THE UNITED STATES

STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

OIL DIVISION
FINAL REPORT

OIL DIVISION
JANUARY 1947
 THE UNITED STATES
STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

OIL DIVISION
FINAL REPORT

OIL DIVISION
First Edition 25 August 1945
Second Edition January 1947
 This report was written primarily for the use of the

U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey in the preparation of further

reports of a more comprehensive nature. Any conclusions or

opinions expressed in this report must be considered as

limited to the specific material covered and as subject to

further interpretation in the light of further studies

conducted by the Survey.

--5
C -
// .
& ©
V / / / /2

This edition has been reproduced by a photolithographic

offset process from the first edition of the report. To expedite,

standardise and clarify the printing of this and other European

reports, minor changes have been made on the cover, title page and

some drawings.

11
 134-4 r"
e---
DEPasired BY THE
-
&–3rael.”
2-/c-42- Foreword
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
JUN 7 47

The United States Strategic Bombing Survey was established by

the Secretary of War on 3 November 1944, pursuant to a directive

from the late President Roosevelt.

The officers of the Survey were:

Franklin D'Olier, Chairman.

Henry C. Alexander, Vice-Chairman.

George W. Ball,
Harry L. Bowman,
John K. Galbraith, -
Rensis Likert,
Frank A. McNamee, Jr. •
Paul H. Nitze,
Robert P. Russell,
Fred Searls, , Jr.
Theodore P. Wright, Directors.

*
Charles C. Cabot, Secretary.

Table of Organization provided for 300 civilians, 350

officers and 500 enlisted men. The Survey operated from headquarters

in London and established forward headquarters and regional headquar

ters in Germany immediately following the advance of the Allied

armies •

It made a close examination and inspection of several hundred

German plants, cities and areas, amassed volumes of statistical and

documentary material, including top German government documents; and

conducted interviews and interrogations of thousands of Germans,

including virtually all of the surviving political and military

leaders. Germany was scoured for its war records which were found

111
sometimes, but rarely, in places where they ought to have been; some

times in safe-deposit vaults, often in private houses, in barns, in

caves; on one occasion, in a hen house and, on two occasions, in
coffins. Targets in Russian-held territory were not available to the
Survey.

Some two hundred detailed reports were made. During the course

of its work, the Survey rendered interim reports and submitted

studies and suggestions in connection with the air operations against

*
Japan. -

While the European War was going on, it was necessary, in

cases, to follow closely behind the front; otherwise, vital records
might have been irretrievably lost. Survey personnel suffered

several casualties, including four killed.

The Survey studied the effects of the air attack on Japan and

further reports have been submitted to the Secretary of War and the Sec
retary of the Navy.

iV
 CONTENTS
Page
General Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

An Empire Built on Coal, Air, and Water. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Killing the German Industrial Octopus. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Primary Target: Oil. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Synthetic Bottlenecks: Chemicals, Rubber, Explosives. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Air Attacks on Chemicals, Rubber, and Explosives. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

How the Oil-Chemical Industry Was Knocked Out. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Weapons. Effectiveness and Bombing Techniques. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The Integration of the German oil, Chemical, Rubber, and -

Explosives Industries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Synthetic Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Chemicals ................................. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Synthetic Rubber . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - - -- - - - - - - - - - - 11
Explosives and Propellants. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . •********* 11

* -
Strategic Air Attack on the German Oil Industry. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

The Self-Sufficiency Program. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - - -- -- - - - - - - - - - 14

The High Cost of Synthetics. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

The Manpower Requirements. . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

The Lag in Construction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

The Effort to Store Up Fuel. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

The Failure to Fill the Tanks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Productive Capacity in 1939-1940. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Further Gains during the War. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Actual vs. Planned Production. . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
The Results of the Air Attacks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Bomb Tonnages vs. Production Losses. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .•• 23

Effects of Losses on Germany. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

Measures to Maintain Reserves. . . . . . . . . . . . . - --- - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - 25

Rise and Fall of the Gauges. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

Underground Plants and Plant Dispersal. . . . . . . . . . . . . * * * * ** * * ** ** * 28
Oil Determined Military Strategy. . . ............................. 36
The Collapse of Germany. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
 Page

Strategic Air Attack on the German Chemical Industry. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

Prewar Status of the German Chemical Industry. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Geographic Distribution of the Chemical Industry. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
War Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
War Production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

, Bombing Attacks on Chemical Plants. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

Effects of Bombing the Chemical Industry. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

Strategic Air Attack on the German Rubber Industry. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

Development of Synthetic Processes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Rubber Processing Industry. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
War Plans for Rubber. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 49
Loss of Production and Air Attacks—Synthetic Rubber Industry. . . . . 50

Loss of Production and Air Attacks—Rubber Fabricating Industry. . . . 52

Ebb and Flow of Germany's Rubber Position, Consumption,
and Stock Level. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

Carbon Black Production and Consumption. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

Attempt to Protect the Rubber Industry from Bombing. . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
Accuracy of Intelligence Estimates. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56

Strategic Air Attack on German Powder, Explosives, and

Propellants Industries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

. Secret Preparations for War. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

Raw Materials—a Critical Weakness. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
Preparations against Bombing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
Rise and Fall of Production. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
Analysis of Bombing Effects. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
Effects on Individual Plants. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
Special Propellants for Rockets and Jet Propulsion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68

How and Why Air Attacks Crippled the German Oil-Chemical Industry. . 74
Natural Oil Targets. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
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War History Typical Refinery. 75

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Synthetic Oil Targets. 86

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War History Typical Fischer-TropschPlant. 92

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War History Typical Hydrogenation Plant. 95

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Benzol Targets 101

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Synthetic Ammonia and Methanol Targets. 103

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War History Typical Nitrogen and Methanol Plant. 106

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 Page
Synthetic Rubber Targets. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112

War History of a Typical Synthetic Rubber Plant. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113

Rubber Fabrication Plant Targets. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117

Weapons Effectiveness and Bombing Techniques. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121

Delivering the Bombs that Counted Was an Expensive Operation. ... 121
Aiming Conditions Were a Major Factor in Determining
Bombing Accuracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
Municipal Targets versus Industrial Targets. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122

Vital Plant Sections Should Be Chosen as Aiming Points. . . . . . . . . . . . . 124

Vulnerable Areas Chosen Consistently as Aiming Points

Were Destroyed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
Longer Raids Would Have Been More Effective. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125

Selection of Bombs for the Job at Hand. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125

Fuzes Must Initiate the Explosion at the Right Time. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128

The Fire Hazard in Oil-Chemical Plants Should Be Exploited. . . . . . . 129

Unexploded Bombs Mean Wasted Missions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
Intelligence and Photo Interpretation Were Vitally Important. . . . . . . 132
German Air Raid Protective Measures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135

Oil Division: Conclusions; Recommendations; Applicati-ns. . . . . . . . . . .. . . 138

Conclusions ....... . . .. . . .. . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .......... .. . .. . 138
Recommendations . . . . . . . . . .* ***** *** ****** ** ******* ****** ***** 138
Application of German Protective Techniques to American Industries 138
 ILLUSTRATIONS
Figure Page

1 Germany's liquid fuel position and plans. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . facing 1

2 Effect of oil offensive on German synthetic fuel production. . . . facing 2

3 Effect of oil offensive on Germany's aviation gasoline

supplies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . facing 2

4 Multiple vulnerability of German oil-chemical plants. . . . . . . . . facing 4

5 Effect of oil offensive on Germany's nitrogen position. . . . . . . . . facing 4
6 Pre-attack view of the vital high-pressure compressors at the Bottrop
Welheim hydrogenation plant, and same compressors after they
had suffered 11 direct hits by large HE bombs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

7. During the oil offensive 29 tons of bombs had to be flown from

England for every ton exploding on damageable structures. . facing 6
8 German heavy equipment was well protected against small bombs
(500 lb or less); views of compressor buildings at Boehlen, Zeitz,
and Bottrop-Welheim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . * ** ** * * * * * * ** * * * * ** * *
7

9 Comparison of planned capacity of underground and dispersal plants

with actual oil production: Greater Germany. . . . . . . . . . . . . . facing 8

10 Integration of German process industries. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . facing 10

11 Government control of German process industries. . . . . .. . . . . . facing 12

12 The rise and fall of Germany’s chemical empire. . . . . . . . . . . . . . facing 12

13 Crude oil production of Greater Germany, by areas. . . . . . . . . . facing .18

14 Capacities of hydrogenation and Fischer-Tropsch plants, and refineries
of Greater Germany, by areas. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . facing 18

15 German production of petroleum products, by process - - - - - - - - facing 20

German production of petroleum products, by type

16
of product . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -- - - - - - - - facing 20
17 Comparison of German production plans with actual production:
aviation gasoline, motor gasoline, and diesel oil. . . . . . . . . . . . facing 22

18 Comparison of German production plans with actual production:

aviation gasoline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . facing 22

19 German loss of production: all petroleum products, 1944. . . . . facing 22

20 Total synthetic fuel production by process: aviation gasoline pro

duced and tons of bombs dropped on synthetic facilities. . . . facing 24
21 German oil production: bombs dropped on oil industry and loss of
production by process. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . facing 24
22 Aviation gasoline: German stocks, production, and
consumption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . facing 26
Figure Page

23 Motor gasoline: German stocks, production, and consumption. . facing 26

24 Diesel oil: German stocks, production, and consumption. . . . . . facing 28

25 Total aviation gasoline, motor gasoline, and diesel oil: German stocks,
production, and consumption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
26 Planned capacity of underground and dispersal plants compared to
total German production: aviation gasoline. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . facing 30
27 Planned capacity of underground and dispersal plants compared to
total German production: motor gasoline. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . facing 30
28 Planned capacity of underground and dispersal plants compared to
total German production: lubricating oils. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . facing 30
29 Diagram of underground lubricating oil plant at Porta. . . . . . . . facing 30
30 Schematic layout of a shale oil plant. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

31 Two fractionators and a flash drum of a cracking plant at Leggendorf 32

32 Planned capacity of underground and dispersal plants compared to

total German production: diesel oil. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . facing 32

33 Close-up of the cracking furnace of the plant at Leggendorf. . . . . . . . 33

34 Fischer-Tropsch plant at Leipzig showing 12 reactors removed from
bombed-out plant at Luetzkendorf. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
35 Underground lubricating oil plant at Porta showing vacuum distilla
tion columns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
36 Furfural unit separators and extraction columns at Porta. . . . . . . . . . . 34
37 Gas separators at Porta. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
38 Furiural pumps at Porta. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

39 Boiler at Porta. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

40 Dewaxing unit filters at Porta . . . . . . . . . .• * ** * * * * ** * ** * * ** ** * ** * * 36

41 Dephenolizing plant at Attenburg. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
42 Reactors set up in a wood near Huels after the little Scholven hydro
genation plant was bombed out. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
43 High-pressure separator and control manifold of one of three dis
persed plants built with equipment from the little Scholven plant 37
44 Close-up of the distillation furnace and fractionators from the little
Scholven plant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
45 Distillation unit used with the hydrogenation unit of the little
Scholven plant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
46 Organization of German agencies regulating the production of
nitrogen, methanol, carbide, ethylene, and inorganic
chemicals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . facing 40
* Goering's four-year production plan as of 1940. . . . . . . . . . . . . . facing 42

48 Goering's four-year production plan as of January, 1943. . . . . . facing 42

49 Index of production of basic chemicals. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . facing 46

50 Location of principal German rubber factories. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . facing

48
Figure Page

51 Location of German synthetic rubber plants. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . facing 50

52 Planned and actual production of synthetic rubber in Greater Ger- -

many, and bomb tonnages dropped on these facilities. . . . . . facing 52

53 Rubber consumption and stocks of Greater Germany. . . . . . . . . facing 53
54 Scheduled versus actual rubber consumption in German pneumatic
tire production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . facing 54
55 Monthly German tire production, by major types. . . . . . . . . . . . facing 54
56 Deliveries of German rubber industry, by principal types of
products . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . facing 56
57 Powder and explosives, capacities actually reached in Greater
Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . facing 58

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58 Production and consumption powder by the armed forces

of

in
Greater Germany facing 60
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59 Production and consumption of explosives by the armed forces

in
Greater Germany facing 60
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60 explosives by types (compared with production
in of

of
Production
nitrogen) Great Germany facing 60
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61 Violent secondary explosions off by incendiaries Lignose

at
set
Sprengstoff Werke, Schoenebeck, destroyed the TNT manufacuring
building 62
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62 Explosion resulting from fire started by incendiaries completely
destroyed the TNT granulating buildings Lignose Sprengstoff
of

Werke, Schoenbeck 62
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63 fire on explosives plant Lignose Sprengstoff
of

of

Destructive effects
Werke, Schoenebeck, following attack on 21 January 1944 by two
RAF Halifax heavy bombers 62
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64 secondary explosion when
in

crater 210 diameter resulted from

A

ft

magazine containing 200 tons

of

bomb scored direct hit on

a

at a

nitro-guanidine the Dueneberg plant Dynamit A.G.. 64

of

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65 175-ft crater resulted from explosion magazine containing 80

of
A

rocket powder following the April 1945 raid on the Duene

of

tons
7

berg plant Dynamit A.G. 64

of

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66 The explosion resulting from bomb hit on 50-ton powder magazine

a

deep the plant area

of

leftcrater 100 diameter and 45

in

in
ft
ft
a

Dynamit A.G. Dueneberg 64

in

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67 Explosion an RDX bomb inside the glycol nitration building

of

of

the
Kruemmel plant Dynamit A.G. broke the supporting columns
of

and caused collapse the roof and ceiling 65

of

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68 Disruption the piping system the TNT building

as
of

of

result the
in

October 1944 attack by the Eighth Air Force on the Clausthal

7

Zellerfeld plant 65
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69 1,000-lb bomb TNT building the Clausthal

of

of

Blast effect the

in
a

Zellerfeld plant 66
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Figure Page

70 Column supports collapsed and the roof fell on the acid tanks when a
1,000-lb bomb hit the roof of the spent acid storage building of the
Clausthal-Zellerfeld plant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
71 Results of hit by a 500-lb HE bomb in the attack of 11 April 1945 on
hydrogen peroxide storage tank at Deutsche Sprengchemie,
Kraiburg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
72 Crater caused by secondary explosion of a hydrogen peroxide tank at
Deutsche Sprengchemie, Kraiburg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
73 A 500-lb HE bomb dropped by the Eighth Air Force hit the powder
magazine at Deutsche Sprengchemie, Kraiburg, on 11 April 1945,
completely destroyed the magazine, and lifted its roof . . . . . . . . . . . 68
74 Aerial view of Kruemmel plant of Dynamit A.G. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
75 Map of Kruemmel plant of Dynamit A.G. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70

76 T-Stoffe hydrogen peroxide (85 per cent): actual production, planned

capacities, planned production, and uses for Greater
Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . facing 70
77 B-Stoffe hydrazine hydrate: actual production, planned capacities,
planned production, and uses for Greater Germany . . . . . . . . facing 71

78 Destruction by HE bombs on buildings of Elektrochemische Werke

Muenchen, Hollriegelskreuth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
79 Complete destruction of hydrogen peroxide columns at Elektro
chemische Werke Muenchen, Hollriegelskreuth, from 500-lb HE
bombs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
80 Location of hydrogenation and Fischer-Tropsch plants, and refineries
in Greater Germany; refining capacity, and synthetic fuel produc
tion capacities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . facing 74
by

USSBS, based

on
oil

81 Extent of crude refining industry surveyed

first quarter 1944 76
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82 Flow diagram typical German crude oil refinery. facing 76
of

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83 Ineffective bombing process equipment: atmospheric distillation

of

unit the Deurag-Nerag refinery 77

in

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84 Nine refineries seen burning the Hamburg-Harburg dock area fol

in

lowing the Eighth Air Force attack 20 June 1944. 78

of

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85 Total crude oil refinery runs Greater Germany. facing 78.

in

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86 Total finished products production, number employees, and bomb

of

surveyed Greater Germany facing 79

of in

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87 Aerial view Deurag-Nerag oil refineries, Misburg, Germany 79

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88 Deurag-Nerag oil refineries, Misburg, before bombing 80

*
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89 Deurag-Nerag oil refineries, Misburg, after bombing 80

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90 direct hit by 500-lb bomb opened up the heat exchangers

of
A

crude topping unit the Rhenania-Harburg refinery 81

in

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91 direct hit on vulnerable equipment the Deurag-Nerag

process
in
A

refinery by one 500-lb bomb caused secondary fire damage and

resultant permanent destruction solvent dewaxing plant 81
to
a

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Figure Page

92 Destruction of small steam boiler unit in the Deurag-Nerag refinery

caused by direct hit of 500-lb HE bomb . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81

93 A tank in the Deurag-Nerag refinery withstood eight near misses of

500- and 250-lb HE bombs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82

94 Destruction of a small electric power plant in the Deurag-Nerag

refinery by three direct hits and two near misses of 500-lb HE
bombs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86

95 German estimates of production of liquid fuels during

strategic bombing offensive, as compared with production
actually realized . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . facing 86
96 Oil production from Fischer-Tropsch plants within Greater Germany
and tonnage of bombs dropped. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .*- - - - - facing 86
97 Oil production from hydrogenation plants within Greater Germany
and tonnage of bombs dropped . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . facing 88
98 Flow diagram of Fischer-Tropsch plants. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . facing 88
99 Flow diagram of hydrogenation plants. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . facing 90
100 Total production at Leuna and bomb tonnage exploding on
target . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . facing 90
101 Effect of direct hit by a 1,000-lb bomb detonating on the bell of a gas
holder used for storage of inflammable hydrocarbon gases in a
Fischer-Tropsch plant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
102 Typical arrangement of several low-pressure reactors of the type most
frequently found in Fischer-Tropsch synthetic oil plants. . . . . . . . . . 93
103 Damage from 2,000-lb HE bomb to three Fischer-Tropsch reactors 94
104 Damage from one 1,000-lb bomb and one 500-lb bomb to an activated
charcoal adsorption plant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95

105 Manifolding system of adsorption plant damaged by hit from what is

believed to have been a 1,000-lb HE bomb ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
106 New type spirally wrapped, high-pressure hydrogenation reactor. . . . 100

107 Effect of bomb fragments on a high-pressure hydrogenation reactor. . 100

108 Effect of strategic bombing on the daily production of a synthetic fuel

plant: Fischer-Tropsch, Rheinpreussen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . facing 102

109 Effect of strategic bombing on the daily production of a synthetic

fuel plant: hydrogenation, Zeitz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . facing 102
110 Actual monthly production of benzol plants and tonnage of bombs
dropped on these facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102

111 General view of Leuna Works, looking south, reproduced from

German pictures taken some years before the war. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104

112 Vertical aerial view of Leuna Works taken by the Luftwaffe in August,
1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105

113 Relations between air attacks and production at Leuna . . . . . . facing 106
Figure Page

114 Monthly production of rubber goods at Continental Gummiwerke

A.G., Vahrenwald-Limmer-Nordhafen, and Korbach
plants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . facing 118

115 Production of rubber goods at Deutsche Dunlop Gummi-Compagnie :

A.G. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . facing 118
116 Production of rubber goods at Harburger Gummiwaren-Fabrik
Phoenix A.G. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . facing 118
117 View of Leuna Works, taken by the Eighth Air Force in May, 1945 119

ft,
118 The Ludwigshafen-Oppau plant, looking north, from about 1,200
on May 1945 120
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119 The central part the Zeitz plant, looking south, 25 June 1945 123

as
of

of
120 Where our bombs fell facing 124
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Leuna Works, July 127
at

121 Smoke screen 1944

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high-pressure hydrogenation research area

at
122
of

Destruction
Dudwigshafen 126
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Breaks and repairs utility mains facing 128

at
123 Leuna.
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Leuna typifying the damage by
at

to
124 Excavation utilities caused
500-lb HE bombs 131
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Group Boehlen, cut by direct hit, and an exposed water
at

125
of

cables
a

main 133
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126 many piles plant damaged by
of

of

One cable the Luetzkendorf

in

500-lb HE and smaller bombs 136

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length pipe bridge Zeitz collapsed
at

as
of

of

of
127 result blast
A

ft

150 a
from 4,000-lb HE bomb which detonated about 100 away. 139
ft
a

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group undamaged Schmalfeld gas generators 140
at

128
of of

Luetzkendorf.
A A

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129 group three Schmalfeld gas generators Luetzkendorf after sev
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eral direct hits by 500-lb HE bombs 140

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Compressor building Boehlen damaged by HE 141
at at

130 500-lb bomb

a

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131 Compressor building Zeitz damaged by 1,000-lb HE bomb 142

a

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132 Compressor Boehlen destroyed by HE 142

at

1,000-lb bomb.
a

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compressor house Boehlen after Allied occupation. 142

at

133
of

Interior
a

134 Near miss by 1,000-lb bomb on 3,100-ton oil storage tank Euro
of
a

paische Tanklager and Transport refinery, Finkewander-Hamburg 143

Near miss by 500-lb bomb on protected oil storage tank

of

135 Ebano
a

Asphalt Werke, Harburg-Hamburg 143

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136 The principal processing structures and equipment Ebano Asphalt

of

Werke oil refinery, Harburg-Hamburg, were basically undamaged,

despite extensive tank destruction and structural damage light
to

steel-frame brick buildings 143

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The compressor Bottrop-Welheim before the war, showing

at

137 house
the 10,000-lb-per-square-inch gas compressors with syn
of

two
chronous motor drives 144
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Figure Page

138 Compressor house at Bottrop-Welheim after three 4,000-lb and eight

1,000-lb HE bombs hit the building and machines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145

139 One of two fired heating coils for the distillation units at Zeitz prac
tically undamaged by several near misses from 500-lb and smaller
HE bombs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
140 Furnace at Zeitz completely wrecked by direct hit from a 4,000-lb
HE bomb . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
141 Interior of reactor building at Luetzkendorf where a 4,000-lb bomb
dislodged the reactors and seriously damaged the building structure 148

142 A 4,000-lb HE bomb hit this reactor building at Luetzkendorf and

destroyed a large part of the installation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149

143 Complete reconstruction of Furfural unit at Deurag-Nerag refinery,

Misburg-Hannover, was required after near miss by a 4,000-lb HE
bomb . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1* * * * 150

144 Propane deasphalting unit at the Deurag-Nerag refinery, Misburg

Hannover, slightly damaged by hits and near misses with 500-lb
or 250-lb bombs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151

145 Unexploded bombs from the Gewerkschaft-Victor synthetic oil plant

and district removed by German bomb disposal personnel to
trenches at a collecting point about 2 miles from the plant at
Castrop-Rauxel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152

146 One of six 4,000-lb bombs which failed to explode and was removed to
a collecting point near the Gewerkschaft-Victor plant . . . . . . . . . . . . 152

147 Approximately 3,000 fuzes removed from unexploded bombs assem

bled at a collecting point near the Gewerkschaft-Victor plant. . . . . 152

148 Inspection of fuzes and unexploded bombs indicated that malfunction

ing resulted principally from flat landing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152

736512 0-47-2
 TABLES
Number Page

1 Examples of Integration of German Industries. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

2 Planned Production of Liquid Fuels (Gasoline, Diesel Oil, and Fuel

Oil)
under German Four-Year Plan of 1936-37. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

3 Germany's 1938 Plan for Storage of Liquid Fuels and Lubricants. . . . . 16

4 German Navy Storage Capacity for Oil as of 1 July 1944. . . . . . . . . . . 17

5 German Synthetic Oil Capacity in Operation or under Construction at

Outbreak of War. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
6 German Production of Petroleum Products. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

7 German Crude Oil Production 1940-44. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . 21

8 Examples of Flexibility in Yields of Hydrogenation Plants. . . . . . . . . . 21

9 German Oil Production as a Percentage of That Called for in

Various Plans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

10 Production Loss from May, 1944 to May, 1945 by Type of Process. . 23

11 Weight of HE Bombs Dropped on German Oil Production Facilities
and the Effect on Capacity and Production. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
12 Monthly German Production of Liquid Fuels and Lubricants, January,
1944 to March, 1945. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
13 German Oil Production Loss, May, 1944 to May, 1945. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

14 German Production, Imports, and Total Supply of Aviation Gasoline,

Motor Gasoline, and Diesel Oil, 1940 to 1944. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
15 German Civilian Consumption of Automotive Fuels from 1940
to 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
16 Production of Important Chemicals in 1940. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

17 Production of Chemicals in 1943. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

18 Chemical Production in 1944 before Bombing Attacks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

19 Capacities of German Chemical Plants Prior to May 1944. 1 . . . . . . . . 44
20 Bombing Effort against German Chemical Industry. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
21 German Imports and Consumption of Natural Rubber. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
22 Bombs Dropped at Synthetic Rubber Plants. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
23 Production Index Based on First Four Months of 1944 as 100. . . . . . . 51

24 Attacks on the Rubber Fabricating Industry. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

25 Loss in Tire Production for 1944. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
26 German Consumption-Production Balance; Reclaim Excluded. . . . . . . 53
27 Distribution of Finished Products Excluding Exports. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
28 Allied Estimates of German Synthetic Rubber Plant Capacity. . . . . . . . 56
29 Cumulative Stock, Average Monthly Consumption for Powder
and Explosives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * , .. 60
Number Page
30 Status of German Explosives and Related Industries on
15 February 1945. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ". . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
31 Loss of Explosives and Powder Production from Bombing of
Surveyed Plants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
32 German Oil Refinery Production of Finished Products. . . . . . . . . facing 75
33 Damage from Air Attacks on Deurag-Nerag Oil Refinery at Misburg. . 83
34 Synthetic Fuel Production Capacities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
35 Type of Damage and Residual Capacity in Surveyed Plants. . . . . . . . . 90
36 Damage from Air Attacks on Fischer-Tropsch Process Fuel
Plant at Meerbeck. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
37 Damage from Air Attacks on Hydrogenation Process Fuel Plant
at Zeitz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
38 Effect of Strategic Bombing on German Benzol Production. . . . . . . . . 102
39 Damage from Air Attack on Synthetic Ammonia and Methanol
Plant at Leuna. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
40 Damage from Attacks on the Synthetic Rubber Plant, Chemische
Werke Huels (1940-1945). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
41 Consumption of Crude and Synthetic Rubber in German
Fabricating Plants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
42 Bombing Accuracy as a Function of Aiming Conditions. . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
43 Bomb Hits on Synthetic Oil Targets during oil offensive. . . .. . . . . . .
122
44 Aiming Points Chosen in Twenty Attacks on Leuna. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
45 Average Weight of Bombs Dropped on
Oil and Synthetic
Chemical Plants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
46 Numbers of Unexploded Bombs Hitting German Oil-Chemical Plants
and Refineries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
47 Type of Damage Usually Caused by Various Sizes and Fuzings of
High-Explosive Bombs Hitting Oil, Rubber, and
Chemical Plant Installations. . . . . . . . .* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 134
 GERMAN LIGNUID FUEl POSITION FIGURES IN Muons OF TONS

e
* -o

5
#9 –
as

ā- STOCKS Expressed

wo

o
IMPORTS INDIGENOUS

# :#
g

5
- TOTAL JAN. 1ST Monthly Reserve

5
#
1936 4.921

m
s
s
- 3.377 it—f 0.3–":
* -
-
...

1940
3.3 MONTHS

| m
*
g
A
|

0
-
1.67 1041
|
1943 I-I
1.5 MONTHS
|
3.406 0.672 1.322

-
ANNUAL
RATE-FIRST

1944
#
# | | |
|

3.702 0.605 1.264

PLAN
FOR 1946
|.
H| | ||
|- | || | |-
|| |*||| H|| |||||

4.772 0-802 1.46

1

Figure
 G ENERAL SUMMARY

An Empire Built on Coal, Air, and Water
Wartime Germany was a chemical empire
built on coal, air, and water. Eighty-four and a
half per cent of her aviation fuel, 85 per cent
of her motor gasoline, all but a fraction of 1 per
cent of her rubber, 100 per cent of the concen
trated nitric acid, basic component of all mili
tary explosives, and 99 per cent of her equally
important methanol were synthesized from these
three fundamental raw materials.
Until the late thirties, most of Germany's liq
uid fuels were imported—she produced only a
third of her 1936 liquid fuel requirements (Fig
ure 1). Then extremely ambitious synthetic oil
and war chemicals programs were started. Ger
many’s military and economic planners were so
convinced that this program could be completed
and explosives was interdependent. The five
synthetic nitrogen plants which produced 84.6
per cent of the country's synthetic nitrogen also
made the process gas required for the production
of 20.6 per cent of the synthetic oil. The body
of this industrial organism was the gas-generat
ing plants which turned coal into process gases;
its arms were the many plants that used those
gases and other material drawn from the coal to
produce synthetic fuels and lubricants, chem
icals, rubber, and explosive products. The largest
German chemical plant, at Leuna, consumed
338,000,000 cubic feet of hydrogen-containing
process gas a day and 54,000,000 cubic feet of
fuel gas, a total of nearly twice the peak winter
time consumption of all New York City. The
arms of this gigantic man-made creature could
be damaged or severed without killing

it,
and maintained without enemy interference that but
they went to war in 1939 with reserve stocks when the gas plants were hit the whole organism
equal to only: was weakened. When these plants could no
longer function, the whole group

of
3.1 months' war needs for aviation gasoline, industries
died.
1.9 months' war needs for motor gasoline,
1.8 months' war needs for tetraethyl lead,
2 months' war needs for nitrogen satis Primary Target: Oil
factory for explosives, and
In

the spring Strategic

U.

1944, when the

of

S.

2.4 months' war needs for rubber.

Air Forces reached full maturity, the German oil
Germany never recovered from this precarious industry was selected top priority target
as
a

position, and throughout the war her oil stocks, group. The first four heavy attacks on oil took
particularly critical items like aviation and mo place on May 1944, but the heat was really
12

tor gasolines, were so tight that her whole mili turned on when General Carl Spaatz dis
8 A.

tary effort in the air and on the ground would patched his memorable cable June
to
of

the
have collapsed like a pricked balloon in three or Air Forces: “Primary strategic aim U.
of

S.

four months had her oil supply been dried up. Strategic Air Forces now deny oil enemy
to

as to
is

forces.” All oil plants were system

to

air be hit
Killing the German Industrial Octopus atically and severely air strength permitted,
as

The oil, chemical, explosives, and rubber in and they were be hit with sufficient frequency
to

dustries of Germany were bound together into a insure their being kept out production.
to

of

vast interlinking complex, so that attacking them Up May, 1944, the RAF and the USAAF
to

was like fighting an octopus. Hydrogen from together had dropped 509,206 tons”
of

bombs on
Leuna was used in making half of Germany's
rubber. In the Ludwigshafen-Oppau Chemical All bomb tonnages are short tons (2,000 lb) and all
*

Works, the production of oil, chemicals, rubber, production tonnages are metric tons (2,205 lb).
 STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY: OIL DIVISION REPORT
enemy targets in Europe, of which 5,670 tons,
or 1.1 per cent, went down on German oil tar
gets. None of these attacks caused important loss
in German oil production. From 12 May 1944
to 8 May 1945 (V-E Day), the combined air
forces dropped 191,256 tons on the 87 German
oil-producing targets, and production took the
downgrade. The output of aviation gasoline to
bogganed (Figure 2). The initial reaction of the
Luftwaffe was to offer increased resistance, and
consumption increased with a consequent terrific
drain on the storage tanks. From August to the
end of the war (except December), consumption
always exceeded production (Figure 3). Less
than 500 tons of aviation gasoline were made
during February, 1945, only 40 tons were made
in March, none at all in April. Stocks of aviation
gasoline on 1 February were only 82,000 tons—
barely enough to wet the tank bottoms.
With both production and stocks declining
rapidly, the most drastic curtailment of aircraft
operation was put into effect. Training was elim
inated in September, and essentially all opera
tions except combat flying were prohibited. In
the closing months of the war, Luftwaffe pilots
were sent into combat with only 40 to 45 hours
of flight training—sitting ducks for our well
trained air crews. Germany's large reserve of
military aircraft stayed on the ground with
empty tanks, unable to oppose the advancing
forces. The situation with regard to motor gaso
line was no less disastrous. Tanks and armored
vehicles were moved to the front by oxen. Every
motor trip exceeding 60 miles had to be ap
proved by a commanding general. A speed limit
of 17 miles per hour was imposed.
Synthetic Bottlenecks: Chemicals, Rubber,
Explosives
Among Germany's key war chemicals were
synthetic nitrogen, methanol (synthetic wood
alcohol), tetraethyl lead, and rubber. Without
nitrogen, not a single ton of military explosives
or propellants could have been made, and there
would have been no fuel for some of the rocket
devices. Certain military explosives were entirely
dependent on synthetic methanol. Without tetra
ethyl lead, the octane number of the Luftwaffe's
aviation gasoline would have been so low that
a 2,000-hp fighter engine would have been able
to deliver only 1,200-hp in the pinches—inade
quate against Allied planes. Without rubber, the
war machine could not have rolled.
Germany's synthetic nitrogen and synthetic
methanol plants were few in number, though of
large capacity, but an ambitious expansion pro
gram was undertaken just as war broke out.
With this program in view, the war planners
were apparently not too uneasy about the minute
stock piles in September, 1939.
Tetraethyl lead, with all production prior to
1939 centered in one plant, was too scarce and
concentrated for comfort. A second plant was
built, coming into operation in July, 1939, a
French plant was captured, and a third German
unit was scheduled for completion in 1945. An
underground plant was also planned, but no
equipment was ever installed. The stock pile of
tetraethyl lead in September, 1939, was equal
to just 1.8 months' war requirements. Ethylene
dibromide, a vital ingredient for ethyl fluid, was
manufactured in only one plant.
Rubber for the war machine was also critically
scarce, but the development and fabrication of
synthetic rubber had advanced successfully by
1936 and 1937. The first large synthetic plant
(at Schkopau) was in operation well before the
war, and a second large plant at Huels came into
production in August, 1940, while a third plant
at Ludwigshafen opened in March, 1943. The
rubber stock pile in September, 1939, was equal-
to 2.4 months' requirements.
The planned expansion in the military explo
sives and propellants industries began secretly in
1934. Many plants were built, and the expansion
and dispersal plans were well worked out, except
that the military were always reluctant to ap
prove adequate facilities for their basic raw ma
terials, apparently finding it difficult to under
stand that without such raw materials their
many over-capacity powder and propellants
plants could not run.
Air Attacks on Chemicals, Rubber, and
Explosives
Neither the German chemical industry nor
any vital segment of it was selected by the Allied
air forces for deliberate concentrated attack. As
TOTAL SYNTHETIC FUEL PRODUCTION BY PROCESS
AVIATION GAsoLINE PRODUCTION AND TONNAGE OF BOMBs DROPPED
-
ON SYNTHETIC FACILITIES

Each Bowe Represen Römhire two/CATES TONMAGE

* - "o of R4/05

-
2000 tons CfBOMes F. rols

--
EstimateD TO HAVE
DROPPED */T PLAM7 0.5 A.A.F |0|| 5
~ ||10|77||
||
6 ||10|| 6 || 7 || 5
|| 8 |<//€ 281/9 ed
I

38 O *

TOTAL
SYNTHETIC
~ 60 PRODUCTION +

# -

-
340 |-

|
320 |-

3 OO -- |

28 O +---
26 O

240

22 O

- +

--~~~~~~ l -
AVIATION
* GASOLINE
|PRODUCTION 1-\ \

+--

2O - -

is
–
O - -
THOUSANDS AVERAGES
I
F |M A M J F M .A
OF METRIC |
TONS PER 1942 1943
194O | 1941 1944 | 94.5
|, |-22
MONTH l l
CO/WF/DEA/TIAL Thousa/WDS of 70//5 £5 W/M47ED
ro save "r Plaxy's
orio 7 2 1.5
is 2 s so:

Figure 2
 AVIATION GASOLINE
STOCKs, PRODUCTION, CONSUMPTION AND TONNAGE OF
BOMBS DROPPED ON THESE FACILITIES
GREATER GERMANY

Each sows "renessars

/OOO TOM's Of 50Mbs
D"OPPED
- wolcares rowass
Es//Mared 70 *VE
h/7 Pla/v7s ()
R.A.F. -- |-| 7 || 0
//O of 477 AC/OS
|-|
4 ||3 || 2 || 5 || 5 ||6
U.S.A.A.F. || 9 ||4 |/O 1/5 1/6 || 4 ||25 &
|

-
6004–A–
550
%
| \ i
\
|
sTocks?
IN TONS
5OO

/
V

\
\||
/
45O
| |

-
4OO \| ||
-
-

/
35O

|
LEGEND ADDITIONS
TO STOCKs
3OO 1–
A --PRODUCTION || ||

- -
| | |

*
250 CONSUMPTION | |

-
DEDUCTIONS |
-
FROM STOCKS |\ |
2OO
—T-T— \ -

PRODUCTION. "

-\
\
-*—t
->
×
*>
:
| N- -
15O - -
-
- \

|
|OO 1– -
UCONSUMPIONT N
---
N |

5O |_|_S :
§

'#
"#"
O

1940
MONTHLY

1941
AVERAGE

1942 1943
J F | M-1 A M . J. J
1944
|A S O |N |D / J , F | M.

1945
A

lord-LEEEEEEEEEEE
*% # #'47ED
#572% AEFASOF7FFFSFOF
7//E 4/o/v7/y.
THE YEAR OF FIRST OF
© 477AC/S ARE 7//OSE MADE Ow/yrd/Voge:MAT/o/y PLA/V7's
W///C// MAA/UFACTUAED 997-24 Or 7//E AV/A7/OW 64SOL//VE
* //VCCL/DES //MAO/r/s and Mr.Sc.

Figure 3
 GENERAL SUMMARY

Oil Division personnel could ascertain, no

far

the plants were available for inspection

as

less

is
single attack was dispatched against synthetic comprehensible.
nitrogen and methanol, despite the readily per There were 35 large explosives and propel
ceptible military consequences. Yet both lants plants, seven which made 70 per cent

of

of

of
these
vital chemicals were knocked out as bonus— the total production high explosives. These

of
of a
fortuitous perhaps and until the end the war plants were never selected for serious strategic
unrecognized—resulting from the vigorous cam attack, although may be argued that knocking

it
paign against oil (Figure 4). When two plants out these key plants might have curtailed pro
Ludwigshafen) were shut down by explosives with less expenditure

of

of
(Leuna and duction
dispatched against oil targets, Ger synthetic
air

of
attacks effort than the incidental knockout
many was deprived per her syn nitrogen plants. As the result single raid by
of

of

of
63 cent

a
nitrogen, per synthetic two Halifaxes which dropped two 2,000-lb.
of

thetic 40 cent her

methanol, and 65 per cent her synthetic rub bombs and 1,748 incendiaries, half of the TNT
of

five additional oil plants in production capacity these plants was

to

ber. Damage

of

of
one
synthetic nitrogen 91 per destroyed and never recovered.
to

creased the loss

in

synthetic methanol 86 per cent. When

to to

cent,
in

the nitrogen supply began vanish, agriculture How the Oil-Chemical Industry Was
was the first to feel the pinch. No synthetic Knocked Out
nitrogen was available for fertilizer after Septem
two principal ways stopping

of
There are
ber, 1944, and the anticipated drop the 1945
in

production heavy process industries such

as
harvest from this cause alone was estimated at of
the German oil-chemical complex: They can be
per cent.
22

knocked out permanently by heart blow, or

a
From September on, the Wehrmacht felt the they can be temporarily incapacitated by non
spite frantic attempts
to
of

and install
in

blow,
fatal injuries. The heart any plant
of
such

in

a
plants for converting by-product coke-oven nitro complex its supply basic process material.
of
is

gen into form satisfactory for explosives man In the German oil-chemical industry this was
a

ufacture, stocks explosives had dropped by

of

process gas. Cutting off the gas supply, through

January, 1945, less than two months' require knocking out the conversion plants, the gas puri
to

(Figure 5). High explosives were only 33 fication plants, the compressors which com
or

ments
and ammonium nitrate 12 per cent
of

per cent pressed the gas, would have dealt heart blow
a

production. Thousands
of

peak finished shell the complex. The veins, arteries, and nervous
to

cases remained unfilled, and those that were system are the water, steam, and electric distri
filled contained up 70 per cent
to

to

spread out that to

of

rock salt
so

bution systems. These are

the small supply explosives. The re
of

stretch tal destruction practically impossible (unless

is

duction in munitions effectiveness was about steam-generating plant, an electric generating

a

the percentage rock salt used. Sup

of to

of

equal plant, water plant destroyed, which was

or

is
a

plies anti-aircraft ammunition were so short, never accomplished German oil-chemical

in

the Flak
to

according plants), but they can be damaged, and produc

of

General von Axthelm

Artillery, that battery commanders were ordered tion impossible until repairs are made.
is

enemy aircraft overhead unless

at

fire
to

not What kept Leuna and some the other Ger

of

(a) the airplanes were attacking the target man oil-chemical plants shut down was damage
battery was supposed protect, (b)
to

which the
to

water lines, gas mains, sewers, and electric

the commander was sure he could hit the air
cables. After the first two attacks on Leuna,
planes!
94 per cent the utilities damaged had
to
of

be
That nitrogen plants were given higher re repaired before the plant could be reopened,
a

pair priority than oil plants under although only per cent the building damage
to

easy
of
is

stand. Why Allied military intelligence—at least be repaired. By November, 1944, there
to

had
Oil Division personnel could learn— the water system
as

had been over 1,500 breaks

in
as

far
pick up knowledge alone, each which, according the plant man
to

of

to

the situation until

of

failed
 STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY: OIL DIVISION REPORT
ager, "would have been considered in peace time
a serious disturbance to production.” The 22 at
tacks on this plant resulted in more than 5,000
individual breaks in the utilities distributing sys
tems. But by achieving some production between
attacks, the plant managed to average about 9
per cent of normal output throughout the period.
Vital process installations were so effectively
protected by blast walls and reinforced concrete
“dog houses” that essential, hard-to-replace
equipment was seldom destroyed by the muni
tions generally employed. In a few instances, of
which the Bottrop-Welheim (Ruhroel) hydro
genation plant is the most striking example, this
destruction was accomplished (Figure 6). In two
raids, 27 September and 31 October 1944, the
RAF hit the high-pressure compressor house
with three 4,000-lb. and eight 1,000-lb. bombs.
The seven heavy compressors and boosters,
through which was funneled every cubic foot of
the hydrogen required for the process, were com
pletely destroyed. The plant could not operate
until new compressors were installed. This
meant a twelve-month shutdown if new com
pressors had to be built and a delay of three
months if replacements could be “lifted” from
another plant. The four subsequent attacks on
this plant were unnecessary. These results may
be compared with those at Leuna, which, after
being hit by 1,643 tons of bombs in 22 attacks,
could have reached 70 per cent of normal pro
duction capacity within a few months without
the importation of any new heavy equipment.
Knocking out vital utilities might be termed
“the hard way” to stop war production since
the bomb dosage must be repeated so often. De
stroying vital process equipment means that the
plant need not be attacked again for months.
Weapon Effectiveness and Bombing
Techniques
Through on-the-spot surveys, interrogation of
Luftwaffe, Wehrmacht, and industrial personnel,
and examinations of captured German docu
ments, the Oil Division found answers to these
questions:
1. How many tons of bombs had to be dis
patched in order that one ton might hit struc
tures or equipment susceptible to damage?
2. Which of the bombing techniques deliv
ered the most bombs on vital plant sections?
3. Which of the various types and sizes of
bombs used against Germany caused the great
est production loss per ton of bonubs dropped?
Tremendous Air Effort Required
Under the conditions created in Germany by
heavy flak, fighter opposition, bad weather, and
effective smoke screening, it was necessary in a
high percentage of the attacks to use instrument
bombing, which proved to be far less accurate
than visual bombing. As a result, tremendous
bombing tonnages had to be flown from England
in order to hit vital parts of plants with a rela
tively small tonnage. Detailed plant records
for three plants (Leuna, Ludwigshafen-Oppau,
Zeitz) show that, of 30,000 tons of bombs
dropped, only 3,781 tons hit within the plant
fences. Different aiming techniques gave the fol
lowing results:
Percentage of Hits
Air Force and Technique Within the Plants
Eighth Air Force, visual aiming .................... 26.8
Eighth Air Force, part visual
and part instrument .................................... 12.4
Eighth Air Force, full instrument ................ 5.4
RAF, night Pathfinder technique .................. 15.8
Weighted average ........................................ 12.6
Figure 7 shows what happened to 146,000
bombs released by the USAAF and the RAF in
the strategic bombing of these three large Ger
man oil-chemical plants. Their combined area
is about 3% square miles; yet only 12.9 per cent
of the bombs dropped landed within the plant
fence limits. Hitting within the plant fences does
not tell the whole story. Some bombs failed to
explode (carefully kept German plant records
indicate that 14.1 per cent of all of the bombs
hitting these plant areas failed to explode),
some fell in open areas where no damage was
caused, some hit unessential buildings, some fell
on the utilities distribution systems, and some
hit vital plant equipment. Only about 3 per cent
of all the bombs dropped hit buildings, equip
ment, and other damageable structures. It is thus
clear that the greatest single chance for bomb
ing improvement in air attacks lies in even a
small increase in bombing accuracy.
 EXAMPLES OF INTEGRATION OF GERMAN INDUSTRIES

EACM LINE

-
\
REPRESENTS
-
10). Of
TOTAL

-
GERMAN
PRODUCTION

150

140

130
SYNTHETIC
RUBBER
120

110

-
C.
NITRic Act
ACID
100
DIVIDEND: DAMAGE OR DESTRUCTION TO RELATED PRODUCTS

L
90

:
C

SYNTHETIC
50 - £|
NITROGEN

40 NITRIC.ACID

30

synthetic SYNTHETIC
NITROGEN METHANOL
TARGET
- -

-
10 -
-

- SYNTHETIC
NIROGEN

|
{{

AVIATION
.

LEUNA SCHKOPAU
4.

figure
 :*
NITROGEN PRODUCTION AND ALLOCATIONS
GREATER GERMANY
NITROGEN PRODUCTION WAS NEVER ATTACKED AS SUCH THE BOMB TONNAGES
SHOWN ON THIS CHART WERE ACTUALLY DIRECTED AT OIL TARGETS

3. F. RA/
&OMP
f {:
-
R.A. 3 ||3 || 2 || 6 ||3 || 6 ||3 || 2 | 1
/OOO TOM'S Of BOME5 &Y
|U.S.A.A.A." /

DASHLINES INDICATE
ALLOCATION

TOTAL
PRODUCTION

CALGIUML
|LCYANAMIDE

BY-PRODUCT
COKE OVENS

L.

FERTUZER";

:SYNTHETIC|

WEHRMACHT NORECTS:

WEHRMACHT DIRECT

SMALL RECONVERSION
OF AMMO. SULFATE

THOUSANDS
OF METRIC
/ TONS PER
MONTH

Gow//DEA///a/.

-
Pre-attack view of the vital high-pressure compressors at the Bottrop-Welheim hydrogenation plant (Ruhroel),
which made Germany's best aviation gasoline. All the hydrogen required for synthetic oil manufacture was
compressed to 10,000 lb per square inch by seven large compressors, of which two are shown.

-
Same compressors after they had suffered 11 direct hits by large HE bombs (three 4,000-lb and eight
1,000-lb bombs), destroying all seven compressors. The four subsequent attacks were unnecessary.

Figure 6

-
5
 STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY: OIL DIVISION REPORT
Unexploded Bombs Mean Wasted Missions
Unexploded bombs bespeak wasted missions
and lives of fliers risked in vain. In two plants
surveyed, unexploded bombs amounted to 24
and 31 per cent of those landing within the fence
lines. The average for 13 plants was 16 per cent
(see Table 46). A study of unexploded bombs
found throughout Germany indicated that fre
quently the bombs had landed flat because the
tail fins had become detached or had broken off
during descent; other bombs still had the arm
ing wires intact in their fuzes when they were
found; in others the fuzes had broken off. Seven
500-lb bombs dropped in a single raid struck the
reactor house of the Fischer-Tropsch plant at
Castrop-Rauxel, a sufficient number to have de
molished it completely. None of them detonated,
and the reactor house was intact on V-E Day.
Targets and Aiming Points Should Be
Selected Very Carefully
Prior to the oil offensive, 53 per cent of the
509,200 tons of bombs dropped on Germany
were aimed at cities and only 13 per cent at
industly, including only 1.1 per cent assigned to
oil targets. During the oil offensive, 27.5 per cent
of the 1,477,217 tons dropped were aimed at
cities, and 22 per cent at industries, including
to oil targets (see Appen
15.9 per cent assigned
dix Table G-I). Why so many tons of bombs
were dropped on cities in preference to the more
vital industrial targets is not known to the Oil
Division. No doubt exists, however, regarding
the benefits to humanity that would have re
sulted from an earlier knockout of these essen
tial industries.
- targets (Figure 8).
Detailed plant examinations convinced Oil Di
vision engineers that, in spite of the bombing in
accuracies involved, a vulnerable plant section
chosen consistently as an aiming point could be
destroyed. An outstanding example was the high
pressure research area at Ludwigshafen, which,
although it contributed practically nothing to the
war production, was chosen as the aiming point in
10 out of 25 attacks on the Ludwigshafen works.
It was completely destroyed. At Leuna, although
the gas generation plant was known to be vulner
able and the most vital part of the entire plant,
it and its vicinity were designated only 16 times
out of 48 specific aiming points. In other words,
only about one third of the airplanes attacking
Leuna aimed their bombs at the most vital and
vulnerable part of the entire target.
Small Bombs Stopped Production, but Did
It the Hard Way
The small bombs generally used against Ger
man oil-chemical targets were capable of creat
ing breaks in vital utilities systems, thereby tem
porarily shutting off plant production, but only
very rarely were small bombs able to destroy
vital equipment. (During the oil offehsive, the
average size of all the 508,512 high-explosive
bombs dropped on oil producing targets by the
USAAF was 388 lb, and of the 263,942 dropped
by the RAF, 660 lb. The average for both air
forces was 480 lb.) Winning a war with small
bombs requires a tremendous air force, but this
is possibly the only choice open if visual sight
ing is not possible or if vital aiming points are
not chosen.
Only Large Bombs Destroy Vital Process
Equipment
Few large bombs were used against German
oil-chemical plants, and most of these were
dropped by the RAF. It is the unanimous con
viction of all Oil Division observers that, under
bombing conditions which permit sighting on a
specific aiming point and with reasonable bomb
ing accuracy, heavy bombs (2,000 to 4,000 lb.,
instantaneously fuzed) are several times as ef
fective per ton as the lightweight bombs (500
lb. or less) used principally against German oil
Incendiaries Were Seldom Used Effectively
Very few instances of appreciable production
loss were caused by the small number of in
cendiaries used against German oil producing
targets (only 6,541 tons out of a total of 196,052
tons). In most instances, incendiaries burned
themselves out or were extinguished before
spilled oil or other inflammable material had
time to spread and become the focal point of a
serious fire. It was the opinion of German plant
managers, concurred in by all Oil Division ob
servers, that incendiaries dropped after or set to
 GENERAL SUMMARY

Compressor building at Boehlen. The 8-in. reinforced concrete Compressor building at Zeitz. A 1,000-lb bomb detonated 5 ft

£:
arch was damaged by a 500-lb HE bomb. Piping was damaged from this 8-in-thick reinforced concrete arch. The compressor

*
by fragments, but the compressor and motor were not damaged. housing was slightly hurt, but the arch shielded the machine.

* .." -

Compressor building at Boehlen. A 1,000-lb HE bomb scoring a This high-pressure compressor at Bottrop-Welheim was demol
direct hit penetrated the 12-in-thick reinforced concrete protec ished by blast of a 4,000-lb HE bomb. Seven similar compressors
tion arch and detonated within the shelter. The compressor was suffered similar destruction when this building received 11 direct
destroyed. hits by three 4,000-lb and eight 1,000-lb bombs.

Figure 8

ignite several minutes following high-explosive of the longer duration and lack of uniformity
attacks. would have resulted in far more serious of RAF raids –
each bombardier sighted his
fire damage. bombs independently, whereas the customary
practice in the Eighth Air Force was for pilots
Longer Raids Would Have Been to release their bombs on a signal from the lead
More Effective plane—RAF attacks were, by almost unanimous
The short duration of most USAAF raids en agreement among the Germans interrogated,
abled German defense personnel to leave shelter more terrifying and more damaging. Had it been
in time to deal with incendiaries and incipient found possible, within the limitations imposed
fires before conflagrations were started. Because by operational considerations, to vary the length

736.512 0–47––3
 STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY: OIL DIVISION REPORT
and pattern of USAAF raids, greater results
would have been achieved for the same expendi
ture in bombs.
German Air Raid Protective Measures
Basically, German air raid protective mea
sures consisted of: (a) active defenses, such as
fighter protection and flak; (b) passive defenses,
such as smoke screens, barrage balloons, blast
walls, decoy plants, and camouflage; (c) con
cealment techniques, such as the ambitious pro
gram for dispersed and underground plants. .
The German active anti-aircraft defenses
caused heavy. Allied losses but did not prevent
successful air attacks. Both fighter and flak de
fenses were extremely heavy during the early
months of the oil-chemical offensive, but as short
ages in both gasoline and explosives became crit
ical, the effect was discernible in a radical weak
ening in the German defensive capacity. During
the final months of the war, Allied bombers
roamed at large over the Reich, encountering
only negligible opposition.
Germany's passive defenses interfered with,
but did not prevent, successful air attacks. The
effective use of smoke screens combined with
bad weather conditions resulted in a tremendous
wastage of bombs. Decoy plants also attracted
many bombs. During the first seven large-scale
attacks on Leuna, nearly as many tons fell on
the decoy plant as on the real plant. Blast walls
and reinforced concrete “dog houses” were use
less against 4,000-lb. bombs, but prevented seri
ous damage from near misses by 1,000-lb. bombs
and were effective against even direct hits of
500-lb. and smaller bombs. But the utility sys
tems were vulnerable, and the oil attacks were
therefore successful.
Concealment techniques were not effective
against Allied air attacks. Even had the ambi
tious underground and dispersal plant program
been started six months earlier and completed
before Allied attacks on oil started, the entire
underground system would still have been nul
lified because the plants depended on Germany's
transportation system, which was, for all prac
tical purposes, destroyed. Figure 9 indicates the
planned and completed program — a clear-cut
case of “too little and too late.”
Possible Application of German Protective
Techniques to American Industries
Air defenses for the United States far su
perior to those which prevailed in Germany
would still leave American industries vulner
able; passive defenses even more extensive than
the German could not prevent destruction. To
move the American oil and chemical industries
underground would be a task of staggering mag
nitude and would still leave the industries sus
ceptible to strangulation through attacks on
transportation. Blast walls and “dog houses” lose
even academic interest in the era of the atomic
bomb and its successors. The only defense of
American industry envisaged by Oil Division
personnel is the prevention of air attacks.
Conclusions
The Allied air offensive against the German
oil-producing target systems:
(a) Effectively stopped oil production with
decisive military consequences;
(b) As an unexpected bonus, effectively
stopped production of military explosives and
propellants, thereby contributing an additional
-
decisive effect;
(c) Could have been accomplished with less
effort if bombing accuracy had been better, if
aiming points had been more wisely chosen, if
munitions capable of destroying vital process
equipment had been employed whenever rea
sonable bombing accuracy was obtainable, and
if sounder military intelligence had been made
available;
(d) Indicated that none of the German pro
tective measures, even after major improve
ments, would fully protect American industry
against enemy air attack.
Recommendations
On the basis of its findings, the Oil Division
recommends:
(a) That intensive research on aiming tech
nique be continued, since improvement in bomb
ing accuracy, with a given weapon, offers the
greatest single chance of improving the effective
ness of air attack.
(b) men with sound industrial experi
That
ence at the operating level co-operate actively
 WHERE
| %
OUR BOMBS
DROPPED:

N OPEN TERRAIN

UNEXPLODED

DECOy
PLANTS WITHIN TARGET AREA - OUISIDE TARGET AREA
COMPARISON - PLANNED
CAPACITY OF UNDERGROUND AND
DISPERSAL PLANTS WITH ACTUAL OIL PRODUCTION
GREATER GERMANY

5OO

45O

400
TOTAL
ACTUAL
PRODUCTION
- -
350 L.

TOTAL PUANNED

*
UNDERGROUND
3OO AND DISPERSAL
CAPACITY

250.
TELANNED
LUBE
CAPAGITY

200.

15O

%
|OO %
$
§
&
- .
5O 2

O --
THOUSANDS
OF METRIC
TONS
PER MONTH
 Avia" -
-
- Gasolins -
- - ExPLOSIVE
PLANTS 150- OCTANE PLANT's
-

O (isobutanol)
O
MoroR a presel
FLEL #
--
ISO-OCTANE *\
-
PLANTs

HYDRöForming
PLANT's
NITRIC ACID

FER ruzER
(2)
C,

AP DE
B

- £
|

PLAN TS
(2)

-
|
- -mň.
TOLUENE

*- --
- -
(2)
|

BENZENE
eccles.

-- -,
Explos-
e.

-,
*
"

-
-

- -
(e

•) - - -
•
-
-

NTEGRATION of
GERMANY'S
PROCESS INDUSTRIES
Coking a
CARBON17ATION
 GENERAL SUMMARY

with Air Force planning and operational groups
in selecting enemy targets, in choosing aiming
points, and in judging the effectiveness of air
attack.
(c) That vigorous research be undertaken
to prevent a recurrence of the unfortunately
large percentage of unexploded bombs found in
Germany.
(d) That, for attacks on plants similar
those investigated in Germany, bombs large
enough to destroy vital equipment be employed,
and that vital plant sections be chosen as aiming
points whenever it is possible to select an aiming
point.
(e) That the United States establish an ade
quate intelligence agency so that any future at
tacks on enemy war industries may be under
to taken with a complete knowledge of the facts.

The greatest danger lies in the threat to the fuel supply. Here the destruction
of a relatively limited number of targets would result in completely para
lyzing the German Air Force, all motorized units, the military and civilian
-
means of transportation, and the Navy.
—From German Air Force Staff, Plans

Division Report of 8 July 1944

 THE INTEGRATION OF THE GERMAN OIL, CHEMICAL,
RUBBER, AND EXPLOSIVES
The Germans waged World War II
with oil,
chemicals, rubber, and explosives made largely
from coal, air, and water. They had searched
their country thoroughly and found very little
petroleum. They had imported it before the war,
and they conquered important fields and cap
tured sizable stocks during the war, but they
still had to use substitutes for crude oil. Less
than 15 per cent of their aviation fuel and only
a fourth of all their oil products made early in
1944 came from crude oil. The rest came from
coal as did also nearly all of Germany's rubber,
explosives, and other war chemicals (Figure 10).
Like oil, coal contains carbon and hydrogen.
With the hydrogen derived from coal and water,
nitrogen can be taken from the air and “fixed”
in the form of ammonia for use in either ferti
lizer or explosives. Methanol (synthetic wood
alcohol), the raw material for many explosives
and chemicals, can be synthesized, with two
gases, hydrogen and carbon monoxide, both of
which are obtainable from coal. Synthetic fuels
can be made in two ways. In the Bergius process,
the complex molecules of coal are split, and hy
drogen is forced into them to convert them into
liquid oil molecules. In the Fischer-Tropsch
process, molecules of hydrogen and carbon mon-
oxide, obtained by breaking up molecules of coal
with steam, are used to build oil molecules. The
Germans employed these processes to manufac
ture the fuel for their war planes, submarines,
and mechanized ground forces.
Germany's chemical industry was well devel
oped long before the war. Its plants, naturally,
were built in or near areas where the coal was
available. One such area was in middle Ger
many, centering on the I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G.
nitrogen and methanol plants there, at Leuna,
another such area was the Ruhr, where Ruhr
chemie and Victor also had nitrogen plants at
INDUSTRIES
t
Holten and Castrop-Rauxel; there was also an
other I.G. Farben nitrogen plant on the Rhine
near Ludwigshafen and Oppau to which coal
from the Ruhr could be brought by barges.
The synthetic oil industry of Germany lit
erally grew out of this chemical industry. I.G.
Farben bought the Bergius patent rights and in
1927 built at Leuna the first commercial hydro
genation plant to produce synthetic gasoline.
This was a logical development because the
Leuna nitrogen plant could produce more hy
drogen than was needed to manufacture am
monia. The high-pressure apparatus and the ex
perience needed to employ the Bergius process
were also available at Leuna. Ruhrchemie ob
tained the patent rights to the Fischer-Tropsch
process and built the first commercial plant of
this type in its nitrogen works at Holten; other
concerns in the Ruhr also favored the Fischer
Tropsch process because of the abundance of
coke and coke-oven gases available there. Dur
ing the war, chemical and oil plants were also
established in Silesia where coal was available.
The quest for self-sufficiency prompted the
Germans to develop synthetic rubber as well as
synthetic fuel. The process that was developed
. made use of materials obtained from coal; the
manufacture of synthetic rubber therefore de
pended on the synthetic chemical and oil plants.
So I.G. Farben began producing rubber near
Leuna, in another new plant in the Ruhr, and in
a third at Ludwigshafen.
The oil, chemical, rubber, explosives, and
other industries, in short, were interlocked not
only by their mutual dependence on coal but
also historically, geographically, and mechan
ically. They were so closely and intricately
woven together, in fact, that they were need
lessly vulnerable to strategic bombing –but
Hitler did not complain until too late.
 INTEGRATION OF OIL, CHEMICALS,
Synthetic Oil
The bulk of Germany's synthetic oil was made
in Bergius hydrogenation plants. These used coal
or coal tars and high-pressure hydrogen. The
hydrogen was made from coke in water-gas gen
erators, purified thoroughly, and used under
pressures of from 3,000 to 10,000 lb per square
inch. Huge, heavy compressors and reactors
were needed. Aviation gasoline, motor fuels, and
diesel fuels were made in this way. Germany
needed so many things, however, that materials
from these hydrogenation plants were soon be
ing used to manufacture many additional prod
ucts. Gases from the reactors were used as motor
fuel and for the manufacture of high-octane avia
tion blending agents such as iso-octane and alky
late. Even synthetic aviation lubricants and im
portant chemicals were made from these gases.
Hydrogenation plant gases also were fed to near
by synthetic rubber plants.
In the Fischer-Tropsch process, gases are han
dled under less pressure, but complicated appa
ratus is required for the actual synthesis of the
oil. This apparatus could not be used to produce
aviation gasoline, but the products of Fischer
Tropsch synthesis had special properties for
which many chemical uses were found during
the war.
Chemicals
Of the thousands of products of the chemical
industry, nitrogen, methanol, and calcium car
bide were among the most important in the
German war effort. Ammonia and methanol
were produced with equipment similar to that
used in synthesizing oils. Calcium carbide was
manufactured from lime and coke in electric
furnaces.
In addition to using ammonia and methanol to
make explosives, and calcium carbide to make
rubber, the Germans made an aviation blending
agent (iso-octane) from methanol via isobu
tanol. This was apparently intended to disasso
ciate iso-octane production from oil, but one
plant was placed in the Ludwigshafen works
and others were placed in new oil-chemical com
plexes in Silesia, where the Luftwaffe was con
fident they could not be attacked successfully.
11
RUBBER, AND EXPLOSIVES
Synthetic Rubber
The main materials used to make synthetic
rubber are butadiene and styrene. The buta
diene was obtained from acetylene, which was
made mainly from calcium carbide produced by
the chemical industry, except in one case where
it was derived from oil plant hydrogenation
gases. The styrene was made from ethylene and
coking plant benzene. The largest synthetic rub
ber plant in Germany, at Schkopau, depended,
moreover, on the Leuna synthetic oil and chemi
cal plant for hydrogen. The rubber industry thus
leaned on the oil and chemical industries. But it
bolstered them by contributing an aviation gaso
line blending agent — diethyl benzene, which is
similar to cumene – and aviation lubricants to
the supplies for the Luftwaffe.
Explosives and Propellants
Nitric acid, which is made from ammonia, is
used in all military explosives and propellants.
Production of these necessities of war, conse
quently, depended on the production of am
monia. For the new explosives, hexogen and
nitro-panta, produced in Germany during the
war, methanol also was required. TNT, the
mainstay of the explosives industry, is made
from toluene, all of which came from the Ruhr
coking industry until 1940. Additional toluene
then was synthesized from methanol and ben
zol. Toward the end of the war, more production
of toluene was planned by the employment of
processes used in synthetic oil production. Ruhr
chemie was also building a plant to make toluene
from normal heptane derived from the Fischer
Tropsch process. A shortage of natural glycerine,
meanwhile, forced Germany to develop a substi
tute, diethylene glycol, which was made by a
series of reactions starting with acetylene, a
product of the carbide industry. Germany's pro
duction of explosives and propellants was thus
enmeshed with the chemical and oil industries
when the war began and became more so as the
war continued.
Table 1 illustrates the concentration of oper
ations. Destruction of these six industrial com
plexes not only would have been a serious blow
to Germany's production of synthetic liquid
 STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY: OIL DIVISION REPORT

fuels but also would have crippled production of
chemicals, explosives, and rubber. The impor
tance of the Leuna and Ludwigshafen plants
was further augmented by the great number of
additional chemical products that they turned
out. These two plants, for instance, produced
76 per cent of the country's ethyl chloride for
tetraethyl lead.
There were many bottlenecks, in fact, in this
complicated industrial structure. Three plants
produced 94 per cent of Germany's synthetic
rubber. Two plants produced four fifths of the
sodium cyanide used to make airplane Plexiglas.
One plant made four fifths of the hydrazine hy
drate used as a rocket and V-weapon propellant.
And one plant made virtually all of the ele
mental phosphorus needed for tracer bullets and
chemical warfare.
I.G. Farben at Leuna was engaged also in the
production of heavy water for Germany's atomic
bomb in a plant of 2 to 3 tons per year planned
capacity (actually they made slightly less than
1 ton per year). The building housing this plant
was reported by the Germans to have been
knocked out in the first raid on Leuna on 12
May 1944, which possibly may have contributed
to the delay in the German development of
atomic power.
The oil, chemical, rubber, and explosives in
dustries had been planned as a single unit, co
ordinated under government and military con
trol, and harnessed to the Nazi war plans (Fig
ure 11). The strategic bombing of the oil
plants made the vulnerability of this structure
so obvious that Hitler personally and publicly
rebuked Dr. Krauch, his general plenipotentiary
for chemical planning. Krauch contended that
he had built large plants to conserve steel and
make the maximum use of gas-producing facili
ties, utilities, etc. The misplaced confidence of
the Germans in the Luftwaffe's ability to protect
them from aerial attacks, however, underlay the
whole plan by which they sought to free them
selves from dependence on other countries for
war supplies. Long after industrial leaders saw
the danger of such integration and concentration

TABLE 1

EXAMPLES OF INTEGRATION OF GERMAN INDUSTRIES

Plant Capacity as Per Cent of Total German Capacity

Plant or Syn. Aviation Aviation Syn. Syn. Nitric Acid Syn.

Complex Company Fuel Fue1+ Lube Nitrogen Methanol (High Conc.) Rubber

Leuna-Schkopau I.G. 13.0 10.9 12.8 32.6 33.3 5.2 46

Ludwigshafen- I.G. 1.4 2.6 - 30.0 6.7 5.6 19

Oppau

Blechhammer- I.G. 4.4 1.0 Plant 8.5 23.2 - -

Hedebreck planned

Sterkrade-
*
Ruhrchemie 1.3 - - 6.6 - Planned—not -
Holten completed

Castrop-Rauxel Victor 0.9 - - 6.9 - - -

Auschwitz I.G. - - - - 23.2 - Not in
operation”

Total 20.6 14.5 12.8 84.6 86.4 10.8 65

* If Auschwitz had been complete and had operated at capacity, it would have contributed about 19 per cent of
the total. -

* These figures are subject to considerable variation due to flexibility in shifting distribution of hydrogenation
products.

Basis taken is 1 May 1943 to 1 May 1944 for Leuna and Oppau. Blechhammer is on basis of April, 1944, figures only.

12
 -
THE REGIMENTATION OF
GERMANY'S OIL AND
CHEMICAL INDUSTRY

sur-Rûr
COMMAND
OFTHEARMED
FORCES

"-
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AR-AME
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PRODUCTION INDEx

#1"i" *-&
BASED ON AVERAGE OF JANUARY - APRIL 1944
PRODUCTION = |OO

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3|||||||||||||||||||}||
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OF GERMANY'S

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| \!.' | | || ||
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| 2 MAY 1944
START OF THE OIL OFFENSIVE

F1GURE 12
 INTEGRATION OF OIL, CHEMICALS, RUBBER, AND EXPLOSIVES

of production facilities, the Luftwaffe continued
to promise them complete protection.
Figure 12 shows the rise and fall of the Ger
man chemical empire as reflected in production
of aviation gasoline, synthetic nitrogen, synthetic
methanol, and nitrogen supplied to the Army for
munitions. Production in the first four months
of 1944 was taken as normal, or 100, in prepar
ing this chart. The similarity of the curves is
striking. Aviation gasoline production declined
first, but decline of the others followed quickly.
The first two months of strategic bombing undid
the results of three years' strenuous work by the
Germans.

The production of nitrogen, methanol, Buna, and fuel are critical points of

attack. These are basic materials, which are inherently bottlenecks, due to
the huge quantities required, together with the fact that they are manufac
tured in a very few large plants. Within the chemical sector these might be
first choice for a "short-term” target.
—From German Air Force Staff, Plans

Division Report of 25 April 1944

The most remunerative targets for enemy air attacks—in the chemical field

-are Ludwigshafen-Oppau, Leuna, Auschwitz, Heydebreck, Holten, Schol

ven, and Rauxel; the loss of these plants would be followed by serious dis.
ruptions—some in a very short time—in the Buna, nitrogen, methanol, and
aviation fuels industries.
—From German Air Force Staff, Plans

Division Report of 3 August 1944

13
 STRATEGIC AIR ATTACK ON THE GERMAN OIL INDUSTRY

Germans used less than one fifteenth as much posed when the war began, and tightened

as
per person was being consumed Germany's plight became more desperate.
oil

as
in

in
1936
make Germany self

to
the United States. Efforts
The stimulus

of
Crude Production. subsidies

in
sufficient were already under way 1936, but

in
substantial import duties more than

to
more than six tenths of the nation's oil was still addition
being imported, mostly from the western hemi tripled exploratory drilling between 1933 and
sphere; the Reich's own fields supplied only 1937. No important new fields were found, but

7
crude production Germany rose from 230,000

in
per cent the country's requirements, and the
of

peak

to
about 1,000,000 tons

of
tons”

in
infant synthetic oil industry then supplied only 1932

a
1940. This production came mainly from well

in
about 30 per cent.
established areas northwestern Germany.

in
Hitler harnessed industry the government
to

govern

to
overcome this deficiency. Existing Anschluss with Austria gave the Nazis access
to

additional producing areas, and discovery

of
mental machinery was expanded, new agencies the
were created, and various industry and trade Prinzendorf field in the Vienna Basin enabled
produce crude

to

at
1,100,000

of
associations were turned into semigovernmental Austria rate

a
bodies. The brown coal producers, for example, tons year 400,000 more than the Germans

—
a
had anticipated by the end

of
were forced to combine to form the Braunkohle 1942. German

–
Benzin A. G. (BRABAG), which built several and Austrian production together, however,
produc never exceeded 2,000,000 tons year, and

in
large synthetic oil plants. Expansion one
of

tion facilities also was encouraged by import Germany needed four times that much.
duties—the tariff on gasoline rose 30 cents per
to

Synthetic Production.

of
gallon 1937—and the government contracted None the crude oils
in

available yielded aviation grade gasoline,

so
buy aviation gasoline and aviation gasoline the
to

blending agents guaranteed prices. Thus, Germans counted on their synthetic oil industry
at
at

not only make up for the inadequate quantity

to

private capital finance Hit

to

first was induced

their crude oil, but also meet their require
to
of

ler's grandiose plans, and government credit was

made available later. ments for aviation fuel. The Nazi program called
for greater production by both the Bergius hy
drogenation and the Fischer-Tropsch processes.
The Self-Sufficiency Program
The former was emphasized, however, because

it
The government encouraged both exploration was the only process by which large quantities
exploitation
to
of

and German fields obtain more aviation gasoline could be produced. More
of

crude. At the same time, tremendous synthetic over, the production

to

was better suited of

a

it

oil industry, based partly on bituminous coal but synthetic liquid fuels from brown coal (the only
mainly on brown coal, was developed. For
some parts Ger
a

of

raw material available

in

alcohol,
as

while, the use

of

such substitute fuels many), and was owned by the influential I.G.
it

benzol, and other coal tar products was also en

Farbenindustrie.
couraged, but this did not help greatly the indigenous liquid fuel pro
in

The expansion
in of

drive for self-sufficiency. Alcohol and benzol,

duction projected the four-year plan sum
is

moreover, were war materials. Before the war

was apparently no attempt
to

there curtail Tonnages oil and oil products are given

of

metric
in
*

civilian consumption, but restrictions were im tons; tonnages, however, are given
in

bomb short tons.

14
 ATTACK ON OIL

arized in Table 2. This plan, for which Herman
Goering was made responsible, was conceived in
1936, formally approved on 27 May 1937, and
revised many times later.
The High Cost of synthetics
Gasoline produced from coal by either the
Bergius hydrogenation or the Fischer-Tropsch
process costs from four to five times as much as
gasoline obtained from natural petroleum. From
8 to 10 tons of brown coal, or 4 to 5 tons of
bituminous coal, are needed to make a single ton
of gasoline. Fifteen times as much steel is re
quired for synthetic oil plants as for crude oil
refineries, and the comparative amount of labor
necessary is almost equally staggering.
The Germans continued, nevertheless, to ex
tend their plans for synthetic production. The
four-year plan gave way in July, 1938, to the
take 4,500,000 tons of steel, or 0.62 ton of steel
per additional ton of annual capacity. This esti
mate, moreover, probably did not cover steel
needed to mine the coal from which the oil was
to be produced.
Diversion of steel and labor to the production
of tanks, submarines, and other materiel cur
tailed and delayed the oil program, but actual
deliveries of steel for the oil projects, between 1
July 1937 and 1 April 1944, were about 4,380,000
tons. This amount of steel would have sufficed to
build a battle fleet four times as big as the U. S.
Navy was in January, 1940.
The Manpower Requirements
The Karin Hall plan estimated that 57,600
construction workers would be needed for the
oil program by 1 July 1939 and 70,000 from
1 October 1939 onward. Requirements by the

Karin Hall plan, which placed more emphasis
on preparations for war. Existing plants and re
fineries produced about 3,70°,000 tons of oil
products in 1938; the new plan called for pro
duction of 11,000,000 tons annually by the be
ginning of 1944, and estimated that this would
end of 1941 were estimated by the office of the
Commissioner General for the Chemical Indus
try at 135,000. But such numbers were never
obtained. When the war began, only 35,000 con
struction workers were being used to build oil
facilities. This number was more than doubled
by mid-1941, however, and employment of con

TABLE 2
struction workers on oil projects reached a peak
of 85,000 in the spring of 1943.
PLANNED PRODUCTION OF LIQUID FUELS The number of workers engaged in operating
(GASOLINE, DIESEL OIL, AND FUEL OIL)
and maintaining the oil plants was 34,000 in
UNDER GERMAN FOUR-YEAR PLAN OF
June, 1938. The Karin Hall plan called for 6,600
1936–37
additional operating personnel in mid-1939, to be
(Thousands of Metric Tons)
increased to 66,000 by the second half of 1942.
1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 In September, 1944, according to a statement
Synthetic - by the Economic Group of the Fuel Industry,
Hydrogenation 622 857 953 1,898 2,732 20,000 persons were employed in crude produc
Fischer-Tropsch 8 117 545 686 693
tion, 14,500 in crude refining, 89,200 in the syn
Total
synthetic 630 1,498 2,584 3,425
thetic industry, and 13,100 in coal tar distillation
974
— a total of 136,800. This estimate did not in
Refining indigenous
160 160 160 160 160 clude miners, and probably omitted construction
_crude"
Alcohol, benzol, tar workers. Hence, some 200,000 workers were
distillation, etc. 1,060 1,061 1,097 1,132 1,162 probably engaged in the production of oil in Ger
TOTAL 1,850 2,195 2,755 3,876 4,747 many. In the United States, about 270,000 per
sons were employed in drilling, producing, and
* The crude was worked up to produce maximum
lubricating oils rather than liquid fuels. The four-year refining oil in 1939, but this country's production
plan shows that about 150,000 tons per year of lubri then was more than twenty times the peak of
cating oils and 175,000 tons of special naphthas were also
8,000,000 tons per year which the Germans at
to be refined from indigenous crude. As subsequent tables
show, Germany was able to push her crude production tained shortly before the strategic bombers be
far above the figures set in these early plans. gan to smash up their plants.

15
 STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY: OIL DIVISION REPORT

this plan. addition, each large synthetic plant

In
The lag in Construction
buffer storage

to
have about 100,000 tons

of
Germany's economy was strained increasingly was
capacity transportation

so
by the demands for labor and steel to supply the that difficulties would
war machine with liquid fuels. Men and mate
not halt its operation.
rial were needed simultaneously for many other TABLE

3
projects. The oil industry's requirements, more
GERMANY'S 1938. PLAN FOR STORAGE OF
over, were especially burdensome on the steel
industry because alloy steels and special forg
LIQUID FUELS AND LUBRICANTS
(Thousands of Metric Tons)
ings constituted a substantial part of the tonnage
needed. Making the large high-pressure vessels Avia
required for the hydrogenation plants was a job tion Motor Lubri
Type Gaso- Gaso- Diesel Fuel cating

of
comparable to manufacturing naval guns. Steel Storage line line Oil Oil Oils Total

–
deliveries began to lag as early as 1938 and were Government
130,000 tons short of allocations when the war owned 1,500 500 150 2,900
750
began. Allocations from then on had to be cut
drastically and frequently.
Industry
owned 1,000 250 - 1,250

–
-

–
The oil industry, moreover, could not obtain Naval storage - 1,800 1,800

—
–
enough construction workers to put in the steel TOTAL 1,500 1,500 1,000 1,800 5,950
150
actually delivered. It was allocated 275,000 tons
of steel in the third quarter of 1941 and got Air Force Plans. The Luftwaffe masked its war
180,000 tons; its allocation for the next quarter preparations behind company formed the

in
a
was 290,000 tons and it received 170,000 tons. early 1930's and deceptively named the Wirt
To make effective use of the steel that was de schafts Forschungsgesellschaft, Economic Re

or
livered, the industry needed at least 90,000 of search Association. This firm, better known as
the 135,000 construction workers it had been WIFO, was created partly buy and store

to
promised for each quarter, but it actually had secret reserves of fuel and lubricants for the
only 71,000 workers in the third quarter of 1941 Luftwaffe, and was charge testing, blend
of
in

only 65,000 in the last quarter. ing, storing, and distributing gasoline and oil

to
and
Even before Germany went to war, the expan the air forces after Germany went war. WIFO to
sion program was far behind schedule. Several built great many storage depots, mostly under
a

plants (Wanne Eickel, Schwarzheide, Welheim, ground and well scattered throughout the Reich.
and the Scholven extension) were completed as new war production plan made late
in
A

1938
planned in 1938, but others (including Luetz government stor
to

refers “further increase”

in
a

kendorf Fischer, Hoesch, and Essener Verein) 4,000,000 tons.

to

age
missed the deadline by from three to six months.
Army Plans. The German army chose rely
to

By the next year, every project except the Gel

senberg plant and the iso-octane plant at Oppau largely on the industry's facilities, and built only
about 50,000 tons storage
of

of

had been delayed from one to nine months. The its own.
Luetzkendorf hydrogenation plant was thirteen
Industry Storage. was planned that industry
III and I
It
II,

months behind. Boehlen Zeitz and

of to

1,000,000 tons
of

should increase its stocks

scheduled for completion December, 1939, and
in

gasoline and 250,000 tons diesel oil.

May, 1940, respectively, lagged from
16
to
11

months. Navy Plans. Naval storage space, according

to

1938 construction plans, was have been suffi

to

Store Up Fuel
to

The Effort cient for 1,650,000 tons by April, 1941, and for
Along with these efforts increase produc as much as 2,000,000 tons later since “stocks
of
in to

tion, the Germans, planned build up fuel and diesel oils can be regarded
as
to

1938 available
stock pile nearly 6,000,000 tons liquid raw material reserves for hydrogenation.”
of

of

A
a

fuel by April 1943. Table gives details statement prepared for the British Admiralty by
of
3
1

6
|
 ATTACK ON OIL

Admiral Adam gives the German navy's storage total production aviation gasoline 1940,

of

bu
in
capacity on 1 July 1944 as 2,114,000 tons, was far from being enough.

it
mostly underground, and distributed as shown in In July, 1939, an official German review

o (
Table 4. the fuel situation showed that Hitler had

TABLE 4
hand only:

GERMAN NAVY STORAGE CAPACITY FOR OIL 480,000 tons aviation gasoline, enough

of

fo
AS OF 1 JULY 1944 3.1 months of war;
350,000 tons motor gasoline, enough

of

fo
(Thousands of Metric Tons)
war;

of
Underground 1.9 months
Storage Surface Tanks Total 760,000 tons of marine diesel and fuel oil
enough for 4.8 months war;

of
North Sea area 1,419 294 1,713
308,000 tons auto diesel oil, enough for

of
Baltic area 337 37 374
Interior 27 - 27
2.2 months of war.

TOTAL 1,783 331 2,114

The whole stock pile was only 1,898,000 tons,
and Germany had consumed more than twice
The total amount of storage space actually that amount single peacetime year. With

in
a
available when the war started is not known, but such low stocks, Hitler obviously was poorly pre
a German document shows that by 12 Decem pared for long, global war.

as a
ber 1943 WIFO could store only 850,000 tons Even late as October, 1938, the Germans
of gasoline and the army's facilities would hold apparently had not expected

to
need maximum
only slightly more than 50,000 tons. Hence, al captured plan
of
reserves oil until much later.

A
though naval storage space increased according dated 30 January 1939 shows that the Luftwaffe
to plan, Germany's total storage capacity was then foresaw relatively small increase (be
a
never as great as contemplated. tween 270,000 and 420,000 tons per year)

in
its
consumption aviation gasoline the autumn,
to of

in
The Failure to Fill the Tanks presumably cover the Polish campaign.

A
The Nazis, however, were not able to fill the tremendous increase, 2,600,000 or even
to
tanks that they had built. The importers and 5,200,000 tons per year, was not scheduled

to
oil

marketers of products, controlled mainly by occur until October 1940, when the real war
1

American and Allied interests, resisted the de presumably was

in to

have begun.
mands from Berlin that they increase their Embroilment global war full year be
a

stocks Germany beyond their reasonable re fore the Nazi war lords were ready for pre
in

it
quirements. Increasing international tension, for vented them from carrying out their aerial
eign exchange difficulties, and the complexity attacks with the savagery they envisioned.
of

“clearing” and barter agreements made the im Hitler gambled, obviously, on Britain's reluc
porters cautious. They kept their German cus fight. But he may have banked, too, on
to

tance
the period the surprisingly low fuel cost blitz attacks.
of

tomers on hand-to-mouth basis

in
a

immediately preceding the war, and trade stocks

Productive Capacity 1939-1940
in

were not large when Hitler thrust into Poland.

accumulate aviation gaso
WIFO's efforts Germany's crude and synthetic oil plants were
to

line were hampered by the limited world supply producing about 4,050,000 tons oil products
of

such gasoline. The Nazis, moreover, did not per year when war broke out. Figure
of

13

shows
dare go about this stock-piling too openly. Never Germany's principal oil produc
of

the location
theless, by undercover purchases over period ing areas and each area's production during the
a

years, WIFO built up 480,000-ton reserve war. Figure 14 shows the location refining
as of of

of
a

aviation gasoline. This was six times and synthetic oil facilities, including some which
as

much
was needed for civilian flying Germany were not completed until the war was nearly
in

in

1938, and equaled nearly one third OVer.

of

America's

17
 |

|
W
 STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY: OIL DIVISION REPORT

Refineries. The total capacity of Germany's re
fineries, about 5,000,000 tons annually (a good
part of which was merely topping capacity), was
much more than sufficient for crude produced in
Germany and imports from the Balkans. This
to about 5,100,000 tons. The next spring, when
they brought the “phoney” period to an end, the
completion of more synthetic plants had raised
this figure to 5,500,000.

-
surplus served later, however, as a cushion TABLE 5
against the effects of aerial attacks on oil re
GERMAN SYNTHETIC OIL CAPACITY IN
fineries. About 29 per cent of this capacity OPERATION OR UNDER CONSTRUCTION
was deep in Germany, mainly in the vicinity of AT OUTBREAK OF WAR
Vienna and the Protectorate, but 71 per cent
(Thousands of Metric Tons per Year)
(2,268,000 tons per year in the Hamburg area,
540,000 tons at Hanover, and 780,000 tons scat Ultimate Capacity
Capac-
tered through northern and western Germany)
ity as Capac- Plants
was within the reach of French and British
of Sep- ity as Designed
bombers. tember, of May, Prior AM1
1939 1940 to War Plants
Synthetic Plants. Nearly 1,280,000 tons of syn
Western Germany
thetic oil products were produced in Germany Hydrogenation 246 386 1,014. 1,065
in 1939. When Poland was invaded, seven large Fischer-Tropsch 144 270 365 365
hydrogenation plants and seven Fischer-Tropsch
TOTAL 390 656 1,379 1,430
plants were operating. At least four more hydro
genation plants, including a large one at Poelitz, Central Germany
Hydrogenation 981 1,018 1,488 1,491
and two more Fischer plants were under con Fischer-Tropsch 96 138 182 182
struction. The Poelitz plant was scheduled to TOTAL 1,077 1,156 1,670 1,673
reach full production in the course of the next
Eastern Germany
year. During
the “phoney” stage of the war, be
-
tween September, 1939, and May, 1940, Ger
Hydrogenation
Fischer-Tropsch - 36
6
640
40
1,495
40
many's synthetic plant capacity was increased
TOTAL - 42 680 1,535
from roughly 1,500,000 tons to about 1,900,000
Total
tons annually.
Hydrogenation 1,227 1,440 3,142 4,051
Table 5 shows the capacity of the synthetic Fischer-Tropsch 240 414 587 587
plants in September, 1939, and May, 1940, the
1 TOTAL 1,467 1,854 3,729 4,638
ultimate capacity of plants designed by the end
of 1939, and the ultimate capacity of all pro
jected plants. Further Gains During the War
Table 5 indicates that about a fourth of Ger The German oil industry was increasingly pro
many's synthetic production when the war be ductive until the spring of 1944, when the strate
gan took place in western Germany, within easy gic bombing began. The increase was fairly
bombing reach of British and French Air Forces. steady—about 900,000 tons per year—and pro
Enlargement of these facilities continued, nev duction in the first quarter of 1944 was at a rate
ertheless, and their ultimate capacity was 37 of 8,000,000 tons per year.
per cent of the total. This disdain for the enemy's Starting in 1940, Allied airmen bombed Ger
proximity probably resulted from the Germans' many's oil production facilities occasionally, but
confidence in the Luftwaffe's ability to protect less than 6,000 tons of bombs were dropped on
them. They did not decide to build the large them prior to 1944, and the effects on over-all
synthetic plants in the East until long after they production were scarcely discernible.
Went to War. Table 6 shows the production of each major
Imports of finished products, mainly from product and the principal sources each year from
Roumania, brought the total annual production 1940 until the war ended. Figure 15 shows total
available to the Germans at the start of the war production according to sources.
736.512O–47–4
 ATTACK ON OIL

TABLE 6

GERMAN PRODUCTION OF PETROLEUM PRODUCTS

(Thousands of Metric Tons per Year)

Aviation Motor Diesel Fuel Lubricating Kero- Liquefied Misc.t

Gasoline Gasoline Oil Oil Oils sene Gases Prod. Total
1940

Crude refining” 18 135 202 207 451 124 4 313 1,454

Hydrogenation 612 299 365 51 169 4 1,504

Fischer-Tropsch synthesis 223 131 - 6 52 37 449

Coal tar distillation 24 83 470 34 612

Alcohol 80 80

Benzol 14 364 175 553

TOTAL 644 1,125 781 728 462 124 225 563 4,652

Crude refining” 11 157 287

1941

192 565 108 4 288

-
1,612

Hydrogenation 847. 319 620 78 6 226 11 2,107

Fischer-Tropsch synthesis 228. 119 11 68 48 474

Coal tar distillation 26 88 541 2 35 692

Alcohol 60 60
Benzol 31 360 206 597
TOTAL 889 1,150 1,114 811 584 108 298 588 5,542

1942

Crude refining" 7 174 377 56 657 152 5 301 1,729

Hydrogenation 1,340 292 722 122 17 262 17 2,772

Fischer-Tropsch synthesis 228 . 97 8 52 61 446

Coal tar distillation 35 89 669 36 830
Alcohol 6 6

Benzol 40 302 243 585

TOTAL 1,387 1,037 1,285 847 683 152 319 658 6,368

1943

Crude refining” 4 150 429 53 767 182 5 343 1,933

Hydrogenation 1,745 386 787 135 35 323 20 3,431

Fischer-Tropsch synthesis 254 99 15 60 56 484

Coal tar distillation 34 94 820 37 985
Alcohol 18 18

Benzol 35 320 302 657

TOTAL 1,784 1,162 1,409 1,008 817 182 388 7.58 7,508

*Includes products from imported crude and unfinished oils.

t Includessolvent naphthas, asphalt, and paraffin.

-
19

-- a-- - -- - - ------
 STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY: OIL DIVISION REPORT

TABLE 6 (continued)

GERMAN PRODUCTION OF PETROLEUM PRODUCTS

(Thousands of Metric Tons)

Aviation Motor Diesel Fuel Lubricating Kero- Liquefied Misc.t

Gasoline Gasoline Oil Oil Oils serie Gases Prod. Total

1944

Crude refining” 3 145 466 66 614 124 235 + 1,653

Hydrogenation 996 293 3.18 68 24 176 + 1,875

Fischer-Tropsch synthesis 160 62 10 74 + 306

Coal tar distillation +

Alcohol 363 65 753 352 + 1,578

Benzol 45 :
TOTAL 1,044 961 911 887 648 124 837 # 5,412
-
1940 First Quarters
Crude refining” 8 108 180 184 396 132 4 224 1,236

Hydrogenation 424 324 324 48 4 120 4 1,248

Fischer-Tropsch synthesis 176 124 8 44 32 384

Coal tar distillation 24 76 480 40 620

Alcohol 36 36

Benzol 48 344 136 528

TOTAL 480 1,012 704 712 408 132 168 436 4,052

1944. First Quarters

Crude refining” 4 172 444 36 844 168 8 372 2,048

Hydrogenation 2,012 552 604 156 44 396. 16 3,780

Fischer-Tropsch synthesis 264 104 12 48 80 508

Coal tar distillation 32 92 732 44 900

Alcohol 36 36

Benzol 376 328 704

TOTAL 2,016 1,432 1,244 924 900 168 452 840 7,976

1945 First Quarters

Crude refining” 172 504 676

Hydrogenation 44 90 100 240

Fischer-Tropsch synthesis 46 20 , 72
Coal tar distillation 48 96 144

Alcohol 72 72
A-
Benzol 4 128 132

TOTAL 48 556 720 12 £1,336

*Includes products from imported crude and unfinished oils.

+ Includes solvent naphthas, asphalt, and paraffin.
# Included with liquefied gases.
$ Yearly rate.
T Includes only aviation gasoline, motor gasoline, diesel oil, and liquefied gases.

2O
 GERMAN PRODUCTION OF PETROLEUM PRODUCTS
BY PROCESS

:*}”
-

EAC// 50/5 *A.F.

A/O. of R4/05
2000 70/15 OF Bombs by
U.S.A.A.A.
U.S.A.A.F. /O ||251 /6, 44.28, 13015.5|34 || 16 J/ 157 ||-
|
#|

L
PRODUCTION

BENZOL 8, MI

£
FISCHER

HYDROGENA

CRUDE OLL
50

O
HOUSANDS
F METRI
MONTHLY AVERAGES J F | M A |M J J A S 0 | N | D J F |M A
PER
MONTH 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945*
cowr/05//7/4. * twcludes Awarlow Gasoline, woroR 64soline, o/Eset out 4/Vo
4./QUEF/ED 6as ow.y
€ //wcLUDED w/r// coal ra/*, ocr-06C, 1944
Figure 15
 GERMAN PRODUCTION OF PETROLEUM PRODUCTS
BY TYPE OF PRODUCT

EAC// bone
*000 tons of :*}” -
60/wes y *...*.*
{ U.S.A.A.A.
-
U.S.A.A.A.| to
wo.
//
Or Aards
6 || 10 || 6 // 1/6
/61441.26 13015.5.1341/615/ 157 || -

AL
PRODUCTION

-
MISO. PRODUCTS

|
|
|

LUBE. Oll

FUEL OIL 5.

DIESELOIL

MOTOR GASOLINE

AVIATION GASOLINE

#9:
£"
MONTHLY AVERAGES J F |M A M . J. J A S 0 |N |D J F |M . A

isao 1941 1942 1943 | 9 4 4. 1945*

COA/A/DEA/7/4L
* two-woes Avlarlow 64souvé, woros gasoline, oiesel on
a/vo L/QUEATED 6as only
Figure 16
 ATTACK ON OIL

Production from Crude. Crude oil production some 3,800,000tons a year and providing the
in Germany declined, but, as shown in Table 7, Germans with 47 per cent of their supplies. The
this was offset by Austria's production, which hydrogenation plants, moreover, were even more
rose sharply as a result of the discovery of new important than these figures suggest—for they
fields. were the source of 99.7 per cent of the Nazis'
TABLE 7
aviation gasoline.

GERMAN CRUDE OIL PRODUCTION 1940-1944 Other Sources. Changes in the amounts of oil
(Metric Tons per Year) obtained from other sources were relatively
small. Slightly more use was made of coal tar,
Old Germany Austria Total
mainly to produce fuel oil. The use of alcohol
1940 1,052,000 413,000 1,465,000
in motor fuel, which was compulsory before the
1941 927,000” 635,000 1,562,000
war, diminished because the alcohol was needed
1942 817,000+ 869,000 1,686,000
for various chemical processes. The use of benzol
1943 776,000* 1,107,000 1,883,000
as motor fuel and for solvent purposes did not
1944, 1st quarter vary greatly from about 600,000 tons per year.
(annual rate) 768,000* 1,195,000 1,963,000

*Includes Pechelgronn from 1 July 1941 at the rate
of about 60,000 metric tons per year.
The refining capacity in Austria was increased,
partly with equipment from France, and some
of the surplus refining capacity in northern Ger
many was utilized by transporting Austrian
crude to the Reich. The Germans also refined
about 800,000 tons per year of imported crude
The Flexibility of the Plants
Germany's oil industry was extremely flex
ible. Its hydrogenation plants especially could
quickly change the proportions of various items
which they produced. Table 8 shows, for ex
ample, how greatly the output of two hydrogena
tion plants varied in different months.
TABLE 8

and partly finished products, principally from EXAMPLES OF FLEXIBILITY IN YIELDS OF

Hungary and Roumania. The output of all re HYDROGENATION PLANTS
fineries rose from 1,450,000 tons in 1940 to (Production in Metric Tons)
2,050,000 tons in the first quarter of 1944.
Boehlen Magdeburg
Although scarcely any aviation gasoline was
obtained directly from crude fed to German Feb., April, July, July, Sept.,
1943 1943 1943 1943 1943
refineries, large quantities of all types of lubri
cants were produced. Lubricants are difficult to
produce by synthetic processes, so this supply of
Aviation
gasoline – 17,521 - 12,842 -
Motor gasoline 19,538 – 15,085 7,811
-
petroleum was very important to the Germans. — .

They apparently did not suffer from a shortage Diesel oil – 10,932 – 8,295

of lubricants until some time after the Allies other 1,649 2,610 821 1,608 281

began to bomb refineries. Data on the lubricating TOTAL 21,187 20,131 26,838 14,450 16,387

oil position are given in Appendix B.

Synthetic Production. The increase in synthetic
oil production was far more striking than the
rise in production from crude. There was no
further expansion of Fischer-Tropsch facilities
after 1940, but the hydrogenation plants grew
in importance. These plants produced 1,500,000
tons, or 32 per cent, of Germany's total oil
supplies in 1940, and in 1944, when the bomb
ing began, they were producing at a rate of
The Germans generally tried to produce as
much aviation gasoline as possible in the hydro
genation plants which used bituminous coal or
bituminous coal tar (Scholven, Gelsenberg, Wel
heim, and Poelitz). The other plants (principally
Leuna, Boehlen, Magdeburg, Zeitz, and Wessel
ing), which produced oil both from brown coal
and brown coal tar (tar derived from brown coal
by low-temperature carbonization), were oper
ated so as to obtain various products as needed.

2]
 STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY: OIL DIVISION REPORT

Figure 16 shows the total production of all the Goering plan, dated the day after the

of
supplies detailed by products. Nazis invaded Russia, and based on the hope

of
The greatest increase was in the production obtaining Russian oil. Even these scaled-down

by
of aviation gasoline, which rose from 644,000 plans were not met the German industry.
tons in 1940 to an annual rate of slightly more Most serious was the failure to meet aviation
than 2,000,000 tons early in 1944. Motor gaso gasoline production.
line production increased but slightly. Diesel oil Figure 18 shows the planned and actual pro
production rose from 780,000 tons in 1940 to a this important item. The production

of
duction
peak rate of 1,700,000 tons annually in the goals set for this product were even higher

in
spring of 1943, but had declined considerably the plans made during the war than they had

-
by the time the strategic bombing started. This been prewar plans.

in
decline resulted almost wholly from greater use
TABLE

9
of hydrogenation plant facilities to produce avia
gasoline. GERMAN OIL PRODUCTION AS PERCENTAGE

A
tion and motor
OF THAT CALLED FOR IN VARIOUS PLANS”

---
Fuel oil production, based largely on distilla
tion of coal tar, increased from 728,000 tons in Production, Per Cent
Date
1940 to about 1,000,000 tons in 1943. Lubricat Plan of Plan 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944
ing oil production rose steadily throughout the
Four-year plan May, 1937 - - -

-
76
war, and was about twice as great by the spring
Karin Hall plan July

12
of 1944 as it had been in 1940.
1938 85 62 55 56 -
oil

industry's flexibility permitted

to

The
it

supplies pro
Revised Karin 15 Sept.
- - -
of

various kinds
in

turn out these Hall plan 1939 93 85

portions which could be used effectively by the Office for eco- July
17
armed forces. Aviation gasoline was always nomic expan- 1940 98 93 85 93 67
badly needed, sion plan
of

but minimum amounts motor

l

Goering
gasoline and diesel oil were always needed, too. 23
-
June
-
-
-
plan-A 1941 82 68
Hence, the plants never were called on de
in to

Goering
greater percentage their output 23 June
-
of

liver the plan-B

a

-
94 84
-
1941
aviation gasoline than was feasible.
of

form
New Goering 29 Oct.
plan 1942

61
–
-

Actual vs. Planned Production - 104

Mineraloel plan Jan.
- - -
5

66
-
1944
The industry's over-all production did not rise
the heights envisioned before the war. Figure Products covered vary from plan plan,
17 to

to
*

A-With Russian oil.

shows actual production and the production
B-Without Russian oil.
anticipated the most important plans. The
in

Karin Hall plan, which may be regarded compare actual and

as

to

more difficult
It
is
a

the original four-year plan, al planned production all oil products because
of

of

continuation
lowed for construction delays experienced and different sources and different products were
expected before war was declared. Nevertheless, covered the various plans. Actual production
in

the items covered by each plan can be com

to

production mid-1940 was have been even

in

of

higher under theKarin Hall plan than, under the pared with the planners' expectations, however,
plan, and was Table which again
9,
to

to

four-year have continued and this has been done

in

maximum March, 1943. meet even the revised plans,

to

rise
to
in

shows the failure

a

When war broke out, was clear that the

it

fighting forces' demands for steel and men would The Results of the Air Attacks
interfere- increasingly with the oil program. Between May 1944 and V-E Day, American
1

Hence, with one exception, the plans drafted and British airmen dropped 185,841 tons HE
of

thenceforth were more conservative than the bombs on oil production facilities Greater
in

prewar program. The exception was Germany. Production dropped precipitously,

as

variant
is
a

22
 ––
|

-
-

|
|

|
-

| |
##; #
i
 400
-

350

3OO
N

250
G|
:

6.

2OO
G|t|

:P|

150
'|:

OO

5O
GN/
|
\
s

-.—lF
:".sLJ
:-|5D
:-NN

THOUSANDS
N:M

JFM/AMJIJAP',
:M

44o
t"S

|J
:-A

also No. F AM
|S

N Dd
#.o

OF METRIC w w
f

:—t::

TONS
A.Tl.

1936
.|--|:

|*
sJ4.
::
:*

PER MONTH
Planned case of
-6

*
in

figure 18

736.512 0-47
-
a---
 GERMAN LOSS OF PRODUCTION
ALL PETROLEUM PRODUCTS-YEAR 1944

TOTAL PRODUCTION AND LOSS LOSS BY PROCESS LOSS BY PRODUCTS

OTHERPROCESSES- - 2:
TRENDOf PLANNEDPRODUCTION - -
-I-I-I-I-I-
(Excess over 1*4 mos.1944)

R
Fische

ss of PLANNED
EXCESS

©
*
O
|
•
--
L
-- DIESEL.Oll
- -
-
O IIHYDROGENATION
v)
O #f
* toss OVERAVERAct"}: -

#:
|-EGEND
-© #| "4 Mos PRoduction
D
|
O

-
-

| MINERALOL PLAN
-- MOTORGASOLINE
AVERAGE FOR

4
FIRST MONTHs
OF 1944
-

AviaTiON
:IE)

#
-

AVERAGE
A
s
A

J
J
|
D
J
F

10 |N| M.

1944 1945 1944 1945

is
4

is
MONTHSOF 1944.PLUS PLANNED

by
*Loss figured suBTRActing actual PRODUCTION
FRow PLANNED PRODUCTION PLANNED PRODUCTION AVERAGEPRODUCTIONFOR FIRST

to
Increases accoRoing THE "MINERALöLPLAN"OF JAN,15,1944
4

IS
**LOSS DETERMINEDBY SUBTRACTINGACTUAL PRODUCTIONFROM FOR FIRST MONTHSOF 1944.
average, soovction
19

Figure

- - - - –!
 ATTACK O N OIL

shown in Figure 15. From an average of 662,000
tons per month in the first four months of 1944,
it dropped to 422,000 tons in June, 260,000
tons in December, and 80,000 tons in March,
1945. Figure 19 shows the production loss based,
first, on the average rate in the first four months
of 1944, and second, on production planned by
the Germans in January, 1944. Compared with
the rate early in the year, a total production of
4,766,000 tons, or 60 per cent of that which
would have been produced, was lost. Based on
the production the Germans had planned, the
production loss resulting from the bombing was
widely dispersed, and turned out less important
products. Many partially damaged refineries
were able to continue crude oil topping opera
tions. The products, however, were less helpful
to Hitler. Plants which had previously operated
such complex facilities as solvent extraction
units and lubricating oil units were able to pro
duce only motor gasoline of poor quality, diesel
oil, and residual fuel oil. Thus, the quality as well
as the quantity of production from the crude re
fineries was affected by the bombing.
TABLE 10

5,679,000 tons. Since the actual production PRODUCTION LOSS FROM MAY, 1944 TO MAY,
equaled or slightly exceeded the planned pro 1945 BY TYPE OF PROCESS
duction until the time of the bombing, it is (Metric Tons)
reasonable to conclude that this latter figure rep Difference between
resents the extent to which the Germans were Production and
deprived of oil by the strategic bombing. German
Jan. to
Apr., 1944 Plan of
Synthetic Production. Most of this downward Process Capacity Jan., 1944
plunge in total production resulted from the Hydrogenation 3,113,000, 3,901,000
damage done to the hydrogenation plants, as Fischer-Tropsch synthesis 358,000 418,000
shown in Figure 20. These plants were producing 800,000
Crude oil refining 800,000
an average of 316,000 tons per month when the 495,000 560,000
Other processes
attacks began. Their production fell to 107,000
TOTAL PRODUCTION LOSS 4,766,000 5,679,000
tons in June, and to 17,000 tons in Septem
ber, but rose to 72,000 tons in November, only
to be reduced to 7,000 tons in March, 1945. The Bomb Tonnages vs. Production losses
Fischer-Tropsch plants, too, were almost com The tonnages of bombs dropped on each class
pletely knocked out of production. Their output, of oil-producing facilities to inflict the losses cited
which had been averaging 43,000 tons per in Table 10 are given in Table 11 and Figure 21.
month, fell to 27,000 tons in June, 7,000 tons in
December, and 4,000 tons in March, 1945. Thus, Other Sources. Still lower bombing priority
in ten months, the synthetic oil industry, on which was given to the other German sources of oil
Germany had lavished 17 years of hard work and products such as the coal distillation and benzol
vast amounts of material, was rendered virtually plants. The production of these plants, conse
useless. quently, did not decline much until October,
1944. By then, the synthetic and crude oil plants
Crude Oil Refining. Production from the crude production was so reduced that benzol was the
oil refineries, as indicated in Figure 15, was not largest remaining source of German motor gaso
affected so seriously as synthetic production. line. The benzol plants then were bombed more
From an average of 167,000 tons per month be intensively, and benzol production fell from an
fore the bombing campaign, it fell to 102,000 tons average of 50,000 tons per month in the third
in December and 40,000 tons in March, 1945. quarter of 1944 to 21,000 tons—of which only
Crude oil refineries were able to continue sub 9,500 tons could be used as motor fuel-in Janu
stantial production longer than the synthetic ary, 1945.
plants, because (a) they had some spare capa The bombing of the hydrogenation plants was
city, and (b) the air forces did not give them such clearly more profitable than the bombing of
high priority, since the plants were smaller, more other facilities. These plants represented 48 per

---
 STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY: OIL DIVISION REPORT

cent of the prebombing productive capacity of
the German oil industry. Forty-seven per cent of
the bomb tonnage was directed at them, and the
damage done to them accounted for 65 per cent
of the German losses of production. One ton of
bombs dropped at these plants caused an aver
age loss of 36 tons of oil products. From data in
Tables 40 and 41 it is estimated that, of the
bombs aimed at hydrogenation plants, 13,000
tons or about 15 per cent fell within the plant
fences. Of the bombs aimed at Fischer-Tropsch
plants, 5,800 tons or about 16 per cent fell within
the plant.Based on these figures, the tons of pro
duction loss per ton of bombs dropped in the
plant was 236 for the hydrogenation, and 62 for
the Fischer-Tropsch plants.
So many bombs were aimed at the Fischer
Tropsch facilities, however, that the average
per ton from these bombs was only ten tons of
production. Some of these attacks obviously
could have been directed elsewhere more advan
tageously.
The production loss per ton of bombs dropped
at the crude refineries was greater than the loss
per ton dropped at the Fischer-Tropsch plants,
\
but only half as high as the loss inflicted per ton
of bombs aimed at hydrogenation plants. Miscel
laneous facilities were bombed only in the last
few months of the war, so the tonnage of bombs
dropped per ton of production capacity was low;
but the ratio of bomb tonnage to production
losses was high — and would have been even
higher if the losses had been measured over a
longer period of time.
of Losses on Germany
Effects
The most serious loss to the Germans was the
loss in production of aviation gasoline,resulting
almost wholly from the bombing of the Bergius
hydrogenation plants. Figure 16 shows the effects
of bombing on the production of individual
products, and Figures 22, 23 and 24 show the
loss loss separately for aviation gasoline, motor gaso
line, and diesel oil.
Aviation gasoline production declined from
170,000 tons per month to 52,000 tons the
month after the bombing offensive began, was
reduced to 26,000 tons by December, and was
virtually eliminated by March, 1945. The drop
in the production of other items, however, was

TABLE 11

WEIGHT OF HE BOMBS DROPPED ON GERMAN OIL PRODUCTION FACILITIES AND THE EFFECT
ON CAPACITY AND PRODUCTION
(Oil in Metric Tons; Bombs in Short Tons)

Hydrogenation Fischer Crude Misc. Total

1. Capacity, in tons per month 316,000 43,000 167,000 136,000* 662,000
Per cent of total 47.7 6.5 25.2 20.6 100.0

2. Production loss, in tons 3,113,000 358,000 800,000 495,000* 4,766,000

Per cent of total 65.3 7.5 16.8 10.4
100.0
3. HE bombs dropped, in tons 87,000 37,000 45,000 17,000+ 186,000
Per cent of total 46.8 19.9 24.2 9.1 100.0

4. Tons of bombs per ton-per-month

capacity 0.28 0.86 0.27 0.13 0.28

5. Tons of production loss per ton of -

bombs dropped 36 10 17.7 29 26

Line 1-Average monthly output in the first four months of 1944 before bombing of oil targets began.
Line 2–Based on capacity in line 1 from 1 May 1944 to 1 May 1945. These figures include plants knocked out and
then captured, which would otherwise possibly have required more bombing to keep them inactive.
Line 3–From 1 May 1944 to 1 May 1945. Includes
all

types
of

bombs used.
Line 4–Equals line divided by line
3. 1.
3

by

Line 5-Equals line divided line

2

*Includes coal tar, benzol, alcohol.

benzol plants only. ~
on

Bombs dropped
*
TOTAL SYNTHETIC FUEL PRODUCTION BY PROCESS
AVIATION GASOLINE PRODUCTION AND TONNAGE OF BOMBS DROPPED
ON SYNTHETIC FACILITIES

EACH BoAwe

:".
2000 TON'SOF BOMBs
DROPPED
In D/CATES TONNAGE
Estimated to have
mur PLA wr
*
*. A. F.
J.S.A.A.F. [125
- ||Po
wo, or mands
17 | 6 | pol & 1/7 || 5 | */ 1/2 |
|| ||6 |*/I/6 |*||19|| 6
to 3
||10|20

38 O

360
s:#icHETI
PRODUCTION

34 O

32 O * FisèHER \
TR9PSGH | || ||

3 OO

28 O

26 O

24 O

22 O

2 OO

| 8 O

| 2 O ==
AVIATION *-i---|--|--|--|--| -
-

:
GASOLINE |

| OO # =>
-> PRODUCTION
|--|--|--|-- | | |

8 O # - - N-----
60--- |
–

-
######## |

4 OH-
#
-
H-H
2O == ----->|--
-
-
O
THOUSANDS
OF METRIC
MONTHLY AVERAGES J F | M. A | M. J J A S O | N |D J F |M A
TONS PER | 940 | 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945
MONTH
Coalf-losa/7/4L ######,
of
Thousa/wds
EEEEEEEEEEE|
rows £57/Awared .7 || 0 || 7 ||2.1| 1.7|1.4|2.9||1.5| 1.512.3|1.9|0.5

Figure 20
 GERMAN OL PRODUCTION
BOMBS DROPPED ON OIL INDUSTRY, AND
LOSS OF PRODUCTION BY PROCESS

#"|
*
BENZOL
8.9
- -
-
-
#.
-
>2///
%
TOTAL
CAPACITY
GERMAN

PERCENTAGE
OIL PRODUCTION
662,000 TONS PER MO.
CONTRIBUTED
BY EACH PROCESS DURING
FIRST FOUR MONTHS OF '944

TOTAL BOMBS DROPPED ON

GERMAN OIL INDUSTRY
186,000 TONS
PERCENTAGE DIRECTED
AT EACH PROCESS FROM
| MAY 1944 TO | MAY 1945

-
©
© %
$ # %
%&
D %

TOTAL LOSS
OF GERMAN OIL PRODUCTION
4,766,000 TONS
PERCENTAGE CAUSED BY
BOMBING OF EACH PROCESS
FROM I MAY 1944 TO | MAY 1945

Figure 21
 ATTACK ON OIL

-
not so precipitous, since these were produced Maintain Reserves

to
Measures

oil
largely in crude refineries, which were not
The Germans' strength throughout the war
quickly. Table shows produc

12
so
knocked out
depended on their ability (a) increase syn

to
four stages during the bombing

at
tion losses
campaign, and Table 13 shows total losses by thetic production, (b) obtain imports and cap
products. ture stocks, (c) restrict civilian consumption,
(d) use substitute fuels, and (e) hold down mili
TABLE tary consumption. Their success increasing

in
12
synthetic production until the strategic bombing
MONTHLY GERMAN PRODUCTION OF LIQUID
FUELS AND LUERICANTS campaign reduced sharply has already been

it
described, but the other factors remain

to
JANUARY, 1944 TO MARCH, 1945 be
considered.
(Thousands of Tons per Month)

Avia

or
Imports and loot. The Germans imported
tion Motor Lubri
captured about 31 per cent their total sup

of
Gaso- Gaso- Diesel cating Fuel
Product Jine line Oils Oils Oil plies aviation and motor gasoline and diesel

of
fuel during the war, Table 14.

as
Apr., 1944, shown

in
Jan.
to

average 121 100 73 76

The blockade deprived them imports from

of
170
June, 1944 52 75 69 55 95 most sources, except Hungary and Rumania.
December, those countries derived their oil prod

of
1944 26 50 66 29 59 Both
March, 1945 39 39 ucts from natural petroleum. The total output
0

of their refineries not shown in available rec

is
TABLE 13 ords. The Germans apparently were unable,
however, reduce domestic consumption

in
GERMAN OIL PRODUCTION LOSS to
Hungary and Rumania greatly was re

as

as
it
MAY, 1944 TO MAY, 1945
duced the Reich. There some evidence, too,
in

is
(Metric Tons)
that they failed obtain extrava

to
their efforts
in
gant and detrimental withdrawals petroleum

of
Difference between Production and
Jan. April, 1944, German Plan of from Hungary's fields.
to

Product Capacity January, 1944 When the Germans invaded the Low Coun
Aviation gasoline 1,663,000 2,294,000 tries and France, they captured 245,000 tons of
gasoline aviation gasoline, 309,000 tons motor gaso
of
Motor 805,000 738,000
line, and 200,000 tons diesel oil, total of
of

Diesel oil 463,000 472,000

a
754,000 tons; but they captured very little

in
340,000 590,000
oil

Fuel
Lubricating oils 520,000 555,000 their other campaigns (the quantities were so
small that they have been included imports
as

Other products 975,000 1,030,000

Table 14).
in

TOTAL 4,766,000 5,679,000

Civilian Sacrifices. When Hitler started the

*
Having war without plants stock war, German civilians were using about 200,000
or
to

gone
piles global struggle, the Germans motor gasoline month. Drastic limita
to

win
of

tons
a

always needed more liquid fuels. The fluctua tions, imposed immediately, cut civilian con
aviation gasoline, motor sumption an average only 71,000 tons
of

tions their stocks

to
in

of

gasoline, and diesel oil are shown separately month 1940. Even more stringent restrictions
in

in

Figures 22, 23, and 24, and compositely Fig later—especially after the failure
in

of

the Caucasus
other prod drive, from which the Nazis expected get addi
to
of

of

ure 25. Records their reserves

ucts are not complete, but the trend indicated tional supplies get
to
of

oil forced civilians

is

by Figure 25. Important events which affected along with still less the war continued. Allo
as

resulted partly from Germany's oil position motor gasoline

or

be
to

to
of

cations civilians had

are also noted on these charts. increased 1943 and 1944, however, because
in

25
 STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY: OIL DIVISION REPORT

TABLE 14

GERMAN PRODUCTION, IMPORTS, AND TOTAL SUPPLY OF AVIATION GASOLINE,

MOTOR GASOLINE, AND DIESEL OIL, 1940 TO 1944
(Metric Tons)

Aviation Motor Automotive

Gasoline Gasoline Diesel Oil Total

1940
Production* 643,000 1,138,000 781,000 2,562,000
Imports, etc.t 78,000 683,000 501,000 1,262,000
Captured stocks 245,000 309,000 200,000+ 754,000

TOTAL SUPPLY 966,000 2,130,000 1,482,000 4,578,000

1941
Production 889,000 1,160,000 1,114,000 3,163,000
Imports, etc. 21,000 1,124,000 612,000 1,757,000
TOTAL SUPPLY 910,000 2,284,000 1,726,000 4,920,000

1942 -
Production 1,370,000 1,002,000 1,285,000 3,657,000
Imports, etc. 102,000 1,021,000 208,000 1,331,000
TOTAL supply 1,472,000 2,023,000 1,493,000 4,988,000

1943
Production 1,788,000 1,133,000 1,358,000 4,279,000
Imports, etc. 129,000 804,000 435,000 1,368,000

TOTAL SUPPLY 1,917,000 1,937,000 1,793,000 5,647,000

1944
Production 998,000 935,000 889,000 2,822,000
Imports, etc. 107,000 542,000 371,000 1,020,000

TOTAL SUPPLY 1,105,000 1,477,000 1,260,000 3,842,000

Total five years

Production 5,688,000 5,368,000 5,427,000 16,483,000
Imports, etc. 682,000 4,483,000 2,327,000 7,492,000

TOTAL SUPPLY 6,370,000 9,851,000 7,754,000 23,975,000

*Products from imported crude and unfinished products refined in Germany are included under “Production.”
* In years other than 1940 “Imports, etc.” includes captured stocks. Imports include shipments from sources outside
Germany direct to German armed forces outside Germany.
#Estimated.

26
 -
-e-I ----|
-E–--||-|-

--------
----#
_-I
---+||---I
–~
–Ż –

*
=\2^--
-*---#

>--:

-*#
-\
->
-|
->
#

-#

:||
i #--|| #|:|

:
|
|
 # |

w)
-

---
#

|
--
or,

-----
- -
s

--
- -
-- ->
-- -- - -- -

->
#
<I
|

<

§S :
8 st 3 3. &

| :
 ATTACK ON OIL

of the relief measures necessitated by the bomb
ing of German cities. Since diesel oil was used
largely in agriculture, transportation, and other
essential work, civilian use of it could not be re
duced so drastically. Nevertheless, civilian con
sumption of diesel oil declined from a prewar
average of 130,000 tons per month to an average
of 80,000 tons per month in 1941, and continued
to decline as the war went on.
The drop in civilian consumption of motor
gasoline and diesel oil, and the extent to which
substitutes were used are shown in Table 15.
Civilians got about the same amount of substi
tutes as of regular fuels in 1943 and 1944. Even
so, they had to get along with less than a third
as much fuel as they had used before the war.
Substitute Fuels. Bottled gas, a mixture of lique
fied butane and propane, which the Germans
called Treibgas, was used to some extent before
the war, and was the first substitute for motor
gasoline that appeared in appreciable amounts.
This gas, however, was a by-product from the
manufacture of aviation and motor gasolines
and was produced mainly in the hydrogenation
plants. The attack on these plants, consequently,
reduced the Germans' supply of Treibgas as well
as their supply of regular gasoline. When the
Caucasus offensive failed, the government re-,
quired most classes of civilians to use gas gen
erators, many of which burned wood, although
some burned anthracite coal and other fuels. By
August, 1944, gas generators had been put on
about 100,000 vehicles and were consuming
about 155,000,000 cu ft of wood, and quantities
of other fuel equivalent to 78,000,000 cu ft of
wood, per year. About 500,000 tons of gasoline
were saved this way in 1944.
Military Oil Consumption. The peaks in mili
tary consumption, of course, coincided with the
big operations. Intervals of defensive warfare
permitted the oil industry to replenish supplies.
As shown in Figure 22, the Polish campaign
did not require much aviation gasoline, but con
sumption rose to about 100,000 tons per month
during the invasion of the Low Countries and
France and during the bombing of Britain later
in 1940. After a considerable decline, aviation
gasoline consumption rose even higher in mid
1941, when Russia was attacked. The next
peaks, in the summers of 1942 and 1943, were
related to the activities in the East. The Allies'
air offensive from the West forced the Ger
mans to fight an air war on two fronts, and the
latter's consumption of aviation gasoline soared
to 195,000 tons in May, 1944. This was nearly
twice as much as had been used in their aerial

TABLE 1.5

GERMAN CIVILIAN CONSUMPTION OF AUTOMOTIVE FUELS FROM 1940 TO 1944

(Thousands of Metric Tons per Year)

Prewar 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944

Motor gasoline 2,400 851 640 345 298 285
Diesel oil 1,500 1,028 946 649 570 405

Total liquid fuel 3,900 1,879 1,586 994 868 690

Bottled gas” 108 225 298 319 388 210

Generators fueled with wood,
anthracite, etc.* - - 20 125 245 370

Methane and gas” - 1 1 2 12 42

Total nonliquid fuels* 108 226 319 446 645 622

GRAND TOTAL 4,008 2,105 1,905 1,440 1,513 1,312

-
Percentage of prewar consumption 100 53 48 36 38 33

Additional wood-generator
used by army.*
fuel
- *- - + 75 130

* Nonliquid fuel tonnages given in terms of equivalent gasoline.

+ Small amount included in the 125 civilian consumption above.

27
 STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY: OIL DIVISION REPORT

The Luftwaffe's tanks, how 1,500,000 tons by the

to
of
assault on Britain. reserves these items
not be refilled. The strategic bomb 1940. The stock pile

at
of
ever, could end remained this level
ing of oil targets, starting in May, 1944, reduced until Hitler attacked Russia. Instead of defeat
production ing Russia quickly expected, however, the

as
so much that the Luftwaffe had to
consumption 44,000 tons nearly
its

to
December. Nazis used half their reserves

in

in
cut 1941.
Since 112,000 tons had been consumed the pre The 800,000 tons on hand January 1942

1
vious December, this was far more than sea were enough for only two months' consumption

a
decline. the 1941 rate, and barely sufficed, no doubt,

to at
sonal

Military consumption motor gasoline went keep oil products flowing through the long
as of

up and down similarly, Figure 23, supply lines the various fronts. The stock pile

to
shown
but the greatest consumption such fuel–268, in this dangerously low level through

at
of

remained
one month—occurred when Germany out 1942, the year which the Germans were
in

in
000 tons
first invaded Russia. Consumption North Africa, Stalingrad, and

at
of

diesel fuel hurled back

in
the same time, but rose higher the Caucasus. The switch defensive tactics,

to
at

to

in
soared
a

peak 100,000
tons one month after the and further sacrifices by civilians, helped the in
in

–
–

Allied landing 1944. This difference dustry rebuild the stock pile

to
France 1,372,000 tons
of in

in

the curves motor gasoline and diesel oil by April, 1944. -

in

consumption resulted partly from substitution The Germans must have felt then that they
diesel-powered tractors for gasoline-propelled were over the hump their long struggle for

in
of

Army vehicles. Consumption both motor gaso self-sufficiency oil, but the strategic bombing
of

in
during the strategic their plants, and the heavy consumption ne
of

line and diesel oil declined

bombing period, but less rapidly than consump cessitated by fierce fighting both the East and

in
aviation gasoline. One reason for this was the West reduced their stock pile 436,000
of

in

to
tion
Germany's motor gasoline and by
of
of

that much tons the end 1944.

diesel oil came from crude oil refineries, which
quickly the syn Underground Plants and Plant Dispersal
or
as

as

as

were not hit hard

thetic plants that produced aviation gasoline.
The heavy attacks on strategic oil targets

in
May, 1944, showed the Germans that they could
the Gauges
of

Rise and Fall

not repair their big plants Allied
as

as
fast
Germany's oil industry was
so

flexible that
of it

bombers could wreck them. So they drew up

increase greatly the output
at to

was possible plans June spread small plants throughout

to to
in

one product the expense another. There

of

Germany and put many them underground.

of

fore, the fluctuations Germany's strength dur

in

Several German technical men say now that

ing the course
of

the war can be measured more they had proposed that production be moved
accurately by the combined stocks
of

aviation underground 1940. But, they add, they were

in

gasoline, motor gasoline, and diesel oil than by told that the war would be won before could
it

only one product. Figure 25 shows total

of

stocks be done, and they were threatened with confine

supplies all three products throughout the
of

ment concentration camps for questioning the

in

war. The German lubricating oil position dis

is

Reich's impregnability. The suggestion, never

Appendix
B.

detail
in

in

cussed theless, was feasible. Properly designed and ven

war, noted previ
to

as

The Germans went tilated oil plants could be operated underground

ously, with only 1,100,000 tons these products
of

with reasonable safety. The water-gas generators

hand. This stock pile fell 941,000 tons dur
on

to

and some other equipment would have be re

to

ing the last few months 1939.” The oil in

of

designed reduce leakage, but this could be

to

dustry, however, was being expanded rapidly;

done. Five air per hour would
to

ten changes
of

production increases and captured stocks boosted take care of minor leaks, and the Germans
planned from 40 changes per hour. Inspect
10
to

This figure from different source than the

is

a
*

1,100,000-ton figure and there may be some small differ ing and maintaining properly built underground
ence in bases. plants would have been much less difficult and

28
 DIESEL OIL
(EXCLUDING MARINE DIESEL)

-
-
GERMAN STOCKS PRODUCTION CONSUMPTION

&
-
PRODUCTION INCLUDES IMPORTS CAPTURED STOCKS CIVIL CONSUMPTION INCLUDES EXPORTS

T
-r

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- -

of

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Wert |- Allie OIL 1 rift war.

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GERMAN OFFENSIVE Russia AFRICAN CAMPAIGN OF EN
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260

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220

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THOUSANDS
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NF-D M.

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£| |*||al" - |*||al" - -|A|s|ol"lel: - - - —l
TONSPER -
1940 194
945
MONTH

|||
–

|
-
24

Figure

|l
 ATTACK ON OIL

than repairing and running surface more complicated underground plant,

to
dangerous

A
subjected to periodical bombing—but the produce 19,400 tons aviation fuel per month,

of
plants

formulated their plans and began to was planned Niedersachswerfen. This was

at

to
Germans

have been built gypsum cliff alongside an

in
dig too late.

a
On 31 May 1944, Albert Speer, the German underground V-1 and V-2 factory, Junkers' air

a
Minister for Armament and War Production, craft plant, and liquid-oxygen plant. The in

a
Edmund Geilenberg as General Commis have included two vapor-phase

to
chose stallation was
for Immediate Measures, and the under hydrogenation units operating series, and

in
sioner

a
and dispersal program that was adopted catalytic cracking unit

to
ground convert coal tar and
a few weeks later was entrusted to him. Geilen crude oil distillate into aviation gasoline; hydro

a
former miner who had become man forming unit

of to
berg was a increase the octane number and
ager of the Brunswick Steel Works. He was given aromaticity straight-run and hydrogenated
unlimited authority to take labor and materials gasoline, and an alkylation and butane dehydro
from other industries, and at one time he com genation unit produce iso-octane. When Ger

to
manded a labor force of 350,000 persons. “He many surrendered, however, the tunnels for this
is responsible,” Hitler decreed, “for tackling, with plant were only three-fifths completed, and only
a generous supply of manpower and material the equipment had arrived

at
of
small amount
a

and reckless energy, the work turned over to him. the site.
The speed of the work is not to be impaired The aviation fuel program also included sev
either by governmental or regional obstacles.” eral small plants and five units produce blend

to
The underground and dispersal program, as ing agents. One the latter units, capable

of

of
originally formulated, was expected to supply producing 1,400 tons diethyl benzene per

of
Germany with 82 per cent as much aviation gaso month, began operating during January, 1945,

in
line as had been produced in January, 1944, 25 chemical plant
at

Gendorf. Other aviation-fuel

a

per cent as much motor gasoline, half as much plants were under construction, but not finished,
lubricating oil of all types, two-thirds as much when Germany collapsed.
aviation lubricating oil, and 88 per cent as much

diesel oil. But, despite Geilenberg's prodigious Motor Gasoline. The motor gasoline program
efforts, only about a million barrels of straight was expected produce 41,000 tons per month
to

run gasoline and diesel oil and a small amount (12,000 bbl per day),
of

which about one-fourth

of a blending agent were obtained, up to the end the aviation gasoline plants
to

to

was be fed
of the war. (Figure 27). Forty-one dispersed plants, which
The program called for produc the crude oil produced
of

Aviation Fuel. could have handled all

Germany, were completed, but less than 40
in

tion of 130,000 tons of aviation fuel per month

day), starting in the summer of per cent their capacity was used, mainly be
of

(37,000 bbl per

transportation troubles.
of

1945, but none of the aviation-fuel plants could cause

have started until late that fall (Figure 26). Toproduce motor gasoline from crude oil, the
Seven high-pressure catalytic hydrogenation Germans emulated Kentucky moonshiners by
plants were to have been built underground and building 36 small distillation units the hills,
in

in

one above ground, to produce 92,000 tons of the woods, quarries, and sometimes under
in

standard aviation gasoline and jet-propelled air ground. Four more were planned,
of

which two
plane fuel per month. Six were to be fed tar from were started. These dispersed plants were camou
coal-carbonization plants, and two were to be fed flaged and too small and widely scattered
to

be
gas oil and residuum from crude. But three of attractive targets for bombers. They were com
the plants never got beyond the planning stage, pleted four months and each one had crude
in

two were dropped before excavating was started, capacity conservatively estimated 3,000 tops
at

another was switched to synthetic nitrogen pro per month. Steam for each one was provided by
and the war ended before excavations four locomotives captured Russia. In
or

duction, three
in
for

the remaining two were finished. addition, five primitive distillation units were

29
 sTRATEG1c BoMBING survey, oil Division REpoRT

built in bombed-out industrial plants, where the 5,500 tons per month (1,500 bbl per average
actual wreckage camouflaged them. These were day), nearly finished nine months after

it
was
continuous shell stills built from steam boilers was planned. Figure 29 (see also

It
shown

in
is
and salvaged equipment. Figures 35 40). the war had continued, and

to

Tar from the dispersed crude distillation units
was to have been used as feed for the lubricat
ing oil plants, but destruction of the latter forced
the Germans to store the tar in open pits. Two
thermal cracking units were built to use this tar
If
transportation had been available, the Germans
probably would have been fairly well supplied
with lubricants in the fall of 1945.
Diesel Oil. For diesel oil, the Germans looked
their crude refineries and dispersed dis

to
first
to produce gasoline, diesel, and fuel oils. These
tillation units, but late 1944 they decided to

in
were relatively modern units removed from dam
excess middle oil from low-tempera

of
make use
aged refineries to sites protected by cliffs or
ture coal-carbonization plants. This oil previ
woods (Figures 31 and 33). One of these plants ously had been fed hydrogenation units, but

to
had been stolen previously from France and the plants being destroyed, new plants

so
those were
other was moved from Luetzkendorf.
phenols from this oil were built. These

to
extract
Destruction of hydrogenation plants also left
would have produced diesel oil which could be

a
the Germans with an excess of tar from coal
made marketable by simple distillation. Five
carbonization, so they planned 33 small, primi
extraction plants were nearly finished, and one
tive cracking units to make use of This pro
it.

was finished, the spring 1945 (Figure 41).

of
in
gram, however, did not get far.
Ten primitive units

to
The Germans also started to build ten small extract oil from shale
were also projected, and makeshift operations
Fischer-Tropsch plants aboveground,
to

make
were started in some of them. The shale was
motor gasoline out
of

carbon monoxide and

piled about 10 high, covered with layer of

ft

a
hydrogen from city gasworks (Figure 34). One
peat, and ignited. Air was then drawn through
good-sized American service station could sell
this mass and the combustion which occurred
gasoline these ten plants could pro
as

as

fast
produced enough heat crack oil vapors out of
to
duce it.
the shale. These vapors then were condensed to
lubricating There are several operating produce very low grade diesel fuel, usable
of
Oil.
a

steps the production lubricating oil, and only hot bulb (semidiesel) engines (Fig
of
in

in

considerable storage intermediate products ure 30). All told, the Germans expected get

to
of

is

necessary. Hence, dispersal these plants was 38,000 tons diesel oil per month from their,
of

of

plans phenol-extraction and shale-oil plants. This, and

to

not considered feasible, but were made

go underground. Six plants were 121,000 tons per month which were expected as
to

be built
underground, and two were by-product from other operations, would have
to

be concealed
in

woods and valleys. These plants were given them 159,000 tons per month, but the use
to

have
been quite complete, with vacuum distillation, feed cracking units
to
of

of

some the diesel oil

Furfural extraction, propane de-asphalting, de and hydrogenation plant would have reduced
a

waxing, sulfuric-acid-treating and clay-treating the output 103,000 tons per month (Figure
to

equipment; two plants, moreover, synthetic 32).

in

lubricating oil was have been produced. In addition these integrated projects for
to

to
If

completed, the concealed lubricating oil plants maintaining production gasoline, lubricating
of

would have produced 38,000 tons per month, oil, and diesel oil underground and dispersed
of

in

which 6,000 tons would have been aviation lubri units, several small plants were planned
to

take
cating oil. All grades, from light machine oils advantage
to
of

local situations. Three were be

through heavy cylinder oils and waxes, were built, for instance, with equipment salvaged from
to

have been produced (Figure 28). the Scholven hydrogenation plant after was
it

More progress was made on these plants than bombed (Figures 42 45). Equipment for
to

on other parts the underground program. One these plants was scattered over
of

in of

the first
a

plant, Porta, with productive capacity large area wooded section near Huels. In the
at

of
a

30
 TOTAL AVIATION GASOLINE, MOTOR GASOLINE AND DIESEL oil
GERMAN STOCKS - PRODUCTION - ConsUMPTION

&
-
PRODUCTION INCLUDES IMPORTS CAPTURED STOCKS Civil consumPTION INCLUDE's ExPORTs

T-I-T- Lle OIL PHASE STRATEGICBOMBINQ

D.
-

||
||
||
| 4
TTTT. EMEREVEN >TTC.:...) TT T OFFENSIVE

*
|| -
-

|
|*

|
||
|
".

|
*

|
|

|
-

|
-

*
1800 - - –l- - - - - - - -
-

||
||
||
||
||
||

-
-
-
-
-
- - -

-
- - - - -
-
-
-
-

-
L

L
- |

-
STOCKS

-
-
-
-
-
*

-
-
--- - - - -
-
-

t
--
T

\
|
|

-
|

|
-

-
-
-

| *
|
|
=\

|| |
N.

+++

| *:
TI

|
-

l
- —il

+
| |+
*

T
T
-T-

|
||
| ||||
||| \ \,
+
–

-k

|
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y
soob---f \
|- N-
^*\

L
800 -

+
| +
-

I
-
+

|
ToTAL TöTAT
*

\
PRODUCTION ONSUMPTION

||
||
700 T
4.

- ––

I
- \t-4 PARTLY
\ \

-
6OO ESTIMATED

500
+

400 N--

3OO

1. -
zoo

:
#:

100.
:#

ź.
.*.*.

O
::::
THOUSAND
F

:: D
J|
A

|M||
OFMETRIC
Tons PER
MONTH 1945

Figure25
 MONTHLY AVERAGE

PLANNED CAPACITY OF UNDERGROUND AND DISPERSAL PLANTS

COMPARED TO TOTAL GERMAN PRODUCTION
AVIATION GASOLINE

ACTUAL
PRODUCTION

PLANNE STIMATED

PLANNED CAPACITY
U8D PROGRAM
BY COMPLETION DATES

£|
THOUSANDS

TONS PER
MONTH
|f|M|A|M|
1944
----->
J|J|A|s|o] N |D|J|f|M|A|M|J J|A|s|o]
1945
N. D. J. F|M|A |M|J
1946
J A

Figure 26
 MONTHLY AVERAGE

PLANNED CAPACITY OF UNDERGROUND AND DISPERSAL PLANTS

COMPARED TO TOTAL GERMAN PRODUCTION
MOTOR GASOLINE

ACTUAL

PRoDuction

PLANNE ESTIMATED

PLANNED CAPACITY
U8D PROGRAM
BY COMPLETION DATES

-\

|
Motor |
| FOR FEED stock for
|
Aviation GASOLINE

Jl Flul Al Mlul J. Alslo N | Dl J. F. M|A|M| J J Alslo N. D. J. F |M|A | M. J. J. A

PE
MONTH 1944 1945 1946

Figure 27
 MONTHLY AVERAGE

PLANNED CAPACITY OF UNDERGROUND AND DISPERSAL PLANTS

COMPARED WITH TOTAL GERMAN PRODUCTION
LUBRICATING OLs

|8O

17O

16 O

15 O

|4O

|3O

| 20

| |O

|OO

90

8O

7O ACTUAL

N PRODUCTION

\
6O

PLANNED CAPACITY
5O

©
U8, D PROGRAM
BY COMPLETION DATES
4O
A--T
3O \s I
r"
|
2O | I

|O
4------
O Z
THOUSANDS
OF METRIC J F M A M J J A s O N D J F M A J J A s O N D J F M A M J J A
TONS PER
MONTH 1944 1945 1946

Figure 28
 |

on to

*
:
[Y

2:
>
<
5
#
<t 5 NO
- #3

- #$$$C's s2
= \->
*-
- as #" -
is
©
>
2
*-
* :-
->
# 3
~ *=
C.
; : 5
£ a
 ATTACK ON OIL

Oll- SHALE-45000T

CQUI".
flul GAJ' ---
COMBufflon
f*UPLNAC:

BLOWEP
3orf Ain. At 5oront EA/04/

LATED
>
ADDITION."
CONDEN.J.".
AND ELECTRO
FILTER

|
| Fuction
WEADEQL

f
1FT.
Zont of BURNING Oll-WATER
mover Up TO 12OOFT JrrPAQ-ATOR
2000 GAL/DAY
1800 TON//mo.

–2– oil

Figure 30. Schematic layout of a shale plant.

desperate effort conceal this plant, the reac Professor Krauch, Commissioner General for
to

tors (normally vertical) were mounted almost the Chemical Industry, estimated
of

Problems
horizontally spite their opera costly put plants
to
as
to
as
of

doubt that was three times

in

it

bility position. underground build them on the surface. Dr.

to
as
to

that Another was be small

in

Fischer-Tropsch plant Fritz Ringer, head the Mineral Oil Bureau

of
of

20 reactors the face

in

cliff, and another was dewaxing unit under Dr. Buetefisch, said the program could not
to
of

be
a

for lubricating oil brewery. have been completed time for World War II,
of

the basement
in

in
a

The whole program called for about 140 sep and Geilenberg himself—who was found repairing
arate plants, varying greatly size and type, bicycles exactly one year after taking over this
in

and was to cost 1,400,000,000 RM. Building, program—said he had told Goering October,
in

equipping, and supplying these plants would 1944, that the oil industry could not be saved
least 200,000 men's labor for unless enough fighters were put pro
at

to

have taken the air

in
a

full year. This more men than were engaged tect the refineries aboveground.
is

the whole oil refining industry

of

the United
in

States in 1944. Program. The most serious weak

of

Weakness
The scarcity labor and materials, the loss the underground
and dispersal program
of

in

ness
the advancing Allies, and was the reliance on railroad transportation. Most
to
of

construction sites
changing conditions compelled the Germans the plants depended on the railroads for both
in to

of

revise their plans repeatedly. The program, their raw materials and the distribution of their
fact, was cut products. This contributed the overloading
of

half the last few months the

in

in

to

War. railroads, already severely

of

the which were

31
 STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY: Oll DIVISION REPORT

Figure 31. Two fractionators and a flash drum of a cracking plant d Leggéndorf. The
installation was protected by a cliff along the Danube. This was one of two relatively
modern units built to produce gasoline, diesel oil, and fuel oils from tar.

damaged by aerial attacks. The vulnerability of bonization or coal hydrogenation plants on

the transportation
facilities was so great that
many Germans admitted that strategic bombing
could have paralyzed the industry even if the
underground and dispersal program had been
completed.
Lack of storage space was another defect.
These plants were expected to run with a maxi
mum of only four days' feed stock and one or
two days output on hand. This increased their
dependence on railroad transportation.
The sources of feed for aviation-fuel plants,
furthermore, would still have been vulnerable if
these plants had been put into operation, be
cause no steps had been taken to protect the car
which the underground plants depended.
A further weakness in the program was the
reliance on outside power. To avoid this, more
excavating would have been necessary and the
railroads would have had to haul more coal to
the oil plants. Cables and transformers were put
underground, but destruction of power stations
or high-voltage transmission lines would have
shut the plants down. Stand-by units big enough
to meet about 40 per cent of the maximum re
quirements were planned in some instances, but
could not be installed because of the shortage of
electrical machinery.
Steam plants were being put underground,

32

--- - -
 MONTHLY AVERAGE
PLANNED CAPACITY OF UNDERGROUND AND DISPERSAL PLANTS
COMPARED WITH TOTAL GERMAN PRODUCTION
DIESEL OIL

18 O

|7 O

|6 O

15 O
itsel oil. "QUI"d
for feed stoox fon
*ATION *L.
|4 O

13 O / A.
12 O
-
-TV
| #
©
**-***
i
•
t
| | O \ | (L-E."
#

/
| OO . \ P X
9O
V\ ACTUAL
*
|
-
\
PRODUCTION
T V

8O

- -
f planned
PLANNED CAPACITY
Estimated

7O - A- U 8 D PROGRAM

\| /ī/.|\
BY COMPLETION DATES

6O

5O
-
V-/ |
l
n
\I
-+-l
4O |
* I

|
3O
T
|
2 |
I
** |
| O l—

£|
|
|
O |
|

róNs' |f|M|A|M| |J|A|s|o N 0 ||f|M|A|M|J. J. As of No|| | F|M|A|M|| || |A

MONTH 1944 1945 1946
COw//DE////a/.
 -
ATTACK ON OIL

|-- |-
- -
- - -- -

Figure 33. Close-up of the cracking furnace of the plant at Leggendorf. It was under
construction when the war ended. This one project required six months labor by 4,000
men. This was the second time the equipment had been moved.

and some plants were set up to burn their own
residuum, extracts, and fuel gas; but some out
side fuel had to be brought to all of these plants.
Carefully planned, centralized underground
plants would have been much less vulnerable
than the dispersed plants built by the Germans.
A few large underground refineries might have
been built near the oil fields, and several large
underground hydrogenation and carbonization
plants might have been placed near the coal de
posits. These could have been subdivided and
placed in separate tunnels, so that accidents in
one part would not have crippled other parts.
With no more steel than was used to repair
bombing damage to surface plants, pipe lines
might have been run to the refineries from the
oil fields, and a network of distribution pipes
might have been extended throughout Germany:
The Germans then might have been able to sup
ply their military forces with a respectable quan
tity of oil products despite the strategic bombing.
Germany's industrial strength might have en
abled her to move her relatively small oil indus
try underground, if the planning had been done
more carefully and the work had been started
sooner. Moving America's big oil industry under
ground would be a much more staggering task.
For g. map of Germany showing the location
of all of the underground and dispersal plants,
see Appendix, Figure 27. Reproductions of Ger

33
 -
£-
#

\\
Figure 34. The Fischer-Tropsch plant at Leipzig was
the largest of ten dispersed plants attached to city gas

|
-
*
T
works throughout Germany. One American service . *

~
.

£**

|
station could sell gasoline as fast as all ten of these . t -
|* -

\.
plants could produce

\l.
12

The reactors shown were

\
it.

*
plant -
at

removed from the bombed-out Luetzkendorf.

Figure 36. Furfural unit separators and extraction
narrow space

at
columns Porta were crowded into

a
this plant was estimated

of

of
one the tunnels. Cost
in
at 27,000,000 RM.
oil

Figure 35. Underground lubricating plant

at

Porta
46,000 yd sandstone were dug out
cu

of

of

where
a

cliff form the tunnels housing the plant. The two

to

vacuum distillation colunms extended about 50 Figure 37. These two tall vessels, placed underground
ft

above the point shown the picture. The Germans Porta, were separate gas from Furfural, treat
at

to
in

a
by

planned keep these plants ventilated

10

40 ing agent for lubricating oil. Note how closely the

to

to

changes air per hour. equipment.

of

excavation fits the

34
 -- - -
- -

-|
-
-

--
-| -

Figure 38. The vacuum pump in the foreground served the Furfural unit, part of which
is shown. This was a three-story section of the plant, as can be seen from the two addi
tional levels in the background.

Figure39 (right). This boiler at Porta was erected

aboveground to save time. A second boiler was to
be built underground after the plant had begun
operation, and this one was to be moved under
ground eventually.

7:15.712( , 47 t; 35
 STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY: OIL DIVISION REPORT

Figure 40. These long, coffin-like structures are dewaxing unit filters, crowded into a
oil

tunnel of the Porta underground lubricating plant. They are new type filter, never
a

before used commercial plant.

in
a

man charts showing the plans for the use The Nazis did not plunge westward into
of

these
plants the oil industry appear Appendix France until nearly all the hydrogenation
of
as
in

Figures 28 plants under construction were operating. Their

to

31, inclusive.
continued need for oil was undoubtedly fac
a

Oil Determined Military Strategy their subsequent decision

to

tor invade the

in

Germany's strategy throughout World War Balkans. Their inadequate oil supply also ac
II

was undoubtedly determined partly by the na part for their failures the Near
in
in

counted
tion's oil supplies. Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel East and North Africa. The Italian fleet was
said, when interviewed on 27 June 1945, that kept port because did not have
in
in

1942
it

they had not expected the invasion enough fuel for major action.
to
is of

Poland
of a

global war. This confirmed “In the case Russia,” Albert Speer, German
in

involve them
by the position the gauges on their oil storage Minister for Armament and War Production, said
of

tanks at that time. when questioned on 30 May 1945, “the need for

36
 Figure 41. This dephenolizing plant at Attenburg was hidden in a clump of trees on
the side of a hill. Fractionators are on the right and condensers in the center.

Figure 42. In a dispersed hydrogenation plant, near Figure 43. High-pressure separator and control mani
Huels, reactors, normally vertical, were installed fold at a hidden plant. Camouflaged bunker at left
almost horizontally. contains control room.

37
Figure 44. Close-up of the distillation furnace and fractionators of the plant shown on
the opposite page. This view reveals how well the equipment was camouflaged; the
height of the furnace can be judged by noting the ladder at the right.

Figure 45. The illustration on page 39 shows the distillation unit used with the hydrogena
tion unit of the little Scholven plant shown in Figure 43. Units were a quarter of a mile
apart. The bunker on the left was the control house for this part of the plant.
–-
38
 ATTACK ON OIL

certainly was prime motive” for the attack gasoline was one reason for not
in oil

of
said that lack

a
That need also contributed to the Rus
1941. making more use fighter planes.

of
sians' victories later. According Speer, the The bombing

to
oil targets also lessened the

of
Germans had 1,200 tanks concentrated against mobility and efficiency the ground forces. Von

of
the Baranow bridgehead 1945, but there was said, interrogated

in
Rundstedt when on 10 and 12
only enough fuel May 1945, that motor gasoline allocations were

or
to

refill the tanks two three

times, so the tanks were virtually immobilized. first on the western front, but were

at
sufficient
fuel, Speer said, reduced by the High Command between July
of
Had not been for the lack
it

Upper Silesia might not have been lost and the and September, 1944. The next month they were
Russians might have been held for long time. further reduced almost daily. Von Rundstedt,
The shortage a
aviation fuel hampered the consequently, called for still more economies and
of

Luftwaffe both directly and indirectly. gas generators on Army

of
was more extensive use
needed so badly that could not be spared It vehicles. All trucks were required pull trailers,

to

to
it

train pilots properly. Hence, more planes than men and horses moved artillery and ammuni
necessary were lost, both combat and acciden tion, even the front, without the help en
in

at

of
tally. Colonel Walter Schwartz indicated when gines, and by V-E Day gas generators had even
questioned on 21 May 1945 that the air training been put on 50 tanks.
program was discontinued September, 1944,
in

The Collapse Germany

of
the aviation fuel shortage. Training
of

because
fields were closed and men were sent back to in Hitler started World War without enough

II
fantry units. Goering added, when interrogated liquid fuel. He had fight much

to

of
the time
June 1945, that the Heinkel 177 which for liquid fuel. He was deprived

of

of
on 29 the bulk
was used on the Russian front after being tried such fuel by the strategic bombing
of

his sources
against England had be grounded because oil targets the last year the war, and,
to

of

of
in
it

consumed too much gasoline. Goering also called when the Nazis could neither manufacture nor
to

attention ferrying aircraft which re capture any more appreciable quantities

in

losses

of
inexperienced pilots, and liquid fuel, Germany's defeat became inevitable.
of

sulted from the use

STRATEGIC AIR ATTACK ON THE GERMAN CHEMICAL INDUSTRY
Prevvar Status of the German
Chemical Industry
Germany's ability to wage war rested, in large
part, on her famous chemical industries. Except
for a brief period after World War I, Germany
has been in the foreground of the world's chem
istry, scientifically and industrially, for nearly a
century. Before World War I, she controlled 88
per cent of the world's dye trade, and before
World War II, she handled about 25 per cent of
all the world's chemical business. Chemical prod
ucts made up 20 per cent of her exports. The
industry employed 515,000 workers, 44 per
cent of them in plants of over 1,000 employees,
and in 1938 its products were valued at about
5,000,000,000 Reichsmarks.
Landmarks in Germany's chemical progress
were Haber and Bosch's discovery (1912) of the
commercial synthesis of ammonia by fixation of
atmospheric nitrogen, which made Germany in
dependent of Chilean nitrate, and Bergius' dis
covery (1920) that coal could be liquefied with
the use of high-pressure hydrogen to yield gaso
line, which pointed the way to self-sufficiency in
oil. -
Research results multiplied research. The Ger
man chemical combines employed great numbers
of chemists to search for new processes and prod
ucts. By 1937, 12,000 qualified chemists were on
the industry's payroll, and the government had
set up the Reich Research Council to supervise
research, avoid duplication, and push priority
projects. -
By the outbreak of World War II,
the control
of the German chemical industry was remark
ably concentrated. The I.G. Farbenindustrie
A.G., known as the “German Dye Trust” (cre
ated in 1925), controlled 85 per cent of the whole
German chemical industry, including nearly all
production of explosives. This made possible the
pooling of resources and research, allocation of
markets, fixing of prices, and planning of pro
duction. After the war began, I.G. Farben men
headed the government agencies charged with
the control of chemical and explosives produc
tion.
Germany was well supplied with the principal
chemical raw materials—coal and limestone. She
also had substantial potassium salt supplies,
which yielded by-product magnesium salts for
the manufacture of light metals used in aircraft
construction. Her principal raw material difficul
ties were in certain metals, particularly those re
quired for alloy steels, in sulfur, and in phos
phorus, which she lacked entirely.
Geographic Distribution of the
Chemical Industry
Coal and water power sources largely dictated
the geography of the German chemical industry.
Before the war its plants were concentrated in
the Rhine Valley, the Ruhr, and the Leipzig area.
When it was realized that bombing attacks on
German industry could not be prevented, at
tempts were made to establish new centers in
central Germany and Upper Silesia.
War Planning
German documents list the following as the
most important war chemicals:
Nitrogen Ethylene
Methanol Sulfuric acid
Calcium carbide Caustic soda
Tetraethyl lead Chlorine
Sodium cyanide Sodium carbonate
Nitrogen, methanol, and ethylene were required
for explosives; calcium carbide for synthetic rub
ber and other organic chemicals; sodium cyanide
for aircraft Plexiglas, case hardening, etc.; tetra
ethyl lead for aviation gasoline; sulfuric acid,
caustic soda, chlorine, and sodium carbonate for
hundreds of necessary industrial uses.
 ORGANIZATION OF
GERMAN AGENCIES REGULATING THE PRODUCTION OF NITROGEN
METHANOL, CARBIDE, ETHYLENE AND INORGANIC CHEMICALS

rfy toensushaesaeviations German Translationsof EnglishAggreviations

s.ca.f-suftrate
commandof f*fast-foforces sc.a.f-oxx.
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rue."
S.C. A. F. G.M.E.A. G.M.A.w.
tseersa
P. sista.-wrfo-west ### ofacreastscr-fan
scafflicneFonscruwds
fareusuns
sessellschaff

RAW MATERIAL AND

PLANNING DIVISION
Production,allocation,
Planning
anddistribution
of all
*PortantRawmaterials,Primary
andfinal PRODucts
of fat whole
wARto Onomy

ARMY ARMAMENT AND COMMISSIONER GENERAL ECONOMIC RESEARCH

FOR PROBLEMs OF THE
EQUIPMENT OFFICE ASSOCIATION
CHEMICAL INDUSTRY
stutasy Poulicy
makingagency
for manoling
|xtraustsouality stoutstments REstarcts,
construction
and nanolescontaactswirwParvare
**wises andQuantity ProductionProslems
*ousrawfor aviationfuel asso
* **Couction 1rs oosponsists.

EH
MONTAN LTD.

wasPlants;wasro
constaucts
negotiate
(contracts)
wirw
***ateinpustry
for Production

T--------------,
# # $
CALCIUM CARBIDE NITROGEN calcum CARBIDE NiTRIC ACID
sulphuric ACID AND AND
CHLORINE *METHANOL DERivATIVES InDEPENDENT Plants Government
sodium HYDROxIDE owntoBYPRivate ownedPlants
sootum CARBONATE Only OnLY industry
sodiuM cyANIDE, ETC. inDEPENDENT Plants INDEPENDENT
Pulants
owntoBYPRIVATE ownedby PRivare
government INDEPENDEnTPLANT's industry industry oppau Dootnitz
ownedplants ownedby Private * Ltuna Pitstenitz
Industry oppau scrinopau notcast Langtu.saints
Leuwa **a*sack wou.frn LiMiz
Aftstrooßf Ludwigswaft" notcast Pitsteritz rot-nosauerTt tuestin
o'sses"uatk Levertrust" wolfen Ludwigswaffin woultin
stations notchist wallotinsurg furrsteinstrø wevotertox
crisisfianstadt utsotagen Pitsrerutz etc. sonoramaust"
all-fnoosef surfeistfeilo *tvotertow

:
ooetritz Leuwa Auschwitz onlysome
government
andwasy others scartopau LiMr
wit/fils *otnissnuttte Guarantees
fortPrices
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ausch-witz *otten
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waapsack *auxel
wolfen etc.
zweckti.
genoorf
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coswig
futsstrastro
*a*burg
**Latim
westergötlaw
andMany otwiths

* REGULATIONOFPRODUCTION
production
castrustainee)-neeulare of PnuaryMarenals
production (wemals,
wood,
rexrules,
frc) fos Annawanrs(wolnscrly"gouineo.sy
wennuacur/(e.g.
aluwwuw carrel)
courteestausscavesse)-neevlare of ulitaryitems(oinedrir
usedarwenwuacar) (e.g.
nau"rausschussranks)
iwref general
creascals sees-swermen acarrelwon acounsrrer Psopvction
wasaurwonized-rosecutarf owlyfor Powofss,explosives,
crea"catwarfareand
*any (including
waterials rocker p ropellawns)twene existedawascowarrrrtfor Powdens andfxplosives usestaugstofff
(Pulves )"rn seecial
sue cowrrers
(sonognausscnuss)
rowp-powpens, s-explosives,wr-emmasy andnooxerwarfsials,c-chemical **a*.was,
rosewoodcrowneoularlow of ori,suna, wrnoein,Mrranoiamo orwensorrif"Ecksmooucts, c.a.s.o.1 seecularauthorited ro act snour,
sonorwencreamcats risecoverwuent soamofor casuicals (reichssrella
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Figure 46
 ATTACK ON CHEMICALS

To become self-sufficient in these chemicals,
the Nazi government created a huge complex set
of agencies charged with expanding production
capacity and allocating materials and products.
This bureaucracy grew progressively more in
volved as the war developed. Figure 46 shows
the complexity of the controls at the end of the
war and indicates the responsibilities of the
various offices and their relations to industry.
Probably because the chemical industry had de
veloped considerable spare productive capacity
before the war, the Germans made no serious
attempt to build up stock piles of important
chemicals—until the development of the global
war showed them, too late, that they had under
estimated their needs. Nevertheless, the Goering
four-year plan, started in 1936, did allow for an
increase in production in preparation for war.
Figures 47 and 48 show the production of chem
icals covered by the four-year plan.
carried out for the construction of plants at
Doeberitz, Piesteritz, Embsen, Wolfen, Linz,
Sondershausen, and Koenigshuette. Projects
were started also at Holten and Heydebreck, but
not completed. Plants for sulfuric acid, chlorine,
caustic soda, sodium carbonate, sodium cyanide,
and ethylene, financed partly by private indus
tries and partly with government funds, were
erected at Niedersachswerfen in the Hartz and
Schoppernitz in Upper Silesia. Units for the
manufacture of heavy chemicals were added in
several government-owned plants for explosives
and poison gas.
War Production
Even before intensive bombing began, the
chemical industry was not meeting its quotas,
partly because of the competition of other in
dustries for power and building materials such
as steel, and partly because of transportation
strain, labor shortages, the cutting off of key
materials by the Allied blockade, etc. Table 16

-
TABLE 16
indicates the extent to which production in 1940
PRODUCTION OF IMPORTANT CHEMICALS
failed to meet the plan.
IN 1940
As the war progressed, even more serious diffi
(Metric Tons) culties were encountered in the construction of
Production new plants. Not only were labor and structural
Percent materials short, but air attacks on factories mak
Four-Year
Plan Actual
of
Plan
ing chemical equipment –
Wilke at Brunswick,
where fractionation columns were made, and
Nitrogen 1,164,000 1,000,000 86 Krupp at Essen, producing stainless steel—ham
Sulfuric acid • 2,400,000 1,730,000 72 pered deliveries. Transportation difficulties, ac
Sodium carbonate 1,600,000 1,410,000 88 centuated by bombing, caused serious delays,
Caustic soda 650,000 570,000 88 particularly in Silesia and other eastern regions

Chlorine
400,000 365,000
Later plans for new capacity involved expan
sion of existing plants (Ludwigshafen, Schkopau,
and Leverkusen), and the creation of the follow
ing entirely new centers:
(a) In the Hartz Mountains and central
Germany (emergency plants)
(b) In Upper Silesia (Heydebreck, Blech
hammer, and Auschwitz)
(c) On the Upper Danube (Moosbierbaum
and Linz)
In addition, under a government-owned cor
poration, known as the Economic Research Asso
ciation (WIFO), secret plans were made and
91 remote from the Ruhr equipment factories. These
difficulties delayed or prevented the completion
of important plants. Despite great government
pressure and high priority, such projects as
Auschwitz II(nitrogen, methanol, and ethylene
derivatives), Fuerstenberg-Degussa (carbide),
Heydebreck II (nitrogen and ethylene deriva
tives), Koenigshuette II (nitrogen), Knurow
(ethylene derivatives), and Moosbierbaum (eth
ylene derivatives) were never completed.
As a result, production fell further behind the
plans, even though the schedules were repeatedly
revised downward. Table 17 compares planned
and actual 1943 production rates of 10 impor
tant German chemicals.
It will be seen that (a) production rose sur

41
 STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY: OIL DIVISION REPORT

TARLE 17 52,806 tons were aimed plants also producing

at
synthetic oil benzol. Thus 92 per cent

or
PRODUCTION OF CHEMICALS IN

of
1943 the
(Metric Tons per Month) attacks on the vital German chemical industry
were purely incidental the attacks on oil pro

to
Actual, Plan for
duction. But 75 per Germany's nitrogen

of
Actual, Middle 1943 Made cent
1939 of 1943 in 1942
-
TABLE 18
80,000 80,000 91,000
Nitrogen
6,000 20,000 21,000
CHEMICAL PRODUCTION IN 1944
Mahind BEFORE BOMBING ATTACKS
Calcium carbide 88,000 140,000 160,000
Average, January April,

to
1944
cyanide 1,300 1,100 1,400
Sodium
4,000 7,500 12,000 Production Rate
Ethylene
Product Metric Tons per Month
Tetraethyl lead 400 400 400
Nitrogen 75,800

. .
acid 170,000 177,000 220,000
Sulfuric Methanol 21,600
Chlorine 30,000 42,000 45,000 Calcium carbide 126,000

44,000 60,000 60,000 Sodium cyanide 600

Caustic soda Ethylene 8,000

.
.
.
Sodiumcarbonate 110,000 130,000 150,000 Tetraethyl lead 400
Sulfuric acid 175,000
Caustic soda 58,300
prisingly little above the prewar level, and (b) Chlorine - - 42,700
-

.
actual production fell well below the plan for Sodium carbonate 114,800
1943, although the plan had been revised down

ward in 1942. By early 1944, just before the oil industry was located synthetic oil plants, and

in
offensive began, chemical production these (Leuna and Oppau) produced over
of

bombing two
had fallen below the mid-1943 level. Table 18 per the synthetic nitrogen. Similarly,
of of

50 cent
shows production of the important German war 89 per cent Germany's methanol production
in the first four months of 1944. plants part

as

of
occurred attacked the oil
in

chemicals
figures indicate the actual production Every nitrogen meth

or
These offensive. attack that hit
realized by German industries before the heavy anol production was aimed
at
oil.
bombing of oil-chemical plants started in May, Other plants producing important chemicals
1944. More nitrogen could have been produced (largely calcium carbide and heavy chemicals)
at the expense of synthetic oil, and more meth
oil

plants. As result, most

of
did not contain
a

anol could have been produced at the expense of the plants producing these other chemicals were
and nitrogen. scarcely bombed
oil

Table 20,
at

all. As shown
in

both
non-oil-producing chemical plants with capa
a

Bombing Attacks on Chemical Plants city 554,000 tons per month were attacked
of

By far the greater part

of

of

the loss German with only 4,700 tons bombs during the entire
of

chemical production from bombing came

as

an offensive.
unexpected bonus from the bombing synthetic
of

the industry's integration, diffi

of

Because
it
is

plants. Many Germany's chemicals, par

of
oil

compute losses the production

to

of

cult
in

ticularly synthetic nitrogen and methanol, were single chemical bombing. The best
as

of

result
a

plants which also produced syn

in

largely made
comparison
to

of

basis seems be the total loss

a

theticoil (see Table 19). Ludwigshafen-Oppa!' production particular chemical with the
of

of
a

Germany's largest themical plants with

of

one
total bombing effort against the plants produc
minor oil production, was bombed, annarently ing that chemical. Table 20 has been prepared
destroying oil production.
of

with the sole intent on this basis.

Considerable damage also resulted from area
specific targets. Bombing the Chemical Industry
of
to at

bombing not directed Effects

May The bombing offensive against oil targets
of

From the end

1944 the war
a
1

Ger steady drop chemical production,

at

57,519 tons
of

bombs were aimed

of

caused
in

total
a

man plants producing chemicals. Of this total, starting June, The production
of

of
in

1944. loss

42
 PRODUCTION PLAN
GOERING's 4 YEAR PLAN

AS OF / 94 O

NITROGEN

-|
C-
|
5 1400
> |
|

-
Oz

-
TOTAL -
# Izoo PRODUCTION
Q/)
|
Z
3 looo- | -
H

8004—||
1||
C2
5:
i.
-
|

*u- soo- | FOR FERTILIZER

-

-
|
O -

#
->
5
4oo.
|| |

*D
a
--
200.
H- TECHNICAL *
O

BASIC CHEMICALS

32OO

D --~

-
%
# 280
Cr-
ul
-*
>>
0- 2400

D--" -"|-T
SULPHURIC ACID
#
P- 2000

–T
SODIUM

D-r
CARBONATE
92
O-
P-
#
16OO
P-

-T
5

-"
1200

--"
# 8oo [GRUSTIC SODA
Od
3
it 4 OO
P-

isse" 1937 1938 1939 1940 END OF PLAN

A.
Cow/-/DEA/7744.
* 5.5G/M/V//V6 or 4 YEAA ALA/w
+/WCLUDES WE////MAC//7
Figure 47
 PRODUCTION PLAN
GOERING'S 4 YEAR PLAN

As OF JAA/UA RY /943

NITROGEN

TOTAL

|O O O

FOR FERTILIZER

TECHNICAL

BASIC CHEMICALs

CK

#
C.
ul
0.
SULFURIC AC1
d
5
P
92
0
H
ul
->
li
O UM CARBONATE
(f)
C
#
*
i
O
*-
CAUSTIC SODA

-
SULFUR

1936
* 1937 1938 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943

+ BEGINNING OF 4 YEAR PLAN

477.4//Vagle Owly 6/ SUPPLY//wg wo/ti/AY A/VD /741)^
%
W/7/y Ay/7/7"ES O&7A//VEO AROM OUTS/DE GERMA/WY
RECOVERY AC/D AWOT /AVCLUDED
7. /AVCLUDES WE///7MAC///
Figure 48
 ATTACK ON CHEMICALS
nitrogen and methanol was precipitous and con
tributed directly to Germany's ultimate defeat.
Although serious, the drop in production of
other chemicals was less abrupt. Figure 49 shows
the monthly production of the more important
chemicals and a monthly index of their total.
Nitrogen
Nitrogen production dropped from an average
of 75,000 tons per month in the first four months
of 1944 to only 20,000 tons in December, despite
desperate efforts to maintain the output by giv
ing nitrogen priority even above synthetic oil.
From August, 1944, on, all synthetic nitrogen was
allocated to munitions. Frantic attempts were
made also to convert ammonium sulfate stocks
to anhydrous ammonia for production of concen
trated nitric acid for explosives, but so little
equipment was available that less than 2,000
tons of this nitrogen were produced from Sep
tember to the end of the war. Two Ruhr plants
were converted to enable them to recover 2,000
tons of ammonia per month as ammonia water
for subsequent oxidation to nitric acid. These
combined efforts were sufficient to maintain the
production of nitric acid for munitions at a some
what higher level than was possible from syn
thetic nitrogen alone. By January, 1945, how
ever, even nitrogen allocations to munitions had
dropped to 20 per cent of the production avail
able early in 1944. Ample capacity existed for
oxidizing ammonia to nitric acid, for the nitra
tion of various chemicals to make explosives, and
for the filling of munitions. Without question,
it was the destruction of the ammonia plants
through the oil offensive that knocked out Ger
many's production of munitions.
Germany's nitrogen production facilities pos
sessed all the attributes of a good strategic bomb
ing target. Nitrogen was essential to Germany's
war effort, no substitutes were possible, produc
tion was concentrated in a few plants, and the
plants were vulnerable to air attack. These fac
tors made the bombing of this industry effective
and decisive, even though it was not undertaken
deliberately as the result of known facts. It was
an unexpected and fortuitous by-product of the
oil offensive. Clearly, the large nitrogen plants
should have had a priority equal to that of oil.
43
Methanol
The loss of methanol production dealt a fur
ther serious blow to the German war economy
because methanol was needed to produce two
of Germany's explosives: pentaerythritol-tetra
nitrate, and hexogen. An increasingly large per
centage of her TNT production also depended
on methanol. Plans for 1944 called for 42 per
cent of the methanol production to be allocated
to these uses, and the remainder went to the
manufacture of synthetic rubber and nunnerous
other important products.
Early in the war practically all the methanol
production was concentrated in one plant, Leuna.
During the war three additional plants were com
pleted in Upper Silesia, but, of the 1944 planned
production, 47 per cent was still to be at Leuña.
Production reached a peak of 25,000 tons in
January, 1944; a year later it was only 3,600
tons. Leuna, which had produced 13,000 tons in
January, 1944, was completely knocked out. The
bombing of Auschwitz and Heydebreck, which
were thought to be producing synthetic oil, ac
counted for most of the remaining loss of pro
duction. As in the case of nitrogen, the Germans:
had made the mistake of locating their methanol
manufacturing facilities largely in oil plants.
There is evidence that the Germans did not
need methanol as badly as they needed nitrogen
or synthetic oil; hence the plants making it alone
did not rate a high bombing priority. The large
complex plants where it was manufactured, to
gether with other products, should, however,
have had the highest priority.
Other Chemicals
Tetraethyl lead plants in Germany were never
specifically attacked or damaged by bombing,
although this product was an absolutely essen
tial component of German aviation gasoline, and
its production was concentrated in two plants.
Furthermore, there was very little spare capa
city. The equipment was also very vulnerable
and difficult to replace. For these reasons, spe
cific attacks on tetraethyl lead plants would have
been disastrous to the Germans, and these plants
should have had a top priority in bombing.
The other principal chemicals were not at
tacked as specific targets, although some of the
 TABLE.
- 19. CAPACITIES OF GERMAN CHEMICAL PLAn’rs

1
PRIOR TO MAY 1944
(Metric Torns per Mornth)

Formal- Acetal- Sodium Ethy- Caustic Sodium * #.

Location Nitrogen Methanol dehyde Carbide dehyde Acetone Cyanide lene Chlorine Soda Carbonate (as SO.) Oi!

OIL PLANTS

Leuna Merseburg 24,900 10,200 150 1,000 1,000 53,750

Ludwigshafen-Oppau 17,000 1,400 2,700 4,000 600 500 1,700 2,000 1,100 8,300 5,250
T
Heydebreck 2,000 6,500 700 830 250

Ruhrchemie (Sterkrade-Holten) 3,600 370 5,000

Rheinpreussen 150 5,500

N.
Linz 5,000
+ +

Auschwitz (Oswiecim) 3,000 1,000

Hibernia awanne-Eicked 4,100 3,200

Victor (Castrop-Rauxel) 4,100 5,000

Moosbierbaum 7,000 6,750

£
Total Oil Plants 60,700 21,100 2,850 5,000 - 150 600 1,870 2,400 2,830 1,100 16,300 84,700

CHEMICAL PLANTS
-

Hoechst 2,400 3,000 9,000

Huels 8,000 2,200 2,500 3,200

Schkopau 800 26,000 12,000 120 1,400 4,170 5,000

Gendorf 2,000 1,400 3,400 4,250

Knapsack 400 24,000 5,250 650

Piesteritz 750 15,000 170

Hart 18,000

Dormagen 3,100

Koenigshuette 2,500 9,500

Mueckenberg 9,000 3,500 440 460

6,000 220
- Burghausen 2,100 - 1,250 - -
Waldshut 1,500 10,000 800 100
-
Waldenburg 2,500

Leverkusen 1,300 3,400 4,000 16,600

 TABLE 19 (Concluded)

Sul Syn

.
Formal- Acetal- Sodium Ethy Caustic Sodium furic Acid thetic
Location dehyde Carbide dehyde Acetone Cyanide lene Chlorine Soda Carbonate (as SO3) Oil
Nitrogen Methanol
Chemical Plants (Concluded)
Falkenau 2,500

_Bobreck 3,000
Zweckel 470

-
Frankfurt (HIAG) 400

Liesing (HIAG) 20 20

Mombach (HIAG) 400

Bruchhausen (HIAG) 30

Wildau (HIAG) 20 750

Dessau (HIAG) 170

Kolin (HIAG) 200

-
Bitterfeld 5,750 5,200

Wolfen 420 1,200 1,300 13,750

-
Zscherndorf

:
1,800 2,000

Ammendorf 220 1,400 1,500

Bernburg 6,000 36,800

21,000
- Rheinberg
Duisburg 15,000

Ewald 1,600

Trostberg 3,000

Gleiwitz 1,250

Mannheim 600

Other plants 10,350 130 280 7,000 100 10,790 20,360 51,250 115,250

Total chemical plants 20,100 940 6,210 38,500 56,270 125,900 157,700
2,700 3,550 130,000 33,650 1,090

Grand total 80,800 23,800 6,400 135,000 33,650 1,240 1,540 8,086 40,900 59,100 127,000 174,000 84,700

*Source: Various data on capacities and peak monthly productions. The figures are considered

of

to
at

represent roughly the capacities the plants the time. They differ, however, from the
on

7,

in
5

capacity figures Tables G-23 and G-24, which are plant production planned May
1944 for the fertilizer year 1944-1945.
an

+
as

it

oil
in
No production existed this plant, but was bombed oil target.
 STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY: OIL DIVISION REPORT

TABLE 20

BOMBING EFFORT AGAINST GERMAN CHEMICAL INDUSTRY

Nitrogen Methanol Other Chemicals Total Chemical Industry

Per Cent Per Cent Per Cent Per Cent
Capacity of Total Capacity of Total Capacity of Total Capacity of Total
(Tons per Capacity (Tons per Capacity (Tons per Capacity (Tons per Capacity
Month) or or Per Cent Month) or or Per Cent Month) or or Per Cent Month) or or Per Cent
Total Bombs of Total Total Bombs of Total Total Bombs of Total Total Bombs of Total
Dropped Bombs Dropped Bombs Dropped Bombs Dropped Bombs
(Tons) Dropped (Tons) Dropped (Tons) Dropped (Tons) Dropped

Plants Making Both

Chemicals and
Synthetic Oil
Capacity* 60,700 75.0 21,100 89.0 33,100 5.6 114,900 16.6
Total Bombs
Droppedf 51,955 100.0 36,726 100.0 36,726 88.6 52,806 91.8
--
Plants Making
Chemicals Only
Capacity 20,100 25.0 2,700 11.0 553,810 94.4 576,610 83.4
Total Bombs
Dropped inone - 'none - 4,713 11.4 4,713 8.2

Total Chemical
Industry
Capacity 80,800 100.0 23,800 100.0 586,910 100.0 691,510 100.0
Total Bombs
Dropped 51,955 100.0 36,726 100.0 41,439 100.0 57,519
100.0

*From Table 19. Most German nitrogen plants made methanol and other chemicals. Plants making several prod
ucts have been included in each appropriate column. Therefore the bomb tonnages shown as total for the chemical
all

industry are not the sums for three categories, since several plants have been included more than one category.

in
May 1944 May 1945. Small bomb tonnages hitting plants spillovers from area attacks are not included.
as
to

From
1

8
*

hit. The declines their production, measure, plans were proposed disperse plants
to
in

plants were
Figure 49, were much less than to hillside slopes where certain units would be
in
as

indicated
the production synthetic oil, nitrogen, sunk into the ground, leaving the contour

of
of

the
in

those
methanol, and were the result mainly landscape unchanged. Late 1944, when the
in
of

the
or

German industry. Al severity air attacks had convinced the Ger

of
of

general deterioration
though these chemicals were basically important, mans that complete protection could be gained
production losses would not have been felt as only through underground construction, plans
keenly oil nitrogen. for the so-called “Orion” project were drawn up.
or
as

quickly
of
or

losses
Therefore, plants making only these products This provided for single underground plant
a

high bombing priority. produce 4,000 nitrogen per

of

would not warrant which could tons

a

month, or,
to

necessary, could be converted

if

Dispersal Plans and Underground produce 5,000 tons methanol. The plant was
of

Chemical Plants operation July 1945. Nine other

to

start on
1

No serious consideration was given under total capa

to

small nitrogen fixation plants with

a

dispersal chemical plants city nitrogen

or

ground locations
of

15,000
of

of

about tons were also

until the third quarter
of

planned, but this program was impeded by the

It

1944. was then too

carry out the small program planned. general shortage materials and labor, and
to

of

late
opinion always existed the plants was completed. Four meth
of

differences
of

Serious none
among German agencies and industrialists on this anol projects, also uncompleted, would have pro
According the predominant opinion, about 2,000 tons per
to

subject.
of

vided small surface units

large-scale underground construction heavy month capacity.
of

chemical plants was impractical September, 1944, for

of

because the Plans were drafted

in

a
As

the equipment involved. compromise tetraethyl lead plant with capacity

of
of

size 200 tons

a

46
-
INDEX OF PRODUCTION OF BASIC CHEMICALS
MONTHLY AVERAGE 1943 = IOO
(SCALES OW A/G//7-ACTUAL TOW/WAGE //W METR/C 7OWS)
KE Y
ACTUAL PRODUCTION

-
PLAN PRODUCTION
|
# 912OO 12OH- L-
+:
12O —#1556OO

\
|||O #. -*.
# *-i- 836Oo |||O - -1408OO
r1 |- |
-
IOO 76OOO |OO 128COO
N

- -H1
90 \+= T- |-|-11152Oo

–
684OO 9C)

|--|-
–
8C) sosoo 8C) O24OO
7o
- \W-T-I- 532OO 7o
SöE."
896OO

-
6O 456OO eo 768OO
–t - OOO TONS
5o
4O
| NITROGEN
IOO=76.OOO TONS
\ 38COO
3C4OO
so |
4O L|
- + 64OOO

512OO
3O | 228CO
2O \ 152OO
14O
r-
57.26O
|
\ 130 - + 5317O

\ -F.T.
F#
l 76OO
IO
12OH-
O O
|
-– asceo
4499C)

-
17o 3485O
W
W-
\ 4O9CO

– --
n
|-
H
co
16O
15O !
*
H 3075o
328OO
so-
so-
-T |
|
368 lo
3272O
| | -
F
-
I +– CHLORINE

i-
14O | 287OO 286-O
!--
To loos 40,900 Tons. | 2s
13O +- 2665o so | 2454C)
12O
| | -
+ 246OO + 2O45O
\
5O
|
| |O
| 2255O
IOO
lI 2O5OO 12O | | V 2O88OO
|_fP. Y

-
|

+ H:
|| O
NMA- - 1914OO

-
9C) 1845O *-*
fiv'.
'HERN"VV"---':
W n
8OH-

\ |-||
174OOO
I

- |-- –
- O T
7O 1435C) so |
-
6O 1230C) 1392 OO
|
-
so
TH-A+--
—
5o 7o 12 18OO
METHANOU lozso +
4o - 100=20,500 TONs||
|
\ 82OO GO H-H toa-too
3O
W
| 615O

4 IOO
5Q
– l
87OOO
<
Cl
2O | 13O
"--- 5 e
|
H. /
|-> --> u: ". 3.
-
IO 2O5O 12O O
#
l |||O Ż
lao T
1754 OO
M-\ M
## 5
:ū #old=
13OH.
r-t-.
1638 OO IOO
- -
...

>
HN
\Y

-
35
-
-

7-TV 1512OO
= <

12O O
e

8O
<

|||O
*——'sseoo e:L
|
|

Z/
/
\

---126OOO 7O
-
\

1OO

::#5
–
VR *H-HICIAL
#
=
*#

90 134CO
|
V

W\

*E

8O IOO8OO 5O
:

CARBIDE
5

L-
5

*–1
:

7o loo 126,000 Tons 4O

I-
=

882OO
"-
2

I-1
I

l
l

M_\|_s M M_J_S M_v_s_Q

-
MOAMGE
s
:

METRIC M ETR 1C
on
#

Ol-cy
INDEX
-

1943 1944 |1945 Tons "DEx:# 1943 1944 |1945 Tons

l

~~~~~~~
Figure 49
 ATTACK ON CHEMICALS

per month to be installed in five months in a Six lignol plants, with a proposed monthly pro
natural cave in Brixlegg, Austrian Tyrol. This duction of about 100 tons of Furfural, 60 tons of
project was given high priority and equipment chlorine, and 60 tons of caustic soda, were also
had been ordered, but construction had not planned and a project was proposed for the erec
started when the area was occupied by the tion of an acrylonitrile plant at Dyhrenfurth
Allied forces. with a productive capacity of 100 tons per
Some dispersal
of other chemical manufac month, construction to start on 1 January 1945.
turing was planned, but this either had not ma No part of this program was completed.
terialized or was incomplete at the end of the Even had these various plans been completed
war. These projects included the transfer of an so that the proposed plants could have started
acetone producing from Knapsack to
plant operation by the end of 1944, attacks on trans
Fuerstenberg-on-Oder, the erection of plants at portation had by then reached such intensity
Falkenau near Eger to make cyanide, and the that the plants could neither have received raw
reconstruction of the Frankfurt cyanide plant. materials nor shipped products.

Berlin, 30 August 1944

My Fuehrer:—
If the attacks on the chemical industries continue in September
in the same strength and with the same precision as in August, the produc
tion of chemicals will be still further decreased, and the last stocks will be
consumed. Then those very materials essential for continuation of modern
warfare will be unavailable in the most important fields.

Heil Hitler!

—Albert Speer *
Reichminister for Arma
ments and War Production

736512 o–47–7
 STRATEGIC AIR ATTACK ON THE GERMAN
RUBBER INDUSTRY

In World War I, Germany learned thoroughly alone; by 1930 they had developed Buna S, a
the necessity of having enough rubber to wage satisfactory tire rubber, and an oil-resistant rub
war successfully. She understood clearly the im ber for special uses.
portance of rubber for airplanes, tanks, and mo The basic raw material for all these rubber
torized transport. Yet she entered World War II substitutes was coal, which assured Germany of
on a shoestring, as far as rubber stocks were con self-sufficiency in case war cut her off from sea
cerned. borne supplies. The main raw materials used in
Before the war Germany was the third largest , the synthesis of Buna S are butadiene and
consumer of the world's rubber supplies, ranking styrene. Butadiene was made from acetylene
after the United States and the United Kingdom. derived either from calcium carbide or from the
Per capita, Germany used roughly a fourth as gases from coal hydrogenation, while styrene was
much natural rubber as the United States, com derived from coal tar, benzene, and ethylene.
pared to one fifteenth of United States consump Buna S manufacture is also heavily dependent
tion of oil. Germany's prewar imports and con on coal as a source of electric power, since it
sumption of natural rubber are shown in takes 18,000 to 19,000 kwh of power to produce
Table 21.* a ton of Buna. The whole synthetic rubber pro
gram consumed as much electric power as the
TABLE 21 great city of Philadelphia. Despite the abun
GERMAN IMPORTS AND CONSUMPTION OF dance of coal in Germany, the industry was vul
NATURAL RUBBER nerable because it was closely integrated and
(Metric Tons per Year) interrelated with the chemical and synthetic oil
industries.
Year Imports Cornsumption
Between 1936 and 1939, synthetic rubber pro
1936 73,415 73,440
1937 97,580 87,720 duction increased from 1,100 to 21,256 metric
1938 97,155 97,155 tons per year, and consumption rose from 1,020
1939 84,801 81,382
to 14,300 tons per year.

In comparison, the United States rubber in Rubber Processing Industry

dustry in 1939 consumed about 600,000 tons of
Before the war the German rubber processing
natural rubber. industry consisted of some 278 rubber factories,

Development of Synthetic Processes of which 53 were major producers. (See Figure

50 and also Appendix Tables C1 and C2.)
To make up her deficiency in rubber in World The most important units were:
War I, Germany developed Methyl rubber, a
substitute so soft that cars with tires made of it (a) 11 tire factories, four producing tires,
had to be jacked up at night. After that war, the seven producing both tires and mechanical
I.G. searched for a better substitute. First they goods.
developed a fair synthetic based on butadiene
(b) 13 mechanical goods factories, in addi
tion to the seven combination factories men
*Source for all German production and consumption tioned.
figuresin this section is The Government Board for
Rubber (Reichstelle Kautschuk) unless otherwise stated. (c) 29 important producers of sanitary and

48
 i
i | # | # | i : | | ; ;: : : | # # | | | | | | | : i |

-
|

: i|; |i |
# # ## | | | | | |O
- enso* - •p- • -

; :
[S]

[E]
|

l
.|| ;

G)
[s]
|
|
:

--
 ATTACK
seamless rubber goods, shoes, heels, rubberized
fabrications, thread, adhesive, etc.
In addition to processing 73,000 to 97,000
metric tons of natural rubber a year before the
war, Germany also processed between 29,000
and 35,000 tons of reclaimed rubber, mainly for
use in mechanical goods.
The German prewar situation on carbon
black, which she started to produce domestically
in 1933, was quite satisfactory. In other raw ma
terials (mineral oils, diverse chemicals, accel
erators, pigments, and textile fibers) Germany
was either self-sufficient or had developed suit
able substitutes.
War Plans for Rubber
Synthetic Rubber Industry. In anticipation of
war, Germany's new synthetic rubber industry
was given a substantial tariff protection, cul
minating with a duty of 30.9 cents per pound
imposed on 21 March 1938. This compares with
a 1939 New York market price for imported
natural rubber of 16 cents per pound. In addi
tion, the I.G.'s Buna development was subsidized
directly and, under the 1937 four-year plan, the
government authorized the construction of three
25,000-ton synthetic rubber plants, besides the
pilot plant at Leverkusen which was already in
operation. The planned capacity of all these
plants was slightly less than Germany's prewar
needs and was increased before construction was
completed on the first two plants, as follows:
(a) Capacity at Schkopau, where opera
tions began in 1938, was increased to 72,000
tons. Schkopau's acetylene came from calcium
carbide made on the site, and the plant's annual
Buna production rate stood at 25,000 tons by
September, 1939.
(b) By the time construction began
Huels in 1938, its design rating was 48,000 tons.
The acetylene for Huels was produced by the
electric arc process from gases which came
mainly from the near-by Scholven and Gelsen
berg hydrogenation plants.
Late in 1939 the third plant, at Rattwitz near
Breslau, was approved, but it was never com
pleted because after the easy victory in France
the High Command and the German Ministry
O N RU BBER
for Economic Affairs decided to rely instead
upon cheap natural rubber from the Japanese.
By September, 1940, the government had
changed its mind and pressed for a new plant at
Ludwigshafen. This plant, designed to produce
30,000 tons of rubber annually from a new buta
diene synthesis based on the reaction of acety
lene and formaldehyde, tied Buna production to
methanol (via formaldehyde) and further inter
related the Ludwigshafen-Oppau production
complex. This plant was not in full operation
until September, 1943.
The last step in the Buna plan involved the
erection of a 36,000-ton plant (together with
chemical and oil plants) at Auschwitz, Poland,
believed to be safe from air attack. Only a few
parts of this plant operated before its capture.
Including the 6,000-ton pilot plant at Lever
kusen, the ultimate planned capacity of the syn
thetic rubber plants was 192,000 metric tons a
year, about twice Germany's prewar consump
tion of natural rubber. The geographic location
of these plants is shown in Figure 51.
The Italians operated one small plant at
Ferrara and planned but never completed a
larger one at Terni. A plant was projected for
France at Anglofort.
Rubber Processing Industry. In terms of total
rubber consumption, including reclaim, the pre
war capacity of the rubber processing industry
was about 15,000 metric tons a month. Of this
capacity 57 per cent was devoted to mechanical
and technical goods, 33 per cent to tires (includ
ing solids), 7 per cent to bogie wheels, tank
treads, and blocks, and 3 per cent to camelback
and repair materials. -
No new rubber manufacturing plants were
built after war broke out, but capacity of exist
at ing machinery was increased by some 20 per
cent—part for new war products, part to offset
production difficulties incident to conversion to
synthetic rubber. In general, however, after al
lowing for the greater difficulty of handling syn
thetics, Germany's war potential in processing
was no greater than her prewar capacity.
Government Controls. Dr. Krauch, Commis
sioner General for Problems of the Chemical
Industry, was co-ordinator of controls over syn
49
 STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY: OIL DIVISION REPORT

as those over synthetic

as well priority targets

as
rubber kusen once number

of
thetic the

1
oil,

and explosives. The Govern

chemicals, Eighth Air Force. Ludwigshafen was repeatedly
ment Board for Rubber administered processing attacked by the RAF and the Eighth, but appar
industry policies laid down by ministry offices, ently the rubber plants were never the primary
while the Industry Group—Rubber (Fachgruppe aiming point. The Auschwitz plant was num

a
Kautschuk) handled technical problems such priority target for the Fifteenth Air Force

as
ber

1
and costs (see Figure 11).
standardization three times.

StockPosition. Dr. Otto Friedrich, Deputy Di Attack Data. Table 22 shows the distribution
the Government Board for Rubber, re
of

bombs dropped synthetic

of
rector the 19,458 tons

at
of
all Europe Au rubber plants.
of

ports that frantic search

in
a

gust, 1939, netted only 7,000 tons natural of TABLE 22

rubber from Holland. At the end of that month,
Germany's stocks amounted only 2.4 months' BOMBS DROPPED AT SYNTHETIC
to

prewar consumption (19,383 tons, 76 per cent

RUBBER PLANTS

natural rubber, 24 per cent Buna). Moreover, Bomb Tonnage Dropped

reclaim was 4,969 tons, equivalent
of

the stock By By
only two months' supply. Period USAAF RAF Total
to

Because the synthetic rubber industry was Sept. 1939 10 June 1943 355 355

to to to

0
1

its infancy and the rubber processing in 10 June 1943 10 Nov. 1943 454 1,714 2,168
in

still
10 Nov. 1943 12 May 1944 1,087 112 1,199
dustry not yet converted synthetics, the Ger
to

Subtotal 1,541 2,181 3,722

mans gambled even more on rubber stocks than
12 May 1944 (oil offensive)
oil

stocks. And the same gamble was taken

on

May 1945 9,264 6,472 15,736

to
8

with finished rubber products: on 31 August

TOTAL 10,805 8,653 19,458
500,000 repre
of

1939, the finished tire stocks

only peacetime con
of

sented 1.2 months

Over 75 per cent this tonnage was dropped
of

sumption.
Ludwigshafen, where was aimed primarily
at at

it

Production and Air Attacks— oil installations, though synthetic rubber pro
of

loss
Synthetic Rubber Industry duction was also jeopardized. Of the total bombs
dropped both the rubber and oil industries,
at

Priority Considerations. The German synthetic

rubber took only one tenth oil. The
as

much as
rubber industry formed highly vulnerable tar
direct and indirect bombing on syn
a

of

effects
get

system concentrated throughout the war

in

thetic rubber are shown Figure 52. Details on

in

few large plants. Yet, although certain

of

the
a

plants were attacked sporadically priority ob German synthetic rubber and rubber raw mate
as

rial production are presented Appendix

in

jectives, the industry was not subjected pro

to

Tables C3, C4, C5, and C6.

or

longed concentrated attack.

Until March, 1943, when the Ludwigshafen Production loss Before Oil Offensive. As Table
plant came into partial operation, there were 22 indicates, this period divides into three
only two large rubber plants (Schkopau and phases:
and one small plant (Leverkusen). (a) Up
10

June 1943, no priority was as

to

Huels)
Thereafter, since Auschwitz was captured by the signed synthetic rubber, but the 72 tons
to

of

Russians before getting into full production, bombs dropped by the RAF (particularly the
in

there were only four plants. But synthetic rub Huels attack 28/29 December 1941) caused
of

ber plants were not placed the first bombing noticeable break the upward production
in

in
a

priority category until 10 November 1943, and trend.

even then they were given fourth place (b)
10

10

the June and

in

Between November
category. They came off the priority list entirely 1943, synthetic rubber targets had number
3
a

May, 1944, when oil was given top priority. At the start this period, Schkopau and
in

of

again
priority. Lever Huels were nearly up rated capacity (5,800
to

Huels was attacked once and

50
 -

s
A
w
R
w

s
Q BERLIN
Y

e
SA
*a*over

*
:
-

N
-
*.*.

f{
*

|s
*
"...
- “..
ce.

•
'l*\

*çnkopau

J
*...

**N

:--.
N.
"--.
S----
•.
*

LOCATION
-

OF
SYNTHETIC RUBBER PLANTS
in

capacities METRic Tons PER MonTM

-

witt-eTo-Na Moon.
* Good

Figure51
 ATTACK ON RUBBER

and 3,800 tons a month, respectively) and Lud
wigshafen had come into partial production.
Stocks of natural and synthetic rubber were
down to one month's supply (9,000 tons). When
the Eighth Air Force attacked Huels on 22 June
1943, they shut down the plant entirely for one
month, causing a loss of 12,000 tons of produc
tion. The end result of this attack was to send
total rubber stocks, excluding reclaim, to a low
Thus, though only 15,736 tons of bombs were
dropped at its plants, the synthetic rubber in
dustry, because of its integration with oil and
chemicals, suffered a crushing blow. This is what
happened:
(a) Schkopau production was lost because
the Leuna hydrogen producing facilities were
knocked out. The meager 2.6 per cent of Leuna's

its
hydrogen earmarked for Schkopau was sole
of 6,500 tons by September (see Figure 53), supply and stood Leuna's priority

at

of
the head
forcing the government planners to reduce the
list. Despite all Leuna could do, Schkopau lost
stock of finished tires to 1% months' supply, and 43,600 tons rubber production (compared,

of

to
holding production of tires and other rubber arti
its January–April average) during the oil of
cles at levels 10 to 15 per cent below schedule fensive.
for the last six months of 1943.

its
(b) Huels lost production because de

of
TABLE 23 pendence on gas from the bombed synthetic oil
plants Scholven and Gelsenberg. This was

at
PRODUCTION INDEX BASED ON FIRST FOUR
partially offset by bringing natural gas from

in
MONTHS OF 1944 AS 100
Bentheim and acetaldehyde from Bavaria.
Synthetic Aviation
Rubber . Gasoline (c) Ludwigshafen and Leverkusen rubber
production dropped because the bombing

of

at of
January-April, 1944 100 100
plants the former and chemical plants
at

May, 1944 76 92 oil

June, 1944 91 31 the latter.
July, 1944 85 21
August, 1944
From the start of the oil offensive to the end
53 10
the war, the over-all loss Buna production
of

of
September, 1944 42 1 6
October, 1944 compared
to to

of
49 12 the first four months 1944
November, 1944 48 29
amounted 75,000 tons.
December, 1944 15 15
January, 1945 40 6.5
Total loss of Production. difficult to eval
It
is

February, 1945 30 0.3

March, 1945 28* 0.02
uate satisfactorily the total loss synthetic rub
of

April, 1945 6* 0
ber production because, while the industry was
Source: Speer documents. subject was con
to

some attack from 1941 on,

it

* Oil Division estimates.

tinually being expanded. However, the estimated
12,000 tons from the 22 June 1943 at
of

(c) By November 1943, when rubber

10 losses
tack on Huels, plus 4,000-ton loss from pre
went into the first priority category, the industry
a

had recovered so that stocks were slightly higher

vious Huels attacks, plus the estimated 75,000
ton loss during the oil offensive, adds up
to

than the September low and production was

91,000 tons lost production.
of

back to 11,000 tons a month. From then until

May This figure conservative when actual versus
is

12 1944, most of the raids concentrated on

Ludwigshafen, but that plant nonetheless worked planned production taken into account. The
is

plan put forward early 1941 contemplated an

in

up to 85 per cent of rated capacity, and the entire

ultimate annual production 200,000 tons by
of

industry reached an all-time peak of 12,787 tons

the last quarter 1944. Figure 52 shows this
of

in March before a decline set in.

plan and how production lagged behind On
it.

loss of Production during the Oil Offensive. this basis, the total production loss was 183,000
After the start of the oil bombing offensive, the tons. Even the actual loss was only the 91,000
if

decline in synthetic rubber production (see Fig tons already mentioned, each the 19,458 tons
of

ure 52) was not unlike that in aviation gasoline, expended synthetic
in of

bombs on rubber resulted

as Table 23 shows. production loss
of

4.7 metric tons.

51
 STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY: OIL DIVISION REPORT

Loss of Production and Air Attacks— TABLE 25

Rubber Fabricating Industry LOSS IN TIRE PRODUCTION FOR 1944

*
Summary. Throughout the war, the German Loss from
Scheduled Loss from
rubber fabricating industry operated on a hand
Article Production Best Month
to-mouth basis. Because stocks were always rela
Airplane tires 50,876 144,540
tively tight, the slightest loss in rubber produc
Heavy-duty truck and bus tires 134,323 217,644
tion made itself felt immediately in finished
product output. Thus the June, 1943, Huels Total passenger tires 31,215 197,710

attack reduced tire and rubber boot production

at Phoenix by about 50 per cent within a month,
while compound consumption at the huge Con
tinental plant dropped more than 40 per cent
in production was rapid in both cases. Appendix
Table C 7 outlines the drastic reduction, about
25 per cent, that had to be made in allocations
of finished products as a result of this raid on
-
Huels.
The fabricating industry, particularly tires
(which enjoyed a number 3 Eighth Air Force
bombing priority between 10 June and 10 No
vember 1943), was also subjected to direct at
tack, as shown in Table 24.
and the hand-to-mouth stock situation, the drop
in rubber consumption for tires did not start
until September, but that from then on serious
and rapid drops occurred in the production of
heavy-duty truck, airplane, and passenger car
tires.
Physical Effects of Bombing. The physical ef
fects of strategic bombing on the German rub
ber fabricating industry are covered below. De
tailed comments on the results of air attack on
principal German rubber fabricating plants from
the end of May, 1943, to November, 1944, will
be found in Appendix Table C9.

TABLE 24
A CIOS* estimate of the residual producing
capacity of the nine largest fabricating plants
ATTACKS ON THE RUBBER FABRICATING (Appendix Table C 10) indicates that, after
INDUSTRY
bombing, these plants had only 45 per cent of
Bomb Tonnage Dropped 1943 capacity.
By By
Period USAAF RAF Total Effects of Bombing on Production. Although
1 Sept. 1939 to 10 June 1943 0 2 2 there is substantial disagreement among sources
10 June 1943 to 10 Nov. 1943 286 0 286 on finished product production, particularly as
10 Nov. 1943 to 12 May 1944 0 0 0
to the latter months of the war, following are the
Subtotal 286 2 288 estimated results of the air attacks on the in
12 May 1944 to 8 May 1945 155 O 155 dustry:
TOTAL 441 2 443 (a) The pneumatic tire fabricating plants
during the period from 1 January 1944 to 1
Though only 443 tons of bombs were aimed at March 1945 were able to convert only 38,117
tire plants per se, according to available informa tons of rubber into tires, and the Oil Division
tion, many tire plants also underwent area at estimates that the total was probably no more
tacks because they were located in cities. The than 40,000 tons at the war's end. This amounts
effects of attacks on production of pneumatic to a loss, over the 16-month period, of about
tires of various types are shown in Figures 54 14,000 tons, or four-months' normal consump
and 55. Production schedules for individual tion (as compared with a normal of 3,400 tons
plants and total actual consumption of rubber per month).
for pneumatic tires are given in Appendix Table (b) The loss in actual tires produced for the
C 8. Before the bombing of Huels in the middle 12 months of 1944 (see Appendix Table C 11)
of 1943, normal consumption of rubber for pneu is summarized in Table 25.
matic tires was 3,300 to 3,400 tons a month.
These charts show that, in spite of some attacks * Combined Intelligence Objectives Subcommittee.

52
 SYNTHE TIC RUBB ER
GREATER GERMANY
PLANNED AND ACTUAL PRODUCT | ON AND BOMB T ONNAGES
DROPPED ON THES E FA CILITIES

wo. Of 477 Acks

EACH BOMB REARESE//

us4aevi-Z:----|--|--|--|-|-|3|-| |-|--|--| |-| 2 ||1 |-|2

R.A.A. R.A.F. 3
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6
7 1
/ 12 I-I-I

PLANNED
PRODUCTION

TOTAL
ACTUAL
PRODUCTION
-
#
£ -

%
scHKOPAUB:

£:*
TO *'''2' 1939||194ol

CONFEDEWT/4.
1941 |1942

ESTIMATED
J|F |M|A|M|J. J.
1943
Also ND|J
KU

E M AM J J Also ND|J|f|M|A
1944 1945

FiIgure 52
 RUBBER CONSUMPTION AND STOCKS
GREATER GERMANY
source. DR. or To FREDRich, DEPUTY DIRECTOR REICHSTELLE KAUTSCHUk

CONSUMPTION

TOT

SYNTHETIC

-
NATURAL

RECLAIMED

STOCKS

SYNTHETIC

NATURALE

Ż
RECLAIMED

THOUSANDS
OF METRIC
MONTHLY AVERAGFS J |F |M|A |M|| J J |A |S|O |N|D|J|F |M|A |M|| J J A |s|O |N|D|J |F |M|A
T
'*|1939|194olleai is 42 1943 | 94.4 * * 1945

CO/VF/LE/V7/44.
* ESTIMATED

Figure 53
 ATTACK ON RUBBER

(c)The loss in mechanical goods cannot be Division estimates for the rest of 1944. There
precisely calculated, but it is reflected in the after conditions in German industry were too
over-all consumption of rubber. See Figure 56 chaotic for further estimates.
and Appendix Tables C 12 and C 13 on ship
ments of mechanical goods. TABLE 26

(d) The total consumption of natural, syn GERMAN CONSUMPTION-PRODUCTION

thetic, and reclaim rubber from the start of the BALANCE; RECLAIM EXCLUDED
war until 1 January 1945 compares as follows Start of War to 1 January 1945
with (1) the industry’s capacity in its best
Metric
month (March, 1943) projected over 64 months Rubber Tons Per Cent
and (2) a monthly capacity for all types of rub
Supply
ber of 15,000 tons (according to Dr. Friedrich):
Natural rubber imports 79,325 14.9
Synthetic rubber production 439,687 82.8
Best War Rate, Rated Capacity, Drain on stocks 12,113 2.3
Actual Tons Tons
Consumption, TOTAL 531,125 100.0
Tons Capacity Loss Capacity Loss
Consumption
676,582 857,600 181,018 960,000 283,418
Exports of Buna and natural rubber 100,000
Consumption* of natural rubber 91,427
The estimated loss of 283,418 tons in rated Consumption" of synthetic rubber 346,314

capacity is equivalent to 15,000,000* heavy-duty TOTAL 537,741

tires. Main items contributing to the loss are (a) Deficit 6,616 1.2

destruction of rubber fabricating plants, (b) lack

* Consumption includes rubber consumed for export
of Buna rubber resulting from bomb damage to articles.
synthetic rubber plants, (c) interferences with
transportation of raw material, (d) withdrawal A breakdown of rubber consumption by prin
of trained personnel from the rubber fabricating cipal classes of products for the period 1939
industry, (e) lack of power at fabricating plants through 1943 is given in Appendix Table C 14.
because of air attacks, etc. Several examples of Information on Buna exports from September,
difficulties in transporting raw materials from 1942, through August, 1943, is given in Appen
the rubber plants to the fabricating
synthetic dix Tables C 15 and C 16.
plants were observed. At Schkopau, in the mid Total consumption exceeded supply by only
dle of 1944, 1,500 tons of Buna could not be 6,616 tons, or about 1 per cent. Although 82.8
moved because of lack of transportation. At Con per cent of Germany's needs came from syn
tinental, of raw-material deliveries
the lack thetic rubber, the contribution of natural rubber
caused the available supplies to fall from an was of especial strategic importance, since it was
equivalent of six weeks' production in January necessary for certain critical tire parts. Though
to two days in December, 1944. the stock withdrawal seems small, it is significant
in view of the very low stocks at the start of the
Ebb and Flow of Germany's Rubber Posi war. At the end of 1944, the estimated stock
tion, Consumption, and Stock Level pile of natural and synthetic rubber was only
7,270 tons (5,200 tons Buna), or less than one
Consumption—Production Balance: Raw Rubber.
Table 26 gives an over-all consumption-produc
month's supply for the industry before bombing.
Reclaim consumption from September, 1939, to
tion balance for the German natural and syn
January, 1945, amounted to 238,841 tons, and
thetic rubber industry from the start of the war
to 1 January 1945. It is based on German sta
was apparently about equal to production, since
tistics up to the end of October, 1944, and Oil
stocks stayed at about the same level.
Substantial quantities of rubber were lost at
* Based on 40 lb of rubber in a medium-size heavy
Ludwigshafen (784 tons) and Huels (500 tons)
duty tire.
in fires that raged for days. Equally serious

53
 STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY: OIL DIVISION REPORT

losses occurred at Continental, until the plant TABLE 27

resorted to storing raw stocks underground. Loss DISTRIBUTION OF FINISHED PRODUCTS

of stocks of finished rubber goods during the re EXCLUDING EXPORTS
treat on the Russian front was reported to be (Based on Rubber Content)
enormous.
Per Cent Distributed to
Distribution and Stocks of Fabricated Rubber. Civilian
According to The Government Board for Rub Year Army Economy
ber, fabricated rubber articles were distributed 1939 52.4 47.6
1940 60.5 39.5
to the army and the civilian economy as out
1941 65 35
lined in Table 27. This table shows that the pro 1942 61.4 38.6
portion of all fabricated articles going to the 1943 65.1 34.9
1944* 70.9 29.1
armed forces was increasing steadily throughout
the war. * Planned

In the tire category, however, the armed

forces received 75 per cent of the production
until the latter part of the war when the army's
share had risen to 85 per cent. (See Appendix
Table C 17.) For details of the stock situa-
tion, planned and actual production of tires, and
the increased military drain on production, see
Appendix Table C 11. Briefly, between Jan
uary and December, 1944, total stocks of pas
senger tires decreased from 27,720 to 18,306,
(c) Civilian goods. Conveyor belts, hose,
and railway production came first. Production
was adjusted as well as possible to essential
needs, with unlimited production authorized
when and if a decisive shortage turned up (for
example, because of a leather shortage, rubber
sole and heel production was increased from 100
to 700 tons a nonth). Production of all dis
pensable consumer goods (raincoats, mats, etc.)

while truck and bus tire stocks dropped from
59,429 to 19,201, despite the fact that tire pro
duction increased until August of that year. The
stock of these materials at the end of the year
represented only a few days' requirements based
on prebombing conditions. Thus, as Appendix
Table C 13 shows in more detail, the army
consumed increasing quantities of replacement
tires to make up for destruction and wear as the
Allies pushed their land offensives.
Priority and Allocation Trends. Priorities for
fabricated rubber goods were set up in the fol
lowing order:
(a) Tires. Airplane tires had the absolute
- priority, followed by truck and tire repair mate
rials and passenger and bicycle tires. The pro
duction program was stipulated each month
and it was elastically adapted to the army's
requirements.
(b) Mechanical goods. Tank and airplane
needs came first, followed by gas protection
equipment, and army and navy accessories. Pro
duction programs were set every three months
at the most and were geared to the airplane,
motor car, and tank programs.
was prohibited from the outset of the war.
After the outbreak of war, production plan
ning was not altered frequently. However, as a
result of the combined bomber offensive, the
following changes were made after mid-1943:
(a) The entire production program was in
creased, and absolute priority was given to air
plane tires until the autumn of 1944.
(b) Special government support was given
to production of tires for 3- and 4%-ton trucks,
even at the expense of other sizes of tires. Tank
track production was increased and given the
same priority as truck tires.
(c) Submarine accessories (especially bat
teries) and airplane parts (especially fuel cells)
were given the highest priority in mechanical
rubber goods.
(d) There were sharp reductions in rubber
products for less essential industries, civilians,
and the export market.
In general, actual production lagged behind
planned production. The allocation of finished
products was strictly regimented. Representa
tives of the armed forces and the government
established quotas for the army and civilian
consumption. Actual distribution to the armed

54
 SCHEDULED VS ACTUAL RUBBER CONSUMPTION
TIRE PRODUCTION
-
IN GERMAN PNEUMATIC
AUBBER S74.7/ST/CS AE/C//STELLE KAUTSC//UK
SOURCES:
of 9 iso/5/62474-#/chi/MisréR/JM for BEWAffnung
UAWD MU///7/OW A/VD USSBS PLA/V7 //VVEST/GAT/OWS

1944 1945

d F M A M J J A s O N D J F M A
-
BOMBING ATTACKS
Metzler July 11,12,1s
EMelBeeny May.ss.sv, *s

wgirth APR. es
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METRIC

MONTH 1944 1945

COWAIDENTIAL Figure 54
 MONTHLY GERMAN TIRE PRODUCTION
BY MAJOR TYPES
SOURCE : Are Conds or me /C/y's 7'EL Le Arad 7"scayuk"

AVY DUT

ASSENGE

LIGHT TRUCK

AEROPLANE

OTORCYCLE

TRACTOR

THOUSANDs J |A|S| 0 |N|D|J ||F |M|A |M|J J |A |S| 0 |N|D|J F |M|A |M| J J |A|S| 0 |N|D|J |F |M| A
OF UNITS
PER MONTH
1942 1943 1944 1945

Cowr/05//7/4d. Figure 55
 ATTACK
forces washandled by offices set up by the army,
navy, air forces. Distribution for civilian
and
consumption was handled by regional govern
ment offices.
Rubber Quality. During the early part of the
war, sufficient natural rubber was available so
that the Germans were not forced to make an
all-synthetic rubber tire. In 1943, according to
Dr. Weber of Continental Rubber Company,
they attempted the manufacture of 100 per cent
Buna Stires, but considerable difficulty resulted.
There is some conflict in information obtained
from the Germans as to subsequent develop
ments, particularly those occurring near the end
of the war. Some improvement in fabrication is
reported to have been obtained in 1944 by the
use of Buna S 3, a more adhesive and more
workable type of Buna. In general, it appears
that the fabricators had the alternative for tire
manufacture of either (1) using 14 per cent
natural rubber and 86 per cent synthetic if nat
ural rubber were available or (2) employing
100 per cent synthetic with Koresin, a potent
tackifier discovered by the Germans. Koresin
was always in short supply, however, because of
the bombing of the only producing unit at Lud
wigshafen. Dr. Weber reports that tubes made
of 100 per cent synthetic rubber were tried, but
performance was so poor that after the middle
of 1944 it was decided to use 25 per cent natural
rubber.
Carbon Black Production and Consumption
According to the Germans, carbon black sup
plies were adequate for all rubber requirements
during the war. The industry had a capacity
rating of about 79,000 tons per annum before
bombing.
Production, which exceeded consumption by
a small margin over the years 1942-44 ran from
50,000 to 58,000 tons per year. Appendix Table
C 18 presents a detailed balance for the year
1944 prepared by the Degussa Company, large
manufacturers of carbon black. Although some
of the carbon black plants were out of action
during the war as the result of bombing (see Ap
pendix Table C 19), the decrease in require
ments as the result of bombing of the fabricating
plants prevented a shortage. Undoubtedly black
55
O N RU BBER
would have limited rubber consumption other
wise. Stocks of black at the end of the war in the
territory occupied by the American, British, and
French forces amounted to only 3,000 tons, less
than one month's normal requirement.
Attempt to Protect the Rubber Industry
from Bombing
Although the decision to disperse and go un
derground in the oil industry had been taken in
June, 1944, it was not until the beginning of 1945
that an underground Buna plant project was
undertaken. A number of locations were selected
but were rejected in favor of a large concrete
vault at Muehldorf. The synthetic rubber plant
was to have a capacity of 1,000 tons per month
with the possibility of later expansion to 2,000
tons. It was to operate on acetaldehyde and ethyl
benzene brought in from near-by plants. A tire
factory to handle the rubber was also planned
in this same vault. Construction was undertaken
in March, 1945, but excavation was not com
plete and no equipment had been installed when
the vault was captured by the American Army.
Underground tire fabrication was attempted
at Tharandt near Dresden. Several of the
bombed rubber fabricating plants had disman
tled equipment but had been unable to move it
from plants to the underground location because
of transportation tie-ups. No information is avail
able on the planned capacity of this plant.
Accuracy of Intelligence Estimates
The location of all the German synthetic rub
ber plants was known to the Allied intelligence
agencies. The estimates of capacity varied con
siderably, with the British Ministry of Economic
Warfare underestimating and the United States
Informal Rubber Committee overestimating the
plant capacity, as Table 28 indicates.
As regards actual production, the Ministry of
Economic Warfare estimated that in May, 1944,
the Germans were producing at the rate of
104,000 tons per year of synthetic rubber, which
is in good agreement with the actual rate of
108,000. The ministry estimated that natural
rubber was coming in through blockade at the
rate of 5,000 tons per year. Actually, shipments
of natural rubber had ceased by that time,
although 1943 imports were about 6,000 tons.
 STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY: OIL DIVISION REPORT

The intelligence on the fabricating plants and
their location was satisfactory, but the Ministry
of Economy Warfare underestimated tire pro
duction, placing the production of truck, motor,
and airplane tires at 169,000 per month. Actual
an attack was not repeated. They testified that
similar attacks on Schkopau, Ludwigshafen, and
Leverkusen could have paralyzed the rubber in
dustry and left Germany rubberless in two to
four months. -

May production was 233,000. Stocks of natural
rubber were overestimated by the British agency
at 10,000 tons in 1944, whereas actual stocks
were about 4,500 tons at the end of 1943 and
sank steadily from that period to 2,470 tons in
October, 1944. However, the Ministry of Eco
nomic Warfare did predict that natural rubber
stocks would be critical by the summer of 1944.
Underlying the lack of interest in the syn
thetic rubber industry as a target was the belief
The 5 August 1944 report of the German Air
Force Staff, Plans Division, states, “The destruc
tion of Schkopau, together with one of the other
three plants (Huels, Ludwigshafen, Auschwitz)
will cripple more than than two thirds of the
total Buna production and have a catastrophic
effect on the rubber supply, vital to the arma
ment industry.”
TABLE 28

that Germany had a sufficient cushion of raw ALLIED ESTIMATES OF GERMAN SYNTHETIC
materials and finished products to absorb the RUBBER PLANT CAPACITY
shock of an attack on the industry. (Metric Tons per Year)

As Estimated by
Conclusions
Ministry of U. S.
When war ended in Europe, damage to the
Economic Warfare, Committee, Actual
German rubber industry was insufficient to con Plant May, 1944 15 June 1944 Capacity
stitute a major factor in the Wehrmacht's de Schkopau 35,000 75,000 72,000
feat. The important damage that had been done Huels 30,000 75,000 48,000
was in large part an accidental dividend de Ludwigshafen 21,000 25-60,000: 30,000

rived from the all-out oil offensive that began Auschwitz 20,000 20-50,000 36,000

in May, 1944. While it is true that lack of gaso Leverkusen 6,000

line alone stalled the German war machine, so TOTAL 106,000 195,000-260,000 192,000

that attacks on rubber plants appeared to be

unnecessary, there is considerable evidence that, *Assumes extraneous aldehyde shipped in.

had synthetic oil, rubber, and chemicals been

considered as a single target group, the same
results could have been achieved more expe
ditiously. This evidence includes:
(1) Interviews with German government
officials which revealed that they were in con
stant dread of an all-out attack on synthetic
rubber, particularly after the successful bomb
ing of Huels. Knowledge of the vulnerability of
these plants caused drastic conservation mea
sures, culminating in an order limiting all traffic
behind the front (military and civilian) to a
maximum speed of 17 miles per hour.
(2) The highly successful results of the one
attack on Huels in June, 1943, which caused a
loss of 12,000 tons of Buna production and re
duced stocks of both raw rubber and finished
tires to 1 and 1.5 months' normal consumption,
respectively. Nazi experts were amazed that such
(3) The fact that the attacks on synthetic
oil plants, roundabout as they were in terms of
direct planning against synthetic rubber, re
duced Buna production from an average of
11,800 tons per month in the first four months
of 1944 to 1,800 tons in December. Buna stocks
dropped from 13,000 tons in January, 1944, to
5,000 tons at the beginning of 1945, and the
government belatedly decided to put a synthetic
rubber plant underground.
-
The drop in Buna production had an almost
immediate effect on fabrication and fabricated
stocks. Tire rubber consumption dropped from
a normal level of 3,400 metric tons a month to
943 tons in February, 1945. During 1944, stocks
of heavy-duty tires dropped from 59,400 in Jan
uary to 19,200 in December and production of
airplane tires declined from 40,000 a month to
19,000.

56
 DELIVERIES OF GERMAN RUBBER INDUSTRY
BY PRINCIPAL TYPES OF PRODUCTS
SOURCE: FACHGRUPPE KAUTSCHUkINDUSTRIE

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PER 1943 - 1944 1945

736512 0–47–8 Figure 56

 ATTACK ON RUBBER

That this much damage was done almost in
advertently (except for the one Huels attack)—
or at least with very sporadic bombing priorities
directed against rubber production –
indicates
how much more could have been accomplished
by a consciously co-ordinated attack. The fact
remains that, at the war's end, while the air
force had put the rubber industry on the rocks,
the German war effort had not been directly af
fected by a shortage of rubber.
The conclusions suggested are:
(1) Synthetic rubber plants offered an ef
fective target system, easily identified, vulner
able, and slow to repair. Moreover, the product
of these plants was absolutely essential to mod
ern warfare.
(2) The fabricating plants were not an
ideal target system since they were numerous,
dispersed, and relatively easy to repair. As such
they should not have been included on the target
list, at least until after raw material plants had
been taken care of.
(3) The air forces target intelligence, while
essentially correct in appraising the German
rubber industry, erred in overlooking the insep
arability as targets of rubber and other chemical
plants, and overestimated the stock cushion.
(4) The best way to insure that Allied air
attacks inflicted the greatest harm to the over-all
German war effort would have been to consider
synthetic oil, chemical, and rubber targets as a
group. Had the delicate interrelationship be
tween Buna and the other chemical products
been defined and considered in operational plans
from the beginning, it is felt that an even larger
extra dividend would have resulted from the oil
offensive in the form of a more complete
stoppage of synthetic rubber production in time
to have contributed directly to the collapse of
Nazi Germany.

The production of synthetic rubber, one of the most important branches of

the chemical industry, is especially vulnerable to air attack. To date, produc
tion has been confined to three plants (Ludwigshafen-Oppau, Huels, and
Schkopau). A fourth plant, Auschwitz, is expected to begin operations
in May. Over one half of the production of Buna to date came from the
Schkopau plant, and approximately 30 per cent from Huels. The loss of these

two plants would have grave effect on German rubber production, despite
the fact that when the new plant reaches full capacity, the total production
will be back to two thirds of the original output.
—From German Air Force Staff, Plans
Division Report of 3 August 1944

Since the supplies of rubber are becoming scarce (production at several

German fire factories has been interrupted and the French fire industry as a
whole has been lost), the plants producing Buna gain increased importance
Cls targets.
—From German Air Force Staff, Plans
Division Report of 10 December 1944

57
 STRATEGIC AIR ATTACK on GERMAN
POWDER, EXPLOSIVES, AND PROPELLANTS INDUSTRIES
The Versailles treaty scaled down Germany's
powder and explosives industry to about 6 per
cent of its World War Isize. Its maximum World
War I production had been 12,000 metric tons of
powder and 20,000 metric tons of explosives a
month—about 55-60 per cent of World War II
output. After the war, three powder plants (at
Reinsdorf, Haslock, and Rottweil) and three ex
plosives plants (at Kruemmel, Doemitz, and
Schlebusch) were permitted to make a limited
amount of military explosives, but most of the
nitrocellulose factories turned to making other
commodities, such as celluloid plastics, films,
rayon, sausage casings, lacquers.
The plants were small, employed few people,
required virtually no imports, and were an un
important part of Germany's economy. The
leading concern was Dynamit A. G. (DAG),
which became dominant after a series of inter
bellum amalgamations with I.G. Farbenindus
trie A.G. Next in importance was Westfalische
Anhaltische Sprengstoff A.G. (WASAG) and its
subsidiaries. Other companies were Wolff and
Company A. G. and Lignose Sprengstoff Werke
G.m.b.H.
Secret Preparations for War
Captured munitions and powder charges in
dicate that Germany began expanding produc
tion and accumulating explosives for World War
II in 1933. At first her factories produced single
base nitrocellulose propellants, which could be
made without building complex new nitroglyc
erin plants. But soon facilities were created for
producing double-base, solventless propellants,
and existing industrial-explosives plants greatly
of TNT.
increased their production
A state-owned corporation, Montan Industrie
werke G.m.b.H., controlled by the Army Weap
co-ordi
ons Office, had been formed in 1932 to
nate these secret preparations for war. Since the
expansion in powder and explosives plants which
ensued went far beyond any civilian needs, the
government provided the money and determined
the policies. Montan built the plants and leased
them to DAG, WASAG, and Wolff. These firms
created subsidiaries to operate the plants and
supplied them with technical men and supervis
ors. Raw materials were provided by the chem
ical industry and by new plants built by another
government-owned corporation, WIFO. A pow
der and explosives committee headed by Dr.
Sarrazin took charge of co-ordinating production
and pooling technical information among the
plants. (A chart showing the organization of the
industry appears in the Appendix as Figure 32.)
The first step was to enlarge existing plants
and rebuild and re-equip the unused World War
I plants. But as early as 1934, plans were being
drawn for secret new explosives factories, under
the code name Wiese, and the first of them, at
Geusen, had its initial section completed in Oc
tober, 1935.
In 1936, a secret schnell (quick) plan for ex
plosives expansion was launched, and 6,000 tons
of steel per month were allocated to There
it.
after expansion proceeded rapidly. Plans were
revised upward
or
as
as
often two three times
in
single year. By 1942, according Dr. Krauch,
to
a
the Commissioner General, 1,480,000 tons of steel
had been expended for new explosives plants.
Between 1934 and 1938 the number of workers
the explosives industry rose from about 1,500
in
to 30,000; was 100,000.
in
1944
it
Figure 57 shows how the industry expanded
between 1933 and the last year
of
the war (see
also Appendix Table D1). four years, 1934
In
1938, powder production
to
to
was increased
5,000 tons per month, and explosives production
10,000 tons per month. About half
to
of
the latter
 POWDER AND EXPLOSIVES
CAPACITIES ACTUALLY REACHED
GREATER GERMANY

NITRIC ACID
(CONCENTRATED)

4.

THOUSANDS 1934 '35 '36 '37 '38 *39 194O '4! '42 "43 44 45
OF METRIC
TONS PER

- MONTH
MOTE: F/GURE's Ex77AAOLATED FROM 407/.4L PRODUCTIO/W AMD ALA/W/W/AWGFIGURES
Figure 57
 ATTACK ON POWDER, EXPLOSIVES, PROPELLANTS

was pure high explosives, and the rest extenders Preparations against Bombing
or diluted explosives, chiefly ammonium nitrate. Expecting that the powder and explosives in
By the beginning of the war, the Germans had
dustry would be target for Allied bombing, the

a
built up a stock pile of 187,000 tons of powder.
German High Command provided very large

a
excess capacity for manufacture. Tables D2,
Raw Materials—A Critical Weakness
D3 and Figures 33, 34, 35, and 36 the Ap

in
The German position in explosives, however, pendix give the locations, production capaci
was vulnerable at some points. The weakest spot ties, and managements explosives plants.

of

It
is
was raw materials. The Germans seriously un evident from the maps that the industry was well
derestimated their needs. In 1939 they estimated dispersed throughout the interior Germany.

of
that they would use 27,500 toris a month of con place explosives
The Germans took care not

to
centrated nitric acid (Hoko) and 4,080 tons of plants the danger zone (Freimachungszone)

in
toluene; actually in 1944 their average monthly
from which they intended

to
evacuate industries.
consumption was 70,000 and 10,000 tons, respec
They followed no fixed pattern organizing

in
tively. They built few raw materials plants but
production. Some plants specialized powders

relied instead on private industry. They also
failed to build up adequate stock piles. During
1941-43, their average reserve stock of nitric
acid, for example, was only a ten-day supply;
they had less than a month's reserve of toluene,
and no reserve at all of stabilizers. Their stock
of glycol was practically used up by the need
for anti-freeze in the winter of 1941-42.
The Germans also made a serious mistake in
in
and/or explosives, some made fuzes and primers
as well, and some even loaded shells. Munitions
loading capacity kept pace with the expanding
powder and explosives industry, and there was
excess capacity throughout the war. In the Ap
pendix, Figure gives the data on the loading
37
plants, Tables D4, D5, and D6 and Figures 38-42
the data on the principal raw materials plants.
The industry was vulnerable bombing be

to
their appraisal of their early lessons in combat. its dependence on transportation. Nitro
of

cause
After their quick victories in Poland and France,
cellulose was usually made one plant and

in
they decided that blitzkrieg warfare required
shipped another, moist paste.
to

of
the form
in

little ammunition, and they stopped expanding Contrary American practice, only one plant,
to

explosives manufacture. Stalingrad and other re Christianstadt, made its own nitric acid. (All ni
verses in Russia made them resume expansion trating plants recovered spent acid.)
in 1943, but it was too late; they had fallen dan
Another vulnerable aspect was the concentra
gerously low in production of nitric acid and
certain important elements few bot
of

tion
in
a

other raw materials.

tleneck plants. Powder stabilizers, for example,
In an effort to compensate for their shortages, were made only Wolfen and Uerdingen.
at

they developed or adopted several technical in

novations, of which the chief were: Rise and Fall of Production
(a) Development of DEGN (diethylenegly Figures and 59 and Appendix Table D7
58

coldinitrate) as a substitute for nitroglycerin; Germany's production month by month,

as

show
(b) Development of a process for the synthe measured against consumption, for powders and
toluene from benzene and methanol;
sis

explosives, respectively, for the period 1940-44."

of

(c) Adoption more economical processes

of

hexogen; These figures do not take into account Allied ammu

of

for the manufacture

*

nition captured by the Germans full reckoning

or

of

foreign process for syn

a

(d) Adoption
of

German losses by Allied capture and explosions, concern

a

glycerine. ing which there no reliable information. Germany

of

thesis
in is
is

have captured large stocks

of

known nitrocellulose
to

The Nazis built two synthetic glycerine plants, France. However, the production facilities acquired in
in

Oppau Heydebreck, and vaded countries were comparatively negligible. France,

In
at at

and one
at

one
a

for example, because sabotage by French workers, the

of

synthetic toluene plant Waldenburg, which

Germans never got more than 700 tons powder produc
of

produced about 35 per cent

of

their total toluene month; Norway, because strikes, they got

of

tion
in
a

Supply. practically no production.

59
 STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY: OIL DIVISION REPORT

Appendix Table D7 indicates that, until the The disastrous German position in explosives
middle of 1944, the Germans had ample ammu was reported to Adolf Hitler by Munitions Min
nition. In the middle of 1943, after Stalingrad ister Speer as early as 30 August 1944:
and later reverses in Russia, they gave explosives The last air attacks have again badly hit the most im
top priority, along with oil, and resumed the portant chemical plants—among them the three hydro
genation plants (Leuna, Brux, and Poelitz) have been put
building of new plants (certain raw materials,
out of operation for several weeks. . . . Methanol produc
notably diglycol and nitric acid, had top priority tion receded from the quota of 34,000 tons to 8,750 tons
from 1942 on). In 1943, and until the middle of in August. . . . In the field of the valuable explosives
(hexogen and TNT) . . . the production will fall 30 per
1944, explosives and powder production was close
cent short. . . . The production of nitrogen will amount to
to capacity, rising to peaks of 24,700 tons of a maximum of 45,000 tons, compared to the planned pro
powder and 51,000 tons of explosives in May duction for September of 85,000 tons.
June, 1944. There were other widespread effects. The first
Nevertheless, these strenuous efforts and the desperate move the Germans made, in order to
German reserves were not sufficient to meet the conserve nitrogen for explosives, was to cut
mid-1944 crisis resulting from heavily the nitrogen allocations for fertilizers
(1) The huge increase in munitions require and mining explosives. In prewar 1938-39, agri
ments after D Day and culture got 19.3 lb of nitrogen per acre (a total
(2) Stepped-up Allied bombing.
TABLE 29
Direct bombing of the industry did not begin
until very late in the war (early 1945). But the CUMULATIVE STOCK, AVERAGE
Allied bombing of four large oil plants (Leuna, MONTHLY CONSUMPTION FOR
Oppau, Linz, and Heydebreck) POWDER AND EXPLOSIVES
in 1944 had
brought the explosives industry practically to a Number of
Months
standstill. It not only destroyed much of the in Cumulative Average
Stock, Monthly for which
dustry's raw material resources, but also diverted Tons Consump- Stocks Were
much of its labor and equipment to repairing . tion Adequate
oil plants. It wrecked explosives, too, because, as 1 January 1941 98,100 5,870 17
pointed out in an earlier section of this report, 1 January 1942 163,133 13,746 12
1 January 1943 197,424 21,370 9
the Germans used their oil plants to produce
1 January 1944 227,824 28,800 7
critical raw materials for explosives as well. 1 January 1945 98,222 52,000 1.9
In order to arrive at some idea of the move
Similar calculations for powder will give the following
ment of stocks, the Oil Division has assumed that results:
J
no great stock piles were available on 1 anuary 1 January 1941 49,000 2,150 22.7

1940. On the basis of the monthly production 1 January 1942 107,900 4,450 28.2
1 January 1943 165,182 7,550 21.7
and consumption of high explosives, the picture 1 January 1944 253,382 8,350 30.0
was as shown in Table 29. 1 January 1945 209,382 17 OO0 12.3
Figure 60 shows how precipitously explosives
production féll after the knockout of nitrogen. of 745,000 metric tons). In 1943-44, it got 10.25 lb
The Germans diverted some nitrogen to explo per acre. For the season 1944-45 its allocation
sives from other industries, but it was not nearly was only 4.45 lb per acre. Obviously this had an
enough. By February, 1945, German explosives effect on food production. The situation in min
supplies had been reduced to a trickle–8,500 ing was not better. The curtailment of mining
tons per month. This was only about 25 per cent explosives reduced coal production, which in
of the output for October, 1944. By that time the turn reduced explosives production, creating a
Germans were driven to such emergency meas vicious circle.
ures as converting from 105-mm howitzers to 75 Another damaging result was the deterioration
mm, because the smaller guns could fire twice as of military explosives. The Germans had to give
many projectiles with the same amount of ex up almost entirely the manufacture of the power
plosives. ful explosive hexogen, which because of its in
 --
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 ExPLoSIVES PRODUCTION BY TYPE
GREATER GERMANY
(IMCL. OCCUPIED TERR/TORy, EXCL. /TALY)
SOURCE SPEER DOCUMENTS

TTT ||
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#: F. M. A |M|| J J A || S
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 ATTACK ON POWDER,
sensitivity was very desirable for armor-piercing
shells. This explosive used a large amount of am
monia and methanol, and the Germans decided
that TNT had first call on those materials.
The Germans also went in for filling shells
with diluted explosives, which reduced their
power. The chief extender used was ammonium
nitrate. But there was also a large-scale use of
inert extenders, mainly rock salt. Some of the
German shells contained as much as 70 per cent
rock salt, with only 30 per cent TNT. The extent
to which extenders reduced the effectiveness of
shells was estimated by Dr. Sarrazin, of the Ger
man main committee on powder and explosives,
as follows:
Explosive Mixture Fragmentation*, Meters
100 per cent TNT 40
60/40 TNT/ammonium nitrate 38
30/70 TNT/ammonium nitrate 34
60/40 TNT/rock salt 28
50/50 TNT/rock salt 26.3
40/60 TNT/rock salt 25
£ Fragmentation
was defined as the distance in meters
at which a target of 1 sq m, mounted on a block 2 m high,
was pierced by only one bomb fragment from a standard
explosive test bomb.
The German explosives shortage was aggra
vated in some respects by a rigid adherence to
production schedules which overlooked changes
in conditions. The Germans continued to allo
cate scarce nitric acid to propellants, for in
stance, even after propellants had run far ahead
of explosives and there was a good deal more
powder than there were explosives.
As to the military results, these were perhaps
best summarized by Field Marshal Keitel.
About the situation in the last months of the war,
he said:
Ammunition was short from time to time, especially
for armored vehicle weapons. On the eastern front, many
ammunition dumps were lost during the retreat. During
the invasion, as well, we had lost large quantities of am
munition. When an ammunition plant was destroyed or
heavily hit, there would be a shortage for a few weeks.
We never had enough for our tanks and tank destroyer
guns, as well as for all our defensive weapons.
Another reason was that we had a lot of ammunition
tied down in other theaters of operation, as for instance
in the Balkans, Hungary, Rumania, Italy, and so on. We
had to store in all these places a minimum amount which
would enable us to fight until more supplies could be
brought up. In the North we had to keep an eight weeks'
supply of ammunition. . . . Smoke was also very short.
61
EXPLOSIVES, PROPELLANTS
Analysis of Bombing Effects
The powder and explosives industry was never
selected for intensive strategic bombing. It was
not even listed on any of the bombing plans.
Toward the end of the war, munitions depots
were given fourth priority, but neither the
sources of powder and explosives nor the plants
producing raw materials were ever made specific
objectives with the purpose of knocking out the
industry.
In the last few weeks of the war, a few powder
and explosives plants were subjected to casual
bombing when other targets became scarce. But
apparently no discrimination was used in select
ing targets. For instance, the Dueneberg plant of
Dynamit A. G. and the Kruemmel plant, 4 mi
away, from which the Dueneberg plant got its
raw cordite paste, were both bombed the same
day. The destruction of Kruemmel would have
closed Dueneberg, and so .there was actually no
necessity for bombing Dueneberg.
Air raids on the high-explosives industry be
fore January, 1945, had no effect whatever on the
ability of the Germans to meet their high-explo
sives requirements. There was enough unused
capacity to absorb the mild shock of the earlier
bombing. The decline in production during this
period was caused not by lack of plant capacity
but by lack of raw materials.
Most of the effective bombing of the explo
sives plants took place during the last six weeks
of the war, when the Germans were already so
nearly out of nitrogen that they were also out of
the war. But the explosives industry could have
been knocked out in earlier stages of the war,
and the loss of its productive capacity would
have had a profound effect on Germany's ability
to continue the war. At the rate of expenditure
of explosives by the German armed forces after
D Day (70,000 tons per month), reserve stocks
would have lasted only three to four months.
In order to cripple Germany's ability to wage
war, it would have been necessary to knock out
only 7 of a total of 35 powder and explosives
plants: namely, Allendorf, Bromberg, Clausthal,
Hessisch-Lichtenau, Kruemmel, Schlebusch, and
Elsnig. These plants, with a combined capacity
of 20,200 tons per month, accounted for 70 per
cent of the total German TNT capacity. Another
 STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY: OIL DIVISION REPORT

good target would have been the manufacture of

stabilizers, which was concentrated in two plants.
If properly selected weapons (incendiaries
preponderating) and pattern bombing are used,
the expenditure of effort required to put an ex
plosives or powder plant out of commission is
much less than for other types of plants. A raid
on the Schoenebeck plant of Lignose Sprengstoff
Werke G.m.b.H. is a good illustration of this
point. It required only 4.3 tons of incendiaries

Figure 61. Violent secondary explosions set off by

incendiaries at Lignose Sprengstoff Werke, Schoene
beck, destroyed the TNT manufacturing building
which once stood in the foreground.

Figure 63. Great destruction was caused when the

explosives plant
of Lignose Sprengstoff Werke,
Schoenebeck, was attacked 21 January 1944 by two
RAF Halifax heavy bombers. Two 2,000-lb HE bombs
and 1,748.4-lb incendiaries were dropped. Both HE's
hit buildings and destroyed them, but by far the
greater part of the damage was caused by incen
diaries. The picture shows the destructive effects of
fire alone on this type of plant.

and 2 tons of high-explosive bombs, dropped by

two Halifax bombers, to accomplish a 50 per cent
permanent reduction in the TNT capacity of this
plant. The area of the plant was 125 acres; con
sequently the bomb density was 0.05 ton per
acre. When one considers that it took hundreds
or even thousands of tons on other types of plants
Figure 62. Explosion resulting from fire started by to get similar effects, these results are amazing.
incendiaries completely destroyed the TNT granu At Schoenebeck, the incendiaries started uncon
lating buildings of Lignose Sprengstoff Werke, trollable fires, which set off secondary explosions
Schoenebeck, which once stood on this location. so great that there were only holes in the ground
Extensive precautions taken by the Germans were left where buildings had stood (Figures 61, 62
unavailing against a combination of high explosive and 63).
and incendiaries properly aimed. In raids on explosives plants the aim is to start

62
 ATTACK ON POWDER, EXPLOSIVES, PROPELLANTS

the fires, drop anti-personnel bombs to prevent Effects on the Industry

the enemy from putting the fires out, and let the
secondary explosions finish the job. In every one
of the plants surveyed, most of the damage was
caused by secondary explosion, either from fire
*
or direct hits by high-explosive bombs.
The recuperability of powder and explosives
plants is of a very low order. Even under the
most favorable conditions, it takes six to nine
months to restore a plant to its original capacity.
The German explosives plants were particularly
vulnerable to low level air attacks, because they
lacked anti-aircraft or fighter plane protection.
Table 30 shows how bombing affected pro
ductive capacity for the various raw and finished
materials in the industry as a whole, and the in
dustry's position on 15 February 1945.
These figures indicate that explosives manu
facturing capacity was hardly touched by the
Allied raids, whereas raw materials, rarely a pri
mary target, suffered very heavily as the result
of oil plant raids and capture of plants. On 15
February, the Germans still had 87.7 per cent of
their TNT capacity, for example, but ammonia
productive capacity was down to 6.9 per cent.

TABLE 30

STATUS OF GERMAN EXPLOSIVES AND RELATED INDUSTRIES ON 15 FEBRUARY 1945*

Operable
Total Per Cent Temporary Per Cent on Per Cent
Product Capacity Total Loss of Loss of 15 Feb. of
100 Per Cent Tons/Month Capacity Tons/Month Capacity 1945 Total
Tons/Month Tons/Month Capacity

Trinitrotoluene 22,000 1,200 5.0 1,500 2.0 19,300 87.7

Hexogen 2,600 1,700 65.0 900 35.0

Solventless cordite 19,200 3,100 17.0 1,500 8.0 14,600 75.0

Concentrated nitric acid 62,500 9,950 15.9 1,600 2.6 50,950 81.5

Oleum 93,000 7,200 7.75 22,635 24.5 63,175 68.0

Methanol 30,575 21,000 68.8 5,000 16.3 4,575 15.5

Toluene 12,500 300 2.4 8,700 69.6 3,500 28.0

Hexamethylene-tetramine 4,650 2,850 61.5 0 0 1,800 38.7

Pentaerythritol 1,025 0 0 300 29.2 725 70.8

Ethylene oxide : 7,100 1,250 17.6 1,250 17.6 4,500 64s

Diglycol 3,850 700 18.2 1,150 30 2,000 51.8

Stabilizers 1,120 0 0 550 49 570 51.0

Guanidine nitrate 1,950 0 0 0 0 1,950 100.0

Nitro guanidine 1,000 0 0 600 60 400 40.0

Methyl nitrate 1,010 1,000 99.0 0 0 10 1.0

Methylamine nitrate salt 1,000 1,000 100 0 0 0 0

Dinitro anisol 350 350 100

Dinitro benzine 3,450 450 13.2 700 20.6 2,300 66.4

Nitrocellulose 19,000 4,150 21.8 770 4.2 14,080 74.0

Ammonium nitrate 30,000 11,000 36.8 5,000 16.7 14,000 46.8

Ammonia as (N) 71,300 10,200 14.3 56,100 78.8 5,000 6.9

* This table was taken from a captured German document. The figures for methanol
and ammonia are not in agreement with those established by Oil Division research.

63
 STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY: OIL DIVISION REPORT
Figure 64. The Dueneberg plant of Dynamit A.G.,
which produced 13.6 per cent of Germany's propel
lant powder, was hit by 800 HE bombs and nine
100-lb incendiaries on 7 April 1945. A crater 210 ft
in diameter resulted from a secondary explosion when
a bomb scored a direct hit on a magazine containing
200 tons of nitroguanidine. Three adjoining buildings
were destroyed and all buildings and installations
within an 850-ft radius were badly damaged. The
explosion may have been caused by either the HE's
or the incendiaries. Production could have been
restored to about 20 per cent of capacity in three to
four weeks.
Figure 65. This 175-ft crater resulted from explosion
of a magazine containing 80 tons of rocket powder
following the 7 April 1945 raid on the Dueneberg
plant of Dynamit A.G. when a lone fighter bomber
shelled the plant ared.
Effects on Individual Plants
Dueneberg. This plant, attacked by 151 Eighth
Air Force B-24's on 7 April 1945, with 26 tons of
1,000-lb high-explosive bombs, 381 tons of 500-lb
bombs, and nine 100-lb incendiaries, a total of
408 tons, was hard hit. A total of 219 tons dropped
in the plant area. Several secondary explosions
resulted, the most spectacular being the detona
nation of 200 tons of nitroguanidine in bulk stor.
age. The explosion destroyed all buildings and
Figure 66. The explosion resulting from a bomb hit on
a 50-ton powder magazine left this crater 100 ft in
diameter and 45 ft deep in the plant area of Dynamit
A.G. in Dueneberg.
installations within an 850-ft radius. German offi
cials estimate that it would have taken three to
four weeks to make enough repairs to restore
production capacity to 20 per cent, but the man
agement did not repair the plant because it real
ized the end of the war was near. It was not
possible to determine whether the incendiaries
or high explosives, or both, caused the secondary
explosions (Figures 64, 65, and 66).
Kruemmel. This plant was hit the same day as
Dueneberg by 118 B-24's, which dropped 325
tons of high explosives, mostly 500 lb, and 0.5 ton
of incendiaries. About half the tonnage was in the
target area. No incendiaries dropped on the tar
get, and there were no secondary explosions.
Damage totaled 15 per cent of the plant cost, but
it completely stopped production. Facilities for
 ATTACK ON POWDER, EXPLOSIVES, PROPELLANTS

TNT production could have been restored 25 to

50 per cent in two weeks, butit would have taken
a year to bring the nitrocellulose plant to full
capacity (Figure 67).

Clausthal. This plant was raided on 7 October

1944 by 129 B-24's, which dropped 363 tons of
bombs (338 1,000-lb bombs and the rest 500, 300,
and 250 lb). About one fourth of the bombs
landed in the target area. The plant, engaged in
TNT production and shell loading, was not oper
ating when bombed. Of its 214 buildings, 70 got
direct hits, and there were 53 direct hits on the
Figure 68. Disruption of the piping system in the TNT
underground piping system. There was only one
building as result of the 7 October 1944 attack by
secondary explosion—a magazine. When the
the Eighth Air Force on the Clausthal-Zellerfeld plant.
bombs penetrated concrete roofs and exploded

by
hit
plant area was

of
inside, they destroyed column supports and col The 750-acre 95 tons HE

lapsed the roof, damaging heavy equipment. But bombs. Of the 214 buildings, 70 were hit and de

5
stroyed. Main damage was underground and sur

to
glancing hits and near misses left the heavy
piping, including per

to of
equipment undamaged. Hits between the build face 100 cent destruction
product mains and 70 80 per cent damage

to
ings and blast walls caused heavy destruction.
other lines. Six months were required bring the

to
The most severe damage in this plant was to the
production plant per

of
TNT back 50 cent
its in

to
this
piping system; the bombing knocked out the
preattack capacity.
products mains entirely and destroyed steam,
air, warm water, and sewage mains 70 to 80 per
cent. To restore 50 per cent of capacity would Schoenebeck. On 24 January 1944, two Hali
have taken three months for shell loading and fax bombers dropped high explosives
of
tons
2

six months for TNT (Figures 68, 69,70). incendiary bombs on this target.
of

and 4.3 tons

The destruction was amazing, owing the sec
to
ondary explosions caused by fires. The capacity
the TNT plant was reduced approximately 50
of

per cent. No attempt was made repair

to

it.
It
restore the electric fuse plant
to

took ten months

full capacity.
to

TNT wash house, two granulating buildings,

A

crude TNT drying room (which contained

a

TNT) and trinitration building

of

about tons
6

were completely destroyed. Heavy pieces of

equipment were found 900 away from the
ft

trinitration building, and only deep crater was

a

found on the building site. This the only one of

is

the explosives plants surveyed where incendi

aries were used great quantity (Figures 61,
in

62, 63).

Kraiburg. This target was attacked April

11

Figure 67. Explosion of an RDX bomb inside the glycol

nitration building of the Kruemmel plant of Dynamit 1945 by 133 B-17's which dropped 381 tons of
A.G. broke the supporting columns and caused col 500-lb bombs. No bomb plot was available. De
extensive that production was
so

lapse of the roof and ceiling. Heavy equipment suf struction was
fered only slight damage. stopped completely. The heaviest damage was

65
 STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY: OIL DIVISION REPORT

Protective Measures. The German explosives

plants had two types defense against bombing,

of
both ineffective. One was the construction of

a
large excess capacity plants well dispersed

in
over the country. This failed because

of
the raw
materials bottleneck.
The other was protection the plants them

of
selves. The buildings were well separated from
each other and arranged irregular patterns

in
(Figures 74 and 75).
They had reinforced concrete roofs, covered
with soil and growing vegetation for camouflage.
Buildings were surrounded by blast walls

of
a
figure 69. Lightly constructed walls were blown out,
he but

heavy nitrators suffered only slight damage from

1,000-lb bomb TNT build
of

blast effect
in

the
a

ing plant.
of

the Clausthal-Zellerfeld

by secondary explosions.
In

caused one case,

a

holding nipolit and

18
to

of

magazine 20 tons raw

was hit and exploded. The crater was
20

powder

diameter. The blast

to

25ft deep and 75

in
ft

80
to

that trees 175 away were

to

great
so

ft

was 200
blown down (Figures 71, 72, 73).

the largest plants Europe,

of

Troisdorf. One
in

producing industrial primers, fuzes, and detona

tors, this plant was hit on December 1944 by
27

B-17's and two days later by 176 RAF heavy

11

spillovers from another target. The

in

bombers
British airplanes dropped two-ton bombs, Figure 70. Column supports collapsed and the roof
12

among others, and the total tonnage was 626. fell on the acid tanks when 1,000-lb bomb hit the
a

Troisdorf caught 100 tons this, the spent acid storage building the Claus
of

of

of

of

total 364 roof

a

bomb hits. The metalworking building, making thal-Zellerfeld plant. Pipe lines and three acid pumps
casings for detonators, was completely des were destroyed by falling roof, and several tanks
troyed, and no attempt was made were severely damaged.
to

it.

rebuild

TABLE
/

31
6-to 27-ft reinforced concrete core with 12
a

LOSS OF EXPLOSIVES AND earth abutment on each side. The walls often
ft

POWDER PRODUCTION FROM BOMBING OF had corridors which served as shelters.

SURVEYED PLANTS There were also reinforced concrete and sand
Production bag walls around the central power plant and im
Production, Loss, Tons portant equipment, for fragment protection.
Plant Date of Raid Tons per per
Month
Other measures were good blackout control and
Month
decentralized fire-fighting equipment.
January 1944 (Exp)
21

Schoenebeck 1,000 500

The main reliance was on the natural camou
Clausthal October 1944 3,000 (Exp) 3,000
7

flage. The plants surveyed had no smoke screens,

Krümmel April 1945 3,700 (Exp) 3,700
7

no flak (heavy flak was considered dangerous

Düneberg April 1945 3,000 (Pow) 3,000
falling fragments), no dummy build
of
7

because
Kraiburg 11 April 1945 1,800 (Pow) 1,800 ings, no fighter protection.
Figure 71. This hydrogen peroxide storage tank at Deutsche Sprengchemie, Kraiburg, had
been buried in the ground to a depth of one quarter of
its

diameter and then covered

with earth. 12-in. concrete housing had been built enclose the covered tank, after
to
A

by
hit

which the concrete structure was mounded. The mound was 500-lb HE bomb

in
a

April 1945. The resulting secondary explosion

of
11

the attack tore the 0.4-in-thick

aluminum tank apart and threw the pieces, 100
to

either side.
ft

67
 STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY: OIL DIVISION REPORT

Conclusion targets in the propellants and explosives indus

In view of the facts established by the survey
and more specifically described in the target re
ports, it is reasonable to conclude concerning air
attacks on explosives and propellants plants such
as the Germans', which consisted of a large num
ber of buildings of comparatively light construc
tion, which were protected by blast walls, which
try. Unfortunately, the damage done to German
raw material supplies had little effect on rocket
production, which used certain special materials
manufactured for that purpose alone.
The first of the German rocket weapons was
the Nebelwerfer, a multibarreled projector
which fired rockets filled with smoke acid, chem
ical agents, or explosives. It was developed be
fore the war. Its rocket propellant was a molding
of Pol powder (solventless cordite), produced
by a special process and apparatus developed for
continuous plasticizing and extruding of the
powder in large rods. This powder was included
in the powder production discussed earlier in this
report.
Early in the war, the Germans began intensive
research to develop better rocket and turbojet
propellants. A large research station staffed with
top-notch scientists and technicians was set up

-
Figure 72. This crater was caused by the secondary
explosion of a hydrogen peroxide tank at Deutsche
Sprengchemie, Kraiburg.

were connected with an intricate piping system,

and which were dispersed over a large area, that:
(1) Pattern bombing should be used in pref
erence to so-called pinpoint bombing, and
(2) Incendiaries mixed with anti-personnel
bombs should predominate, and this combina Figure 73. A 500-lb HE bomb dropped by the Eighth
tion should be salted with a limited number of Air Force hit the powder magazine at Deutsche
500- and 1,000-lb bombs to open up the build Sprengchemie, Kraiburg, on 11 April 1945, com
ings and disrupt the piping system. pletely destroyed magazine,
its

the and lifted roof

position shown. The building beyond,
to

into the
Special Propellants for Rockets and which the magazine was attached, suffered blast
Jet Propulsion
by

damage. The crater the explosion was

caused
In the last year of the war, the Allies naturally deep. Secon
15
to

70 80 diameter and about

in
ft

ft

had a special interest in propellants used for the dary explosions and fires usually augmented bomb
V weapons and jet-propelled airplanes and sub damage explosives plants, especially
to

done when
marines. The plants making these propellants plants were subjected high-explosive
to

the area
by

might well have been considered the Number 1 bombing, supplemented incendiaries,
736.512 0–47–4)
68
Figure 74. Kruemmel plant of Dynamit A.G., one of the largest in Germany, with a pro
duction capacity of 3,000 tons of TNT and 3,800 tons of raw cordite paste per month.
It also had a shell-loading plant and produced several other types of high explosives.
A total of 790 buildings of various types, ranging from ordinary wood construction to
reinforced concrete structures carefully protected by blast walls, were dispersed in an
area of 794 acres. The functional pattern of plant divisions is easily recognizable. The
natural camouflage and wide dispersion of structures are typical of nearly all German
-
explosives and powder plants.

69
 -
Q:
faitt (1)."
*** *

Figure 75. In this map of the Kruemmel plant dispersion of the buildings is more plainly
seen than in the aerial view. There are blast walls around buildings. Small circles show
bomb hits. The plant was hit by 325 HE bombs on 7 April 1945. It would have required
5,000 to 6,000 working hours to restore TNT production to full capacity. The nitro
its

cellulose plant could have been restored per cent capacity within four
15

to
of

five
to

weeks; complete restoration would have required about

12
its

of

months. Other sections

the plant (nitro-penta, TNT pressed bodies, hexogen, nitroglycerin, etc.) would have
required four six weeks for restoration. The shell loading plant was left intact.
to

70
coroewnal T-STOFF-HYDROGEN PEROXIDE (85%)
GREATER GERMANY
ACTUAL PRODUCTION,PLANNED
W ThousA/WDS OF METR/C

ACTUAL
TOM'S PE* Mowr//

PRODUCTION
CAPACITIES, PLANNED PRODUCTION

AND PLANNED CAPACITIES

-]
8 USES

TOTAL
PLANNED
CAPACITY

HEYDEBRECK

ACTUAL
PRODUCTION *:::::::::::::::::::
#RHUMSPRINGER:#

LAUTERBERG

£
6:":#| | |A|s|o |N|D
THOUSANDS
|| |A|s|o |N|D|J |f|M|A |M|| || |A|s|o |N|D| |f|M|A|M|
TONSPER -
1943 1944 1945

PLANNED PRODUCTION AND USES

LEGEND
TOTAL PLANNED TOTAL PLANNED
PRODUCTION USES
RHUM's
PR.III JET U BOAT
II
RHUMSPR.
JET TORPEDO
WALDENBURG I V2
*EYDEBRECK I
RMUMspr.I LAUNOMER CATAPULT

HollsiegelskREur"? V-1
Ž
LAUTERBERø JET fightenelane

THOUSANDS| JAN, FEB.

B. MA R. APR. MAY JUN.- JUL.- AUG,- SEP. OCT | Nov. I DEC.

*
OF METRIC
TONS PER
1945
* includes werssenstein-Aussia-Mummiween

Figure 76
 B-STOFFE- HYDRAZINE HYDRATE
GREATER GERMANY
ACTUAL PRODUCTION, PLANNEDCAPACITIES, PLANNED PRODUCTION AND USES

ACTUAL PRODUCTION 8 PLANNED CAPACITIES

HEILBRONN

TOTAL
PLANNED

ACTUAL

LUDWIGSHAFEN
LEVERKUSEN
O

METRIC J. J. A. S. O | N | D. J. F. M. A. M. J. J. A |S O | N |D J F | M A | M. J J A |S|O |N |D
TONS PER
MONTH 1943 1944 1945

PLANNED PRODUCTION 8 USES

225

-
kEY
TOTAL PRODUCTION TOTALUSEs
2OO
LUD-MAFEN
... navy

175 LeverexusE- Luftwaffe

©Erstwofew

15 O

125

|OO

75

5O

25
%

METRIC || JAN. | FEB. MAR. APR. MAY JUN. JULY AUG. SEPT | OCT.
TONS PER
MONTH 1945

Figure 77
 -
--

Figure 78. These views show a high degree of destruction by HE bombs on buildings of
Elektrochemische Werke Muenchen, Hollriegelskreuth. Only the five-story hydrogen
peroxide building remained intact. The plant (which included the adjacent plant of
Gesellschaft fuer Linde Eismachinen A.G.) was hit on 19 July 1944 with 242 HE bombs,
-
70 of which hit buildings.
 STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY: OIL DIVISION REPORT

for this purpose at Peenemunde. Another center cent concentration was obtained by the electro
at Kiel concentrated on development of jet-pro lysis of sulfuric acid or ammonium bisulfate:
-
pelled submarines. then this product was distilled to 85 per cent
The Germans tried a number of available oxi strength with special equipment. The two proc
dizing materials and fuels, including concen esses were often carried out in separate plants.
trated nitric acid, Visole (vinyl ethers), gasoline, Hydrazine hydrate was made by the controlled
light diesel fuel, etc. They finally settled on con reaction of sodium hypochlorite with ammonia,
followed by distillation for purification and con
centration. In the combined propellant the Ger
mans used a permanganate catalyst for decom
position of the peroxide.
Large-scale production of 85 per cent hydro
gen peroxide apparently began in 1941. By the
middle of 1943, the monthly requirements for
rockets and jet propulsion included, among
others, 7,000 metric tons of concentrated hydro
gen peroxide, 22,500 of nitric acid, 13,000 of
liquid oxygen, 4,000 of ethanol, 800 of hydrazine
hydrate, 9,000 of explosives. Of these, hydrogen
peroxide and hydrazine hydrate were the only
materials unique to the rocket program.
Dilute hydrogen peroxide (30 to 35 per cent)
was produced in ten plants, of which the most
important were those at Hollriegelskreuth, near
Munich, and at Bad Lauterberg, in the Harz
Mountains. Concentrated hydrogen peroxide
was produced in two plants at the same loca
ticns; at the end of the war other plants were un
der construction. Hydrazine hydrate production
was concentrated in three plants, at Ludwigs
Figure 79. Complete destruction of these hydrogen hafen, Leverkusen, and Gersthofen. One plant,
peroxide distillation columns shows the effectiveness in Hollriegelskreuth, produced all of the vital
permanganate catalysts.
of light (500-lb) high explosive bombs on lightly con
Methods and processes for producing these
structed chemical processing equipment. This damage
materials were neither so highly organized nor
occurred at the Elektrochemische Werke Muenchen,
so stable as those in the rest of the propellants in
Hollriegelskreuth, on 19 July 1944 and completely dustry. The Germans experimented constantly
stopped production. with new materials and processes. An interesting
sidelight was their persistent efforts to adapt
centrated hydrogen peroxide (85 per cent) as the nitric acid as an oxygen carrier. It turned out to
principal oxygen carrier, used with hydrazine be unsatisfactory for use in submarines, because
hydrate, pyrocatechol, or crude oil as a fuel. its exhaust gases left telltale bubbles in the wake
Liquid oxygen in combination with methyl or of the craft. During the last months of 1944, the
ethyl alcohol also was used. nitric acid shortage threatened to put a crimp in
The Germans, placing high hopes on rockets the Germans' V and jet-propelled weapons. But
and jet-propelled weapons, gave these materials they were expanding hydrogen peroxide produc
a very high priority. tion rapidly. Figures 76 and 77 show the rise in
Concentrated hydrogen peroxide (85 per cent) production in 1944 and the planned increases in
was produced in two stages: first a 30 to 35 per 1945.

72
 ATTACK ON POWDER, EXPLOSIVES, PROPELLANTS

The Unbombed Plants ische and Linde Eismaschinen at Hollriegels

Germany's plans and the testimony of her
engineers emphasize how heavily the Nazis
gambled on rockets and jet propulsion. They
expected their jet-propelled planes to stop the
Allied bombing operations, and had great plans
for the expansion of V bombing, with which they
hoped to destroy the Allied bases, pin down the
air forces, and force a land war on the Allies—
which they were sure they could win.
In view of these facts and the difficulty of
coping with such weapons as V-2 at the opera
kreuth and Henkel and Company at Holthausen.
The two Hollriegelskreuth plants were raided
together on 19 July 1944. Of the 266.5 tons of
high-explosive bombs dropped, 32.25 hit Elektro
chemische and 30.75 Linde Eismaschinen.
At Elektrochemische, facilities for 30 per cent
hydrogen peroxide were completely destroyed,
but the real bottleneck, 85 per cent hydrogen
peroxide, was virtually undamaged; it lost only
a few days’ production because of power plant
damage (Figures 78 and 79).

tional end, it is surprising that Allied bombing At Linde Eismaschinen, liquid oxygen produc
so thoroughly neglected the vital propellants tion was knocked out, but the plant's some 120,
plants. The hydrogen peroxide and liquid oxygen 000 cu m per month was probably no more than
plants were extremely vulnerable: they were 1 per cent of the total German liquid oxygen

of light construction, and much of their equip
ment was fragile-glass or chemical stoneware.
They also offered well-concentrated targets.
Their immunity may have been caused partly
by inadequate intelligence work. Intelligence re
ported, for example, that hydrogen peroxide was
manufactured at the Linde Eismaschinen plant
in Hollriegelskreuth; actually the product
manufactured here was liquid oxygen. Some
bombed locations which intelligence identified as
factories turned out to be only storage depots.
Only two of the ten German plants making 30
to 35 per cent hydrogen peroxide were ever hit,
and even those bombings caused only a few days'
loss of production. The big plant for 85 per cent
hydrogen peroxide manufacture at Bad Lauter
berg was never bombed, and there is no record
that the important Gersthofen hydrazine hy
drate plant was a primary bombing target.
Surveys were made of the bombing effects on
three rocket propellants plants—Elektrochem
production. More useful damage occurred in this
plant to facilities for manufacture of gas lique
faction equipment.
At Henkel and Company, hit in four separate
" attacks but a primary target in only one, on 21
May 1944, the 2.33 tons of bombs dropped caused
only slight damage and did not affect production.
These three plants had many well-concen
trated buildings. Analysis of the bombing results
indicates that such plants should be hit with
500-, 1,000-, and 2,000-lb high-explosive bombs
and some incendiaries. The bombs should include
some with instantaneous fuzing and some with
0.025-fuze settings. A bomb density of 2 tons per
acre is recommended.
But the fact remains that the 85 per cent hy
drogen peroxide plants, the core of the rocket
propellants industry, were almost unscathed by
bombing. The light bombing of this industry had
no effect on the German rocket program during
1944 and early 1945.

In modern war a country's ability to produce munitions decides victory or

defeat. The destruction or crippling of the munitions industry is the key to
victory.
A systematic attack on the key points of the munitions industry could have
ended the war with Germany one year earlier. Basic chemical raw materials,
special steels and the transport systems serving these plants should have
been special objectives.
Major General Henrici
Chief of Ordnance, German Army
 HOW AND WHY AIR ATTACKS CRIPPLED THE
GERMAN OIL-CHEMICAL INDUSTRY

NATURAL OIL TARGETS

Approximately 25 per cent of Germany's war tons per month, equal 55 per cent

to

of
the motor
time oil was supplied by 40 refineries, 25 of 80 per cent

or

of
and aviation oils the aviation
which were located in prewar Germany (Figure grade lubricating oil (see Figure 81).
80). Seventeen of these, accounting for 82,500
Process Description. In contrast synthetic oil

to
tons per month or 48 per cent of the total avail
plants, refineries are not aggregations proc

of
able crude, were grouped in northwestern Ger
organized standardized arrangements.

in
esses
many. The crude oil refined monthly totaled
They are equipped according

to
170,000 tons, of which 38 per cent came from the amounts
composition

to
of
prewar Germany, 59 per cent from Austria, and and the crude oil be run and
the products refinery usually

to
be made.

is
A
the remainder from “protected” countries. The
simple design and occupies about one eighth

in
products included most of Germany's highly im
the area covered by synthetic plant

of

of
portant airplane engine lubricants, motor oil, in the

a
dustrial oils, and some diesel fuels. same capacity. An average-size refinery produces
40,000 tons per month. occupies about 100

It
Production of lubricants, always bordering on
acres of which 13 are devoted to tanks, to

9
inadequacy, had become critical by August, 1943.
process equipment, utilities and general

to
The German air forces had increased their de

4
buildings, and the remainder fire lanes, road

to
mands for airplane engine oil from 62,000 to
ways, and space for expansion (Figure 82).
87,000 tons per year, an increase of 51 per
cent over production for July. The loss of the
In Germany, where the most needed product
Naples and Leghorn refineries increased Italy's was lubricants, the crude oil was first distilled
pipe shell still remove volatile mate
as or

to
in

demands on Germany from 7,000 to 30,000 tons

a

rials such gasoline, kerosene, and diesel oils.

per year. Various makeshift measures were im
posed on industrial users. It is known that syn The remaining liquid, containing crude lubricat
ing oils various types, was further distilled
of

thetic oil plant compressors were oiled with

prevent thermal decomposi
to

water-oil emulsions and that reclamation of used under vacuum

tion. These oils were then subjected refining

to
widely practiced. Plans were made
oil

to

was
operations for removing impurities, increasing
increase the processing
of

crude Austria and

in

temperature stability, improving color, and re

Southwestern Germany with French and Italian
moving wax. These steps involved complicated
accelerate completion sev
to

equipment, and
of

equipment, and was not unusual for finished

to it

eral synthetic lubricating oil plants. Table 32

lubricating oil pass through many six,
as

as
lists Germany's 1944 production principal re
of

finery products. treatments after being separated from the vola

tile materials. For the manufacture gasoline,
of
of

Survey Refineries. Oil Division teams made equipment was employed for cracking, removing
six plants representing
of

detailed examinations odor, improving color, eliminating corrosiveness,

the oil refining production during
of

per cent
35

and blending, tetraethyl

or

of

for the addition

1944 (see Appendix
of

the first four months lead and inhibitors.

Tables E1, E2). Three additional plants and
several dispersal plants were given part-scale in Vulnerability. The crude oil distillation and
vestigation. Five cracking units which comprise the .principal
of

the refineries studied were

design and produced equipment refinery are usually open
of

10,248
of

total
in

of

modern
a

74
REFINING CAPACITY IN GREATER GERMANY VIENNA AREA
AND PROTECTORATE 49 Shell-Floridsdorf Wien-Floridsdorf 13,000
Includes Rerunning Plants. Total Crude Distillation 50 Vacuum Oel A.G. Kagran (Wien) 9,000
Capacities (excluding Poland-Galician area), Dea-Noya
51 Schwechat (Wien) 15,000
3,000,000 Tons per Year
52 Benzol-Verband Vosendorf 7,000
Tons 53 Deutsche Gasolin Korneuburg 7,000
per 54 I.G. Moosbierbaum 12,500
No. Company Location Month
55 Ostmarkische
Old GERMANY Mineraloelwerke Lobau (Wien) 25,000

26 Rhenania (Shell) Harburg PROTECTORATE CZECH AREA

- (Hamburg) 60,000
56 I.G. Pressburg 16,700
27 Rhenania (Shell) Grasbrook
57 oderfurter
(Hamburg) 17,000
Mineraloelwerke Oderfurt 6,000
28 Rhenania (Shell) Wilhelmsburg
(Hamburg) 8,350
58 Vacuum Oel A.G. Kolin 12,500
59 Fanto Pardubitz 12,500
29 Rhenania (Shell) Monheim 16,000
60 Oderberger Oderberg 1,000
30 Erdoel A.G.
Deutsche Wilhelmsburg 10,000
61 Kralupy Kralupy (Prague) 1,500
31 Deutsche Erdoe A.G. Heide 16,000
32,33 Deurag-Nerag
62 Privos
Misburg 27,000
(Moravska Ostrava)
34 Wintershall Lutzkendorf 10,000

- :-
35 wintershall Salzbergen 5,250 POLAND-GALICLAN AREA
36 Deutsche Gasolin Emmerich 6,000 63 Kontinentale Oel Trzebinia 22,500
Vacuum Oel A.G. Dzieditz

*:
37 Deutsche Gasolin Dollbergen 4,200 64 8,500
Phoenix-Sengawald Hannover 1,700
Five refineries in
38 Mineraloel and |
, Asphalt A.G. Ostermoor 10,000

39 Oelwerke J. Schindler Hamburg 2,500

SYNTHETIC FUEL PRODUCTION PLANTS
40 Oelwerke J. Schindler Peine 1,500
IN GREATER GERMANY
41 Ebano Harburg
(Hamburg) 45,000 HYDROGENATIOr.

42 Eurotank Hamburg 35,000 Tons *

I.G. Oppau 1,250 per
No. Plant Month
43 Vacuum Oel A.G. Oslebshausen 10,000
1 Leuna 50,000
44 Vacuum Oel A.G. Wedel 2,500
2 Boehlen 25,000
45 Pechelbronn Pechelbronn 10,000
3 Magdeburg 20,000
46 Ernst Schliemann's
Oelwerke Hamburg 5,000 4 Zeitz 25,000
47 Albrecht and Co. 5 Scholven 20,000
Mineraloelwerke Hamburg 1,250 6 Gelsenberg 35,000
Adler Hannover 600 7 Welheim 12,500
Korff Bremen 500 8 Poelitz 50,000
Freital Leipzig 250 9 Luetzkendorf 4,000
48 Ludwigshafen Mannheim 1,250 10 Wesseling 17,000
11 Ludwigshafen-Oppau 4,000
12 Moosbierbaum 7,500
13 Bruex 50,000
14 Blechhammer 13,750
15 Heydebreck 3,330
16 Auschwitz 2,500

FISCHER-TROPSCH SYNTHESIS
17 Ruhrchemie 5,000
18 Victor 3,330
19 Rheinpreussen 5,500
20 Krupp 5,500
21 Essener Steinkohle 7,080
22 Hoesch 4,000
23 Schwarzheide 14,170
24 Schaffgotsch 3,333

-:
25 Luetzkendorf
Installed capacity at end of war.
1,000
 ;

-> -5 : ;

| |

-
:**

.*** *
*£

%.
s•
*
-N*

*.
*-S.

|*
Af-*

' •*f
 HOW AND WHY ATTACKS AFFECTED PRODUCTION

frame and rugged construction, with cast iron About 22,000 tons came from refineries, which
or steel walls 1 to 2 in. thick. Consequently, they meant that they still retained about 60 per cent
are difficult to damage, except by direct hits crude distillation capacity.

of
from fairly heavy bombs (see Figure 83). The
Damage. The damage encountered

of
most

in
steam generating equipment is also solid in con
the reparable

of
struction, and there were very few German re the refineries examined was
finery power houses knocked out by bombs. type. Practically every attack which hit re

a
The most vulnerable installations were found finery target stopped operations for time, but

a
the damage was such that could usually be

it
to be the solvent dewaxing and gasoline chem
ical treating plants. These units were of light
repaired within few weeks with materials avail

a
construction, and large amounts of highly inflam able. In some instances, vulnerable solvent de-

.
waxing plants and similar units were destroyed
mable liquids were handled or stored in the im
by bombs fire, and the lubricant section was

or
mediate area. Storage tanks were also a vulner
operation for months. Permanent damage

of
able target, but investigation revealed that the out
compressors, pumps, and large engines would

to
Germans were operating out of and into railway
have deprived the enemy vital production,

tank cars with only slight inconvenience after
80 per cent of their tankage had been destroyed.
A weak spot in every refinery is its cooling water
system, since fairly large quantities of low-pres
of
but unfortunately this occurred all too seldom.
The Allied air forces demonstrated their strength
over Hamburg, but left the large lubricating oil
refineries practically untouched. takes mini

It
sure water are circulated for condensing vapors

a
refinery. Had

to

at
of
mum ten months build
and cooling the oils. The water coolers are frag

a
the bombs dropped on Hamburg

of
ile and susceptible to blast damage, while the least some
during the attacks midsummer 1943 been di

in
water circulating pumps generally are of brittle
Germany's three principal lubricating
to

cast-iron construction and are grouped in one verted

oil refineries, assess the catas

to
not difficult
to is
it
place. One or two bombs accurately placed could
stop all operations until these pumps were re trophic results the German war economy.
- The estimated residual capacity

of
placed. the nine
plants surveyed was 127,500 tons 60 per cent

or
Air Attacks. The 1943 air attacks on Hamburg, original capacity, after repairs which could
of

city which boasted 28 per cent of the refining be made ten weeks without the replacement
in

a
production, caused tremendous destruction but any major equipment. The quality prod
of

of of
failed to damage the highly essential refineries. ucts would not compare with the quality those
In fact, lubricant refining continued at an un strategic bombing,
of

available before the start

interrupted pace. In May, 1944, when the
oil

most cases primitive methods' would,

of
since
in

industry was finally assigned top priority, necessity, replace the modern processes de
a

refineries were still producing lubricants ap stroyed.

at

proximately their normal capacity. Between all plants surveyed, only nine deaths re
In

May, 1944, and V-E Day, the Allied air forces sulted from strategic bombing.
dropped 45,098 tons high-explosive bombs Appendix Table G16 contains bombing accu
at
of

the German refineries. These attacks proved racy data on the German refineries.
vastly more damaging than had been anticipated
War History Typical Refinery
of

that, although the crude distillation equip

in

ment remained virtually intact, the lubricant The Deurag-Nerag Refinery Misburg,
at

manufacturing facilities were practically de Hannover on the Weser-Elbe Canal,

of

miles east
stroyed and the resulting situation was typical German refinery (see Figures 87,
as

serious
is
a

for Germany though all the equipment had 88, and 89). Its capacity input was 27,000 tons
as

damaged (Figures crude per month, and its primary products

of

been 84, 85, 86). After the

synthetic oil plants were bombed out, was pos were airplane oil and other high-quality lubri
it

prepare 43,000 per cants, diesel fuel and motor gasoline (see Ap
to

of

sible some tons month

diesel oil the refineries and dispersal plants. pendix Table E3).
in

75
 STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY: OIL DIVISION REPORT

EXTENT OF CRUDE OIL REFINING INDUSTRY SURVEYED BY USS.B.S.

BASED ON FIRST QUARTER 1944
PERCENT OF GREATER GERMAN OIL INDUSTRY
io 20 30 4o 50 €o 70 so 90 100
NUMBER OF
REFINERIES

TOTAL CRUDE
PROCESSING CAPACITY

TOTALAVIATIONLUBE
OlL(FROM CRUDEOIL
ONLY)
TOTAL REFINERY
% EMPLOYEES
INSURVEYEDPLANTS

%TOTALREFINERIES
BOMB TONNAGE
LOADED FORSURVEY
ED PLANTS KEY

"########EE
Figure 81

This refinery was heavily attacked on 20 260,000 tons of petroleum production up to

June 1944 when 103 tons of bombs exploded
among its installations, causing extensive dam
age, particularly to the vulnerable solvent de
waxing process. It closed down but restarted on
1 August at 40 per cent of the original capacity
for low-quality lubricants and 95 per cent of its
motor fuel capacity. In a second attack on 24
August, the bombing was less accurate and only
44.7 tons of bornbs exploded in the refinery. The
plant was in operation again on 1 September.
Another raid on 11
September, in which 54.9
tons of bombs hit the target, closed it down until
15 October. A raid on 4 November missed the
refinery but hit a near-by cement factory. On 20
November, the entire refinery was again shut
down, and five subsequent raids prevented it
from resuming operation except for eight days
until the time of its capture in early April, 1945.
A total of 40,000 tons of raw and finished prod
ucts were lost as a result of fire and spillage,
and the enemy was deprived of an estimated
- V-E
Day.
Defense Measures. The Misburg refinery was
equipped with the usual defenses devised for
German industry. A decoy plant, approximately
2 miles from the refinery, attracted bombs dur
ing several raids. The canal near the plant was
camouflaged so that it could not be used for
identification purposes, and camouflage matting
was placed over the tanks to change their con
tours. A smoke screen apparently had some
effect as it was noted in several target reports.
The flak was believed by the German manage
ment to be inadequate, and numerous requests
were made for additional and heavier guns.
Shelter accommodations for the plant personnel.
included two reinforced concrete cylindrical
shelters 60 ft long, with walls that were as much
as 6 ft thick. Small one-man shelters were also
used extensively to enable key personnel and
machine operators to remain at their posts

76
i
 TABLE 32
GERMAN OIL REFINERY PRODUCTION OF FINISHED PRODUCTS
(Metric Tons)

|
1944 arolin. Solvents Kerosene Diesel Oil Fuel Oil Lubricants Total

|
Aviation Motor
Jan. - 14,486 11,907 12,924 38,921 3,805 69,487 151,530

Feb. 458 11,632 11,986 14,073 32,116 1,959 67,738 139,962

Mar. 362 15,295 10,801 14,916 40,260 3,528 68,868 154,030

Apr. 273 10,963 9,992 15,086 36,709 3,670 60,594 137,287

May 244 10,867 12,587 i?,262 39,036 4,447 61,640 146,083

-
June 247 7,859 9,382 11,900 30,480 5,611 51,496 116,975

July 213 6,313 8,333 9,789 34,591 8,313 38,786 106,338

Aug. 292 13,902 8,188 5,936 54,551 5,632 36,056 124,557

Sept. 836 5,179 5,610 6,887 42,991 3,023 39,464 103,990

Oct. 288 15,276 3,294 6,674 43,533 3,116 44,669 116,850

Nov. 35 15,170 2,496 4,442 37,237 10,294 27,883 97,557

Dec. 71 14,541 3,891 37,827 13,434 29,163 102,095

3,168
TOTAL 3,319 141,483 97,744 123,780 468,252 66,832 595,844 1,497,254

Jan. 1945 - 9,158 2,239 3,353 27,353 4,302 13,826 60,231

Figure 83. Ineffective bombing of process equipment. This atmospheric distillation unit
area of 2 acres in the Deurag-Nerag refinery received ten 500-lb and thirty-three 250-lb
bomb hits. Vital equipment was not permanently damaged. It took eight days of repair
time to restore the unit to 100 per cent of original capacity.

77
 in
figure 84. Nine refineries seen burning the Ham
burg-Harburg dock area. The refineries sustained only

in
temporary damage and were back operation

1.

a
within few weeks. The plants were: Ebano,

3.
Rhenania-Ossag, Harburg, Deutsche Petroleum,

2. 4
5.
6.
Julius Schindler, Albrecht,
Rhenania-Ossag,

7
8.
Grasbrook, Europaische Tanklager, Rhenania.
Ossag, Wilhelmsburg, 9.J. Hallerman.

*
 TOTAL CRUDE OIL REFINERY RUNS

GREATER GERMANY

E.-,
*...*
50-5
Æ/*ESENTS /OOOJonoreed's as
ey
a
U
of somes] saar
TOTAL FINISHED
PRODUCTS

BUNKER

LIGHT ONLS

LIGHT OILs
FROM
PLANTS

THER LUBE's

-
AVIATION LUBES

USANDSO MonTHLY Avce. MAY 1JUN. JUL. AUG, SEP. OCT ||NOV. DEC. I JAN. F.E.B. MARJAPR.
TRIC
1943 1944 1945

COWride/W774. woré- 460/£ oofs wor//wclude ASPHAL7, coke,

WAX A/VD OT//EA Spe.C/AL produc/s.
Figure 85
 TOTAL FINISHED PRODUCTS PRODUCTION, NO OF EMPLOYEES
AND BOMB TONNAGE DROPPED ON THESE FACILITIES
FOR EIGHT CRUDE OIL REFINERIES SURVEYED
GREATER GERMANY

PRODUCTION - FINISHED PRODUCTS

OTAL BOME TONNAGE
EXPLODED IN PLANTS

AL BOMB TONNAGE
R ON PLANTS
2
TOTAL

|| 5

| -
4.

-
O
(/)
L5
O
On
C.
~6
<
(f)
~
O
*~~
|
Lll
CD
<I

-
~

|
O

-
->
5THERT
BRICANTS
O
D

AVIATION_LUBESã
NUMBER

MONTHLY AVGE. MAY JUN JUL | AUG |SEP OCT | NOV | DEC ||JAN | FEB | MARIAPR

1943 1944 1945

cowr/DE//7/44. 460we does wor /Avclude 4sphalf, core,

wax awd or/veryseecrat PRoducrs

Figure 86
 -

79
"
--|
||
-|:#:|i> |

|
:
--

80
|
|i|#;
*#

-
:---
||
 HOW AND WHY ATTACKS AFFECTED PRODUCTION

during air raids. Fire-fighting equipment was *.

modern and effective. Stationary foam systems
were provided at the beginning of the war, but
they were easily damaged by bombs and were -

|
soon discarded for portable foam equipment. "…
High-pressure water spray was also used ex
tensively. The plant showed remarkably little
*H
fire damage. This is due partly to the efficient
fire fighting and partly to the energy of plant
personnel in dealing with incendiaries, which
they declared did not terrify them and could be
easily extinguished.

Personnel. The refinery employed 1,060 peo

ple, including 795 Germans and 265 foreigners.

on
Figure 91. direct hit this vulnerable process

A
Absenteeism remained low and was never a equipment the Deurag-Nerag refinery by one

in
contributing factor toward production losses. 500-lb GP (U.S.) bomb fuzed 0.1 sec nose and 0.025
Morale, on the other hand, deteriorated badly sec tail caused secondary fire damage arid resultant
after the spring of 1944, and the plant reports permanent destruction solvent dewaxing plant.

to
a
contain estimates of as much as a 50 per cent damage comparatively

at
Fire was rare occurrence

a
drop in efficiency by the end of 1944. The nerv refineries.

Figure 92. Destruction

of

this small steam boiler unit

by
hit

Figure 90. A direct 500-lb bomb opened the Deurag-Nerag refinery was caused by direct
in
a
up

an

exchangers this crude topping unit, 500-lb high-explosive GP (U.S.) bomb fuzed
of

of

the heat hit

a

by

extremely vulnerable spot the Rhenania-Harburg sec nose and 0.025 sec tail. Damage caused
in

0.1
six

refinery. Repairs were completed weeks. this attack shut down the plant for four weeks.
in
 STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY: OIL DIVISION REPORT

ous strain of long hours plus close government
supervision apparently had its effect on man
agement and labor. There is evidence that, dur
ing the final months of the war, an organized
“go slow” campaign was carried on in the re
finery. During the autumn of 1944, the manage
the planes and half the weight of bombs if
larger bombs had been employed.”
Because of the reparable nature of the dam
age inflicted, the refinery maintained a high rate
of recuperability. In May, 1945, this plant was
able, under Allied control, to produce 18,000

Figure 93. This tank in the Deurag-Nerag refinery, a fairly vulnerable target, withstood
eight near misses of 500- and 250-lb high-explosive GP (U.S.) bombs fuzed short delay.
A fire started but was extinguished, and after minor repairs the tank was put back
- into service.

ment found it necessary to place additional
supervisory guards over forced repair labor in
order to get essential jobs done.
Impressions and Recommendations. The ac
curacy in bombing attacks on this refinery was
below the average. Out of 5,747 tons of high
explosive bombs dropped, 290.2 tons actually hit
within the refinery area, an accuracy of 5 per
cent. The average bomb weight for all of the
raids was 487 lb. A memorandum of a meeting
at the refinery between the plant directors, Luft
waffe officers, and government repair officials
contained this statement: “It is thought that
greater damage could have been attained by half
tons per month or 65 per cent of capacity after
eight days of repair. Within 40 days, the produc
tion was up to 100 per cent of original capacity.
The products were of lower quality, however,
since the modern lubricating oil units had been
destroyed. The timing of raids was good, except
in a single instance when the plant was allowed
one month of uninterrupted production.
Against the equipment used in this type of
refinery, it is believed that bombs of 2,000 lb
and larger are most efficient. Anti-personnel
bombs would prevent fire fighters from leaving
shelters. Delayed action incendiaries or waves
of incendiaries dropped a few minutes after high
explosives would ignite flammable gases and

82
 TABLE 33. DAMAGE FROM AIR ATTACKS ON DEURAG-NERAG OIL REFINERY AT MISBURG

Daily Daily
Tons of Production Production Estimated

of
to
Tons of Bombs on before after Description Darnage Units Recuperability after the Attack Dama
R

Attack Bombs Target Attack, Attack, in

Date Dropped Area Tons Tons

20 June 497 103 1,430 None Nerag Nerag 10,000,000

1
1944 Restart Aug. Top vacuum unit: tanks 70 per cent dam Coubrough unit: did not operate af
aged. Coubrough vacuum unit: pump house ter this attack. Furfural unit: will
1

and tanks 90 per cent damaged. Furfural operate 40 per cent by August.
unit: heavily damaged, pump house and Contact plant: will operate 40 per

4
foundation destroyed, tanks 80 per cent de cent by August. Extraction plant:

to
stroyed. Contact plant: damaged. New con dispersed Porta. Acid treating
in

tact plant: furnace destroyed, pump house plant: operated last 1943. New
and tanks heavily damaged. Old dewaxing acid treating plant: old unit rebuilt
and refrigeration plant: filter and pump house at new location, almost finished on 26
in

destroyed, refrigeration unit and two com November 1944, never been op
pressors damaged. New dewaxing and refrig eration. Old dewaxing and refriger
eration plant: two towers displaced by blast. ation unit: will operate 40 per cent
8

Blending and mixing plant: 50 per cent de by August. New dewaxing and
stroyed. Propane deasphalting unit: heavily refrigeration plant: operated only
damaged, tanks 100 per cent destroyed, one occasionally, using refrigerating unit
compressor and all pumps damaged. Transfer of old dewaxing plant. Blending and
pump house: lightly damaged. Boiler and mixing plant: only 50 per cent re

:
in

power house: power house destroyed, treat paired, never put operation. Pro
ing water system and conveyor damaged pane deasphalting unit: will operate
1

100 per cent by August. Transfer

Deurag pump house: will operate by 25 July.
Topping unit: heavily damaged, tanks 80 per Boiler and power house: conveyer
cent destroyed. Dubbs cracking unit: dam will operate by 20 July. Transfer
aged, tanks 50 per cent destroyed. Stabiliz pump house: will operate by 17
ing unit: tanks damaged. Gas polymerization August.
unit: towers seriously damaged. Redistilla
tion unit: damaged. Kerosene treating unit: Deurag
damaged. Boiler house, loading rack, cooling Topping unit: will operate by 25
tower and system, workshop and change July. Dubbs cracking unit: will op
1

house: lightly damaged. Transformer station erate by August. Kerosene treating

to

and power lines and piping: 80 per cent de unit: no feed stock operate. Load
10

stroyed. Compressed-air station, mechanical ing rack repaired by August.

and electrical workshop: completely de Boiler house repaired by 20 July.
stroyed. Drum filling building: destroyed and Piping repaired by 28 July. Cooling
pumps damaged. Tankage: 14 tanks de tower and system repaired by 25
5

stroyed, tanks damaged, crude oil storage July. Drum filling building repaired
70 per cent destroyed. Office building, labo by 10 August. Workshop repaired
14

ratory, and railroad tracks: heavily damaged by July.

24 August 217 44.7 1,350 None Nerag Deurag and Nerag back on stream 1,000,000
1

30

1944 Restart Sept. Furfural unit: piping and building per by September
cent damaged; furnace, pumps, instruments
*.
 TABLE 33. DAMAGE FROM AIR ATTACKS ON DEURAG-NERA.G OIL REFINERY AT MISBURG-Continued
-
Daily Daily
Production Production Estimated

-
Tons of - --

of
to
Tons of Bornbs on before after Description Darnage Units Recuperability after the Attack Damage
Attack Bombs Target Attack, Attack, in RM
Date Dropped Area Tons Tons

lightly damaged. Contact plant: 60 per cent

damaged. Extraction plant: damaged moder
ately, approximately 40 per cent. Acid treat
ing plant: piping and storage drums 40 per
cent and building completely destroyed.
Blending and mixing plant: lightly damaged.
\

Boiler and power house: damaged

Deurag
Dubbs cracking unit: heavily damaged. Pip
ing, fuel gas system, hot oil pump house, of
fice building, and laboratory: heavily dam
aged. Loading rack, boiler house, water pump
house, transformer station and power lines,

9
and 18 tanks damaged. Tankage: tanks
destroyed

11-12 Sept. 306 54.9 620 None Nerag Deurag and Nerag back on cream 2,000,000
15

1944 Restart 15 Oct. Top vacuum unit: furfural unit and contact by October

#
plant: heavily damaged. Propane deasphalt
ing unit: medium damage. New dewaxing and
refrigeration plant, boiler and power house:
lightly damaged

Deurag
Dubbs cracking unit, piping, cooling tower
and system, transformer station and power
lines: heavily damaged. Boiler house, two
crude oil tanks, and laboratory: completely
destroyed. Topping unit, kerosene treating
plant, transfer pumps, loading racks: dam
aged

20 Nov. No record 3.5 1,150 None Nerag Deurag and Nerag back on stream 500,000
1944 Restart 23 Dec. Furfural unit: damaged by 23 December

Deurag
Stabilization topped gasoline stabilizer and
piping: heavily damaged. Loading rack dam
-
aged

0
26 Nov. 892 2(...? None Nerag Deurag and Nerag back on stream 3,000,000
1944 Restart 23 Dec. Furfural unit, old dewaxing and refrigeration by 23 December
plant, new dewaxing and refrigeration plant,
propane deasphalting unit: light damage
 Deurag
Topping unit, piping, transformer stations
and power lines, railroad tracks: heavily

5
damaged. Tankage: tanks destroyed and
10 tanks damaged. Stabilization unit, gas
polymerization unit and loading rack: dam
aged

0
29 Nov. 1,160 1.2 None Deurag Deurag and Nerag back on stream 1,000,000
1944 Restart 23 Dec. Stabilizing unit, gas polymerization unit and by 23 December
loading rack: damaged

-
31 Dec. 233 29.5 470 Restart 14 Feb. Nerag Nerag 4,100,000
1944 Furfural unit, acid treating plant, blending Top vacuum unit repaired by 26
and mixing plant, boiler and power house: February. Furfural unit repaired by
heavily damaged. Top vacuum unit, contact 31 March. Old and new contact plant
plant, new contact plant, old dewaxing and repaired by 26 February. Propane
refrigeration plant, new dewaxing and refrig deasphalting unit: did not operate
eration plant, propane deasphalting plant, after this attack. Transfer pump
15

transfer pump houses: damaged house repaired by January.

Deurag Deurag
Topping unit, Dubbs cracking unit, cooling Topping unit repaired by 14 Feb
Qo tower and system, transformer station and ruary. Dubbs cracking unit repaired
©n
power lines: heavily damaged. Stabilization. by 20 February. Stabilizing unit re
unit, gas polymerization, redistillation, trans paired by 15 March. Loading rack
fer pumps, loading rack, piping, drum filling repaired by 31 January. Piping,
building, office building, laboratory, and cooling tower and system repaired
workshops: damaged by 15 February. Drum filling build
ing repaired by 26 February. Work
shops repaired by 20 January

0
13-14 Feb. 36 12.0 None Nerag Units damaged by this attack will No data
1945 Restart 26 Feb. Furfural unit: heavily damaged. Propane de be repaired by 26 February
asphalting unit: damaged

Deurag
Dubbs cracking unit: damaged

0
14-15 Mar. 1,233 7.2 None Nerag This attack caused an indefinite 7,500,000
1945 Shut Down Boiler and power house: damaged shutdown

Deurag
Ethyl blending, cooling tower and system,
transformer station and power lines, railroad
8

tracks, and tanks: damaged. One tank de

stroyed. Office and administrative building:
heavily damaged
 STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY: OIL DIVISION REPORT

Figure 94. Destruction of a small electric power plant in the Deurag-Nerag refinery by
three direct hits and two near misses of 500-lb high-explosive GP (U.S.) bombs fuzed
0.1 sec nose and 0.025 sec tail. Since the generators were destroyed, replacements
would have been needed to repair the damage.

liquids spilled from broken tanks and pipe lines. hitting the target, production data, description
Thus more extensive fire damage should result. of damage, and recovery capacity estimates.
Table 33 is an attack and damage log, includ Figures 90 through 94 show types of damage
ing dates of attacks, bombs dropped, bombs which were found in oil refineries.

SYNTHETIC OIL TARGETS

During the first four months of 1944, syn
thetics accounted for more than one half of
Germany's total oil supply, reaching a peak of
381,000 tons per month in March, 1944. Of
the total oil, only a small part (6.7 per cent)
was made in 9 plants by the Fischer-Tropsch
method, whereas 47.8 per cent was made in 16
plants employing the high-pressure hydrogena
tion method invented by Bergius.
Bombing Offensive Against Synthetic Oil. Be
tween 12 May 1944 and 8 May 1945 the Allied

86
 GERMAN ESTIMATES OF PRODUCTION OF LIQUID FUELS
DURING STRATEGIC BOMBING OFFENSIVE
AS COMPARED WITH PRODUCTION ACTUALLY REALIZED

AVIATION GASOLINE

spee" 7-29-4

-
Assuming wofurther

GEeechen "-27-
AssumingNo furthern Rands
speen 1-19-45

wo funner *Ards
*d/ds COMrinue

speen 10-5-44
Assuming
Wo further *d/Ds
*A/Ds Cowr//wue

-------
MOTOR GASOLINE

Geree
chem 7-27-4
Assuming no furthern R4/

speen no-5-44
455uM/MG sPEER 1- 19-45
speen 7-29-44 r */DS
Fur Tarn mand *Alds AvoFunrne Rands
Rands

A-Tual
10//

DIESEL Oll
speen 7- 29-44
ssuming woFunraçRR4
speeR /-/*-45
- - wo fuñrne RI Raids
-
GEsfore & 7-27 4.4 R4/05
55umingwo furt.TheR R4/05
speen no-5-44
Assuming
Furt.Theft| Rand's
*4/05 covrinue

ACTUAL
PRODucrlow

DS | --
OF METRIC
MAR. APR. || MAY | JUN. JULY AUG, SEPT. OCT. NOV. DEC. || JAN. | FEB. MAR. APR.
TON'S PER
MONTH. 1944 1945
574/77 OF 57/7476.6/C 60/M6//VG offe/VS/VE
Figure 95
 Oll. PRODUCTION FROM FISCHER-TROPSCH
PLANTs wiTHIN GREATER GERMANY

:* -
AND TONNAGE OF BOMBS DROPPED

-
EAC// BOMB -

#. f
[
REPRESE/WTS R.A.F. || 3 6 d
TOM'S OF BOMes U.S.A.A.A. | | || J &

60

---

:
5O
:
TOTAL |
PRODUCTION

^T\ -

40+
\
.."

3O

2O
2

|O- | |T- #: #:£:£ *

:
$
*

-
#######
RMEIMP-Eussex

Of
AVERAGES
M

MONTHLY
O

D
N
A

f
S
J

J
F
J

J
|

METRICTONS
PER MONTH 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945
-
|

COWDEWTAT indicates PLANT'sNot investigat-D BY us s.a.s

Figure 96
 HOW AND WHY ATTACKS
air forces dropped 185,841 tons of high-explo
sive bombs on 87 German oil producing targets
(16 hydrogenation plants, 9 Fischer-Tropsch
plants, 40 refineries, and 22 benzol plants), fly
ing 61,712 sorties. At first, production losses
were extremely sharp, because the plants had
not been hit before and production loss resulted
no matter what sections were hit. In later attacks
bombs which hit sections of the plant already
knocked out obviously could not contribute to
further production loss. As the intensity of the
attacks increased, production continued to fall
until September, despite the frantic efforts of a
350,000-man emergency repair organization.
Production increased slightly in October and
still more in November, mostly because weather
conditions interfered with bombing accuracy
(10.1 per cent of the bombs dropped on syn
thetic plants in these months were by visual
sighting, as compared with 41.5 per cent during
the previous four months). Production cascaded
again in December. Less than 500 tons of avia
tion gasoline were made in February, 1945, only
40 tons in March, and none at all in April.
Working desperately to cope with the disaster
which threatened to overwhelm their oil indus
try, the Germans improved their defenses by
introducing faster fighter planes and new jet
propelled craft. Heavier caliber flak artillery was
provided, and smoke screening was adopted
throughout industrial areas. The workers were
also promised that “secret weapons” would soon
remedy the situation, but later events proved
that these were either in an infant stage of de
velopment or existed entirely in the Goebbels
broadcasts. Reports to Hitler by his military and
economic advisers became increasingly pessi
mistic. In the end the Strategic Air Forces made
even these estimates optimistic (see Figure 95).
Survey of Synthetic Oil Plants. Oil Division sur
vey teams made detailed examinations of seven
plants (four hydrogenation and three Fischer
Tropsch plants representing 27 per cent of the
hydrogenation capacity and 20 per cent of the
Fischer-Tropsch).
In some of the plants investigated, the syn
thetic oil sections represented only fractions of
the entire target area, and the studies were,
therefore, complicated owing to the use of com
87
AFFECTED PRODUCTION
mon facilities such as gas production plants for
furnishing gas to two or more synthesis com
plexes. Leuna, for example, as already men
tioned, contained hydrogenation, nitrogen fixa
tion, and methanol plants; Victor operated ni
trogen fixation and Fischer-Tropsch plants;
Ludwigshafen-Oppau contained nitrogen fixa
tion and hydrogenation plants, in addition to a
large number of chemical plants; Luetzkendorf
included a hydrogenation plant, a Fischer
Tropsch plant, and an oil refinery. Such integra
tions were not uncommon, however, and the tar
gets studied could be considered representative
of the German synthetic oil producing industry.
Table 34 indicates the installed capacities of
the synthetic oil plants in Greater Germany and
also which plants were subjected to detailed and
partial study. Figures 96 and 97 show the trend
of production of synthetic oil during the period
of the strategic bombing offensive. The produc
tion curves for all hydrogenation and Fischer
Tropsch plants parallel rather closely the com
parable figures for the plants investigated. This
fact lends support to the conclusions that studies
of individual targets may be applied to the
planning of offensives against similar targets
elsewhere.
Synthetic Oil by Two Processes. The two syn
thesis systems employed in Germany differ
only in method. The end product of both is oil
in its different forms, and both are based on the
conversion of coal. In the hydrogenation proc
ess, part of the coal is decomposed into coke,
liquids, and gases, and part is treated with steam
to make hydrogen which is subsequently com
bined with the coal derivatives under high pres
sure to produce oil. In the Fischer-Tropsch proc
ess, coke or brown coal is blown with steam and
either air or oxygen to prepare hydrogen and
carbon monoxide which are then allowed to
combine in a chemical reaction to produce a
high-quality crude oil. In both processes, the
initial step is the preparation of gas, and, with
certain exceptions, the gas preparation processes
are similar in principle and construction.
The magnitude of the gas preparation step
can be visualized if one considers that the gas
required for one gallon of oil by the Fischer
Tropsch process would heat an average home
 STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY: OIL DIVISION REPORT

- TABLE 34 enough gasoline to fill the wing tanks of a Flying

SYNTHETIC FUEL PRODUCTION CAPACITIES Fortress would heat an average-sized house in
the New York area for a full winter.
Plants
Plants Sub The equipment for manufacturing the enor
Investi- jected mous quantities of gas required is unusually
Capacity,” gated To Part bulky and intricate. The gas preparation section
Metric Towns In Scele
Plant Per Year Detail Study of a Fischer-Tropsch plant with a production ca
pacity of one tank car of oil every three hours
HYDROGENATION PLANTs
occupies about 2% acres of land, one third of .
Leuna 600,000 X
which is built up with steel structures over 100
Boehlen 300,000 X
ft high. The light construction of these instal
Magdeburg 240,000
lations and the usual practice of concentrating
Zeitz 300,000 X
them in a single area of a plant makes them
Scholven 240,000
satisfactory targets for bombing. The only con
420,000
Gelsenberg structional factor unfavorable to bombing is the
Bottrop-Welheim 150,000 X parallel units which usually comprise these
Poelitz 600,000 plants. The Meerbeck (Rheinpreussen) Fischer
Luetzkendorf 48,000 X Tropsch plant, for example, contained 11 gas
preparation units. In order to knock out gas pro
Wesseling 204,000
X_
Ludwigshafen-Oppau 48,000 X duction facilities completely, all 11 of these in
Moosbierbaum 90,000 stallations would have had to be completely de
stroyed or heavily damaged. All, however, are
Bruex 600,000
concentrated in an area of 2% acres.
Blechhammer (North)+ 165,000

Heydebreckt 40,000 Fischer-Tropsch Process. The Fischer-Tropsch

Auschwitz (Oswiecim)+ none process requires complex equipment in which
TOTAL 4,045,000 gas passes in series flow through

(a) Two purification sections to remove sulfur

FischER-TRoPSCH PLANTs compounds,
Ruhrchemie (Holten) 60,000 X
(b) A reaction section in which oil is synthe
Victor (Castrop-Rauxel) 40,000 X sized,
Rheinpreussen 66,000 X (c) A condensation section in which part of the
Krupp (Wanne Eickel) 66,000 oil vapors are condensed, and
Essener Steinkohle (d) An adsorption system in which the uncon
85,000
(Kamen) densed gasoline from (c) is selectively re
Hoesch (Dortmund) 48,000 moved.
Schwarzheide (Ruhland) 170,000
Condensed and adsorbed oils are then distilled
Schaffgotsch (Odertal) 40,000
in fractionation columns similar to those used in
Luetzkendorf 12,000 X
is,

refineries. The process for the most part, con

TOTAL 587,000 atmospheric pressure (see Figure 98).
at

ducted
The Meerbeck Fischer-Tropsch plant re
* Capacities are based on installed capacity as of approx
imately the end of the war. ferred to contained
*The ultimate capacity: Blechhammer 396,000; Heyde
parallel sets hydrogen sulfide removal
of
4

breck 90,000, and Auschwitz 30,000 metric tons per

year. towers, each 30 high and 35 diameter;
in
ft

ft

parallel sets organic sulfur removal towers,

of
5

for 1 to 1% winter days, and the quantity of gas high and diameter;
12

30
in
ft

ft

per day in four average Fischer-Tropsch Fischer-Tropsch -reactors, by by

10

used 100 each

8

plants would supply the whole of New York City size;

in
ft

15
for the same period. adsorption systems, each containing towers;
The coal required to make
2

7
 O|L PRODUCTION FROM HYDROGENATION
PLANTS WITHIN GREATER GERMANY
AND TONNAGE OF BOMBS DROPPED

wo or 477 AC/(S
--
-
EAC// BoM6
P
DROPPED
{RAf |-| 4
t
REPRESE/WTS 1000 7 |n || 3 || 2 || 5 || 5 6 7 || 3
&Y U.S.A.A.
(vs. 4.4.5E.
TO/WS or bo/we * | *O /5 /6 ||14 ||25 | 15 || 3 || 6 || ||

" MiNERALouPLAN (1-44)

1.G.PLATEs (6-42)
TOTAL PRODUCTION
BLEC-A-ER
HEYDEBRECK
BRUEx
NOT
MooseleRBAUM
INVESTIGATED
POELITZ
BY
GELSE-BERG
U.S.S.B.S.
SCMOLVEM
MAGDEBURG
wessELING
weLHELM
LudwigsHAFEN
INVESTIGATE
Luetzkendorf
& BoERLEN
BY
U.S.S.B.S.
ZEITZ
LEU-A

THOUSANDS
OF METRIC
MONTHLY AVERAGES
TONS PER
MONTH 1940 | 1941 1942 1943

Figure 97
 |:

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 HOW AND WHY ATTACKS AFFECTED PRODUCTION

2 stabilization systems in which gasoline was
separated from gaseous substances; and
2. distillation plants.
The reactors alone covered an area of about
, V4acre, and the building in which they were
housed covered 21/2 acres.
The most critical targets in a Fischer-Tropsch
plant are the sulfur removal systems, because
sulfur, if left in the gas, renders ineffective the
catalyst which promotes the combination of the
gaseous components. This equipment is light in
construction and susceptible to damage by both
fragmentation and blast. It represents an impor
tant complex that can be easily identified by at
tacking airplanes. Moreover, partial destruction
of the purification system necessarily leads to
proportional loss in production.
The other elements in a Fischer-Tropsch com
plex are, for the most part, made up of multiple
parallel units, any unit of which could be elimi
nated without completely stopping production.
Thus, the elimination of one out of ten water
gas sets would have reduced productive capacity
at the Meerbeck plant by about 10 per cent, or
unconverted coal substance and oil are drawn off
in separate streams. The liquid thus interme
diately produced must be processed further to
convert it to gasoline. Oil is recovered from the
slurry by centrifuging and by decomposing the
pasty mass through subjection to heat. The li
quid is separated into two parts by fractionation,
the lighter part being sent through a second
processing step, and the heavy part being used
for making paste with fresh coal powder (see
Figure 99).
Hydrogenation is conducted at pressures
ranging from 3,000 to 10,500 lb per square inch.
To attain these pressures, the gas must be passed
through a large number of heavy compressors.
Because of the pressure under which the syn
thesis takes place, the equipment through which
the mixture of coal, oil, and gas subsequently
passes is also heavily built, the piping and ves
sels resembling heavy artillery pieces in con
struction. Moreover, the installations operate at
temperatures from 600 to 1,000°F. and even in
peacetime are surrounded by heavy concrete
walls for protection' against breaks in lines or
joints. It
is,

therefore, obvious that there little

is
the elimination of one of 100 reactors would
hope destroying such equipment except by
of

have decreased production by 1 per cent. A third well-placed hits from the heaviest bombs.
item, in order of vulnerability, is probably the
In contrast Fischer-Tropsch plants, hydro
to

activated charcoal vapor recovery plant, because genation plants require large amounts energy

of of
fully 50 per cent of the synthesis product has to
for compressing the huge quantities gases.
be recovered by means of this equipment.
The power plant an average-size hydrogena
of

A Fischer-Tropsch plant is practically self tion plant would be sufficient for supplying light
sustaining from the standpoint of energy supply,
and power city 250,000, population.
to

of
a

because large quantities of steam are generated Hydrogenation-plants could be rendered inoper
in the synthesis process. A small power plant is power supplies were completely cut off,
able
to if

necessary for converting this steam into elec accomplish this means the destruction of
but
tricity, but it affords only meager possibilities as
large groups heavy equipment. Realizing the
of

a bomb target.
the power and steam supply,
of

critical nature
the Germans usually installed generating equip
Hydrogenation Process. The hydrogenation process requirements, and
of

ment far
in

excess
process is considerablymore complicated than emergency power was also obtainable from the
the Fischer-Tropsch. In this process, coal is well-integrated power grids.
ground to powder, mixed with heavy oil to form
a paste, pumped through heat interchangers Water. Both syntheses require enormous quan
where, in the presence of compressed hydrogen, water for cooling and steam generation.
of

tities
the temperature is increased to about 800° F., Germany, natural water was usually satu
In

the level at which the hydrogen combines with be removed,

to

rated with minerals which had

part of the coal, and is allowed to react in heavy lest they interfere with the chemical reactions
vessels. After cooling, the mixture passes into clog boiler tubes. Most plants were,
or

involved
separators in which gas, liquid, and a slurry of therefore, limited fresh water supplies and
to
as

89
 STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY: OIL DIVISION REPORT

found it necessary to circulate large amounts of
water through easily damaged cooling towers.
The elimination of these cooling towers was
ceptionallyeffective in shutting down plants, and
the bombing of the Moehne and Eder dams dis
rupted production in several of the Ruhr plants
for a number of days.
How Production Was Stopped. Production was
stopped, for the most part, by physical damage
to plant equipment and facilities. Secondary
causes of production loss included destruction of
raw materials, destruction of transportation fa
cilities, destruction of personnel, reduction of
morale, and other minor factors. None of these
secondary causes contributed heavily to pro
duction loss in the synthetic oil plants, although
in individual plants it was evident that in a pro
longed war they might have figured significantly
in the over-all production loss.
Physical Damage. Physical damage, the main
cause of production loss in both Fischer-Tropsch
and hydrogenation plants, may be grouped into
-
two classifications:
(1) Permanent damage,
(2) Reparable damage.
Plants surveyed show that both types were
fective in reducing or eliminating production.
Permanent damage (destruction of vital equip
ment such as compressors, turbogenerators,
transformers, reactors, gas purifying systems, and
distillation systems) reduced or entirely stopped
production until new equipment could be ob
ex tained from manufacturers or “cannibalized.”
Reparable damage (breaks in pipe lines and
cables, fragmentation damage to towers, tanks,
and gasholders, damage to process equipment
which could be repaired on the spot) was usu
ally effective in reducing or even halting pro
duction for short periods of time, but to keep
production down by this type of damage neces
sitated frequent series of attacks.
The type of damage inflicted on the plants,
which were surveyed in detail, and their subse
quent “residual capacity” or percentage of nor
mal capacity, which could be attained after the
completion of simple repairs, are summarized in
Table 35.
Vital processing equipment, although effec
tively protected with blast walls and reinforced
“dog houses,” was occasionally destroyed. The
Bottrop-Welheim hydrogenation plant provides
an impressive example of a plant rendered per
manently inactive by the destruction of a rela
tively small amount of equipment. In two raids,
27 September and 31 October 1944, the RAF
hit the high-pressure compressor house with
ef eight 1,000-lb and three 4,000-lb bombs. The
heavy compressors and boosters, in which every
cubic foot of hydrogen required for the conver
sion of coal to gasoline was compressed to 10,500
lb per square inch, were completely destroyed

TABLE 35

TYPE OF DAMAGE AND RESIDUAL CAPACITY IN SURVEYED PLANTS

Fischer-Tropsch
Hydrogenation Plants Plants
A11
Production and Darnage Bottrop- Rhein- Synthetic
Leuna Zeitz Welheim preussen Victor Plants

Capacity (thousand metric tons per month) 50 25 12.5 5.5 3.3 386

Tons of bombs dropped 18,095* 3,489* 3,486 7,866* 2,876 123,584

Average weight of bombs (pounds) 405 321 487 736 518 483

Tons exploded in plants per thousand

capacity
tons of preraid
33 28 26.5 27 21.7 -
Per cent of residual capacity 70 100 0 0 40 -
Type of damage observed by Survey Repa- Repa- Perma- Perma- Repa
rable rable nent nent rable

* Based on records of Survey teams. Believed to be more accurate than official figures.
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-
 HOW AND WHY ATTACKS AFFECTED PRODUCTION

(see Figure 6). The plant closed down and even
today could not be operated unless new com
pressing equipment were obtained.
Production loss at Ammoniakwerk Merse
burg, at Leuna, on the other hand, was due en
tirely to reparable damage. Following the first
two attacks, 94 per cent of the utilities damaged
had to be repaired before the plant could start
up again. Compressors and pumps could run with
tarpaulins strung overhead, but pipe and cable
breaks had to be patched up. By November,
there had been over 1,500 breaks in the Leuna
water piping system alone, and in all 22 attacks
on the plant over 5,000 individual breaks were
sustained by the utilities distributing systems.
Figure 123 shows graphically the plant's unsuc
Figure .100 tells the story of its struggle to re
cover in the face of repeated blows delivered by
the Allied air forces.
12 May 1944, knocked pro
The first attack,
duction from 100 per cent down to zero. On
28 May, when the plant was showing signs of re
covering, a second raid knocked it flat again but
only for six days. At this point the management
drew up a plan that would have returned the
plant to 75 per cent production in 27 days. The
recovery followed the plan closely, reaching 75
per cent in 29 days. Four days later a third at
tack sent production back to zero. The recovery
capacity was still strong, however, and the plant
was back to 51 per cent in 11 days on a plan
which called for 80 per cent recovery in 13

hit
cessful attempt to cope with accumulating pipe days. At this point Attack 4 the plant, knock
breaks. ing production for three days. After this

of
out

it
The permanent damage inflicted on Welheim restarted production and achieved 35 per cent
of it
in two raids with 10 tons of bombs may be com normal five days, when Attacks and on

in

pared with the reparable damage at Leuna
which, after being hit by 1,643 tons of bombs in
22 raids, would have been able to attain 70 per
cent of its preattack production capacity within
6
5
28 and 29 July stopped production for the fifth
time. This time the plant's recovery was slower,
and five additional attacks on the now inactive
plant kept production down until

15
October.
a few months without importing any new heavy recovery schedule drawn up this time pro

at
A

-
equipment.
vided for 50 per cent production by the middle
December. Despite two light attacks, this plan
of

Recovery Capacity. The speed with which a

synthetic plant returned to production following was maintained, and production had reached
an air attack depended upon the replaceability 29 per cent by 21 November when Attack 14
zero again. Five additional
to

of destroyed equipment, the availability of re knocked down

it

pair labor, and freedom from further attacks attacks kept down until 29 December when
it

until repairs could be completed. Through par production was resumed on schedule that
in a

ticularly effective bombing or fortuitous hits, called for 30 per cent recovery one month and
45 per cent two. Recovery had reached 15 per
in

single plants were knocked out in a few con

centrated raids. Because of the lightness of the cent when Attacks 20 and 21 on 14 January put
the plant again out action for 38 days. Re
of

bombs dropped, however, especially in the

earlier raids and in raids by the USAAF, and covery started again on 21 February, following
plan that foresaw 20 per cent production
in

because of the effective protective installations

a

one month and 30 per cent two. This schedule

in

erected by the Germans, vital, irreplaceable ma

chinery such as compressors and generators was was followed fairly closely, and production had
seldom destroyed, and consequently recovery reached 20 per cent on April when Attack 22
4

from raids was largely a question of repair ma shut down the plant for the ninth and final time.
terial, labor, and time. Allied occupation prevented any further re
covery.
A typical example of the recovery capacity
of a plant is provided by the records of the Am The Leuna versus Allied air forces bout re
moniakwerk Merseburg, at Leuna. Because of sembled some ways prize fight. The plant
in

this plant's great importance to the German war was knocked down nine times but never out, and
economy, it is safe to assume that repair work recovered rapidly first but more slowly
at

as

the
was not held up by lack of material or labor. accumulating punishment began tell. Its re
to

91
 STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY: OIL DIVISION REPORT
covery capacity also slackened as indicated by
the decreasing percentages of the recovery plans.
It might be said that the plant was finally de
feated on points. To have achieved a complete
knockout, the Allied air forces would have had
to destroy its recovery capacity, and they did
not deliver a sufficiently strong punch to accom
plish this.
syn
Personnel. In September 1944 the German
thetic oil industry was employing 89,200 plant
personnel, including 13,148 German women and
22,769 foreigners. Loss of personnel due to air
raids on plants averaged approximately 1 per
cent, this low figure resulting principally from
an efficient air raid warning system and safe
shelters both inside and outside plant buildings.
Losses among off-shift workers were higher, be
cause of the spillover of bombs on near-by
workers' settlements which were inadequately
provided with shelters.
In a number of plants absenteeism averaged
approximately 5 per cent for the entire war
period and in three typical plants rose during
the heavy bombing period after May, 1944, to
between 7 and 10 per cent. On single days fol
lowing heavy attacks, percentages of 18 and 30
were reported in individual plants. Certified ill
ness at one plant for which records were avail
able averaged 8.2 per cent.
The quality of labor decreased, particularly in
1944, owing to the calling up of skilled workers
to the armed services, the increasing age level
of workers, the increased employment of female
labor, and the use of foreign workers in growing
numbers.
Morale in some of the plants was high; in
others it was maintained largely by terrorization.
Workers, both German and foreign, who failed
to meet set standards were sent to re-education
camps run by the S.S., brutally punished for a
fortnight or longer, and then sent back to the
plant. This system was effective, but it built up
a store of hatred against certain plants which
found expression during the final weeks of the
war when the control collapsed. Orgies of destruc
tion, killing, and looting, in which both German
and foreign workers participated, resulted in
major damage to plant records and hitherto pro
tected equipment.
92
The German workers usually assumed a fatal
istic attitude toward the bombing attacks, rea
soning that they were part of total war and that
the tables had turned against Germany. For the
most part they were indifferent to damage to the
plant in which they worked or to the necessity
of keeping oil production at the highest possible
level. During the heavy attacks of 1944 the
workers in several plants defied the control or
ganization and ran to the shelters at every alert.
In other instances they refused to leave the
shelters.
Cleaning up after raids and repairing dam
aged equipment, while officially the tasks of
Wehrmacht labor detachments, the Todt Organ
ization, and the Geilenberg Staff, also required
the services of large numbers of plant personnel,
although there is no indication that diversion of
labor for this purpose was allowed to interfere
with plant production. Working a 60-hr week,
laborers and office staff alike were required to
devoted the hours in excess of the 8-hr shift pe
riod to clean-up and repair work. Some plants
found it cheaper to employ a large staff of repair
construction workers than to wait for repair
squads from the outside. In August, 1944, there
were 150,000 men engaged in repair of hydro
genation plants alone, and in January, 1945,
350,000 were employed rebuilding the oil
industry.
War History of a Typical Fischer-Tropsch
Plant
The Meerbeck plant of Rheinpreussen, a typi
cal Fischer-Tropsch plant located about 3 miles
northwest of Homberg on the west bank of the
Rhine, is one of the smaller synthetic oil plants
of Germany but one of the larger Fischer
Tropsch installations. It occupies an area of 100
acres (built-up area 31.5 acres or 31 per cent).
With a productive capacity rating of 5,500 tons
per month, it accounted, during the first four
months of 1944, for 11.2 per cent of the Fischer
Tropsch production and 0.8 per cent of the total
German oil production. Using coke, coke-oven
gas, and coke-oven “wash oil” as raw materials,
the plant produced motor gasoline, diesel oil,
Treibgas (a light hydrocarbon mixture used
principally as bottled gas for motor fuel), and
Wax.
 HOW AND WHY ATTACKS AFFECTED PRODUCTION

Figure 101. Effect of direct hit by a 1,000-lb bomb Figure 102. Typical arrangement of several low
detonating on the bell of a gas holder used for pressure reactors of the type most frequently found

oil
storage of inflammable hydrocarbon gases in a in Fischer-Tropsch synthetic plants. The reactors
Fischer-Tropsch plant. Lack of any evidence of fire are extremely intricate design and contain thou

in
square feet cooling tubes.

of
indicates that the holder had been emptied.

of
sands

Air Attacks. The most interesting feature in the was believed that they served pin

to
because it
raid history of this plant is the great loss of pro point the target.
resulting from the very small tonnage Camouflage reed mats on wire netting was
of
duction
of bombs which actually exploded in the plant. used on the oil cracking plants and storage tanks
Following small attacks in June and early July, but was not considered satisfactory because

it
the first major attack occurred on 20 July when hindered fire fighting.
145 RAF bombers dropped 817 tons of bombs, Like most German oil plants, Meerbeck had
of which 25.6 tons exploded in the target area. decoy plant 2.7 miles west which was equipped
a

Eighty per cent of the total plant was heavily for igniting deceptive fires. Until May, 1944, the
damaged or destroyed, and it was estimated that decoy was successful attracting airplanes
in

reconstruction would take many months. This
was the knockout blow and, except for a slight
revival for three days in October, the plant did
not produce again. In 12 further attacks an addi
tional 6,446 tons of bombs were dropped, of
which 112.5 tons hit the inactive plant, effec
away from the main plant and was bombed on
several occasions.
. Reinforced concrete blast walls were placed
around vital machinery and were effective
against both blast and fragmentation from small
compliance with the govern
In

caliber bombs.
tively checking reconstruction work. (See Fig March, 1944, for the dispersal
of
of

ment order
exposed spots, the equip
to

ures 101-105.) vital industries less

ment for making higher alcohols, acetones, alu
Defense Measures. Defense measures included minum oxide, and hydrogen was moved Alme,
to

flak, barrage balloons, camouflage, decoy piants and the cracking plant for brown coal low-tem
with deceptive fires, protective shelters and blast perature tar was set up near Magdeburg. Neither
walls, and plant dispersal. The plant was de these plants had begun production when the
of

fended by approximately 100 guns, but the num war ended.

ber was reduced to about 60 when very heavy
attacks began and protection was needed for was good this plant until
at

Morale. Morale
plants in east or central Germany. Barrage bal May, 1944, when the attacks began. Because oil
loons were tried only once and then discontinued was such demand, the plant was not closed
in

93
 STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY: OIL DIVISION REPORT

during air raids. Instead, small individual
ters for operators of machines were placed inside
the buildings. This system was not successful,
however, and workers ran to the heavy concrete
shelters at every alert without waiting to see
whether the attack was intended for the plant.
Absenteeism averaged slightly less than 5 per
cent, but following the heavy attacks it jumped
to as much as 18 per cent for single days.
Impressions and Recommendations. An out
standing feature in the bombing of this plant
was the lack of accuracy in 2mming. Of the bombs
aimed at this target, 97 per cent missed. Ger
mans in this district were convinced that two
shel types of attacks were planned and carried out:
target attacks, and Terrorangriffe or terror at
tacks, in which bombs were strewn indiscrimi
nately over populated areas. Of the 7,866 tons
of bombs dropped at this plant, 2,259 tons, or
roughly 30 per cent, were dropped after 2 No
vember 1944, when the plant was abandoned as
a production unit.
Investigation of this plant supported the con
viction that, because of its extensive pipe system
and the lightness of constructional materials
used in vital equipment, the conventional type
of Fischer-Tropsch plant that has once been
heavily damaged could be permanently kept out
of production with a few accurately placed

Figure 103. Damage from 2,000-lb high-explosive bomb to three Fischer-Tropsch

reactors of the type shown in Figure 102. The intricate design of these reactors makes -
quick repairs extremely difficult.

94
 HOW AND WHY ATTACKS AFFECTED PRODUCTION

first four months of 1944, it turned out 84,000

metric tons. As feed stock, it used brown coal
tar brought by rail from near-by carbonization
plants, and its products included gasoline, diesel
oil, wax, spindle oil, machine oil, and liquefied
gases.

Air Attacks. The Zeitz plant, one of the targets

its
oil
for the offensive, received
first attack on
May was hit by 102 tons

12

of
1944 when

it
high-explosive and incendiary bombs. Damage
gasholders, hydrogenation stalls, scrubbers,

to
and exchangers put the plant out

of
action for

a
period which the German managers estimated
(See Figures

13
Figure 104. Damage from one 1,000-lb bomb and would not exceed weeks. 106
one 500-lb bomb to an activated charcoal adsorption
and 107.)
second heavy attack on 28 May, when 187

A
plant. Such plants were widely used in Fischer
Eighth Air Force planes placed 82.6 tons high

of
Tropsch and benzol plants for recovering lighter
explosive bombs the plant, further damaged

in
liquid hydrocarbons. The manifolding of the towers
is quite complicated (three to four different gases and disrupted the recovery schedule. Opera
it

tions had not been resumed when, the third

in
are injected at various times during their operating
attack on 16 August, an additional 113 tons

of
cycle). The plant was completely inoperable, and
bombs fell the plant, causing damage
in

to
repairs would take many months the
Linde plant, the gas and water scrubbers, gen

a
bombs dropped at short intervals. Repairs to erator, feed pumps, two stalls, and the high
pressure pump house, gasholders,

to
as

as
these plants with their many vulnerable installa well
tanks, and coolers.
tions require considerable amounts of material
and long periods of freedom from air attacks. At this point was estimated that production
it

A history of production variations during the

bombing operation is shown graphically in Fig
ure 108. Table 36 gives a log of the attacks on
this plant, with bombs dropped, bombs which ex
ploded in the target area, a summary of damage
to plant equipment, production data, and esti
mates of the period required for repairs after
each raid.

War History of a Typical Hydrogenation

Plant
The Zeitz synthetic oil (Bergius) plant of
Braunkohle Benzin A.G. (Brabag), a typical coal
hydrogenation plant of medium size, is located
near the town of Zeitz and about 20 miles south
west of Leipzig. It covers a rectangular area of
312 acres (built-up area 29.5 acres, or 9.5 per Figure 105. This adsorption plant was similar
to

the
cent). This plant was fairly important to the one shown Figure 104. The manifolding system
in

German war economy, producing 6.7 per cent of was damaged by have
to

hit from what believed

is
a

the total hydrogenation products and 3.2 per been 1,000-lb high-explosive bomb. Repair would
a

cent of the total German oil supply. During the have required new, prefabricated parts.

95
 TABLE 36

DAMAGE FROM AIR ATTACKS ON FISCHER-TROPSCH PROCESS

*
FUEL PLANT AT MEERBECK
-
Average
Daily
Produc
tion for Daily Production

3
Average Days after Attack,

of
HE Weight Bombs before Metric Torns

-
Bornbs HE Bombs Exploded Attack,
as
- Recuperability Esti

in
Dates of Dropped, Dropped, Target Metric 2nd 7th mated by Plant, Per Estimated Dam

of

of
1944 attacks Tons Pounds Area, Tons Tons Day Day Cause Production Loss and Other Major Damage Cent Capacity age,Reichsmarks

0
*
25/26 June 49 710 1.8 176.3 66.2 Hydrogen sulfide removal plant, organic sulfur re

in
moval plant, and pipe lines damaged by fragmen- 50 10 days

to
3

tation. Water-gas holder punctured. Damage oil 100 probably 350,000

cracking plant and carbon dioxide scrubbing equip- weeks
ment. Fire damage

0
*

0
of
6

30 June/1 July 63 1,820 7.8 103.2 Destruction compressed air main. Severe damage None for days;

to
four gas holders and one cooling tower then 30 increasing Not available
as

to

100 help be
came available

5
0
+

0
of
1/2 July 500 118.9 118.8 No interruption repairs, no added damage None

$
0

6
to
to

0
ge.

3/4 July 500 0.6 130.2 Damage two Fischer-Tropsch reactors, No additional delay
holder, pump house, pipe lines, and electric calles; over estimate after Not available

in
also fire damage polymer and alcohol plant previous attack

6
11/12 July 500 130.8 not affected None

0
12/13 July 11 500 133.5 not affected None

6
0
13/14 July 500 136.7 not affected None

0
*
in
in

to
1
3

in

16/17 July 65 2,070 0.9 137.5 93.6 Damage process equipment and lines gas- 25 day, 40
in

in

cracking and gas conversion plants. Fire damage days, 70 days, 60,000
97

both these plants and 100 in wenks

0
0
of

Will run into

or

20/21 July 817 710 25.6 107.9 80 per cent the total plant heavily damaged Reconstruction will
millions
to

destroyed; major damage power plant, reactor take months

house, water-gas holder, alcohol plant, transformer
-
station, shops, and tanks

+
23/24 Aug. 500 not affected None

0 0
+

3 3
.
25/26 Aug. 500 not affected None

0 0 0
0
0

+
27 Aug. 877 510 40.7 Water-gas generators, gas purification plants, reac- Will delay recon

-
of
at

tor house, pumping installations, power house, tank- struction plant 2,000,000
age, and pipe lines heavily damaged least one month
 TABLE 36 (Continued)

Average
Daily
Produc
tion for Daily Production

3
Average Days after Attack,
HE Weight of Bombs before Metric Tons
Bombs HE Bombs Exploded Attack, Recuperability as Esti

in
Dates of Dropped, Dropped, Target Metric 2nd 7th mated by Plant, Per Estimated Dam

of
1944 Attacks Tons Tons
of

Pounds Area, Tons Day Day Cause Production Loss and Other Major Damage Cent Capacity age,Reichsmarks

5
0
+
0
26/27 Sept. 500 not affected

0
0

0
+
14 Oct. Attack not 6.6 Damage to oil condensation, cooling towers, and Will delay recon- 40,000
reported railway track throughout the plant struction somewhat

O
*
25 Oct. 1,089 750 6.3 42.5 Reactor house and reactors damaged; also Lacon- Will delay recon- 300,000
dary installations struction somewhat

1
*

0
+
to
Nov. 919 950 4.7 48.0 Only damage roads and garages Reconstruction con- 20,000
tinues

wo

2
0
+

0
to
* Nov. 938 1,160 20.3 48.0 Heavy damage, water-gas generators, hydrogen No estimate, recon
to

sulfide removal plant, benzine distillation unit, struction continues 1,500,000

tanks and pipe lines

8
0
to
Nov. 734 1,050 13.1 0+ Heavy damage water-gas generating equipment, No estimate possible,
gas cracking plant, pipe bridges, cable system, and reconstruction con- 800,000
trackage tinues

0
0
*
to

20 Nov. 973 720 9.0 0+ Heavy damage water-gas generators, Fischer- Reconstruction 1,300,000
Tropsch reactors, and gas purification equipment stopped

0
0
20/21 Nov. 11 500 not affected None

0
0
0

+
to

21 Nov. 893 710 11.8 Heavy damage water-gas generating equipment, Reconstruction
gas purification system, adsorption plant, and rail- abandoned 1,200,000
way track

8
1
0

0
0

0
+
Dec. 500 No added damage

to
Attacked again prior this date.

*+
Caused by previous attack.
 TABLE 37

DAMAGE FROM AIR ATTACKS ON HYDROGENATION PROCESS

FUEL PLANT AT ZEITZ

Daily Production after

.
Average Production Attack, Metric

of
Weight Bombs before Tons
Bombs. HE Bombs Exploded Attack, Recuperability as Esti
Date of

in
Dropped, Target Metric
–2nd Zth 14th mated by Plant, Per Estimated Darn
Attack *:::: ons Pounds Area, Tons Tons

of
of
day day day Cause Production Loss and Other Major Damage Cent Capacity age,Reichsmarks

0
o
12 May 1944 260.1 294 100.0 519 Gas plant: scrubbers, compressors, and gasholders
damaged. Hydrogenation: stalls, exchangers, and tar

-
pump damaged. Product finishing: gas recovery,
stabilizer, gasoline and diesel washing, lubricating oil 20 in 13 weeks
finishing, and phenol removal damaged. Tankage: 30 in 16 weeks Both raids
- -

or
tar and process tankage damaged destroyed. Utili- 70 in 21 weeks 27,070,000

+
O

0
0
o
28 May 1944 447.3 142 82.6 ties, etc.: shops, power house, two transformer build- 100 in 26 weeks
ings, pipe lines, and underground cables destroyed.

to
Considerable damage pumps, motor accumula

Š
of
12
- tors, and instruments. The raid May centered

of
on gas plant area; the raid 28 May concentrated
on feed preparation and tankage

0
o
o
O

*
16 Aug. 1944 226.1 248 113.0 Gas plant: Linde plant, gas and water scrubbers,

-
generator, water pump, gas holder, and coke unloader
damaged. Hydrogenation: feed pumps, gas boosters,
two stalls, one stall crane, and high-pressure pump
house damaged. Product finishing: product rerun
6

unit badly damaged; one gasoline washer destroyed. Partial in weeks 14,990,000
Tankage: crude tar tankage damaged, tar unloading
pumps wrecked. Utilities: two boilers and turbines
(half the capacity) and feed pumps badly damaged;
switching gear, substations, water mains, and process
piping damaged

o
O

0
30 Nov. 1944 693.5 250 26.3 300 Scattered bomb damage over plant; oxygen plant 50 by Dec. 20
severely damaged; gas holder wrecked. Main damage 75 by Dec. 25 3,250,000
of

to
1

underground piping and cables. Initiation re- 100 by Jan.

pairs slowed down by long delay bombs
 TABLE 37 (Continued)

DAMAGE FROM AIR ATTACKS ON HYDROGENATION PROCESS

FUEL PLANT. At ZEITZ

Daily Prsduction after

Average Production Attack, Metric

of
Weight Bombs before Tons
Bombs HE Bombs Exploded Attack, - - Recuperability as Esti

in
Dates of Dropped, Dropped, Target Metric 2nd 7th 14th mated by Plant, Per Estimated Dam

of
Tons Pot'nds Area. Tons Trns
of

Attack day day day Cause Production Loss and Other Major Damage Cent Capacity age,Reichsmarks

0
0
0
16 Jan. 1945 1,462.7 760 254.0 521 Gas plant: oxygen plant building, refrigeration, two
gas holders, gas producers, various buildings dam
aged; one gas blower and separator wrecked; Claus
plant: gas scrubber and phenol rernoval units se

to
verely damaged; slight damage nitrogen gas
3

holder, gas compressor buildings, and compressors. 50 in months

in

Hydrogenation: two hydrogen gas boosters and one 75 31/4 months

$
4

feed pump, crane rail track supports severely dam 100 in months 32,700,000
aged; several buildings, numerous water mains, and Partial production
in

cables damaged. Products finishing: lubricating plant resumed 3%

- and paraffin units and two tanks destroyed; stabilizer months
unit and two other tanks severely damaged. Utili
of
ft.

ties, etc.: one cooling tower and 1.300 pipe

- bridge with piping destroyed; coal tipple, under
ground cables, and water lines severely damaged;
power and boiler houses, several substations dam
aged; coal bunkers slightly damaged

o
O
o
of

31 Mar. 1945 339 412 25.6 383 Considerable damage moderate extent, power 50 18 days
plant damage repair requiring longest time 75 24 days
in in in

100 30 days 2,300,000

Not realized because
of

Allied occupation

of

*
Because previous attacks.
 STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY: OIL DIVISION REPORT

would be resumed on a small scale in six weeks.

The plant opened on 1 October and had attained
a daily production of 300 tons by 15 November.
On 30 November, 285 Eighth Air Force planes
landed 263 tons of bombs within the plant con
fines, and production dropped back to zero. The
main was to underground piping and
damage
cables. Recovery, according to plant estimates,
would reach 50 per cent by 20 December and
100 per cent by 1 January.
The plant opened on 19 December and had
attained a production level of 521 tons per day
when it was hit by 254 tons of bombs dropped
by 320 RAF bombers on 16 January 1945.
Damage was extensive but reparable, and it was
Figure 107. Effect of bomb fragments from an
estimated that the plant could achieve full re
unidentified bomb on a reactor of the type shown
covery in four months. Another attack on 31
in Figure 106. The bands were broken in many
March, followed by Allied occupation, ended the
places, and the vessel would have to be completely
bombing history of this plant. After surveying
rewrapped to be serviceable.
the plant, Oil Division personnel concurred in
the estimate of the plant managers that, with
simple repairs, Zeitz could achieve 100 per cent flak including rockets, the regional fighter de
production in 30 days. fense, and protective installations in the plant.
The decoy plant, located 3% miles away, was
Defensive Measures. Defensive measures in ineffective except in one attack. An area smoke
cluded a decoy plant, effective smoke screening, screen operated by the army and a plant smoke
screen for which the air raid warden was re
sponsible concealed the plant during several at
tacks. Flak was heavy throughout the area, and
the defenses of the important Leuna plant, 20
miles to the west, which included searchlight
concentrations, a strong flak concentration, and
fighter protection, also came into operation for
the defense of Zeitz.
Vital plant equipment was protected against
blast and fragmentation by unusually strong re
inforced concrete sections which fitted together
to form walled shelters. The air raid defense was
one of the most efficiently organized groups en
countered anywhere in Germany. Not only the
3,000 persons employed in the plant, but as
many as 3,080 additional persons were engaged
after heavy attacks in repair work alone. This
Figure 106. A new type spirally wrapped, high
accounts principally for the remarkably fast re
pressure hydrogenation reactor, which consists of a covery once repair work was begun.
solid forging of considerably thinner wall construc
tion than was used before the war. The forging is Impressions and Recommendations. The out
wrapped with a steel reinforcing band to provide standing feature in the attack history of the Zeitz
strength. This principle has been employed for many plant was its rapid rate of recovery. The plant
years in the manufacture of heavy-artillery barrels. achieved almost full production within a few

100
 HOW AND WHY ATTACKS AFFECTED PRODUCTION

days of resuming operation following a bomb
ing raid. This is attributable to the low average
weight of the bombs dropped (321 lb), to the
fact that most of the damage inflicted could be
repaired by the plant forces, and to the effective
shelters and blast walls surrounding compressors,
generators, and other vital equipment. A fifth
attack, in which 254 tons of bombs including
twenty 4,000-lb. bombs hit the plant, accounted
for 40 per cent of the total bomb damage in
flicted during the war, according to German
estimates.
and extremely vulnerable to bomb damage. Re
pairs presented no major problem, however, and
once they were completed the plant was ready
to resume at its normal capacity. More damage
to heavy equipment would have complicated re
pairs and rendered quick recovery impossible.
A history of the changes in plant production
as the air offensive progressed is shown graphic
ally in Figure 109. It is interesting to note how
little permanent damage was inflicted on the
plant despite the high percentage of bombs ex
ploding in

it.
The installations in this plant were more log the attacks, including bomb loads, the

of
A
widely separated than those in any other single bombs hitting the plant, summary

of

of
tons

a
plant investigated. Consequently, overhead and major equipment damage, and effect on produc
underground pipes and cables were overextended tion, given Table 37.

in
is
BENZOL TARGETS

Benzol, derived from coal, constituted approx benzol recovery plants were made by Oil Divi
imately per cent Germany's motor fuel. Its sion field teams, consideration the equipment

of
of
17

production was widely dispersed throughout and operational features such plants indicates

of
Germany's coal-rich areas about 75 small that the bombing techniques and weapons found
in

plants, usually adjacent collieries. In 1943, most satisfactory for oil refineries should prove
to

643,000 tons benzol were produced, equally effective for benzol refinery plants.
of

of

which
60 per cent came from the coke ovens the The coking equipment which produces the
in

Ruhr district, per cent from eastern Germany, benzol appears, from brief study the Rhein
17

of
a

per cent from the Saar, and the remainder from preussen coke ovens, be very sensitive
to

to
9

scattered localities. bombing attacks. The ovens are arranged bat

in
Of the total benzol production 60 units connected by common
to
of

the first six teries

in

25
1944, 56 per cent was used fuel lines and tar collecting manifolds. Therefore
of

months motor
in

fuel, 24 per ce:ht high-explosives manufacture, any one unit by bomb neces
of

the elimination
in

per cent chemicals, and per cent sitates shutdown and consequent quick cooling
15

rubber
in

in

a
5

manufacture. At times small amount was also an entire battery. The newer ovens, lined with
of
a

diethyl benzene,
to

of

allotted the manufacture silica brick, are damaged almost irreparably by

high-octane blending agent such quick reduction temperature. When this
in

which was used as

a

aviation gasoline. The benzol plants directly occurs, the entire battery ceases be productive
to
in

provided 68 per cent all the toluol (raw mate for many months. Such batteries usually pro
of

rial for TNT manufacture) produced Ger vide easily identifiable targets several hundred
in

many, and per cent the toluol went into high feet long and about 20 wide, which should be
87

ft
of

explosives. Under the impact the bombing at attacked force whenever reasonable accuracy
in
of

tacks against the methanol plants, the benzol probable.

is

industry became increasingly important

to

the
Air Attacks. While oil refineries and synthetic
high explosives and, between
of

manufacture May, 1944.

oil plants were attacked early
as

as

June and August, 1944, produced 82 per cent

of

the benzol recovery plants were not attacked

all the German toluol.
until October and then only lightly. Novem
In

Vulnerability. While no detailed surveys ber, total of 1,451 tons of bombs was aimed at
of

101
 sTRATEG1c BoMBING survey, oil Division REPoRT

benzol plants, and by January, 1945, the total
bomb load had increased to 5,654 tons. During
February and March, 1945, an additional bomb
load of 11,520 tons was dropped, bringing the
total weight up to 17,174 tons (see Table 38 and
Figure 110 and also the Appendix, Figures 45,
46, and 47).
Production loss. By January, benzol produc
tion had dropped to 38.4 per cent of the January
April, 1944, capacity, and by March, production
in the Ruhr had practically ceased. The benzol
production loss was not due solely to the weight
of bombs dropped directly on the benzol plants.
A large percentage of the loss was the incidental
result of bombing other industries located near
the plants, as well as coke ovens, water supplies,
and transportation systems. By November, 1944,
the benzol output of the Ruhr area had dropped
from 30,300 tons per month to 11,500 tons, a loss
of 62 per cent, although the benzol industry had
not by this time been singled out as a strategic
target for attack.
Since the start of the oil offensive, the cumu
lative loss in production up to the end of Janu
ary amounted to 113,400 tons of benzol, about 18
per cent of the preattack annual production. This
loss is not devastating when compared with the
oil industry totals. Probably the most serious
effect was the loss of the coproduced toluol,
which meant that explosives production was seri
ously affected. A survey made in the middle of
April, 1945, by the Benzol Association disclosed
that the Ruhr benzol industry was then capable
of producing about 360 tons per month.

TABLE 38

EFFECT OF STRATEGIC BOMBING ON GERMAN BENZOL PRODUCTION

| A 94 4 | 1945
|
|Jan.-Apr., | |
| Average May June July Aug. Sept. Oct Nov. Dec Jan.

Total production* 53.6 56.5 49.2 50.3 44.2 40.4 29.3 27.8 20.6

Bombs dropped on benzol recovery

industry.* 116 1,451 693 3,394t

Total production loss per month,

based on January-April, 1944,
average" 4.4 3.3 9.4 13.2 24.3 25.8 33

Cumulative production loss” 4.4 7.7 17.1 30.3 54.6 80.4 113.4

Per cent of production maintained 100 105.4 104.1 91.8 93.8 82.4 75.4 54.6 51.9 38.4

To motor fuel." 30.3 29.8 31.2 22.3 21 21.1 20.5 15 17.6 9.5

To aviation fuel." 0.2 4.4 4.5 3.9 3.4 1.2 0.7 0.8

To toluol and xylol" 9.1 10.3 10.1 8.6 8.4 6.9 6.6 4.7 3.2 2.7

To solvents and sundry products for

chemical industry.* 14.2 16.4 14.3 13.9 16.4 12.3 9.9 8.4 6.3 7.6

*In thousands of metric tons.

f Between April 1945, an additional bomb load of 11,520 tons, not included in these figures, was
1 February and 30
dropped on the benzol industry, bringing the total bomb load aimed directly at the benzol industry to 17,174 tons.

7:#512 0-47–12
102
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 BENZOL PLANTS
ACTUAL MONTHLY PRODUCTION AND TONNAGE

£e
OF BOMBS DROPPED ON THESE FACILITIES

wo, OFAA/DS
Each Boing *Aft
500 TOW's Of Bowgs ðy
J.S.A.A."
*-* O 10 1 - || || || 6 || || || ||
U.S.- I- - -
|

5
--|--
... -
--- PRODUCTION

13.2
LOSS

- FRööuctio | | ||

201–
1054
—"liou
–4–LCC:}|-#* -
75

£
£|*|*| " *
MONTH
O
MONTHLY AVERAGE

|
1943
J

PERCE/v746e argumes after PERCE/v7

F | M

of
A | M J J
1944
| A

va/v -a/PR/l average

|S 0 | N | D

Produc//ov
J | F |M

1945
A

Figure 110
 HOW AND WHY ATTACKS AFFECTED PRODUCTION

SYNTHETIC AMMONIA AND METHANOL TARGETS

Ammonia and methanol were starting mate heavy-walled equipment. Methanol and the

rials for a large part of the German chemicals
production, both organic and inorganic. These
products were made by two basic syntheses from
gases: hydrogen and nitrogen for ammonia,
drogen and carbon monoxide for methanol.
in
higher alcohols are made the same way except
that the gases employed are hydrogen and car
bon monoxide, and different catalysts and slightly
hy different operating conditions are employed.
The To produce hydrogen, nitrogen,

or
carbon
syntheses were very similar, being carried out monoxide, the same raw materials, coal

at high pressures (3,500 lb per square inch), at
high temperatures, and in almost identical equip
ment. The gases for both processes were made
or
coke,
air (or oxygen), and steam are used; the same
equipment units, water-gas generators and gas
producers, are employed. The composition

of
the
from coal, air, and water in common equipment. finished gas dependent on the distribution

Because all three basic processes use the same
raw materials and same types of equipment, they
were frequently all found in the same plant.
of
is
the steam, air, and oxygen used; the distribution
between water-gas generators and gas producers
(often interchangeable); and the method

of
final
Consequently, although methanol and ammonia purification. The gases must be purified re

to
plants were not priority targets for air attack, the plants studied

to
move sulfur (recovered

plants were attacked in conjunction with
these
the synthetic oil units with which they were in
tegrated. The production of explosives, fertil
in
make sulfuric acid and pure sulfur), carbon di
oxide, and carbon monoxide (for the ammonia
synthesis), and must be treated catalytically

to
izers,and other chemicals was thus fortuitously adjust the carbon monoxide content. The gas
curtailed,and an opportunity was afforded for producing and purification equipment bulky

is
studying the effects of bombing on such targets. light construction, operat
of
and intricate.
It
is

ing low pressure, and covers large area.

at

a
Survey of Ammonia and Methanol Plants. Of
Thus the gas producing and purification facilities
the plants listed in Tables 1 and 19 Oil Divi
offer an excellent bombing target owing

to
their
sion survey teams made detailed examina
size and structural weakness, and finally because
tions of three, Gewerkschaft Victor at Castrop
their elimination would cause break the

in
a
Rauxel and I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G. plants integrated production.
of

chain
at Leuna and Ludwigshafen-Oppau, representing
two thirds of Germany's synthetic nitrogen and
On the other hand,
these plants are made up
At

many parallel units. Leuna, for example,

of

half her methanol capacity. Another nitrogen

there were 65 gas generators, most them ca
of

plant, Ruhrchemie at Holten, was visited.

pable serving either water-gas generators
as
of

Synthetic Ammonia and Synthetic Methanol. gas producers (for gas with nitrogen).
In
or

There is little resemblance between ammonia
and methanol physically and chemically; yet the
methods of producing them synthetically are so
similar that they may as well be considered to
gether in studying the effects of bombing the
the
same plant were 40 activated carbon-type gas
desulfurizing units supplied by 18 gas blowers.
The plant had 139 gas converters for the shift
reaction. To knock the gas plant out completely,
be damaged, fairly
to
of

most these would have

a

plants. Both are made by the basic synthesis of difficult task. All this equipment, however, was
from the same raw materials: coal or coke, pre
of

gases collected into an area 30 acres where

it

air, and steam. Both depend on the consump target

of

sented an excellent vital and vulnerable

tion of large amounts of similar utilities—steam, units with no spare capacity outside the area.
In

power (electricity, steam, or gas), and water. the plants studied, the gas generating and puri
Ammonia is made by passing a mixture of fication equipment had not been extensively hit
relativelypure nitrogen and hydrogen over a by bombs, although should have been pri
it

bed of catalyst at high pressure (3,000 to 3,500 mary aiming point more often.
per square inch) and temperature (750°F) heavy
lb.

The synthesis units proper consisted

of

103
 STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY: Oll DIVISION REPORT

walled vessels (reactors, coolers, separators) of damaged the plant be shut down. The

to
if

is
alloy steel, transfer lines and heaters of heavy synthesis plants, therefore, were not choice tar
walled pipe, and the high-pressure compressors gets, especially when the bombs were small and

-
and pumps. All of this equipment is vital in that, the aiming conditions unfavorable.
if it is damaged beyond repair, months are re The enormous utility requirements high

of
a
quired for its replacement. On the other hand, pressure synthesis plant—steam for gas produc
most of it was well protected by concrete and tion, power for gas compression, and water for
brick walls. Unless such equipment received di cooling (with corresponding sewer capacities)–
rect hits from bombs or near misses from very power plants utility

or
suggest the choice

as of
large bombs, it was not damaged. Flying frag transfer equipment target. They were not

a
Examples feasible targets, however, since they covered

it.
ments of bombs had little effect on
500-lb bombs exploding within such large area. Not many hits were observed
of of

were found

a
a
yard high-pressure compressors pro generators, but there were some ef

or
or

so on boilers
tected by concrete walls without damaging the fective ones. Likewise, water treating or pump
compressors. Direct hits near misses by large ing plants are vulnerable. The Germans ex
or

bombs on compressors effectively put them out pressed surprise our not bombing the coal

at
commission, but since large plant consists unloading and transfer equipment Oppau,
of of

at
in a

numerous compressors parallel, all must be which would their opinion have been very

in

Figure Leuna Works looking south, reproduced

of

111. General view from German

on

pictures taken some years before the war. The tall chimneys
13

the boiler houses

helped fliers identify the plant.

104
 | ;
|

-
.*
-
---

by

Figure 112. Vertical aer ial August, 1944.

of

iew Leuna Works taken the Luftwaffe

in
v

105
 STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY: OIL DIVISION REPORT
effective. Utility transfer lines including sewers
were damaged frequently by the numerous
bombs, large and small, falling in the plants
studied.
How Production Was Stopped. In the methanol
and ammonia plants studied, production was
stopped largely by the destruction of man-hours
rather than equipment. The physical damage
caused by the bombing was largely of a repa
rable nature. The return of the plant to produc
tion was therefore usually a question of how
quickly repair could be made.
While there were numerous isolated cases of
permanent damage to equipment such as com
pressors, pumps, and electric transformers, this
damage (usually occurring on pieces of equip
ment present in multiple units) did not in most
cases curtail production because of the excess
capacity of the individual sections of the Ger
man plants. The greatest single factor in shut
ting down the plants producing methanol and
ammonia was the destruction of utility transfer
equipment, especially electric cables, water lines,
sewers, and steam lines. While the materials re
quirements were not excessive, the strain on man
power in making repairs was heavy, and the pro
duction loss accumulated.
The loss of production at both Ludwigshafen
and Leuna was the result of repeated bombings,
most of which temporarily stopped production
of the plant by reparable damage, usually to
utility lines. As soon as the plant could be re
paired and production resumed, another attack
would be carried out and the cycle repeated. At
Leuna the production of the plant averaged only
about 9 per cent of capacity (7 per cent for
methanol and ammonia because of priorities)
after the air attacks recommenced in May, 1944.
At Oppau the plant production for the four
month bombing period ending December 15 was
about 30 per cent. From then, on it was essen
tially nothing.
War History of a Typical Nitrogen
and Methanol Plant
Ammoniakwerk Merseburg (Leuna), a typ
ical plant producing ammonia and methanol
(integrated with other chemicals and liquid fuels
|06
production), is located at Leuna near the Saale
River. It is over 11,000 ft long, up to 3,500 ft
wide and occupies 757 acres, of which area 23
per cent is occupied by buildings and tanks. The
plant produces liquid fuels, ammonia, methanol,
and the higher alcohols, by three basic high-pres
sure syntheses from gases derived from coal, coke,
air, oxygen, and steam. Chemical derivatives from
the basic materials comprise some 80 products,
including synthetic fuels and lubricants, fertil
izers, acids, various solvents, organic chemicals,
plastics, etc. In 1943 the monthly production
of the plant was 21,000 tons of nitrogen, over
14,900 tons of methanol, and 600 tons of isobutyl
alcohol. This was approximately 32 per cent of
the synthetic nitrogen and 72 per cent of the
methanol production of Germany.
Some idea of the size of the plant may be
gained from the following figures. It consumed
annually over 1,000,000 tons of by-product coke,
400,000 tons of brown coal coke, and 9,000,000
tons cf brown coal; gas production in the plant
for process and fuel exceeded 390,000,000 cu. ft.
daily; water was consumed at a rate of up to
180,000 gpm; the steam generating capacity was
4,300,000 lb per hour and the connected electric
load 390,000 kw (see Figures 111, 112).
Air Attacks. The Leuna plant was attacked
from the air 22 times starting on 12 May 1944.
The striking feature of these attacks was that,
every time more than a ton of bombs hit the
plank, production came to a halt, but not per
manently. After each attack the Germans indus
triously repaired the damage and attempted to
get the plant in operation. Production seldom
approached an appreciable proportion of capac
ity before a new attack again terminated the
activity. This is illustrated graphically in Fig
ure 113, which shows the production of nitrogen,
methanol, and the closely related (from a
process viewpoint) isobutyl alcohol, for the year
1944.
The chief factor causing loss of production
was the destruction of utility lines, including
sewers, without which the plant could not be
operated. Although widely distributed, this dam
age could be repaired by available labor and
materials. After sustaining 22 major attacks, the
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 HOW AND WHY ATTACKS
plant was still in such a basically sound condi
tion that it could have been returned to 70 per
cent of normal production capacity in a few
months without requiring the replacement of
essential equipment.
Personnel. The plant employed during and just
previous to the war about 33,000 persons, in
cluding 10,000 foreigners and 2,300 German
women. There were 4,100 office workers (815
German women) and 400 chemists and engi
neers. During the strategic bombing period 301
workers (1 per cent) were killed and 795 (2.4
per cent) were injured. These figures are typical
of the industry. The morale was generally good
except after the first two attacks when inade
quate air raid shelters led to panic and absen
teeism.
Defense Measures. Over 19,000 (about 60 per
cent) of the plant's employees were organized
in a very effective air raid protection organiza
tion. About 30,000,000 RM were spent up to
1942 for equipment for personnel, decoy plants,
protection against bomb fragments, air raid shel
ters, etc. Smoke screens were generally used,
and they were effective. On several of the first
eight attacks (the only ones where data are
available) more bombs fell on the decoy plants
than on the Leuna Works. The active defense by
anti-aircraft batteries was very effective, espe
cially during the late summer and early fall of
1944 when 500 to 600 guns were in use. Of these
107
AFFECTED PRODUCTION
one fourth were 128-mm guns, the rest 108-mm
and 88-mm.
Impressions and Recommendations. It is prob
able that the production would have been
stopped for longer periods had the physical dam
age exceeded the capacity of the plant personnel
to repair it swiftly. This obviously could have
been realized by either of two methods:
(a) Dropping more bombs on the plant by
increasing the size or number of the attacks.
(b) Hitting the plant more frequently by
more accurate aiming.
Only 10.1 per cent of the bombs dropped fell
within the plant area, leaving a considerable
opportunity for improvement in this respect.
Production could have been stopped for longer
periods had the nature of the damage been such
that repair materials from outside sources were
required, or had vital equipment, such as heavy
compressors, pumps, and electric generators, been
destroyed. For a more effective stoppage of pro
duction in an ammonia and methanol plant like
Leuna, permanent dislocation of some vital part
of the plant should be effected. This requires the
use of large bombs on some vital part of the
plant, such as gas production and purification
units.
Table 39 is an attack and damage log show
ing bombs dropped, bombs hitting the plant, pro
duction status before and after raids, damage
inflicted, and recuperability.
 TABLE 39

DAMAGE FROM AIR ATTACK ON SYNTHETIC AMMONIA AND METHANOL PLANT AT LEUNA

Estimated

of
Bombs Daily Production, Per Cent Normal
Exploded Recuperability,

in
Bombs Target 2nd Day 7th Day t
1'.' c: #. an ":

of
#: P#. 4: # £. £ Attack Causes Production Loss and Other Major Damage #: %: ":

0
to
12 May 1944 490 95 96 Damage utilities: Steam lines, over 100 major Operations started 45,800,000

in
breaks; water lines, over 50 major breaks; power 10 days
cables, 100 major breaks. Telephone system and
sirens were out. 15 large fires started. Building dam

of
age: 7,000,000 cu. ft. building volume totally

ft.
destroyed; 5,000,000 cu. severely damaged;
19,000,000 cu. ft. moderately and 67,000,000 cu. ft.
lightly damaged

0
of

0
to

8
133 41 22 Complete loss all utilities due 150 new major 20 12 days
28 May 1944

in
15

breaks utility piping and 110 major cable breaks. 50 days

Telephone office severely damaged. Building dam-
-

70 22 days

of

ft.
in in in in

age: 800,000 cu. building volume totally 100 84 days 9,900,000

ft.
destroyed; 12,000,000 cu. severely damaged;

ft.
ft.

5,000,000 cu. moderately and 16,000,000 cu.

lightly damaged

0
7

#
31 76 31 General damage, but no important single items. 194

7
July 1944 93 40 days

in
major breaks utility lines 80 14 days 5,900,000

0
of
11

20 July 1944 361 87 53 35 The southern part the plant was severely hit. 264 50 days 14,120,000
in
new breaks were found the pipe line system. Gas 70 14 days
in in in in in

generation, ammonia synthesis, and the Salts Divi- 85 27 days

to

sion suffered damage. Damage sewers and rail

in
a

roads created bottlenecks production for few

days

28/29 July 1944 1,584. 214 35

00
00

00
of

0
to
17

1,361 77 Complete loss all utilities due 410 major breaks 20 days 66,320,000
-
in
in

to
to

water lines; 400 500 steam lines. Damage 40 60 days

Total 2,945 291 cables and substations was very great. Coal con- 50 90 days
3,

to

veyors boiler houses Me Me Me 202, Me 203 65 120 days

of
4, to
in in in in in

14

would be out operation for weeks. Three 80 150 days

17

boilers were destroyed and damaged; turbo

6 9 to

generators damaged. Repairs gas lines would de

termine when operations could be resumed. Gas
to

generators were damaged. Damage occurred com

pressors, scrubbers, cooling towers, and recycle gas
compressors. Hydrogenation, methanol, and alkylate
distillation units were damaged. Dehy3rogenation
of

in

ovens the alkylate plant were put out service.

Mechanical shops were badly damaged
 450

at
24 Aug. 1944 Waterworks Daspig hit, and the boiler house put 25 30 days 16,900,000

in

of
out commission. 273 major breaks were located 33 60 days
utility lines. Gas productions and purification areas 42 90 days

of
were severely hit. Alkylation plant would be out 52 120 days

in in in in in
production for weeks 70 180 days

11
in
240

in
Sept. 1944 Gas recovery units Hydrogenation Division were No delay 13,100,000
damaged. Smoke acid production will be out for previous plan

of
weeks because hits. The Linde plant and the

in
Haeuber installation the ethane plant were dam
aged. Gas holders were destroyed

at
13 Sept. 1944 330 Waterworks Daspig received 70 hits. Water in Four weeks' delay Included in

in
takes, filters, boiler house, and main pump house previous plan above figure

to
seriously damaged. Repairs the inlet line esti
mated to take weeks. Sewers also received hits.
Three 1,700-lb boilers received direct hits. Gas pro
duction and purification department was hit again.

in
Several compressors used ammonia synthesis re

in
ceived hits. Some fractionation columns the Hy
drogenation Division received direct hits. This would

in
of
be the bottleneck the starting up the hydro

in
genation plant. Water pumps methanol plant
damaged. Formaldehyde, propionaldehyde, and al
kylate plants received hits. The whole plant must

3
be prepared for winter operation, which will slow

of
down repairs. The number major pipe breaks
from this and the preceding attack was 304

28 Sept. 1944 725 Coal conveyor for boiler house Me 203 was severely One week's delay 3,270,000
in

to
damaged; would take months make repairs. The earlier plans

it in
5
switchgear power plant Me was again destroyed.
to

Gas generator and the coal conveyor gas genera

tor building Me 240 were severely damaged. The
last large gas holder was destroyed. High-pressure
water scrubbing unit was damaged severely. Me
chanical shops were seriously hit

7
Oct. 1944 278 Water lines from Daspig were hit again. One week 10 in 10 days 53,000

to
in

effect repairs. No damage plant proper 20 20 days

35 60 days
in in in

58 90 days

2
to

Nov. 1944 New

in

1,324 Outside electric power failed owing direct hits. No delay 116,000
attacks
in

No damage plant proper previous plans

8
Nov. 1944 498 New
in
in

Practically no damage plant No delay 21,000

attacks previous plans
8

21 Nov. 1944 503

of

Report this attack missing No data available 8,370,000

to

owing following
attacks
 TABLE 39 (Continued)

of
Bombs Daily Production, Per Cent Normal Estimated
Exploded Recuperability,

in
Bombs Target Before 2nd Day 7th Day 14th Day Per Cent of Damage,
Date of Dropped, Area, Attack After After After Capacity by Plant Reichs

of

L.
Attack Tons suo Attack Attack Attack Causes Production Loss and Other Major Damage After Attack marks

0
0
25 Nov. 1944 1,747 55 New Coal conveyor for boiler house Me 204 hit again. No data available 5,130,000

to
to

in
attack One boiler Me 202 destroyed. Electric power owing following
Daspig failed attacks

o
0
1
it
of
30 Nov. 1944 595 39 New Hits on railroad put out commission for several No data 6,245,000

in
attack days. The electric switch installation compressor
building Me 187 was severely damaged. Distillation

in
units the Hydrogenation Division received direct

of
hits. The south end the plant was hit by 200
bombs. Cables, sewers, and water lines were very seri
ously damaged. Cooling tower Me 984, the alkyla
tion plant, catalyst manufacturing plant, and the
Mersol and Mesomoll plants were severely hit

6
O
O
O

8
to
Dec. 1944 1,044 46 Railroad yard received 20 30 hits. West camp No data 25,620,000
completely destroyed, leaving 1,700 persons without

s
in

shelter. Four boilers destroyed. Coal conveyors

in

a
Me 108 hit causing two-week shutdown boiler
in

house Me 203. One turbogenerator Me 203 was

of

damaged severely. One third feed water treating

plant was lost. All utility pipe lines and cables very
in

heavily damaged. Gas lines gas producing and

purification plants were hit by 60 bombs. Methanol
a
plant was hit and large crane damaged

6
0
0
A
6/7 Dec. 1944 1,828 72 large flue was destroyed; four boilers, two bunkers No data Included in
in

and three feed water pumps damaged. Two hits previous

coal conveyor Me 224. One turbogenerator was se attack
of
in

verely damaged. One half substation south

plant was destroyed. Phenol water plant damaged.
in

Compressors and high-pressure buildings ammonia

plant were severely damaged. Adipic acid and nitric
acid plants were hit again. The electric power dis
in

tribution the hydrogenation distillation suffered

great damage. Seven stalls used alcohol synthesis
in

in a

were severely damaged, causing reduction pro

of

duction 70 per cent. Mechanical shops were se

verely damaged
 985 18

in
12 Dec. 1944 Coal conveyor Me 990 received four hits causing 10 18 days 1,980,000.
two- to three-weeks shutdown. Tank fire broke out 19 30 days

a in
35
in in in
Hydrogenation Division (Me 825). Building dam 60 days

in
age DHD installation. Lubrication oil, Haeuber,
and activated carbon plants were damaged. Main
sewer received one hit

260 15

in
14 Jan. 1945 2,413 Gas production and purification installations were Start up 30 days 57,800,000
hit heavily. Last operable shift reaction building 18 60 days

to
heavily damaged. Damage was also sustained ex 25 90 days

of
of
traction unit sulfur removal, north end water 30 120 days
gas plant, blower house, and coke conveyors. Recir 35 150 days

in
in in in in in

11
culating compressors ammonia plant Me were 70 270 days

to
damaged. Damage occurred the following equip

in
ment the Hydrogenation Division: Recirculating
compressors, paste pumps, oven stalls and control
rooms, large crane, distillation unit, DHD unit, and
centrifuge building. The Organic Division was hit

in
the following places: Methanol and isobutyl oil

=
distillation and tank storage, alkylate plant, Mersol

of

.a
plant and great number all pipe bridges. All
shops were hit hard. Outside power supply was cut off.
Some boilers received direct hits. Feed water treat
ing plant Me 288 was damaged, which reduced the
in

A
available steam supply. chimney boiler house

4
Me collapsed. Railroads and coal transportation
was badly interrupted; central kitchen was destroyed.
Telephone system was badly crippled. Office build
ings were barely usable. 712 major breaks were

in
found utility lines
in

A
4/5 April 1945 1,113 61 20 large fire started the Hydrogenation Division, 60 to 70 in No data
at

in
another the camp Daspig. Water supply was 10 months available
in

cut for ten days by hits water lines. Sewers were

also hit. Shift reaction building severely damaged
by blast. One hydrogenation stall was hit, and the
gas circulation system and the low-pressure depart
of

ment this Division were damaged

 STRATEGI C BOMBING SURVEY:
SYNTHETIC RUBBER
The equipment used in synthetioruober plants
is similar in most respects to that employed in
refineries and hydrogenation plants. There are, of
course, numerous items which are required for
processing steps specific to rubber synthesis. The
plant at Huels, with an actual capacity of 40,000
tons per year, occupies an area of 541 acres
(about 10 per cent built up), and cost approxi
mately 400,000,000 RM, of which the greater
part was invested in crude rubber manufacturing
equipment. This compares with the 100,000,000
RM cost of a hydrogenation plant occupying 188
acres and producing 150,000 tons per year.
Process. Synthetic rubber, a complex hydro
carbon, was prepared from coal in an intricate
series of chemical processes. Butadiene, used in
the preparation of synthetic rubber of the Buna
type which is now being manufactured in the
United States from petroleum or grain, was man
ufactured in Germany primarily from acetylene.
This gas, it will be recalled, was used in early
automobile and bicycle lamps and, in recent
years, has become better known as a welding
gas. The Germans had devised several methods
for preparing acetylene.
Schkopau, Leverkusen, and Ludwigshafen
used the most familiar one in which water is
sprayed on lumps of “carbide.” A more recent
development, which involves subjecting the hy.
drocarbon gases to the high temperature of an
electric arc, causing the gases to decompose to
acetylene, was used at Huels. The acetylene is
purified, converted in the presence of a mercury
catalyst to a new material, acetaldehyde, which
is then transformed chemically to aldol and sub
sequently to butylene glycol by hydrogenation
at 3,000 lb per square inch. The butylene glycol
is then dehydrated to butadiene, one of the two
principal raw materials for Buna. Part of the
acetylene is hydrogenated at low pressure to
ethylene, which is treated with benzol to make
ethyl benzene and subsequently dehydrogen
ated to styrene, the other principal constituent
of Buna rubber. These two substances are al
lowed to combine to form latex in a series of
mixing vessels, and then coagulated, washed on
a wire screen, dried, and, pressed into sheets.
| 12
oil DIVISION REPORT
TARGETS -
Vulnerability. Synthetic rubber plants are vul
nerable to air attacks much in the same respects
as refineries and synthetic oil plants. The various
items of critical equipment include low-temper
ature gas fractionation plants, compressors for
hydrogen, adsorption towers, fractionation tow
ers, pumps, autoclaves, cranes for transporting
heavy vessels, and various special types of equip
ment peculiar to the chemical industry. Gas
holders are highly important, as in the case of
Fischer-Tropsch plants. Cooling towers are also
numerous because tremendous quantities of wa
ter are required. At Huels, the power plant sup
plying the electric arcs was an important target,
particularly since no excess power-generating fa
cilities existed. From the standpoint of inflicting
reparable damage, the mazes of pipe bridges and
electric cables provided vulnerable objectives.
Breaks in the pipe lines supplying gas from out
side the plant confines rendered the plant tem
porarily inoperable.
These plants should be markedly vulnerable
to incendiaries properly employed, since hydro
gen, butadiene, ethylene, natural gas, acetylene.
etc., all highly inflammable, are piped through
out the entire plant. Moreover, numerous inflam
mable liquids, such as alcohols, aldehydes, sty
rene, ethyl benzene, and the like, circulate
through the various stills. Rubber fires are also
extremely difficult to control, as was evidenced
at the Huels rubber storage warehouse. An es
sential condition, however, is an adequate use of
high-explosive bombs to release inflammable
materials.
Air Attacks. The synthetic rubber industry was
rarely given top priority by the target selection
groups. During the strategic bombing offensive,
starting 12 May 1944, 480 tons of bombs were
directed at Huels, 826 tons at Leverkusen, and
13,670 tons at Ludwigshafen. The high tonnage
dropped at Ludwigshafen was directed at oil
production. The relatively smaller tonnage di
rected at Huels and the absence of attacks on
Schkopau—far more important rubber produc
ers—indicate the low priority of rubber targets.
Late in 1944, Huels suffered a production loss
owing to the combined effects of lack of gas and
 HOW AND WHY ATTACKS AFFECTED PRODUCTION

–
destruction of rail facilities the latter factor
eliminating operation with externally purchased
intermediates. Schkopau was rendered inactive
by air attacks on Leuna which prevented deliv
eries of hydrogen. Leverkusen, a small rubber
producer, was bombed out by attacks on its
chemical plants.
War History of a Typical
Synthetic Rubber Plant
The Chemische Werke Huels represents the
latest and most modern design of German syn
thetic rubber plants. Controlled and operated
under the direction of the I. G. Farbenindustrie,
the plant, located in the Ruhr, north of Essen,
had a rated capacity of 4,000 metric tons per
month, making it the second largest Buna plant
in Germany. It was built under the auspices of
the German four-year plan and began produc
tion in August, 1940.
with considerable resultant damage. There was
also heavy loss of life (186 persons killed). Work
ers standing in the open were admiring what .
they thought was an admirable Luftwaffe spec
tacle when the bombs came down. The plant was
shut down for one month for repairs, and full
production was not again for six months.
achieved
Aside from a few sporadic bombs and ineffective
attacks just prior to occupation of the area by
the Allied forces, Huels was unmolested for the
rest of the war and operated until 29 March 1945,
the day the plant was occupied by elements of
the U. S. Ninth Army. The plant, at this time,
was practically intact and, except for lack of gas,
could have started rubber production at essen
tially full capacity. During the entire period of
the war, 1,367 tons of bombs were directed at
this plant, of which approximately 12.5 per cent
hit the target. In a single raid on 17 March 1945,
480 tons of bombs were reported aimed at the
plant but none of them hit

it.
Production. Huels was the only plant in Ger
Damage. The plant was built up, for the most
many which manufactured acetylene by the
part, parallel operating units

so
of

of
series that
a

electric-arc cracking of hydrocarbon gases. For

permanent stoppage production necessitated
of
styrene production, benzene was obtained from
more types equip
or
of

of

of
destruction all one
coal-tar plants in the Ruhr, and ethylene was
ment through which the critical process streams
produced at Huels. Related organic rubber soft
pass. The following list
to

of
had indicative the
is
eners, including sulfur, were also manufac
precautions taken by the Huels management

of to
tured. The capacity of the plant increased grad
ually from 300 tons during the first month to insure partial production even though parts
4,000 tons by January, 1943. Except for slight
the plant were rendered inoperable by air attack.
interruptions, this production was maintained
Major Processing Equipment Number Installed
until 22 June, when the plant was shut down by
Turbogenerators 15
a bombing attack. There was a sharp decline
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

Acetylene arcs and rectifiers 15

.
.
.
.

during the last half of 1944 and the first quarter more under
(3

of 1945 as a result of damage to Scholven and construction)

Carbon black recovery systems 15
Gelsenberg, the two plants supplying the major
.
.
.

Arc gas scrubbing plants

part of the raw hydrocarbon gases. As an alter Acetylene purification systems
native source, a pipe line was laid from the Acetaldehyde synthesis units
Aldolization units - - - -
Bertheim natural gas wells in Holland, but this
.

Butylene glycol distillation systems

.

source was able to supply only 35 per cent of Butylene glycol dehydration reactors
1

the Huels normal requirements. Butadiene distillation systems

Linde hydrogen plants
Air Attacks. The most effective bombing of the Linde air separation units
.

Acetylene hydrogenation systems

plant occurred on 22 June 1943, when 182 air
Linde ethylene concentration units
planes of the Eighth Air Force, in its first day
.

Benzol refining systems

.
.
.

light mission over Germany, dropped 448 tons Ethyl benzene alkylation units
Ethyl benzene dehydrogenation units
1

of bombs, of which 321 bombs weighing 88.6 tons

.

Styrene distillation systems

exploded inside the plant area. A direct hit
.
.
.

Buna polymerization, coagulation, and

,

caused the main acetylene gasholder to explode finishing

9
8
 TABLE 40

DAMAGE FROM ATTACKS ON THE SYNTHETIC RUBBER PLANT,

CHEMISCHE WERKE HUELS (1940-1945)
in

Bombs Average Damage

of
Bombs Exploded Weight Cause of Production Loss and Recuperability after Attack, Reichsmarks,

in
Date of Attack Dropped, Plant, HE Bombs, Other Major Damage Estimated by Plant Reported
Tons Tons Pounds by Plant

Not known Not determined - Production had not started 161,000

17/18 June 1940*

6
12/13 June 1941 670 None reported None

6/7 Sept. 1941 49 2.90 580 Water main broken; secondary damage by Few days 1,193,000

1
flooding. man badly wounded

0
12/13 Sept. 1941 36 1,106 None reported None
to

14

28/29 Dec. 1941 67 29.28 1,046 Pipe bridge destroyed; Buna finishing days repair Buna finishing; 6,846,000
fired. Gasholder blew up. Explosion de- gasholder damage would take
of

4
stroyed other gasholders. High-pres- months; complete repairs line

F
at
4

sure gas line hit, gas caught fire. Fire breaks would require least

as
to

acted flare for attacking airplanes. weeks. Damage acetylene scrub

4

- Buildings damaged, water connections bers, weeks. Estimated capacity

4
in

broken, acetylene scrubber damaged, mo- weeks, 50 per cent

tor insulation pierced.
7
dead; 31 slightly
at

wounded Actually operated 30 per cent

capacity for first month, 80 per
cent for second month, and re
in

to

turned full production third

month after raid

Kybol production out for first

of

quarter 1942
of

3**
of
10

13 June 1943 3** 3,000 One HE exploded below roof power Loss per cent production for 71,000
9
1
to

house hitting turbines. generator and June. Power taken from grid
of

turbine completely destroyed. Aldol evap make up part loss

orators damaged. Could not make up by
aldehyde purchases
 448

%
22 June 1943 88.59 552 “Practically all manufacturing buildings Estimate capacity by begin 32,345,000

in
difficulty.” Total casualties 186 dead; ning of August. Full production

of
500 slightly wounded possibly by beginning 1944

Actually realized 36 per cent of

in
capacity 40 days, 72 per cent in

:
1

3% months, 92 per cent by Dec.

and 100 per cent by the end of
January, 1944 -

1*

5
12+

of
22/23 May 1944 1,000 Contact plant butadiene reactor build- days production loss 1,200,000
ing and gasholder hit. Fragmentation

in
damage pipe lines. dead; 22 slightly
wounded

8
March 1945t 260 39.37 508 Damaged mostly offices, garages, and re- Estimate 2,000 tons per month None reported
pair shops. Buna storage fired by HE. 500 production loss
tons Buna burned

:
3
killed; 14 wounded Butadiene would be short

14 March 1945 6* 5.25* 500 Benzol columns hit. Styrene columns hit. 2-3 weeks loss None reported
Cooling tower for power house damaged.
Graphite electrode shop destroyed. Ex

of
plosion acetylene line and holder. Water
line hit. Turbine with generator damaged.

3
dead; 29 wounded

o
17 March 1945 480 746 None reported

TOTAL 1,367 169.39

Attack not indicated but hit the plant.

Crippled airplane from raid on Bochum jettisoned bombs on plant.

in

**f
Not official Army Air Force records.
 STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY: OIL DIVISION REPORT
In addition to the main rubber raw materials and
rubber producing equipment listed, the equip
ment used for making miscellaneous chemicals
was also installed on the parallel system prin
ciple.
In the important raids, the damage which tem
porarily eliminated production was mainly of the
reparable type. Pipe lines, cables, water mains,
and gas distribution systems were damaged.
There was relatively little damage to process
equipment. Such items as were affected and the
munitions responsible were:
Crude ethylene compressor damaged by two 1,000-lb
bombs.
Air separation units destroyed by one 1,000-lb bomb.
2 transformers destroyed by two 1,000-lb bombs.
1 turbine in turbogenerator set destroyed by three 1,000-lb.
bombs.
Gas compressor destroyed and 5 others (also switchgear)
damaged by one 1,000-lb bomb.
Conveyor belt system in carbon black plant destroyed by
one 1,000-lb bomb.
3 centrifuges and motors in aldol plant destroyed and 8
centrifuges damaged by one 1,000-lb bomb.
In the butylene glycol distillation, 20 pumps and 9 small
vessels destroyed, and 3 vessels and 8 pumps damaged
by two 500-lb bombs.
Numerous gasholders destroyed.
The fact that vital equipment suffered only
minor damage was undoubtedly largely respon
sible for the rapid recovery to maximum pro
duction level.
Defense Measures. The Huels plant was de
fended by a fairly heavy flak concentration and
also had the advantage of the Ruhr area de
fenses, which included searchlight belts, heavy
flak, and fighter interception bases. The plant
was equipped with installations for smoke screen
ing, but, because of the short distance involved,
it was found impossible to blanket the area be
fore the bombers reported crossing the Channel
were over the target. The most elaborate camou
flage system encountered anywhere in Germany
was employed at this plant. It consisted of wire
netting and glass wool, with small structures
| 16
erected on the netting to resemble trees and
shrubbery. The cost of installation was 4,000,000
RM. Aerial photographs indicated its ineffective
ness. Reinforced concrete bunker type shelters
were provided following the heavy casualties in
the 22 June attack.
One complete acetaldehyde plant and one
ethyl benzene plant were dispersed to an under
ground location in Mettenheim, Bavaria, but had
not begun production when the war ended.
Personnel. For full operation, the plant re
quired a total personnel of 10,400 employees, of
which 2,400 were women. Two thousand addi
tional persons were employed for maintenance
and construction work. Morale was not put un
der a heavy strain and, consequently, remained
high. Absenteeism averaged approximately 5
per cent.
Conclusions. The brief attack history of this
synthetic rubber plant, one of the most vital units
in the entire Nazi war economy, indicates that
plants of this type can be shut down for short
periods by damage to utilities and for long peri
ods by destruction of vital equipment. Any part
of the plant is vulnerable to bombs. In this par
ticular plant, the most vulnerable section was
probably the water supply which was pumped
from the Lippe River by a single pumping sta
tion. Destruction of the water pumping facilities
would have kept the plant out of operation, by
German estimate, for at least three months. The
destruction of any step in the interlocking system
of processes would have put the entire plant out
of action. Production can be stopped more effec
tively for a long period of time by the total de
struction of a single vital plant than by strewing
bombs over the entire works and damaging a
number of plants.
- Table 40 is an attack and damage log, in
cluding dates of attacks, bombs dropped, bombs
hitting the target, description of damage, and
estimate of recovery capacify.
 HOW AND WHY ATTACKS AFFECTED PRODUCTION

RUBBER FABRICATION PLANT TARGETS

From synthetic and reclaimed crude rubber, industry was never a first-priority target for air
278 plants manufactured rubber goods of all sorts raids, but these plants were located in large cities
from tires and tubes to rubber boots and fruit and were badly damaged by area raids and spill
jar rings. Of these, the two largest were Conti overs from attacks on other targets. Normal pro
nental Rubber at Hannover and Dunlop at Han duction levels were maintained through 1943 and
au. In 1943, Continental accounted for 45 to 55 early 1944. Damage caused by raids was repaired
per cent of the tire production of Germany and rapidly, and when vital equipment was damaged
Dunlop for 14 per cent; Phoenix at Harburg, the the production was allocated to other plants.
fifth largest plant, made 5 per cent of Germany's Production charts of Continental, Dunlop, and
tires. In addition, these plants produced large Phoenix indicate how production was affected
quantities of footwear and other rubber goods. (Figures 114-116). Of these, only Continental
suffered appreciable damage before October,
TABLE 41
1944.
CONSUMPTION OF CRUDE AND SYNTHETIC
RUBEER IN GERMAN FABRICATING PLANTS Damage. On 12 December 1944 the Dunlop
Approxi
factory was shut down when 30 tons of bombs
mate
Consumption of Per Cent aimed at the marshaling yards about one third
Crude and Syn- of Total
thetic Rubber, Consump of a mile away hit the plant. It would have recov
Plant 1943, Tons tion Products
ered about 20 per cent of its capacity by the mid
Continental- 36,000 40 Tires, tubes, dle of February, 1945, but attacks on the mar
Hannover mechanicals
shaling yards and the town of Hanau on 6 and 7
Dunlop-Hanau 11,000 Tires, tubes
12. January 1944 eliminated it for the rest of the
Phoenix- 5,500 6 Tires, tubes,
Harburg mechanicals war because materials were not available for
All others 38,500 42
repair.
TOTAL
The Phoenix plant at Harburg was hit by 7
GERMANY 91,000
tons of bombs aimed at the near-by Rhenania Oil
Refinery on 25 October 1944 and 3 tons more on
Vulnerability. The manufacture of tires is a 21 November 1944. These two attacks resulted in
complicated process involving the compound
an 80 per cent loss of production which had not
ing, mixing, and milling of Buna and reclaimed
been recovered when the plant was shut down
rubbers with chemicals, carbon black, and oils; completely by attacks on 7 and 31 March 1945.
preparation of cords, treads, and beads; and as
The bombs which hit Phoenix found key points
sembling them into tires. The tires are then vul such as the mixing, spreading, and tire depart
canized under pressure by means of steam heat. ments, and shut the plant down without demol
This processing requires heavy machinery as ishing could have been brought back
to
it.
It

60
well as conveyors and other equipment for han per cent normal production
of

two months had

in

dling the many materials involved. Nearly all of

the necessary skilled labor been available.
the work must be done under carefully controlled
The Continental Rubber Company operated
conditions of temperature and humidity, which
four plants Hannover, but only the main plant
in

meant that bomb-damaged buildings must be

was appreciably damaged by air attack. con
It

repaired before operation could be resumed. The

buildings, 60 per cent
of

of
52

sisted which were

heavy machinery, such as mixers, mills, and cal
of steel frame construction with concrete fire
enders, was usually not crippled unless hit by a
proofing and 25 per cent were reinforced concrete.
1,000-lb bomb or heavier. The rubber plants
The other per cent, which were not classed
15

were very susceptible to fire because of the high

fire resistant, were brick or nonfireproofed
as

of

ly inflammable materials used and the large floor

- steel frame construction. Half these buildings
of

areas required.
were totally destroyed severely damaged, and
or

Apparently all were damaged some extent. Even though

to

Air Attacks. the rubber fabrication

117
 STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY: OIL DIVISION REPORT
the buildings were badly damaged, the heavy
machinery of the plant survived and could be
reinstalled in one of the other plants in Han
nover without much lost time.
Of the 105 attacks made on the city of Han
nover and the adjacent areas, 14 resulted in hits
on the Continental plant, which received a total
of 73 tons of bombs.Hits totaling 2% tons on 9
and 18October 1943 resulted in a temporary loss
of 30 per cent in production, and the attack of 9
March 1944 caused a loss of 13 per cent. From
October, 1944, curtailed electric power supply
caused by the area raids reduced the Buna rub
ber consumption to less than 1,500 tons per
month. Periodic hits after that time caused tem
porary interruptions in production until 25 March
1945, when 49 tons of bombs struck the plant and
closed it down (see Figure 114). In spite of the
serious damage done to the buildings, the plant
could have been brought back to 30 per cent of
normal capacity in about four months.
Other important plants, such as Metzler at
Munich and Gummiwerke at Fulda, were also
put out of action late in 1944.
This series of blows cut tire production to less
than one third, as indicated by natural and syn
thetic rubber consumptions: 3,078 tons in Sep
tember, 1944; 1,065 tons in January, 1945; and
953 tons in February, 1945 (Figure 55). Esti
mates of the residual capacity of the nine largest
fabricators is given in Appendix Table C10.
I 18
Production of mechanical goods was also sub
stantially reduced by bombing. Paguag at Dues
seldorf was hit on 23 September 1944 and elimi
nated by the attacks of 2 and 3 November 1944.
Clouth at Cologne was knocked out 3 October
1944, and the Gummi Faden Fabrik at Cologne
was hit on 15 and 28 October. These plants
turned out such items as belting, rolls, rubber
threads, gas masks, and packing.
Conclusions. The results of bombing of these
plants indicate that they can be knocked out
most completely by destroying the mixing room,
if its location is known. In most plants mixing is
centralized and is vital to the operation of the
plant. However, it should be noted that destroy
ing the mixing room would require many hits
with large bombs (1,000 lb or heavier) and fuze
settings for maximum fragmentation damage.
Of equal importance is damage to the steam boil
ers, because rubber fabrication plants are help
less without high-pressure steam for vulcaniza
tion. Destruction of the fabric preparation de
partments and the loss of prepared fabric would
stop the production of tires. This would require
a heavy concentration of incendiaries after de
struction of the roof by high explosives. In gen
eral, destruction of roofs and buildings is quite
effective in slowing down production, because
these plants cannot operate without weather pro
tection.
 ||

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ii
 PRODUCTION OF RUBBER GOODS
DEUTSCHE DUNLOP
SOURCE:
GUMM! -
PLA/VT RECORDS
COMPAGNIE A.G.

TOTAL | -
ODUCTION
MECHANICAL

OTHER TIRES
INCLUDING TUBES

G1ANT TIRES

:: AIRCRAFT TIRE

LONG
TONs
J F |M A | M. J J A S O | N D FM AM J J A so |N D J F |M|A
PER MONTH 1943 1944 1945
PRODI'C//0/W
F/GURESweRE Awo7.Ava/lable for Avoye
*be// OK F///57 Ayals of DeceAwbeAt
eur P/Woduc//ow com/r//yu.edon the 54Me level as OCTO&E. A. Pavolouc from ceased
arre & ara arraca or decrazee.A re. -

Figure 115
 PRODUCTION OF RUBBER GOODS
HARBURGER GUMMIWAREN
SOURCE.
- FABRIK
- ALA/W7 AECORDS
PHOENIX A.-G.

TONNAGE OF BOMBS ACTUALLY

EXPLODING IN THIS PLANT
5T 11-21-44 TON's 3-51-45

7 TON'S IO-25-44 || 2TON'S3-7-45

# |
l

| MECHANICAL Goods
(Rubber only) kilograms

J|f|M|A|M|| ||
1943
|A|s on D J Fm A M J J
1944
A so no l J. F.

1945
-
M. | A

Figure 116
 -

--
-

in

by

of

Figure 117. View Leuna Works, taken the Eighth Air Force May, 1945. Fore

ground, the organic products division. Right middle distance, the hydrogenation area.
11
in

power plants.
of

The group chimneys distance marks the older boiler and

the of
is

To

the left them the gas production area.

 ft,

on

Figure 118. The Ludwigshafen-Oppau plant looking north from about 1,200
May 1945. The older part the Ludwigshafen plant the foreground and Oppau
of

in
is
in 7

the distance. The Rhine was the most important transportation

of

means for this

plant, both for raw materials (coke and coal), and many products.
w

120
 WEAPONS EFFECTIVENESS
No discussion of the effectiveness of Allied
weapons can refute the obvious fact that with
these weapons in hand our fighting men tri
umphed over every enemy. The object of all
bombing was to destroy the enemy's capacity
and will to wage war. This was accomplished
more completely than many believed possible.
In surveying the results of our strategic bomb
ing offensive on the German oil-chemical indus
try from the point of view of weapons effective
ness, Oil Division personnel studied facts and
compiled statistics to show how efficiently our
weapons performed, what conditions governed
their effectiveness, and how in certain instances
objectives could have been attained with less
cost to the Allies in human life. To assemble the
facts, the Oil Division investigated in detail
2,062 bombing incidents, checked German air
raid reports, interrogated plant directors, engi
neers, and air raid wardens, and made detailed
damage surveys of 26 representative oil, chem
ical, rubber, and explosives plants. An analysis
of the material amassed points to general con
clusions regarding:
Bombing efficiency.
Choice of targets and aiming points.
Raiding tactics.
Bomb sizes and types.
The use of incendiaries.
Unexploded bombs.
Air Force intelligence.
AND BOMBING TECHNIQUES
area of 3.5 sq. mi. and producing 22.4 per cent
of Germany's total synthetic fuel) revealed
the accuracy achieved by 146,000 high-explosive
bombs. As this number comprises 38.3 per cent
of the total number dropped at all German hy
drogenation plants and 19 per cent of the bombs
dropped at all German oil-producing targets, the
data can be regarded as representative for the
industry as a whole (see Appendix Tables G1
and G15 for details).
Of the bombs dropped on these three targets,
only I in 29 hit structures essential to production.
As shown in Figure 120, 87.1 per cent of the
bombs were spread over the surrounding coun
tryside, including at least 3 per cent on decoy
plants. Only 12.9 per cent hit within the fence
lines. Of these, 1.8 per cent failed to explode, 7.6
per cent landed in open spaces, doing little or no
damage, 1.3 per cent hit pipe lines and other
utilities, and 2.2 per cent hit damageable build
ings and equipment. In round numbers, out of
every 100 bombs dropped:
87 missed the target, 3 hitting decoy plants,
8 landed in open spaces inside the target
area, causing little or no damage,
landing inside the fence lines failed to
explode,
hit pipe lines or other utilities, doing re
parable damage, and only
2 hit buildings and important equipment.
air

forces, therefore, had

29
The
to

release tons
plant get ton on plant struc
to

over order
in
a

Delivering the Bombs that Counted Was an tures. The Oil Division has no information on
Expensive Operation how many additional tons had
to

be flown from
Information accumulated from multiple England (to make up for aircraft shot down,
that, prevailing conditions, abortive missions, etc.)
to

Sources shows under order deliver 29

in

a truly tremendous effort was required to deliver tons over the targets. clear that greater
It
is

a given weight of bombs on damageable plant bombing accuracy would have paid handsome
sections. A detailed study, augmented by care dividends.
fully kept and meticulously documented Ger
Aiming Conditions Were Major Factor
in

man records, of 57 attacks on three of Germany's

a

largest oil-chemical plants (Leuna, Ludwigs Determining Bombing Accuracy

hafen-Oppau, and Zeitz, covering a combined Fighter opposition and intense, accurate flak

121
 STRATEGI C BOMBING SURVEY: OIL DIVISION REPORT

TABLE 42
was only

to
new lease on life and began

It
rise.
BOMBING ACCURACY,+ through the colossal expenditure 23,922 tons

of

in of
AS A FUNCTION OF AIMING CONDITIONS November, compared with 8,858

as
bombs

in
(Leuna, Ludwigshafen-Oppau, and Zeitz) August, that the bombs hitting inside the plant
fence lines were again brought

to
2,883 tons (see
Total Tons of
Tons Bombs Per Cent Table 43) and oil production resumed its down
Type of Aiming of Bombs Hitting of Hits ward course.
Dropped Plant
8th Air Force visual 3,993 1,069 26.8 Municipal Targets versus Industrial Targets
8th Air Force part visual,
part instrument 4,553 Until the oil offensive began May, 1944, only

in
566 12.4
8thAir Force full per cent the bombs dropped on Germany

at of
1.1
instrument 11,870 641 5.4
oil plants, while per cent were

53
RAF night “Pathfinder” were aimed
technique 9,540 1,505 cities. Of the total 509,206 tons drop

at

of
15.8 aimed
TOTAL OR ped by the combined Allied air forces before
OVER-ALL May, 1944, per cent were directed industry,

at
13
29,956 3,781 12.6
including oil; per cent transportation; and

at
14
* Detailed data are given in Appendix Table G14.
20 per cent tactical targets (see Appendix

at
forced our bombers to high altitudes (25,000 to Table G1). During the oil offensive, 1,477,217
ft), and sometimes drove them off their tons were dropped, which 27.5 per cent were

of
30,000
course. Weather was often bad, and effective cities, 22 per cent industry, 30.5 per
at

at
aimed
transportation, and 20 per cent
at

at
smoke screens were widely used (see Figure cent tactical
121). Detailed German hit data for 29,956 tons of
bombs dropped in 40 attacks on Leuna, Lud TABLE 43

wigshafen-Oppau, and Zeitz show variations BOMB HITS ON SYNTHETIC OIL TARGETS
ranging from 5.4 per cent hitting the plants in DURING OIL OFFENSIVE
Eighth Air Force full instrument aiming, to 26.8
per cent in Eighth Air Force visual aiming, with Tons Estimated”
Total To Have Hit "Estimated
the RAF night attacks ranging between with Tons Within Plant Per Cent
15.8 per cent. Table 42 gives data for the 29,956 Dropped Fences of Hits
tons (about a quarter of the total tonnage drop 1944
ped on all synthetic oil plants). Appendix Table May 2,509 673 26.8
June 5,095 966 19.0
oil

G16 gives corresponding figures for refineries. July .10,459 1,698 16.2
Table 42, fair estimate can be
of

On the basis
a

August 8,858 2,080 22.5

high-explosive bombs hitting
of

of

made the tons September 11,668 1,698 14.6

October 8,737 1,360 15.6
German synthetic oil plants during the oil offen
November 23,922 2,883 12.1
sive. has been assumed compiling this table
in
It

December 12,312 1,516 12.3

that, for each sighting condition, percentages
of

-
“hits” for one quarter syn 1945
at
of

the bombs aimed

January 9,754 1,479 15.2
thetic oil plants are representative for the total February 14,114 2,282 16.4
of bombs directed at them. These estimates, March 12,969 1,880 14.6
April 3,249 514 15.8
which were employed Figure reveal why
in

1,

German aviation gasoline production rose TOTAL OR

in

September and October, 1944, despite the heavy OVER-ALL 123,586 19,029 15.4

bomb tonnages dropped. The percentage esti

to of

These estimates are based on German records hits

of
*

mated hits decreased from 22.5 August

in

14.6 actually achieved with 29,956 tons dropped under various

September and 15.6 October; bomb ton-. aiming conditions on Leuna, Ludwigshafen-Oppau, and
in

in

assumed that all attacks on all plants the

in
It

nages hitting the plants fell correspondingly from Zeitz.

is

same accuracy was realized for each sighting condition as

August September and
to

for these three targets. See Appendix Table G14 for de

2,080 tons 1,698
in

in

1,360 October. German oil production took tails.

in

122
 WEAPO NS EFFECTIVE NESS AND BOM BING TECHNIQUES

targets. Oil targets received 234,806 tons or 15.9 19.5 per cent at industry, including 12.1 per cent
per cent of the total tonnage. Of the 1,986,423 directed at oil targets.
tons of bombs dropped on Germany during the . In their official reports German air raid war
entire war, 34 per cent were aimed at cities and dens and military observers distinguished be

Figure 119. The central part of the Zeitz plant, looking south, as of 25 June 1945.
The more important installations are: 1. Winkler gas generators. 2. Hydrogenation
stalls. 3. Compressor house. 4. Hydrogen sulfide removal plant. 5. Gas purification
columns. The Winkler generators present a distinctive appearance. If knocked out, they
all

would stop production.

123
 STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY: OIL DIVISION REPORT
AIMING POINTS CHOSEN IN TWENTY ATTACKS
(Seventeen by USAAF and Three by
Aiming Points Chosen
Gas plant area (water-gas generators,
purification and absorption plants, and
repair shops)
Waterworks, compressor houses, steam
and power plants
High-pressure hydrogenation stalls and
general high-pressure area, gas phase
distillation units, organic products
area
TOTAL
* See Appendix Table G19 for details.
tween strategic targets and “terror attacks” (Ter
rorangriffe) on their cities. Political, industrial,
and military spokesmen frequently expressed
both amazement and gratification over the Allied
choice of targets. Their belief, concurred in by
practically every civilian interrogated, was that
cities could be rebuilt but that industry was vital
to the pursuit of war. It is not known in the Oil
Division whether the decisions which resulted in
such a heavy tonnage being dropped on cities be
fore the oil offensive began were based on lack
of knowledge of the tremendous importance of
the oil, chemical, and rubber industries, or on the
inability of the air forces during those early days
of the war to achieve precision bombing. No
doubt exists, however, regarding the benefits to
the rest of the world that would have resulted
from an early knockout of these vital industries.
Vital Plant Sections Should Be Chosen as
Aiming Points
This report has emphasized previously that
certain sections in each type of oil-chemical plant
are truly vital. It appears obvious that key sec
tions, susceptible to knockout by air attack,
should normally be picked as aiming points. Yet
frequently this was not done.
The RAF, because of its attack technique, in
general chose only a single aiming point. The
USAAF followed a different practice and in most
attacks used multiple aiming points within a
single plant. On 17 USAAF attacks on Leuna,
for example, there were 44 briefed
TABLE 44
ON LEUNA*
RAF)
Essentiallity and Vulnerability Number of Times Chosen
Characteristics as Aiming Point
Vital and vulnerable. Severe damage 16
to and around these aiming points
would stop all plant output.
Vital, but difficult to damage seriously 18
by bombing attack
If knocked out would affect only part 14
of plant production. Very difficult to
damage seriously by air attack
48
points, an average of 2.6 aiming points per at
tack. In some attacks, as many as five briefed
aiming points were assigned to different groups;
in three large USAAF attacks (6, 15, and 17)
averaging 566 bombers each, only a single aim-,
ing point was used. Table 44 summarizes the
briefed aiming points for 20 of the attacks on
Leuna.
Only a third of the briefed aiming points at
Leuna were in the gas plant area, which was the
most vital and vulnerable section of the whole
target. Another third of the briefed aiming points
were in plant sections which, although vital to
the entire plant's production, were difficult to
damage seriously by bombing attack. The 18
heavy, reinforced concrete stalls housing high
pressure hydrogenation reaction vessels were
stated in official target folders to be very diffi
cult to damage, and this view was borne out when
a 12,000-lb bomb detonating in front of a row of
heavy stalls housing high-pressure equipment
completely gutted one stall while the adjacent
ones remained virtually intact. Nevertheless,
stalls were chosen as aiming points on six at
tacks by the Eighth Air Force and on one by the
RAF.
Vulnerable Areas Chosen Consistently as
Aiming Points Were Destroyed
The high-pressure research laboratories at
Ludwigshafen-Oppau, which contributed noth
ing to oil or war chemical production and were
aiming not even particularly effective during 1943-44,
124
| WHERE
100% *-&
OUR BOMBS
DROPPED:
- *-&
* \-4
*N
S
S.
*NS
*NS
"S.
TS
*-&- - -

~
|S
~
S
$
§
\
 WEAPO NS EFFECTIVEN ESS
were chosen as 10 out of the 25 aiming points on
ten large-scale attacks, apparently on the theory
that the “brains” of the I.G. Farbenindustrie
were located there and could be destroyed by
bombs. Under relatively unfavorable aiming
conditions, 19.3 per cent of the bombs that fell in
the plant in 12 attacks hit within 1,000 ft of the
aiming points. As Figure 122 clearly demon
strates, structures within the area were prac
tically obliterated (see Appendix Table G17).
This instance may, it is believed, be accepted as
proof that a damageable plant section chosen as
an aiming point in a number of attacks can be
demolished.
Real knowledge concerning plant vulnerabil
ity, vital plant areas, and the type of damage
that will cause greatest and most prolonged pro
duction loss is extremely difficult to get from
text books and reports. To Oil Division person
nel it seems most important that men with sound,
broad experience in building, operating, and re
pairing plants of the type to be attacked should
participate not only in decisions regarding the
target systems to be attacked but also in choos
ing the plant section to be hit.
Longer Raids Would Have Been
More Effective
The brevity of most USAAF raids was ex
ploited by German defense personnel as an un
expected but eagerly seized advantage. They
were able to leave shelter in time to deal with
incendiaries and incipient fires before conflagra
tions were started. The uniformity of approach
followed in USAAF raids on some targets also
enabled the Germans to predict with fair ac
curacy how the attack would develop, and they
were thus able to make appropriate prepara
tions. The Germans interrogated agreed almost
unanimously that, because of the longer duration
and lack of uniformity of RAF attacks (each
bombardier sighted his bombs independently,
whereas the practice in the Eighth Air Force was
for pilots to release their bombs on a signal from
the lead plane), the English raids were more
terrifying and more destructive. Had it been pos
sible, within the limitations of operational con
ditions, to increase the length of raids and vary
their pattern, greater effect could have been
achieved for the same expenditure of bombs.
125
AND BOM BING TECHNI QUES
Selection of Bombs for the Job at Hand
A hunter intending to shoot quail does not set
out with an elephant gun; likewise, an elephant
hunter does not rely on birdshot. Bombing is
governed by the same principles. For maximum
results with minimum expenditure of effort, the
bombs must be just as carefully chosen. The ob
ject in a strategic bombing attack is to deprive
the enemy of productive facilities. The oil tech
nologist knows that in oil plants certain pieces
of production equipment are irreplaceable. He
also knows that, while it is possible to damage
certain auxiliary facilities and shut down the
plant, these can be replaced or repaired without
too much difficulty. Therefore, he will un
doubtedly suggest a weapon that will destroy
the irreplaceable.
Surveys in the field by technologists estab
lished certain incontrovertible facts regarding
the strategic bombing offensive, namely: (a) not
enough permanent damage was done to equip
ment, loss of which could have shut plants down
permanently, and (b) a great number of mis
sions were flown in order to counteract repairs
which were speedily made to “minor injuries.”
TABLE 45
AvERAGE weight OF BOMBs DROPPED ON OIL
AND SYNTHETIC CHEMICAL PLANTS
(Average Weight of Bomb, Lb)
Dropped Dropped Combined
by RAF Average
Hydrogenation and syn
thetic chemicals 370 678 457
Fischer-Tropsch 427 610 561
Crude oil refineries 394 669 431
Benzol plants and misc. 543 731 664
Over-all average 388 660 482
Throughout the offensive on the oil-chemical
industry, the bombs used were of relatively small
caliber-100, 250, and 500 pounders, as may be
seen from Table 45. Only 6.3 per cent of the
bombs were 1,000 lb and heavier. The attacks
were, to all appearances, based on the observa
tion that it is easier to hit the elephant with a
shotgun than with a rifle. The average weight of
bombs dropped by the Eighth Air Force on
hydrogenation plants, which, in the parlance of
the hunter, have the “thickest skin,” was 370 lb
 STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY: OIL DIVISION REPORT

—only enough to prick the skin. (The RAF aver
aged 678 lb.) Except in a few isolated attacks,
the USAAF approach predominated. The result
was that, while plants were temporarily put out
of action, the air forces had to return repeatedly
to open up old wounds and possibly inflict new
ones. Such situations prevailed at Leuna, Zeitz,
Boehlen, Ludwigshafen-Oppau, and Victor at
Castrop-Rauxel. Two other plants investigated
were rendered permanently nonproductive by
straight shooting with adequate weapons-Rhein
preussen's plant at Meerbeck and the Ruhroel
plant at Bottrop-Welheim.
That both types of attack were effective in
eliminating production is a matter of record. At
the first five plants named, units were rendered
ineffectual by damage to water mains, power
cables, coal conveyors, sewers, and other small
but necessary items. When the bombs hit them,
damage was also done to light buildings, garages,
storehouses, offices, tanks, gasholders, cooling
towers, and light machinery. The “bird-shot”
failed, however, to affect destruction if the
quarry was protected by blast walls. The near
miss value was also discouragingly slight.
At Meerbeck and at Sterkrade-Holten, it was

Figure 122. These views reveal the very high level of destruction sustained by the high
pressure hydrogenation research area at Ludwigshafen which received 4 tons of bombs
per acre. Most of the damage was done by the attacks of 8 and 13 September 1944
hit

when 1,000-lb high-explosive density 1.24 tons per acre. This area
of

bombs with
a
an

on

aiming point, and two attacks more than 25 per cent

of

was these the bombs

that hit the plant landed within 1,000
of
it.
ft

736.512 O-47–14 126

Figure 121 Smoke screen at Leuna Works, 7 July 1944. Reproduced from E ighth A Ir
Force composite.

127
 STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY: OIL DIVISION REPORT

possible to show that the proper choice of weap seven high-pressure compressors, thirough which
could pay large di zidends. all the hydrogen used the process had

to
pass

in
ons

A 500-lb bomb scored a direct hit on a Fischer and without which the plant could not operate,
Tropsch reactor, blowing a hole approximately 3 was hit by eight 1,000-lb and three 4,000-lb
bombs. Every one the compressors was de

of
ft in diameter and 2 ft deep into the tightly
stroyed. The plant was finished productive

as
spaced plates and tubes of the oven. A 1,000-lb

a
bomb, detonated on top of another reactor, the unit.
second of a battery. The first reactor in the bat
tery was blown through the end of building hous Fuzes Must Initiate the Explosion
the Right Time

be at
it,

ing the reactor was utterly demolished, and

the battery was likewise destroyed.

be
the third
in

To effective, explosions must

at
set off
The steel structure supporting the reactors was proper point the right time. blasting

at
the

A
twisted and torn apart, and the spandrel walls expert coal mine drills his hole, sets his

in
a
approximately
of

were blown out for distance charge, and the proper moment activates his

at
a

50 ft.
set off the charge. He complete

to
detonator

in
of is
2,000-lb bomb penetrated the roof and op all times. The control an explosive

in at
control
A

im

is,
the ground charge however, possible only

to
erating deck and detonated bomb
in

a
mediately re degree.
of

of

front the northerii row

in

actors, making crater 25 diameter and

in

delayed
ft

or
10 bomb fuzed for instantaneous
A
a

deep. Three reactors were completely de is

explosion, depending on the job expected

to
ft

is
it
stroyed, and seven additional ones were badly do. Those fuzed detonate instantaneously ex
to
damaged. All equipment an area about 75 by
in

plode upon striking an object, and the force

a of
the building was seriously
of

the corner
in

the explosion from surface hits mainly

ft

100

in
is
damaged by blast and fragmentation, the entire horizontal direction above the surface. the

If
main gas piping system was destroyed, the steel permitted penetrate

to
same bomb were into the
structure supporting the three destroyed reactors ground before going off, most
of

of
the force the
the base, nine 8-by-12-in.
at

was sheared off bomb would be expended churning up the

I

in

beams supporting the main operating deck were earth. The earth would also “catch” most of the
bent off center, and the main operating deck 30 fragments. Except for underground utilities sys
above the point detonation was dislodged.
of

tems, very little oil, chemical, rubber plant

or
ft

4,000-lb bomb penetrated the roof and oper equipment built below the surface normal
in
A

is

ating deck and detonated on the earth floor Germany, substantially all the
in

times. Even
in

two parallel productive plants were operating aboveground.

of

of

the midst ows reactors.

It
1

demolished twelve reactors covering an area 80 On the other hand, considerable amount of
a

by 115 ft, blew out the entire end wall equipment built high into the air. Water-gas
of

the
is

building, demolished 91 the side walls, sets, for example, are fitted with superstructures
of
ft

sheared off four 12-by-24-in. H-columns which more above the ground. Rea
or

that tower 100

ft

supported the roof and the crane, and tore loose soning that instantaneously fuzed bombs striking
from their moorings three 12-by-30-in. main High equipment would expend their force ineffec
girders. Two 12-by-24-in. H-columns located 75 tively, whereas delay fuzed bombs would have
a

respectively from the center detona penetrate into the vitals equipment
to
of

of
95

chance
ft

and
tion were bent by blast, and an 85 length exploding, bombing strategists compro
of

the before
ft

12-by-24-in. girder, serving by choosing delay

as

crane track was mized both and instantaneous

a

severed and found lying on the ground. The hit fuzes.

from the 4,000-lb bomb, by the plant engineer's Observations made by Oil Division personnel
admission, rendered the entire plant inoperable. oil, chemical, and rubber plants Germany
in

in

At Ruhroel, the Survey observed an outstand indicated that the instantaneously fuzed bombs
ing example large bombs were more effective for the types equipment
of
of

of

the usefulness
in

quick building housing prevalent. Most

of

delivering knockout. the smaller bombs were fuzed

A
a

128
 WEAPO NS EFFECTIVEN ESS AND BOMBING TECHNIQUES

with 0.025 sec and 0.1 sec delay. They penetrated
roofs of buildings, damaging piping, instrument
panels, conveyors, etc. The damage was usually
reparable. Since the area occupied by buildings
was in most plants only a small fraction of the
total area, most of the bombs buried themselves
in the ground and dug craters. Little or no dam
age was done unless the bombs struck in the
vicinity of underground cables or pipes. At one
refinery, members of the Survey were told that
the common use of such bombs during the later
phases of the bombing practically eliminated the
* that incendiaries were often snuffed out by high
need for blast walls, since there were so few frag
ments and so little blast. The major issue was
ent, the damage might have shifted from the re
parable variety to the permanent type. To be
sure, incendiary bombs were sometimes carried
to the targets and dropped, and small fires were
started. The efficient efforts of trained fire-fight
ing squads, however, usually prevented large
fires. Had these people been kept in their shel
ters longer, the fires might have become un
controllable. It was the impression of the Survey
parties that the incendiaries had not been used
to their best advantage. The Germans reported
explosive bombs. They were frequently found

oil
inside tanks—extinguished. Others were found
not, however, whether small bombs instantan embedded pitch-unexploded.

eously fuzed were more destructive than small
bombs delay fuzed, but whether small bombs
were more destructive per ton than large bombs.
The answer was conclusively in favor of large
bombs. Adequate data on the fuzing of large
bombs were not available because, except for
1000-lb bombs, those used on German industry
were almost without exception instantaneously
fuzed.
in
Survey members concluded that uncontroll
able fires could be started if: (a) delayed ac
tion incendiaries were used or fire bombs were
dropped after high-explosive attacks had opened
up lines, vessels, etc., and released inflammable
materials, and (b) anti-personnel bombs were
dropped keep plant protection forces under
to
cover. Moreover, incendiary attacks should be
prevent high-explosive bombs from
to

timed
snuffing out the small flames developed when the
The Fire Hazard in Oil-Chemical Plants
incendiary bomb first explodes. Phosphorus
Should Be Exploited should be incorporated incendiary bomb

in
The large and efficient fire-fighting squads charges whenever possible. Its revivification
which were found in every plant investigated by properties upon drying caused no end

of
trouble
the Survey in Germany bear witness to the ever to the Germans.
present fear of fire. It is, perhaps, because of the Incidentally, was found that the Germans
it

existence of these forces that so little fire damage were extremely well informed concerning the
was observed in the plants visited. In the few markings of Allied bombs and were schooled

in
instances where fires got out of control (the establishing the identity
of

the contents bombs of

power cable system at Bottrop-Welheim burned practically on sight.
for 24 hours; the rubber storehouse at Huels con
taining 500 tons of rubber was destroyed), the Unexploded Bombs Mean Wasted Missions
damage was more than superficial. On the whole, Out 30,434 high-explosive bombs that hit
of

however, fires were quickly extinguished. Mem representative German oil-chemical plants
13

bers of the Oil Division were impressed with the and refineries, 16.4 per cent failed explode.
to

potentialities offered by incendiary bombs in oil One every six bombers sent on these attacks
in

chemical plants. On numerous occasions, oil was might just effectively have loaded its bomb
as

spilled by high-explosive bombs which, ignited, bays with scrap iron. Missions were wasted and
would have wrought serious damage (the pitch airmen lost flying junk Germany. This
to
of

lives
tanks at Bottrop-Welheim were burst by high distressing discovery was made by Oil Division
explosive bombs, and pitch covered several acres personnel Germany. Realizing fully the ser
in

of the plant area but was not ignited). On other iousness of this statement and the extent of its
occasions, gas mains were opened up, alcohols implication, investigators
to

went unusual
spilled, and other inflammable materials spewed lengths verify every item
to

of

information and
into the open. Had an active fire point been pres data assembled in the different localities.

129
 -

MAY 1944

-|36.5120–47
 STRATEGIC BOMBIN G SURVEY: OIL DIVISION REPORT

Many of the plants surveyed maintained care Where there was any doubt regarding the source
unexploded bombs of bomb, was listed as “unidentified.”
ful

of

it
of

the number

a
records
which fell inside their fence lines. Information Seeking an explanation for these disconcert
from these records, checked against on-the-spot ing figures, Oil Division personnel made several
findings, presented Table 46, which shows discoveries. In wooded area near the Gerwerk
in

a
is

the frequency unexploded bombs schaft Victor synthetic oil and nitrogen plant
of

13
in
these
- unexploded bombs which

of
plants. were found scores
the bombs hitting these plants, had been removed from the plant and surround
Of

12.2 per cent those dropped by the USAAF ing district. Among them were ten 1,000-lb
of

explode, bombs, six 4,000-lb bombs, and great number

to

failed

a
those dropped by the RAF pile estimated
of

to
of
per cent 500- and 250-lb bombs.

A
18.9
explode, contain between 2,500 and 3,000 fuzes was found
to

failed
per cent another part
to
of
24

of

of
unidentified bombs failed the woods. On the basis

in

a
explode, partial count, was computed that 60 per cent

it
per cent the weighted over-all aver the fuzes were from British bombs and 40 per
of
of

16.4
explode. cent from American.
to

age failed

TABLE 46

OF UNEXPLODED BOMBS HITTING GERMAN OIL-CHEMICAL

-
NUMBERS
PLANT'S AND REFINERIES

Per Cent of

-
Plant Bombs Hiting Target Bombs Exploded Unexploded Bombs Unexploded Bombs Total
on Target on Target on Target
8th RAF uniden. 8th uniden sun uniden- stn Uniden. Per Cen
AF tified AF RAF tified AF RAF tified AF RAF tified UXB's

-
Leuna 7,425 1,218 6,330 926 1,095 292 14.8 24.0 16.0

Ludwigshafen 2,396 1,203 2,132 980 264 223 11.0 18.5 13.5
Oppau 1,097 975 1,013 740 84 235 7.7 24.1 15.4
Zeitz 3,500 1,020 3,100 860 400 160 11.4 15.6 12.3

Leverkusen 314 270 44 25.0 14.0 14.1

4

1
3

Meerbeck-Homburg 540 375 165 30.6 30.6

Rhenania-Ossag,
Harburg 1,256 362 1,155 334 101 28 8.1 7.7 7.9
Europaische
Tanklager 637 224 590 215 47 7.4 4.0 6.5
9

Ebano Asphalt

-
Werke 231 98 223 89 3.5 9.1 5.2
9
8

Deutsche
Vacuum Oel 82 200 78 197 4.9 1.5 2.5
4

--
Castrop-Rauxel 1,177 894 283 24 24.0

-
Bottrop-Welheim 3,025 2,645 380 12 12.0
Scholven 3,450 2,286 1,164 33.7 33.7
Subtotal

Total bombs,
16,620 6,154 7,652 14,624 4,986 5,825 2004 1,168
-
1,827 12.2 189 24.0
-
all sources 30,434 25,435 4,999 16.4

Deurag-Nerag Refinery 1,463 high-explosive bombs exploded the plant, and

At

in

the total falling the plant were unex

12

the management estimated per cent

of

that
in

ploded bombs.
Sterkrade-Holten, the plant management
At

that 750 (30 per cent)

of

estimated the
2,500bombs hitting the plant failed explode.
to

130
 -

Figure 124. This excavation at Leuna typifies the damage to utilities caused by 500-lb
high-explosive bombs fuzed 0.1 sec and 0.025 sec delay. Thousands of such breaks
to sewers and water lines stopped Leuna's production for short periods.

131
 STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY: OIL DIVISION REPORT
The arming wires from a few fuzes had not
been removed. Only three burned-out primer
detonators were found. These had apparently
been taken out of unexploded bombs, and their
scarcity seemed to indicate that, with relatively
few exceptions, the bombs had exploded when
the fuzes functioned properly. Some fuzes (all
apparently from bombs that landed flat) had
broken off on contact with solid structures. A
study of the many bombs lying in the woods pro
vided at least one explanation for the failure of
so many to detonate. A large proportion of them
were dented on the side, indicating that they had
landed flat. None of the removed fuzes appeared
to be damaged, an indication that the bombs had
not hit on their noses.
Seven 500-lb bombs had penetrated the roof
of the reactor building at the Gewerkschaft Vic
tor plant. Each punched an oblong hole in the
roof, indicating that the bomb was falling im
properly when it struck the roof. None of the
bombs exploded. This evidence indicated that
the tail either had failed to keep the bomb prop
erly aimed, or had become separated from the
bomb. Evidence gathered from other sources
confirmed the fact that the tails of many unex
ploded bombs had become separated from the
bombs while in flight. While being interrogated,
a German ballistics expert asked an Oil Division
representative, “What experiments are the Allies
conducting on tailless bombs?” He stated that
he had frequently observed bombs falling with
out tail fins, and this statement was confirmed by
other sources.
Intelligence and Photo Interpretation Were
Vitally Important
Behind the scenes of the mighty air attack on
Germany's industries, air force intelligence
groups worked in collaboration with the opera
tional commanders, recommending targets for
raiding and then interpreting the damage done
to them. Comparing the estimates and assess
ments of these groups with the actual situation
as revealed by plant records and on-the-spot
findings, Oil Division personnel were able to
reach conclusions regarding the accuracy with
which this work was done.
During and after attacks, photographic recon
naissance was carried out. Photographs went to
the Central Interpretation Unit (CIU) where
British and American experts interpreted them
and compared their interpretations of the evi
dence shown, estimating when knocked-out
plants would resume operation and to what ex
tent production in damaged plants was reduced.
Recommendations were also made regarding
bomb sizes and types for different targets. The
Working Committee of the Combined Strategic
Targets Committee, composed of military and
civilian representatives of British and American
agencies, met each Monday in London to ex
amine all available intelligence and recommend
target priority systems for the week. With this
information in their hands, the air forces went
to work.
An important duty of the Target Committee
was to rate the monthly capacity and estimate
the monthly production of each plant selected as
a target. Germany's total production was over
estimated by about 10 per cent in 1940, the dis
crepancy increasing to approximately 33 per cent
at the time the oil offensive began. Throughout
the sharp decline, the Target Committee con
tinued to overestimate production. At the time
the bombing offensive began, production in the
hydrogenation plants was overestimated by 23
per cent, and during the last months of the year
the Target Committee's estimate was more than
double the actual production. The output of the
Fischer-Tropsch synthetic plants was grossly
overestimated throughout the war. At the begin
ning of the oil offensive, the capacity figure an
nounced by the Target Committee was 1,350,000
tons per year, whereas the actual figure was 450,
000. German crude oil production was under
estimated by about 200,000 tons per year during
the first part of the war, but the estimation of
increase rose more rapidly than the actual in
crease so that by May, 1944, the estimate was 30
per cent above actual production.
The interpretation from aerial photographs of
damage done and estimates of its effect on pro
duction were on the whole remarkably accurate.
The predicted dates for resumed operations in
plants which had been closed by raid damage
usually fell within a few days of the actual date
as indicated by plant records. These predictions
 WEAPO NS EFFECTIVEN ESS
provided an excellent calendar for bombing op
erations. Various factors including weather con
ditions and other strategic tasks, however, some
times precluded the rebombing of the plants on
the dates recommended. In some instances,
periods of several weeks of almost full produc
tion were allowed to pass before the plants were
again bombed, and German Ministerial reports
indicate how important, especially during the
final 12 months, these uninterrupted periods were
to the continuance of the war.
Unexplained discrepancies which undoubtedly
sometimes affected the choice of aiming points
were encountered in the designation of buildings
in the plants. A complex described in the official
target ground plan of the Rheinpreussen syn
Figure 125. Water mains and buried
view shows a group of cables at Boehlen cut by a direct
AND BOMBING TECHNIQUES
thetic oil plant as pump houses was in reality the
much more important power house and trans
former house. The loading station at Castrop
Rauxel was designated as a new Fischer-Tropsch
reactor house and was much more heavily
bombed than the actual reactor house. Other dis
crepancies of this type were encountered.
Weakness in Air Force Intelligence seemed,
for the most part, to be based on faulty general
information concerning plant capacities and the
location within the plants of the different units.
Sound prewar intelligence would have pre
vented these errors. Some parts of the oil indus
try would not have been overbombed; other seg
ments might have received requisite attention
earlier. \
electric cables were damaged frequently. This
hit
an
and exposed water main.
 STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY: OIL DIVISION REPORT

Photographic interpretation, a comparatively
new field, was performed with an accuracy that
was always satisfactory and at times remarkable.
German Air Raid Protective Measures
Basically,German air raid protective meas--
ures (described in detail in Appendix F) consis
ted of: (a) active defenses, such as fighter pro
tection and flak; (b) passive defenses, such as
smoke screens, barrage balloons, blast walls, de
coy plants, and camouflage; (c) concealment
techniques, such as the ambitious program for
dispersed and underground plants.
The German active anti-aircraft
caused heavy Allied losses but did not prevent
successful air attacks. Both fighter and flak de
fenses were extremely heavy during the early
months of the oil-chemical offensive, but as short
ages in both gasoline and explosives became crit
ical, the effect was discernible in a radical weak
ening in the German defensive capacity. During
the final months of the war, Allied bombers
roamed at large over the Reich, encountering
only negligible opposition.
Germany's passive defenses interfered with,
but did not prevent, successful air attacks. The
effective use of smoke screens combined with
defenses bad weather conditions resulted in a tremendous

TABLE 47

TYPE OF DAMAGE USUALLY CAUSED BY VARIOUS SIZES AND FUZINGS OF HIGH-EXPLOSIVE

BOMBS HITTING OIL, RUBBER, AND CHEMICAL PLANT INSTALLATIONS*

100- and 250-lb 500-lb

Installations Bombs Fuzed 0.1 and 0.025 Sec Bombs Fuzed 0.1 and 0.025 Sec

Direct Hits Near Misses Direct Hits Near Misses

Water, steam and power plants, and electric sub- Easily Easily Easily Rarely
stations repaired repaired repaired damaged

Utilities distribution systems, water, sewers, ca- Easily Rare but Easily Rarely
bles, interplant gas lines, steam and power lines repaired easily repaired damaged
repaired

Light process equipment, including gas generat- Could be Could rarely Could be Rarely
ing and purifying systems, gasholders, distillation repaired be repaired repaired damaged
units, tankage control instruments, cooling tow
ers, Fischer-Tropsch reactors

Heavy process equipment, protected by blast Rarely Not Rarely Not

walls and concrete shelters, including pumps, com- damaged damaged damaged damaged
pressors, blowers, etc.

Very heavy process equipment, including reactor Rarely Not Rarely Not
vessels, heat exchangers, gas separators, and rub- damaged damaged damaged damaged
ber fabricating equipment

* A near miss assumes that the bomb hit up to the following distance from the nearest
edge of structure or equipment:
5 ft for 100- and 250-lb bombs
10 ft for 500-1b bombs
15 ft for 1,000- and 2,000-lb bombs
25 ft for 4,000-lb bombs
Secondary effects are excluded from consideration because they varied with the con
tents of each individual line, tank, holder, etc. -
Buildings are not included because damage to buildings alone rarely had any effect
on plant production. Damage to buildings usually was not repaired. Any repairs that were
made usually followed the resumption of production.

134
 WEAPO NS EFFECTIVEN ESS AND BOM BING TECHNIQUES

wastage of bombs. Decoy plants also attracted
many bombs. During the first seven large scale
attacks on Leuna, nearly as many tons fell on the
decoy plant as on the main plant. Blast walls and
reinforced concrete “dog houses” were useless
against 4,000-lb bombs, but prevented serious
damage from near misses by 1,000-lb bombs
and were effective even against direct hits of
500-lb and smaller bombs. But the utilities sys
tems were vulnerable, and the oil attacks were
therefore successful.
Concealment techniques were not effective
against Allied air attacks. Even had the ambi
tious underground and dispersal plant program
been started six months earlier and completed
before Allied attacks on oil started, the entire
underground system would still have been nul
lified because the plants depended on Germany's
transportation system, which was, for all prac
tical purposes, destroyed. Figure 9 indicates the
planned and completed program — a clear-cut
case of “too little and too late.”
Recommendations:
Table 47 summarizes Oil Division findings re
garding the ability of munitions of various sizes,
variously fuzed, to damage plant equipment in
the oil, chemical, and rubber industries. The

TABLE 47

TYPE of DAMAGE USUALLY CAUSFD BY VARIOUS SIZES AND FUZINGS OF HIGH-EXPLOSIVE

BOMBS HITTING OIL, RUBBER, AND CHEMICAL PLANT INSTALLATIONS*

1,000-lb 2,000-lb. 4,000-lb.

Bombs Fuzed 0.1 and 0.025 Sec Bombs Fuzed Instantaneously Bombs Fuzed Instantaneously
Incident
nc/dents
Direct Hits Near Misses Direct Hits Near Misses Direct Hits Near Misses Investigated
-
Permanently Could be Permanently Could be Extensively and Permanently 120
damaged repaired damaged repaired permanently damaged
damaged

Could be Slight Permanently Could be Extensively and Permanently 700

repaired effects damaged repaired permanently damaged
could be above grade damaged above
repaired grade

Permanently Slight Permanently Permanently Extensively and Permanently 920

damaged effects damaged damaged permanently damaged
can be damaged
repaired

Permanently Not Permanently Some damage Extensively and Permanently 230

damaged damaged damaged permanent; permanently damaged
some could be damaged
repaired

Permanently Not Permanently Rarely Permanently Rarely 92

but locally damaged damaged damaged damaged damaged
damaged

TOTAL 2,062

Permanent damage is defined as damage that required materials, parts, or new ma

chines, castings, shapes, etc., from outside the plant-materials that could not be impro
vised by plant forces. It also includes rebuilding or any reconstruction aside from repair
or patching.

Reparable damage is defined as damage that can be well enough repaired by plant
forces and imported labor so that operation can be resumed. Plates, bricks, cement, pipe
lengths, bars, rods, angles, and other materials usually part of plant maintenance stocks
are assumed to be available.

135
 STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY: OIL DIVISION REPORT

same findings are presented pictorially in Fig
ures 124 to 144, which illustrate the most im
portant findings on this subject.
It is the conviction of all Oil Division ordnance
officers, fire damage appraisers, and design,
con
struction, and maintenance engineers who have
participated in plant surveys that, for the muni
tions available for use against Germany,
1. Instantaneously fuzed large bombs (2,000
to 4,000-lb) should be employed against all tar
gets in these industries whenever bombing tech
nique, under prevailing aiming conditions, can
ensure dropping a reasonable percentage of
bombs on vital aiming points.
2. Under conditions that reduce bombing ac
curacy (full instrument attack, the types of air
borne radar available, and air conditions which
frequently existed over Germany), 500- and
1,000-lb bombs should be used in what is really
area attack. It is clear that such attacks shut
down the German plants in these industries, but
attacks had to be repeated frequently (every two
to four weeks) because the type of damage
caused was so readily repaired. Figure 123 shows
the number of major breaks in water lines at
Leuna as well as the progress made repairing
them. It was this type of damage that kept Leuna
from producing more than a fraction of her pre
attack capacity.
3. Actual findings on incendiaries are very
limited since they were used so infrequently dur
ing the attacks studied, and those dropped nor

- -

Figure 126. One of many piles of cable in the Luetzkendorf plant damaged by 500-lb
high-explosive and smaller bombs. Damaged cable had to be repaired or replaced
before operation of the plant could be resumed.

136
 WEAPO NS EFFECTIVEN ESS AND BOM BING TECHNIQUES

mally were extinguished before spills of inflam
mable material had a chance to spread, become
ignited by the incendiaries, and serve as focal
points for serious fires. Survey personnel believe
that incendiaries dropped several minutes after
high-explosive attack, or equipped with delay
elements good for, say five minutes, would be
most effective in any attack on these industries.
4. Delayed action anti-personnel bombs
should be used in order to delay the fire fighting
and in order to get maximum results from any
fires started.
5. Immediate steps should be taken to ascer
tain the reasons for the excessive number of un
exploded bombs and to correct whatever defects
in bombs or techniques are revealed.

Mainly 100-lb bombs were used in the earlier attacks later the majority
were 300-lb or 500-lb bombs and finally 1000-lb bombs. The heaviest
damage during the attacks occurring toward the end of July were done by
1000-lb bombs and resulted in a prolonged shutdown of the plant. The
management considers the guided English night attacks with heavy caliber
bombs to be more dangerous than the American day attacks, especially
,when the flak is handicapped by low visibility.
—Major General Gerlach of the Staff of the Luftwaffe
Anti-Aircraft Defense of Leuna, November, 1944

Berlin

19 January 1945
My Fuehrer
oil

Since 13 January 1945 a new series of heavy attacks on the industry

introduced, already prolonged
of
led
to

has been which has shutdown the

great hydrogenation plants Poelitz, Leuna, Bruex, Bleckhammer, and
of

Zeitz, the complete shutdown during the last quarter

of

addition
to

1944
in
all

plants, especially Scholven, Wesserling, Welheim,

of

Western and Gelsen

berg. The repair the plants after each attack has become more difficult:
or of

owing machines and equipment;

of

of
to

the use destruction reserves

in
be

addition, repairs take longer time. must also stated that the now
If
a

frequent night attacks are more effective than the day raids
as

heavier
extraordinary accuracy achieved; therefore,
an

bombs are being used and

the repair and production during the first quarter
of

to

even 1945 were

if

proceed undisturbed, the planned production, which during the final quarter
last year seemed possible, can longer
be
no
of

achieved.
Heil Hitler!

Albert Speer
Reichsminister for Armaments Production

137
 OIL DIVISION: CONCLUSIONS;
RECOMMENDATIONS: APPLICATIONS

Conclusions (c) That vigorous research be undertaken

The Allied air offensive against the German to prevent a recurrence of the unfortunately
oil-producing target systems: large percentage of unexploded bombs encoun

(a) Effectively stopped oil production with tered in Germany.

decisive military consequences.
(b) As an unexpected bonus, effectively
stopped production of military explosives and
propellants, thereby contributing an additional
decisive effect.
(c) Could have been accomplished with less
effort if bombing accuracy had been better,
aiming points had been more wisely chosen,
(d) That for attacks on plants similar to
those investigated in Germany, bombs large
enough to destroy vital equipment be employed,
and that vital plant sections be chosen as aiming
points whenever any aiming point is possible.
if (e) That the United States establish an ade
if quate intelligence agency so that any future at

munitions capable of destroying vital process tacks on enemy war industries may be under
equipment had been employed whenever rea taken with a complete knowledge of the facts.
sonable bombing accuracy was obtainable, and
if sounder military intelligence had been made
Application of German Protective
available.
Techniques to American Industries
Recommendations Air defenses for the United States far superior
On the basis of its findings, the Oil Division to those which prevailed in Germany would still
recommends: - leave American industries vulnerable; passive
(a) on aiming tech
That intensive research defenses even more extensive than the German
nique be continued, since improvement in bomb could not prevent destruction. To move the
ing accuracy, with a given weapon, offers the American oil and chemical industries under
greatest single chance of improving the effec ground would be a task of staggering magnitude
tiveness of air attack. and would still leave the industries susceptible to
(b) That men with sound industrial experi strangulation through attacks on transportation.
ence at the operating level co-operate actively Blast walls and “dog houses” lose even academic
with Air Force planning and operational groups interest in the era of the atomic bomb and its
in selecting enemy targets, in choosing aiming successors. The only defense of American in
points, and in judging the effectiveness of air dustry envisaged by Oil Division personnel is
attack. the prevention of air attacks.

138
Figure 127. Pipe bridge at Zeitz. A length of 150 ft collapsed as a result of blast from a
4,000-lb high-explosive bomb which detonated about 100 ft away.

139
 Figure 128. A group of undamaged Schmalfeld gas
generators at Luetzkendorf.

Figure 129. A group of three Schmalfeld gas generators at Luetzkendorf after several
by 500-lb explosive bombs. The damage was reparable. Because of conges
its

direct hits
tion, this equipment would have suffered seriously from heavy instantaneously fuzed bombs.

140
Figure 130. Compressor building at Boehlen. The 8-in. reinforced concrete arch was
damaged by a 500-lb high-explosive bomb. Piping was damaged by fragments, but
the compressor and motor remained intact.

141
 t
Figure 131 compressor building at Zeitz. A 1,000-lb Figure 132. Compressor building at Boehlen. A
high-explosive 1,000-lb high-explosive bomb penetrated the 12-in.
bomb detonated 5 ft from this 8-in.-
thick reinforced concrete protection arch. The com- thick concrete protection arch and detonated within
pressor housing was slightly damaged, but the arch the shelter. The compressor was destroyed.
shielded the machine.

Figure 133. The interior of a compressor house at Boehlen after Allied occupation.
by
all

Except for the one compressor shown in Figure 133 machines were intact. Hits
superficial damage the building.
to

500-lb bombs resulted

in

()-47– -15
7.46512

142
 by
Figure 134. Near miss by 1,000-lb bomb on a 3,100

ft)
Figure135. Near miss 500-lb GP (U.S.)

(4
oil

storage tank Europaische Tanklager and bomb fuzed 0.1 sec nose and 0.025 sec tail on
of

a
ton
Ebano Asphalt Werke,

oil
protected storage tank

of
Transport refinery, Finkewander-Hamburg. The tank

on
was entirely undamaged although the edge Harburg-Hamburg. striking
of
the The bomb detonated
to

of

35-ft crater extended within inches the tank. heavy reinforced concrete blast-wall apron. The

by
an

example limited damage resulting from damage that was caused blast and fragmentation
of

This
is

the cratering effects HE bombs fuzed short delay. was serious.

of

Figure 136. The principal processing structures and

oil

equipment Ebano Asphalt Werke refinery,

of

Harburg-Hamburg, were basically undamaged,

despite extensive tank destruction and damage
light steel-frame brick buildings.
to

of

total 699
A

bombs, principally 250- and 500-lb sizes, totaling

lb)
hit

146.1 tons weight (average 418 this 30-acre

In 12 in

refinery attacks, bomb density

of

4.84 tons
in

per acre. June, 1945, the plant management

six weeks repair
to

estimated that after four and

50

reconstruction, the plant could operate per cent

at

capacity.

143
- - - -- - - -- -

Figure 137. The compressor house at Bottrop-Welheim before the war, showing two of
the 10,000-lb-per-square-inch gas compressors with synchronous motor drives.

144
Figure 138. Compressor house at Bottrop-Welheim after three 4,000-lb and eight
hit

1,000-lb high-explosive bombs the building and machines. All seven machines with
their motors, starters, relays, and hydrogen lines were destroyed.

145
 ::::::: :::
Figure 139. The installation beyond the hut is one of two fired heating coils for the
d ve ral n e Clr m is se s frOm
la
til

io its Cl
d

Z
is

e
n

-
:::
::

s
::
t*

ig6
:I
'4
.\
Figure 140. This unit was similar to the one in Figure 138. It was completely wrecked by
hit

direct from 4,000-lb high-explosive bomb. Restoration would have required building
a

new unit.
a

147
Figure 141. Interior of reactor building at Luetzkendorf where a 4,000-lb bomb dis
lodged the reactors and seriously damaged the building structure. The main gas header
is visible in the background.

148
 -- - -- -

Figure 142. A 4,000-lb high-explosive bomb hit this reactor building at Luetzkendorf
and destroyed a large part of the installation.

149
Figure 143. Furfural unit at Deurag-Nerag refinery, Misburg-Hannover. A 4,000-lb high
explosive bomb instantaneously fuzed scored a near miss on this unit in an attack on
13/14 February 1945. The bomb struck approximately 20 ft from the side of the structure,
ft,

making a crater 35 ft in diameter and 6 ft deep. A pump house, 30 by 95 light

of

steel-frame brick construction with concrete foundation and floor (white outline) was
completely destroyed by blast. The open steel Furfural structure
as

whole was knocked

a

alignment, and all glass wool insulation was blown off towers; there
to

of

out
ft
2
l

was minor fragmentation damage. As the result blast damage caused by this bomb,
of

be

complete reconstruction would necessary.

150
Figure 144. The propane deasphalting unit at the Deurag-Nerag refinery, Misburg
Hannover, received four direct hits and four near misses by 500-lb GP bombs fuzed
0.1 sec nose and 0.01-0.025 sec tail, or 250-lb GP bombs fuzed instantaneously 0.1 sec
nose and 0.025 sec tail in three attacks: 24 August, 12 September, and 31 December
1944. There was light blast and fragmentation damage. Two high-pressure settling
tanks, 6 ft in diameter and 18 ft in length, were seriously damaged. Repair work was
begun with limited labor 1 May 1945, and the unit was operating at approximately
80 per cent of capacity by 1 June 1945, indicating the minor extent of the damage
inflicted.
 -
Figure 145. Unexploded bombs from the Gewerk
oil

schaft-Victor synthetic plant and district were

by bomb disposal personnel
to
removed German Figure six 4,000-lb bombs which failed

of
146. One
collecting point about
at

trenches miles from the

2
a

to explode and was removed collecting point

to
a
plant Castrop-Rauxel.
at

near the Gewerkschaft-Victor plant.

Figure 148. Inspection fuzes and unexploded

of

Figure 147. Approximately 3,000 fuzes (60 per cent bombs indicated that malfunctioning resulted prin
British, 40 per cent U.S.) removed from unexploded cipally from flat landing. Most unexploded bombs
collecting point near the were flat landers.
at

bombs were assembled

a

Gewerkschaft-Victor plant.
-

152
 UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
LIST OF REPORTS
The following is a bibliography of reports resulting from 21 Vereinigte Deutsche Metallwerke, Hildesheim, Ger
the Survey's studies of the uropean and Pacific wars. many
Those reports marked with an asterisk (*) may be pur 22 Metallgussgesellschaft G m b H, Leipzig, German
chased from the Superintendent of Documents at the 23 Aluminiumwerk G m b H, Plant No. 2, Bitterfeld,
-
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. Germany

£
24 Gebrueder Giulini GmbH, Ludwigshafen, Germany
25 Luftschiffbau, Zeppelin G m b H, Friedrichshafen
European

L'
War on Bodensee, Germany
26 Wieland Werke AG, Ulm, Germany
OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN 27 Rudolph Rautenbach Leichmetallgiessereien, Solin

£
gen, Germany
*1 The United States Strategic Bombing Survey: Sum 28 Vereinigte Aluminiumwerke AG, Lunen,
mary Report (European War ermany
*2 The Strategic Bombing Survey: Over 29 Vereinigte Deutsche Metallwerke, Heddernheim,
all Report (European War)
*3 The Effects of Strategic Bombing on the German 30 Duerener Metallwerke AG, Duren Wittenau-Berlin
War Economy & Waren, Germany

AIRCRAFT DIVISION AREA STUDIES DIVISION

(By Division and Branch)

*31 Area Studies Division Report
32 A Detailed Study of the Effects of Area Bombing
Aircraft Division Industry Report on Hamburg
Inspection Visits to Various Targets (Special Report) 33 A Detailed Study of the Effects of Area Bombing
on Wuppertal
Airframes Branch
34 A Detailed Study of the Effects of Area Bombing
on Dusseldorf
35 A Detailed Study of the Effects of Area Bombing
Junkers Aircraft and Aero Engine Works, Dessau, on Solingen
Germany 36 A Detailed Study of the Effects of Area Bombing
Erla Maschinenwerke GmbH, Heiterblick, German on Remscheid
A T G Maschinenbau, G m b H, Leipzig (Mockau), 37 A Detailed Study of the Effects of Area Bombing
German on Darmstadt
Gothaer onfabrik, A G, Gotha, Germany 38 A Detailed Study of the Effects of Area Bombing
Focke Wulf Aircraft Plant, Bremen, Germany on Lubeck
Over-all Report 39 A Brief Study of the Effects of Area Bombing on
Messerschmitt AG, Part A - Berlin, Augsburg, Bochum, Leipzig, Hagen, Dort
Augsburg, Germany |Part B mund, Oberhausen, Schweinfurt, and Bremen
Appendices I, II, III
Dornier Works, Friedrichshafen & Munich, Germany CIVILIAN DEFENSE DIVISION
Gerhard Fieseler Werke G m b H, Kassel, Germany
Wiener Neustaedter Flugzeugwerke, Wiener Neu Civilian Defense Division—Final Report

#
stadt, Austria Cologne Field Report
Bonn Field
Hanover Field port
Aero Engines Branch
Hamburg Field Report—Vol I, Text; Vol II, Exhibits
15 Bussing NAG Flugmotorenwerke G m b H, Bruns Bad Oldesloe Fiel Report
wick, Germany Augsburg Field Report
Reception Areas in Bavaria, Germany
16 Mittel-Deutsche Motorenwerke G m b H, Taucha,
German
17 Bavarian Motor Works Inc, Eisenach & Durrerhof, EQUIPMENT DIVISION

£,
Germany
18 Bayerische Motorenwerke A G (BMW) Munich, Electrical Branch
-
19 Henschel Flugmotorenwerke, Kassel, Germany *48 German Electrical Equipment Industry Report
49 Brown Boveri et Cie, Mannheim Kafertal, Germany
Light Metal Branch
Optical and Precision Instrument Branch
Light Metals Industry X. Aluminum
of Germany {#
Part II, Magnesium *50 Optical and Precision Instrument Industry Report
 Abrasives Branch Submarine Branch
*51 The German Abrasive Industry
52 Mayer and Schmidt, Offenbach on Main, Germany German Submarine Industry Report
Maschinenfabrik Augsburg-Nurnberg A G, Augs
* Anti-Friction Branch burg, Germany
Blohm and Voss Shipyards, Hamburg, Germany
*53 The German Anti-Friction Bearings Industry Deutschewerke A. G, Kiel, Germany

#
Deutsche Schiff und Maschinenbau, Bremen, Ger
Machine Tools Branch main V

Machine Tools & Machinery as Capital Equipment Friedrich Krupp Germaniawerft, Kiel, Germany
Howaldtswerke A. G., Germany
Machine Tool Industry in Germany
Herman Kolb Co., Cologne, Germany Submarine Assembly Shelter, Farge, Germany
Collet and Engelhard, Offenbach, Germany Bremer Vulkan, Vegesack, Germany
Naxos Union, Frankfort on Main, Germany
Ordnance Branch
MILITARY ANALYSIS DIVISION
The Defeat of the German Air Force *101 Ordnance Industry Report
V-Weapons (Crossbow) Campaign 102 Friedrich Krupp Grusonwerke A. G Magdeburg
Air Force Rate of Operation Germany
Weather Factors in Combat Bombardment Opera 103 Bochumer Verein fuer Gusstahlfabrikation A G,
Bochum, German
tions in the European Theatre :
Bombing Accuracy, USAAF Heavy and Medium 104 Henschel & Sohn, Kassel, Germany
Bombers in the ETO 105 Rheinmetall-Borsig, Dusseldorf, Germany
Description of RAF Bombing - 106 Hermann Goering Werke, Braunschweig, Hallendorf,
64a The Impact of the Allied Air Effort on German Germany
gistics Lo: 107 Hannoverische Maschinenbau, Hanover, Germany
MORALE DIVISION 108 Gusstahlfabrik Friedrich Krupp, Essen, Germany
*64b The Effects of Strategic Bombing on German Morale
(Vol I and Vol II)
oIL DIVISION
*109 Oil Division, Final Report
Medical Branch *110 Oil Division, Final Report, Appendix
*65
*111 Powder, Explosives, Special Rockets and Jet Pro
The Effect of Bombing on Health and Medical Care ellants, War Gases and Smoke Acid (Ministerial
in Germany eport #1)
112 Underground and Dispersal Plants in Greater Ger
MUNITIONS DIVISION many
Heavy Industry Branch
113 The German Oil Industry, Ministerial Report Team
78
The Coking Industry Report on Germany 114 Ministerial Report on Chemicals
Coking Plant Report No. 1, Sections A, B, C, & D
Gutehoffnungshuette, Oberhausen, Germany
Oil Branch
Friedrich-Alfred Huette, Rheinhausen, Germany
Neunkirchen Eisenwerke A G, Neunkirchen, Ger
many 115 Ammoniakwerke Merseburg G m b H, Leuna, Ger
Reichswerke Hermann Goering A G, Hallendorf many—2 Appendices
Germany 116 Braunkohle Benzin A G, Zeitz and Bohlen, Germany
August Thyssen Huette AG, Hamborn, German Wintershall AG, Leutzkendorf, Germany
Friedrich Krupp AG, Borbeck Plant, Essen, Ger 117 Ludwigshafen-Oppau Works Qf IG
Farbenindustrie
many A G, Ludwigshafen, Germany
Dortmund Hoerder Huettenverein, A G, Dortmund, 118 Ruhroel Hydrogenation Plant,
*
Bottrop-Boy, Ger
Germany many, Vol, I, Vol. II
Hoesch AG, Dortmund, Germany 119 Rhenania Ossag Mineraloelwerke A G, Harburg
Bochumer Verein fuer Gusstahlfabrikation A G, Refinery, Hamburg, Germany -
Bochum, Germany 120 Rhenania Ossag Mineraloelwerke A G, Grasbrook
Refinery, Hamburg, Germany
Motor Vehicles and Tanks Branch 121 Rhenania Össag Mineraloelwerke AG, Wilhelmsburg
Refinery, Hamburg, Germany
German Motor Vehicles Industry Report 122 Gewerkschaft Victor, Castrop-Rauxel, Germany, Vol.
Tank Industry Report I & Vol. II
Daimler Benz AG, Unterturkheim, German 123 Europaeische Tanklager und Transport A G, Ham
Renault Motor Vehicles Plant, Billancourt * Paris burg, Germany
Adam Opel, Russelheim, Germany 124 Ebano Asphalt Werke A G, Harburg Refinery, Ham
DaimlerBenz-Gaggenau Works, Gaggenau, Germany burg, Germany
Maschinenfabrik Augsburg-Nurnberg, Nurnberg, 125 Meerbeck Rheinpreussen Synthetic Oil Plant—Vol. I
Germany * & Vol. II
Auto Union A G, Chemnitz and Zwickau, Germany
Henschel & Sohn, Kassel, Germany
Maybach Motor Works, Friedrichshafen, Germany Rubber Branch
Voigtlander, Maschinenfabrik AG, Plauen, Germany-
Volkswagenwerke, Fallersleben, Germany 126 Deutsche Dunlop Gummi Co., Hanau on Main,
Bussing NAG, Brunswick, Germany Germany -
Muehlenbau Industrie A G (Miag) Brunswick, Ger 127 Continental Gummiwerke, Hanover, Germany
many 128 Huels Synthetic Rubber Plant
Friedrich Krupp Grusonwerke, Magdeburg, Germany 129 Ministerial Report on German Rubber Industry
 £
Propellants Branch 184 Daimler-Benz AG, Mannheim, Germany
- 185 Synthetic Oil Plant, Meerbeck-Hamburg, Germany
130 Elektrochemischewerke, Munich, German 186 ewerkschaft Victor, Castrop-Rauxel, Germany
131 Schoenebeck Plant, Łignose prengstoff 187 Klockner Humboldt Deutz, Ulm, Germany
Werke G m b H, Bad Salzemen, Germany Ruhroel Hydrogenation Plant, Bottrop-Boy, Germany
132 Plants of Dynamit AG, Vormal, Alfred Nobel & Co, 189 Neukirchen Eisenwerke AG, Neukirchen, Germany
Troisdorf, Clausthal, Drummel and Duneberg, 190 Railway Viaduct at Altenbecken, Germany
Germany 191 Railway Viaduct at Arnsburg, Germany
133 Deutsche Sprengchemie GmbH, Kraiburg, Germany 192 Deurag-Nerag Refineries, Misburg, Germany
193 Fire Raids on German Cities
OVER-ALL ECONOMIC EFFECTS DIVISION 194 IG Farbenindustrie, Ludwigshafen, Germany, Vol I
& Vol II
134 Over-all Economic Effects Division Report 195 Roundhouse in Marshalling Yard, Ulm, Germany
Gross National Product------- Special papers IG Farbenindustrie, Leverkusen, Germany
Kriegseilberichte------------- which together 197 Chemische-Werke, Huels, Germany
Herman Goering Works------- comprise the 198 Gremberg Marshalling Yard, Gremberg, Germany
Food and Agriculture--------- above report 199 Locomotive Shops and Bridges at Hamm, Germany
134a Industrial Sales Output and Productivity
TRANSPORTATION DIVISION
PHYSICAL DAMAGE DIVISION

#
*200 The Effects of Strategic Bombing on German Trans
Physical Damage Division portation
134b (ETO)
135 Villacoublay Airdrome, Paris, France 201 Rail Operations Over the Brenner Pass
Repair Yards, Malines, Belgium 202 Effects of Bombing on Railroad Installations in
136 Railroad Regensburg, Nurnberg and Munich Divisions
137 Railroad Repair Yards, Louvain, Belgium 203 German Locomotive Industry During the War
138 Railroad Repair Yards, Hasselt, Belgium .
139 Railroad Repair Yards, Namur, Belgium
204 German Military Railroad Traffic
140 Submarine Pens, Brest, France
141 Powder Plant, Angouleme, France UTILITIES DIVISION

6:
142 Powder Plant, Bergerac, France
143 Coking Plants, Montigny & Liege, Belgium *205 German Electric Utilities Industry Report
144 Fort St. Blaise Verdun Metz, France 1 to 10 in Vol I“Utilities Division Plant Reports”
145 Gnome et Rhone, Limoges, France 207 11 to 20 in Vol II “Utilities Division Plant Reports”
146 Michelin Tire Factory, Clermont-Ferrand, France 208 21 Rheinische-Westfalische Elektrizitaetswerk A G
147 Gnome et Rhone Aero Engine Factory, Le Mans,
France Pacific War
148 Kugelfischer Bearing Ball Plant, Ebelsbach, Germany
149 Louis Breguet Aircraft Plant, Toulouse, France OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN
150 S. N. C. A. S. E. Aircraft Plant, Toulouse, France
151 A. I. A. Aircraft Plant, Toulouse, France *1 Summary Report (Pacific War)
152 V Weapons in London Japan's Struggle to End The War
153 City Area of Krefeld The Effects of Atomic Bombs on Hiroshima

£
*3 and
154 Public Air Raid Shelters in Germany Nagasaki
155 Goldenberg Thermal Electric Power Station, Knap
sack, Germany
CIVILIAN STUDIES
156 Brauweiler Transformer & Switching Station, Brau
weiler,
Storage Depot, Nahbollenbach, Germany Civilian Defense Division
157
158 Railway and Road Bridge, Bad Munster, Germany
159 Railway Bridge, Eller, Germany Field Report Covering Air Raid Protection and Allied

£rt
Subjects, Tokyo, Japan
160 Gustloff-Werke Weimar, Weimar, Germany Field Covering Air Raid Protection and Allied
161 Henschell & Sohn G m b H. Kassel, Germany Subjects, Nagasaki, Japan
162 Area Survey at Pirmasens, Germany
163 Hanomag, Hanover, Germany Field Report Covering Air Raid Protection and Allied
Subjects, Kyoto, Japan
164 M A N Werke Augsburg, Augsburg, Germany
Friedrich Krupp AG, Field Report Covering Air Raid Protection and Allied

£
165 en, Germany
Subjects, Kobe, Japan
166 Erla Maschinenwerke G m b H, Heiterblick, Ger
many Field Report Covering Air Raid Protection and Allied
Subjects, Osaka, Japan
167 A T G Maschinenbau GmbH, Mockau, Germany Field Covering Air Raid Protection and Allied
168 Erla Maschinenwerke G m b H, Mockau, Germany Subjects, Hiroshima, Japan—No. 1
169 Bayerische Motorenwerke, Durrerhof, Germany
*10 Summary Report Covering Air Raid Protection and
170 Mittel-Deutsche Motorenwerke G m b H, Taucha,
Germany Allied Subjects in Japan
171 Submarine Pens Deutsche-Werft, Hamburg, Germany
*11 Final Report Covering Air Raid Protection and
172 Multi-Storied Structures, Hamburg, Germany Allied Subjects in Japan
173 Continental Gummiwerke, Hanover, Germany
174 Kassel Marshalling Yards, Kassel, Germany Medical Division
175 Ammoniawerke, Merseburg-Leuna, German *
176 Brown Boveri et Cie, Mannheim fafertal, ermany *12 The Effects of Bombing on Health and Medical Serv
177 Adam Opel A G, Russelsheim, Germany ices in Japan
178 Daimler-Benz AG, Unterturkheim, Germany *13 The Effects of Atomic Bombs on Health and Medical
179 Valentin Submarine Assembly, Farge, Germany Services in Hiroshima and Nagasaki
180 Volkswaggonwerke, Fallersleben, Germany
181 Railway Viaduct at Bielefeld, Germany Morale Division
182 Ship Yards Howaldtswerke, Hamburg, Germany
183 Blohm and Voss Shipyards, Hamburg, Germany *14 The Effects of Strategic Bombing on Japanese Morale
 £
ECONOMIC STUDIES *33 Nissan Automobile Company
Corporation Report No. XVIII
Aircraft Division (Nissan Jidosha KK) ,
(Engines)
*15 The Japanese Aircraft *34 Army Air Arsenal & Navy Air Depots
*16 Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd. Corporation Report No. XIX
Corporation Report No. I (Airframes and Engines)
(Mitsubishi Jukogyo KK) *35 Underground Production of Japanese Aircraft
(Airframes & Engines Report No. XX
*17 Nakajima Aircraft Company, Ltd.
orporation Report No. II
(Nakajima Hikoki KK)
Basic Materials Division
(Airframes & Engines)
*18 Kawanishi Aircraft Compan *36. Coal and Metals in Japan's War Economy
Corporation Report No. }II
(Kawanishi Kokuki Kabushiki Kaisha) Capital Goods, Equipment and Construction Division
(Airframes)
*19 Kawasaki Aircraft Industries Company, Inc. *37 The Japanese Construction Industry
Corporation Report No. IV *38 Japanese Electrical Equipment
(Kawasaki Kokuki Kogyo Kabushiki *39 The Japanese Machine Building Industry
Kaisha)
(Airframes & Engines) Electric Power Division
*20 Aichi Aircraft Company
Corporation Report No. V
(Aichi Kokuki KK) *40 The Electric Power Industry of Ja

*21
(Airframes & Engines)
Sumitomo Metal Industries, Propeller Division
Corporation Report No. VI
*41 The
#"
ports
Power Industry of Japan (Plant Re

(Sumitomo Kinzoku Kogyo KK, Puropera Manpower, Food and Civilian Supplies Division
Seizosho)
(Propellers)
*22 Hitachi Aircraft Company
*42 The Japanese Wartime Standard of Living and Utili
Corporation Report No. VII zation of Manpower *

(Hitachi Kokuki KK)

£
(Airframes & Engines) Military Supplies Division
*23 Japan International Air Industries, Ltd.
Corporation Report No. VIII *43 Japanese War Production Industries
-
Kokusai Koku Kogyo KK) *44 Japanese Naval Ordnance
Airframes) 45 Japanese Army Ordnance
*24 Japan Musical Instrument Manufacturing Company *46 Japanese Naval Shipbuilding
Corporation Report No. IX *47 Japanese Motor Vehicle Industry
(Nippon Gakki Seizo KK) *48 Japanese Merchant Shipbuilding
(Propellers)

#:
*25 Tachikawa Aircraft Company
Corporation Report No.
Oil and Chemical Division
Hikoki KK)
Airframes) 49 Chemicals in Japan's War
*26 Fuji Airplane Company 50 Chemicals in Japan's War—Appendix
Corporation Report No. XI 51 Oil in Japan's War
(Fuji Hikoki KK) 52 Oil in Japan's War—Appendix
(Airframes)
*27. Showa Airplane Company Over-all Economic Effects Division
Corporation Report No. XII
(Showa Hikoki Kogyo KK)
(Airframes) *53 The Effects of Strategic Bombing on Japan's War
Economy (Including Appendix A: U. S. Economic
*28 Ishikawajima Aircraft Industries Company,Ltd.
Intelligence on Japan-Analysis and Comparison;
Corporation Report No. XIII Appendix B: Gross National Product on Japan
(Ishikawajima Koku Kogyo Kabushiki
Kaisha) and Its Components; Appendix C: Statistical
(Engines) Sources).
*29 Nippon Airplane Company
Corporation Report No. XIV Transportation Division
(Nippon Hikoki KK)
(Airframes) *54 The War Against Japanese Transportation, 1941–
*30 Kyushu Airplane Company 1945
Corporation Report No. XV /
(Kyushu Hikoki KK) Urban Areas Division
(Airframes)
*31 Shoda Engineering Company *55 Effects of Air Attack on Japanese Urban Economy
Corporation Report No. XVI (Summary Report)
(Shoda Seisakujo) *56 Effects of Air Attack on Urban Complex Tokyo
(Components) Kawasaki-Yokohama
*32 Mitaka Aircraft Industries *57 Effects of Air Attack on the City of Nagoya
Corporation Report No. XVII - *58 Effects of Air Attack on Osaka-Kobe-Kyoto. .
(Mitaka Koku Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha) 59 Effects of Air Attack on the City of Nagasaki
(Components) 60 Effects of Air Attack on the City of Hiroshima
 MILITARY STUDIES 87 Report of Ships Bombardment Survey. Party (En

I),

on
closure Comments and Data Effectiveness
Military Analysis Division of Ammunition
Ships Bombardment Survey Party (En

£
88 Report

of
J),
Air Allied with the United States in the War

on
61 Forces Accuracy

of
closure Comments and Data
Against Japan Firing
Japanese Air Power Reports
#
Bombardment Survey Party (En

of
89
closure K), Effects

of
Japanese Air Weapons and Tactics Surface Bombardments on
# Japanese War Potential
The Effect of Air Action on Japanese Ground Army
Logistics -
of Forces Under the Southwest Pacific Physical Damage Division
numan
66 The Strategic Air O rations of Very Heavy Bom the Incendiary Bomb Attacks on Japan

(a
of
90 Effect -
bardment in the ar Against Japan (Twentieth R(port on Eight Cities)
Air Force) 91 The Effects of the Ten Thousand Pound Bomb on
67 in China, Burma, India—World War Japanese Targets Report on Nine Incidents)

(a
Alioperations
92 the Atomic Bomb on Hiroshima, Japan

of of of
Effects
T' Air Transport
aloan
The #rteenth
Command in the War Against
94
Effects
Effects
the Atomic Bomb on Nagasaki, Japan
the Four Thousand Pound Bomb on Japa
69 Air Force in the War Against Japan Targets Report on Five Incidents)

(a
nese
70 The Seventh and Eleventh Air Forces in the War 95 Two Thousand, One Thousand, and Five

of
Against Japan Effects
Hundred Pound Bombs on Japanese Targets

(a
71 The Fifth Air Force in the War Against Japan Report on Eight Incidents)
Report on Physical Damage Japan (Summary

in
A
Naval Analysis Division Report)

I
T:
*72 Interrogations of Japanese Officials (Vols. and G-2 Division
*73 Campaigns of the Pacific War
The uction of Wake Island 97 Japanese Military and Naval Intelligence
98 Photographic Intelligence the Japa

of
Evaluation

in
*75 The Allied Campaign Against Rabaul
nese Homeland, Part Comprehensive Report

I,
76 The American Campaign Against Wotje, Maloelap,
Mille, and Jaluit (Vols. I, II and III) Photographic Intelligence the Japa

of
99 Evaluation

in
*77 The Reduction of Truk nese Homeland, Part II, Airfields
78 The Offensive Mine Laying Campaign Against Japan 100 Photographic Intelligence the Japa

of
Evaluation

in
79 Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party–Fore nese Homeland, Part III, Computed Bomb Plotting
word, Introduction, Conclusions, and General Photographic Intelligence the Japa
of
101 Evaluation

in
Summary nese Homeland, Part IV, Urban Area Analysis
80 Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (En 102 Evaluation Photographic Intelligence
of
the Japa

in
closure A), Kamaishi Area

£
#
V,
nese Homeland, Part Camouflage
Bombardment Survey Party (En

#
Report of Photographic Intelligence the Japa
of

103 Evaluation

in
closure B), Hamamatsu Area nese Homeland, Part VI, Shipping
Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (En Photographic Intelligence the Japa
of

104 Evaluation

in
closure C), Area *
Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (En nese Homeland, Part VII, Electronics
105 Photographic Intelligence the Japa
of

closure D), Evaluation

in
Area
Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (En nese Homeland, Part VIII, Beach Intelligence
E), *106 Photographic Intelligence the Japa
of

Evaluation

in
closure Muroran Area
Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (En nese Homeland, Part IX, Artillery

: F), *107 Photographic Intelligence the Japa

of

Evaluation

in
closure Shimizu Area
Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (En nese Homeland, Part X, Roads and Railroads
closures G and H), Shionomi-Saki and Nojima Photographic Intelligence the Japa
of

108 Evaluation
Saki Areas nese Homeland, Part XI, Industrial Analysis in

printing officf. 1947

u. s. Government
O–47–16
:

736.512