NOTES ON CIVIL PROCEDURE 1 MIDTERMS ANGOG

INTRODUCTION

REMEDIAL LAW SUBSTANTIVE LAW

Rules which prescribe procedures for the Creates, defines, and regulates rights and duties
protection and enforcement of all claims arising concerning life, liberty, or property. The violation
from the rights and duties created by law. It is a of which gives rise to a cause of action.
mechanism to enforce a right created by law.

Sources of civil procedure and remedial law

Rules of Court
o This refers to the body of rules governing pleading, practice, and procedure promulgated by the Supreme Court.
o This is promulgated under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution: ―Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and
inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of
procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.‖
Hierarchy of Courts; and exceptions

Province of Bataan v. Escalada, G.R. No. 181311, 24 November 2021

The case is about petition for certiorari, mandamus and filed by the Province of Bataan assailing the decision of the RTC. That the lower acted in
favor of the verified petition for injunction filed by Sunrise Papers Inc. , Victor Gawtee and Metrobank.

In which the RTC declared that:

1. Declaring invalid and illegal the warrant of levy made by the Province of Bataan on January 2, 2003 and the notice of sale on August 29,
2003 of the subject machinery and equipment enumerated in Annex "1" of the petition for injunction (which are the same properties
purchased by intervenor Victor G. Gawtee.
2. Declaring Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-246955 and T-246956 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Bataan as falsified and
invalid.
3. Declaring the demolition, taking out and disposition of aforesaid properties unauthorized, illegal and invalid.

Facts
 Sunrise is a domestic corporation with a paper mill plant on two parcels of land in Bataan.
 Sunrise obtained loans from Metrobank from 2001 to 2003, mortgaging the real properties as security.
 Provincial Treasurer's Office (PTO) demanded payment of real property taxes, leading to a warrant of levy in
2003. Worth P1,414,015.44 and became P1,715,398.55 as of December 2002.
 Sunrise made partial payments to prevent property auction, but PTO proceeded with notice of sale in 2003.
 Due to the Sunrise obligation to pay taxes the PTO auctioned real properties in 2004, and Province bought
them for taxes, penalties, and costs.
 PhilEXIM's mortgage rights were assigned to Gawtee, leading to execution and sale of machinery.
 Sunrise filed for relief from judgment, claiming illegal compromise agreement and forged signature of Evelyn's
signature on the agreement was forged. Atty. Victor T. De Dios, Jr., Sunrise's purported counsel who
endorsed the agreement with Gawtee.
 Metrobank demanded payment from Sunrise in 2005.
 Province obtained new titles for the real properties, excluding Metrobank's mortgages.
  Sunrise filed a petition for injunction against the Province regarding the real properties.
 Province manifested its claim over the properties in due to partial payment of taxes.
 Gawtee intervened to his ownership of the machinery.
RTC ruling infavor of Gawtee.

Province of Bataan filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus before the Court of Appeals to assail the Decision and the
Order of the RTC.

Argued The RTC had no jurisdiction over the case because Section 267 of R.A. No. 7160 was not complied with. Section 267 requires the
payment of a deposit for any action assailing the validity of the tax sale through a public auction of a real property under R.A. No. 7160.
This is a jurisdictional requirement and is intended to protect the interests of the buyer at the public auction. Since the action filed by
Sunrise was to assail the validity of the auction sale for its real property tax delinquencies, it should have complied with this requirement.
Sunrise's failure to do so means that the RTC had no jurisdiction over its petition. Moreover, Sunrise filed a Notice of Dismissal wherein it
acknowledged its failure to post the deposit. As such, the RTC should have dismissed the petition.

Issue:
Does the RTC have jurisdiction over the case?

Ruling
Yes, Under the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, where the issuance of an extraordinary writ is also within the competence of the CA or the RTC, it is
in either of these courts that the specific action for the writ's procurement must be presented. The doctrine of hierarchy of courts is a
constitutional imperative and is not a matter of mere policy. Failure to comply may result in the dismissal of the action.

Nonetheless, the doctrine is subject to certain exceptions, namely:

(1) when there are genuine issues of constitutionality that must be addressed at the most immediate time;
(2) when the issues involved are of transcendental importance;
(3) cases of first impression;
(4) the constitutional issues raised are better decided by the Court;
(5) exigency in certain situations;
(6) the filed petition reviews the act of a constitutional organ;
(7) when petitioners rightly claim that they had no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law that could free them
from the injurious effects of respondents' acts in violation of their right to freedom of expression; [and]
(8) the petition includes questions that are "dictated by public welfare and the advancement of public policy, or demanded by the broader interest
of justice, or the orders complained of were found to be patent nullities, or the appeal was considered as clearly an inappropriate remedy.

Petitioners could have appealed the Decision of the RTC to the CA. The Court is mindful of Section 7(a)(3) of R.A. No. 1125, as amended, which
provides that the CTA has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over the decisions, orders, or resolutions of the RTCs in local tax cases originally decided
or resolved by them in the exercise of their original or appellate jurisdiction. However, this case is not a purely local tax case. A local tax case must
involve a tax issue.119 It is a dispute between the local government unit (LGU) and a taxpayer involving the imposition of the LGU's power to levy
tax, fees, or charges against the property or business of the taxpayer concerned.

Based on the foregoing, petitioners cannot claim that they had no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law that
would justify their direct resort to the Court. A strict application of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts would warrant the outright dismissal of their
petition. However, the Court finds that the fifth exception, namely the exigency of the resolution of this case, justifies a liberal application of the
doctrine of hierarchy of courts. The issues in this case do not only concern the jurisdiction of the RTC but the right of Gawtee as the owner of the
machinery and equipment, the right of Cameron as a mortgagee of the real properties, and the extent of the damage they may have suffered
because of petitioners. In any event, the Court is not required to rule on the factual issues of this case in the first instance. Accordingly, it is best
for the Court to resolve once and for all the controversies surrounding the parties in this case.

Section 267 of R.A. No. 7160 provides:

Section 267. Action Assailing Validity of Tax Sale. - No court shall entertain any action assailing the validity of any sale at public auction of real
property or rights therein under this Title until the taxpayer shall have deposited with the court the amount for which the real property was sold,
together with interest of two percent (2%) per month from the date of sale to the time of the institution of the action. The amount so deposited shall
be paid to the purchaser at the auction sale if the deed is declared invalid but it shall be returned to the depositor if the action fails.
Neither shall any court declare a sale at public auction invalid by reason of irregularities or informalities in the proceedings unless the substantive
rights of the delinquent owner of the real property or the person having legal interest therein have been impaired.

The taxpayer in Section 267 refers to the "declarant of the property in a real property tax declaration, who is generally its owner, and his declared
property is realty tax delinquent."138 The taxpayer in this case is undoubtedly Sunrise whose properties were levied because of its failure to pay
the real property taxes due to the Province. Sunrise filed a petition for injunction against petitioners to declare the auction sale void on the ground
that it was not duly notified of it.139 Sunrise did not refute having any outstanding liability for real property taxes. It is also not part of the
government or a tax exempt entity. That being the case, Sunrise should have made a deposit pursuant to Section 267. Sunrise, however, stated in
no uncertain terms that it was unable to deposit the amount required under Section 267 in its June 29, 2005 Notice of Dismissal. It even declared
that the RTC did not have jurisdiction over the case.140
Nonetheless, Sunrise's failure to pay the deposit required under Section 267 shall not result in the dismissal of the case before Us. The RTC
refused to require the payment of the deposit from Sunrise. The dismissal of the case will certainly prejudice Gawtee and Cameron. Intervention
cannot exist as an independent action and is supplemental to an existing litigation.141 The RTC correctly observed that there are substantial
issues involved considering the intervention of Gawtee and Cameron. In any event, the Court held in Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. v. Presiding
Judge, RTC Manila, Br. 39,142 and Eagle Realty Corp. v. Republic143 that the dismissal of the plaintiffs action shall not necessarily result in the
dismissal of the intervenor's complaint-in-intervention. The Court explained in Eagle Realty Corp. that "An intervenor has the right to claim the
benefit of the original suit and to prosecute it to judgment. Having been permitted to become a party in order to better protect his interest, an
intervenor is entitled to have the issues raised between him and the original parties tried and determined."144 As such, Gawtee and Cameron's
petitions-in-intervention cannot be dismissed notwithstanding Sunrise's failure to pay the deposit required under Section 267 of R.A. No. 7160.
Besides, Sunrise already paid the Province P700,000.00 for its tax liability and P81,685.68 for the cost of the auction sale of its properties.

Computation of time

Estrella v. SM Prime Holdings, G.R. No. 257814, 20 February 2023

Facts

The case involves a property that was formerly part of the Maysilo Estate, which was left by Gonzalo Tuason. The Maysilo Estate was
eventually subdivided into smaller lots that were sold to different persons and entities. One of the disputed lots is Lot 7-C-2, which is
the subject property of this case.

In 1961, a group of people claiming to be the heirs of Maria de la Concepcion Vidal, a co-owner of the Maysilo Estate, filed a petition
with the Court of First Instance of Rizal to substitute their names on OCT No. 994 in the place of Vidal. The court granted the petition.
The purported heirs of Vidal then filed a petition for the partition and accounting of the Maysilo Estate covered by OCT No. 994. The
RTC granted the petition and appointed three commissioners to determine the most equitable division of the properties. However, no
recommendation was submitted.

The subdivided lots were eventually sold to various transferees, including the City of Caloocan. In 1998, the City of Caloocan sold the
subject property to Gotesco. Gotesco then secured a new title, TCT No. 326321, covering the subject property.

The purported heirs of Vidal filed a case against Gotesco to nullify and cancel TCT No. 326321. They argued that they are the real
owners of the subject property and that Gotesco never acquired valid title to it.
  Tri-City claimed that it acquired the subject property from Estrella et al. in exchange for shares of Tri-City and Platinum Global
Properties, Inc.
 Gotesco filed a Motion to Dismiss, arguing that Tri-City had no standing to intervene because the subject property was covered
by OCT No. 994 registered on April 19, 1917, while the purported mother title from which Tri-City allegedly derived its right was
OCT No. 994 registered on May 3, 1917.
 SM Prime Holdings, Inc. (SM Prime) filed a Motion for Substitution, requesting that it be allowed to substitute for Gotesco as
defendant in the case due to the sale of the subject property in their favor.
 The RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss filed by Gotesco and admitted the Petition for Intervention filed by Tri-City.
 SM Prime filed a Demurrer to Evidence, which was granted by the RTC.
 Estrella et al. and Tri-City moved for reconsideration, but these were denied.
 Estrella et al. appealed the decision of the RTC to the Court of Appeals (CA).
 The CA dismissed the appeal of Estrella et al. for failure to file their Brief on time.

The CA found that Estrella et al. were given 45 days, or until September 7, 2019, within which to file their Brief. However, despite
receipt of the notice of the CA instructing them to file their Brief and the October 9, 2019 Minute Resolution, they failed to file on time.
It took them six months, or on February 14, 2020, to file their Brief.

The CA found that the explanation proffered by Estrella et al. was unacceptable. The CA ruled that the attribution of negligence to the
counsel's messengerial staff does not automatically shield the client from the adverse consequence of such negligence and relieve the
client from the unfavorable result of such lapse.

The CA declared that the failure of Estrella et al. to find out the status of their appeal and to monitor whether the counsel filed their
Brief on time rendered them undeserving of any sympathy from the court with regard to the negligence of their counsel.

Issue
Is Petition docketed as G.R. No. 257814 is marred with procedural infirmities, warranting its outright dismissal?
Ruling
Yes, the Petition docketed as G.R. 1Vo. 257814 is marred with procedural infirmities, warranting its outright dismissal At the outset, procedural
defects were noted, warranting the dismissal of the case docketed as G.R. No. 257814. The Petition lacks (1) proof of service on the CA; (2) clearly
legible duplicate original or certified true copy of the assailed Resolution dated January 31, 2020, as only a photocopy was attached; and (3)
competent evidence of identity of the counsel for petitioner who signed the affidavit of service. Furthermore, the material dates indicated in the
Petition docketed as G.R. No. 2578 i 4 were hardly sufficient to establish the timeliness of its filing.

The foregoing avennents fail to satisfy the material dates that must be outlined in a petition filed under Section 4, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Here, the quoted averments in the Petition fail to establish that it was timely filed because the dates when the assailed resolutions were received by
Estrella et aL cannot be ascertained. The Manifestation with Motion to Admit their Appellants' Brief is not even the motion for new trial or
reconsideration contemplated in Section 4, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Nevertheless, even assuming for the sake of argument that the
Manifestation with Motion to Admit their Appellants' Brief filed by Estrella et al. may be treated as a motion for reconsideration that was timely
filed, the present Petition was still filed out of time.

In this regard, it is worthy to highlight Administrative Matter (A.M) No. 00-2-14-SC, where this Court clarified the application of Section 1, Rule 22
of the Ruies of Court in the event that the last day of filing a pleading falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or a legal holiday, and the original period is
extended. The relevant portion of A.M. No. 00-2-14-SC74 states: Whereas, Section 1, Rule 22 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
Section 1. How to compute time. -In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by these Rules, or by order of the court, or by any
applicable statute, the day of the act or event from which the designated period of time begins to run is to be excluded and the date of performance
included. If the last day of the period, as thus computed, falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday in the place where the court sits, the
time shall not run until the next working day. Whereas, the aforecited provision applies in the matter of filing of pleadings in courts when the due
date falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or le?al holiday, in which case, the filing of the said pleading on the next working clay is deemed on time.

Whereas, Lhe question has been raised if the period is extended ipso jure to the next working day imi.--nediately following where the last day_ of
the period is a Saturday, Sunday[,] or legal holiday so that when a motion 74 Computation of Time When Last Day Falls on a Saturday, Sunday or
Legal Holiday and a Motion for Extension Filed on Next Working Day is Granted, A.M. No. 00-2-14-SC, February 29, 2000. Et Decision 11 G.R.
Nos. 257814 and 257944 for extension of time is filed, the period of extension is to be reckoned from the next working day and not from the
original expiration of the period; NOW[,] THEREFORE, the Court Resolves, for the guidance of the Bench and the Bar, to declare that Section I,
Rule 22 speaks only of "the last day of the period" so that when a party seeks an extension and the same is granted, the due date ceases to be the
last day and hence, the provision no longer applies. Any extension of time to file the required pleading should therefore be counted from the
expiration of the period regardless of the fact that said due date is a Saturday, Sunday[,] or legal holiday. Noticeably, Estrella e1 al. stated that
they received a copy of the assailed Resolution of the CA on November 5, 2021. As such, Estrella et al. were given until November 20, 2021 to file
the Petition or a motion for extension. Since the last day to file fell on a Saturday, the petition or motion for extension may be filed on the next
working day, November 22, 2021. However, for purposes of computing the last day to file the petition during the extended period, it should be
reckoned from November 20, 2021, the actual last day, even if it fell on a Saturday. Applying A.M. No. 00-2-14-SC, it is clear that though the
original due date fell on a Saturday and the motion for extension of time was filed on November 22, 2021, the reckoning date to compute the
extended period within which to file the petition should still be November 20, 2021. Thus, Estrella et al. only had until December 20, 2022 to file
their petition.

General Provisions

Cases Governed Rule 1 Section 3

Rules shall govern the procedure to be observed in actions, civil, or criminal and special proceedings.

Civil Action:
Is one by which a party sues another for the enforcement and protection of a right, or redress of a wrong.

May be ordinary or special.

Criminal Action:
Is one by which the State prosecutes a person for an act or omission punishable by law.

Specia Proceeding:
A remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact.

Rule 1 Sec4
Rules not applicable to:
1. Election cases,
2. Land registration cadastral,
3. Naturalization,
4. Insolvency proceedings,
And in other cases not herein provided for, except by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient.

Types of Civil Actions

In rem

Actions in rem are actions against the thing itself. They are binding upon the whole world. 59 The phrase, "against the thing," to describe in rem.
actions is a metaphor. It is not the "thing" that is the party to an in rem action; only legal or natural persons may be parties even in in
rem actions.60 The following are some of the examples of actions in rem: petitions directed against the "thing" itself or the res which concerns the
status of a person, like a petition for adoption, correction of entries in the birth certificate; or annulment of marriage; nullity of marriage; petition
to establish illegitimate filiation; registration of land under the Torrens system; and forfeiture proceedings.

In personam

An action in personam is a proceeding to enforce personal rights and obligations brought against the person and is based on the jurisdiction of the
person, although it may involve his right to, or the exercise of ownership of, specific property, or seek to compel him to control or dispose of it in
accordance with the mandate of the court. Its purpose is to impose, through the judgment of a court, some responsibility or liability directly upon
the person of the defendant. Of this character are suits to compel a defendant to specifically perform some act or actions to fasten a pecuniary
liability on him.58 The following are some of the examples of actions in personam: action for collection of sum of money and damages; action for
unlawful detainer or forcible entry; action for specific performance; action to enforce a foreign judgment in a complaint for a breach of contract.

Quasi in Rem

A proceeding quasi in rem is one brought against persons seeking to subject the property of such persons to the discharge of the claims
assailed.61 In an action quasi in rem, an individual is named as defendant and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interests therein to
the obligation or loan burdening the property. 62 In an action quasi in rem, an individual is named as defendant. But, unlike suits in rem, a quasi in
rem judgment is conclusive only between the parties. 63 The following are some of the examples of actions quasi in rem: suits to quiet title; actions
for foreclosure; and attachment proceedings.

On jurisdiction
In actions in personam, the judgment is for or against a person directly. Jurisdiction over the parties is required in actions in personam because
they seek to impose personal responsibility or liability upon a person. 64 "In a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court, provided that the latter has jurisdiction over the res. Jurisdiction over the res is
acquired either (a) by the seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into actual custody of the law; or (b) as a result of the
institution of legal proceedings, in which the power of the court is recognized and made effective.

Frias v. Alcayde, G.R. No. 194262, 28 February 2018

Doctrine: Due process dictates that jurisdiction over the person of a defendant can only be acquired by the courts after a strict compliance with the
rules on the proper service of summons.

Facts
  On December 5, 2003, Bobie Rose D.V. Frias (petitioner) and Rolando Alcayde (respondent) entered into a contract of lease for a residential
house and lot in Muntinlupa City. The lease term was one year, starting on December 5, 2003 and ending on December 4, 2004. The
monthly rent was P30,000.
 Respondent failed to pay the rent for 24 months, starting from December 2005.
 Petitioner filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against respondent.
 The MeTC rendered a decision in favor of the petitioner and ordered respondent to vacate the premises and pay the accrued rentals at 12%
legal interest, plus P10,000 in attorney's fees.
 On July 25, 2007, respondent filed a petition for annulment of judgment with the RTC, Muntinlupa City, Branch 203. He argued that the
MeTC's July 26, 2006 decision does not bind him because the court did not acquire jurisdiction over his person. He also argued that the
MeTC lacked jurisdiction over the case because the petitioner did not make a prior demand to pay and to vacate, and because the petitioner
did not refer the case to the barangay.
 A copy of the petition for annulment of judgment was allegedly served to the petitioner, but the service was defective. The Officer's Return
did not indicate the impossibility of a personal service within a reasonable time, it did not specify the efforts exerted by the sheriff to locate
the petitioner, and it did not certify that the person in the office who received the summons in petitioner's behalf was one with whom the
petitioner had a relation of confidence ensuring that the latter would receive or would be notified of the summons issued in her name.
 On September 7, 2007, the RTC issued an order denying the respondent's motion for a TRO.
 Frias appealed to the CA but was denied due to lack of merit.

Issue
Did the Court commit grave abuse of discretion by not dismissing the case due to not acquiring the jurisdiction over the person.

Ruling
Yes, it is elementary that courts acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiff or petitioner once the complaint or petition is filed. On the other hand, there
are two ways through which jurisdiction over the defendant or respondent is acquired through coercive process - either through the service of
summons upon them or through their voluntary appearance in court.

Elsewhere, We declared that jurisdiction of the court over the person of the defendant or respondent cannot be acquired notwithstanding his
knowledge of the pendency of a case against him unless he was validly served with summons. Such is the important role a valid service of
summons plays in court actions.

At any rate, regardless of the type of action - whether it is in personam, in rem or quasi in rem � the proper service of summons is imperative.75

Where the action is in personam and the defendant is in the Philippines, as in this case, the service of summons may be done by personal or
substituted service as laid out in Sections 6 76 and 777 of Rule 14. Indeed, the preferred mode of service of summons is personal service. 78 To
warrant the substituted service of the summons and copy of the complaint, (or, as in this case, the petition for annulment of judgment), the
serving officer must first attempt to effect the same upon the defendant in person. Only after the attempt at personal service has become
impossible within a reasonable time may the officer resort to substituted service.

his Court explained the nature and enumerated the requisites of substituted service in Manotoc v. Court of Appeals, et al.,80 which We summarize
and paraphrase below:

(1) Impossibility of Prompt Personal Service -

The party relying on substituted service or the sheriff must show that defendant cannot be served promptly or there is impossibility of prompt service.

"Reasonable time" under Section 8, Rule 14, is defined as "so much time as is necessary under the circumstances for a reasonably prudent and
diligent man to do, conveniently, what the contract or duty requires that should be done, having a regard for the rights and possibility of loss, if any,
to the other party."

To the plaintiff, "reasonable time" means no more than seven (7) days since an expeditious processing of a complaint is what a plaintiff wants. To the
sheriff, "reasonable time" means 15 to 30 days because at the end of the month, it is a practice for the branch clerk of court to require the sheriff to
submit a return of the summons assigned to the sheriff for service. Thus, one (1) month from the issuance of summons can be considered
"reasonable time" with regard to personal service on the defendant.

Sheriffs are asked to discharge their duties on the service of summons with due care, utmost diligence, and reasonable promptness and speed so as
not to prejudice the expeditious dispensation of justice. Thus, they are enjoined to try their best efforts to accomplish personal service on defendant.
On the other hand, since the defendant is expected to try to avoid and evade service of summons, the sheriff must be resourceful, persevering,
canny, and diligent in serving the process on the defendant.

For substituted service of summons to be available, there must be several attempts by the sheriff to personally serve the summons within a
reasonable period of one (1) month which eventually resulted in failure to prove impossibility of prompt service. "Several attempts" means at
least three (3) tries, preferably on at least two (2) different dates. In addition, the sheriff must cite why such efforts were unsuccessful. It is only
then that impossibility of service can be confirmed or accepted.

(2) Specific Details in the Return -

The sheriff must describe in the Return of Summons the facts and circumstances surrounding the attempted personal service. The efforts made to find
the defendant and the reasons behind the failure must be clearly narrated in detail in the Return. The date and time of the attempts on personal
service, the inquiries made to locate the defendant, the name/s of the occupants of the alleged residence or house of defendant and all other acts
done, though futile, to serve the summons on defendant must be specified in the Return to justify substituted service.

(3) A Person of Suitable Age and Discretion -

If the substituted service will be effected at defendant's house or residence, it should be left with a person of "suitable age and discretion then
residing therein." A person of suitable age and discretion is one who has attained the age of full legal capacity (18 years old) and is considered to
have enough discernment to understand the importance of a summons. "Discretion" is defined as "the ability to make decisions which represent a
responsible choice and for which an understanding of what is lawful, right or wise may be presupposed." Thus, to be of sufficient discretion, such
person must know how to read and understand English to comprehend the import of the summons, and fully realize the need to deliver the
summons and complaint to the defendant at the earliest possible time for the person to take appropriate action. Thus, the person must have the
"relation of confidence" to the defendant, ensuring that the latter would receive or at least be notified of the receipt of the summons. The sheriff must
therefore determine if the person found in the alleged dwelling or residence of defendant is of legal age, what the recipient's relationship with the
defendant is, and whether said person comprehends the significance of the receipt of the summons and his duty to immediately deliver it to the
defendant or at least notify the defendant of said receipt of summons. These matters must be clearly and specifically described in the Return of
Summons.

(4) A Competent Person in Charge -

If the substituted service will be done at defendant's office or regular place of business, then it should be served on a competent person in charge of
the place. Thus, the person on whom the substituted service will be made must be the one managing the office or business of defendant, such as the
president or manager; and such individual must have sufficient knowledge to understand the obligation of the defendant in the summons, its
importance, and the prejudicial effects arising from inaction on the summons. Again, these details must be contained in the Return.

Summary proceedings on first level courts

Rule IV
Small Claims Cases
Section 1. Scope. – This Rule shall govern the procedure in actions before the Metropolitan Trial Courts (MeTCs), Municipal Trial Courts in Cities
(MTCCs), Municipal Trial Courts (MTCs) and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts (MCTCs) for payment or reimbursement of a sum of money where the
value of the claim does not exceed One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00).
Rules on Expedited Procedures in the First Level Courts

SUMMARY PROCEDURE
APPLICABILITY
Section 1. Coverage. – These Rules shall govern the expedited procedures in the Metropolitan Trial Courts (MeTCs), the Municipal Trial Courts in
Cities (MTCCs), the Municipal Trial Courts (MTCs), and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts (MCTCs), for the following cases falling within their
jurisdiction:
A. CIVIL CASES
(1) Summary Procedure Cases, as follows:
(a) Forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases, regardless of the amount of damages or unpaid rentals sought to be recovered. Where attorney’s
fees are awarded, the same shall not exceed One Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱100,000.00).

(b) All civil actions, except probate proceedings, admiralty and maritime actions, and small claims cases falling under Rule IV hereof, where the
total amount of the plaintiff ’s claim does not exceed Two Million Pesos (₱2,000,000.00), exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s
fees, litigation expenses and costs.

(c) Complaints for damages where the claim does not exceed Two Million Pesos (₱2,000,000.00), exclusive of interest and costs.

(d) Cases for enforcement of barangay amicable settlement agreements and arbitration awards where the money claim exceeds One Million Pesos
(₱1,000,000.00), provided that no execution has been enforced by the barangay within six (6) months from the date of the settlement or date of
receipt of the award or from the date the obligation stipulated or adjudged in the arbitration award becomes due and demandable, pursuant to
Section 417, Chapter VII of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as The Local Government Code of 1991.

(e) Cases solely for the revival of judgment of any Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Municipal Trial Court, and Municipal
Circuit Trial Court, pursuant to Rule 39, Section 6 of the Rules of Court.

(f) The civil aspect of a violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (the Bouncing Checks Law), if no criminal action has been instituted therefor. Should a
criminal action be later instituted for the same violation, the civil aspect shall be consolidated with the criminal action and shall be tried and
decided jointly under the Rule on Summary Procedure.
All other cases not included herein shall be governed by the regular rules of procedure.
(2) Small Claims Cases, as defined hereunder, where the claim does not exceed One Million Pesos (₱1,000,000.00), exclusive of interest and costs.
A “small claim” is an action that is purely civil in nature where the claim or relief raised by the plaintiff is solely for the payment or reimbursement
of a sum of money. It excludes actions seeking other claims or reliefs aside from payment or reimbursement of a sum of money and those coupled
with provisional remedies.

The claim or demand may be:

(a) For money owed under any of the following:
1. Contract of Lease;
2. Contract of Loan and other credit accommodations;
3. Contract of Services; or
4. Contract of Sale of personal property, excluding the recovery of the personal property,
unless it is made the subject of a compromise agreement between the parties.
(b) The enforcement of barangay amicable settlement agreements and arbitration awards, where the money claim does not exceed One Million
Pesos (₱1,000,000.00), provided that no execution has been enforced by the barangay within six (6) months from the date of the settlement or date
of receipt of the award or from the date the obligation stipulated or adjudged in the arbitration award becomes due and demandable, pursuant to
Section 417, Chapter VII of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as The Local Government Code of 1991.

B. CRIMINAL CASES
The following criminal cases shall be governed by the Rule on Summary Procedure:
(1) Violations of traffi c laws, rules and regulations;
(2) Violations of the rental law;
(3) Violations of municipal or city ordinances;
(4) Violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (the Bouncing Checks Law); and
(5) All other criminal cases where the penalty prescribed by law for the off ense charged is
imprisonment not exceeding one (1) year, or a fi ne not exceeding Fifty Thousand Pesos
(₱50,000.00), or both, regardless of other imposable penalties, accessory or otherwise,
or of the civil liability arising therefrom. In off enses involving damage to property
through criminal negligence under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, this Rule shall
govern where the imposable fi ne does not exceed One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos
(₱150,000.00).
If the prescribed penalty consists of imprisonment and/or a fi ne, the prescribed imprisonment
shall be the basis for determining the applicable procedure.

All other cases not included herein shall be governed by the regular rules of procedure.
Sec. 2. Non-applicability. – These Rules shall not apply to civil cases where the plaintiff ’s cause of
action is pleaded in the same complaint with another cause of action subject to the regular procedure;
nor to criminal cases where the off ense charged is necessarily related to another criminal case subject
to the regular procedure.

CAUSE OF ACTION

DEFINITION SECTION 2 RULE 2

Is the act or omission by which party violates a right of another.

Section 1 Rule 2 Ordinary Civil Actions- Every ordinary civil action must be based on a cause of action.

Section 3 Rule 2 One for a single cause of action- A party may not institute more than one suit for a single cause of action.

Section 4 Rule 2 Splitting a single cause of action; effect of- If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of
one or a judgement upon the merits in any one is available as a ground for dismissal of the others.

Joinder Section 5 Rule 2 Joinder of causes of action is the assertion of as many

causes of action as a party may have against another in one pleading
alone (Sec. 5, Rule 2, Rules of Court). It is the process of uniting two
or more demands or rights of action in one action (1 C.J.S., Actions §
61).
Illustration: D is the debtor of C for P350,000.00 due on
January 5, 2011. D likewise owes C P350,000.00 due on February
13, 2011. Both debts are evidenced by distinct promissory notes and
incurred for different reasons. D has not paid the debts despite
demand. Each debt is a separate cause of action because each is the
subject of a different transaction. However, under the rule on joinder
of causes of action, C may file a single suit against D for the
collection of both debts, despite the claims being actually separate
causes of action and having arisen out of different transactions.