In this case the defendant a returning officer, wrongfully refused to register, a duly tendered vote of

the plaintiff, who was a qualified voter. The candidate for whom the vote was sought to be tendered
was elected and no loss was suffered by the rejection of the plaintiff’s vote.

HELD, that nevertheless an action lay. The action was allowed on the ground that the violation of
plaintiff’s statutory right was an injury for which he must have a remedy and was actionable without
proof of pecuniary damage.

The petitioner an MLA of J&K was wrongfully detained by the police while he was going to attend the
Assembly session. He was not produced before the Magistrate within the requisite period. As a
consequence of this the member was deprived of his constitutional right to attend the Assemble
Session. There was also violation of his right to personal liberty under Article 21.

By the time the petition was decided by the Suprement Court, Bhim Singh has been released, but by
way of consequential relief exemplary damages amounting to Rs. 50K were awarded to him.

In this case a school master setup a rival school to that of the plaintiff’s school with the result that
the plaintiff had to reduce their fess in order to prevent decrease in number of students. He
therefore filed a suit against the defendant for damages.

It was held that the plaintiff had no legal remedy for the loss suffered by him because there was no
infringement of any legal right of the plaintiff.
In this case the plaintiff constructed some shops on the old foundation of a building without
obtaining necessary sanctions from the Municipal authorities. The defendants (Municipal
authorities) demolished the constructions.

It has been held that the demolition of an unauthorized building is not injuria to the plaintiff. In such
cases he cannot get any compensation even if he has suffered heavy loss.

Mayor of Bradford Corporation Vs. Pickles (intercepting underground water)

The defendant by making excavations on his own land intentionally intercepted the underground
water that used to flow to the reservoir of the plaintiff. It was held that the injury inflicted by the
defendant on the plaintiff was no legal injury and, therefore, no action lay, although the sole motive
of the defendant was to coerce the plaintiffs.

In B. Govindarajulu Chetty Vs M.L.A Govindaraja in this case, the owner handed his lorry to the
defendant's shop for repairs. After repairing, the employee of the shop drove it and there an
accident occurred. It was held that by the Madras High Court the owner of a lorry cannot be liable
vicariously because here the owner of the shop is not a servant of the lorry owner, he is just an
independent contractor.
Shyama Devi (The respondent) was a savings account holder with SBI (the appellant). The
Respondent was introduced and encouraged to open an account with the Appellant Bank by her
friend Kapil Deo Shukla, who was an employee of the bank at the time. Subsequently, the
Respondent began depositing money into her account. Some of the deposits into her accounts were
given to Kapil Deo Shukla, under the belief that he shall deposit them. Upon suspicion by the
Respondent’s husband, the bank was requested to clarify the deposits into the account. The bank
claimed only a deposit of Rs. 1932 had been ratified and accepted, while the other deposits were
denied. Consequently, the respondent filed a suit in the trial court claiming the remaining amount.

The court however HELD, K.S Shukla’s embezzlement of funds was an act that was done outside the
designated responsibilities vested in him, furthermore, the court concurred with the bank’s
argument of K.D. Shukla’s actions being in his capacity and being acts that were beyond his course of
employment.
Beard Vs. London Omnibus Co. Ltd.

The conductor of a bus took it upon himself to turn the bus around at the terminus, in the absence
of the driver. In doing so, he negligently injured the plaintiff.

The plaintiff sued for damages against the employers of the bus conductor.

The employers were found not to be liable for the conductor’s actions because his job was not to
drive the bus but rather to collect fares, and the act in question fell completely outside the scope of
his employment.

The task of driving was performed without authorization, and it went beyond the ambit of the
employer’s vicarious liability. Because it was not a part of the conductor’s duty to drive the omnibus.
He was doing something outside the scope of what he was employed to do. And hence, it couldn’t be
said negligence in the course of his employment.

In the case of Limpus v London General Omnibus Co., A bus driver was given explicit written
instructions not to race with or obstruct other buses. The driver disobeyed the order and while he
was racing with another bus, a collision occurred.

An action was brought against the bus company for the reckless and improper conduct of its driver.

The bus company attempted to avoid liability by arguing that it had strictly prohibited its drivers from
obstructing the movement of other buses.

Therefore, even though the driver had disobeyed the order, the Court decided that he was acting
within the scope of his employment. The employers were held liable because, at the time of the
accident, the driver was nonetheless doing what he was employed to do, i.e., he was acting within
the scope of his employment. It was immaterial whether his act was prohibited.

It was believed that the driver was, though in an improper manner, promoting his employer’s
passenger service business by seeking to disturb another bus.
Halls V. Brooklands Auto Racing Club

Defendant has a motor racing track where races are hosted. The track was oval-shaped, a long,
straight stretch, with railings and barricades for safety purposes. Spectators can come to watch the
race by buying tickets and getting a seat in the seating area. Some people preferred to stand along
the railing.

On one fine day when the race was going on, two cars were very close to each other and travelling at
100 miles per hour. After some time, the two cars collided with each other, and it shot into the air,
fell into the railing, and bounced in the sitting area, thereby killing two spectators and injuring
others. No such accident had occurred before in the history of such sports.

One of the spectators (the plaintiff) who had also come to watch the races at Brooklands auto racing
club filed an action, alleging that the premises had not been adequately safe for spectators and that
inviting spectators to witness such a dangerous sport without providing any notices or warnings is a
breach of contract and damages must be provided to the injured persons.

In this case, doctrine of voluntary non-fit injuria was applied in this case. Considering that this was
the first time that such an injury occurred, the court decided that there was no negligence on the
part of the defendant's company, as in high-risk games such accidents are common. The plaintiff had
consented to the probable risks involved while purchasing the tickets for the event, and it was also
assumed that he had knowledge of the risks involved in these games.

In the case of Padmavati v. Dugganaika, the plaintiffs had asked for a lift in the jeep of the
defendants and while travelling in it one of the screws of the wheel of the jeep fell out, as a result,
the jeep crashed and it caused the death of one of the plaintiffs. In the case, the Court held that the
defence of volenti non fit injuria will apply and thus the defendants were not liable because by sitting
in the jeep the plaintiffs had assumed the risk of being injured in an accident.
In R V. William the defendant was the teenaged complainant's singing teacher. He had sex
with her, telling her that his actions were a method of remedying her breathing and improving
her singing. The girl agreed, believing that she was being subject to a medical or surgical
intervention. The defendant was convicted of rape.
In the case of Lakshmi Rajan v. Malar Hospital, a 40-year-old married woman noticed a
lump in her breast but this pain does not affect her uterus. After the operation, she saw that
her uterus has been removed without any justification. The hospital authorities were liable for
this act.

In Smith v. Baker & sons, (1891) AC 325, the plaintiff was an employee of the defendant
and the site where he used to work had a crane which carried rocks over their heads. The
plaintiff had also complained to the defendant about it. One day the plaintiff was injured
because of these rocks falling on him and thus he sued the defendant for damages. It was
held that the defendant was liable and had to pay damages to the plaintiff because the
plaintiff had consented to the danger of the job but not to the lack of care.
In the case of Haynes v. Harwood (1935), 1 KB 146, the servant of the defendant brought
two horses in the town near a police station and left them to do some other work. The horses
were upset by the children and they broke free, seeing them in rage the plaintiff who was a
police officer went to stop the horses and in doing so he got injured and brought a case
against the owner for damages. The court held the defendant liable because the defence of
volenti non-fit injuria did not apply in a rescue case.

Bird (plaintiff) sued Holbrook (defendant) for damages for his medical expenses and
injuries. He trespassed in the defendant’s garden in search of his peafowl but had no
intention of stealing anything. Unfortunately, his trespass activated the hidden weapon,
and he was shot, suffering serious injuries above the knee.
 The issue of the case was whether Holbrook had the authority to place dangerous traps
on his property without a warning sign.

The court held that the defendant intended to harm thieves rather than prevent stealing,
which made a solid argument in favor of the plaintiff. Anyone who sets a trap that can
cause harm without warning must pay the victims for all damages. Therefore, the
defendant is liable for any injuries resulting from his failure to post a warning sign.

In Stanley v. Powell, Powell who was the member of a shooting party fired at a pheasant
but the pellet from his gun glanced of a tree and accidently wounded Stanley another
member of the party. It was held that Powell was not liable. If the act is wilful or negligent,
the defendant would be liable.
In 1866, the defendants, who were expressmen engaged in carrying packages between
New York and California, received at New York a box containing nitro-glycerine to be
carried to California. There was nothing in the appearance of the box tending to excite any
suspicion of the character of its contents. It was received and carried in the usual course of
business, no information being asked or given as to its contents. On arriving at San
Francisco, California, its contents were leaking and resembled sweet oil. The box was then
taken for examination, as was the custom with the defendants when any box carried by them
appeared to be damaged, to the premises occupied by them, which were leased from the
plaintiff. Whilst a servant of the defendants, by their direction, was attempting to open the
box, the nitro-glycerine exploded, injuring the premises occupied by them and other
premises leased by the plaintiff to, and occupied by, other parties. The defendants had no
knowledge of, and no reason to suspect, the dangerous character of the contents. They
repaired the injuries to the premises occupied by them. Held that they were not liable for
the damage caused by the accident to the premises occupied by other parties.
In Nichols v Marsland, a defendant’s ornamental pools, formed by damming a stream on
their land, breached during an unforeseeable rainfall, damaging a neighbouring property.
The plaintiff sought damages, claiming the defendant’s liability. The core issues encompass
liability for water escape, the applicability of the “act of God” defence, and the defendant’s
duty of care.

The plaintiff argued that the defendant’s voluntary water storage created a hazard, while the
defendant maintained no negligence and cited the exceptional rainfall as an “act of God.”
The court in Nichols v Marsland ruled in favour of the defendant, finding the rainfall
constituted an “act of God,” absolving them from liability due to their lack of duty comparable
to precedent cases.
A company by the name of “The Plymouth, the Devonport and District Tramways” company
released its brochure, highlighting that the tramways company will now have the right to use
the mechanically powered or steam powered trams, thereby, replacing the old horse-
powered trams. On reading the advertisement and the claims issued by the company, Sir
Henry Peek (plaintiff) bought the shares of the company believing that the company now has
the right to use mechanical power. The permission to use the steam-powered trams was
denied by the “Board of Trade”. In fact, the company never had such rights, because the
right to use the mechanical powered trams were subjected to be given by the “Board of
Trade”. The Plymouth company had actually applied to receive the permission for the use of
steam powered trams and believing that they would easily get the approval to operate the
steam-powered trams as it was just a simple formality, the company published the
advertisement in their prospectus to invite people to purchase the shares of the company.
When the board of trades turned down the company’s permission, the shareholders of the
company led by the plaintiff, who had purchased the shares of the company relying on the
statements and claims made by the company bought a suit of fraudulent misrepresentation
and deceit against the company (defendant).
The “House of Lords” held that a person could be made liable for the fraud and
misstatement if there was a dishonesty on his part and he deliberately invites people to enter
into a contractual obligation. A plaintiff in order to sue a person in the element of fraudulent
misrepresentation must prove that there was dishonesty on the part of the defendant. The
shareholder’s claim in the case “Derry v. Peek” was rejected because they could not prove
that there was a lack of honesty on the part of directors of the company.
In the case of Leigh VS Gladstone it was held that the forcible feeding of a person who was
hunger-striking in a prison served as a good defence for the tort of battery.

In Cope Vs Sharpe, The defendant committed certain acts of trespass on the plaintiff’s land
in order to prevent fire from spreading to his master’s land. The fire never in fact caused the
damage and would not have done so even if the defendant had not taken the precautions he
took. But the danger of the fire spreading to the master’s land was real and imminent. Held:
The defendant was not liable as the risk to his master’s property was real and imminent and
a reasonable person in his position would have done what the defendant did.

In Vaughan v. Taff Valde Rail Co., sparks from an engine of the respondent’s railway company were
authorized to run the railway, set fire to the appellant’s woods on the adjoining land. It was held that
since they did not do anything which was prohibited by the statute and took due care and
precaution, they were not liable.
In Smith v. London and South Western Railway Co., the servants of a railway company negligently
left the trimmings of hedges near the railway line. The sparks from the engine set fire to those
hedges and due to high winds, it got spread to the plaintiff’s cottage which was not very far from the
line. The court held that the railway authority was negligent in leaving the grass hedges near the
railway line and the plaintiff was entitled to claim compensation for the loss suffered.
The defendant threw a squib, which is a small, lit firework, into a busy marketplace with lots of
people and stalls. To protect themselves and avoid damage, the squib was thrown on by two other
people. When it landed near to the complainant, it exploded and caused injury to his face. He later
lost the use of one of his eyes. The original thrower, the defendant, was charged with assault and
trespass.

The defendant was found liable for trespass, and he appealed this decision. The defendant argued
that the injury to the complainant was not caused by his actions; it was not a direct act, as others
threw the squib on. The issue in the appeal was whether the defendant throwing the squib caused
the injury or whether other people broke this chain of causation, and the injury was caused by novus
actus interveniens.

This case has become known as the Famous Squib case. The court dismissed the appeal; the injury to
the complainant was the direct and unlawful act of the defendant who originally threw and intended
to throw the squib. The other people were not ‘free agents’ in this situation and threw on the squib
for their own safety and this was justifiable. The throwing on was classed as a continuation of the
defendant’s action, which was intended. Whatever followed this was part of the defendant’s original
act.
Re Polemis and Furness, Withy & Co. Ltd. Employees of the defendant had been loading cargo into
the underhold of a ship when they negligently dropped a large plank of wood. As it fell, the wood
knocked against something else, which created a spark which served to ignite the surrounding petrol
fumes, ultimately resulting in the substantial destruction of the ship. At first instance (arbitration), it
was held that the reasonable unforeseeability of the outcome meant that the defendant was not
liable for the cost of the ship.

The Court of Appeal adopted a strict liability approach to causation and assessing liability here and
subsequently held that the defendant was liable for all of the consequences that had resulted from
their negligent actions. The fact that the extent of these consequences was neither subjectively
appreciated nor objectively foreseeable was deemed irrelevant to such a determination. Notably, this
authority would go on to be replaced in the case of Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v Morts Dock and
Engineering Co Ltd

The crew members of the Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd were working on a ship, when they failed to
turn off one of the furnace taps. This caused oil to leak from the ship into the Sydney Harbour. Morts
Dock & Engineering Co (The Wagon Mound) owned the wharf, which they used to perform repairs
on other ships. The leaking oil on the water surface drifted to the site where Morts were welding
metal. A supervisor enquired to find out whether the oil was flammable, which he was assured that
it was not. However, a spark from welding and mixed with debris, caught fire from the spilt oil and
this caused a fire to spread rapidly. This caused significant damage to Mort’s wharf.

The court held that Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd could not be held liable to pay compensation for the
damage to the wharf. This case disapproved the direct consequence test in Re Polemis and
established the test of remoteness of damage. This asks whether the damage would be reasonably
foreseeable. In this case, the damage caused to the wharf by the fire and the furnace oil being set
alight could not be foreseen by a reasonable person.
In Rylands v Fletcher (1868) LR 3 HL 330, the defendants employed independent contractors to
construct a reservoir on their land. The contractors found disused mines when digging but failed to
seal them properly. They filled the reservoir with water. As a result, water flooded through the
mineshafts into the plaintiff’s mines on the adjoining property. The Court of Exchequer Chamber held
the defendant liable, and the House of Lords affirmed their decision.

It was decided by Blackburn J, who delivered the judgment of the Court of Exchequer Chamber, and
the House of Lords, that to succeed in this tort the claimant must show:

1. That the defendant brought something onto his land;

2. That the defendant made a “non-natural use” of his land (per Lord Cairns, LC);
3. The thing was something likely to do mischief if it escaped;
4. The thing did escape and cause damage.
As seen in the case laws above, IC is not considered as the Act of third party.

In this case, an explosive made out of a coconut shell filled with explosive substances, instead of
rising in the sky & exploding there, ran at a tangent, fell amidst the crowd & explodes, thereby
causing serious injuries to the respondent. One of the questions for consideration before the Kerala
High Court was whether the appellants, who had engaged an independent contractor to attend to
the exhibition of fireworks, would be liable. It was held that the rule in Rylands v Fletcher would be
applicable because the explosive is an “extra hazardous” object. The persons using such an object are
liable even for the negligence of their independent contractor.
In the English case of Crowhurst v Amersham Burial Board (1878) 4, branches of a tree, whose
leaves and branches were poisonous to stock, projected over the neighbour's land and were eaten by
the neighbour's horse, which later died from poisoning. This was found to constitute nuisance.

Read v Lyons. The claimant was employed by the defendant in their factory which made explosives
for the Ministry of Supply. During the course of her employment an explosion occurred which killed a
man and injured others including the claimant. There was no evidence that negligence had caused
the explosion. The defendants were not held liable.

Sochacki v Sas

The defendant was a lodger in the claimant’s house. He lit an open fire in his room and then went
out. Unfortunately, a spark jumped from the fire and set the room alight. The fire spread to the rest
of the house and the claimant brought an action against the defendant based on liability arising
under Rylands v Fletcher.

Held:

The defendant was not liable. Whilst the fire was likely to do mischief if it escaped, the use of an
open fire in the claimant’s fireplace was not considered a non-natural use of land.

In Noble v. Harrison a branch of a tree fell on a car and the car was smashed. It was an act of God
and hence the owner of the tree was not liable.
As the facts of the case go, a servant of the plaintiff-company was proceeding on a highway in
Calcutta, driving a carriage which was drawn by a pair of horses belonging to the plaintiff. He met
with an accident, caused by negligence of the servants of the Government. For the loss caused by the
accident, the plaintiff claimed damages against the Secretary of State for India.

The principle of this case holds that if any act was done in the exercise of sovereign functions, the
East India Company or the State would not be liable. It drew quite a clear distinction between the
sovereign and non-sovereign functions of the state.
Lokumal, a temporary employee of the State of Rajasthan was employed as a motor driver (on
probation) of a government jeep car under the Collector of Udaipur. While driving the car back from
the workshop after the repairs were done, defendant knocked down one Jagdishlal, who was walking
on the footpath by the side of the public road. Jagdishlal was severely injured and his skull and
backbone were fractured. Three days later, he died in the hospital. The Plaintiffs, i.e., widow of
Jagdishlal and his daughter aged 3 years, through her mother as next friend filed a suit for damages
for tort against Lokumal and the State of Rajasthan claiming compensation of Rs. 25,000 from both
defendants.

The Supreme Court said that it is clear from the findings of the courts below that the tortious act was
committed by State in circumstances wholly dissociated from the exercise of sovereign powers.

 UP Police constables took into custody Ralia Ram on suspicion of being in possession of
stolen property.
 His property, including gold, silver and seers, was seized and kept in malkhana (police
custody) till the disposal of case. Soon, he was released on bail and they returned only
the seized silver to him.
  When police officers refused to return seized gold, he filed the present suit against the
respondent claiming that the gold seized from him should either be returned to him, or
its value should be ordered to be paid to him along with interest by damages and future
interest.
 They contended they were not liable to return either the gold or pay the money value of
gold with interest. The respondent accused Mohammad Amir, who was then the head
constable and malkhana’s in-charge, that he flew away to Pakistan with the gold and
some other cash.
 SC held the State was not liable as police officers did the act in the exercise of sovereign
powers. By holding the power to arrest a person, to search for him, and to seize his
property are powers conferred on the police officers by statute as sovereign powers.
 Sovereign power is a legal doctrine by which the State is immune from civil suit or form
criminal prosecution. It adapted this archaic concept of sovereign power from British
jurisprudence that “the king can do no wrong”.

Saheli v. Commissioner of Police, 1989, is the case where a 9 year old boy died after being beaten by
the Indian Police. The Court directed a payment of Rs 75,000 to the mother of the deceased child
and permitted the Delhi Administration to take appropriate steps for the recovery of the amount
paid as compensation or part thereof from the officers responsible for this dastardly act.

This was among the path breaking judgments that allowed for compensation in the event of
excesses by the lawless Indian police force.

In Nilabati Behera Vs. State of Orissa, a letter was sent by Smt. Nilabati Behera to the Supreme Court
stated that her twenty-two-year-old son, Suman Behera had died in police custody after being
inflicted with several injuries.

The honorable court took suo moto action and converted it into a writ petition under Article 32 of
the Indian constitution.

The petitioner claimed compensation for the violation of her son’s fundamental right to life
guaranteed under Article 21.

The Orissa police had arrested Suman Behara for investigation involving the offence of theft and he
was detained at the police outpost.
The very next day, his dead body was found near the railway track. The lacerations on his body
indicated an unnatural death.

The Apex Court held the Petitioner awarded compensation of Rs.1,50,000 and a sum of Rs.10,000 to
be paid to the Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee.

The Supreme Court also ordered the State of Orissa to initiate criminal proceedings against those
who killed Suman Behara.

The petitioner, Rudul Sah, was arrested for the murder of his wife. After serving his sentence, he was
acquitted by the Sessions Court in Muzaffarpur, Bihar, on June 3, 1968. However, on October 16,
1982, he was released from prison following a 14-year sentence. The petitioner sought
compensation for his wrongful detention by filing a writ petition of habeas corpus with the Supreme
Court under Article 32. He also requested state-funded medical treatment and an ex-gratia payment
for his recovery.

The Court granted the petition, ruling that the petitioner’s incarceration in prison following his
acquittal was completely unlawful.

Furthermore, even if he was mentally ill at the time he was acquitted, he could not be imprisoned for
an extended period. The reason is straightforward. Even a lunatic has legal rights during the trial
process. The court found the state’s action to be harsh and devoid of factual support. As a result, the
court determined that the petitioner’s detention was irrational.

For e.g. a lifeguard did not save a drowning person would be termed nonfeasance
Misfeasance, a surgeon mistakenly left scissors inside the patient. Or Driving a car at 50 Km/Hr in a
congested part of the city where speed limit was 15 Km/Hr.

Malfeasance e.g. A person driving a car without a license and causing an accident. This was an act
which he was under a legal duty not to do.
Also known as the "Paisley Snail" or "Snail in the Bottle" case, the case involved Mrs May Donoghue
drinking a bottle of ginger beer in a café in Paisley, Renfrewshire. Unknown to her or anybody else, a
decomposed snail was in the bottle. She fell ill, and subsequently sued the ginger beer manufacturer,
Mr Stevenson. The House of Lords held that the manufacturer owed a duty of care to her, which
was breached because it was reasonably foreseeable that failure to ensure the product's safety
would lead to harm to consumers. There was also a sufficiently proximate relationship between
consumers and product manufacturers.

In Bolton Vs Stone The claimant was injured after a ball from a neighbouring cricket pitch flew into
her outside her home. The cricket field was arranged such that it was protected by a 17-foot gap
between the ground and the top of the surrounding fence. Balls had been known to get over the
fence and land in people’s yards, but this was rare, making the strike which hit the claimant
exceptional. The claimant sued the cricket club in the tort of negligence for her injuries.

The House of Lords held that the cricket club was not in breach of their duty. In this case, the
likelihood of the harm was very low, and erecting a fence any higher than the defendant had already
done would be impractical. The cricket club was also providing a social useful service to the
community. A reasonable cricket club would have, therefore, not behaved any differently.

In Bourhill Vs. Young, Mr Young had been negligently riding his motorcycle and was responsible for a
collision with car in which he himself suffered fatal injuries. At the time of the crash, Mrs Bourhill (C)
was in the process of leaving a tram about 50 feet away. C heard the crash and, after Mr Young’s
body had been removed from the scene, she approached and witnessed the immediate aftermath. C
was 8 months pregnant at the time of the incident and later gave birth to a stillborn child. C
subsequently brought an action against Mr Young’s estate, claiming she had suffered nervous shock,
stress and sustained loss due to the negligence of D.

D was not liable for any psychiatric harm that C might have suffered as a result of the accident. It was
not foreseeable that C would suffer psychiatric harm as a result of D negligently causing a loud traffic
accident, nor was C sufficiently proximate to the scene of the crash itself. D, therefore, could owe no
duty of care to C.

Plaintiff sued to recover for damages sustained when a water plug installed by the Defendants
sprung a leak and doused the Plaintiff’s house. The plug had been installed 25 years prior to the
incident, which was caused by extraordinarily cold weather. Prior to the incident, there had been no
problems with the plug.

No. Verdict was entered for Defendants. No evidence was entered showing any acts or failures to act
on the part of Defendants such as could comprise negligence. The evidence showed that Defendants
routinely took precautions against cold weather, and that only due to a particularly and
unforeseeably cold winter did any damage occur. This was properly characterized as an accident, not
as negligence.
The claimant was standing on a station platform purchasing a ticket. Whilst she was doing so a train
stopped in the station and two men ran to catch it. One of the men tripped and whilst attempting to
help the fallen man, members of the railway staff caused a box of fireworks to fall and the fireworks
to explode. The explosion caused a set of scales to fall at the other end of the platform which in turn
injured the claimant. The court at first instance found in favour of the claimant, and the judgment
was affirmed on appeal. The defendant appealed to the US Supreme Court.

It was held that the defendant was not liable to the claimant. In this respect, it was held that a
claimant must, in order to bring a claim in negligence, demonstrate that there has been some
violation of her personal rights. Whilst it was acknowledged that the guards who caused the package
of fireworks to fall were negligent in doing so, it was not considered that they were negligent to the
claimant. There was no indication that the content of the package was fireworks or that dropping it
would cause it to explode. Furthermore, the claimant was standing some distance away from the
package. Therefore, it was considered that if the defendant was held liable to the claimant in these
circumstances, a defendant would be liable in any circumstance for almost any loss.

The plaintiff was walking in a public street past the defendant’s shop when a barrel of flour fell upon
him from a window above the shop, and seriously injured him. Held sufficient primâ facie evidence
of negligence for the jury, to cast on the defendant the onus of proving that the accident was not
caused by his negligence.
A nuisance is a form of tort which can be defined as unlawful interference with the peaceful
enjoyment of one’s rights. In the present case, Dr. Ram Raj Singh who runs a clinic of his own
suffered some form of unlawful interference due to a construction brick grinding machine by the
defendant named Babulal. Dr Ram Raj Singh was of the view that he has suffered loss because of
the reduction in the number of clients due to constant noise and sound pollution being caused by
the machine. On the other hand, the defendant was of the view that he had taken sufficient
measures in reducing the pollution caused by the machine. The case is mainly based on the issue
that whether Dr Ram Raj Singh has suffered any substantial injury to grant an injunction.

The Hon’ble Court decided in the favour of the plaintiff and a permanent injunction was issued
against the defendant.

The claimant was the owner of a large country house with over a thousand acres of land. This land
was close to a copper smelting factory which had long been in operation. The smelting factory
discharged noxious gases as a result of its operation, which were considered to be a normal part of
the smelting operation. As a result, trees on the claimant’s land were damaged by the fumes and
noxious gases. The claimant sued in nuisance.
The claim was allowed. It was no defence to say that the claimant ‘came to the nuisance’ and the
defendant could not be said to have acquired a right through prescription to continue to discharge
noxious fumes. Whilst smelting and the discharge of these fumes was not in itself unlawful, and in a
locality in which this was to be expected there could be no nuisance.

The defendants operated a factory which made paper boxes. This required the factory to be
continually warm and dry to ensure that the paper boxes were in good condition. The claimant
rented the ground floor and used this area to store special brown paper. The heat from the
defendant’s factory damaged this brown paper, which was unusually sensitive to heat, and the
claimant sued in nuisance.

The claim was dismissed as there was no nuisance. The conditions in the factory were not
particularly unusual, and the claimant’s operation of the factory in these conditions was not
unlawful. The defendants had acted as reasonable tenants of their property. It had been shown
that the heat from the factory would not have damaged ordinary paper. Instead the defendant’s
brown paper happened to be unusually sensitive to the heat, and it was this which caused the
damage rather than anything that the defendants had done wrong. Accordingly, this could not be
considered a nuisance caused by the defendants. Where one carries on an unusually delicate trade,
they cannot then complain because they are injured by the defendant’s carrying on their lawful
business on their property if this would not have injured anything but an unusually delicate trade.
Mellish and Cox were two merry-go-round owners who lived near Lambton, the two owners were
competing for business and a nuisance claim was bought against them both.

In cases where the actionable offense is the aggregate of two or more smaller offenses that know of
each other’s existence, then each is liable for the remedy against the aggregate complaint.
Therefore, in this case, although the true nuisance is the combination of both organs, both of them
must cease their playing when the injunction is granted, even if one might not be loud enough to
create an actionable offence. Each defendant must be restrained in respect of his own share of the
offence.

Usha Ben V. Bhagyalaxmi Chitra Mandir

In 1970s a film was released ‘Jai Santoshi Maa'. X filed case and demanded that ban should be
imposed on the film's release because the film has hurt his emotions and religion. It was said that in
the film the goddess of hindu religion has been potrayed wrongfully due to which he has been hurt.
Judgement: court said that X may have suffered damages due to the movie but her no legal right has
been violated and therefore no legal remedies were given.
A ticket checker of railway asking for the identity proof and other documents as a part of his duty is
no defamation, as he has not published any defamatory statement.

The claimant was known

as the wife of a well-
known race-horse
owner and ex-General of
the Mexican Army.
The claimant and her
husband did not live
together. However,
they met each other very
often at her workplace.
The newspaper
wrote an article with a
photo of the husband with
another woman
labelled as Miss X.
Furthermore, the article
was implying that they
were engaged.
As a result, the claimant
argued that the publication
in the
newspaper of a
photograph of her
husband with a woman
labelled
as Miss X, caused damage
to her in the way that it
was intended
to imply that her husband
was living with her
immorally.
The claimant was known
as the wife of a well-
known race-horse
owner and ex-General of
the Mexican Army.
The claimant and her
husband did not live
together. However,
they met each other very
often at her workplace.
The newspaper
wrote an article with a
photo of the husband with
another woman
labelled as Miss X.
Furthermore, the article
was implying that they
were engaged.
As a result, the claimant
argued that the publication
in the
newspaper of a
photograph of her
husband with a woman
labelled
as Miss X, caused damage
to her in the way that it
was intended
to imply that her husband
was living with her
immorally.
The claimant was known
as the wife of a well-
known race-horse
owner and ex-General of
the Mexican Army.
The claimant and her
husband did not live
together. However,
they met each other very
often at her workplace.
The newspaper
wrote an article with a
photo of the husband with
another woman
labelled as Miss X.
Furthermore, the article
was implying that they
were engaged.
As a result, the claimant
argued that the publication
in the
newspaper of a
photograph of her
husband with a woman
labelled
as Miss X, caused damage
to her in the way that it
was intended
to imply that her husband
was living with her
immorally.
Cassidy Vs Daily Mirror Papers Ltd. The claimant was known as the lawfully wedded wife of a famous
race-horse owner. The claimant and her husband lived separately but he often visited her at her
workplace. The defendant newspaper published a photograph of the claimant’s husband with a
woman labelled as Miss X, to whom – as alleged by the attached article – he was engaged.

Issues: The claimant argued that the publication caused damage to her in that it was intended to
imply that her husband was living with her immorally.
The Court of Appeal held, affirming the lower court’s decision, that the publication in question was
capable of constituting defamation.

 The defendants were publishers of a newspaper. They published a defamatory article of a person
named ‘Artemus Jones’, who they thought to be fictional, having an affair.
 The claimant, who happened to be named Artemus Jones, sued in defamation.
 The Court of Appeal decided in favour of the claimant.
 The defendants appealed on the basis that they had no intention for the words to apply to the
claimant as they were not even aware of his existence.

A person charged with libel cannot defend himself by shewing that he intended in his own breast not
to defame, or that he intended not to defame the plaintiff, if in fact he did both. He has nonetheless
imputed something disgraceful and has nonetheless injured the plaintiff.

The first respondent wrote letters to his wife who is the daughter c the appellant. The letters
contained defamatory imputations concerning the appellant. The letters were handed over to
the appellant and he filed a complaint for defamation against the first respondent. The
Magistrate held that a communication between spouses of a matter defamatory of another did
not amount to publication and that no evidence could be given of it under Section 122 of the
Evidence Act, 1872, against the first respondent, and discharged him.

In Radheshyam Tiwari v Eknath (AIR 1985 Bom 285) the defendant who was the editor of a local
Marathi Weekly published a series of articles mentioning that the plaintiff, who was a BDO, issued
false certificates, accepted bribe, adopted corrupt and illegal means to mint money and was a
'Mischief Monger'. In an action for defamation, the defendant pleaded all three defences. The
defence of Justification was discarded as truth of facts mentioned could not be proved. The
defence of Fair Comment was not accessible because there was a statement of fact, rather than an
expression of opinion. The defence of qualified privileges could also be not availed because the
publications were mala fide.

McQuire v Western Morning News Co Ltd: CA 1903

The paper had carried an article with a swingeing condemnation of a musical. It defended the
defamation action claiming fair comment.
Held: Collins MR said that there was no evidence of actual malice, no personal imputations and no
allegations of fact. In these circumstances, if comment was to be ‘fair’ it had to be relevant and not
such as to disclose in itself actual malice.
In the case of Leigh VS Gladstone it was held that the forcible feeding of a person who was hunger-
striking in a prison served as a good defence for the tort of battery.

Assault Cases
Stephens v. Myers [1830]
EWCA KB J37
In a parish council meeting,
the meeting voted to have the
defendant ejected. He refused,
and advanced towards the
chairman waving his clenched
fist saying he would ‘rather
throw
him from the chair’. He was
stopped before getting within
striking distances but the
chairman sued for assault.
HELD - the claim succeeded.
Tindal CJ said: ‘It is not every
threat, when there is no actual
personal violence, that
constitutes an assault, there
must, in all cases, be the
means of
carrying that threat into effect.’
The claimant was chairing a meeting at a local parish. The defendant sat at the other end of the
table. The discussion became very heated. The defendant got out of his chair and told the claimant
that he would ‘rather pull the chairman out of the chair, than be turned out of the room’. He then
advanced on the claimant shaking his fist. Witnesses thought that the defendant’s intent was to hit
the claimant. However, he was stopped by the churchwarden before he got near enough to strike.

The claimant sued the defendant for assault. The defendant argued that it was not an assault
because he had no power to carry out any threat.

Jones (Defendant) prohibited Bird (Plaintiff) from moving in the direction he wished to go. Plaintiff
was free to remain where he was, or move in any other direction but the one direction obstructed by
Defendant. Plaintiff sued Defendant for false imprisonment.
The Supreme Court held that obstructing a person from moving in one direction does not constitute
false imprisonment when all other directions are open, as no physical force or restraint was used
against them.
Therefore, the defendant’s act did not constitute false imprisonment, and the appeal was denied.