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That attack triggered a ferocious wave of Saudi and Emirati air strikes
in Yemen, many of which killed civilians. The deadliest, on January
21st, hit a prison in Saada, a northern city. Médecins Sans Frontières, a
medical charity with employees there, said at least 82 people were
killed (pictured). A separate strike on a telecoms facility in Hodeida
disconnected Yemen from the internet for four days.
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Houthi attacks have become common in Saudi Arabia, which shoots
down missiles or drones almost every week. This was the first time
the Houthis had successfully targeted the uae. It reflects their fury at
an abrupt battlefield reversal in Yemen, engineered by the Emiratis.
And it presents the uae with a difficult choice: to back off, allowing
the Houthis to capture an important city, or to risk more attacks that
could inflict real damage on its economy.
For more than a year the main front line in Yemen has been around
the city of Marib, 120km (75 miles) east of Sana’a, the capital. It is
home to 3m people, one-third of them displaced from other regions,
and to Yemen’s largest oil and gas reserves. The Houthis have thrown
waves of fighters at the city, including children. Casualties have been
horrific, but they have slowly worn down the city’s defenders.
The uae had little to do with this. In 2019 it withdrew most of its
troops from a war it had come to see as a quagmire. Emiratis had
fought largely in south Yemen, which was an independent country
until 1990 and retains a secessionist streak. The Houthis have little
support there. For a time it seemed the Emiratis were pursuing de
facto partition: they would maintain a sphere of influence in the
south, while the Saudi-backed and internationally recognised
government struggled against the Houthis in the north.
were swift: they pushed the Houthis out of Shabwa and went on to
seize bits of Marib province as well. Battlefield victories in Yemen are
not always durable. Still, the Houthis have suffered a big setback in the
past few weeks. Instead of a seemingly inexorable march to seize
Marib, they now face a new threat on their southern flank.
The attacks on Abu Dhabi were an ultimatum to the uae: halt your
advance or face further bombardment. The physical danger is modest.
Houthi missiles and drones cannot carry big payloads, and the uae
has advanced air defences—bolstered by America, which has
thousands of troops at al-Dhafra, an air base south of Abu Dhabi (they
fired their own air-defence systems at the Houthi missiles on January
24th).
The reputational risk is far greater. The uae markets itself as an oasis
of stability, seemingly immune to the region’s conflicts, even as it has
pursued an aggressive foreign policy that embroiled it in them.
Investors view it as a safe place to start a business or buy property. The
22m tourists who visited in 2019 had little to worry about beyond
sunburn or some bad oysters at brunch. Continued attacks would
jeopardise that image.
uae were made possible by Iranian support. The drones and missiles
aimed at Abu Dhabi were probably based on Iranian designs.
Now the uae must decide whether to press forward or pull back in
Yemen. It could reach a deal with the Houthis to keep the Giants
Brigades in Shabwa as a defensive force. If Marib falls, however,
Shabwa would become more vulnerable. The Houthis could also force
the uae’s hand. They have threatened strikes on Dubai, the uae’s
business and tourism hub; on January 25th a spokesman for the group
warned visitors to avoid Expo 2020, the world’s fair that opened in
October.
This article appeared in the Middle East & Africa section of the print edition under
the headline "UAVs over the UAE"
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