Europe's New Populism

Author(s): Anthony Hartley

Source: The National Interest , Winter 1992/93, No. 30 (Winter 1992/93), pp. 37-40
Published by: Center for the National Interest

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/42896825

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 Europe's New Populism

rural population of the West and South with

mistrust of Washington politicians and Wall
RECENT
RECENT clarity Europe
clarity Europe
howhowhavefarEVENTS
thosefarwho have
shown in inshown
those
ride withridesome
who with Western some in Street bankers who were thought to be too
Mercedes to international gatherings have far removed, both geographically and in
erred in their view of politics as a rational habits of mind, either to care for, or be
activity to be neatly programmed by them- affected by, the plight of dirt farmers.
selves. A revolt against the political class in American populism, therefore, derived
France and Italy, acute xenophobia in from the impact of economic hardship on
Germany, the destruction of a consensus those who, unable to understand what had
regarding economic policy in Britain - all hit them, concluded that "they," the men of
these disturbances seem to indicate that the power and money, were not only indifferent
strangely tranquil years when we were all to what was happening, but were actively
subject to the disciplines of the Cold War are conspiring against the well-being of the poor
over. Another political era has arrived and, and powerless. Bewilderment was followed
with it, a new and unexpected political by paranoia, and paranoia by anger. Though
style - a style which can be described as pop- the populists failed in the end, many a politi-
ulism. ' co paid the penalty for his failure to under-
What is populism, and why should its stand the needs and inarticulate fears of the
various manifestations destabilize European voters. It was, as Robert Penn Warren wrote
politics just at the moment when the collapse about the election of Huey Long, "hell
of the Soviet Union and its empire in among the yearlings and the Charge of the
Eastern Europe signals an end to the danger Light Brigade and Saturday night in the back
of a major war? room of Casey's saloon rolled into one..."
The word is, of course, a familiar one to Confusion is a feature of populist politics.
anyone who has studied American political Of course, the confrontation between
history. It evokes memories of figures like "them" and "us" is familiar enough in
"Sockless" Jerry Simpson or "Alfalfa" Bill European politics, too. Writing in the 1930s,
Murray, of injunctions to Kansas farmers to the French politician and journalist Robert
"raise less corn and more hell." In the 1890s, de Jouvenel remarked that "there is more in
American populism sprang from a combina- common between two deputies, one of whom
tion of economic pressure on the largely is a revolutionary, than between two revolu-
tionaries, one of whom is a deputy." This
Anthony Hartley is former editor of Encounter sentiment received a theoretical setting from
and a contributing editor to The National the Italian political philosopher Gaetano
Interest. Mosca, whose writing brought the concept of

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a "political class" into general use. His defin- ter, then we should be living in the world of
ition of it was based on the view that "every- Oliver Stone). It is, after all, government by
thing in government which concerns deci- "those who know" or "those who have
sion-making, the exercise of authority, com- learned." But the perception by the citizen of
mand and responsibility is always the func- such a function will alter according to the
tion of a special class... which is always a tiny times in which he lives. If those times are dif-
minority compared with the ruled mass on ficult and he feels that his interests are being
which it imposes its will."1 Mosca, indeed, neglected by the political class, he will react
approved of this state of affairs. The political with bewilderment and hostility. His view of
class was obeyed because of its "innate supe- it will impart a conspiratorial tinge to its
riority" and its "coordinated organization." actions. If, on the contrary, there is a politi-
Looked at from below, however, or as an cal leader who, by fireside chat or public ora-
object of populist suspicion, the political tion, can address his anxieties directly, then
class appears as a group of men who, while the mass of society will be brought closer to
performing certain undoubted services to the political class, and the credibility of the
society, are also concerned to develop and system reinforced.
maintain their own power. Gradually they
build up a special interest which may come to
Failures of the Political Class
take priority over that of the citizen. Mosca
saw access to that class as being gained by
certain social qualities: "military valor, IN Western
Western THE
- let -alone
PRESENT
Easternlet- Europe
alone Eastern condition - Europe of
wealth, education, birth, merit." Substitute there are many factors that have converged
for these quaintly ordered qualifications to produce symptoms of populist revolt. The
"membership of the Communist Party most interesting of these concerns the work-
bureaucracy," and we encounter Milován ings of the European Community and its
Djilas's "new class," a derivative of Mosca's impact on democratic government, but there
theory. Add bankers, lawyers, university are other factors that should be mentioned.
presidents, and prominent ecclesiastics, and For some years now, ever since the cata-
an enlarged "political class" becomes "the strophe of state socialism became evident,
establishment," a crude and potentially para- political theorists, from both right and left,
noiac description of the same phenomenon. have concentrated on what might reasonably
The composition of such a group and the be called "populist" ideas. The fashionable
weighting of the various elements within it phrases of the 1980s have been "participa-
will depend on national habits and tradition. tion," "decentralization," "community poli-
In France, the existence of the énarchie tics," "empowerment" - all of them slogans
ensures a considerable role for civil servants of an intellectual movement ostensibly con-
and technocrats; in Germany the cerned to return power "to the people."
Bundesbank is an independent power withinRight-wing libertarians and left-wing anar-
the political class. Differences of opinion andchists can join forces to storm the citadels of
allegiance exist, patrons and political cliente-a political class described in lurid terms: "the
les proliferate, but, to return to the quotationmilitary-industrial complex," "the secret
society," "bureaucracy run wild." Jurists
from Jouvenel, there is an underlying simi-
larity and solidarity.
Now of course the conduct of govern- ^his and other quotations from Mosca's The
ment or political life by small interlocking Theory of Governments and the Parliamentary
groups of people is quite normal. That is to System (Turin, 1884) are taken from Ettore
say that Mosca's description is often accurate A. Albertoni, Mosca and the Theory of Elitism
and not always sinister (were it always sinis- (Oxford, 1987), pp. 21-23.

38

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emphasize "rights," but ignore the duties black Africa, is socially disruptive and politi-
whose performance is the condition of rights cally destabilizing. Its consequences can be
being more than pie in the sky. The fact that seen in the xenophobia and violence directed
the object of all this is not so much the elimi- against Romanian gypsies in eastern
nation of a political class as its replacement Germany. It is ironic that matters have been
by an alternative power structure of local made worse by an idealistic gesture on the
activists somehow escapes attention. part of convinced Europeans, the "Schengen
Moreover, while being under attack agreement," which threw open the frontiers
from populist theorists, the political class in of continental Europe at the very moment
the United States and Europe has been none when national control of migrants was most
too successful over recent years in wrestling needed. Immigration is the most serious
with the economic and social problems of political problem in Europe today; its conse-
late twentieth-century industrial society. It quences will be far-reaching and unpleasant.
was the extreme nature of this failure in However, the most striking populist
reactions in Europe have been those brought
Eastern Europe which overthrew communist
rule. But Western countries too have been about by the French and Danish referen-
afflicted by economic stagnation and grow- dums on Maastricht. These spasms of revolt
against an idea applauded by elites over many
ing social problems, culminating in an accu-
mulation of the social wreckage which weyears are not accidental. For one of the
have agreed to call "the underclass." effects of the European Community's exis-
Unemployment is only one result of tence a has been to move government further
depression that appears to the man in theaway from the citizen, while rendering its
street as the consequence of post-industrialdecisions still more incomprehensible to
society painting itself into a corner. How can those affected by them. What used to be
the political class explain to an unemployed domestic legislation is now decided after pro-
workman in Britain or France that he is longed negotiations, in which secrecy of pro-
being crucified on a cross of high German cedure and the hidden motivations of those
taking part closely resemble the ways of the
interest rates brought about by the economic
demands of reunification? In 1929 it was old "cabinet diplomacy" applied to foreign
affairs. Individual issues are mingled in the
already difficult enough to explain the causes
famous "Brussels packages" rather than
of the slump to those affected by it. Now,
with international flows of trade and curren- decided on their own merits. Intent on arriv-

cy more complex and more rapid, it is almost ing at a consensus, ministers and officials
impossible. The worst frustration of this situ- may neglect valid objections or else ignore
ation is that the casualties are left with no reality altogether. In any case, the man in the
one to blame. Governments are no longer instreet (or even the journalist) cannot trace
control; the only obvious target is the "sys-the reason for decisions or find out who is to
tem" or the "political class," the classic be held responsible for them.
scapegoat of populist rhetoric. The connection of this situation with
In addition to economic depression, thepopulism is clear .Those who make European
classes who voted against Maastricht in policies - ministers, commissioners, tech-
France's referendum - manual workers and nocrats, both national and supra-national -
poor farmers - are being exposed to other are an exact photo-fit of Mosca's political
social disorders caused by an increased flow class - even, in some cases, to the extent of
of immigration into Western Europe. This holding their positions through heredity.
new Völkerwanderung , set in motion by the But they have lost even that tenuous connec-
opening of Eastern European frontiers and ation with grass-roots politics possessed by a
population explosion in the Maghreb andnational political class. Indeed, when the

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European Community was first founded, this
was believed to be an advantage. The
Commission, a collection of philosopher-
kings, would, it was thought, be able to judge
conflicting interests with a lofty objectivity
overriding national prejudices and, when
required, enact measures which politicians in
member-states would have shrunk from tak-
ing. The European Community, therefore,
came to serve as a whipping-boy for national
governments. Of course, it was other things
too: in Germany, an outlet for a patriotism
which could not be avowed; in Italy, a substi-
tute for a political system despaired of by its
citizens. Nevertheless, the impression
retained of it by most individuals is one of alone, but accumulate authority through
remote and arbitrary power.
Their destruction by the conditions of inter-
dependence or by a corrosive skepticism con-
fuses peoples who require national landmarks
by which to navigate.
The present state of Europe is one of
disorientation. The political class is rapidly
losing authority. Governments lack credibili-
ty as their perceived power to cope with the
terrors of the year 2000 lessens. The
European Community has not yet acquired
it. The future of European politics will
remain turbulent, until Mosca's political class
remembers that it must address the real pre-
occupations of the governed, and that insti-
tutions are not made by summit conferences
habit and use over a long period.
The commissioners and officials of the

Us vs. Them European Community also need to meditate

THERE aging
agingpopulist
populist ARE
politicsmany politics factors in encour- Europe
in Europe
today. Economic despair and xenophobia
bring violence in their wake. Movements
arise which see in that violence the most
derment
effective means of political self-expression. In being added by seemingly arbitrary
that case, events like those in Rostock and, in any case, unexplained decisions from
become commonplace. Is Western Europe Brussels. Once disorientation has spread
going down that path? None of the irritants
mentioned above can be easily removed. The
pressure towards instability will continue,
and it may be that the least harmful way of
giving it an outlet will be a renewed national-
ism. That bone can always be flung to the
populist dog, however doubtful the conse-
quences. What else, for instance, can be
offered to the Russian people than the sense
of national mission described by Sergei
Stankevich?2 All countries need totems.
this lesson after their narrow squeak in the
French referendum. Peoples are not to be
hustled out of accustomed ways of behavior
by bright-eyed meliorists. Technological
change brings enough confusion to the indi-
vidual European without additional bewil-
through large sections of a society, it is not
easily remedied. The gap between "them"
and "us" widens. For "us," goaded by despair
at our own helplessness, there remains a
recourse to populist revolt and perhaps the
catharsis of violence. If the great and the
good drop bricks, we can at any rate throw
them. □
2 See "Russia in Search of Itself," The National
Interest , Summer 1992, pp. 47-51.

40

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