White Light v.

City of Manila, 576 SCRA 416 (2009)

FACTS:

 Mayor Alfredo Lim signed into law Manila City Ordinance No. 7774 entitled, “An
Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time Admission Rates and Wash-up Rate Schemes in
Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, Pension Houses, and Similar Establishments in the
City of Manila” (the Ordinance)
 As a result, the Malate Tourist and Development Corporation (MTDC) filed a complaint
for declaratory relief with prayer for preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining
order (TRO) impleading defendant City of Manila and praying that the Ordinance be
declared invalid and unconstitutional
 White Light Corporation, et al. also filed a Motion to Intervene on the ground that the
Ordinance directly affects their business interest as operators of drive-in hotels and
motels of Manila
 The Regional Trial Court (RTC) ordered the City to desist from the enforcement of the
Ordinance
 The City maintains that it is empowered to regulate the establishment, operation and
maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beer houses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses,
lodging houses and other similar establishments under Section 458 (4) (iv) of the Local
Government Code

ISSUE:
Whether or not the assailed Ordinance of the City of Manila is a valid exercise of police power .

RULING:
No, the Supreme Court reversed the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) and
reinstated the Decision of RTC Manila, Branch 9 upholding that the Ordinance is
unconstitutional.
Under the Constitution, no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law. Liberty, as guaranteed by the Constitution, was defined by Justice Malcolm
to include "the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary restraint or servitude”. To
consider the exercise of police power as valid, it must appear that the interests of the public
generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with private
rights and the means must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and
not unduly oppressive of private rights. It must also be evident that no other alternative for the
accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. More importantly, a
reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the measure and the means employed for
its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights and
those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.

In this case, although the objective of the Ordinance is to minimize, if not eliminate, the use of
the covered establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and other similar activities, which
certainly fall within the ambit of the police power of the State, other legitimate activities would
also be impaired. Similarly, the behavior which the Ordinance seeks to curtail is in fact already
prohibited and could be diminished by simply applying existing laws.
Hence, the exercise of police power through the assailed Ordinance is considered an arbitrary
intrusion into private rights and is deemed unconstitutional and invalid.

Rama, et al. vs. Moises, et al. Case Digest

Hon. Michael L. Rama, et al. vs. Hon. Gilbert P. Moises, et al.
G.R. No. 197146. December 6, 2016

Synopsis
A law enacted prior to the 1987 Constitution, like a presidential decree, is presumed to
be valid and constitutional on the theory that it was carefully studied by the Legislative
and Executive Departments prior to its enactment, and determined to be in accord with
the Fundamental Law. However, the presumption of validity and constitutionality is
overturned and the law should be struck down once it becomes inconsistent with the
present Constitution and the later laws.

Facts
On May 25, 1973, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 198
(Provincial Water Utilities Act of 1973). By virtue of P. D. No. 198, Cebu City formed the
Metro Cebu Water District (MCWD) in 1974. Thereafter, the Cities of Mandaue, Lapu-
Lapu and Talisay, and the Municipalities of Liloan, Compostela, Consolacion, and
Cordova turned over their waterworks systems and services to the MCWD. From 1974
to 2002, the Cebu City Mayor appointed all the members of the MCWD Board of
Directors in accordance with Section 3 (b) of P. D. No. 198, to wit:

(b) Appointing authority. The person empowered to appoint the members of the board of
Directors of a local water district, depending upon the geographic coverage and
population make-up of the particular district. In the event that more than seventy-five
percent of the total active water service connections of a local water district are
within the boundary of any city or municipality, the appointing authority shall be
the mayor of that city or municipality, as the case may be; otherwise, the
appointing authority shall be the governor of the province within which the
district is located. If portions of more than one province are included within the
boundary of the district, and the appointing authority is to be the governors then the
power to appoint shall rotate between the governors involved with the initial
appointments made by the governor in whose province the greatest number of service
connections exists. (emphasis supplied)

In July 2002, Cebu Provincial Governor Pablo L. Garcia wrote to the MCWD to assert
his authority and intention to appoint the members of the MCWD Board of Directors.' He
stated in his letter that since 1996, the active water service connections in Cebu City
had been below 75% of the total active water service connection of the MCWD; that no
other city or municipality under the MCWD had reached the required percentage of
75%; and that, accordingly, he, as the Provincial Governor of Cebu, was the appointing
authority for the members of the MCWD Board of Directors pursuant to Section 3 (b) of
P. D. No. 198.
Later on, the MCWD commenced in the Regional Trial Court in Cebu City (RTC) its
action for declaratory relief seeking to declare Section 3(b) of P.D. No. 198
unconstitutional; or, should the provision be declared valid, it should be interpreted to
mean that the authority to appoint the members of the MCWD Board of Directors
belonged solely to the Cebu City Mayor. The RTC (Branch 7) dismissed the action for
declaratory relief.

To avoid a vacuum and in the exigency of the service, Provincial Governor Gwendolyn
F. Garcia and Cebu City Mayor Tomas R. Osmeña jointly appointed Atty. Adelino Sitoy
and Leo Pacana to fill the vacancies. However, the position of Atty. Sitoy was deemed
vacated upon his election as the Municipal Mayor of Cordova, Cebu in the 2007
elections.

Governor Garcia commenced an action for declaratory relief to seek the interpretation of
Section 3 (b) of P.D. No. 198 on the proper appointing authority for the members of the
MCWD Board of Directors.

On February 22, 2008, however, Mayor Osmeña appointed Yu as a member of the

MCWD Board of Directors.7 Accordingly, on May 20, 2008, the RTC dismissed the
action for declaratory relief on the ground that declaratory relief became improper once
there was a breach or violation of the provision.

On June 13, 2008, Governor Garcia filed a complaint to declare the nullity of the
appointment of Yu as a member of the MCWD Board of Directors (docketed as Civil
Case No. CEB-34459), alleging that the appointment by Mayor Osmefia was illegal; that
under Section 3(b) of P.D. No. 198, it was she as the Provincial Governor of Cebu who
was vested with the authority to appoint members of the MCWD Board of Directors
because the total active water service connections of Cebu City and of the other cities
and municipalities were below 75% of the total water service connections in the area of
the MCWD.

On November 16, 2010, the RTC rendered the assailed judgment declaring the
appointment of Yu as illegal and void and ruled that the court has not been able to find
any constitutional infirmity in the questioned provision (Sec. 3) of Presidential Decree
No. 198. The fundamental criterion is that all reasonable doubts should be resolved in
favor of the constitutionality of a statute. Every law has in its favor the presumption of
constitutionality. For a law to be nullified, there must be shown that there is a clear and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution. The ground for nullity must be clear and beyond
reasonable doubt.

Mayor Osmeña and Yu jointly moved for reconsideration, but the RTC denied their
motion. Hence, the petitioners have instituted this special civil action for certiorari.

Issues
1. Whether Yu's expiration of term renders case moot and academic.
2. Whether Section 3(b) of P.D. No. 198 was void on its face for violating the
constitutional provision on local autonomy and independence of HUCs under Article X
of the 1987 Constitution.
3. Whether Section 3(b) of P.D. 198 is unconstitutional for violating the Due
Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause.

Rulings

Yu's expiration of term did not

render case moot and academic
We note that respondent Yu's term as a member of the MCWD Board of Directors
expired on December 31, 2012. However, this fact does not justify the dismissal of the
petition on the ground of its being rendered moot and academic. The case should still
be decided, despite the intervening developments that could have rendered the case
moot and academic, because public interest is involved, and because the issue is
capable of repetition yet evading review.

For sure, the appointment by the proper official of the individuals to manage the system
of water distribution and service for the consumers residing in the concerned cities and
municipalities involves the interest of their populations and the general public affected
by the services of the MCWD as a public utility. Moreover, the question on the proper
appointing authority for the members of the MCWD Board of Directors should none of
the cities and municipalities have at least 75% of the water consumers will not be
definitively resolved with finality if we dismiss the petition on the ground of mootness.

Section 3(b) of P.D. 198 is already superseded

The Court opines that Section 3(b) of P.D. No. 198 should be partially struck down for
being repugnant to the local autonomy granted by the 1987 Constitution to LGUs, and
for being inconsistent with R.A. No. 7160 (1991 Local Government Code) and related
laws on local governments.

The enactment of P.D. No. 198 on May 25, 1973 was prior to the enactment on
December 22, 1979 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 51 (An Act Providing for the Elective or
Appointive Positions in Various Local Governments and for Other Purposes) and
antedated as well the effectivity of the 1991 Local Government Code on January 1,
1992. At the time of the enactment of P.D. No. 198, Cebu City was still a component city
of Cebu Province. Section 328 of B.P. Blg. 51 reclassified the cities of the Philippines
based on well-defined criteria. Cebu City thus became an HUC, which immediately
meant that its inhabitants were ineligible to vote for the officials of Cebu Province. In
accordance with Section 12 of Article X of the 1987 Constitution, cities that are highly
urbanized, as determined by law, and component cities whose charters prohibit their
voters from voting for provincial elective officials, shall be independent of the province,
but the voters of component cities within a province, whose charters contain no such
prohibition, shall not be deprived of their right to vote for elective provincial officials.
Later on, Cebu City, already an HUC, was further effectively rendered independent from
Cebu Province pursuant to Section 29 of the 1991 Local Government Code.

Hence, all matters relating to its administration, powers and functions were exercised
through its local executives led by the City Mayor, subject to the President's retained
power of general supervision over provinces, HUCs, and independent component cities
pursuant to and in accordance with Section 252 of the 1991 Local Government Code, a
law enacted for the purpose of strengthening the autonomy of the LGUs in accordance
with the 1987 Constitution.

Article X of the 1987 Constitution guarantees and promotes the administrative and fiscal
autonomy of the LGUs. The foregoing statutory enactments enunciate and implement
the local autonomy provisions explicitly recognized under the 1987 Constitution. To
conform with the guarantees of the Constitution in favor of the autonomy of the LGUs,
therefore, it becomes the duty of the Court to declare and pronounce Section 3(b) of
P.D. No. 198 as already partially unconstitutional.

Section 3(b) of P.D. 198 is unconstitutional for

violating the Due Process Clause and
the Equal Protection Clause
We opine that although Section 3(b) of P.D. No. 198 provided for substantial distinction
and was germane to the purpose of P.D. No. 198 when it was enacted in 1973, the
intervening reclassification of the City of Cebu into an HUC and the subsequent
enactment of the 1991 Local Government Code rendered the continued application of
Section 3(b) in disregard of the reclassification unreasonable and unfair. Clearly, the
assailed provision no longer provided for substantial distinction because, firstly, it
ignored that the MCWD was built without the participation of the provincial government;
secondly, it failed to consider that the MCWD existed to serve the community that
represents the needs of the majority of the active water service connections; and,
thirdly, the main objective of the decree was to improve the water service while keeping
up with the needs of the growing population.

Hence, we deem it to be inconsistent with the true. objectives of the decree to still leave
to the provincial governor the appointing authority if the provincial governor had
administrative supervision only over municipalities and component cities accounting for
16.92% of the active water service connection in the MCWD. In comparison, the City of
Cebu had 61.28% of the active service water connections; Mandaue, another HUC,
16%; and Lapu Lapu City, another HUC, 6.8%. There is no denying that the MCWD has
been primarily serving the needs of Cebu City. Although it is impermissible to inquire
into why the decree set 75% as the marker for determining the proper appointing
authority, the provision has meanwhile become unfair for ignoring the needs and
circumstances of Cebu City as the LGU accounting for the majority of the active water
service connections, and whose constituency stood to be the most affected by the
decisions made by the MCWD's Board of Directors. Indeed, the classification has truly
ceased to be germane or related to the main objective for the enactment of P.D. No.
198 in 1973.

Under the foregoing circumstances, therefore, the RTC gravely abused its discretion in
upholding Section 3(b) of P.D. No. 198. It thereby utterly disregarded the clear policies
favoring local autonomy enshrined in the 1987 Constitution and effected by the 1991
Local Government Code and related subsequent statutory enactments, and for being
violative of the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the 1987
Constitution.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for certiorari; ANNUL and SET ASIDE the
decision rendered in Civil Case No. CEB-34459 on November 16, 2010 by the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 18, in Cebu City; and DECLARE as UNCONSTITUTIONAL Section
3(b) of Presidential Decree No. 198 to the extent that it applies to highly urbanized cities
like the City of Cebu and to component cities with charters expressly providing for their
voters not to be eligible to vote for the officials of the provinces to which they belong for
being in violation of the express policy of the 1987 Constitution on local autonomy, the
1991 Local Government Code and subsequent statutory enactments, and for being also
in violation of the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause.