The Formal Analysis of Normative Concepts

Author(s): Alan Ross Anderson and Omar Khayyam Moore

Source: American Sociological Review, Vol. 22, No. 1 (Feb., 1957), pp. 9-17
Published by: American Sociological Association
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 THE FORMAL ANALYSIS OF NORMATIVE CONCEPTS
ence between visual images and external facts.
The mental image or idea was thought to
be like a mirror image or portrait or possi-
bly a map which reproduces exactly or in
some proportion the features of the object
represented. The idea was true in proportion
as it reproduced the objected represented....
The naive pictorial theory of correspondence
was accordingly rejected by the more critical
mechanists, and numerous attempts have
been made to deal with the problem in terms
of a symbolic theory of correspondence. The
hypothesis of symbolic correspondence, how-
ever, creates a transition which has led many
mechanists to suggest that it is not corre-
spondence that is important in the truth of a
sentence or formula, but the predictive power
of these to produce expected results. The
truth of a formula is its workability.29
The difficulties raised by the correspondence
test of truth of a model are compounded
when one turns, with Pepper, to the other
tests of truth and particularly when one
realizes that each dominant metaphor or
model seems to insist on its own special test
of its own truth. The point is that the model-
29 Stephen Pepper, World Hypotheses, A Study
in Evidence, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University
of California Press, 1942, Ch. IX.
9
makers of contemporary science are em-
broiled in metaphysical controversiesno less
real because they are usually ignored.
In a sense, then, this present discussion of
the role of "systems" and "models" in sci-
ence, a discussion admittedly much too am-
bitious, has reached a point not far from
where it was left nearly a half-century ago
by Aliotta. Scientific theory, which holds
that reality is a function of the observer and
the observing process, maintains a philo-
sophically idealistic position. This is, of
course, by no means a damning fact, except
when unawareness of it starts from and
leads to unexamined generalizations. Aliotta
pointed out, "The scientific concept is some-
thing more than a mere summary of percep-
tions; it is not an abridged experience, but
an idealized experience, and its fruitfulness
lies in its ideal character."30 Thoughtfully
pursued, this theme makes it possible on
the one hand to avoid the equation which
asserts that the model is reality and enables
us, on the other, increasingly to incorporate
reality into the model, into some model.
30 Antonio Aliotta, The Idealistic Reaction
against Science, London: Macmillan, 1914, p. 402.

THE FORMAL ANALYSIS OF NORMATIVE CONCEPTS *

ALAN Ross ANDERSONAND OMAR KHAYYAMMOORE
Yale University

logic has been

LTHOUGH mathematical indefinitely many systems can be con-
applied in several empirical disci- structed; but whether such tools are to be
plines,' logicians have only recently of use to sociologists depends in part on
begun to develop formal systems that are the amount of interchange across discipli-
in
likely to be of special interest to sociologists. nary boundaries. This article is written
From the point of view of modern logic, the hope of enlisting the support and in-
terest of investigators treating problems to
*This paper reports one aspect of a more gen- which such notions as rule, norm, obligation,
eral research program supported by the Office of
Naval Research, Group Psychology Branch, Con- etc., are central.
tract No. SAR/Nonr-609(16). Permission is granted Concepts of this kind are of obvious im-
for reproduction, translation, publication and dis- portance for sociological theory; almost all
posal in whole or in part by or for the U. S. Gov- sociologists make use, in one way or an-
ernment. [The Review retains copyright authority
for all other uses.] other, of such notions. But in spite of the
1 See for example the references given in Omar widespread use of normative concepts, very
Khayyam Moore and Scarvia B. Anderson, "Mod- little is known of their logic. For the most
ern Logic and Tasks for Experiments on Problem part logicians have restricted their attention
Solving Behavior," The Journal of Psychology, 38
(July, 1954), pp. 151-160. to descriptive discourse (variously called

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10 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW
"informative," "factual," "cognitive," etc.),
as opposed to prescriptive discourse (or
"emotive," "normative," "expressive," etc.).
Powerful technical tools have been developed
for the analysis of the former, but there
have been only a few attempts to provide
analogous machinery for the latter. What-
ever the reasons for the neglect of the
prescriptive may be, this situation seems
unfortunate. We all do, as a matter of fact,
draw conclusions from a variety of state-
ments that may, broadly speaking, be called
"normative." We reason from moral pre-
cepts, from imperatives, from commands,
from statements of legal responsibility and
obligation, and from sets of rules for games
like chess, bridge, and football.
These facts suggest that there are grounds
for optimism concerning the possibility of
developing a formal logic for norms.2 There
have been many informal discussions of nor-
mative discourse, centering usually around
imperatives; but there have been very few
attempts to give a rigorous and formal char-
acterization of the logical structure of the
family of related notions consisting of legal
or moral obligations, prescriptions, sets of
directions, recipes, fiats, technological com-
mands, and the like. Among these are Mally,3
Menger,4 Hofstadter and McKinsey,5 von
2 It should be emphasized that the chief value
of formalizing a logic of norms, or indeed any logic
at all, does not lie simply in the use of shorthand
notational devices, though an economical symbolism
can be helpful. The idea is not to "translate"
from one language into another, but rather to
express propositions in a language the logical struc-
ture of which is explicit and definite. An adequate
formalization makes it possible to check in a de-
tailed and rigorous way just what follows from
what, and such rigorous checking is an obvious
prerequisite for the use of the axiomatic approach.
For an especially clear discussion of the sense
in which systems of formal logic (including
mathematics) are "languages," see Alonzo Church,
Introduction to Mathematical Logic, Volume I,
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1955, pp.
47-68, especially footnotes 111 and 116.
3 E. Mally, GrundgesetZe des Sollens, Graz:
Leuschner and Lubensky, 1926.
4 Karl Menger, "A Logic of the Doubtful. On
Optative and Imperative Logic," Reports of a
Mathematical Colloquium, 2nd series, No. 1, Notre
Dame: University Press, 1939, pp. 53-64.
5 A. Hofstadter and J. C. C. McKinsey, "On
the Logic of Imperatives," Philosophy of Science,
6 (October, 1939), pp. 446-457.
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Wright,6 Feys 7 and Prior.8 Space does not
permit a general review of these systems,
though each of them merits consideration.
We have selected for initial discussion a
system which is particularly relevant to
sociology, namely von Wright's Deontic
Logic.9 But before discussing this formalism,
it may be helpful to outline informally a
problem typical of those on which the logi-
cal analysis might be expected to throw light.
Some sociological theorists have main-
tained that under certain circumstances
there is a "strain of consistency," and
under other circumstances a tendency to-
ward inconsistency, among the norms of a
given social order. An empirical test of such
a thesis presupposes a reasonable explica-
tion of the concept of "consistency" as used
in such analyses. In many instances it is
difficult to see precisely what is meant by
"consistency" as applied to sets of norms.10
Despite the vagueness and ambiguity of the
term "consistency," however, we would ex-
pect to find some uniformity in its applica-
tion by sociologists. Consider, as illustra-
tions, the following three cases.
I. If a set of norms both obligates and
forbidsan agent to executea given act under
the same circumstances,the set of norms
would no doubt be regardedas inconsistent.
1I. If a set of norms (1) makes it obliga-
tory to do act B if act A is done, (2) permits
act A, but (3) forbidsact B, then again the
set wouldno doubtbe held to be inconsistent.
It might be maintained,that is, that doing
the permitted never commits an agent to
doing the forbidden,within a consistent set
of norms.
6 G. H. von Wright, "Deontic Logic," Mind,
60 (January, 1951), pp. 1-15.
7 Robert Feys, "Expression modale du 'devoir-
etre,'" The Journal of Symbolic Logic, 20 (March,
1955), pp. 91-92.
8 A. N. Prior, Time and Modality, Oxford: The
Clarendon Press, 1956.
9 "Deontic" logic is the logic of the modes of
obligation. Expositions of von Wright's system
may be found in von Wright, loc. cit.; or in G. H.
von Wright, An Essay in Modal Logic, Amsterdam:
North-Holland Publishing Company, 1951; or in
A. N. Prior, Formal Logic, Oxford: The Clarendon
Press, 1955.
10 It should be emphasized that "consistency,"
in such contexts, frequently has only a vague
analogical resemblance to "consistency" in the vari-
ous logical senses. For the latter see Alonzo Church,
op. cit., pp. 108-109.
 THE FORMAL ANALYSIS OF NORMATIVE CONCEPTS 11
III. Considera set of norms which (1) be performed in any case," none of the
makes act B or act C obligatoryif act A is terms "obligatory," "permitted," "forbid-
done, (2) permits act A, but (3) forbids den," are applicable to them?
both act B and act C. To say that such a Evidently what is required is a system
set of normsis inconsistentamountsto say- of concepts that will handle not only the
ing that an act which commits an agent to easier problems, but will also enable us to
forbiddenalternativeswould itself be forbid-
den by a consistentset of norms. deal effectively with complex and/or un-
familiar cases. The system of deontic logic
For such simple cases, it seems that com- proposed by von Wright provides, among
mon sense suffices to decide whether norma- other things, a tool for treating just such
tive systems are consistent (though of course questions as have been outlined above.
we are all familiar, from recent develop-
ments in science, with the fact that common FORMAL DEONTIC LOGIC
sense may well be inadequate even for Von Wright's system assumes a universe
problems which appear to be easily re- of discourse consisting of "acts," or per-
solved). But in any event it is clear that haps better, "act-types." The word "em-
common sense does not take us very far. bezzlement," for example, refers to a kind
The following case, although undoubtedly of incident, or a class of incidents, rather
much simpler than many situations which than to any particular occasion on which
actually arise, will provide an illustration. something is embezzled. As variables for
IV. Considera set of normsfrom which it "act-types" (for brevity, now, simply
follows that (1) it is obligatorythat if act "acts") he uses "A," "B" "C" . . . In
D be done then act B not be done, (2) it addition to the atomic acts over which the
is forbiddenthat if act A is done then act variables range, there are various combina-
C is done, (3) it is obligatorythat if act A tions of acts:
is done then either act B or else both act Correspondingto any act A there is a.
C and act D be done, and (4) it is per- negation-actof A, symbolized-A. ~A is that
mitted that act D be done. Should (1)-(4) act which is performedby an agent if and
be taken as evidence that the set of norms only if he does not performA; to use von
is inconsistentor not? Even if it is clear to Wright'sexample,"The negation of the act
the reader how this question should be an- of repayinga loan is not repayingit."
The conjunction-act,symbolized(A & B),
swered, it is obvious that realistic cases of
is that act which is performedby an agent
much greater complexitymight arise. More- if and only if he performsboth act A and
over, it would be valuable to have a clear act B.
statement of principles in accordancewith The disjunction-act (A v B) is that act
which any case, simple or complex,could be which is performedby an agent if and only
decided. if he performseitheract A or act B (or both).
The implication-act(A -- B) is that act
But complexity is not the only problem. which is performedby an agent if and only
Some apparently simple questions may be if it is not the case that A is performedand
puzzling and difficult to resolve, in part, B is not.
because they are rarely raised. For example, The equivalence-act(A <---- B) is that act
suppose that a set of norms obligated an which is performedby an agent if and only
agent to perform some act which is impossi- if he performs both A and B, or neither
A nor B.
ble for causal or perhaps even logical rea-
sons. Should such a set of norms be re- The only primitive deontic concept is
garded as consistent? If not, then what "permission"; the others (i.e., obligatory,
should be said about logically impossible 1" An example of a
acts? Are they to be forbidden? Or should cannot be performed, iscontradictory act, one that
smoking-and-not-smoking
we treat them as permitted? Or should they (at the same time by the same person). This sort
perhapsbe regardedas indifferent?Or should of contradictory act is not to be confused with,
we say that, inasmuch as contradictory acts e.g., smoking in defiance of a "No Smoking" sign,
or with sometimes smoking and sometimes not
are vacuous in the sense that they cannot smoking.

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12 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICALREVIEW
indifferent, forbidden) are defined in terms
of this primitive concept. "Permission" is
symbolized by "P," and the result of apply-
ing "P" to the name of an act is a formula
of the system. That is, "PA" is to be in-
terpreted as expressing the proposition that
acts of kind A are permitted. (The notion
of permission is, of course, always to be
understoodas relative to some set of norms.)
Similarly, "PEA" is to be understood as
saying that it is permitted not to do A; etc.
"P" together with the act-types thus pro-
vide a collection of deontic propositions. As
was remarked previously, there is available
adequate technical machinery for manipu-
lating propositions, and von Wright brings
to bear on the deontic propositions the
classical two-valued propositional calculus.
This calculus contains analogues of the op-
erations just described for the calculus of
acts.'2 The other deontic concepts may then
be defined in terms of the concept of per-
mission as follows:
Def. 1. OA= df APIA
FA = df -PA
Def. 2.
Def. 3. IA = df (PA) & (P~A).
Definition 1 says that an act A is obliga-
tory ("O") if and only if it is not permitted
not to do A; definition 2 says that an act A
is forbidden ("F") if and only if A is not
permitted; and definition 3 says that an
act A is indifferent ("I") 13 if and only if
that is, if it is permited to do A or B (i.e.,
it is permitted to do A and also permitted if it is permitted to execute the disjunction-
to do MA (i.e., not to do A). As von
act: A or B), then either it is permitted to
12That is, corresponding to any proposition p do A or it is permitted to do B; and con-
there is a denial U-p which is true if and only if p versely. The formal analogue of Principle
is false, and for any two propositions p and q II is
there is a conjunction (p & q) (which is true if and
only if both p and q are true), a disjunction (p v
q) (which is true if and only if at least one of p
and q is true), an implication (p -> q) (which is
true if and only if it is not the case that p is true
and q is false), and an equivalence (p<--->q) (which
is true if and only if p and q are both true or both
false). Expositions of this calculus may be found
in any standard textbook in symbolic logic. Of
course the symbols "..I", "&",, etc., are here used
in a different sense, but no ambiguity need arise
since, for example, "I" applied to an act-name
always yields an act-name, whereas negation
(symbolized the same way) applied to a proposi-
tion always yields a proposition.
13Von Wright discusses this concept, but does
not specify notation for it; we introduce a special
symbol for "indifference." For expository purposes,
trivial changes and occasional departures from
extreme rigor will be found here and elsewhere.
Wright remarks, indifference is a narrower
concept than permission. Everything indif-
ferent is permitted, but not conversely; ob-
ligatory acts, e.g., are permitted but not
indifferent.
The definitions above make use of con-
nectives drawn from the propositional calcu-
lus as well as from the calculus of acts. And
the application of the propositional calculus
to the deontic propositions yields many
formulae which are theorems in virtue of
their propositional structure alone. For ex-
ample, (PA-- PA), i.e., if A is permitted
then A is permitted. However, the interest-
ing theorems from the sociological point of
view are those that depend for their status
as theorems on the deontic concepts, and on
the two principles governing them, which
we quote from von Wright:
I. The Principle of Deontic Distribution.
If an act is the disjunction of two other
acts, then the propositionthat the disjunc-
tion is permittedis the disjunctionof the
propositionthat the first act is permittedand
the propositionthat the second act is per-
mitted.14
II. The Principleof Permission.Any given
act is either itself permittedor its negation
is permitted.'5
The formal analogue of Principle I is
P(AvB) d---> [(PA) v (PB)],
(PA) v (P-A),
that is, either it is permitted to do A, or it
is permitted to do A.
With the aid of the three definitions and
the two principles, von Wright develops a
decision procedure16 as a method of de-
14 Von Wright, "Deontic Logic," op. cit., p. 7.
15 Ibid., p. 9.
16There are in general two ways of specifying
the set of theorems of formal systems, either by
means of an axiomatization, or a decision proce-
dure. An axiomatization consists of a list of axioms,
together with one or more principles of inference
that lead to theorems. A decision procedure is an
effective method for determining whether or not
an arbitrarily given expression of the system is

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 THE FORMAL ANALYSIS OF NORMATIVE CONCEPTS
termining which formulae are theorems. The
system therefore shares with axiomatic
formulations the property of providing a
rigorous (and in this case effective) method
of testing expressions for "logical truth."
The illustrative examples mentioned earlier
can easily be tested by von Wright's method,
and it develops that in each of the cases,
(I), (II) and (III), the formal results ac-
cord with the presumed common sense solu-
tion. In case (IV), von Wright's decision
procedure shows that the set of norms is
inconsistent.17
As regards the puzzling questions con-
cerning the deontic status of impossible acts,
it appears that several alternatives are avail-
able. Von Wright discusses this question,
and proposes a principle of deontic con-
tingency: "A tautologous act is not neces-
sarily obligatory, and a contradictory act
is not necessarily forbidden."18 This prin-
ciple is consistent with the other two
principles mentioned above, but it is not
the only way to resolve the problem. In a
system to be mentioned below, for example,
application of the deontic categories is
limited to contingent states of affairs (i.e.,
those which are neither necessary nor im-
possible).
It is not feasible to discuss the alterna-
tives available in detail without giving a
complete and rigorous formulation of the
systems. Since it lies beyond the scope of
this paper to present these systems qua
formal systems, we will content ourselves
a theorem. Although for some systems there are
both axiomatizations and decision procedures, the
two techniques are in general independent; some
systems have axiomatizations and no decision pro-
cedures, others have decision procedures and no
axiomatizations. The decision procedure for von
Wright's system consists roughly of a truth-table
analysis of expressions in disjunctive normal form.
There is as yet no axiomatization of the system in
print, though it would be a simple exercise to
produce one.
17 A complete truth-table analysis of example
(IV), carried out in the manner proposed by von
Wright, would involve initially a two-valued truth-
table with 216 rows (some of which would be
deleted). The amount of labor involved in testing
such expressions can be vastly reduced by adapt-
ing methods of Alan Ross Anderson, "Improved
Decision Procedures for Lewis's Calculus S4 and
von Wright's Calculus M," The Journal of Sym-
bolic Logic, 19 (September, 1954), pp. 201-214.
18Von Wright, "Deontic Logic," op. cit., p. 11.
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13
with mentioning two more general consid-
erations relevant to von Wright's logic.
In the first place, leaving aside for the
moment the fact that certain expressions
are provable as theorems, the formalismpro-
vides a clear explication of a number of
normative concepts. In this respect it may
be compared with the Hohfeldian analysis
of such notions as duty, demand-right,
power, immunity, etc.19 That analysis at
this level is not without value may be seen
from Hoebel's application of the Hohfeldian
concepts to primitive law.20
In the second place, the deontic concepts
of von Wright's system have close formal
connections with other logical concepts, a
fact first pointed out in recent literature by
von Wright himself. In fact it was the ob-
servation of formal similarities between the
notions "obligatory," "permitted," "indif-
ferent," "forbidden," and the extensively
studied concepts "necessary," "possible,"
"contingent," "impossible," which led von
Wright to formalize a deontic logic. The
formal similarities extend to other concepts
as well, as summarizedin the table of modal
categories. (See Table 1.)
TABLE 1. MODAL CATEGORIES
*
Alethic Existential Epistemic Deontic
a. necessary universal verified obligatory
b. possible existing unfalisfied permitted
c. contingent partial undecided indifferent
d. impossible empty falsified forbidden
* This classification appears in G. H. von
Wright, An Essay in Modal Logic, Amsterdam:
North-Holland Publishing Company, 1951, p. 2.
We have again made slight changes for expository
reasons. In particular,von Wright did not supply
terms to designate two of the modes, on the
groundsthat no suitableEnglish words were avail-
able. We have inserted "partial"and "unfalsified,"
by fiat. So far as we know, this use of "partial"
is new.
The alethic modes are predicated of prop-
ositions, in such contexts as "It is necessary
that p," and "It is imposible that p,"-p
being any proposition. These modes have
19 W. N. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Concep-
tions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning and Other
Essays, edited by W. W. Cook, New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1923.
20 E. Adamson Hoebel, The Law of Primitive
Man, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954.
14 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICALREVIEW
been treated in the systems of Strict Impli-
cation due originally to Lewis,2' and further
studied by McKinsey,22 von Wright,23 and
others. The existential modes are regarded,
in many important contexts, as properties
of classes. For example, the statement that
there are no rich professors can be con-
strued as saying that the class of rich pro-
fessors is empty. The existential modes are
handled in the theory of quantification, for
which one locus classicus is Principia Mathe-
matica.24 The epistemic and deontic modes
were first investigated formally by von
Wright. It is clear that the epistemic modes,
like the alethic, apply to propositions. Von
Wright, as previously noted, takes the de-
ontic modes as applying to acts, though
other alternatives are available, one of which
will be discussed in the next section.
Among the formal similarities noted by
von Wright are the following (where the
letters refer to entries in the table): what-
ever is a is b, whatever is b is not d, and
whatever is c is neither a nor d. To put the
last relation more concretely: a contingent
proposition is neither necessary nor impos-
sible; a partial class is neither universal nor
empty; an undecided proposition is neither
verified nor falsified; and an indifferent act
is neither obligatory nor forbidden. Of
course these examples by no means exhaust
the relations among modes in a given cate-
gory. Moreover, there are systems of logic,
some of which von Wright discusses, which
combine concepts from two or more cate-
gories. In our opinion, a more adequate con-
ceptual scheme for the analysis of normative
concepts would involve a combination of
the modal categories listed above.
FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS
Given a social group with an empirically
specified normative structure, von Wright's the context of
logic would clearly facilitate the analysis The locution
21 C. I. Lewis, A Survey of Symbolic Logic,
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1918.
22 J. C. C. McKinsey, "A Solution of the Deci-
sion Problem for the Lewis Systems S2 and S4, a penalty or sanction that the recipient of
with an Application to Topology," The Journal of
Symbolic Logic, 6 (December, 1941), pp. 117-134.
23 Von Wright, An Essay in Modal Logic, op.
cit.
A. N. Whitehead and Bertrand Russell, Prin-
24
cipia Mathematica, Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 1910, 1912, 1913.
of relations among the norms. However,
these relations by no means exhaust the
interesting and important aspects of norma-
tive systems. Two crucial aspects of such
systems are the following. (1) There is a
need for a method of relating norms to the
system of social sanctions or penalties that
support them. (2) It is important to relate
both norms and sanctions to possibilities for
action.
1. It is, of course, customary to couch
discussion of norms in terms of the conse-
quences of conforming to, and deviating
from, their demands. The lack of such con-
sideration is not to be regarded as a defect
in von Wright's approach; it is in fact com-
mon in logical studies to isolate concepts
and consider only some of their formal
properties. Von Wright's system simply ex-
hibits the methodological principle of divid-
ing difficulties in order to conquer them
individually, a practice characteristic of
twentieth century studies in mathematics
and logic. But this lacuna does point to the
need for an expansion or elaboration of
von Wright's system so as to take adequate
account of sanctions.
Although it is clear that the notions of
sanction must somehow be got into relation
with the deontic logic, methods of effecting
this rapprochement have not yet been ex-
tensively explored. However, some work has
been done toward analyzing the relation be-
tween commands (rather than norms) and
sanctions.
In an article primarily concerned with
commands and imperatives, Bohnert sug-
gested a formal analysis of the role of
"penalties" in imperative discourse.25 In
brief, he recommends that commands be
treated as ellipses for disjunctive proposi-
tions, one part of which is ordinarily un-
verbalized, but nevertheless understood in
utterance of the command.
"Do A," for example, is to be
understood as elliptical for the declarative
proposition "Either you will do A, or else
S." where "S" is understood as referring to
the command will presumably attempt to
25 H. G. Bohnert, "The Semiotic Status of
Commands," Philosophy of Science, 12 (July, 1945),
pp. 302-315. We have made inessential changes in
his notation to facilitate subsequent discussion.

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 THE FORMAL ANALYSIS OF NORMATIVE CONCEPTS
avoid. Alternatively "Do A" might, depend-
ing on the context, be understood as an
ellipsis for "Either you will not do A, or
else R," where now "R" refers to a reward
which the recipient of the command will
presumablyattempt to attain.
Bohnert's suggestions have not been
axiomatized, but they show at least one
way in which commands can be related to
penalties so as to yield propositions. This
feature of Bohnert's analysis is a distinct
advantage, since it makes possible the ap-
plication of the usual logic of propositions
to commands.26Other ways of relating com-
mands to propositions have been proposed,27
but Bohnert seems to have been the first to
formulate such a relation in a way that
brings in penalties and rewards explicitly.
It would not be difficultto treat Bohnert's
suggestion axiomatically,28and the resulting
"logic of sanctions," as we might call it,
would constitute a rigorous formal theory
on a par with von Wright's deontic logic. The
obvious next step would be to construct a
formal theory that encompasses both these
systems so as to bring out the relations be-
tween obligations, the imperative sentences
which express these obligations, and the
sanctions associated with them.
2. It is clear that the possibilities of hu-
man action can be studied without regard
either to particular realizations of these pos-
sibilities, or to the consequences of acting
in any particular way. As an illustration of
this point we may take the theory of games.29
The analysis of any game begins with a
complete characterizationof all possible ways
26 Traditionally, commands have not been re-
garded as propositions, primarily on the grounds
that we are not inclined to ask of a command such
as "Mail this letter" whether it is true or false.
Certain writers have evinced an extreme reluctance,
for philosophical and grammatical reasons, to ad-
mit any very close relation between propositions
and commands. In our opinion this is an open
question, to be decided by constructing logical
systems whose utility can be tested in scientific
practice.
27 See for example R. M. Hare, The Language
of Morals, Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1952.
28 In formalizing Bohnert's proposal, care would
be required to avoid, if possible, such counterintui-
tive results as those mentioned by Menger, loc. cit.,
p. 60.
29 John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern,
Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, Prince-
ton: Princeton University Press, 1947.
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15
of playing, these possibilities being circum-
scribed only by the (non-normative) rules
of the game, and not by their chances of
success or failure. From among these possi-
bilities, certain strategies are selected as,
roughly speaking, most likely to win.
The case seems to us to be similar in
analyzing normative systems. If we think
of possibilities for action as being bounded
by non-normative"rules"consisting of "laws
of nature," then the social norms stipulate
that certain of these possibilities will, if
actualized, lead to rewards or penalties.
There are extensively studied formal sys-
tems suitable for the analysis of possibili-
ties (and the other alethic modes). Pioneer
work on this subject was done by Lewis in
1918,30 and since then the systems S1 to
SS 31 S6 32 57 and S8,33 M,34 and T,35 to
mention only a few, have been constructed
and discussed extensively. These modal sys-
tems provide alternative explications of the
concepts of possibility, necessity, contin-
gency, etc., and this kind of analysis is
required for the clarification of the vague
notion of "possibilities for human action."
Just as deontic logic makes a contribution
to the analysis of normativesystems, and the
"logic of sanctions" could also contribute
to this end, so the logic of "possibility,"
taken together with the foregoing, may shed
light on the problem. What is wanted is a
formal frame of reference rich enough to
incorporate at least these three facets of
normative systems.36From the formal point
30 Lewis, op cit.
31 C. I. Lewis and C. H. Langford, Symbolic
Logic, New York: The Century Company, 1932.
32 M. J. Alban, "Independence of the Primitive
Symbols of Lewis's Calculi of Propositions," The
Journal of Symbolic Logic, 8 (March, 1943), pp.
25-26.
33 Sdren Hallden, "Results Concerning the De-
cision Problem of Lewis's Calculi S3 and S6," The
Journal of Symbolic Logic, 14 (January, 1950),
pp. 230-236.
34 Von Wright, An Essay in Modal Logic, op.
cit.
35 Robert Feys, "Les Logiques Nouvelles des
Modalit6s," Revue Neo-scholastique de Philosophie,
40 (November, 1937), pp. 517-553, and 41 (May,
1938), pp. 217-252.
360f course there are other important aspects
of normative systems; there are, for example subtle
problems concerning the relations between possi-
bilities for action, and beliefs about these possibili-
ties. There are a number of ways in which the
16 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW
of view, (1) and (2) above motivated the
construction of systems more comprehen-
sive than von Wright's upon which we will
commentbriefly.
The system O'M*37 has the following fea-
tures. In addition to the usual primitive
notions of alethic modal logic,38 0'SM takes
only the notion "sanction" symbolized "S,"
as primitive. The basic deontic modes are
defined with the help of this notion in such
a way that von Wright's system (with ap-
propriate qualifications) emerges as a sub-
system of O'M*.The only axiom mentioning
the sanction states that the sanction is con-
tingent; i.e., it is possible to behave in such
a way that the penalty or sanction will occur,
and also in such a way that it will not occur.
The deontic modes are construedas applying
only to contingent propositions; that is, (1)
propositions p, q, r, . . . rather than acts,
are the elements of the universe of dis-
course,39 and (2) the question of what to
do with contradictoryand tautologouspropo-
sitions is answered by limiting the range of
deontic modes to propositions that are
contingent.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to
systems we are discussing might be extended so
as to cover such questions. Epistemic modal oper-
ators may prove of value in this connection, and
one obvious and important way in which these
systems should be extended is by adding quantifi-
cation theory (a generalization of the existential
modes).
37This system is closely related to a group of
new systems described and elaborated in Alan Ross
Anderson, The Formal Analysis of Normative Sys-
tems, Technical Report No. 2, Contract No.
SAR/Nonr-609( 16), Office of Naval Research,
Group Psychology Branch, 1956.
38The underlying alethic system of O'M* is in
fact von Wright's system M (shown to be equiva-
lent to Fey's system T by Boleslaw Sobocinski,
"Note on a Modal System of Feys-von Wright,"
The Journal of Computing Systems, 1 (January,
1953), pp. 171-178). Choice of alternative alethic
logics yields systems somewhat different from
O'M*. The exposition here of O'M* does not reflect
various "reductions" effected for the family of
systems OM of Anderson ibid.
39The letter "p," for example, is a variable
ranging over propositions. In this context, the
propositions may be about "acts," in von Wright's
sense.
This point should not be construed as meaning
that "acts" are unimportant, or have somehow
been done away with; taking propositions as ele-
ments of the universe of discourse, is simply an
alternative interpretation, worth investigating. There
may well be others, e.g., propositional functions.
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present O'M* in detail, but it may be of
interest to mention the way in which the
deontic modes are defined. We use the letter
"M" to represent "possibility"; that is,
"Mp" is read "it is possible that p."
O'p= df [(Mp) & (M-p)]
Def. 4.40
& -M (uP & -S) .
In this definition of obligation "O'," the
first clause, [(Mp) & (Ma-p)], says that
p is contingent, i.e., possibly true and possi-
bly false. That is, it is possible to act in
such a way as to make p true, and also in
such a way as to make it false. The last
clause M ( Up & -S) says that it is im-
possible that p and the sanction should both
be false; thus if p is false, then the sanction
S is true. This amounts to saying that p
is obligatory if and only if it is contingent,
and failure to do what is required to make
p true would lead to the sanction.
Similarly,we define:
F'p = df [(Mp) & (M-p)]
Def. 5.
& AM (p &AS).
That is, p is forbidden if (as before) p is
contingent, and moreover, it is impossible
that p should be true and S false. In other
words, it is impossible to act in such a way
as to make p true without incurring the
sanction.
Def. 6. I'p = df M (p &-S) &M
(up & -S).
That is, p is indifferent if it is possible
that p should be true and S false, and it
is also possible that p should be false and
S false. I.e., it is possible to act so as to
make p true, without incurring the sanction,
and also possible to act so as to make p
false, without incurring the sanction. (The
contingency of an indifferent p is a logical
consequence of the definition of indifference,
and hence need not be explicitly stated.)
With these definitions the relations ex-
pressed in Def. 1-3 all become provable as
theorems of O'M-; moreover, the two prin-
ciples enunciated by von Wright are also
40 Definitions 4-6 are arranged to facilitate com-
parison with definitions 1-3. We here use "O"' in-
stead of "O", etc., to distinguish these notions
from those of von Wright. An analogue of von
Wright's primitive notion of permission is defined
in O'M* as follows:
P'p = df Map & M (p & -S)
 THE STATISTICAL MEASUREMENT OF AGREEMENT
theorems of O'M*.41This means that von
Wright's system is a subsystem of O'M*;
and that some account is also taken of
Bohnert's suggestions. It would be point-
less to try to characterize O'M* further in
such a brief compass; formal systems always
require intensive study if their explanatory
power is to be fully appreciated.
If the "explanatory power" of such con-
structs seems highly abstract or remote, the
situation should be compared with con-
temporary physical theories, where mathe-
matical theories much more recondite than
those presented here have a direct and im-
mediate bearing on empirical research. And
just as many mathematical developments
were initiated by empirical problems, so the
development of O'M* was motivated by the
hope of throwing light on some empirical
problems in small-group research. More
specifically, in experiments currently being
conducted in the Yale Interaction Labora-
tory, opportunities are available for study-
ing, under well-controlled conditions, small
groups in the process of developing norma-
tive structures. A clear and accurate account
of these interactional processess calls for a
precise and rigorous conceptual framework
within which to characterize the behavior
of the group.
Small-groups research is of course only
one, and not necessarily the most important,
41 As applied to contingent propositions, that is;
this qualification applies elsewhere as well.
THE STATISTICAL MEASUREMENT OF AGREEMENT
W. S.
University of California, Los Angeles
A NUMBER of statisticalproblemsof im-
portance in social research logically
require the measurementof the agree-
ment (rather than the correlation) between
two or more variables. These problems are
often handled individually as they arise and
on an ad hoc basis. Appropriate techniques,
however, are available for handling them,
though they have hitherto seen use mainly
in non-sociological fields. The purpose. of
this paper is to discuss these techniques in
a general setting, and to indicate the im-
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17
area of application of such formal systems.
It is hoped that the foregoing discussion
will have suggestive value for workers in
other sociological fields, and will stimulate
interest in current research in mathematical
logic, especially modal logic. This research
is not remote from the daily affairs of soci-
ologists. For instance, whenever instructions
are given for filling out a questionnaire,
commands expressing obligations are in-
volved. More generally, any adequate socio-
logical theory must encompass, in our opin-
ion, the concepts norm, obligation, etc. It
is therefore a matter of importance to de-
velop sound techniques for analyzing norms
and systems of norms.
SUMMARY
The development of an adequate theoreti-
cal structure for sociology will in all likeli-
hood require interdisciplinary co-operation
between sociologists and those working in
the formal sciences if it is to proceed in a
maximally fruitful way. The purpose of this
article is to bring to the attention of soci-
ologists recent work in mathematical logic
which has direct relevance for their research.
Von Wright's deontic logic offers promising
leads for the analysis of normative struc-
tures; the family of systems of which O'M*
is a member provides a more comprehensive
framework, taking account of the role of
penalties and possibilities for action vis-a-vis
norms.
ROBINSON
portance of agreement as a statistical con-
cept in its own right.
The idea of agreementappears in a variety
of situations, among which are problems in-
volving: the interchangeability of measures,
as in the substitution of an index for a
more fundamentalmeasure; measurementof
the reliability of an instrument such as a
test or scale; measurement of the "objec-
tivity" or lack of bias of a concept as applied
to observational material by different ob-
servers; comparison of observed with theo-