Philosophy versus Literature?

Against the Discontinuity Thesis

Author(s): BENCE NANAY
Source: The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 71, No. 4 (FALL 2013), pp. 349-
360
Published by: Wiley on behalf of The American Society for Aesthetics
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 BENCE NANAY

Philosophy versus Literature? Against the Discon

Thesis

ABSTRACT

According to what I call the 'Discontinuity Thesis,' literature can never count as genuine philosophizing: there
permeable barrier separating it from philosophy. While philosophy presents logically valid arguments in favor of
precisely formulated statements, literature gives neither precisely formulated theses nor arguments in favor of or agains
Hence, philosophers do not lose out on anything if they do not read literature. There are two obvious ways of ques
the Discontinuity Thesis: first, arguing that literature can indeed do what philosophy is generally taken to do, and
arguing that philosophy is not, in fact, the presentation of logically valid arguments in favor of or against precisely
statements- what it does is closer to what literature is generally taken to do. I use a combination of these two stra
argue that philosophy is not as intellectually straightforward as it is advertised to be, and literature is not as intel
impoverished as it is generally taken to be.

I. INTRODUCTION There are two obvious ways of questioning

the Discontinuity Thesis: one is to argue that
There has been a lot of discussion recently literature about
(maybe some outstanding examples
whether and how philosophy can andofshould high literature)
learn can indeed do what philos-
from the sciences- for example, philosophy ophy is generally
of taken to do. This would be
perception from vision science. Much the less
'Don'tatten-
Underestimate Literature' strategy.
tion has been paid to whether and how The philosophy
converse strategy is to argue that philoso-
can and should learn from literature or from the phy is not, in fact, the presentation of logically
arts in general.1 Most contemporary philosophersvalid arguments in favor of or against precisely
(or at least those who do not specialize in philos-formulated statements. What it does is closer
ophy of literature) accept, explicitly or implicitly,to what literature is generally taken to do. We
the following picture of the relation between lit- can call this the 'Don't Overestimate Philosophy'
erature and philosophy. Literature may be usedstrategy.
for popularizing philosophical arguments, but it I use a combination of these two strategies to ar-
will always be discontinuous with philosophy. Itgue that philosophy is not as intellectually straight-
can never count as genuine philosophizing: thereforward as it is advertised to be and literature is
is an impermeable barrier separating it from phi-not as intellectually impoverished as it is gener-
losophy. While philosophy presents logically valid ally taken to be. I do not take this to demonstrate
arguments in favor of or against precisely formu-that philosophy and literature are really two labels
lated statements, literature gives neither precisely for describing the same human enterprise. There
formulated theses nor logically valid arguments in are genuine differences, but they are continuous
favor of or against them. Hence, philosophers dowith each other. But if they are continuous, then
not lose out on anything if they do not read litera- literary works can count as real philosophy and
ture. I call this picture of the relation between phi-it would be a mistake for philosophers to ignore
losophy and literature the 'Discontinuity Thesis.'2these.
The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 71:4 Fall 2013
© 2013 The American Society for Aesthetics

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 350 The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism

II. THE DISCONTINUITY THESIS argues, literature by its very nature is not the
dispassionate quest for truth. So those who find
Consider the following picture of the the relation
formulation of the Discontinuity Thesis too
between literature and philosophy. Philosophy biased toward analytic philosophy can substitute
presents unambiguously formulated premises this morethatgeneral formulation when evaluating
would necessitate an unambiguously formulated the Discontinuity Thesis.
conclusion. Literature does not. Hence,Fourth, we have the Discontinuity Thesis is very closely
a barrier between literature and philosophy related to that
another important theme in the philoso-
would prevent any literary text from phy counting as
of literature, namely, the question of whether
genuine philosophy. I call this view the Disconti-
literature can express truths that are beyond phi-
nuity Thesis. losophy's reach. The relation between the two de-
The Discontinuity Thesis, as it stands, requires bates is not always straightforward. While the view
some clarifications and qualifications. First, is it that "there may be some views of the world and
a descriptive or a normative claim? It seems that how one should live in it . . . that cannot be fully
the most charitable interpretation of the Discon- and adequately stated in the language of conven-
tinuity Thesis is a normative one: good philoso- tional philosophical prose" may remind one of the
phy presents unambiguously formulated premises Discontinuity Thesis inasmuch as it allocates dif-
that would necessitate an unambiguously formu- ferent and distinct epistemic roles to literature and
lated conclusion. Good literature does not. Other philosophy, Nussbaum's view is in fact very much
things being equal, making the premises and con- against the spirit of the Discontinuity Thesis-
clusions of a philosophy paper more unambiguous which she is strongly opposed to.5 Nussbaum is
makes the paper itself better. The same is not true one of the most outspoken proponents of the idea
of a novel or a short story. that there is no barrier between literature and phi-
Second, the Discontinuity Thesis goes well be- losophy (in fact, literary writing is philosophy, just
yond the claim that philosophy and literature arenot "conventional philosophical prose"). Those,
like Nussbaum, who hold that certain truths can
different intellectual enterprises. The negation of
the Discontinuity Thesis is the claim that thebe expressed by literature but not by philoso-
barrier between philosophy and literature is per-phy are not forced to endorse the Discontinuity
meable. And this is consistent with a view accord- Thesis.
ing to which there are important differences be- Finally, what is meant by philosophy and litera-
tween philosophy and literature.3 In other words, ture here? The texts? The mental processes of the
rejecting the Discontinuity Thesis does not have person writing these texts? The mental processes
to lead to postmodernist relativism, according to of the person engaging with these texts? While
which every text is philosophy and every text is the Discontinuity Thesis can be formulated in any
literature. of these three ways, much of the argumentative
Third, what is the scope of the Discontinuity support for the Discontinuity Thesis comes from
Thesis? Is this true of all philosophy or philosophy
taking the discontinuity to be the last one of these:
per se or for what is considered to be analytic phi-
when we are properly engaging with a philosoph-
losophy? One not particularly original way of ar-ical text and when we are properly engaging with
guing against the Discontinuity Thesis would be to a piece of literary fiction, we are supposed to have
point out that not all philosophy is analytic philos-
very different mental processes.
ophy and it is only analytic philosophy (or maybe This takes us to the arguments in favor of
the Discontinuity Thesis. Without attempting
even only some versions of analytic philosophy)
that presents unambiguously formulated premises to give a full inventory of pro-Discontinuity
that would necessitate an unambiguously formu- Thesis arguments, I will mention the three most
important strands of arguments. A very general
lated conclusion.4 This way of questioning the Dis-
continuity Thesis misses the target. Proponents way of characterizing them would be that they
of the Discontinuity Thesis could simply describeaim to point out that while philosophy is the
dispassionate quest for truth, literature (a) is not
philosophy, with Plato, as the dispassionate quest
for truth. And as Plato himself, presumably the a quest, (b) does not aim at the truth, and (c) is
earliest proponent of the Discontinuity Thesis, not dispassionate.

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Nanay Philosophy versus Literature 351

III. AGAINST THE DISCONTINUITY

First, philosophy is a (sometimes tedious, THESIS
some-
times cumbersome) quest: it starts with gener-
ally accepted premises and, There
goingare two general strategies
through logical for arguing
against the
steps of necessitation, arrives at Discontinuity
a not generally Thesis: questioning what
accepted conclusion. This isitnot
says about
the philosophy
way literatureand questioning what it
works. As Timothy Williamsonsays about literature.
says, The latter
"serious is what we may call
phi-
losophy is always likely tothe 'Don'tthose
bore Underestimate
with Literature'
short strategy: at
attention-spans."6 For thoseleastwith
some works
shortof literature
attentionpresent genuine and
maybe even novel philosophical arguments that
spans, there is always literature.
Second, the oldest pro-Discontinuity
are of the same qualityThesis
as the best of any bona fide
argument comes from Plato: philosophy. This strategyaims
philosophy often proceeds
at through
case studies
the truth, whereas literature lies- ofit
analyzing the philosophical content
deliberately
presents something that is of certain
notnovels.
true.7 While this
argument may not move many The converse strategy
these could be it
days, labeled the
played an important role in'Don't Overestimate Philosophy'
establishing thestrategy.
viewThe
that there is an impenetrable
claim therebarrier between
is that the picture of philosophy that
philosophy and literature. would be needed for the Discontinuity Thesis to
But the most importantbeand plausible is an unrealistic one.
influential Philosophy is
argu-
not the highly intellectualized
ment in favor of the Discontinuity Thesis is enterprise
about it is of-
ten made out to be.
the role of emotions in philosophy and literature.8
The two
Philosophy is the dispassionate strategies
quest can, of
for course, combine.9
truth. It If
is a bad thing if emotionswe move philosophywith
interfere closer to the
literature
ar- (by not
gumentation of a philosophyoverestimating
paper. it) and literature closer to
Emotions, on philoso-
the other hand, are the bread
phy (by not and butter
underestimating it), of lit-
then the distance
erature: it is a good thingbetween
if a them could be diminished
literary text considerably.
trig- I
gers emotions. Note that discuss thisthese argument is in
two strategies in turn about
the following
the proper engagement with sections. philosophy and lit-
erature. While the proper engagement with phi-
losophy presupposes dispassionate, IV. THE 'DON'T UNDERESTIMATE LITERATURE'
emotion-free
STRATEGY
mental processes, the proper engagement with
literature presupposes emotionally laden mental
processes.
The 'Don't Underestimate Literature' strategy o
Literary works influence us emotionally: they arguing against the Discontinuity Thesis question
seduce us to feel or think in some way or another, the assumptions made about the nature or func
sometimes even in spite of our rational beliefs. tion of literature. Its general upshot is that liter
Philosophy, in contrast, does not use such sus- ture is not as intellectually impoverished as it ha
picious means of convincing: it proceeds only in been suggested by the Discontinuity Thesis. Bu
rational and emotion-free logical steps. If a philo-there are very different ways of arguing for th
sophical argument appeals to emotions, it is, as it claim.
is I consider the three most important ver
widely held, a bad argument. But then how could sions of this strategy in this section.
we take literary works to be genuine contributions
iv. a. The Role of Imagination
to philosophy? I call this argument the 'Disconti-
nuity of Emotional Engagement' argument. The 'Don't Underestimate Literature' strategy
As we shall see, this argument is the most dif-
of arguing against the Discontinuity Thesis is
ficult challenge for those who want to reject thevery often intertwined with arguments in favo
Discontinuity Thesis. Surprisingly few of the ex-of aesthetic cognitivism: the position that art
works can teach us and that this contributes to
isting attempts to argue against the Discontinuity
Thesis have taken this argument seriously enough.their artistic value. What matters from the point
My aim is to explore a way of arguing against theof view of this article is whether literature can
Discontinuity Thesis that is not vulnerable to this
teach us- regardless of whether this contributes
objection. to artistic value. And the proponents of aesthetic

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 352 The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism

cognitivism argue that literature

philosophy ascan
it doesteach
in the caseus non- this
of literature,
trivial truths. Note that aesthetic cogntivism,
would still not guarantee in
the success of this version
some of its forms, is compatible
of the 'Don'twith the Disconti-
Underestimate Literature' strategy
nuity Thesis- one can maintain that
for the simple literature
reason that imaginationcanmay work
teach us truths, but not philosophical
very differently intruths, or that
these two contexts. One way to
while we can learn from literature,
flesh out this worrythe way
is to return weI take
to what do to be
so is very different from, the
andmain is indeed
argument incompat-
in favor of the Discontinuity
ible with, the way we learn from
Thesis, philosophy.
the Discontinuity of Emotional Engage-
But the 'Don't Underestimate Literature' strat- ment argument, according to which literature is
egy can nevertheless use one of the main argu- supposed to evoke emotions, whereas philosophy
ments in favor of the aesthetic cognitivist view: is not. Some imaginative episodes are completely
that we can learn from literature because litera- dispassionate, for example, when I am buying cur-
ture guides our imagination in such a way thattains without having measured the windows and
leads to knowledge.10 One can extend this argu-I try to imagine what size they are. Other imag-
ment by pointing out that imagination plays aninative episodes are not at all dispassionate, and
important role not only in our engagement withimagination triggered by literary works is gener-
literature but also in our engagement with phi-ally taken to be a very emotional affair indeed.14
losophy, and especially our assessment of thought But when reading philosophy (or when assessing
experiments.11 thought experiments), we are supposed to exer-
Here is Hilary Putnam, one of the earliest con- cise our imagination in a dispassionate way. In
temporary proponents of this argument (talking other words, the emphasis on imagination will not
here more specifically about moral philosophy, help us to address the most important and influ-
rather than philosophy in general): ential argument in favor of the Discontinuity The-
sis: the Discontinuity of Emotional Engagement
Literature does not, or does not often, depict solutions. argument.
What especially the novel does is aid us in the imag-
inative re-creation of moral perplexities, in the widest
iv.B. Changing the Way We See the World
sense - If moral reasoning, at the reflective level, is
the conscious criticism of ways of life, then the sensitive Some other proponents of the 'Don't Underesti-
appreciation in the imagination of predicaments and per- mate Literature' strategy, notably Philip Kitcher
plexities must be essential to sensitive moral reasoning.12 and Stanley Cavell, follow a different route.15
They show us by example that some Shakespeare
The general idea is that as imagination is at play plays, James Joyce's Ulysses , or Thomas Mann's
both when we are engaging with literary fictions Death in Venice present philosophical arguments
and when we are reading philosophy, we have no that are comparable to the arguments of any
reason to consider literature and philosophy to philosopher in the canon (some other eminent
be dramatically different: both confront us with candidates include Jorge Luis Borges's short sto-
nonactual situations. ries and Marcel Proust's novel).
One may be skeptical about this way of apply- Kitcher even provides explicit (but brief)
ing the 'Don't Underestimate Literature' strategymethodological remarks about how this strategy
for two reasons. First, one may worry about how should work. According to him, the common de-
much of philosophy really relies on imagination.nominator between philosophy and literature is
While imagination undoubtedly plays an impor-that masterpieces of both can radically change the
tant role in thought experiments, the importanceway we see the world and our lives. Philosophy
(and relevance) of the thought experiment itselfcan make us see the world differently and so can
has recently been questioned.13 It would signifi-literature.16
cantly weaken the 'Don't Underestimate Litera- While this similarity would be difficult to
ture' strategy if it had to take sides in these grandquestion, it is important to note that the advocate
debates concerning the uses of thought experi-of the Discontinuity Thesis does not need to deny
ments in philosophy. this. The proponent of the Discontinuity Thesis
Second, and more importantly, even if imagina-could agree that both literature and philosophy
tion plays as crucial a role in our engaging withcan make us see the world differently, but they can

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 Nanay Philosophy versus Literature 353

insist that while philosophy does

still insufficient so bythe
for countering means of
Discontinuity
dispassionate and rational of Emotional Engagement argument.
arguments, The pro-
literature
makes us see the world differently
ponent bypoint
of this argument could seducing
out that in
us with the help of emotions. In the
the case of philosophy, other words,
concluding step of the
Kitcher's version of the 'Don't Underestimate philosophical argument must be made purely on
Literature' strategy is also vulnerable to thethe
Dis-basis of rational and logical considerations.
continuity of Emotional Engagement argument. And this is not guaranteed in the case of litera-
ture that could lure us with its emotional biases
iv.c. Putting Us in the Position to Draw Conclu- to draw a conclusion in a way that is neither ra-
sions tional nor logical. In order to meet the challenge
posed by this argument, it is not enough to use
A third way of applying the 'Don't Underestimate
the 'Don't Underestimate Literature' strategy. We
Literature' strategy is, like the first one, suggested
also need to question the assumptions the Discon-
by Hilary Putnam (again, in the context of moral
tinuity Thesis makes about philosophy. In other
philosophy, rather than philosophy in general):
words, we need to use the 'Don't Overestimate
"Novels and plays do not set moral knowledge
Philosophy' strategy as well.
before us, that is true. But they do (frequently) do
something for us that must be done for us if we
are to gain any moral knowledge."17 V. THE 'DON'T OVERESTIMATE PHILOSOPHY' STRATEGY
In Putnam's original article, this suggestion is
not properly distinguished from his main theme The 'Don't Overestimate Philosophy' strategy is
about the role of imagination, but it is possible the converse of the 'Don't Underestimate Litera-
to consider the two proposals independently. The ture' strategy: it points out that philosophy is not
general point here is that literature puts us in a as highly rational, logical, and intellectual as it is
position where we can draw conclusions in more taken to be by the Discontinuity Thesis. Again,
or less the same way as we do when we read a there are various versions of this strategy.
philosophical argument. The difference is that in
the case of literature, this last step (the step of v.A. What Counts as Philosophy?
QED) has to be taken by the reader herself.
I take this version of the 'Don't Underesti- The most widespread version of the 'Don't Over-
estimate Philosophy' strategy argues that the con-
mate Literature' strategy to be the most promis-
cept of philosophy the Discontinuity Thesis re-
ing. Here is an example. The protagonist of Robert
lies on is unacceptably narrow. Philosophy is not
Musil's The Man without Qualities is Ulrich, and
one of the least likable characters in the book is logic: it does not present unambiguously formu-
lated premises that would necessitate an unam-
Arnheim. But their general outlook is very sim-
biguously formulated conclusion, or at least it does
ilar in many respects. Most importantly, they are
not have to do this in order to count as genuine
both against taking the human mind to be fully
philosophy.
and entirely rational and they both emphasize the
But this version of the 'Don't Overestimate Phi-
nonrational elements of human behavior and life.
losophy' strategy would be of little use if it did
But the similarity of their views highlights the
not go beyond this merely negative claim and lay
very few but nonetheless even more important
out some alternative models that would count as
differences- that the denial of rationality can lead
philosophy as much as the logically necessary in-
to a panromantic attitude and also to a cheerfully
ferences model. Here is Martha Nussbaum's pro-
skeptical antiromantic attitude. Musil does not ex-
posal (in the context of moral philosophy):
plain this as if he were writing a carefully argued
philosophy paper about the way the mind works,
but by showing us two examples that have so much
If the enterprise of moral philosophy is understood ... as
overlap that we immediately focus on the differ-
a pursuit of truth in all its forms, requiring a deep and
ences and the reasons for these differences. sympathetic investigation of all major ethical alterna-
While the 'Putting Us in the Position to Draw
tives and the comparison of each with our active sense
Conclusions' version of the 'Don't Underestimate of life, then moral philosophy requires such literary texts,
Literature' strategy may be the most promising, and the experience of loving and attentive novel-reading
it is important to note that this move in itselffor
is its completion.18

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 354 The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism

One worry about this suggestion is that

value of human lives. Nevertheless, itdo is
they philosophy,
explicitly about moral philosophy
real philosophy and
that canit
leadis farand
listeners from
readers to im-
clear how it could be generalized to on
proved perspectives other branches
a (if not the) central philosoph-
of philosophy. Maybe it isicaltrue
questionthat
- Instead(part of) what se-
of a rigorously-connected
moral philosophy does isquence
that it and
of clear compares
precise declarativevarious
sentences, we are
ethical alternatives "withoffered
our a active sense
rich delineation of life,"
of possibilities- accompanied
but it is difficult to see how philosophy
by a tacit of science
injunction: Consider this.21
or metaphysics could be described as doing the
same.

Even if we grant that some important Kitcher's strategy then is to point out that there
examples
of philosophy are based on such comparisons, are some philosophers,
this even very good philoso-
would not save Nussbaum's version of the 'Don't phers and even contemporary, highly regarded an-
Overestimate Philosophy' strategy from the Dis- alytic philosophers whose work is important not
continuity of Emotional Engagement argument. because of the arguments they present, but be-
Proponents of the Discontinuity Thesis could ar- cause of the way they "describe, exactly and in
gue that even if we accept that philosophy is of- rich detail, some . . . work of a type overlooked
ten based on the comparison of various alterna- by orthodox philosophical accounts; by consid-
tives with each other and with one's "active sense ering the phenomena she portrays, her readers
of life" (whatever that may mean), a serious dis- are expected to recognize the superiority of the
similarity still remains between philosophy and precise claims . . . she offers as replacements for
literature. In the case of literature, these com- orthodoxy."22
parisons should be dispassionate: they should be One potential worry is how widespread this
made on rational and logical grounds only. We strategy is. Kitcher explicitly mentions Nancy
need to judge one alternative to be preferable to Cartwright's work as an example, and there may
the other on the bases of rational considerations. be others, but this still leaves open the question
as to whether we can take this to be a genuine
And this is very different from what happens in lit-
erature, where these alternatives are presented in trend in philosophy rather than some isolated ex-
an emotionally colored manner, which rules out amples of somewhat idiosyncratic philosophers.
such dispassionate rational judgments. In short,Even if we grant this point, the general problem
Nussbaum's version of the 'Don't Overestimate with Kitcher's proposal (and one he is very much
Philosophy' strategy is vulnerable to the Discon- aware of) is that it fails to engage with the Dis-
tinuity of Emotional Engagement argument. continuity of Emotional Engagement argument.23
When characterizing (moral) philosophy, Nuss- Even if we accept that both philosophy and lit-
baum talks about "a pursuit of truth in all erature its offer "a rich delineation of possibilities-
forms," that is, not only in its dispassionate, butaccompanied by a tacit injunction: Consider this,"
also in its emotionally loaded forms.19 But then this would still be compatible with the Disconti-
this characterization (and with it, her version nuity Thesis: philosophy, but not literature, offers
of the 'Don't Overestimate Philosophy' strategy) the rich delineation of possibilities in a dispas-
will be rejected by everyone who takes philosophysionate, purely rational, manner.24 Thus, Kitcher
(and
to be exclusively the dispassionate pursuit of truth. Nussbaum) would need to supplement this
alternative picture of what philosophy is with an
Philip Kitcher also outlines an alternative con-
ception of philosophy that is more similar toargument
lit- that would disarm the Discontinuity of
Emotional
erature than to logic.20 Kitcher's alternative is in Engagement argument.
some respects similar to Nussbaum's, but it is dif-
v.B. The Psychology of Philosophy
ferent enough to consider it separately. Kitcher
admits that literature very rarely presents argu- We have seen that the main problem with all three
ments: unambiguously formulated premises versions that of the 'Don't Underestimate Literature'
would necessitate an unambiguously formulated strategy as well as the most influential versions
conclusion. As he says: of the 'Don't Overestimate Philosophy' strategy
we have considered in this section was that they
Wagner and Joyce do not argue. They do not even failed to give an appropriate response to the Dis-
present precisely-articulated theses about the worthcontinuity
and of Emotional Engagement argument:

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 Nanay Philosophy versus Literature 355

the argument that while

of thephilosophy is the
psychology of philosophy supposed
'Pure Log-
to be dispassionate, literature ical Inference'
ispicture.
not. I will argue against this
The aim of this subsection is to address this ar- Pure Logical Inference picture of the psychology
gument head-on. As we have seen, most versions of philosophy. But if the Pure Logical Inference
of the 'Don't Overestimate Philosophy' strategy picture is false, then the Discontinuity of Emo-
endeavor to broaden our conception of what phi- tional Engagement argument, which presupposes
losophy is. This was both Kitcher's and Nuss- this picture, will appear much less persuasive.
baum's project. The version of the 'Don't Over- My argument against the Pure Logical Infer-
estimate Philosophy' strategy I want to explore ence picture is threefold: (i) human reasoning in
here is not about what philosophy is, but about general is unlikely to follow the Pure Logical Infer-
how we engage with it. ence picture, (ii) reasoning in an academic context
We have seen in Section II that the Discon- is even more unlikely to follow the Pure Logical
tinuity Thesis can be formulated in three ways:Inference picture, and (iii) philosophical reason-
as a claim about (a) the discontinuity between ing is yet even more unlikely to follow the Pure
texts, (b) the discontinuity between the mentalLogical Inference picture. In other words, we have
processes of the person writing these texts, or (c) sets of arguments for rejecting the claim that
three
the discontinuity between the mental processes of
philosophical reasoning follows the Pure Logical
the person engaging with these texts. The argu-Inference model: (i) one is generally true of all
ments Kitcher and Nussbaum give are arguments kinds of human reasoning, (ii) one is true of rea-
about (a). I explore a different line of attack, one in an academic context, and (iii) one is spe-
soning
that is about (c). If we formulate the Discontinu-
cific to philosophical reasoning. I consider these
in turn.
ity Thesis this way, it amounts to saying that when
we are properly engaging with a philosophical text
and when we are properly engaging with a v.B.i.
pieceHuman reasoning in general does not follow
of literary fiction, we are supposed to havethe veryPure Logical Inference picture. There is a
different mental processes. The Discontinuity wealth
of of recent empirical findings about how
Emotional Engagement argument provides direct we actually reason that seems to flatly contradict
the Pure Logical Inference picture of human
support to this version of the Discontinuity The-
sis, and, as a result, it is easier to questionreasoning.
this Reasoning is sensitive to order effect,
argument in this context. to framing effects, and even to such banal envi-
There has been a lot of research recently ronmental
on factors as the dirtiness of one's hands

what has been labeled as the 'philosophy ofor whether we are holding a cup of coffee or a
phi-
losophy': the philosophical discussion of whatteddy
phi- bear.27 Maybe the way we should reason
is by going through a series of cognitive states
losophy is, for example, whether it is an a priori
or an a posteriori enterprise.25 What we wouldconnected by inference, but it is unlikely that this
need in order to substantiate the 'Don't Overes- is what in fact happens when we reason.
timate Philosophy' strategy is a project that could These findings are difficult to explain within the
be labeled as the 'psychology of philosophy': whatframework of the Pure Logical Inference model of
psychological processes are (or can be) involved reasoning- our beliefs and other cognitive states
when we are philosophizing. are not altered by the mess on the table in front
The Discontinuity of Emotional Engagementof us or by the film sketch we have just watched.
argument presupposes a very specific view about A general worry about this conclusion is this:
the psychology of philosophy: that the psychol- maybe these findings show that human reasoning
ogy of philosophy can be described exclusively by does not follow the Pure Logical Inference model,
talking about explicit beliefs and the logical rela-but they say nothing about whether it should do
tion between them.26 According to this picture, theso. These findings may support a descriptive claim
proper way of engaging with philosophical texts is about how (most) humans reason, but they are
the following. We are starting out with beliefs we silent on the normative claim about how we should
have rational reasons to accept, and as a result of reason. So the proponent of the Pure Logical In-
going through logically valid inferences, we add ference model (and a proponent of the Disconti-
some further beliefs to these that we also have ra- nuity of Emotional Engagement argument) could
tional reasons to accept. We can call this picture say that they pose no danger to the claim that good

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 356 The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism

(great, appropriate, and soofon)

and weight instanceshuman
to be found on the reasoning
other side,
does follow the Pure yet
Logical Inference
these it either neglects and despises, or else model.
by some
And, as good philosophy must
distinction employ
sets aside and good
rejects; in order that by this rea-
soning, these findings have no direct
great and pernicious impact
predetermination the authority on
of the
debate about the Discontinuity Thesis.
its former conclusions may I address
remain inviolate.30
this important worry in Subsection V.B.iv.
Confirmation bias can also be, and has been, em-
v.B.ii. Reasoning in anpirically
academicstudied, and context does
recent studies show that not
follow the Pure Logical
this Inference picture.
phenomenon is prevalent Some
in all academic
may dismiss the empirical findings about the impu-
disciplines.31
rity of human reasoning ButIconfirmation
mentioned above
bias is difficult to reconcileby say-
ing that while some people are
with the Pure Logicalundoubtedly
Inference model: the infer-sub-
ject to these biases, no self-respecting
ences academic
we make under confirmation bias are not
can possibly be subject to valid
logically them. Here
inferences. is a
On the other repre-
hand, con-
sentative quote: "We should acknowledge
firmation bias that in
can be, and has been, explained not
all intuitions are created equal emotional terms. Simply put, if a scientist has spent
the physical intuitions of thirty
professional
years defending scientists
a specific thesis, it is hardly
are much more trustworthy than those
surprising of under-
that she becomes emotionally invested
graduates or random personsin in a bus
it, and station."28
this emotional In
investment is responsible
short, expertise makes us immune (or atbias.32
for the confirmation least less
susceptible) to the effects described above.
But we still have This
the following worry. Maybe
argument is most often made some about philosophical
(or even most) academics are subject to
expertise (in the context of confirmation
the merits bias,and
but notdemer-
the really good ones.
its of armchair philosophy),Confirmation
but a version of us
bias can give ita can
descriptive claim
be used for academia in general: only
about how the
academics hoi
in fact polloi
reason. It cannot tell
gets fooled by ordering effects; the about
us anything expertshow they do not.
should reason. And
But recent empirical evidence suggests
this normative that
claim is the one that is in
at stake in
most cases, expertise has no the
effect on Inference
Pure Logical ordering ef-
picture. I address this
fect, framing effect, and the other
worry biases
in Subsection discussed
V.B.iv.
above.29 If these studies are to be relied on, expert
reasoning is in no better position in relation
v.B.iii. Philosophical reasoningtodoesthe
not follow the
Pure Logical Inference model Pure than the reasoning
Logical Inference model But the Pure Log-
of non-experts. ical Inference model is even less convincing if
The debate about expertise is a complex
we consider one, Confirma-
philosophical reasoning.
and I do not want to rely on one
tion side
bias in, say, or the other
mathematics or chemistry is a
result that
in order to establish the claim of the fact that the mathematician
reasoning in an or the
academic context does not follow the Pure Logical
scientist is heavily invested in the theory she is de-
Inference picture. But there are reasons
fending. But, normally, to thebelieve
only reason why the
that in an academic context mathematician
reasoning or theis
scientist
even is invested
fur- in the
ther from the Pure LogicaltheoryInference model
she is defending is that itthan
is her own theory.
in an everyday context. The main reason
Presumably, there is no forpersonal,thisnonmathemat-
is confirmation bias. ical reasons for wanting the Galois theory to be
Confirmation bias is the phenomenon in which true.
we treat evidence in favor of and against the the- The same cannot be said about philosophical
ory we accept differently. This phenomenon was debates, like the ones about free will or dual-
already recognized by Francis Bacon, who writes ism. Given that these (and other) philosophical
in the Novum Organum : themes are directly relevant to our lives and ev-
eryday choices, we should expect even stronger
The human understanding when it has once adopted an confirmation biases. It is not only the philosoph-
opinion (either as being the received opinion or as being ical theory that one has endorsed that biases our
agreeable to itself) draws all things else to support and assessment of new evidence. In the case of phi-
agree with it. And though there be a greater number losophy, it is also our most deeply held personal

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 Nanay Philosophy versus Literature 357

convictions. And our most what otherdeeply

(largely not held
rationallypersonal
acquired) beliefs
convictions very rarely we have and how
come difficult weas
about findait to make the
result of
rational and logical judgments.33 new belief consistent with them. As Oscar Wilde
The usual worry remains: says in Act I of
that An Ideal Husband
these results : "A man
say who
nothing about the normative allows himself claim,
to be convinced about how
by an argument is
we should do philosophy.a thoroughly This isunreasonable
the worry person."35I now
turn to. This old Quinean point applies differently in the
case of philosophical reasoning and in the case of
v.B.iv. The descriptive versus the normative claim.
reasoning in general. In the latter case, it counts
Could we not defend the Pure Logical Inference as yet another reason why the Pure Logical In-
model by insisting that it is a normative model ofference model of reasoning is doomed- as the
how we should engage with philosophical reason- majority of our beliefs have been acquired not
ing? The reality is that we do not always reason by logical analysis but by perceptual learning or
other nonrational means, we should not treat be-
the way we should. In this case, all the experiments
I mentioned in this section would count as devi- lief acquisition as a fully rational, inference-based
ations from the norm. A version of this claim is process. But this argument still only establishes
to say that the Pure Logical Inference model de- the descriptive and not the normative claim about
scribes rational reasoning, but we are not always,reasoning in general.
and not fully, rational beings. Another version of In the case of philosophical reasoning, however,
this general claim is that the Pure Logical Infer- we need to proceed differently. Philosophy- even
ence model is the right description of the phyloge- naturalistic philosophy at its extreme- needs to
netically more recent, conscious, and deliberative take the 'manifest image' seriously. Besides telling
System 2, but the automatic and mainly uncon- us how the world is, philosophy also needs to tell
scious System 1 often overrides System 2.34 The us how the way the world is relates to the way
general moral of all of these distinctions (norma-we take the world to be. This point can be made
tive or descriptive, rational or irrational, System in
2 Sellarsian terms: while the sciences are about
or System 1) is that the empirical findings I men- the 'scientific image,' the starting point of philoso-
tioned above do not challenge the Pure Logical In-phy is the 'manifest image.'36 Philosophy then can
ference model; they only explain why it sometimes explore the relation between the scientific image
fails to apply to actual philosophical reasoning. and the manifest image or it can clarify the man-
These considerations about the difference be-ifest image itself, independently of what science
tween the normative and descriptive claims may tells us. But manifest image is part of who we are
very well save the Pure Logical Inference picture
and it is also part of what philosophy is. In other
as a valid model for (i) how we should reason
words, it is not a bias or a bug in philosophical rea-
and for (ii) how we should reason in an academic soning that it starts out with a set of beliefs that
context. While mathematicians are subject to we all are dragging along with us and whose rational
kinds of biases, mathematics (as it should be done)origins are dubious at best. It is a feature: with-
is, or it should be, a series of steps of pure logical
out this, we would lose what makes philosophy
inference. philosophy.
But the normative versus the descriptive move If this is true, then, at least when it comes to
does not work for philosophical reasoning, for the
philosophical reasoning, we cannot make the nor-
following simple reason. Our acquisition of beliefs
mative versus descriptive move. It is part of what
in general and of beliefs concerning philosophical
philosophy is and what it should be that it does
topics in particular depends to a large extent not
on pretend that only rationally justified beliefs
what other beliefs we already have. It happens are in our mind. If we did so, this would elimi-
very rarely that someone comes to believe that nate the manifest image altogether. In short, the
free will is impossible because she reads a logi-Pure Logical Inference picture fails not only as a
cally valid argument supporting it, all of whose descriptive model for philosophical reasoning but
premises she already accepts. Most often, we are also as a normative one.
already invested in the claim that free will is im- But then, as the Discontinuity of Emotional
possible (or that it is possible). Whether we come
Engagement argument presupposes, the Pure
to believe that free will is impossible depends Logical
on Inference picture of the psychology of

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 358 The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism

philosophy, the Discontinuity

Peterhouse of Emotional En-
gagement argument will lose ofits
University support. And as
Cambridge
a result, the Discontinuity Thesis
Cambridge, UK itself will sound
less convincing as well.
internet: bence.nanay@UA.AC.BE, bn206@cam.ac.uk

vi. conclusion: the importance of the 1. For simplicity, I talk about the relation between phi-
DISCONTINUITY THESIS losophy and literature in this article, but it should be clear
that all the arguments apply to any nonabstract art forms.
2. The Discontinuity Thesis does not have to be com-
Finally, a word about the relevance of mitted
the claim I asymmetry between literature and philoso-
to a value
argued for in this article. What if the Discontinuity
phy. According to the Discontinuity Thesis, literature cannot
Thesis is false? Why should we care?doThe
whatshort
philosophy can- but literature may, of course, be
as valuable as or even more valuable than philosophy- it is
answer is that we should care a great deal.
just that it is supposed to do something very different from
First, the rejection of the Discontinuity
what Thesis
philosophy is supposed to do.
has direct implications for a number of 3. debates
See, for example, Jorge J. E. Gracia, "Borges's 'Pierre
in the philosophy of literature. The most impor-
Menard': Philosophy or Literature?" The Journal of Aesthet-
tant example is the aesthetic cognitivism ics anddebate.
Art Criticism 59 (2001): 45-57.
4. D. D. Raphael gives a version of this argument in
As we have seen, according to aesthetic cogni-
"Can Literature Be Moral Philosophy?" New Literary His-
tivism artworks can teach us, and this tory
contributes
15 (1983): 1-12.
to their artistic value. This is a conjunctive claim,
5. Martha C. Nussbaum, Love's Knowledge: Essays on
and the second conjunct is notoriously Philosophy
difficult and Literature (Oxford University Press, 1990),
pp. 3, 142-144.
to assess, but if the argument I presented in this
6. Timothy Williamson, "Past the Linguistic T'irn?"
article is correct and we should reject the
in TheDiscon-
Future for Philosophy , ed. Brian Leiter (Oxford:
tinuity Thesis, then we have very good reason
Clarendon to 2004), pp. 106-128, at p. 127.
Press,
accept the first conjunct: not only can 7. wePlato, Republic , trans. G.M.A. Grube, rev. C.D.C.
learn
from literature, or from art in general,Reeve
but (Indianapolis:
we can Hackett, 1992), pp. 264-276 (Book X:
595a-605c).
even learn philosophy from it. In contrast, if we
8. See Iris Murdoch, The Fire and the Sun: Why Plato
do accept the Discontinuity Thesis, then aesthetic
Banished the Artists (Oxford University Press, 1977); Iris
cognitivism seems doomed. Murdoch, Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals (New York:
Second, if the Discontinuity Thesis is Penguin
false,Press,
then 1994); and Nussbaum: Love's Knowledge.
9. Although they rarely do, the most important excep-
philosophy has no excuse for ignoring literature-
tion being the first chapter of Philip Kitcher's Deaths in
while philosophy can and does learn a lot from
Venice: sci-
The Cases of Gustav von Aschenbach ( Leonard Hast-
ence, it can also learn from literature. I started
ings Schoff this
Lectures) (Columbia University Press, 2013).
1U. Gregory
article with a contrast between the way there has Currie, Ine Moral Psychology ot Fic-
been a lively and ongoing discussion tion,"
of in Art and Its Messages: Meaning , Morality, and So-
whether
ciety, ed. Stephen Davies (Pennsylvania State University
and how philosophy can and should learn from
Press, 1997), pp. 49-58; Gregory Currie, "Realism of Char-
the sciences and the relative lack of interest in the acter and the Value of Fiction," in Aesthetics and Ethics:
equivalent question about whether and how phi- Essays at the Intersection , ed. Jerrold Levinson (Cambridge
losophy can and should learn from the arts. My University Press, 1998), pp. 161-181; Berys Gaut, "Art and
Knowledge," in The Oxford Handbook of Aesthetics, ed.
aim was to show that philosophy should take the
Jerrold Levinson (Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 436-
arts seriously, and, ironically, the main consider- 450.
ations in favor of this come from the sciences. If 11. See, for example, Tamar Szabó Gendler, Intuition,
we have reason to reject the Discontinuity Thesis,Imagination, and Philosophical Methodology (Oxford Uni-
philosophers may be persuaded to read not onlyversity Press, 2010), and Timothy Williamson, The Philoso-
phy of Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007), for two very
Science and Nature , but also Proust and Joyce.37
different expositions of the importance of imagination in
philosophy in general and in thought experiments in partic-
BENCE NANAY ular.

Centre for Philosophical Psychology 12. Hilary Putnam, "Literature, Science, and Reflec-
tion," in Meaning and the Moral Sciences (London: Rout-
University of Antwerp
ledge, 1978), pp. 83-94, at pp. 86-87; see also Moira Gatens,
Antwerp, Belgium "The Art and Philosophy of George Eliot," Philosophy and
and Literature 33 (2009): 73-90.

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 Nanay Philosophy versus Literature 359

13. See, for example, Edouard ply in Machery,

the case of any such alternative
Ron picture.
Mallon, (See also
Shaun Nichols, and Stephen P.Kitcher,
Stich, Deaths in Venice, pp. 19-20.) I am using
"Semantics, Cross-the Pure
Logical Inference
Cultural Style," Cognition 92 (2004): picture as a foil
B1-B12; because it is Swain,
Stacey remarkably
Joshua Alexander, and Jonathan widespread both among the defenders
M. Weinberg, "Theof the Discontinuity
Insta-
ThesisRunning
bility of Philosophical Intuitions: and among philosophers
Hot in general.
andI am gratefulon
Cold to
an anonymous referee for raising this
Truetemp," Philosophy and Phenomenological point.
Research 76
(2008): 138-155. 27. See Bence Nanay, Between Perception and Action
14. For different versions of this claim,
(Oxford University Press,see, for
2013), chap. 4, forexam-
a summary.
ple, Kendall L. Walton, "Fearing28.Fictions,"
Steven D. Hales, Relativism
TheandJournal
the Foundations of
Philosophy 75 (1978): 5-27; Alvinof Philosophy (MIT Press, 2006),
Goldman, p. 171. See also Timothy
"Imagination
Williamson, "Armchair
and Simulation in Audience Responses to Philosophy,
Fiction," Metaphysical
in Modal-
The
Architecture of the Imagination: ity andNewCounterfactual Thinking," on
Essays Proceedings of the Aris-
Pretence,
totelian Nichols
Possibility, and Fiction , ed. Shaun Society 105 (2005): 1-23; Williamson,
(Oxford The Philos-
Univer-
ophy of Philosophy,
sity Press, 2006), pp. 41-56; Tamar SzabóTimothy Gendler,Williamson, "Philosophical
"Imagi-
native Contagion," MetaphilosophyExpertise and37 the(2006):
Burden of Proof," Metaphilosophy
183-203; 42
Neil
Van Leeuwen, "Imagination Is (2011):
Where 215-229; Antti
theKauppinen,
Action "The Rise
Is," and Fall
The of
Journal of Philosophy 108 (2011):Experimental
55-77. Philosophy," Philosophical Explorations 10
15. Kitcher, Deaths in Venice, (2007):
and 95-118;Stanley
Ernest Sosa, "Experimental
Cavell, Philosophy
"The and
Avoidance of Love: A Reading Philosophical
of King Intuition,"
Lear,"Philosophical
in Studies
Must 132 (2007):
We
Mean What We Say? (New York: 99-107.
Scribner's, 1969), pp. 267-
353. 29. For summaries, see Lysann Damisch, Thomas Muss-
weiler, and Henning
16. See especially Kitcher, Deaths in Venice,Plessner, "Olympic
pp. Medals
17-as Fruits of
Comparison?
19; see also Philip Kitcher, Joyce's Assimilation and Contrast
Kaleidoscope: An Invi- in Sequential Per-
tation to Finnegans Wake (Oxford formance Judgments," Journal
University of Experimental
Press, 2007); Psychology:
Philip Kitcher, "Der Ring des Applied
Nibelungen 12 (2006): 166-178;
in Charles
Wagner A. Brown, und "Order Ef-
fectsein
Nietzsche: Kultur-Werk-Wirkung: and the Audit Materiality eds.
Handbuch, RevisionStefan
Choice," Journal of
Lorenz Sorgner, H. James Birx, Applied
and Business Research 25 Knoepffler
Nikolaus (2009): 21-36; Frans B. M. de
(Reinbek: Rowohlt Taschenbuch Waal, "Silent
Verlag,Invasion: Imanishi's
2008),Primatology
pp. 403- and Cultural
Bias in Science,"
408; Philip Kitcher, "Collideorscape: Finnegans Animal Cognition
Wake 6in (2003):
the 293-299; Eric
Large and in the Small," JoyceSchultz,
StudiesEdward Annual
T. Cokely, and(2009):
Adam Feltz, 188-
"Persistent Bias
211: Philip Kitcher, The Ethical in Expert Judgments
Project (Harvard about Free Will and Moral Responsi-
University
bility: Awithout
Press, 2011); Philip Kitcher, "Youth Test of the Expertise Defense," Consciousness
Qualities," The and
Cognition 20and
Monist forthcoming; Philip Kitcher (2011): Richard
1722-1731; and Jonathan
Schacht, M. Weinberg,
Finding an Ending: ReflectionsChad onGonnerman,
Wagner's Cameron Buckner,
Ring and Joshua Alexan-
(Oxford
der, "Are Philosophers
University Press, 2004); Philip Kitcher and Richard Expert Intuiters?"
Schacht, Philosophical
"Authority and Judgment in Psychology
Mozart's 23 (2010):
Don 331-355.
Giovanni and
Wagner's Ring, " in The Don Giovanni 30. Francis Bacon, "Novum Organum,"
Moment: Essays in The
onEnglish
the Legacy of an Opera, eds. Lydia Philosophers from Bacon
Goehr and to Mill, ed. Edwin
Daniel A. Burtt (New
Her-
witz (Columbia University Press, York: Random
2006), House, 1995),
pp. pp. 24-123, at See
161-180. p. 36.
also Bence Nanay, "From Philosophy 31. See, for
ofexample,
Science Raymond
to S. Nickerson, "Confir-
Philoso-
phy of Literature (and Back) viamation Bias: A Ubiquitous
Philosophy of Phenomenon
Mind. Philip in Many Guises,"
Kitcher's Philosophical Pendulum," Review ofTheoria
General Psychology 2 (1998): 175-220;
11 (2013): 257- Clifford R.
266. Mynatt, Michael E. Doherty, and Ryan D. Tweney, "Con-
17. Putnam, "Literature, Science, and Reflection," firmation Bias in a Simulated Research Environment: An
p. 87. Experimental Study of Scientific Inferences," The Quar-
18. Nussbaum, Love's Knowledge, pp. 26-27; see also terly Journal of Experimental Psychology 29 (1977): 85-
pp. 142-144. 95; Eva Jonas, Stefan Schulz-Hardt, Dieter Frey, and Nor-
19. Nussbaum, Love's Knowledge, p. 7. man Thelen, "Confirmation Bias in Sequential Information
20. See, especially, Kitcher, Deaths in Venice, and Search After Preliminary Decisions: An Expansion of Dis-
Kitcher, "The Youth without Qualities." See also Gatens, sonance Theoretical Research on Selective Exposure to
"The Art and Philosophy of George Eliot." Information," Journal of Personality and Social Psychol-
21. Kitcher, Deaths in Venice, p. 26. ogy 80 (2001): 557-571; Joshua Klayman and Young- won
22. Kitcher, Deaths in Venice, p. 267. Ha, "Confirmation, Disconfirmation, and Information in
23. Kitcher, Deaths in Venice, pp. 16-20. Hypothesis Testing," Psychological Review 94 (1987): 211-
24. Kitcher, Deaths in Venice, p. 26. 228.

25. See, for example, Williamson, The Philosophy of 32. See, for example, Klayman and Ha, "Confirmation,
Philosophy. Disconfirmation, and Information in Hypothesis Testing,"
26. Strictly speaking, the Pure Logical Inference pic- and Jonas, Schulz-Hardt, Frey, and Thelen, "Confirmation
ture is not the only possible stance in the psychology of phi- Bias in Sequential Information Search."
losophy that the Discontinuity of Emotional Engagement 33. How about those parts of philosophy whose subject
argument can rely on. Any picture where philosophizing in- matter is less personal? How about logic, for example? In a
volves fewer emotions would be sufficient. My arguments recent study it was demonstrated that even with logic- the
against the Pure Logical Inference picture would also ap- branch of philosophy that is supposed to be the closest to the

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 360 The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism

Pure Logical Inference pattern- our 35. Oscar Wilde, An Idealare

conclusions Husband , in The Major
heavily
influenced by our emotions and, Works even more
, ed. Isobel surprisingly,
Murray (Oxford University Press, 1989),
the logical inferences themselves pp. are
389-475, at p. 401.
most often emotionally
mediated. Kinga Morsanyi and Simon J. Handley,
36. Wilfrid Sellars, "Philosophy and"Logic
the Scientific Im-
Feels So Good- I Like It! Evidence for Intuitive Detection age of Man," in Frontiers of Science and Philosophy , ed.
of Logicality in Syllogistic Reasoning," Journal of Exper- Robert Colodny (University of Pittsburgh Press, 1962), pp.
imental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition 38 35-78.
(2012): 596-616. 37. This work was supported by the EU FP7 CIG grant
34. Steven A. Sloman, "The Empirical Case for Two
PCIG09-GA-201 1-293818 and the FWO Odysseus grant
Systems of Reasoning," Psychological Bulletin 119 (1996):
G.0020.12N. I am grateful to Philip Kitcher and Gregory
3-22. Currie for discussion as well as comments on an earlier draft.

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