6

Reflexivity and modesty in the

application of complexity theory *

Roger Strand and Sílvia Cañellas-Boltà

In this book, novel approaches to various fields of governance on the interface between
science and society are presented. These approaches include new ways of managing
scientific uncertainty, new modes of interaction between citizens and experts, and new
forms of public participation. The theoretical foundation of these innovations is to be
found in a variety of new research fields, including:
● Complex systems research

● Science, technology and society studies

● The philosophy of post-normal science

● Ecological economics

In this chapter, we call this wide range of fields ‘complexity theory’.

The topic of this chapter is to reflect on a series of philosophical doubts. How much
should complexity theorists trust their own complexity theory? If we are convinced by
our own theories, how strongly should we promote them in society and with what basis
of justification? There are two reasons why such questions are of interest. First,
although we may be convinced about the excellence of our own ideas, we should admit

* This chapter is based on the breakout session ‘Pros and Cons of Messy Governance’ held during the
Interfaces between Science and Society workshop in Milan, November 2003. Contributions made
by the session speakers Jerome Ravetz and Moses Boudourides, and the session rapporteur Sofia
Guedes Vaz, as well as numerous other session participants, have had a profound influence on the
form and content of the chapter. However, the views and opinions expressed should be attributed
to the authors only.
 6. reflexivity and modesty Strand and Cañellas-Boltà 105

that there is not much experience yet with putting them into practice. Second, our own
ideas typically include the general insight that experts should not be trusted too much,
and that things are more complicated than a theory can express. How much should we
be trusted? How much do we simplify things in our theories and approaches? At the
expense of what and whom?
The conclusion of the chapter is that we are entitled to promote our ideas and
approaches if and only if we combine them with the virtues of modesty, sincerity and
openness, and do not try to hide our own vulnerability. Promoting an approach does
not preclude you from listening to others and being ready to set a side your own pro-
posal for other reasons, perhaps even if you still believe in your own theory. Indeed, it
is exactly this attitude that is required by complexity theory.

Complexity theory, messy governance and a particular

problem of expertise
During recent decades, new ideas and insights into the interfaces between science and
society have gradually emerged. Useful keywords showing their family resemblance
are ‘uncertainty’, ‘complexity’ and ‘the plurality of legitimate perspectives.’ If we allow
ourselves to try to express the essence of these new insights, we might say that they
show how a number of older distinctions and dichotomies become too simple as science
and society grow closer and more intertwined. Among these ideas we find the old
dichotomies typically considered decisive by Modern Western philosophy, i.e. as those
between facts and values, knowledge and action, science and non-science, and indeed
expert and lay people.
This is not to say that these distinctions have lost their importance. Rather, what we
have seen, are the hazards of rendering them absolute, as a justification for political
systems dominated by expert-driven decision-making processes. Thus, the emerging
science of complex systems has shown how and why the real, non-linear world differs
from the controlled and idealised systems of the laboratory, limiting the possibilities of
scientific prediction and control (Bak 1987; Rosen 1991; Rescher 1998). Research into
uncertainty, for instance under the label of post-normal science or ‘knowledge assess-
ment’, has made typologies of forms and severities of uncertainty and quality of knowl-
edge, with numerous case studies showing how decisions have to be made on the basis
of irremediably uncertain, partial and value-laden scientific information (see for exam-
ple: Funtowicz and Ravetz 1990; Walker et al. 2003). Science, technology and society
studies have argued for the necessity of seeing the development of science, technology
and society as a co-evolution, the one shaping the context of, and creating possibilities
and constraints for, the others (Pickering 1995). Indeed, post-empiricist philosophy has
led us to reconsider Enlightenment beliefs and desires for science-based absolute, ‘per-
spective-free’, objectivity, certainty and control.1 In this chapter we will need a concept
1 Paul Feyerabend’s writings may be an example (Feyerabend 1975); on the European continent, one
did not really have to wait for the ‘post-empiricist’ period to arrive at these insights, as seen in the
intellectual traditions of the Frankfurter school (including Jürgen Habermas) and the French epis-
temologists (Bachelard, Canguilhem, Foucault).
106 interfaces between science and society

for this diverse, but interconnected bundle of theoretical developments. For lack of a
better word, we shall call it complexity theory.
Strongly linked to the development of complexity theory, there has been a simulta-
neous development of novel approaches to management and governance. Indeed, this
book is largely devoted to the presentation of such approaches and to their foundation
in some part of what we just labelled complexity theory. Thus, various strands of com-
plexity theory have been taken to suggest or imply the introduction of means for the
analysis and communication of uncertainty. Above all, however, complexity theory is
taken to be a theoretical foundation for the introduction of participatory approaches,
ranging from community-based research and the recognition of non-academic or non-
expert knowledge to new forms of deliberative democracy and ‘inclusive governance’.
Only to a slight extent have these novel approaches to governance gained any sig-
nificant terrain. Enlightenment decision-making structures based on a combination of
expert advice and representative democracy still tend to dominate, expecting ‘science
to speak truth to power’. This should be no surprise. If it is true that the focus on uncer-
tainty and participation is founded on recent insights into complexity, the mere fact
that these insights play only a minor role both within and outside the academic world
is sufficient to explain why most institutions and practices of governance have still not
been reformed according to the convictions and desires of complexity theorists.
Indeed, from the point of view of those not convinced of complexity theory, the novel
approaches might seem unnecessary, untidy and inefficient. Why conflate expert advice
with public opinion? Why spend time on sophisticated uncertainty management tech-
niques instead of plainly trying to eliminate that uncertainty? Why delay decisions with
possibly incompetent discussion groups and other time- and resource-consuming pro-
cedures? To those not convinced of the desirability of the novel approaches, it might
seem that they would imply a risk of transforming an agreeably imperfect but at least
efficient and streamlined technocracy into an anarchic and unprofessional mess. In
order to bear in mind this concern, we shall somewhat humorously denote the bundle
of novel governance approaches messy governance.2
Like most other theorists and practitioners, complexity theorists and messy gover-
nance practitioners put a considerable effort into arguing why their theoretical per-
spective is important and why their novel approaches ought to be implemented. This is
a reasonable strategy. From a conviction that one’s theoretical arguments and practical
approaches may contribute to a more meaningful or somehow better governance, it
seems proper to try to convince others and to change the world in what one considers
an appropriate direction. In that case, one needs forceful arguments.
On the other hand, be it from a complexity theory point of view or simply from com-
mon sense, we believe in the philosophical postulate that every analytical perspec-
tive—complexity theory included—has its weak spots. In one’s enthusiasm over nov-
elty it may be tempting to gloss over the weaknesses, or at least not focus too strongly
on them yet, until one has gained some power. We believe that such a temptation must
be overcome and that a thorough discussion of one’s weak spots may strengthen one’s

2 The messiness of ‘messy governance’ thus resides in its externally perceived untidiness and ineffi-
ciency, although it may appear coherent and consistent with its theoretical foundation, as viewed
by its proponents. This differentiates it from the otherwise similar notion of ‘clumsy solutions’ as
conceived by Thompson and Price (2002).
 6. reflexivity and modesty Strand and Cañellas-Boltà 107

position. First, showing our doubts and weaknesses would be consistent with the norm
of transparency, which often is regarded central in the novel approaches to governance.
Second, one should not exclude the possibility that one’s own doubts and one’s oppo-
nents’ apparently uninformed criticisms actually are quite related. Showing our doubt
might perhaps be a first step towards accommodating and understanding external crit-
icism.
There can be many doubts about complexity theory and messy governance. There
are almost as many different opinions within the conglomerate of complexity theories
as there are authors and the novel approaches to governance are still far from being evi-
dence-based in any sense of the word. Nevertheless, the focal point of this chapter is
one particular doubt regarding the nature of the relationship between complexity the-
ory and messy governance. Specifically, we shall ask about the justification of messy
governance and if it can be justified by complexity theory.
The reason is that there may be something special about complexity theory that
makes the justification particularly difficult. The suspicion to be examined is essentially
the following: In the Enlightenment tradition, it was generally assumed that knowl-
edge tells us how the world really is, and that knowledge can be applied by simply using
it as a map of the world. For instance, Francis Bacon (1620) explained that: ‘human
knowledge and human power come to the same thing, for where the cause is not known
the effect cannot be produced’ (Book I, Aphorism 3). The scientific expert, then, is the
one who has discovered the true causal relationships in the world and, when we want
a particular effect, we simply ask the expert how to cause the effect and follow the pre-
scription given. Now, complexity theory typically criticises the Baconian and Enlight-
enment ideas for being too simple. The relationship between knowledge and the world
may be vastly more complicated; hence one should not naively believe experts and
implement theory.
The self-referential problem is pressing. If part of your theory is that it may be a bad
idea to trust experts and directly implement their theories, why should society listen to
your (complexity) theory and implement your suggestions of messy governance? What
could ‘justification’ mean from within complexity theory? That is the philosophical for-
mulation of the issue at stake in this chapter. The practical formulation, closely related
but not equivalent to the philosophical one is: what (positive and negative) surprises
could arise from the introduction of messy governance? In Martin O’Connor’s words:
‘Which human and social agencies will be repressed by complexity theory and messy
governance?’3 Which approaches and lines of action will be encouraged, invented, jus-
tified and reinforced? Which other lines of action will be underestimated, discredited
or forgotten?
We said above that, because there is no general agreement on this point, there may
be something special about complexity theory. Above all, it would depend on one’s
notion of complexity. The next section will clarify this point, distinguishing between
‘thin’ and ‘thick’ complexity. Next, we illustrate the general problem by the use of a case
study—a research project studying environmental management in northern Norway.
Drawing on this case study, we argue that complexity theory might be applied in a
reflexive manner if combined with the appropriate set of norms and attitudes, includ-
ing modesty and openness, both in a personal and an emotional sense.

3 As quoted from the discussion of the breakout session on the ‘Pros and Cons of Messy Governance’.
108 interfaces between science and society

Thin and thick complexity

In our pragmatic definition of ‘complexity theory’, we lumped together quite diverse
fields within the academic world. Uncertainty and complexity are being studied by
numerous research traditions, using very different methodologies. These differences
are relevant when discussing our self-referential problem of expertise. For instance,
one of us has proposed to distinguish between ‘thin’ and ‘thick’ complexity (Strand
2002). Thin complexity is then the notion of complexity that is found in the emerging
science of formal non-linear ‘complex systems’ including systems theory, catastrophe
theory, chaos theory, neural networks, cellular automata and agent-based model-
ling/complex adaptive systems. Scientists within these fields would typically recognise
the plurality of different perspectives within the system they study, for the agents of the
system. However, the role of the researcher is often implicitly taken to be that of the
truth-seeking, truth-finding, neutral and objective observer. Thus, for Casti (1997),
complex systems based modelling may ultimately provide us with ‘true’ models of the
world (‘would-be-worlds’ in his terminology), with which we may experiment in silico
in order to improve policy. Casti’s position is thus the same as the centuries-old vision
of the role of natural science speaking truth to modern society and, from this vision,
there would not appear to be any particular problem in the application of complexity
theory expertise as the one introduced above. Complex systems modellers will be tra-
ditional experts, only better.
On the other hand, there are ‘thicker’ notions of complexity that also render the rela-
tionship between knowledge and the world as complex, and from which the problem
posed earlier appears relevant. Such notions may be found in the humanities and social
sciences, where the complexities resulting from the expert’s dual role as an observer
and a participant were recognised long before the advent of post-empiricist or post-
modernist philosophy. Thick notions of complexity may, however, also emerge out of a
continued reflection on thin complexity, simply by pursuing at some length the ques-
tion of the role of the researcher/modeller/analyst. For instance, Ralph Stacey, a pio-
neer in the use of complex adaptive systems in management theory, has warned against
the uncritical use of so-called complex adaptive systems (CAS) metaphors because one
easily traps the discourse into:
● A rule-based conception of human behaviour

● A way of relating to systems similar to that of the computer programmer,

residing outside the computer and controlling it at wish
For Stacey, the question that reveals understanding of complex systems is not ‘how
can I govern the system into a new attractor (desired by me)?’ but rather ‘what is my
role in this system, and how does the action of me and others affect the system?’
(Stacey 2000).
Stacey’s question brings us to the practical formulation of our problem: the possible
repression of human and social agency by complexity theory and/or messy gover-
nance. Indeed, being true to complexity theory, we should not expect the practical con-
cerns to be reducible to the theoretical concerns of justification. Rather, we think that
there is a tension to be found both in the literature and in the practical approaches. We
see individuals—not excluding ourselves—on one hand expressing profound theoreti-
 6. reflexivity and modesty Strand and Cañellas-Boltà 109

cal reflexivity, while on the other hand developing, say, technical solutions for uncer-
tainty management or inclusive governance (perhaps even including a software pack-
age).
There is nothing necessarily wrong with this. The challenge, however, is to meet (or
anticipate) outsider, non-complexity theory expectations that such solutions can pro-
vide the uniquely correct answer and a ‘technical fix’. For instance, we may develop a
multi-criteria software model, which according to our theoretical position ought to be
regarded as nothing but one heuristic device among many in a social participatory
process. Its actual reception by citizens and policy-makers, however, may be less reflex-
ive. The perception might not be avoided that it is a new expert device to ensure the
rationality of the decision-making process, and its actual mode of employment may be
strongly informed by that expectation. In Enlightenment thought about science and
technology, one would typically immunise the science from responsibility for such
unexpected use (or more generally its unexpected effects) by denying any guilt and
rather blaming the end-user as misusing the technical solution. This mechanism of
deflection, however, is exactly one of the central targets of criticism by complexity the-
ory, which typically prescribes a change of focus from guilt and blame to caution, pre-
caution and acceptance of co-responsibility. But then the same ought to apply also to
the application of complexity theory, which accordingly has to be judged not only in
terms of theoretical justification, but also in terms of actual practices in the interface
with society.
We ought to comment on our use of the term ‘complexity theory’, which may be crit-
icised for being unusual or strange. In our attempt to reflect on the shortcomings of
what we have called Enlightenment thought about the relationship between science
and society, and the distinctions between observer and participant, subject and object,
and facts and values, why do we not simply identify ourselves as ‘postmodern thinkers’
or ‘postmodernists’? It is true that there are resemblances between the endeavour of
this chapter and, say, the relationship between Lyotard’s (1984) diagnosis of the post-
modern condition and its implications in terms of virtues as reflexivity, tolerance with
plurality, flexibility, humbleness and the need to put one’s own agenda at stake in the
encounter with one’s opponents/fellow beings, as reflected in the writings of Richard
Rorty, Zygmund Bauman, Emmanuel Levinas and many others. On the other hand, the
uses of the word ‘postmodern’ are now so many that it is as empty as ‘modern’. Neither
do we think that one has to agree with Lyotard’s diagnosis to follow the argument of
this chapter. Lyotard attempted a deep analysis of broad underlying patterns of change
in the Western mindset regarding our ways of justifying knowledge and types of knowl-
edge. What we describe are tensions within the perspectives we call complexity theory,
felt by us as aspiring theorists and practitioners in the field, tensions created from the
difficulty of justifying action from one’s belief in having adequate knowledge. These
tensions are, on one hand, a more local phenomenon than what Lyotard intended to
capture; some would argue their strength depends on exaggerated intellectualism. On
the other hand, such tensions have been felt important for a long time. To stretch the
point, we may say that they have motivated most of Western philosophy since pre-
Socratic philosophy.4

4 Though often framed as the issue of theoretical inconsistency and paradox, such as in Plato’s Par-
menides.
110 interfaces between science and society

So far we have stated the problem of this chapter in fairly abstract terms. Although
possible, it has strong limitations as explained above. To be able to pursue the issue fur-
ther, we contextualise it by looking at a concrete case. The example is chosen from our
own empirical research on the environmental management of dredging in polluted
harbours in northern Norway.

NORCAT and the Ballstad case

The NORCAT research project is a Norwegian–Catalan collaboration studying uncer-
tainty and complexity in a few cases of environmental and landscape management and
governance on a regional level.5 Within NORCAT we carried out the so-called Ballstad
case study as described elsewhere (Cañellas-Boltà 2004; Cañellas-Boltà et al. 2005).
The object of the study was the lengthy environmental management process (2000–
2004) concerned with the application for a permission to perform a maintenance
dredging of Ballstad harbour.
Ballstad is a fishing village in the Lofoten Islands of northern Norway, with 1,000
inhabitants and a considerable fish industry. In the 1990s, there was a felt to be a need
for maintenance dredging of the harbour. Maintenance dredging is a ubiquitous activ-
ity in commercial harbours. Essentially, it removes sediments from the sea bed and, in
the Ballstad case, also rocks to increase harbour depth. According to Norwegian law,
dredging is an activity that requires permission from the environmental authorities due
to its potential detrimental impact on the environment. In the Ballstad case, as in many
other Norwegian harbours, toxic substances were found in the sediments. Accordingly,
when the harbour and coastal authorities applied for a dredging permission in 2000,
the issue for the environmental authorities was the environmental hazard caused by
the dredging, or rather the resultant dispersion and spread of the pollutants during the
dredging.
What followed was a lengthy negotiation process involving scientific consultants to
find a technical solution (for preventing the spread of pollution) that was acceptable
both to the environmental authorities granting the permission and the coastal author-
ities responsible for carrying out the work. During the process, there was a certain
amount of frustration on both sides; the environmental authorities not being satisfied
with the documentation of the proposed preventive measures, while the coastal
authorities urged what they considered practicable and not too expensive solutions.
Finally, everyone settled for a so-called conventional dredging technique combined
with the use of a silt screen (a geotextile cloth) to prevent spread of pollution outside
the main harbour area, which was anyway known to be quite polluted.
Our empirical research was retrospective, beginning after the frustrations and con-
flicts had to some extent been resolved. Our approach was inspired by writings on post-
normal science and we addressed issues of uncertainty and quality of information, in
particular the information on the environmental risk involved and the efficacy of the
technical solutions produced.

5 www.norcat.net, 28 June 2006.

 6. reflexivity and modesty Strand and Cañellas-Boltà 111

What we found was an array of sources of strict uncertainty and ignorance, for exam-
ple on the possible local effects of tributyl tin (TBT) spread in that particular site, as well
as in the calculations underlying technical proposals. Little if any of the uncertainty or
the (lack of) quality of the information was documented, communicated or discussed
during the case. Neither did there seem to be much explicit discussion or negotiation
of the specific framing of the issue, i.e. as a question of the risk of spreading pollutants
during dredging, rather than the hazards involved in the planned disposal of the mate-
rial in a landfill in an inhabited area, or the hazards involved in the alternative of sim-
ply letting the pollution stay where it was. Instead, it appeared that, in the negotiations,
the underlying differences between the actors (in terms of perspectives and stakes)
took the shape of a dispute over technical solutions, expressed as beliefs and doubts
towards the silt screen or a proposed surveillance programme based on turbidity mea-
surements.
We have previously interpreted this as an underlying difference on the level of what
Ravetz <reference?>called the ‘practical problem’, defined as ‘what we really want, for
which purpose’, though actually negotiated as if it were a mere disagreement about
technical solutions. In accordance with our theoretical perspective, we performed
interviews and discussions with citizens of Ballstad, in order to understand their
life–world and values, as a retrospective exercise something that from the post-normal
perspective one would have wanted to be included in the management proceedings
themselves. To put it more plainly, if the case in part was a question of values, the peo-
ple ought to have been consulted and heard.
The purpose of our research is then not only to document what happened at Ballstad
and in other cases, but to provide public environmental managers with an improved
understanding and sensitivity of issues of uncertainty, quality and complexity, as well
as with some clues about how to operationalise such a sensitivity. For instance, we hope
that our analysis of the technical information in the Ballstad case provides an example
for environmental managers to follow in order to detect and present various sources of
uncertainty. Furthermore, we hope that our way of organising a debate with the citi-
zens of Ballstad might have been an example to follow. The regional environmental
authorities have indeed said that they have found our research interesting in this sense.
Yet it is clear that our approach is but one of many possible approaches. Instead of
our focus on the cognitive content of the information and discussion about the biolog-
ical effects of the particular pollutants in the harbour basin (and in particular the
aspects of uncertainty and quality), one might have studied the case from a political sci-
ence perspective, focusing on the relationships between the involved institutions,
including their power relations. Alternatively, the negotiation process could have been
studied in terms of its own internal dynamic rather than in terms of its cognitive con-
tent, which we ourselves actually showed to be full of uncertainty of various kinds. And
so we may continue. Obviously, the conclusions would then have differed and so one
would expect the implications to do, i.e. the implications likely to be drawn from the
conclusions, either by us or by others.
Indeed, one may ask oneself as a researcher (and that we did many times) why one
is doing such a study as we did at all. The conflict was over—solved by the actors them-
selves without our help. Our analysis may be perfectly correct, but the value of the
more or less strictly deduced implications of it remains unknown. And at the local level
of Ballstad, our study, however meticulously planned and cautiously carried out, meant
112 interfaces between science and society

a certain intrusion into the society. For instance, one local actor did not approve of our
questions about the way the issue had been framed. Our academically motivated ques-
tions about the focus on the risks of the dredging operation and not the environmental
aspects of the landfill disposal, were perceived by this person as an act of questioning,
creating suspicions and public anxiety about the safety of the landfill, which was to be
used as new land property. Although we have seen no indication of any significant anx-
iety in this direction, we cannot exclude the possibility that this person is right. Indeed,
rather than claiming researchers’ privileges to ask freely and innocently, we tend to
acknowledge the person’s point, and rather defend our action based on our environ-
mental science-informed belief that the landfill might be a potential environmental
problem in this case, justifying some public awareness. In other words, we resorted to
a normal science belief to justify a post-normal research strategy.
More profoundly, we often seem to end up in Enlightenment models of justifying our
research, along the following lines. The actors did sort out their conflict themselves,
but listening to our analysis, they may be enlightened by a deeper understanding of the
aspects of uncertainty and quality, and this will make them manage better. The ques-
tion is then what we mean by ‘better’—more efficient, more in accordance with the
desires of the actors themselves, better in terms of environmental protection, fairer,
more rational? Often it seems that ‘better’ is thought of as ‘with less conflict’; again,
however, strands within complexity theory itself may warn us that both this and the
other mentioned values can be highly problematic because the values themselves may
be in conflict. In a given context, an escalation of conflict might be desired if environ-
mental protection or local democracy is assigned the highest value. To decide what is
‘better’ may be at the heart of the issue.
To sum up, there are considerable problems in justifying a research project such as
the Ballstad case study. This does not imply despair; there are various ways of justify-
ing the approach, it is just that they are problematic. Bearing this case in mind, we are
now ready to decontextualise again in order to proceed with our reflection.

Three theoretical doubts

Let us then sum up the theoretical problems of justification and reflexivity encountered
in the Ballstad case. First, there is the problem of justifying the choice of theoretical
research perspective. Next, there is the issue of what authority, if any, our research
approach and results will and ought to carry. Third, there is the problem of justifying
our research activities as an intrusion in the community where the study took place.
This intrusion will also serve as a proxy for the hypothetical case in which the study had
not been retrospective, but instead a full-fledged participatory research or action
research approach, introducing elements of messy governance into the actual man-
agement process.
 6. reflexivity and modesty Strand and Cañellas-Boltà 113

The first doubt: how to justify the choice of perspective

The first of these problems is perhaps the easiest one to solve from a complexity theory
point of view. There are theoretical perspectives that assume by their very content that
there can be only one appropriately chosen approach to a given object of study and,
accordingly, they have to assume that they themselves constitute this uniquely com-
prehensive and appropriate perspective. This would be the case, for instance, if one
thinks that a theory should aim towards being the truth about some part of the world.
Complexity theory—in the sense of thick complexity—typically does not assume that.
Indeed, it would foresee a plurality of legitimate perspectives.
Does this mean that the complexity theorist could allow as one of the many legiti-
mate theoretical perspectives that which is non-complex and makes claims of offering
the uniquely adequate perspective in a given situation? We think the answer to that
question is yes, underlining the complement ‘in a given situation’. No idea of complex-
ity implies that there must be a plurality of legitimate perspectives in every case. In
large numbers of everyday situations, consensus is readily available both with regard
to facts and values. Although complexity theorists may believe in the vital importance
of uncertainty management and public participation, they may agree that certain tech-
nical and technocratic as well as conventional democratic practices are not in dispute
and actually appear to work quite well by anybody’s standard. Complexity theory is
consistent with a pragmatic and modest attitude on behalf of one’s own theory, yield-
ing when the issue at hand appears to have special characteristics that are better han-
dled by beliefs and practices based on thin complexity or even simplicity, and believing
that one may contribute as one of several legitimate voices in other cases. Such an atti-
tude could be seen to shift some of the burden of proof to one’s opponent if there is a
discussion about the legitimacy of the complexity theory perspective: ‘Why do you
think complexity theory is not one of the legitimate perspectives?’

The second doubt: what authority does our perspective carry?

The second problem is that of authority when the complexity theory perspective is con-
tested, or when it is taken to have substantial practical implications, possibly in the
direction of messy governance. This will take us into the self-referential problem pre-
sented in the introduction: why believe in experts who claim that their area of exper-
tise is to know why one should not believe too much in experts?
A reflection on the concept of authority, using social constructivist sociology of sci-
ence as a proxy for complexity theory, may throw some light on this problem. It seems
clear that the kind of authority we are referring to is intellectual authority. A reflexive,
consistent position would then be to simply put one’s arguments forward and leave
them to speak for themselves. Either they will be accepted or not; if they are accepted,
they gain authority. Of course, in some parts of the social constructivist tradition, this
is about all there is to say about justification and epistemic authority. To simplify mat-
ters, the stereotype social constructivist (if such a person ever existed) might say some-
thing such as the following: ‘Philosophers erroneously believe that theories carry
authority because they are true. In reality, it is the other way around, namely that the-
ories will be perceived as true as a result of becoming accepted.’ Such a theory position
can be either unreflexive or reflexive, i.e. it may claim that it is an exception to this rule,
114 interfaces between science and society

or that it obeys the rule that it sets out. The reflexive position is accordingly to say that
the social constructivist theory itself may become accepted and hence true, or rejected
and hence false. In the so-called ‘chicken debate’ in the sociology of science—named
after the paper Epistemological Chicken by Collins and Yearley (1992)—there is an inter-
esting discussion about the virtues and problems of such degrees of reflexivity. Again,
to simplify matters, to Collins and Yearley, reflexivity implies a weakening of one’s own
programme to the extent that the radical potential of the theory is lost.
The ‘chicken debate’ is instructively documented elsewhere (Pickering 1992). It is
interesting to reflect how a constructivist/relativist stance may be defended, and how
one could proceed to claim some epistemic authority for it. Basically, we think that
there are two lines of argument available—one having an external and possibly unre-
flexive flavour and the other to be seen as internal and more reflexive. We would like
to stress that neither of these are identical to the actual positions in the chicken debate.

Unreflexive epistemic authority

An external defence implies to evoke some external source of intellectual authority. In
principle, such a defence could be made on purely epistemological ground: ‘Although
we believe in a relativist theory of knowledge and expertise, our particular field of
expertise (i.e. understanding science, expertise, justification, etc.) is different, and it is
actually possible to provide a true or at least generally adequate account in this single
case.’ The question is why this is possible. One could try to argue that, while natural sci-
ence experts deal with esoteric knowledge and unobservable entities, the study of sci-
entists and expertise is grounded in a readily observable social reality that cannot be
denied or disputed. Such an argument is extremely problematic. Unreflexive defences
of constructivism and relativism have accordingly been made more along lines that
combine epistemological, pragmatic and moral/political considerations, arguing that
even though we cannot prove our theory to be true (who could?), to proceed with this
theory is the proper thing to do. For Collins and Yearley (1992), this is the core of their
argument. The unreflexive version of constructivism/relativism is required in the polit-
ical and cultural fight against the exaggerated authority of natural science and tech-
nology, and the oppression that it causes.
Can one defend a theory by claiming that it is politically or morally correct, and that
it has desirable consequences? Of course, there is a long history for such claims, in the-
ology and in some corners of Marxist and ‘vulgar pragmatist’ philosophy. In this regard,
it is useful to recall the idea of standpoint epistemology, which was more fashionable
in the heydays of intellectual Marxism and then within feminist theory. The basic idea
of standpoint theory is that, although there is a multiplicity of legitimate perspectives,
some perspectives carry a combined epistemological and moral force because they are
the perspectives of the oppressed or unprivileged. Not only are the problems experi-
enced by the working class, poor people, women, coloured people, sick or disabled peo-
ple, or homosexuals more important than those of the rich, powerful, white, healthy
heterosexual man. The unprivileged actually perceive the world more clearly as they
are more heavily impacted by it. This opens up for the desire for politically correct
knowledge. It appears to us that one can be reminded of standpoint theory in current
justifications of community-based or activist research, although it is rarely stated
explicitly that research growing out of a community of poor or oppressed people by
 6. reflexivity and modesty Strand and Cañellas-Boltà 115

itself will result in more adequate knowledge than research initiated and carried out
by, say, the government.6
The point to which one is willing to accept standpoint theory is important in our dis-
cussion. An intellectually trivial version of this kind of thinking is that which claims that
the government or the ruling classes are corrupt liars, and accordingly one should base
oneself on the research done by the uncorrupted. This has little to do with complexity
and more to do with more or less sectarian activism. Another version, compatible with
Enlightenment thought, is that one needs, say, community-based research to discover
and solve the particular problems experienced in the community. In current policy dis-
course, this can be translated into the idea of ‘user involvement’. One arrives at the cru-
cial point, however, when one claims that in an otherwise equal intellectual disagree-
ment between the ‘privileged’ and the ‘unprivileged’, the view of the unprivileged
person per se carries more authority. Exactly at that point conflict and ambitions of
power are chosen at the expense of reflexivity, modesty and inclusive dialogue. We do
not say that such a choice is always or even usually wrong; however, it is based on an
assumption of moral simplicity—that it is possible to divide people (or other entities)
into privileged and unprivileged, oppressors and oppressed, and perhaps also good and
evil. Returning to Ballstad, such a classification would have been completely out of the
question: we had absolutely no reason to believe in any difference in moral qualities
among the actors.

Authority as an internal (immanent) issue

An intellectually more promising strategy in our view, then, is to work with the intel-
lectual authority residing in the theoretical perspectives themselves. A way of making
the desired move to immanence is to leave the question why others should be impressed
by one’s theory and ask the reflexive constructivist/relativist personally: ‘Of course I
believe you when you say that history will tell whether your theory will become
accepted, but why do you believe in your theory enough to propose and defend it?’
We need to address two aspects of that question, returning to complexity theory in
general. First, we need to discuss the aspect of intellectual content. Second, we need to
ask what it implies to propose and defend a theory or a theoretical perspective.
The aspect of intellectual content is that of the internal quality of complexity theory
and the quality of the connection between complexity theory and messy governance.
The issue of internal quality is outside the scope of this chapter, and the issue of the
connection between theory and practice will be discussed only briefly. The critical
question, as we see it, is in what sense theoretical insights into uncertainty and com-
plexity can be taken to ‘imply’ uncertainty management, public participation and other
measures of messy governance.
Part of the question stimulates a primarily intellectual debate on factual matters. For
instance, if we take it to be important to display and communicate uncertainty and
quality of information as transparently and efficiently as possible, is it a good idea to
employ the NUSAP scheme (Funtowicz and Ravetz 1990) or the uncertainty framework
of Walker et al. (2003)? Will it represent new cases of uncertainty in an adequate man-

6 We were reminded of standpoint theory during discussions about community-based research dur-
ing the Interfaces workshop.
116 interfaces between science and society

ner? Is there a danger of creating a new source of opacity in the technicalities involved
in the sophisticated design and calculation of a NUSAP expression or a table as pre-
scribed by Walker et al.? When, and under what circumstances, will ‘extending the peer
community’ actually help to solve the problems that it was supposed to solve? In the
link between complexity theory and messy governance, is it assumed a too idealist pic-
ture of what lay participation is and can be in a world of interest groups, power politics
and intellectual dishonesty? Can one have a stakeholder panel working with back-cast-
ing techniques if some of the stakeholders are armed and insist on bringing the arms
with them?
By asking these questions, we do not wish to make the rhetorical point that com-
plexity theory is to be considered politically naive. Rather, we think that the questions
have an empirical nature. Of course there is no guarantee that the connection between
complexity theory and messy governance will hold in all cases. What is needed, then,
is a process of learning by experience, gradually understanding criteria of success and
failure. For instance, in the Ballstad case, both we as researchers as well as most of the
main actors themselves were in a state of authentic doubt about what the facts meant
and what ought to be done in the dredging case. This is a different from a situation in
which the researchers and/or the actors think that the facts, values and uncertainties
should be taken to imply a particular technical solution or a particular prioritisation of
values. Such differences are relevant both to the choice of messy governance interven-
tions and to the justification of the choices.
In a learning process of this kind, we might need to reconsider values and not only
our anticipations in terms of facts. A pressing issue is that of the acceptability of non-
violent conflict. If one recalls the scandal on BSE (mad-cow disease) in the UK, this is
sometimes evoked as an instance of how badly things may go if experts are allowed to
proceed in a technocratic, non-transparent manner, with broad public distrust as its
consequence. On the other hand, on a different time-scale, one might think that the BSE
scandal indeed was a fruitful event, raising a lot of public attention and participation
in risk issues, leading to institutional changes as well as a lot of inspiring research.
Indeed, if routines of uncertainty management and citizens’ participation had been
implemented into the UK system before the BSE event, one might not have had the pub-
lic attention and participation one actually got.
Thus, one may speculate that after all messy governance is quite rationalist, with an
inclination for planned, prescribed and orderly processes rather than, say, lobbying,
demonstrations in the streets, public revolt or other informal and/or chaotic ways of
acting and communicating. It appears that our theoretical contributions by their very
nature promote values such as intellectual honesty, emotional positivity, co-operation,
rational debate and patience.7 Although these values are hardly controversial from an
abstract, philosophical point of view, they are far from uncontroversial in certain given
political contexts. One may note that this reflection on content, recalling that com-
plexity theory itself would predict an essentially open-ended relationship between the-
ory and practice, leads us into the aspect of form, or, as formulated above: what does
it imply to propose and defend a theory or a theoretical perspective?
We have already noted that in our context of (thick) complexity theory, it could not

7 This point is due to contributions made by Moses Boudourides during the breakout session on the
‘Pros and Cons of Messy Governance’.
 6. reflexivity and modesty Strand and Cañellas-Boltà 117

mean a claim of truth, or a uniquely correct perspective, an unconditional prescription

or a guarantee of success. Maximally, it could have an ambition of making one of pos-
sibly many contributions into a dialogical and perhaps dialectical process of under-
standing the issue at stake. The contribution could also consist in proposing ways of
action that we think suitable, at least if certain value choices can be accepted, some of
which may be partially implicit in our intellectual perspective. Stronger claims, we
think, cannot be based in the theoretical perspective per se, but rather in the rights to
agency that its proponents will have as people and actors in society. We will return to
this point below.
On the other hand, there are possibilities of weaker claims to authority based on dif-
ferent conceptions of what it means to propose and defend a theory. Notably there is
the function of deconstruction, that is, to give an intellectual analysis to show that
something is less obvious, straightforward or unproblematic than previously consid-
ered by playing out its inconsistencies. Deconstruction can be an intellectual exercise,
as in Derrida’s analyses, or indeed in the ancient logical figure of ‘reductio ad absur-
dum’. Perhaps is it also possible to interpret certain social experiments as resulting in
deconstruction. This brings us to the third doubt.

The third doubt: researchers as intruders

Under conditions of complexity, there can be orders of magnitude between the stakes
involved in the intellectual justification of a theoretical perspective and the stakes
involved in the implementation of this perspective—be it in a research exercise or a
social experiment. In one case, a naive and incoherent perspective may be imple-
mented into practice to everybody’s satisfaction while, in some other case, the practi-
cal implementation of an intellectually well-argued perspective may trigger a chain of
disastrous events. The insight into the unpredictability in the interface between science
and society is probably what has led to the currently popular call for socially robust
knowledge (Nowotny et al. 2001).
To ask for socially robust knowledge is to ask for the identification of recognisable
domains of interfaces between knowledge and society with only a moderate degree of
complexity. In our view, it is to ask for something that we do not yet have. Complexity
theorists have been particularly good at documenting and explaining why things in
general are more complex than what was assumed in Enlightenment thinking. The
quest for socially robust knowledge is different; now we find new simplicities in the
recently discovered complexity, similarly to the emerging research fields studying thin
complexity. Criticising thin complexity for not having understood ‘real’, thick human
and social complexity, and not really having found the new simplicities ourselves, com-
plexity theorists should be the first to admit that neither we nor anybody else yet know
how to create socially robust knowledge. In particular, we cannot guarantee that messy
governance will not go wrong. We are still in a state of ignorance in the sense of Wynne
(1992). O’Connor’s question (which social and human agencies will be repressed by
complexity theory?) is an empirical question to be investigated, and furthermore to be
shaped by our own activity. This chapter, for instance, may take us by its very language
further into intellectual elitism; or then perhaps not. Perhaps it will have a Feyeraben-
dian or Wittgensteinian effect of making an abstract argument that encourages others
118 interfaces between science and society

to talk more simply about the things in the real world. The latter is of course our inten-
tion.
Returning to Ballstad, it appears that we put forward quite weak arguments when we
were accused of intrusion by one of the actors in the community. Not equipped with
truth or exclusive epistemic authority, not solving their problem, not being able to give
a promise of improvement of practice—what were we doing? As noted above, we actu-
ally resorted to a defence—perhaps above all to ourselves—based on a ‘normal science’
evaluation of the situation. It was true that our questions about the pollution in the
dredged sediments could be perceived as questioning the projects involved in con-
structing new property out of the landfill masses. However, drawing on our natural sci-
ence competencies, we considered it defensible to run that ‘risk’ because we thought
the safety of those masses could actually be a relevant issue. This makes a difference.
If the questions had been raised about a potential environmental hazard that we our-
selves considered completely irrelevant or unrealistic, the intrusion would have been
harder to justify—at least to ourselves.
This line of reasoning flies in the face of standard methodological virtues in social
science. No ‘good’ sociologist or anthropologist would ever approach a community with
assumptions of what is actually the case. Then again, traditional conceptions of
methodological disciplinary quality might have too idealist a view of the possibility and
desirability of being a ‘neutral observer’.
There are several noteworthy observations to be made in this respect. The first one
is that our complexity theory-based reflections above forced us into also employing a
natural science-based perspective in the consideration of what was at stake at Ballstad.
Next, we saw that the same consideration implied a deviation from methodological dis-
ciplinary virtues (of social science in this case). The modesty implied in the reflexive
application of complexity theory accordingly involves the recognition that the per-
spective is not even intrinsically self-sufficient, but also that one cannot always hide
behind disciplinary authority when a trans- or un-disciplinary approach is required.
The final point we need to make is that of the understanding of the role of the com-
plexity analyst, theorist, researcher or practitioner as an intruder.
We believe that it is clear from the analysis throughout this chapter that the justifica-
tion of our intrusion cannot be made entirely in terms of intellectual authority. We do
not possess the truth about the facts or about moral qualities. This is to say, when jus-
tifying our actions, we cannot hide behind intellectual authority. We have to stand for-
ward as persons (or groups), possibly with a more or less pronounced intellectual inter-
est, or a social cause, or both intertwined.
There are several ways to conceive the relationship between the intruder subject and
those exposed to the intrusion. Sometimes the relationship is completely unproblem-
atic. The community invites the researchers and all stakeholders agree that this is a
good idea for the same reasons as the researchers themselves. In the Ballstad case, we
were indeed generally welcomed by almost all the actors; in the process of recruiting
informants, people who had previously been to some degree in conflict, agreed that it
was a good idea to welcome ‘an external viewpoint’. In general, however, one cannot
assume an unproblematic relationship. One unrealistic vision of the relationship could
then be to surrender completely one’s own agenda, letting the community take you
wherever they want. Within action research, such a vision has been criticised by the slo-
gan ‘synergy, not sympathy’. Intruder cannot and should not deny their agenda; what
 6. reflexivity and modesty Strand and Cañellas-Boltà 119

has to be sought is a synergy with the community (or in general, those experiencing the
intrusion).
Although it is hard to disagree with the call for synergy, we think that it ought to be
combined with a readiness to put one’s agenda at stake as part of the issue, as part of
the learning process. Although we still fail to understand what creates socially robust
knowledge and practice, we might claim to know that many historical instances of
oppression and cruelty have had proponents who were unwilling to admit own fallibil-
ity or renegotiate their own agenda along the way. Sympathy understood as surrender
to pain is futile; however, we cannot see any methodological problem with sympathy
or empathy understood as an effort to open oneself up to others’ perspectives, values
and life-worlds in order to learn and possibly modify one’s own perspectives and val-
ues. Sometimes the activity of openness will require openness also in language, not
only with regard to disciplinary or lay-expert divides, but also across the range artifi-
cially divided into the cognitive and the emotional domain. This does not imply a sur-
render of one’s own agenda, intellectual interest or social cause. It only implies that one
stands forward with the agenda, being a citizen oneself. Indeed, the willingness to
enter into emotional discourse is not just a matter of reflexivity (recalling that com-
plexity theory typically makes more complex Hume’s distinction
<reference?>between reason and passion) but also a matter of justification and legit-
imacy.
Our reflection has arrived at the insight that complexity theory and prescriptions of
messy governance cannot be theoretically justified by themselves. Rather, it is the act
of proposing and performing these perspectives and practices that can be justified.
These acts are the acts of persons, and part of the justification is connected to their
intent and intentionality. If we have done away with unconditional Enlightenment trust
in rules, theories and expertise, how could one accept the intent and agency of people
if they are unwilling to display their vulnerability and put themselves and their agenda
at stake in a personal encounter?

The ‘reflexive solution’: modesty, sincerity, openness,

vulnerability
We may now sum up the conclusion gathered along the reflection. We have asked how
we can justify complexity theory (complex systems science, post-normal science, sci-
ence studies, ecological economics. etc.) and its apparent implication in messy gover-
nance (uncertainty management, knowledge assessment, public participation, etc.).
We have seen that, as a theoretical perspective critical to absolute belief in expertise,
complexity theory poses a particular problem of reflexivity: Why believe in complexity
expertise? Furthermore, the perspective itself warrants the conclusion that there is an
unpredictable relationship between theory and practice. Why should we think that our
applications will work well?
We have argued in favour of a reflexive position: complexity theory should indeed
not claim a special status for itself. It is a fallible, incomplete, imperfect and risky per-
spective just like any other perspective. Its theoretical and practical success is an empir-
120 interfaces between science and society

ical question to be followed up in the future. In the meantime, we ought to be modest

in our claims for success, even ready to yield if the case is such that a different per-
spective than ours appears more adequate.
Modesty is not incompatible with boldness. Although we cannot claim epistemic
authority other than that which is immanent to our arguments and evidence, we are
entitled to agency, individually or as groups. If we are criticised for being intruders by
our opponents, we may claim that we, too, belong to this world. The defence is not our
theoretical superiority (unless when such a superiority somehow can be agreed on),
but the sincerity of our commitment.
Sincerity is a property of humans and not of theories. In our view, the justification of
complexity theory and messy governance cannot ignore the human and personal
dimension. Accordingly, we have argued that the willingness to display and risk one’s
own vulnerable compound entity of personality, knowledge and values, is not just a
matter of maintaining a respectable work ethic, but actually an intrinsic part of the
issue of justification.
Finally, it appears that our recommendations strip complexity theorists and practi-
tioners of messy governance of every power device one may think of in the fight against
the other’s perspectives. That is true. However, it is also true that fights against other
perspectives are contrary to the content of complexity theory.

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