my account of the
truth conditions of nomological statements. But the account will be
6 This problem was pointed out by Israel Scheffler in his book, The Anatomy of
Inquiry, New York, 1963. See section 21 of part II, pages 218ff.
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7 This version of the general theory is essentially that set out by David Armstrong
in his forthcoming book, Universals and Scientific Realism. In revising the
present paper I have profited from discussions with Armstrong about the general
theory, and the merits of our competing versions ot it.
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Thus one could have, for example, a construction function K such that
K(redness, roundness) = the proposition that all red things are round.
Conceived in the most general way, some construction functions will
map ordered n-tuples of universals into propositions that involve as
constituents universals not contained in the original n-tuple. Thus G
could be a function so defined that G(property P) = the proposition
that everything with property Pis green. Other construction functions
will map ordered n-tuples of universals into propositions which do not
contain, as constituents, all the universals belonging to then-tuple. H
could be a function so defined that H(property P, property Q) = the
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(5) the proposition that R(P1, P2, ... , Pn) logically entails the
proposition that p.
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4. Objections
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concepts, though rather favored by the later Carnap 10 and others, has
not been generally accepted. Once irreducible higher order relations
enter into the account, a shift to a metalanguage containing terms
referring to entities other than particulars appears unavoidable, and I
suspect that this shift in metalanguages may make the solution
proposed here difficult for many to accept.
The second part of this objection raises a deeper, and more serious
point. Does it follow from the analysis offered that, if the world had
been somewhat different, Platonic realism would have been true? The
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Let us now try to get clearer, however, about the sort of evidence
that provides the strongest support for the hypothesis that a given
generalization is nomological. I think the best way of doing this is to
consider a single generalization, and to ask, first, what a world would
be like in which one would feel that the generalization was merely
accidentally true, and then, what changes in the world might tempt
one to say that the generalization was not accidental, but nomological.
I have already sketched a case of this sort. In our world, if all the fruit in
Smith's garden are apples, it is only an accidentally true generalization.
But if the world were different in certain ways, one might classify the
generalization as nomological. If one never succeeded in getting
pears into Smith's garden, if bananas changed into apples, and oranges
into elephants, as they crossed the boundary, etc., one might well be
tempted to view the generalization as a law. What we now need to do
is to characterize the evidence that seems to make a critical difference.
What is it, about the sort of events described, that makes them
significant? The answer, I suggest, is that they are events which
determine which of "conflicting" generalizations are true. Imagine
that one has just encountered Smith's garden. There are many
generalizations that one accepts- generalizations that are supported
by many positive instances, and for which no counterexamples are
known, such as "Pears thrown with sufficient force towards nearby
gardens wind up inside them," "Bananas never disappear, nor change
into other things such as apples," "Cherry trees bear only cherries as
fruit." One notices that there are many apples in the garden, and no
other fruit, so the generalization that all the fruit in Smith's garden are
apples is also supported by positive instances, and is without
counterexamples. Suppose now that a banana is moving in the
direction of Smith's garden. A partial conflict situation exists, in that
there are some events which will, if they occur, falsify the generaliza-
tion that all the fruit in Smith's garden are apples, and other events
which will falsify the generalization that bananas never change into
other objects. There are, of course, other possible events which will
falsify neither generalization: the banana may simply stop moving as it
reaches the boundary. However there may well be other
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gneralizations that one accepts which will make the situation one of
inevitable conflict, so that whatever the outcome, at least one
generalization will be falsified. Situations of inevitable conflict can
arise even for two generalizations, if related in the proper way. Thus,
given the generalizations that (x)(Px ::> Rx) and that (x)(Qx ::> -Rx),
discovery of an object b such that both Pb and Qb would be a situation
of inevitable conflict.
Many philosophers have felt that a generalization's surviving such
situations of conflict, or potential falsification, provides strong
evidence in support of the hypothesis that the generalization is
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i=1
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1xm
(1 x m) + (0 x n) + (1 x 0) + (k x (1 - (m + n)))
m + k(1- m- n)
In view of the fact that, given that E*, it is not possible that T, this value
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is also the probability that S, that is, the likelihood that the
generalization that (x)(Px ::::> Rx) is nomological. let us consider some
of the properties of this result. First, it is easily seen that, provided
neither m nor n is equal to zero, the likelihood that the generalization
is nomological will be greater after its survival of the conflict situation
m will be
than it was before. The value of
m + k(1- m- n)
smallest when k is largest. Setting k equal to one gives the value
m m
i.e., , and this is greater than m if neither m
m+1-m-n 1-n
nor n is equal to zero.
of k decreases, and this too is desirable. If the event that falsified the
one generalization were one that would have been very likely if
neither generalization had been nomological, one would not expect it
to lend as much support to the surviving generalization as it would if it
were an antecedently improbable event.
m
Thirdly, the value of increases as n increases.
m + k(1-m-n)
This means that survival of a conflict with a well supported
generalization results in a greater increase in the likelihood that a
generalization is nomological than survival of a conflict with a less well
supported generalization. This is also an intuitively desirable result.
Finally, it can be seen that the evidence provided by survival of
conflict situations can quickly raise the likelihood that a generalization
is nomological to quite high values. Suppose, for example, that m = n,
m
and that k = 0.5. Then will be equal to 2m. This
m + k(1- m- n)
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result agrees with the view that laws, rather than being difficult or
impossible to confirm, can acquire a high degree of confirmation on
the basis of relatively few observations, provided that those
observations are of the right sort.
But how is this justification related to the account I have advanced
as to the truth conditions of nomological statements? The answer is
that there is a crucial assumption that seems reasonable if relations
among universals are the truth-makers for laws, but not if facts about
particulars are the truth-makers. This is the assumption that m and n
are not equal to zero. If one takes the view that it is facts about the
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Can the relevant difference between law and non-law statements be described
in familiar terminology without reference to counterfactuals, without use of modal
terms such as 'causal necessity', 'necessary condition', 'physical possibility', and the
like, and without use of metaphysical terms such as 'real connections between
matters of fact'?
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then a would be Q (at time t2), yet false that if a were not Q (at time t2),
then a would not have been P (at time t1). Whence it follows that its
being a law that all P's are Q's is not equivalent to its being a law that all
non-Q's are non-P's.14
The flaw in this argument lies in the assumption that laws can be
analyzed as generalized subjunctive conditionals. The untenability of
the latter claim can be seen by considering any possible world W
which satisfies the following conditions:
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But this law does not follow from the laws referred to at (4) and (5), and
hence is excluded by condition (6). The possibility of worlds such as W
shows that laws are not equivalent to generalized subjunctive
conditionals. As a result, the Stalnaker-Thomason argument is
unsound, and there is no reason for thinking that logically equivalent
statements can express non-equivalent laws.
Sevently, given the above account of laws and nomological
statements, it is easy to show that such statements have the logical
properties one would naturally attribute to them. Contraposition
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holds for laws and nomological statements, in view of the fact that
logically equivalent statements express the same law. Transitivity also
holds: if it is a law (or nomological statement) that (x) (Px :::> Qx), and
that (x) (Qx :::> Rx), then it is also a law (or nomological statement) that
(x) (Px :::> Rx). Moreover, if it is a law (or nomological statement) that (x)
(Px :::> Qx), and that (x) (Px :::> Rx), then it is a law (or nomological
statement) that (x) [Px :::> (Qx 1\ Rx)], and conversely. Also, if it is a law
(or nomological statement) that (x) [(Px v Qx) :::> Rx], then it is a law (or
nomological statement) both that (x) (Px :::> Rx), and that (x)(Qx :::> Rx),
and conversely. And in general, I think that laws and nomological
statements can be shown, on the basis of the analysis proposed here,
to have all the formal properties they are commonly thought to have.
Eighthly, the account offered provides a straightforward explana-
tion of the nonextensionality of nomological contexts. The reason
that it can be a law that (x) (Px :::> Rx), and yet not a law that (x)(Qx :::>
Rx), even if it is true that (x) (Px = Qx), is that, in view of the fact that the
truth-makers for laws are relations among universals, the referent of
the predicate "P" in the sentence "It is a law that (x) (Px :::> Rx)" is, at
least in the simplest case, a universal, rather than th~ set of particulars
falling under the predicate. As a result, interchange of co-extensive
predicates in nomological contexts may alter the referent of part of the
sentence, and with it, the truth of the whole.
Finally, various epistemological issues can be resolved given this
account of the truth conditions of nomological statements. How can
one establish that a generalization is a law, rather than merely
accidentally true? The general answer is that if laws hold in virtue of
theoretical relations among universals, then whatever account is to be
given of the grounds for accepting theories as true will also be
applicable to laws. The latter will not pose any independent problems.
Why is it that the results of a few carefully designed experiments can
apparently provide very strong support for a law? The answer is that if
the truth-makers for laws are relations among universals, rather than
facts about particulars, the assignment of nonzero initial probability
to a law ceases to be unreasonable, and one can then employ standard
theorems of probability theory, such as Bayes' theorem, to show how a
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