Professional Documents
Culture Documents
and Models of
Public Policy Making
THOMAS A. BIRKLAND
M.E. Sharpe
Armonk, New York
London, England
POLICIES AND POLICY TYPES 133
Forms of Policies
Competitive regulatory Subcommittees; executive Logrolling among favored Stable Very low; very little full
bureaus and commissions· actors congressional involvement
small interest groups '
Redistributive President and his Ideological and class conflict Stable High
appointees; committees
and/or Congress; largest
interest groups (peak
associations); "liberals/
conservatives"
Influence of
President, presi-
Cdngress as Congressional
dency, and central- Private sector
Bureaus a whole subcommittees
Policy type ized bureaucracy
Low (supports High High (subsidized
Distributive Low High groups)
subcommittees)
Source: Table adapted from Congress, the Bureaucracy, and Public Policy, by Randal B. Ripley and Grace A. Franklin Copyright© 1991 by
Harcourt, Inc. Reprinted by permission of the publisher.
13
7
138 AN INTRODUCTION TO THE POLICY PROCESS POLICIES AND POLICY TYPES 139
Distributive Policies often create beneficiaries and create groups to represent these benefi-
ciaries, the United States is now characterized by what Lowi calls inter-
Distributive policies involve the granting of some sort of benefit to a est group liberalism, in which all claims to federal support and funding
particular interest group or other well-defined, relatively small group of are assumed to be legitimate, and few, if any, decisions are made to
beneficiaries. Examples ofdistributive policy include farm subsidies and separate the most compelling claims from the most minor. In such a
federal spending on local infrastructure projects like dams, flood con- system, the elected branches of government are more interested in ser-
trol systems, aviation, highways, and schools. These benefits are usu- vicing particular interests than in servicing the public interest or at
ally distributed in the process of developing authorization and least something approximating it as a whole.
appropriations bills as part of the budgeting process. 3
Distributive policy allows for a considerable amount of negotiation Regulatory Policies
and distribution of benefits to members of Congress, because they cite
their effectiveness in bringing home money from Washington in their Regulatory policies are, in general tenns, policies that are intended to
reelection campaigns. Because all members benefit equally from this govern the conduct of business. There are two broad types of regulatory
"pork-barrel" spending, there is a powerful incentive to engage in what policies. Competitive regulatory policy involves policies designed to
political scientists call logrolling, in which members pledge to vote for "limit the provision of goods and services to one or a few designated
each other's funding bills. For example, a member of an urban congres- deliverers, who are chosen from a larger number of competing potential
sional district may pledge to support a rural member's farm subsidy bill deliverers."5 Ripley and Franklin cite the allocation of radio and televi-
in exchange for support for a mass transportation bill. This "horse trad- sion frequencies and the awarding of cable television franchises as ex-
ing" is probably necessary for the expeditious passage of federal spend- amples. Another example is policies intended to regulate trades or
ing bills, but Congress's procedures and norms also encourage this sort professions, such as law, medicine, engineering, electrical and plumb-
of negotiation, leading to more "pork-barrel" spending, which serves to ing contractors, or hairstyling. States generally assign the power to li-
allow members to "bring home the bacon" to their districts. cense professions to members of that particular profession: lawyers,
Distributive policy making is made even easier by the inability, in this through the state bar !:!Ssociations, and physicians, through their state
style of policy making, to easily identify particular groups of people that medical associations, are licensed and regulated by their peers. This sys-
are benefiting from the policy, while the costs of the policy are more broadly tem assures professional oversight over the activities of professionals,
spread across society. Local officials and congressional representatives who must be trained and regulated to assure competent service to their
depict these policies as good for the local community, but as being paid clients. These p'olicies, on the other hand, also create barriers to enter a
for by the entire nation through general federal funds. Indeed, local spend- profession, thereby limiting the number of professionals who provide a
ing programs are often justified as a way of gaining a community's "fair service and, possibly, maintaining high fees.
share" offederal taxes paid by the district or state's taxpayers. Because of For the most part, competitive regulatory policy is made without much
the actual or assumed benefits to particular people without any public scrutiny. Much cifthis policy is made at the state level, further ensur-
countergroups seeking to stop spending, there is little conflict over dis- ing its low visibility, and the most active participants in such policies tend to
tributive policy. It is usually made fairly quickly, easily, and with a mini- be at the legislative committee and trade group levels. Much of this type of
mum amount ofscrutiny ofindividual spending decisions. When the news policy is relatively arcane and stimulates little public notice.
media or other members do scrutinize such spending, there may some- Protective regulatory policy, on the other hand, 1s mtended to protect
times be a call for refonn of this system, but the benefits of the current the public at large from the negative effects of private activity, such as
system of pork are so clear that the system of distributive policy endures. tainted food, air pollution, unsafe consumer products, or fraudulent busi-
This type ofpolicy making is problematic in a democracy, as Theodore ness transactions. While most businesses and their leaders are respon-
Lowi notes in The End ofLiberalism. 4 Because government pro grams sible citizens who do not wish to hurt or alienate their customers,
140 AN iNTRODUCTION TO THE POLICY PROCESS POLICIES AND POLICY TYPES 141
businesses are also motivated by profit. Businesses often resist regula- social programs, coupled with the disdain felt by many people for these
tion on cost grounds, saying that it would reduce or eliminate profit programs' recipients, created a political atmosphere in which it became
margins, make products uncompetitive on the market, place firms at easier and even politicaily acceptable-to propose policies such as
competitive disadvantages vis-a-vis their foreign competitors (or com- tax cuts that shifted benefits from the poor to the wealthy. 7
petitors in other states, if the policy is made at the state level), and so on. Still, some people do speak for the less powerful, and any redistribu-
Because businesses resist regulation while regulatory agencies insist tion of resources-money or rights is expected to engender consider-
that they are acting in the public interest, protective regulatory policy able controversy.· Such policies include the classic welfare policies and
tends to be highly contentious. Congressional committees and the full also civil rights and liberties policies. The civil rights example is a good
body of Congress get involved, along with major trade organizations illustration of this notion of at least the perception of the redistribution
(such as the National Association of Manufacturers or the American of rights. When blacks began to demand the rights and resources guar-
Banking Association). Decisions are reached based on negotiation and anteed them under the Constitution rights such as equal educational,
compromise, because, in most cases, neither business nor the regulators housing, and job opportunities, the right to vote, and the right to due
can entirely dominate policy making; Congress and its committees are process in criminal proceedings}--many people resisted these policies
often put in the position of broker, mediating between the goals of the because they believed that they would somehow be losers if blacks were
regulatory agency and business interests. ''winners" of these rights. Civil rights legislation was passed in the mid-
1960s, but only with. high-level governmental participation and after
Redistributive Policy intense and rancorous debate that suffused political and social life from
Washington to Main Street.
Redistributive policy is highly controversial, involving the highest lev- Lowi 's ideas continue to be quite influential, and for good reason. As
els of government and the leaders of what are called peak associations Daniel McCool argues, Lowi is a leading theorist of policy types be-
in policy making characterized by a high level of conflict and difficulty cause he approaches policies not merely as outputs of government but
in changing policy. as something that shapes and is shaped by political conflict. Thus, in the
Redistributive policy is characterized by actions "intended to ma- typology described in Table 6.1, the nature and visibility of political
nipulate the allocation of wealth, property, personal or civil rights, or conflict will differ considerably with the type of policy in question.
some other valued item among social classes or racial groups." 6 Based You can apply these ideas to your own policy interests to understand
on this definition, obvious examples include welfare, civil rights for how the politics of your issues of greatest interest will play out. For
racial or social minorities, aid to poor cities or schools, and the like. example, if you deeply appreciate the natural world, you may be very
While there has been considerable redistributive policy making in the interested in environmental policy. As you know, however, environmen-
United States since the Roosevelt administration, these policies are dif- tal policies have been historically contentious, and the politics of envi-
ficult to pass because passage requires that the less powerful prevail ronmental policy often involves the highest levels of government in a
over the more powerful interests or at least persuade more powerful particular area. Environmental policy shares many of the characteristics
groups that it is right and just to approve the redistribution of some of protective regulatory policy: high levels of trade association, execu-
resource to the less powerful. tive, and iegislative involvement, high visibility, considerable conflict,
It is worth noting, however, that redistributive policy can involve the but also a propensity to be addressed via compromise. You might con-
transfer of resources from the less well off to the better off. During the clude that your participation in environmental policy making would be
Reagan administration, the recipients of federal redistributive benefit&- most effective if you joined with an existing environmental group, such
the poor, urban areas, economically depressed areas-were depicted as as the Natural Resources Defense Council or Sierra Club, to contribute
unworthy recipients, and the policies intended to help them were se- your voice to the debate. This is because your lone voice would be
verely criticized. The growing dismay with relatively expensive federal drowned out by the thousands of other voices in this policy domain.
142 AN INTRODUCTION TO THE POLICY PROCESS POLICIES AND POLICY TYPES 143
I
James Q. Wilson: Concentrated and Diffuse Table6.2
I
Costs and Benefits
WIison's Cost-Benefit Polley Typology
A persistent criticism ofLowi's typology of policies is that it is difficult Benefits
to assign policies to just one category. Some policies have redistributive
Concentrated among Distributed among
and regulatory attributes, such as the regulation of consumer product very few people many people
safety that redistributes the responsibility for risk away from consumers Concentrated among Interest group politics: Entrepreneurial
and to the companies that manufacture products. This also has a strong very few people conflict between groups politics: groups and
that would benefit and their leaders seek
regulatory component James Q. Wilson, in response to these problems those that would bear to persuade policy
with Lowi's conception of policy types, developed a policy typology the costs. Treated as a makers to regulate
that rejects the use of ambiguous policy types and considers instead a zero-sum game. In the public
interest, in the face
way of arranging policies in terms of the extent to which their costs and of oppositlon from
benefits are focused on one particular party or diffused, is spread across the groups that
numerous people or interests. This typology is depicted in Table 6.2. would bear the
cost.
What might be the easiest policies to advocate and enact? In this
typology, a policy that provides an obvious benefit to one group would
motivate that group to press for enactment of the policy; its task would Costs Distributed among many Clientele oriented Majoritarian
people politics: close "clienteIe" politlcs: relatively
be made even easier if the costs of the policy are hard to assign to a relationships between loose groups of
particular group, that is, if the costs are distributed broadly throughout pollcy makers, regula- people, or those
tors, and the regulated acting on their
some larger group. Wilson cites as examples the Civil Aeronautics Board interest. behalf, who seek a
(CAB) and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) as two substantive or
agencies that administer this kind of clientele-oriented policy. In the symbolic statement
of policy. Often
aviation example, before the major airlines were deregulated in 1978, leads to weak,
the CAB regulated airline routes and fares, and airlines had to apply to ambiguous
and gain approval from the CAB to gain permission to fly a new route or policies.
to change fares. This system meant that the airlines enjoyed a substan- Source: Derived from James Q. Wilson, Political Organizations (Princeton: Princeton
tial benefit (protection against cut-rate competition) while the burden of University Press, 1995).
this policy, in the fonn of higher fares, fell on the flying public. In a
similar way, the FCC's policies for licensing broadcasters ensure that implementation of the Occupational Safety and Health Act, and its ad-
the number of radio and TV stations in a market remains relatively fixed, ministration by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
thereby creating some stability at the expense of the general public, which (OSHA), have led to fierce battles between labor unions and business,
may favor a greater number of broadcast voices. because the participants in this debate believe that the benefits of this
On the other hand, if the costs are easily pinned to a particular group policy flow to a relatively small number of interests (labor) and are paid
or interest, it is likely that the cost-bearing group will take steps to op- for by a relatively small number of interests (business).
pose the policy. There are two examples of this in Wilson's typology. If Another example involving concentrated costs involves regulation of
the costs are concentrated and the benefits are concentrated, a style of business in the interest of public safety. Wilson uses highway safety
policy making involving interest group conflict becomes prominent. policy, as administered by the National Highway Traffic Safety Admin-
Wilson's example is the battle between labor and business interests in istration (NHTSA), as an example of a policy that distributes benefits
the field of occupational safety. In particular, both the enactment and (safer cars) very broadly across the driving public, but that places the
144 AN INTRODUCTION TO THE POLICY PROCESS POLICIES AND POLICY TYPES 145
more immediate burdens on the automobile manufacturers. In this case, cies that seek to redistribute costs and benefits-redistributive policy-
NHTSA is confronted with a hostile target of regulation, and politics are are highly contentious because they are often perceived as zero-sum
likely to remain fairly contentious. This policy type is called entrepre- situations, in which any gain for one interest is accompanied by an equal
neurial policy because policy entrepreneurs and interest groups, such as and opposite loss by the other.
Ralph Nader and his public interest organizations, seek openings to ad- But it is important to understand that this distribution of costs and
vance these policies in the name of a diffuse but still real public interest. benefits may be as much a social construction as the result of a real
The auto safety example may not be the most apt today, however, as calculation of costs and benefits. If a group believes or is convinced
public demands for safety, as expressed in consumer choices for antilock that it will bear the costs of a policy, it is likely to act against the
brakes and airbags, have made safety a mainstream feature of cars, and policy. Thus, a policy that seeks to reduce youth crime by providing
manufacturers tout the safety of their vehicles in their advertising. It is after-school services may be resisted by a large number of citizens
not difficult, however, to find contemporary examples of policies that because they believe that they are paying a high cost for a less-than-
seek to regulate industry and that are promoted by entrepreneurial groups obvious benefit to themselves. This illustration shows the difficulty of
and their leaders, such as environmental policy. linking policies to actual benefits, but also illustrates how benefits and
What results, however, if both the costs and benefits of a policy are costs seem to be as much in the eye of the beholder as a carefully
diffuse? Wilson uses as an example the Sherman Antitrust act. This law calculated accounting exercise.
prohibits firms from creating anticompetitive "trusts." Since so few firms If these .attributes of policy (cost/benefit, distribution/redistribution)
are at any one time prepared to create a trust, there are very few firms are so prone to perception, then what good is any exercise in assigning
that feel the cost of this policy; at the same time, the benefits of promot- policy types? Lowi noted in 1964 that "it is not the actual outcomes but
ing competition are often diffuse, affecting lots of people a little bit the expectations as to what the outcomes can be that shape the issues
rather than having a major influence on our individual economic deci- and determine their politics." 10Peter Steinberger also addresses this is-
sion making. This sort of policy is therefore called majoritarian policy sue by "conceptualizing some of the ways in which participants tend to
making because majorities of the public want antitrust legislation as a define policies. " 11 In other words, policies may not have inherent mean-
way of curbing big business power or at least as a means of symboli- ings in terms of any policy typology, but may gain their meanings only
cally reining in business. This sentiment was translated to policy with- when groups discern meanings and propagate them among friendly and
out much heated opposition, in large part because the language of the hostile audiences. For example, many safety innovations in automobiles
law was so ambiguous--prohibiting "combinations in restraint of and other consumer products cost relatively little per item produced, but
trade"-that "it was not exactly clear what was aimed at. " 8 manufacturers and their allies believe that the additional cost will make
The value of Wilson's typology is not in the names of the policy types. their products unprofitable. This argument will help persuade groups to
Indeed, we should think of the concentration of benefits and costs as mobilize in a particular way based on a perception of policy.
tendencies or as ends of two continua rather than as two dichotomies
adding up to a four-cell matrix. This said, we can see some relationships other Policy Typologies
between Wilson's and Lowi's ways of thinking about policy types and
their connections to issue networks or subgovemments. For example, The Lowi and Wilson typologies are not the only ways to categorize
clientelism is closely associated with Lowi's distributive policy type, in· public policies. Following are four additional and not mutually ex-
which interest groups gain benefits that are "paid for" (financially or clusive ways we can categorize policies. Of course, as in any typol-
otherwise) by the bulk of society. This in tum is associated with the ogy, policies may not fit into perfectly delineated boxes or cells, but
subgovernment or "iron triangle" model ofinterest relationships, in which thinking about policies in these different ways may help you gain
interest groups, bureaucracies, and congressional subcommittees work insight into the features of policy that are most important from an
together in a mutually reinforcing relationship. 9 On the other hand, poli- analytic perspective.
148 AN INTRODUCTION TO THE POLICY PROCESS POLICiES AND POLICY TYPES 149
Substantive and Procedural Policies federal grant that provides money to local communities to hire police
officers, as was implemented in the Clinton administration. Examples
James Anderson reminds us of the very important difference between of symbolic policies include antidrug efforts such as the "just say no"
policies that set the rules for policy making and the more familiar poli- and DARE campaigns and legislation and proposed constitutional amend-
cies-that actually provide the goods and services we expect from gov- ments that would prohibit burning the flag (such laws were held uncon-
ernment. He defines the difference between substantive and procedural stitutional by the Supreme Court in Texas v. Johnson 14)._As Anderson
polices as what government does versus how it does it. Nevertheless,· notes, these policies appeal to our values and our sense of idealism, but
procedural policies are very important and actually have, in the end, a do not really deliver any particular benefit, whether they claim to or not
substantive effect on politics. 12 Sometimes symbolic policies claim to have an impact, but this is often
Anderson cites the federal Administrative Procedures Act (APA) of based on faulty causal reasoning. For example, the system of TV show
1946 as a particularly important procedural policy; the states also have ratings was developed in response to a widespread belief that various
similar laws. The APA establishes the procedure by which government social ills, particularly among children, result from violent or sexually
agencies make, issue, and enforce rules and regulations as they imple- expressive TV shows. There is little research to substantiate this, but the
ment the laws passed by Congress. If a regulation (or a "rule," in the TV industry implemented a voluntary ratings scheme to preempt fed-
language of the act) is established by an agency following the processes eral legislation. In this case, TV ratings systems are the symbolic poli-
laid out by the APA, then it is assumed to have the force of law (like cies intended to address the perceived problem.
statute or case law). The APA governs how federal agencies let citizens
know that they are going to make a rule and how the public can comment Public Versus Private Goods
on the rule and offer suggestions or express their opposition to the rules.
While the details of federal rule making sound pretty dry, overall we One of the main ways we distinguish between what should be provided by
can say that the APA is a very important policy. How would American government and what is better provided by the private sector is by analyz-
government be different if there was no one way for the federal govern- ing whether a good is a public good versus a private good. Again, public
ment to make rules in the open, accessible to public comment and oppo- goods are goods that, once provided for one user, are available to all in a
sition? Could certain interests be benefited and others harmed if the society and that cannot be exclusively consumed by a single person or
regulatory process were kept a secret? It would seem so, which is why, group of people. Private goods are goods that can be used by only the
in future enactments, Congress amended the APA to make government immediate consumer and whose enjoyment is then denied to others.
even more open through the Freedom of Information Act of 1974, the Laws that provide for clean air and water are classic examples of public
Government in the Sunshine Act, and the Privacy Act of 1974. The over- goods: a decision to clean up the air or water for one person requires that
all goal, while procedural, is to ensure fairness in governmental dealing everyone be provided with a better environment. Similarly, it would be
·. with citizens, which is substantively important as well. 13 difficult to set up a system of police protection in which only those who
subscribe to police services receive protection against crime.
Material and Symbolic Policies The public-private goods distinction, like most typologies, is not a
fine distinction. There are other factors to take into account besides the
Another way to categorize policies is to examine whether the policy is consumption·of a particular good. For example, the United States Postal
material or symbolic. While the distinction between these two is not Service (USPS) is a quasi-governmental corporation that provides docu-
absolute, one can distinguish between material policies, which provide ment and package delivery services. FedEx, United Parcel Service, Air-
a material (that is, tangible and obvious) benefit to people, and symbolic borne, and other firms are also in the same business. Why, then, should
policies, which simply appeal to people's values without any resources the USPS continue in business if private firms can do the job? After all,
or actual effort behind them. A material policy, for example, may be a mail and parcel delivery has all the hallmarks of a private good: the