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The Stratification of the World-Economy: An Exploration of the Semiperipheral Zone

Author(s): Giovanni Arrighi and Jessica Drangel
Reviewed work(s):
Source: Review (Fernand Braudel Center), Vol. 10, No. 1, Anniversary Issue: The Work of the
Fernand Braudel Center (Summer, 1986), pp. 9-74
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Review,X, 1,Summer1986,9-74
The Stratification
of theWorld-Economy:
Zone*
An Explorationof theSemiperipheral
GiovanniArrighi
JessicaDrangel
oftheProblem
I. Statement
LI. Oneofthemoststriking oftheworld-economy
features
ofa significant
istheexistence number ofstatesthatseemtobe
permanently stationedin an intermediatepositionbetween
"maturity"and "backwardness," as modernization theorists
wouldsay,or between"center"and "periphery," as depen-
dencytheoristswouldsay. By wayof illustration, one may
thinkofsomeLatinAmerican states,suchas Argentina,Chile,
♦This articlewas promptedby questionsraised in the Research WorkingGroup
(RWG) on Semiperipheral Statesand in a previousprojecton thePoliticalEconomy
of SouthernEurope, both at the Fernand Braudel Center.The latterprojectwas
mainlyconcernedwithpoliticalchange in SouthernEurope. Its resultshave been
publishedelsewhere(Arrighi,1985a).The RWG on Semiperipheral Stateswas formed
threeyearsago and has been concernedwiththe social and politicaleconomyof
developmentalprocessesthroughan examinationof selectedcase studies.Its results
willbe publishedin a book in 1987.At thistimeof writingthisarticle,thecountries
analyzed by and the personsinvolvedin the RWG werethe following:Argentina
(Roberto P. Korzeniewicz),Chile (Miguel Correa), India (James Matson), Israel
(BeverlyJ. Silver),Italy(GiovanniArrighi),Mexico (JessicaDrangel),Poland (Ravi
© 1986ResearchFoundationof SUN Y
10 GiovanniArrighi& JessicaDrangel
Mexico, and Brazil; of South Africa;and of most Southern

and EasternEuropeanstates,includingtheU.S.S.R.
In thecourseof thetwentieth century,all thesestateshave
experienced far-reaching social and economic transfor-
mations, often associated with politicalconvulsions.Yet in
important respectstheyhavefailedto"catchup" withtheselect
groupofstatesthat,at anypointoftime,havesetthestandards
of statusand wealthin theworld-system. From thispointof
view, and taken as a of
group states, their positiontoday
appearsto be as intermediate as itwas 50 or perhapseven 100
yearsago.
The existenceof a relativelystable intermediate group of
statesis at variancewiththe expectationsof modernization
and dependencytheoriesalike. Accordingto modernization
theory,intermediate positionsare temporary becausetheyare
Statescometo occupyintermediate
transitional'. positionson
their way from backwardnessto modernity.In contrast,
accordingto dependencytheory,intermediatepositons are
temporary becausetheyareresidual:The polarizingtendencies
of the world-economy will ultimatelypull statesin interme-
diate positionstoward the centeror toward the periphery.
Startingfromdifferent, indeedoppositepremises,moderniza-
tion and dependencytheoriesthus agree on the essential
instabilityof intermediatepositions.1
1.2.Theseviewshavebeenimplicitly orexplicitlychallenged
in the 1970'sby theories thatcame to emphasizetheimpor-
Palat), Portugal(Carlos Fortuna),SouthAfrica(WilliamG. Martin),Taiwan(Dennis

Engbarth),and Turkey(EyiipOzveren).We are indebtedto all theparticipants in the
RWG as well as to ImmanuelWallersteinand Brian Van Arkadieforstimulating
discussions,comments,and criticisms at variousstagesof preparationof thearticle.
Special thanksare due to Bill Martinand BeverlySilverfordetailedcommentson an
earlierdraft,to BillDavis forcomputerassistance,and to RobertoKorzeniewiczand
TrevorAbrahamsforhelp in theelaborationand presentation of data.
1. Thesetendencies arestillevidentinmorerecentstudies.Thus,on theone hand,

Rostow (1978: 561, et passim) stressesthe nationaluniquenessof cases of stagnant
economicgrowth.On the otherhand,Amin(1982: 168, 196,etpassim) arguesthat
polarization is immutable,and that semi-industrialized countriesface a bleak
economicfuture.
Stratification
ofWorld-Economy 11
tanceofintermediate positions.Mostlypresented as qualifi-

cationsandelaborations ofdependency theory, somebeganto
conceptualizeintermediate positions between center andperiph-
eryby defining "subimperial" states (Marini,1969)or "go-
between nations" (Galtung,1972).Other theories acknowledged
thepossibility thatdevelopment in generaland industrial-
izationinparticular might occurwithin stateswhilestillrepro-
ducing a structure ofdependence (Cardoso& Faletto,1979).
Theseimportant qualifications andelaborations ofdepen-
dencytheory contain twomainshortcomings. Inthefirst place,
they are too narrowly focused on a special case, that of the
"dependent" or "subordinate" state epitomizedby certain
LatinAmerican countries.
Thisfocusleavesoutofconsidera-
tionsomeof themostsignificant instancesof intermediate
socio-economic - first
status andforemost theU.S.S.R.,which,
farfrombeingdependent or subordinate, is one ofthetwo
worldsuperpowers. it
And, conversely, may lead one to
includeamongintermediate statescountries (suchas Canada)
thathave in all respectsattainedcore statusbut present
featuresof"structural dependency."
In thesecondplace,thetheories inquestion, whilecouched
in a world-systems perspective, focuson individual statesas
theycometooccupyintermediate positions oras theyexperi-
ence"dependent development." Thisleavestheanalysisopen
tovariouskindsof"fallacies ofcomposition" inthesensethat
whatis foundto be trueforindividual statesmaynotbe true
forgroupsofstates.
13. Building upontheseprevious theorizations, Wallerstein's
of
concept semiperiphery was introduced precisely to avoid
theseshortcomings. Thedetailsoftheconceptwillbecritically
examined inthesecondpartofthisarticle.Fornow,suffice it
tosaythatWallerstein follows dependency theoristsin assum-
inga world-economy structured in core-periphery relations.
Theserelations, however, do not linknationalor regional
economies,as in mostversionsof dependency theory, but
economicactivities structured in commodity chainsthatcut
acrossstateboundaries. Core activities are thosethatcom-
manda largeshareof thetotalsurplusproducedwithina
commoditychain and peripheralactivitiesare those that

commandlittleor no such surplus.
All statesenclose withintheirboundariesboth core and
peripheralactivities.Some (corestates)enclosepredominantly
core activitiesand some (peripheralstates)enclosepredomi-
nantlyperipheralactivities.As a consequence,theformer tend
to be thelocus ofworldaccumulationand powerand thelatter
thelocus of exploitationand powerlessness.2
The legitimacyand stabilityof this highlyunequal and
polarizingsystemare buttressedby the existenceof semi-
peripheralstatesdefinedas those that enclose withintheir
boundariesa moreor less evenmix of core-peripheral activi-
ties. Preciselybecause of the relativelyeven mix of core-
peripheralactivitiesthat fall withintheirboundaries,semi-
peripheralstates are assumed to have the power to resist
peripheralization,althoughnotsufficient powerto overcomeit
altogether and move intothe core.
These assumptionshold for groupsof states(core, semi-
peripheral,peripheral)notforindividualstates:
Over timethe loci of economicactivitieskeep changing.. . . Hence
someareas"progress"and others"regress."Butthefactthatparticular
stateschangetheirpositionin theworld-economy, fromsemiperiph-
eryto coresay,orviceversa,does notinitselfchangethenatureofthe
system.These shiftswill be registeredfor individual states as
"development"or "regression." The keyfactorto noteis thatwithina
capitalistworld-economy, all statescannot"develop"simultaneously
sincethesystemfunctionsby virtueof havingunequal
by definition,
core and peripheralregions(Wallerstein,1979:60-61;emphasisin the
original).
therelativeimportance
Accordingto thisconceptualization,
of each stratumor group of states remainsmore or less
constant throughoutthe historyof the capitalist world-
economy (Hopkins & Wallerstein,1977: 129). This stable
oftheworld-economy
structure
three-tiered is inturnassumed
2. Wallerstein arescatteredinbooks and articles

's thoughtson thesemiperiphery
published over the last ten years. The most importantarticlescan be found in
Wallerstein(1979 and 1984) and themostrecentformulation in Wallerstein(1985).
Stratification
ofWorld-Economy 13
toplaya keyroleinpromoting thelegitimacy andstability of

thesystem.3
In thisarticlewe shallbe exclusively concerned withthe
claimthatintermediate statesconstitutea distinctstructural
positionoftheworld-economy. We shallinvestigate whether
threedistinctstructuralpositionsoftheworld-economy canbe
empirically and
identified, whether therelative importance of
eachstratum hasactually remained more or lessconstant,not
overthewholehistory oftheworld-economy, butoverthelast
45 years.
1.4.Evenso delimited, theproblemhas no easysolution.
Wallerstein's on
suggestions howtoidentify thesemiperipheral
zonearenottoo helpful. In an earlywriting on thetopic,he
answersthe question,"How can we tell a semiperipheral
country whenweseeone?"byproviding twocriteria: one,"[in]
a systemof unequalexchange,thesemiperipheral country
standsin between in termsoftheproducts it exportsand in
terms ofthewagelevelsandprofit margins itknows";and,two,
"[the]direct and immediate of
interest the stateas a political
machinery in thecontrol ofthe market (internal andinterna-
tional)isgreaterthanineither thecoreortheperipheral states"
(1979:71,72).
In a laterwriting,wearetoldthatthesemiperiphery
includestheeconomicallystronger countriesofLatinAmerica:Brazil,
Mexico, Argentina,Venezuela,possiblyChile and Cuba. It includes
thewholeouterrimof Europe: thesoutherntierof Portugal,Spain,
Italyand Greece;mostof EasternEurope; partsof thenorthern tier
such as Norway and Finland. It includesa series of Arab states:
Algeria,Egyptand Saudi Arabia; and also Israel.It includesinAfrica
at leastNigeriaand Zaire,and in Asia Turkey,Iran,India,Indonesia,
China, Korea and Vietnam.And it includestheold whiteCommon-
wealth: Canada, Australia, South Africa,possibly New Zealand
(Wallerstein,1979: 100).
Itisimmediately
clearthatthislonglistofstates(accounting
forsomething
ontheorderoftwo-thirds ofworldpopulation)
3. This is an additionalassumptionthatconcernsthefunctionofthesemiperiph-
eral zone and thatis neithernecessarynorsufficient
to accountforitsexistence.
is notbased on thetwocriteriagivenabove. It includesstates

that (1) export the most diversekind of products,(2) are
characterized bythemostdiversewage levels(and, in as faras
we can tell,profitmargins),and (3) pursuethe mostdiverse
policiestowardtheinternaland worldmarkets.As a matterof
fact,thelistsimplyincludesall statesthatseemto occupyan
intermediate positionin theworld-economy fromthepointof
viewofeithertheirincomelevelsortheirpowerintheinterstate
system.The connection between such positions and the
structure of theworld-economy, as spelledout in theconcept
of semiperiphery, is completelylost, and the listcould have
been drawnup withoutanyreference to such a concept.
It is no wonderthateven sympathetic scholarswho have
triedto use theconceptof semiperiphery complainabout its
ambiguitiesand lack of operationality. Thus, Milkman,who
welcomesthe conceptas "a long overdueimprovement over
the two-categoryschemes still prevalentin much of the
theorizingabout internationalrelations,findsit "one of the
weakest and most ambiguous componentsof Wallerstein's
framework" (1979: 264). And Evans,who uses theconceptto
situatehis "Brazilianmodel,"franklyadmitsthat"[until]the
idea ofthe'semi-periphery' has beenspecifiedtheoreticallyand
the characteristics of 'semi-peripheral' countrieshave been
betterelaborated,usingthetermis primarily a wayofasserting
thatthereis a distinctcategoryof countriesthatcannot be
simplyconsidered'peripheral'and yetare structurally distin-
guishablefromcentercountries"(1979: 291).
This is a minimaluse oftheconceptofsemiperiphery which
does notdo justiceto itsinnovativethrustand therichnessof
its theoreticaland practicalimplications.We shall therefore
takeup Evans'schallengeto specify further and to
theoretically
operationalizetheconceptin question.We shallbegin,in Part
II, by restatingand elaboratingWallerstein'sconceptualiza-
tionofthesemiperiphery. In PartIII, we shallderivefromthis
revisedconceptualization operationalcriteriafortheempirical
identification of thethreezones of theworld-economy. As it
turnsout,theapplicationofthesecriteriato data coveringthe
period1938-83allowsus notonlyto identify thethreezonesin
Stratification
ofWorld-Economy 15
question,but also to observesome interestingpatternsof

developmentof the world-economyas a whole and ofeachof
itszones.The fourth and concludingpart of thearticle
will
outline
briefly the main theoretical
implications of these
andtheworkthatremains
findings to be done.
II. The Conceptof Semiperiphery

ILL It hasbeenremarked
that
The conceptofsemiperiphery remainsa prisoneroftheambiguityof
its usages. For it refersus back to two differentdefinitions, without
reallyreconciling them. One is economic:the semiperipherylocated
is
inspace and coversthoseregionswherethesumof"surpluses"coming
in and going out hovers around the zero point. This suggestsan
intermediate situationin thehierarchyoftheworld-economy, linking
a negativebalance withthe"core" and a positiveone withother,less
advancedcountries The otherdefinition is political.It emphasizes
thevoluntaryactionofstatesto improvetherelativepositionoftheir
countriesby acceptingcompetitionbut by pursuinga policy of
catching-up (Aymard,1985:40).
This ambiguity is compounded by thefactthattheterm

"semiperiphery"is sometimes usedtosuggest an intermediate
positioninthehierarchy oftheinterstatesystem. A confusion
between thepositionofa stateinrelation totheworlddivision
oflaboranditspositionintheinterstate system, forexample,
underliesWallerstein's longlistof semiperipheral countries
toinPartI. Itshowsupmorespectacularly
referred inChirot's
claimthat,sincecompletedecolonization has reducedthe
powerdifferentialbetween coreandperipheral states,formal
sovereigntyhaseliminated theperiphery, andthecountries of
Asia,Africa,and LatinAmericacan nowbe categorized as
(1977:148,179-81).
semiperipheral
To avoidtheseambiguities, weshallusetheterm"semipe-
riphery"exclusively to referto a positionin relationto the
worlddivisionoflaborandneverto refer to a positioninthe
interstate In
system. doingthis, we do not imply thatcommand
the
intheeconomicand political world arenas are notclosely
interrelated. On thecontrary,we wantto emphasizethatthe

separationofthetwotypesofcommandis a peculiarity ofthe
capitalistworld-economy (as opposed to world-empires) that
mustbe subjectedto close theoreticaland empiricalscrutiny
ratherthan assumedaway by postulatingtheiridentity(see
II.5, below).
II.2. As we turnto thedichotomycore-periphery, through
whichworld-systems theorydefinesthestructure oftheworld-
economy,we arefacedwithmoreambiguities. The dichotomy
is meant to designatethe unequal distributionof rewards
amongthevariousactivities thatconstitutethesingleoverarch-
ing division of labor definingand bounding the world-
economy.All theseactivitiesare assumedto be integratedin
commoditychains.4These chainscan be analyzedfromtwo
distinctpoints of view. One is that typical of classical
economicsas wellas ofitsMarxiancritique.It focuseson the
distribution ofthetotalproductamonglabor incomes,prop-
ertyincomes,and a residualthatcan be referred to as "pure
profit"or entrepreneurial income.The otheris thattypicalof
world-systems theory.It focuseson the distributionof the
totalproduct,notamongfactorsofproduction,butamongthe
variousnodesofthecommodity chain("economicactivities")-
each consistingof a combinationof differentfactors of
production.
Classicaleconomists(and Marx) purposefully brushedaside
(mainly through the assumption pure competition)the
of
inequality rewardsaccruingto different
of unitsof the same
factorof productionas theyseek remuneration in different
kindsofactivity. World-systems theoryputs at thecenterofits
conceptualizationsprecisely what classical economists had
brushedaside. In doingthis,however,ithas retainedtheterm
"surplus"(throughwhichclassicaleconomistsdesignatednon-
4. "Take an ultimateconsummableitemand traceback the set of inputsthat

culminatedin theitem- thepriortransformations, therawmaterials,thetransporta-
tionmechanisms, thelabor inputintoeach ofthematerialprocesses,thefoodinputs
intothelabor. This linkedset of processeswe call a commoditychain"(Hopkins &
Wallerstein,1977: 128).
Stratification
of World-Economy 17
laborincomes)withoutclearlydefining itsmeaningin thenew

theoreticalconstruction.
In ourview,theuse oftheterm"surplus"is neithernecessary
norhelpfulin defining core-periphery relations.All we needis
to assume that economic actors(irrespective of whetherthey
seek a remunerationfor labor-power,assets, or entrepre-
neurialenergies),farfromacceptingcompetitionas a datum,
continuously endeavorto shift,and some succeedin shifting,
the pressureof competitionfrom themselvesonto other
actors.5As a result,thenodes or economicactivitiesof each
and everycommoditychain tend to become polarized into
positionsfromwhichthe pressureof competitionhas been
transferred elsewhere(core-likeactivities)and positionsto
whichsuchpressurehas beentransferred (peripheralactivities).
It followsthataggregaterewardsinperipheralactivitieswill
tendto approachlevelsofremuneration thatare onlymargin-
ally higher than what the factorsof productionengaged in
themwould collectivelyfetchoutsidethe overarchingworld
divisionof labor. In contrast,aggregaterewardsin core-like
activitieswilltendto incorporatemostifnotall oftheoverall
benefitsof the worlddivisionof labor.6Whetheror not the
rewardsof each class of factorsof production(wages,rents,
and profits),as opposed to aggregaterewards,are higheror
lower in core or peripheralactivitiesis a different issue. It
ofthecenter-periphery
5. This was indeedthespiritoftheoriginalformulations
dichotomyby Prebischand his associates(United Nations, 1950; Prebisch,1959).
This formulation,however,did not take into sufficient account the dynamicand
long-term aspectsoftherelationship.See Hopkinsand Wallerstein(1977:115-16)and
II.3. below.
6. We maychoose to use theterm"surplus"as a short-handdesignationof the
differentialbetweenthetotalproductofa commoditychainand thetotalrewardsthat
wouldaccrueto factorsofproductioniftheywereremunerated at theratesobtaining
inperipheralactivities.Ifwedo so, wecan say(as wedid insection1.3.above) thatcore
activitiesare thosethatcommanda largeshareofthetotalsurplusproducedwithina
commoditychain and peripheralactivitiesare thosethatcommandlittleor no such
surplus.We must,however,be awarethat,conceptually, thisnotionofsurplusis quite
distinctfromthatof surplus-valueused by Marx and the classical economiststo
designateproperty and entrepreneurialincomes.
depends on how aggregaterewardsare distributedbetween

wages,rents,and profitswithineach activity.
To determinethis, we need additional assumptionsand
hypothesesthat do not pertainto the definitionof core-
peripheralactivities.We may assumethatprofitsabsorb the
entiredifferential betweentherewardsof core and peripheral
activities,in whichcase wagesand/or rentswillbe thesamein
bothkindsofactivities.Or we mayassumethatwagesand/or
rentsabsorb thedifferential,in whichcase profitswillbe the
same in core and peripheralactivities.Only under a most
restrictivesetofassumptionscan wetake,as Wallerstein (1979:
71; 1984: 16), Chase-Dunn(1984: 87), and otherssuggestand
do, the level of wages (or of profit) as a criterionfor
distinguishing coreand peripheralactivities.
Thisrestrictiveset
of assumptionsis neithernecessaryto definerigorously core-
peripheryrelationsnor useful in capturingthe varietyof
situations(in termsoffactoraldistribution ofrewards)in and
through which relationshavehistorically
core-peripheral been
reproduced.In whatfollowswe shall therefore take onlythe
level of aggregate rewards as indicative of the core or
peripheralstatusof an activity.
II.3. We furtherassumethatno particularactivity(whether
definedin termsof its output or of the techniqueused) is
inherently core-likeorperiphery-like.
Anyactivity can become
at a particularpoint in timecore-likeor periphery-like, but
each has thatcharacteristicfora limitedperiod.Nonetheless,
thereare alwayssome productsand techniquesthatare core-
likeand othersthatare periphery-like at anygiventime.7
Thereasonforthisassumption isthat,followingSchumpeter,
we tracethefundamental impulsethatgeneratesand sustains
competitivepressuresin a capitalist economy to profit-
7. This differentiatesour positionfromthat of Prebischand the Economic

CommissionforLatinAmerica(ECLA) referred has the
to in footnote5. Wallerstein
meritof having disentangledthe concept of core-periphery relationsfrom any
particularpair of products(such as raw materialsversusmanufactured products)or
fromanyparticularpairofregions/ countries.He stillconfounds,however,thecore-
periphery relationwiththeuseofmoreorlessmechanizedtechniques(see,forexample,
1984: 16).
ofWorld-Economy
Stratification 19
orientedinnovations definedas "the settingup of a new

production function"(1964:62)or,inourterms, thesettingup,
widening, and of
deepening, restructuringcommodity chains.
Thusbroadlydefined, innovations includetheintroductionof
newmethods ofproduction, newcommodities, newsourcesof
supply,new traderoutesand markets, and newformsof
organization.
Theintrusion oftheseinnovations "incessantlyrevolution-
izestheeconomic structure/romwithin,incessantlydestroying
theold one, incessantly creatinga new one" (Schumpeter,
1954:83). In Schumpeter's view,thisprocessof "creative
destruction"istheessenceofcapitalism. On theonehand,itis
"notonlythemostimportant immediate sourceofgains,but
alsoindirectlyproduces,through theprocessitsetsgoing,most
ofthosesituations fromwhichwindfall gainsandlossesarise
andinwhichspeculative operationsacquiresignificant
scope"
(1964: 80). On the otherhand,it causes disequilibria and
cutthroatcompetition; itmakespreexisting productivecombi-
nationsobsolete;itinflictswidespreadlosses(1964:80).
As a consequence,
[spectacular]prizesmuchgreaterthanwould have been necessaryto
call forththe particulareffortare thrownto a small minorityof
winners,thuspropellingmuchmoreefficaciously thana moreequal
and more"just"distribution the
would, activity ofthatlargemajority
of businessmenwho receivein returnverymodestcompensationor
nothingorlessthannothing, and yetdo theirutmostbecausetheyhave
the big prizesbeforetheireyes and overratetheirchancesof doing
equallywell(Schumpeter,1954:73-74).
Schumpeter toexplicate,
usedthisconceptualization among
otherthings,the alternationof long phasesof economic
and"depression,"
"prosperity" orA-andB-phasesas theyare
now called. By assumingthat revolutions in production
occurin discrete
functions rushes,whichareseparated from
each otherby spans of comparativequiet,he dividedthe
incessant
working oftheprocessofcreative destructioninto
twophases- thephaseofrevolution properand thephaseof
absorptionoftheresultsoftherevolution:
Whilethesethingsare beinginitiatedwe have briskexpenditureand

predominating"prosperity" . . . and while[they]are beingcompleted
and theirresultspour forthwe have the eliminationof antiquated
elementsof theindustrialstructure and predominating "depression"
(1954: 68).
Justas Schumpeterassumed that profit-oriented innova-

tionsand theireffects(the dampeningof competitionat one
pole and itsintensification at anotherpole) clusterin time,so
we can assume(irrespective ofthevalidityofthatotherclaim)
thattheyclusterin space. That is to say, we can substitute
"where"for"while"in the above quotationand read it as a
descriptionof core-periphery relationsin space, insteadof a
descriptionof A-B phasesin time.8
II.4. Capitalistenterprises are seldom,ifever,involvedin a
but
singleactivity pool different activitieswithintheirorgani-
zationaldomainsand willtherefore be characterized bymixes
ofcore-peripheral activities.It followsthatin pursuingmaxi-
mum/higherprofitseach enterprisewill continuouslyen-
deavorto upgradethatmixbyentering newfieldsofoperation
and abandoningothersas wellas transforming theactivitiesin
whichit is involvedat any giventime.This is tantamountto
sayingthateachcapitalistenterprise, besidegeneratingcompet-
itivepressuresthroughinnovations,is alwaysand simultane-
ouslyinvolvedin respondingto thepressurescreatedbyother
enterprises - that is in movingout of (or transforming) the
activitiesin whichthecompetitivepressureis highor increas-
ing,and entering activitiesinwhichthecompetitive pressureis
low or decreasing.
Two thingsmustbe noticedabout thisprocess.First,itis a
zero-sumgame.As theriseofan activity to corestatusimplies
thedeclineofone or moreotheractivitiesto peripheralstatus
(i.e., it impliesthatcompetitivepressureshave been shifted
8. We could,ofcourse,retainbothreadingsand tracethetwotypesofunevenness
to a commonsource.For a tentativestepin thisdirection,see Arrighi,
et al. (1986). It
should also be noticedthatthe previousquotationfromSchumpeter(1954: 73-74)
needsno changeto readas a descriptionofcore-peripheral - unlesswe want
relations
to make it more general by substituting"political and economic actors" for
"businessmen."
Stratification
ofWorld-Economy zi
fromone activityto otheractivities), the successof an

enterprise in upgrading its mix of core-peripheral activities
alwaysimplies a more or less generalized downgrading ofthe
mixesof otherenterprises. Secondly, as thecapitalist enter-
prise is a locus of "accumulation" (of assets,expertise,
specializedknowledge, andorganization), thepresent capabil-
itiesofanenterprise toupgrade itsmixofactivities willtosome
extentdependuponitspastsuccessindoingso.
It followsthatcore activitieswill tendto clusterin a
relativelysmallgroupofenterprises that,to borrowanother
expression from "are
Schumpeter, aggressor by natureand
the
wield really effective of
weapon competition" (1954:89).As
shouldbe clear by now, this"reallyeffective weaponof
competition" isthe abilityto shiftcontinuously thepressure of
competition from one's organizational domain onto activities
thatfall outsidethatdomain,by generating a continuous
streamof innovations withina givendomain,and/or by
shifting thedomainitselfin responseto otherenterprises'
innovations. Weshallrefer tothisgroupofenterprises, within
whichcoreactivities tendtocluster, as "corecapital"andtoits
obverse(thenecessarily muchlargergroupofenterprises on
whosedomainof activities the pressureof competition is
as
shifted) "peripheral capital"(see Averitt, 1968).
The clustering of core and peripheral intotwo
activities
differentgroupsofenterprises in
doesnot andbyitself produce
a similarpolarization ofthespaceoftheworld-economy into
core and peripheral zones.To be sure,thepolarization of
capitalistenterprises at
will, anygiventime, have a spatial
dimensionin the obvioussensethatcore capitalmustbe
locatedsomewhere. Wemayalsoassumethatcoreenterprises
areattracted tothesamelocationsbysomeexternal economy
thatensuesfromtheirsticking together. And we maycallthe
ensemble of these locations the "core zone."
Generally speaking,however, anyspatialpolarization of
thissortwouldbehighly unstable inthelongerrunbecausethe
"cost disadvantages" of locationsin the core zone would
inevitablyoutstrip its"revenue advantages. "Thatistosay,the
mainadvantage forcorecapitalofoperating ina corezoneis
theproximity to thelargeand stablemarketsaffordedby the

high rewardsthat accrue to core activities.But these high
rewardsare to some extentalways reflectedin higherrents
and/or higherwagesthanthoseobtainedin peripheralzones.
The morecore capital crowdsinto a specificcore locale, the
more the disadvantagesassociated with these higherrents
and/or wagesare likelyto outstriptheadvantagesassociated
withproximityto highrevenuesand, therefore, to triggera
relocationof core capital towardwhatpreviouslyweremore
peripherallocations.In the absenceof factorsotherthanthe
profit-maximizing thepolar-
activitiesofcapitalistenterprises,
ization of the space of the world-economyinto core and
peripheralzones would thusbe extremely volatile:While,at
anygiventime, core and peripheralactivitieswouldclusterin
different locales,thespecificlocalesthatplaytheroleofcoreor
peripheralzone would be changingall thetime.
II.5. Otherfactors,however,are and historically have been
continuously at work. The competitive struggleamongcapital-
istenterprises has not takenplace in a politicalvoid, but has
beencloselyinterrelated withtheformationofstates- thatis,
offormally sovereign territorial
jurisdictions.Followingworld-
we
systemstheory, assume, one, that a multiplicityof such
states (each with autonomous responsibilityfor political
decisionswithinitsjurisdiction,and each disposingof armed
forces to sustain its authority)has been integralto the
formationof the world-economy, and, two, that almost all
commoditychains of any importancehave traversedtheir
boundaries.
As each statehas formaljurisdictionoverthemovementof
commodities,assets,labor-power,and entrepreneurial ener-
gies across and within its each can
frontiers, state affect to some
degreethe modalitiesby whichthe social divisionof labor
operates.By restricting or enhancingthe freedomof under-
taking or enteringspecificeconomic activities,states can
upgrade some activitiesto corestatusand downgradeothersto
-
peripheralstatus they can, that is, affectthe very core-
peripheralstructure of theworld-economy.
ofWorld-Economy
Stratification 23
Iftheworld-system had a singleoverarching stateappara-

tus,thelattercouldenforce trueandcomplete monopolies that
would be the main if not the onlydeterminant of core-
peripheral relations.The same wouldbe trueof any state
apparatusamongmany,iftherewereno overarching world
divisionoflabor.Butin a capitalist world-economy divided
intoa multiplicity of statejurisdictions, and continuously
subjecttothe endogenous shocks ofinnovations inproduction
functions, thepowerofeach stateapparatusto shapecore-
peripheral relations is alwayslimitedbythepowerof other
statesto do the same and, above all, by the competitive
pressurescontinuously generated byeconomicinnovations.
Inthisconnection, statescanbeassumedtobeinvolved ina
zero-sumgame analogousto the one playedout among
capitalistenterprises but withradicallydifferent ends and
means.The analogyliesin thefactthat,one,statesenclose
withintheirjurisdictional domaina mixof core-peripheral
thattheystrive
activities toupgrade, and,two,thattheactual
upgrading ofthe mix enclosed byanyonestate(or groupof
states)alwaysimplies a more or lessgeneralized downgrading
ofthemixenclosedbyotherstates.Giventhefirst assumption,
thesecondfollowsas a corollary of our definition of core-
periphery relations.
States,however, are notprofit-maximizing units.Nordo
theyorganizeand controltheeconomic activities thatfall
undertheirjurisdictions as closelyand directly as capitalist
enterprises do. The primary function of states is not the
accumulation ofwealthbutthereproduction oftheirmonop-
oly of thelegitimate use of violenceovera giventerritory
againstchallengesfromotherstatesand fromtheirown
subjects.Statestherefore pursuelegitimacy and use forcein
such a pursuit - an objectiveand an instrument that are
normally alien to the capitalist enterprise.
Notwithstanding thesedifferences between capitalistenter-
prisesand states, we assume that too
states striveto upgrade
(ortoprevent thedowngrading of)their mixofcore-peripheral
Economic
activities. command hasa cumulative character that
is wantingin political command because "wealth" can be

accumulatedmoreeasilythan"power."The capacityto bring
(cumulating)economiccommandto bear upon (noncumulat-
ing)politicalcommandis thusalwaysan important ingredient
in the strugglefor legitimacyand power among states and
betweenstatesand theirsubjects.9
In a capitalistworld-economy, thecapacityofstatesto do so
is always problematic.The main difficulty is thateconomic
commandis largelydependentupon an innovativeparticipa-
tion in the worlddivisionof labor (II. 3), and thatcapitalist
enterprises haveprogressively becomethespecializedagencies
ofsuchparticipation (II.4). The problemofupgradinga state's
mix of core-peripheral activitiesis thuslargelya problemof
being able to attractand develop organic links with"core
capital" (as definedin the previoussection).This capacityis
onlyinparta reflection ofa state'spoliticalpower- thechance
thatits commandswill be obeyedby otherstatesand by its
subjects.For thereasonsgivenbelow,itdependsequallyifnot
more on the extentto whicha state has alreadydeveloped
organiclinkswithcorecapitaland,therefore, alreadyencloses
withinitsjurisdictiona predominantly core mix of activities.
Thisdependenceofthepresentand futurecapacityofa state
to upgradeitsmixofcore-peripheral activitieson itsprevious
successin doingso, generates,to use Myrdal's(1956) expres-
sion, processesof "circularand cumulativecausation" that
have been thebread and butterof dependencytheory.These
processes are most obvious and plausible when they are
referred to the oppositeends of the spectrumformedby the
variousmixesof core-peripheral activitiesenclosedby states:
the peripheralend, consistingof statesthatenclosepredom-
9. It is not, however,the only ingredient.Economic peripherallycan be
compensatedor more than compensatedin the political arena by size, ideology,
organization,and politicalinnovationsofvariouskinds(see Schurmann,1974).This
was demonstratedin a strikingway by the militaryand politicaldefeatof the most
powerfulcore state(the U.S.) bya relatively
smalland economicallyperipheralstate
(Vietnam). At the same time,the defeatdid not significantly affectthe relative
economiccommandofthetwostates,whichremainedas core(U.S.) and as peripheral
(Vietnam)as theywerebeforetheconfrontation.
Stratification
ofWorld-Economy 25
inantly peripheral activities,and thecoreend,consisting of

statesthatenclosepredominantly coreactivities.
Giventhelargegap betweenthemixesthatcharacterize
thesetwogroupsofstates, theassumption thatcorestateshave
a muchgreater capability thanperipheral statesto retain/ at-
tractcorecapitalwithin their jurisdiction is relativelyeasyto
justify.For thelarge(and growing) differential between the
rewards thataccruetocore-like activitiesandthosethataccrue
toperipheral activities10
is necessarily reflected ina capability
ofcorestates(anda corresponding incapability ofperipheral
states)(1) to control access to the most remunerative outletsof
all majorcommodity to
chains,(2) provide the infrastructure
andservices required bycore-like activities,and(3) tocreatea
politicalclimatefavorable to capitalist entrepreneurship.
Thismeansthatcorestatescontroltherevenue advantages
ofcorelocationsand can use thatcontrolbothto developa
symbiotic relation withthecorecapitalthatis alreadylocated
within their jurisdiction,andtoattract morecorecapitalfrom
peripheral locations. To be sure, peripheral statescontrolthe
costadvantages ofperipheral locations.Generally speaking,
however, theycannotuse thiscontrolto competeeffectively
withcorestatesinattracting corecapitalfortwomainreasons.
Inthefirst place, giventhe muchlarger number ofperipheral
thancorestates, itiseasierforthelatter tobargainandobtain
freeaccesstothecostadvantages ofperipheral locationsthanit
is fortheformer to bargainand obtainfreeaccessto the
revenueadvantages ofcorelocations.As a consequence, the
costadvantage ofperipheral locations isfarmore"dependent"
on a freeaccessto therevenueadvantages ofcorelocations
thanthelatteraredependent on a freeaccessto theformer.
In thesecondplace,andcloselyrelatedtotheabove,inthe
environment typicalof thecorezone- characterized by re-
munerative markets, efficient infrastructures and services,and
a politicalclimate favorable tocapitalist enterprise- highcosts
10. On thecircumstances in questioncan be assumed

underwhichthedifferential
to be not onlylargebutalso growing,see footnote16.
arenotan obstaclebutan incentive to thecontinuousstreamof

innovationsthatis requiredto reproducethezone'scorestatus.
In contrast,intheenvironment typicaloftheperipheral zone-
characterized byfragmented anddiscontinuous markets, ineffi-
cientinfrastructure and services,and a politicalclimateoften
unfavorableto capitalistentrepreneurship - high costs are
powerlessin sustaininginnovationswhile low costs simply
providean incentiveto organizeperipheralactivities.11
It followsthat,overtime,corestatesand corecapitaltendto
develop a symbioticrelationshipthat increaseseach other's
capabilityto consolidateand reproducetheirassociationwith
predominantly core-likeactivities.The obverseof this ten-
dency is the endemic inabilityof peripheralstatesto escape
their association with predominantlyperipheralactivities.
Taken together,the two tendenciesimply a stable if not
growingpolarizationofthespace oftheworld-economy intoa
peripheral and a core zone.
II.6. Thisconclusionis plausiblewhenreferred to statesthat
havejurisdictionovera mix of core-peripheral activitiesthat
fallseitherbelow a verylow thresholdof core-likeactivities
presentin themix(peripheralstates)or above a muchhigher
threshold(core states). There is no reason, however,for
supposingthatitappliesto all thosestatesthathappento have
jurisdictionover a more or less even mix of core-peripheral
activities(semiperipheral states).
Thesestateswillbe subjectto thesamepolarizingtendencies
thatcontinuouslyreproducethecore and peripheralzones of
the world-economy.Yet the more or less even mix of core-
peripheralactivitiesthatfalls undertheirjurisdictionoffers
11. Anotherreasonlowerwagesintheperipheralzone failto attractcoreactivities

is thattheyarenormallyaccompaniedbytendenciesthatoffset theirpositiveeffects on
costsofproduction.Since therewardsin peripheralactivitiesare,bydefinition (II. 3),
onlymarginally higherthanwhatfactorsofproductioncould earnoutsidethesocial
divisionoflabor oftheworld-economy, in rewardsis largelya wage
ifthedifferential
differential,there will be a strongtendencyamong peripheralhouseholdersto
withdrawperiodicallylabor-powerfromthe circuitsof the world-economy.As a
consequence,labor suppliesand outletsforcapitalistproductionbecomeevenmore
discontinuousand unreliablethantheypreviouslywerewithobviousnegativeeffects
on profitability.
Stratification
of World-Economy 27
semiperipheral statesthechanceto resistperipheralization by

exploitingtheirrevenueadvantagevis-à-visperipheralstates
and theircostadvantagevis-à-viscorestates.Theymaydo this
ina numberofways.Theymayattemptto obtainsomekindof
isolation fromcompetitivepressuresby strengthening the
linkagesthatconnectthecoreand peripheralactivities thatfall
withintheirboundariesat theexpenseofthelinkagesthatcut
acrossthoseboundaries.Or theymaytryto followtheopposite
policy of strengthening one or anothercost advantage of
production located within theirjurisdictionin competition
withcore locales. Or theymaytrysome combinationofthese
two strategiesin an attemptto have the best of two worlds:
someprotectionofcore activitieswithintheirboundariesand
intensification of competitionin the core activitieslocated
outsidetheirboundaries.Whateverthestrategy, stateactionin
thesemiperipheral zone does makea difference: Byselectively
exploitingthe peripheralizing tendenciesof the world-econ-
omy,semiperipheral stateswillnormallymanageto counteract
them.
These strategies,however,willgenerallybe counterproduc-
tive fromthe point of view of upgradingthe mix of core-
peripheralactivities ofstatesinthesemiperipheral zone.To the
extentthatsemiperipheral statessucceedin isolatingthecore-
like activitieslocated withintheirjurisdictionfromworld
competitivepressures,theyalso deprivethemof the advan-
tages of operatingin a wider economic space and of the
incentiveto generatethe continuousstreamof innovations
whichalone,in thelongrun,can reproducecorepositions.To
theextentthatsemiperipheral statessucceedin enhancingthe
cost advantagesof locations withintheirjurisdictions,pro-
ducersinthesemiperipheral zone can effectivelycompetewith
producers in the core zone. This competition,however,far
fromupgrading the mix of core-peripheral activitiesof the
semiperipheral zone,is one ofthemechanismsthatturnscore-
likeactivitiesintoperipheralactivitiesand keepsthemixofthe
zone moreor lesseven.
This conceptualization does notexcludethepossibility that
individualsemiperipheral states,pursuinga particularly inno-
vativecombinationof economicpoliciesand/or blessedby a

world-economicconjuncturethat gives them some strong
competitive advantage,can upgradetheirmixofcore-periph-
eralactivities untiltheybecomecorestates.Nordoes itexclude
thatperipheralstatescan similarlymoveintothesemiperiph-
eral zone. On the contrary,these transitionsmust be con-
sidered not only real possibilitiesbut key mechanismsof
reproductionof the threeseparatezones of the world-econ-
omy.Justas theendemicinabilityofperipheral statesto escape
theirassociationwithpredominantly peripheralactivities is the
obverse of the core state's capabilityto consolidate their
associationwithpredominantly core-likeactivities(II.5), so
theinabilityofthebulkofsemiperipheral statesto moveinto
thecore(and ofperipheralstatesto moveintothesemiperiph-
ery)is theobverseofthesuccessofsomestatesto upgradetheir
mixofcore-peripheral activitiesand moveto a higherposition.
Our conceptualizationdoes imply,however,that these are
exceptionsthroughwhichtheruleis enforced, and thattherule
is forstatesto remaininthezone inwhichtheyalreadyhappen
to be.
II.7. In sum, statesare not passive recipientsof mixes of
core-peripheralactivities.Although all of them striveto
upgradeor at leastto preventthedowngradingofthemixthat
fallsundertheirjurisdiction, thecapabilityactuallyto succeed
in theendeavoris notequallydistributed amongall states.It
variesdiscontinuously withtheweightofcore-likeactivitiesin
themixthatalreadyfallsundera statejurisdiction.
According to our conceptualization,the interactionof
economicand politicalprocessesof the world-economy pro-
duces a frequency distributionofworldpopulationbythemix
ofcore-peripheral activitiesofthestateofresidenceofthetype
shownin Figure 1. The distribution is assumedto be highly
skewedtowardthelowerend of therangeof core-peripheral
mixesbecauseperipheralactivitiesare,bydefinition, farmore
crowdedthan core activities.Point PC on the x-axis corre-
spondsto thethresholdabove whichstateshavethecapability
to upgradethemixthatfallsundertheirjurisdiction, so as to
Stratification
of World-Economy 29
Figure1: HypotheticalDistributionof WorldPopulation (Percentageof World

Population by Mix of Core-PeripheralActivitiesof the State of
Residence)
theircoreposition;andpointPP corresponds
consolidate to
thethresholdbelowwhichstateshavelittleor no power,not
onlytoupgradebutevento prevent thedowngrading oftheir
mixprovoked bytheconsolidation ofcorepositions.
Weshall
to thesethresholds
refer as "perimeter ofthecore"(PC) and
oftheperiphery"
"perimeter (PP) to designatethefactthat
theydefine, the
respectively, lower boundary ofthecorezone
andtheupperboundary oftheperipheral zone.12
12. The term"perimeterofthecore"(and, byanalogy,theterm"perimeter ofthe

periphery")is takenfromLange (1985) who,however,uses itin a different
sense(see
Arrighi,1985b:247).
Betweenthesetwo thresholdslies thesemiperipheral zone,

thatis theensembleof all statesthat,because of themoreor
lessevenmixofcore-peripheral activitiesoverwhichtheyhave
wield
jurisdiction, the power preventthe downgradingof
to
theirmixbuthave littlepowerto promoteitsupgrading.This
tri-modaldistributionallows us to give a preciseanalytical
meaningto theconceptofsemiperiphery becauseitprovidesus
with two obvious cuttingpoints through which we can
unequivocallysingleout threegroupsofstatesor zones ofthe
world-economy:a peripheral,a semiperipheral, and a core
zone. All we need at thispointin orderto identify the three
zonesis someoperationalmeasurement ofthevariousmixesof
core-peripheralactivities.
III. The Stratification

of theWorld-Economy:
An EmpiricalAnalysis
///./.It must be stated at the outset that there is no

operationalwayofempirically distinguishing betweenperiph-
eral and core-likeactivitiesand therefore of classifying
states
accordingto the mix of core-peripheralactivitiesthat falls
undertheirjurisdiction.As repeatedlyemphasized(II. 2, II.3),
no lineor techniqueofproductioncan, in and ofitself,define
an activityas core-likeor periphery-like.13 Whethera partic-
ular activityis one or the otheralwaysdepends on its ever-
changingrelationships ofcooperationand competition withall
other activitiesof the world-economy.In order to classify
activitiesas core-likeor periphery-like,we would minimally
need a completemap of all commoditychains of the world-
economy,as wellas an assessmentof therelativecompetitive
pressureat each of theirnodes. This is in itselfan impossible
task whichwould onlyraise further problemsof meaningful
quantification and aggregationof thedata collected.
13. The mostsophisticated
attempts statesaccordingto activities
at classifying are,
to our knowledge,Snyderand Kick (1979) and Nemethand Smith(1985). While
unhelpfulin identifyingthethreezones of theworld-economy, thesestudiescan be
veryvaluable in definingthetradepatternsof statesin differentstructural positions
once thesepositionshave been identifiedon some othergrounds(see III.6 below).
ofWorld-Economy
Stratification 31
Fortunately, wedo notneedtoundertake suchan exercise.

Mixes of core-peripheral activitiesplay in world-systems
theory a roleanalogoustothatplayedby"marginal in
utility"
neo-classical pricetheory or "labor embodied" in Ricardian
andMarxiantheories ofvalue.Allsuch"quantities" playa key
role in theirrespective conceptualizations but cannotbe
subjected todirectmeasurement. Whatmatters istobeableto
derivefrom theconceptualization a setofempirically verifiable
hypotheses thatcanprovideus withindirect measurements of
key variables.
Fromthispointof viewour conceptualization is highly
operational.According to our assumptions, activities
core
commandaggregate rewards thatincorporate most,ifnotall,
oftheoverallbenefits oftheworlddivisionoflabor,whereas
peripheral commandaggregate
activities rewards thatincor-
if
poratefew, any, of those benefits (see II.2. above).The
greatertheweightof peripheral activities in themixfalling
withinthejurisdiction ofa givenstate,thesmaller theshareof
thetotalbenefits oftheworlddivision oflaborcommanded by
theresidents of thatstate.And,conversely, thegreaterthe
weight ofcoreactivities,thelargertheshareofthosebenefits
commanded bytheresidents ofa state.Thedifferences inthe
commandovertotalbenefits of theworlddivisionof labor
mustnecessarily be reflectedin commensurate differencesin
theGNP percapitaofthestatesinquestion.
We can therefore take GNP per capita expressedin a
commonmonetary unit as an indirectand approximate
measurement ofthemixofcore-peripheral activities thatfall
withinthejurisdiction ofa givenstate.WetakethelogofGNP
percapita,notonlybecauseofitshighly skeweddistribution,
butmainly becauseweareinterested intherelative rather than
theabsolutedifferences among states. And we take GNP per
capitainU.S. dollarsatmarket exchange ratesbecauseweare
interested in differencesin commandoverworldeconomic
resourcesratherthanin differences in actualstandardsof
living.14
countriesconverted
14. The problemsofcomparingGNP percapita of different
intoa commonmonetary theuseofmarketexchangeratesarewell-known.
unitthrough
III.2. Usingdata fromthesourcesspecifiedin AppendixI,

populationby state (as percentageof total population)was
plottedby thelog of GNP per capita in 1970U.S. dollars,by
intervalsof one-tenth.The resultingfrequencydistributions,
smoothedby means of a three-intervals movingaverage,are
in
shown Figure2. As can be seen,fiveoutofninedistributions
(1938, 1950, 1975, 1980, and 1983) are roughlytri-modal,
whereasthe tri-modality of the distributions for 1948, 1960,
1965, and especially 1970 is more doubtful.
In all instances,however,the distributionspresentthe
followinganalogieswiththeideotypicaldistribution ofFigure
1: (1) All havea maximumin thelowerrangesofloggedGNP
per capita thatstands out as an obvious "peripheralmode"
(PM); (2) at theotherextremeof the range,all turnupward
generating a local maximumthatcan be identified as the"core
mode" (CM); (3) all but the 1960distribution (whichhas two
intermediate peaks of equal frequencyseparatedby a single
interval) have one intermediate peak (separatedfromthecore
and peripheralmodesbyone ormorelow-frequency intervals),
whichwe can identify as the"semiperipheral mode" (SM). In
thecase of 1960,we have somewhatarbitrarily chosenas the
semiperipheral mode the interval falling between the two
peaks.
The factthatthethreezonesare inmostinstancesseparated
by one or morelow-frequency intervals,ratherthanbysingle
cuttingpoints(PP and PC) as in Figure1, does notin anyway
contradictour previousconceptualization.On the contrary,
the longerthe low-frequency stretch,the strongermustwe
considerthe evidencethatthe periphery, semiperiphery, and
core zones constituteseparate structuralpositions of the
Theyderivefromthefactthatexchangeratesreflect whatcurrencies commandon the

worldmarketratherthanwhattheycommandwithinthejurisdictions oftherespective
states. Studies are in progressto findconversioncriteriathat will make national
accounts comparable in termsof currencypurchasingpower ratherthan implicit
commandoverworld-economic resources(see Kravis,et al., 1975,1978,1982).From
our pointofview,however,theproblemdoes notarisebecauseourconceptualization
refersto commandover worldeconomic resourcesand not to actual standardsof
living.
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world-economy. Long low-frequency stretches,however,do

not provide obvious cuttingpoints at which to set the
boundariesbetweenthezones,as theyoftenpresentmorethan
one minimumthatcould be legitimately chosenas theactual
The
boundary. codingprocedure we have adopted(see Appen-
dix II) represents
a compromisebetweentheneedto definethe
zones in the spiritof our previousconceptualizationand the
needto retainforfurther analysisas manyfeaturesas possible
oftheactual distributions.
Generallyspeaking,in interpreting both the discrepancies
and thesimilaritiesbetweentheactualdistributions ofFigure2
and theideotypicaldistribution ofFigure1, itshouldbe borne
in mindthatthelatterrefersto spans of timelong enoughto
allow structuralfactorsto counteracttheshort-term of
effects
randomfactorsand themedium-term effectsof conjunctural
factors.The varioussmoothingprocedureswe adopted,as well
as those alreadyembodied in our data base, weremeantto
eliminateas many random influencesas possible fromthe
observeddistributions. The factthat,evenafterthesmoothing,
some of thesedistributions are stilla verypale reflection
of a
tri-modaldistributionis in part due to the influenceof the
conjuncturalfactorsthatwe shall presentlydiscuss.In part,
however,it is due to thefactthatrandomshocksare notjust
"disturbing" influences on the"normal"workingofthesystem
butare integralto it. Innovationsand paritiesamongnational
currencies,forexample,are bothkeysystemicfeaturesof the
world-economy. But both are also generallysubjectto some
degree of randomnessin theiroccurrenceand short-term
effects.15
15. In theveryshortrun,theeffectsofinnovationson thedistribution ofbenefits
havea strongrandomcomponentinthesensethatbenefits and lossesinitially
accrueto
states and enterprisesaccordingto the particularcombinationof resourcesthey
happen to "sit on," ratherthan or in addition to theirpast, present,and future
capabilitiesto appropriatebenefits.
These randomeffects,however,willimmediately
triggeroffactions and reactionswhich,over time,will reshapethe distributionof
benefitsin accordanceto relativecapabilities.
Mutatismutandis,similarconsiderationsapplyto anotherkeyfactorin the
distribution ofbenefits:
thesystemofparitiesat whichthevariousnationalcurrencies
exchangewitheach other.At any giventime,a moreor less largenumberof such
Stratification
ofWorld-Economy 37
Grantedall this,the observeddistributions of Figure2

suggest that random influencesare onlypart ofthe story.More
specifically, thefact thatfive out of nine distributions show
roughbut clearfeatures of tri-modality suggests in
that, all
likelihood, systematicinfluences ofthekindassumedin our
conceptualization are indeed at work. In orderto assessthe
extentand natureoftheseinfluences, letus nowturnto an
intertemporal analysisofourninedistributions.
III.3. The modesofthethreezonesforthevariousyears
underconsideration havebeenplottedin Figure3, and the
cumulative distribution ofworldpopulation byzoneinFigure
4. Whenpoints are not joinedby a line (as 1948 and 1950),it
meansthattheyarenotcomparable. Whentheyarejoinedbya
brokenline(as 1950and 1960),itmeansthatcomparability is
limited (see AppendixI).
The two chartsbringintoreliefdifferent aspectsof the
stratification of the world-economy. Figure3 showsthe
evolution overtimeofthedistanceorgapbetween zones,and
Figure 4 shows theevolution over time of theirrelativesizeor
weight.
Whenwefocusonthedistance between, andrelative sizesof,
thecoreandtheperipheral zones,twomainfactsemerge from
ourcharts.First,thegapbetween thetwozones(as measured
bythedifference ofthelogs[or bytheratio]oftheirmodal
GNP percapita)has increased intheperiodunderconsider-
ationbuttheentireincreasehas occurredsincethemiddle
1960's.As can be seen fromFigure3, the core and the
peripheral modesexperienced rapidgrowth in 1938-48, slow
growthin 1950-60and zerogrowth in 1960-65. In all these
periodsthetworatesof growthwereidentical.After1965,
however, although thecoremoderesumed itsascentin step-
likebutsteadyfashion, theperipheral modestagnated so that
paritiesare criéespar hasard (as Walras would have said), that is, theyincludea
randomcomponentthat will be reflectedin the observeddistributionof benefits
among states. Only in the longerrun,will the relativecapabilitiesto appropriate
benefitsemergeas the key determinantof both the systemof paritiesand the
distributionof incomes.
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39
in 1983 it stillwas at its 1960 level. Secondly,as can be seen

fromFigure4, therelativesizeoftheperipheralzone increased
sharplyfrom3-4timesthesize ofthecorezone in 1938/1948/
1950to 7-9 timesin 1960/1965/1970.Thereafter, however,it
hasdeclined,attaining in 1980/1983moreorlessits1938/1948/
1950level.
Thesetrendscan be interpreted as evidencethatoverthelast
45 yearsthepolarizingtendenciesoftheworld-economy have
not lessenedbutchangedin intensity and mode of operation.
In the 1940'sno polarizingtendenciesare in evidence.From
1950 up to themiddle1960'stheymaterializedin a widening
peripheralization (i.e., in an increaseintherelativeproportion
of worldpopulationlocatedin theperipheralzone); sincethe
middle1960's,in contrast,theyhave materializedin a deepen-
ing peripheralization(i.e., in a wideningof the gap that
separatesthecoreand theperipheralzones). The netoutcome
has beenthefollowing:Whilethesize oftheperiphery relative
to thatofthecoreis intheearly1980'smoreor lesswhatitwas
in the 1940fs,thegap betweenthemodal rewardsof thetwo
zones has widenedappreciably.16
If we now switchour focusto thesemiperipheral zone, we
are struckby the fact that the polarizingtendenciesof the
world-economy have in the long run failedto affectin any
significantway the size and position of the semiperipheral
zone. Notwithstanding considerableshort-to medium-term
fluctuations, bytheearly1980's,itsmodeoccupiedas interme-
diate a positionas it did in 1938 or in 1950 (see Figure 3).
Moreover,it is interesting to noticethatthesize of thesemi-
16. In interpreting itshouldbe borneinmindthata constantdegreeof

thisfinding,
polarizationbetweenanytwoofthethreestructural positionsoftheworld-economy
(expressedin termsof mixesof core-peripheral activitiesas in Figure 1) impliesa
growingor a narrowinggap expressedin loggedGNPPC accordingto whetherthe
benefitsoftheworlddivisionoflabor can be assumedto be increasingor decreasing
over time. Since the threestructuralpositions are definedin termsof unequal
capabilitiesof statesto appropriatethose benefits,if the inequalityin capabilities
remainsthesamebutthebenefitsareincreasing, thegap betweentherewardsofthose
whohavelowerand thosewhohavehighercapabilitiesshouldalso increase(and ifthe
benefitsare decreasing,thegap betweenrewardsshouldalso decrease).
ofWorld-Economy
Stratification 41
peripheral zonehas remained remarkably constant through-

outtheperiod(see Figure4).
The picturethatemergesfromFigure3 is one of two
relativelyrigidlines(corresponding to thetrajectories ofthe
peripheral and core a
zones)enclosing space within whicha
third, moreflexible line(corresponding tothetrajectory ofthe
semiperipheral zone) moves up and down between the"ceiling"
setbythetrajectory ofthecorezoneandthe"floor"setbythe
trajectory oftheperipheral zone.Whentheintermediate line
getsclosetotheceiling, as itdoesinthedecade1960-70 (orthe
floor),theboundaries between thesemiperiphery andthecore
(or the in
periphery) Figure 2 tend to be blurred and the
corresponding frequency distribution may seem tohave turned
bi-modal.
This,however, provesto be onlya temporary effectofthe
and
pulls pushes to which the trajectory of thesemiperipheral
zoneis subject.Thesepullsandpushescan be interpreted as
evidenceofthefactthatthesemiperipheral zoneis subjectto
thesamepolarizing tendencies thatkeepthecoreandperiph-
eralzoneswideapart.Yetinrelative terms, thesemiperipheral
zonesometimes loses(as in 1938-48 andagainin 1970-83) and
sometimes benefits (as in 1950-70) fromthesetendencies, and
thisalternation iswhathasreproduced thesemiperiphery as a
distinctstructural position of the world-economy.
This finding seemsto substantiate our claimthatsemi-
peripheralstatesare capable of selectively exploitingthe
peripheralizing tendencies of the world-economy so as to
the
prevent downgrading of their mix of core-peripheral
activitiesbut not sufficiently to attaincore status(II.6).
However, according to ourassumptions, themainreasonfor
theexistence ofa three-tiered structure oftheworld-economy
is itsdivisionintoa multiplicity ofstatejurisdictions endowed
withunequalcapabilities to enforce /resist peripheralization.
Statesintheuppertierfinditrelatively easyto remainthere;
statesin the lowertierfindit extremely to move
difficult
upward; and states in the middle tier generally have the
capability to resist peripheralization but not thecapability to
moveintotheuppertier.Upwardanddownward mobility of
individualstatesis thusnot excludedbut consideredexcep-

tional(II.6).
It followsthatin orderto substantiateour hypothesisit is
notenoughto showthata three-tiered structureoftheworld-
economy can be identified over a longperiodoftime,
relatively
as we have just done. It is also necessaryto show that the
state-composition of each zone has not substantially changed
over an equally long period of time.If we findthatthishas
actuallybeen thecase, thenwe have good reasonsto believe
thatthereproductionof thethree-tiered structure is no mere
accidentbutprobablytheoutcomeoftheunequalcapabilities
of statesto enforce/ resistperipheralization.
Ill A. In orderto verify theextentto whichthereproduction
ofthethree-tiered structure oftheworld-economy overthelast
45 yearshas been associated witha highor low mobilityof
states across the boundaries of the three zones, we have
constructeddouble-entry tablesthatclassifystatesaccording
to theirposition at the beginningand at the end of three
differentperiods: 1938/50-1975/83 (Table 1), 1938/50-
1960/1970(Table 2) and 1960/70-1975/83 (Table 3).17Table 1
is themostimportant, because itcoversthewholeperiodand
becauseitcomparesyearsinwhichthethree-tiered structure of
theworld-economy was mostclearlyinevidence.We therefore
startwithTable 1 and thendiscussthetwosubperiodscovered
byTables 2 and 3.
TherearetwowaysofreadingTable 1: (1) alongtherowsor
thecolumnsto gauge thegainsand losses ofeach zone, or (2)
along the diagonals to gauge the overall mobility(or lack
thereof)of the system.Reading along the main diagonal
(core/core, periphery/ periphery), we singleout all the states
thatin 1975-83wereexactlyin thesame structural positionas
theywerein 1938-50.Ifwe add themup,we obtaina totalof66
statesout of 93 (or 71%) whichaccountfor84% of thetotal
populationofthe93 states,irrespective ofwhetherwe takethe
1950 or 1983 populationfigures.These percentagesalready
17. The procedurefollowedin classifying states,as wellas thenamesofthestates
fallingin each slot,are specifiedin AppendixIII.
Stratification
of World-Economy 43
TABLE 1
PositionofStatesin 1975-83Comparedto Their
Positionin 1938-50
Position in 1938-50
Core PC PP ^^^ Total

periphery
(a) 11 4 3 18 (+7)
Z (b) 13.1 2.6 5.6
3 (c) 10.4 1.8 4.3 16.5 (+3.4)
(a) 1 4 5 (-1)
g (b) .1 1.4
-, (c) .1 1.2 1.3 (-2.0)
00
I - - - __________ ----- ----- - - - - ______ _______________
m
S , S (a) 1 23 5 1 30 (-3)
*c a •§, (b) .6 18.6 0.8 0.8
c 'Sit<u (c) .8 17.6 1.0 1.0 20.4 (-5.9)
•S 2:
« (a) 2 4 2 8 (-5)
£ £ (b) 0.5 0.3 2.7
(c) 0.7 0.5 3.5 4.7 (+2.4)
>>
S (a) 14 27 32 (+2)
•£ (b) 0.2 1.2 51.6
t<u (c) 0.3 1.5 55.5 57.3 (+2.2)
(a) 11 6 33 13 30 93 (0)
^ (b) 13.1 3.3 26.3 2.3 55.1 100.0
S (c) 100.0
NOTE: (a) # of states,(b) % of populationin 1950; (c) % of populationin 1970.

See AppendixIII forsourcesand procedure.
implya lowoverallmobilityofstatesacrosstheboundariesof
thethreezones.Thestatesalongthemaindiagonal,however,
arenotonlyonesthathavenotcrossedtheboundaries from
one zone to another.The statesalongthetwo contiguous
diagonals(core/ ofthecore,periphery/
perimeter perimeterof
theperiphery)arestatesthathavemovedfroma zoneto its
upperorlowerboundary (orfroma boundary toa contiguous
zone)but without the
crossing boundary itself.
Altogetherthey
are22statesthataccountedfor10%oftotalpopulation bothin
1950andin 1983.
In sum,95% ofthestatesforwhichwe could finddata (and

94% oftotalpopulation)werein 1975/83stillon or withinthe
boundariesofthezone in whichtheywerein 1938/50.Taking
the periodas a whole,upwardor downwardmobilityin the
systemhas beentrulyexceptional.Accordingto Table 1, ithas
beenlimitedto threecases oftransition froma semiperipheral
to a coreposition(Japan,Italy,and Libya,as can be seenfrom
thecorresponding tableofAppendixIII); one case ofupward
mobility from peripheryto semiperiphery (South Korea, to
whichTaiwan wouldprobablybe added ifwe had data forthe
lateryears);and one case of downwardmobilityfromsemi-
periphery to periphery (Ghana).
The factthattwo relativelylargestates(Japan and Italy)
have succeededin movingfromthesemiperiphery to thecore
and thefactthatdemographicgrowthin theperipheralzone
has been higherthanin both thecore and the semiperiphery
accountfortheseemingpolarizationof the systemshownin
the"total"columnofthetable.In thiscolumn,we haveputin
bracketsthelosses(-) or gains(+) of statesand of percentage
pointsoftotalpopulationexperiencedovertheperiodbyeach
position. Taking the three intermediatepositionstogether
(semiperiphery, perimeterof the core, and perimeterof the
periphery), in the45-yearperiodconsideredtheyhave lost 9
statesout of 52 (7 to thecore and 2 to theperiphery) and 5.6
of
percentagepoints population out of 3 1.9 (3.4 to thecore and
2.2 to theperiphery).
At this rate, it would take a centuryor more for the
semiperiphery to lose itssignificance- assumingthatitwould
do so whenit accountedfor15% or less of worldpopulation.
But of coursewe do not knowwhethertheloss of thelast 45
yearscan be extrapolatedintothefuture, as itmighthavebeen
influencedby cyclical or conjuncturalfactors.The period
coveredby our data is not long enoughto allow us to isolate
anysuchinfluences. It is longenough,however,to giveus some
idea of theirpossibleimpacton thetrend.We havealreadyseen
how the polarizing and peripheralizingtendenciesof the
world-economy have been characterizedby different intensi-
ofWorld-Economy
Stratification 45
tiesandmodesofoperation indifferentsubperiodsofthetime
spancoveredbyourdata(II.3). Tables2 and3 cannowprovide
us withfurther
insights intothischanging modeofoperation.
Themoststriking featuresofthesetwotablesare,one,that
theybothshowa greateroverallmobilitythanTable1and,two,
that the mobilityis exclusivelydownwardin the period
1938/50-1960/70 exclusivelyupwardin the period
and
Thecentral
1960/70-1975/83. diagonal(core/core,periphery/
ofTable2 accountsfor51%ofthetotalnumber
periphery) of
TABLE 2
Positionin 1938-50
Position in 1938-50
Core PC PP ^P'^ Total

periphery
« (a) 3 3
<b> 7'3 7.3
|
(a) 7 7
£ (b) 5.2 5.2
o
i
o
S . «' (a) 7 13 20
c go. 0>) 5.7 17.6 23.3
to u
eo
<u
q
- """-~~ - ~~~- '~~ ~~~ .-------
________________
________________________ _________________
•H
» (a) 7 1 8
j2 & (b) 2.6 0.4 2.9
S (a) 12 12 30 54
•g. (b) 5.1 2.0 54.3 61.4
-h (a) 10 7 32 13 30 92
2 (b) 12.5 5.7 25.2 2.4 54.3 100.0
NOTE: (a) # of states; (b) % of population. See Appendix III for sources and
procedure.
TABLE 3
Positionin 1960-70
Position in 1960-70
Core PC PP ^WW Total

periphery
(a) 3 7 7 2 19
£ (b) 6.7 4.2 7.0 .22 18.3
cS
(a) 5 1 6
£ (b) 1.2 .11 1.35
co
B , s <a> n 6 i5 32
c (b)
-g| 10.7 3.3 7.1 21.0
to m
^ (a) 8 8
o pl, (b) 4.0 4.0
iu (a) 39 39
£ (b) 55.3 55.3
,h (a) 3 7 23 9 62 104
u (b) 6.7 4.2 19.0 3.6 66.4 100.0
H
NOTE: (a) # of states; (b) % of population. See Appendix III for sourcesand
procedure.
statesand for80% ofthetotalpopulationand thatofTable 3

for5 1% ofthestatesand 73% ofthepopulation(as against71%
ofthestatesand 84% ofthepopulationinTable 1). Most ofthe
differencesbetweenTables 2 and 3, on theone hand,and Table
1, on theotherhand,arenotmainlydue to a greatermobility of
statesacrosstheboundariesofthezones. Rather,theyare due
to greatermobilityto and fromthezones and theircontiguous
perimeter(s),as witnessedby thefactthatthedifferences are
considerably reduced if we add up the squares of all three
Stratification
ofWorld-Economy 47
centraldiagonals.Thecorresponding percentages are87% of

statesand95%ofpopulation inTable2 and76%ofstatesand
86%ofpopulation inTable3 (as against95%ofstatesand94%
ofpopulation inTable 1).
Exceptforthepopulationpercentage ofTable2 (whichis
nowslightly higher thanthepopulation percentageofTable1),
thedifferences arereducedbutstillfairly large. can thus
We
conclude thatthemobility ofstatesinthethree-tier structureof
theworld-economy hasbeenlowerintheperiod1938-83as a
wholethanin eachofitssubperiods. As alreadymentioned,
mobility in the twosubperiods has been inoppositedirections.
Without into
entering unnecessarily cumbersome details,this
opposition is brought outveryclearly byTables2 and3,as in
theformerall the null slotsare above the maindiagonal
(implying generalized downwardmobility), whereasin the
latterall thenullslotsarebelowthemaindiagonal(implying
generalized upwardmobility).
It followsthatthelong-term stabilityof thethree-tiered
structure oftheworld-economy overthelast45yearshasbeen
associatedwitha medium-term pendulum-like movement of
extensive downward mobility of states inthe period1938/50-
1960/70andofa somewhat moreextensive upwardmobility in
theperiod1960/70-1975/83. The netoutcomeis shownin
Table 1,whichwehavealreadydiscussed.It impliesthatthe
upwardmovement ofthelaterperiodbrought moststatesthat
hadexperienced downward mobility intheearlierperiodback
towheretheywerein 1938/50. However, somestateswereleft
behindanddidnotrecouptheirearlierposition (Ghanabeing
onlythemostclear-cut case),whereasothers(suchas Japan,
Italy,Libya,and SouthKorea),whichhad notexperienced
downward mobility intheearlier period, nonthelessmovedup,
thusgaininga foothold in a higher tier.
Thispendulum-like movement is easilyinterpretedinlight
ofthemajoreventsoftheworld-economy intheperiodunder
consideration. The centraleventhas undoubtedly beenthe
establishment ofU.S. hegemony, whichushered ina clusterof
and
technological organizational innovations of world-eco-
nomicsignificance. Core-periphery relationswereaccordingly
revolutionized and a new"standardof coreness"established.

For a while,the U.S. (state and capital) wielded"the really
effective weapon of competition,"to use the expressionwe
haveborrowedfromSchumpeter (II.4). Competitive pressures
shifted discontinuouslyfromonesetofactivities to anotherset,
and the mix of core-peripheral activitiesof most stateswas
correspondingly downgraded.Accordingto ourdata,onlytwo
statesfullystood up to thenewstandardofcoreness:Canada
(structurallypartoftheU.S. economy)and Sweden(see Table
2 and thecorresponding table of AppendixIII).
Traditionallycore statessuch as West Germanyand the
U.K. werepushedintotheperimeter ofthecore,and statesthat
wereon theperimeter ofthecore,suchas Franceand Belgium,
werepushedoverintothesemiperiphery. Thischaracterization
is notjusttheproductofstatistical artifacts. It also makessense
in termsof thehistoricalprocessesof theworld-economy, as
witnessedbythefactthatinthe1950'sand early1960'sall these
traditionallycore stateswereengagedin an intensecompeti-
tion withtraditionallysemiperipheral states to capturethe
technology,organization,know-how,and financeofthenew
hegemonicpower. Moreover, this was done by offering
cheaperlabor suppliesthancould be obtainedin thelatter.
The point is that the establishmentof U.S. hegemony
changedthe rulesof the competitivegame (as any clusterof
innovationsof world-economicsignificanceto some extent
alwaysdoes). It forcedcorecountriesintotheperformance of
semiperipheral to
rolesand starteda race "catchup" withthe
new standardof coreness.To the extentthatthe core zone
becamelesscrowded,thesemiperipheral zone becamemoreso
and thereforesubject to intensifying competitivepressures.
These intensifying competitivepressures,in turn,trickled
down toward the lower reaches of the zone, pushingsemi-
peripheralstatestowardtheperimeter oftheperiphery orright
intotheperiphery.
States suddenlyplunged(or liftedinto) a zone by random
shocksor revolutions inproductionfunctions, however,do not
by thatveryfactturninto organicmembersof thatzone. A
state becomes an organic memberof a zone only when its
ofWorld-Economy
Stratification 49
economicand politicalinstitutions have beenshapedby a

protracted associationwitha givenmix of core-peripheral
activities(see II.5). Thisis whyall thecorestatesthatwere
forced intosemiperipheral rolesinthe1950'sand1960's(joined
bya fewnew-comers) managedtoreenter thecorezoneinthe
1970's.As thesestatesmovedto thecore,thecompetitive
pressures wereto someextentdiminished in thelowertiers,
and thegeneralupwardmobility thathas characterized the
1970'sensued.
III.5. In lightoftheseconclusions, thesharpdecreaseinthe
relativesizeofthecorezoneinthe1950'sanditssteadyincrease
inthe1960'sand1970's(seeFigure4) cannowbere-interpreted
as a reflection oftheexitand reentry ofsomeofitsorganic
members inthecourseoftheswings ofdownward andupward
mobility. As forthe trends inthegaps between the threezones
showninFigure3,wearenowina position toassesstheextent
towhichtheyreflect gainsandlossesoftheorganic members of
thezonesrather thanshifts inthemembership ofthezones.18
In ordertoisolatetheseinfluences, wemustidentify groups
ofstatesthat,on accountoftheirlongpermanence ina given
zone,canbeconsidered itsorganicmembers. Asitturns out,74
outof93 statesremained throughout theperiodwithin or on
theboundaries ofa givenzone,thusqualifying as itsorganic
members: 10ofthecore,20ofthesemiperiphery, and44 ofthe
periphery (seeAppendixIII).
In Figure5, wehaveplottedtheloggedGNP percapitaof
eachofthesethree groupstakenas a whole,as wellas therange
oftheGNP percapitaofeachgroup(log[mean+/- standard
deviation]). Bycomparing thetrendsofFigure5 withthoseof
18. Take forexample the rapid increasein the mode of the semiperiphery in
1950-70,whichcreatedtheimpression ofa fusionofthecoreand semiperipheral
zones,
and its equally rapid fall in 1970-83,which promptlyreestablishedthe distance
betweenthetwo zones. Was thissharpup-and-downtheexpressionof an improve-
mentand thenworsening in thepositionoftheorganicmembersofthesemiperiphery
vis-à-visthe organic membersof otherzones? Or was it due to the conjunctural
worseningand thenimprovement in the positionof some organicmembersof the
core zone vis-à-visothermembersof thesame zone? Or was theupswingsimplythe
expressionofexceptionally highratesofgrowthofa fewmembersofthesemiperiph-
eryand thedownswingthe"statisticaleffect"of theircross-overintothecore zone?
"a
î
I
■s
s
s
I
eu
«M
O
I
S.
1
I
•o
S
S
i
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o
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UJ
>
g
g)
50
Stratification
ofWorld-Economy S1
Figure3,wecanassesstheextentto whichthelatterreflected
structural rather thanconjunctural factors.The maindiffer-
encebetween thetwochartsisthattheshort- tomedium-term
instabilityof the semiperipheral mode of Figure3 haslargely
in
disappeared Figure Except 5. forthe sharpdownturn of
1980-83, thetrendin theGNP percapitaofthegroupof20
semiperipheral statesis as steadyas (and in 1950-80steadier
the
than) corresponding trendsofthe10 corestatesand 44
peripheral states.
Theimplication is thatmostoftheshort-to medium-term
of the
instability semiperipheral modeandoftheboundaries of
thedistributions ofFigure2 derivesfromthefactthatat any
giventimethesemiperiphery doesnotincludeonlyitsorganic
members. Throughout ourperiod,thelatterhaveconstituted
themajority of thestatesthathappenedto be in thesemi-
peripheral zone,and statistically theyaccountforthelong-
termstability ofthetrimodal distributionsofFigure2 evinced
bythetrendsofFigures3 and4.
However,althoughthegroupof organicsemiperipheral
statesexertsthestrongest influenceonthetrend, theshort- to
medium-term fluctuations aremainlydueto thefactthatthe
semiperiphery is also a bufferzonebetween thecoreandthe
periphery. At any giventime,the semiperiphery always
includessomestatesthathavebeenmoreor lesstemporarily
demotedfromthecore(or promoted fromtheperiphery) by
oneofthemanyrandomor systematic shocksthrough which
theworld-economy operates.
In ourperiod,as wehaveseen,therehavebeenno lasting
demotions fromthecorezoneandonlyoneseemingly lasting
promotion from theperiphery (S. Korea).Yettherehavebeen
temporary butsignificant shifts
intheposition ofstatesonand
aroundtheboundaries ofthethreezonesthathaveaffected
boththeboundaries themselves andthemodeofthesemipe-
ripheral zone.In 1960,1965,and1970,theeffect wasso strong
as to blurtheboundary between thecoreandthesemiperiph-
ery and make the distributionslook almostbimodal.19
oftheboundaryand thesharpincrease,and thendecrease,ofthe
19. This blurring
semiperipheralmode in 1965-70were to some extentdue to anotherfactor:the
In sum,a comparisonof Figures3 and 5 suggeststhat,once

we adjust thetrendsto eliminatethe influencethatconjunc-
turaland transitionalmembershave on themode and bound-
aries of the semiperiphery, most fluctuationsin the relative
position of thethreezones disappear,butthelong-term trends
remain very much the same. Little thereforeneeds to be
changedin our earlierconclusionsconcerningthe polarizing
tendenciesof the world-economyover the last 45 years(see
III.3).
As can be seenfromFigure5, overtheperiodas a whole,the
adjustedtrendsstillshow an increasedpolarizationbetween
the core and the peripheralzones with the semiperiphery
retainingits intermediate position.They also show thatthis
overalltendencyhas notdevelopeduniformly throughout the
period. In 1938-48,there was no increasingpolarization
betweencoreand periphery, butonlybetweenthecoreand the
semiperiphery, whichthus convergedtowardtheperiphery. In
1950-65, the threezones grew at about the same rate. As a
matterof fact,in 1950-60,the gaps betweenthe threezones
narrowedsomewhatas the rate of growthof the periphery
exceeded thatof the semiperiphery, and thatof the semipe-
riphery exceeded that of the core. As we saw,thesewereyears
ofwideningratherthandeepeningperipheralization. In 1965-
80, the semiperiphery keptup withthe rateof growthof the
core,whiletheperiphery stagnatedand fellbehindbothzones.
The wideningofthegap betweenperiphery and coreis entirely
concentratedin thisperiod.Finally,in 1980-83,all thezones
presencein thesemiperipheral zone ofstatesinvolvedin a transition to thecore or to

theperiphery. Whena stateactually"takesoff intoa transition to coreposition,itwill
fora timeexperienceextremely highratesof growth.If it is a largestatein termsof
population, these high rates of growthwill inflatethe rate of growthof the
semiperipheral mode and/orblurtheboundariesbetweenthezones. As soon as the
transitionis completed,the rate of growthof the mode will fall back and clear
boundariesbe reestablished. It is doubtfulwhetherthetransitions of Libya and Italy
havehad anysignificant influenceon thedistributionsofFigure2. Libya'spopulation
is too smallto haveanyinfluence and Italy'sascentto thecore
on theaggregatefigures,
was ratherflat since it consistedof a movementfromthe upper reaches of the
semiperiphery to thelowerreachesof thecore. Japan,in contrast,certainlyhad an
influenceon thesemiperipheral mode and boundariesbecause ofbothitssize and its
extremely rapidgrowth.
Stratification
ofWorld-Economy S3
experienced a decline,butthedeclineofthesemiperiphery was

muchsharper thanthatoftheothertwozones.Indeed,itwas
so sharpthatintheshortspanofthreeyearsthesemiperiphery
lostall it had gainedvis-à-vis theperiphery in theprevious
15years.
III.6. Before wedrawsomeconclusions from thesefindings,
one finalpointhas to be made.We startedour empirical
investigation by sayingthatthereis no operational wayof
distinguishing between peripheralandcore-like activitiesand
therefore of classifyingstatesaccording to themixof core-
peripheral thatfallsundertheirjurisdiction
activities (II. 1).
However, having founda wayofclassifying statesintogroups
thatare likelyto reflect mixesof core-peripheral
different
weareina position
activities, toidentifytheactivities
thatwere
core-like at anygiventime.
Thisrequires aninvestigationintothekindofactivities that
havebeenassociated withorganicmembers ofthethreezones.
Ifweweretofindthatatanygiventimetheorganic members of
thecorezonespecialized inparticularkindsofactivities
(which
werealso lesswidespread amongtheorganicmembers ofthe
othertwozones),we couldsaythatthosekindsofactivities
werecore-like at thatparticularpointin time.An investiga-
tionofthissortfallsbeyondthescopeofthisarticleexceptin
one particularrespect:the changingstatusof "industrial
activities."
In development and "develop-
studies,"industrialization"
ment"are oftentreatedas synonyms. The terms"developed
countries" and"industrial countries"areusedinterchangeably,
andtheindustrialization oflessdeveloped countriesistakenas
a symptom of their"catching up" withthemoredeveloped
ones.Warren(1980)and othercriticsofdependency theory
relyheavilyon thefactthat,intermsofindustrialization, the
gapbetween developedandlessdeveloped countries hasbeen
narrowing. Ourfindings canbeusedtobring somenewlight on
thisissue.
In Figure6 parta, wehaveplotted theaveragepercentage of
thelaborforceemployed in"industry,"andinFigure6 partb
theaverageshareof"manufacturing" in GDP forthethree
•a
I
3
Cm
O
i
54
ofWorld-Economy
Stratification 55
groupsofstatesthatwehaveidentified as organicmembers of
thecore,periphery, and semiperiphery. For theperiodafter
1960,bothchartsshowa significant narrowing of thegap
betweenthedegreeof industrialization of thecore,on one
hand,and thatof thesemiperiphery and periphery, on the
otherhand.As a matterof fact,accordingto thechartof
Figure6 partb,sometime inthelate1970'sthesemiperiphery
notonlycaughtup withbut overtookthecorein termsof
degreeofindustrialization.
As theseindexesreferto thesamegroupsofstatesas the
indexesofFigure5,wecancomparethemperiodbyperiodin
orderto assessthechanging relationshipbetween industrial-
izationand relative economiccommand.In theperiod1938-
48,thereseemstobe a strong correlation
positive between the
two.As we haveseen(III. 5), thiswas a periodin whichthe
semiperiphery was losingeconomiccommandin relationto
boththecoreand theperiphery. Thisrelativeloss is closely
mirrored in theindexesof industrialization of Figure6, so
therearegoodreasonsforsupposing thatinthisperiodcore-
likeactivitieswerelargelyindustrial activities.Interestingly
enough, it was at the end of thisperiodthatPrebisch andhis
associatesfirstintroducedthe conceptof core-periphery
relationsand formulated it in termsof a primary activities-
industrialactivitiesdichotomy.
In the period 1950-60,a positivecorrelationbetween
industrial activities
andcore-like activities
is stillinevidence
butina differentform. Itmanifests ina narrowing
itself ofboth
theindustrialization andtheGNP gapsthatseparatethecore
from theperiphery andsemiperiphery. Semiperipheral andtoa
lesserextentperipheral statesbeginto erodethe"monopoly"
ofcorestatesovercore-like industrial
activities.Theerosionis
reflectedina relativedeclineoftheeconomic command ofcore
states.
1960-65aretransitional years:Thegap in industrialization
continues to decrease,butthereis no corresponding relative
declineincorestates'economic command. Thiscanbetakenas
a symptom ofthefactthatthepositivecorrelation between
industrial and core-like activities
was losingstrength. In the
subsequent twentyyears a weakened positive correlation

turnedinto an increasinglystrongnegativecorrelation.In
1965-80,whiletheperiphery and thesemiperiphery continued
to industrializeas rapidlyas theyhad done intheprevioustwo
decades,thecorebeganto de-industrialize byboththeshareof
labor forceand theshareofGDP indexes(see Figure6). As a
consequence,the industrialization gap betweenthe core and
thesemiperiphery disappeared or almostdisappeared(depend-
ingon theindexwe choose) and thatbetweenthecoreand the
periphery narrowedconsiderably.Yet in thissame periodthe
economiccommandof thesemiperiphery relativeto thecore
remainedconstant,and thatof the peripheryworsened(see
Figure5 and III.5).
The implicationis that industrialactivitieswere being
peripheralized-theywere,thatis, losingtheirpreviouscore
status. Interestingly enough, it was toward the end of this
period that Wallerstein suggestedthat the core-periphery
dichotomyshouldbe disentangled fromtheprimary activities-
industrialactivitiesdichotomy(see footnote7). The impor-
tance of thissuggestionis underscoredby trendsin 1980-83,
whenthesemiperiphery further increaseditsindustrial"advan-
tage"vis-à-vis the core and simultaneously experienced a sharp
dropinitseconomiccommandrelativeto boththecoreand the
periphery.
In sum, the industrializationof the semiperiphery and
has
periphery ultimately been a channel, notof subversion, but
of reproductionof thehierarchyof theworld-economy. This
findingillustratesthe process emphasizedin our previous
conceptualization wherebythegeneralizedattempt bypolitical
and economicactorsto capturewhatat anygiventimearecore
activitiesstimulates competition thatturnstheseactivities into
peripheral ones (II.6). In the 1940's, activities
industrial (or at
leastmanyofthem)wereindeedcore activities.In the 1950's,
lured by the "spectacularprizes"thrownat such activities,
political and economic actors of the peripheryand semi-
peripherythrewthemselvesinto"industrialization." At first,
theyreaped some benefits and thereby inducedothers to follow
suit. In the 1960's and 1970's,however,industrialactivities
ofWorld-Economy
Stratification 57
becameincreasingly overcrowded sothatnotonlythespectac-

ularprizesdisappeared, buteventhesmaller benefits reapedby
theearly-late-comers progressivelyturned into the widespread
lossesofthe1980's.
At thispointa newquestionarises:In whichparticular
economicsectorsdo coreactivities concentrate today,ifthey
no longercluster in industrial or manufacturing activities? It
hasbeensuggested thatindustrializationhasbeendisplacedas
the basis of core activitiesby the growingimportance of
integrated
vertically transnational corporations inallbranches
ofeconomic activity (fromagriculture andmining tomanufac-
turing, and
distribution, banking). These latterdevelopments
have servedto dissolveand blur any previously existing
correlationbetween thecore-periphery dichotomy anddichot-
omiesbased on thespecifickindof commodities produced
(e.g.,manufacturing versusagriculture) or evenon thetech-
niquesofproduction used(e.g.,highproductivity versuslow
productivity).
Withintransnational corporateorganizations, activities
carriedoutindifferent nationallocalesarepartofintegrated
andjointprocessesthatmakesuchdistinctions irrelevant if
possibleat all. The relevant distinction is betweenactivities
thatinvolve strategic decisionmaking, control andadministra-
tion,R&D, on one hand, and activitiesof pureexecution, on
theother.The corezone tendsto becomethelocus of the
"brain"activities of corporatecapital,the peripheral zone
tendstobecomethelocusofthe"muscleandnerves" activities,
and thesemiperipheral zone tendsto be characterized by a
moreor less even mix of "brain" and "muscle and nerves"
activities
(Arrighi, 1985b:275).
The validityofthisor alternative hypotheses can onlybe
verified an of the
through investigation typesuggested at the
beginning of thissection. The evidence we have presented,
however, suggests thatinanyeventa highdegreeofindustrial-
izationas suchcannotprovidean explanation ofthecapacity
shownbycorestatesin the1970'sand 1980'sto re-establish
theircommand overthebenefits oftheworlddivision oflabor.
IV. ConcludingRemarks
Thishasbeena preliminary investigationinmorethanone
respect. As we have just seen, new questionsare raisedthat
require far more extensive and detailed researchthanwehave
yetbeenabletodo. Additional research isrequirednotonlyto
addressthesenewquestions butalsotoprovide theanalysisof
theworld-economy withmoresolidempirical andtheoretical
foundations. Thelimitedreliability andcomparability ofthe
datawehaveusedhavenarrowly constrained thepossibilities
ofmanipulating anddrawing conclusions fromthem,andof
coursemorereliable andcomparable datamight haveproduced
somewhat different results.
The mainlimitation of our data, however,is not their
reliabilityand comparability. It is theshorttimespanthey
cover.Astheyhardly coveronelongwave(thetransition from
B- to A-phaseof 1938-48, theA-phaseof 1950-65/70, and a
B-phasethatisstillinprogress), wecannotsaymuchconcern-
ingthecyclicalrhythms and thelongueduréeoftheworld-
economyanditsthree-tiered structure. Theevidence wehave
presented, however, does not support theviewthatin B-phases
thepolarizing tendencies of theworld-economy are weaker
thaninA-phases, as suggested byFrank(1969)andothers. The
as a
A-phaseappears period widening of and
peripheralization
theB-phaseas a periodofdeepening and,
peripheralization,
while all the genuinetransitions to an upper tier were
completedin the B-phase,the corresponding "take-offs"
occurredin the A-phase(III.3-5). This mightwell be a
peculiarity of thesinglelongwavethatourdata happento
cover,butin orderto ascertain thiswewouldhaveto extend
ourinvestigation muchfurther backintime.20
Lastbutnotleast,thestatistical evidencewehavepresented
simply shows that over the last45 the
years world-economy has
as our
behaved if hypotheses were accuraterepresentationsof
historicalprocesses. Inordertofindoutwhether thisisactually
thecase,thereis ofcoursenosubstitute forhistorical
analysis.
20. A firststepin thisdirectionhas beentakenin Arrighi,et al., 1986.
ofWorld-Economy
Stratification 59
But whenall is said and done,it seemsto us thatour

preliminary investigation has established strong primafacie
evidencefortheconclusionthattheworld-economy shows
patterns of stratificationand development that cannot be
explained interms ofeither "modernization" or"dependency."
To besure,bothtypesoftheory couldclaimsomerelevance to
an explanation ofoneor another ofourfindings. Butneither
can providea comprehensive explanationof the overall
patterntheyreveal.
Modernization theory (and itsdevelopmentalist variants),
forexample, couldclaimthattherehasbeensomecatching up.
As a matterof fact,if catchingup is definedin termsof
therehas beenquitea lot ofit.Thisclaim
industrialization,
shouldnotbe lightly dismissed. Theindustrialization andthe
evenmoreextensive deruralization ofperipheral andsemipe-
ripheralstateshavesocial and politicalimplications of the
greatestimportance for the statesthathave experienced them
as wellas forthefutureof theworld-economy (Arrighi&
Silver,1984).Theseimplications, however, canbe easilymis-
construed ifwedo nottakeintoconsideration themoststriking
findingofourinvestigation: thefactthatall thiscatching up
has not significantly affected thedifferentials in economic
commandthat separatethe different tiersof the world-
economy.
In thisrespect,dependency theory scoresmuchbetter than
modernization theory. Insupport oftheformer, ourinvestiga-
tion has shownthatthe world-economy has indeedbeen
to
subject widespread polarizing tendencies.According toour
measurements, these tendencies may not have beenas strong as
assumedbythemoreextreme versions ofdependency theory,
buttheycertainly havebeenextensive and strongenoughto
dismissanyclaimof thedevelopmentalist perspective to a
holistic ofthe
understanding world-economy.
In one important respect,however, thetwotheoriesfail
equally.Neither ofthemcaninfactexplainthepersistence of
an intermediate group of states thatas a group, is neither
catchingup withthe small groupof statesthatsets the
standardsofwealthintheworld-economy norjoiningthelarge
groupofstatesthatsetsthestandardsofpoverty.Numerically,
largegroupofstates- abouttwicethesizeof
thisis a relatively
thecoregroupand about halfthesize oftheperipheralgroup.
Butitssignificance forthepoliticsoftheworld-economy is far
greaterthanthesenumbersindicate.
In the interwaryears,two major politicalinnovationsof
worldsignificance originatedin thisgroup:communismin the
U.S.S.R. and fascismin Italy. In the postwar years, the
U.S.S.R. remainedsteadfastly in thisgroupwhilebecoming
one of the two superpowers.In the currentworld-economic
crisis,the group includes most of the major epicentersof
political turmoil(South Africa, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Israel,
Nicaragua,El Salvador,Poland) and all thegreatdebtorstates
otherthan the U.S. (Argentina,Mexico, Brazil, Venezuela,
Chile,Poland).
The semiperiphery has thusbeenand continuesto be a zone
of politicalturbulence.In lightof this,it is surprisingthat
semiperipheralstates have been studied fromall different
anglesexceptforwhattheyall haveincommon:thefact,to put
it crudely,thattheyare stuckin-between, and thattheyhave
to runfastin orderto remainwheretheyare.21After"Euro-
centrism"and "Third-Worldism,"thetimeis ripefora closer
look at thesemiperipheral zone.
AppendixI:
Sourcesand Use of theData
The distributionsof Figure2, fromwhichFigures3-5 and
Tables 1-3 are derived,are based on the followingsources:
Woytinskyand Woytinsky (1953) for 1938 and 1948,World
2 1. The factthatsemiperipheralstateshaveto runveryfastinorderto remaininan

in-betweenpositionis implicitin our hypothesisthat,in thesemiperipheral zone,the
polarizingtendencies oftheworld-economy are neutralized
by state action(II. 6). The
pointis made explicitand subjectedto historicalverification in the analysesof the
ResearchWorkingGroupon Semiperipheral to at thebeginning
States,referred ofthe
article.
Stratification
ofWorld-Economy 61
Bank(1984)for1960-83, andWorldBank(variousyears)for
1980 and 1983. For 1950, we have used estimatesthat
Morawetz(1977)has derivedfromWorldBankdata. From
thesesourceswe obtainedGNP percapitain U.S. dollars,
whichwe converted intoconstant1970dollarsbyusingthe
U.S. GNP deflator givenin U.S. Department of Commerce
(1975 and various years).
TheWoytinsky andWoytinsky dataonlycover57 statesin
1938 and 58 statesin 1948.The WorldBank data cover
between 101and105statesaccording totheyear.As ourmain
concern wastoidentify theglobaldistributionofincome(and
the positionof statesin relationto such distribution), at
differentpointsintime,wealwaystookall thestatesincluded
in each source.This procedureconsiderably reducedthe
intertemporal comparability of data. Moreover, giventhe
large sizeof some statesthatwereomitted from one sourceor
theother(mainly theU.S.S.R.,from theWorldBankdata,and
China,fromthe1948Woytinsky and Woystinsky data and
fromtheWorldBankdatapriorto 1980),thedistributions of
someyearsweregreatly distorted.
To reducethesedistortions
we integrated thedata ofbothsourceswithdata fromother
sources(to be specified below).
these
Notwithstanding integrations, thecomparability of
the distributions acrosstimeremainslimited,particularly
whentheyswitch fromonesourceto another. Thus,inall the
charts,we haveacknowledged thelack of comparability of
1938-48 with1950,andthelimited comparabilityof1950with
1960-83.However, theindexesofFigure5 areconstructed on
thebasisofconstant "basketsofstates"(seeAppendixes II and
III) andtherefore providea morereliable basisforintertempo-
ralcomparisons thantheindexesofFigures3 and4.
As fortheintegration ofthesourceslistedabovewithdata
from othersources, wehavefollowed twodifferentprocedures.
InthecaseofChina,Romania,andHungary (forwhichWorld
Banksourcesprovide dataforthemorerecent years),wehave
estimated theirpositionin previousyearson thebasisofthe
ratesofgrowth ofGNPpercapitainU.S. dollarsimplicit inthe
seriesprovided byBanks(n.d.).InthecaseoftheU.S.S.R.,for
whichtheWorldBankdoes notprovideanydata,we have

takentheestimates for1950-80givenin CentralIntelligence
Agency (1982),to whichwehaveaddedourownestimate for
1983basedona plausible rateofgrowth fortheperiod1980-83.
Inassessingthereliabilityandcomparability ofthedata,the
purposeforwhichtheyhavebeenusedshouldbe bornein
mind.This was twofold:to see whether theygenerateda
trimodaldistributionand, theydid, singleouttheintervals
if to
oflowfrequency thatcouldbe usedas theboundaries ofthe
threezones (see AppendixII). Throughout the paper no
iseverattached
significance totheGNPpercapitaofanysingle
stateotherthanin relationto thoseboundaries. Moreover,
eventhetrends andfluctuations inthemodaloraverageGNP
percapitaofgroupsofstatesarealwaysanalyzedinrelation to
themodaloraverageGNP percapitaofothergroupsofstates.
In otherwords,whatmatters in assessingthereliability
and
comparability ofour data is their to
capacity provide us with
an indicationof the distribution of rewardsin the world-
economy andtheapproximate positionofstatesinrelationto
thatdistribution.
AppendixII:
ProcedureFollowed in DefiningtheBoundaries
and Size of theThreeZones
Theboundaries between thezones(see Figures2a-2c)and,
byimplication, sizeofthezonesshowninFigure4
therelative
havebeendefined according to thefollowing procedure.
Asa preliminary we
step, singled out the threemaximainthe
thatcouldbe identified
distributions as thecore,semiperiph-
eral,andperipheralmodes.Wehavetakenthemid-point ofthe
interval
ofhighestfrequency inthe low ranges oflogged GNP
as of the
percapita(GNPPC) representative peripheral mode
(PM), andthemid-point oftheinterval ofhighestfrequency at
theoppositeendoftherangeas representativeofthecoremode
(CM), The mode
semiperipheral was then definedas thepoint
ofhighest in the
frequency range threeintervalsto therightof
Stratification
ofWorld-Economy 63
theperipheral modeandthreeintervals to theleftofthecore

mode.The "three-intervals clause"was introduced to ensure
(with a one-intervalmargin) that the same states would not
enterintothedetermination of twodifferent modesvia the
three-intervals
movingaverage.Thiscriterion leftindetermi-
natethesemiperipheral modeforthe1960distribution, which
hastwointermediate of
peaks equalfrequency in theintermedi-
ate range(see Figure2b). Sincethetwointermediate peaks
wereseparatedbya singleinterval, wefeltjustified intaking
thelatteras representing thesemiperipheral mode.Had the
two intermediate peaks been separatedby more thanone
interval,wewould have considered the distribution as nontri-
modalanddiscarded it.
The 1970distribution shouldhave beendiscardedfora
differentreason,namely because whatwehavechosenas S M
and CM are notseparatedbymorethanthreeintervals (see
Figure2b). Bystrictlyapplying theprocedure defined above,
we shouldhavechosenas thesemiperipheral modethemuch
maximum
flatter enclosedbetween PP1 andPP2. Thisseemed
to us excessivelyformalistic. We havetherefore chosenthe
intervalofhigherfrequency marked as SM as thesemiperiph-
eral mode.However,we madesurethatnoneof our main
inferencesdependedcrucially on thischoice,andmadeclear
throughout the discussion of the datathatthetrimodality of
the1970distribution is questionable.
Havingdetermined thethree modes,theboundaries between
thezonesweredefined as follows:
had onlyone local minimum
(1) If the distribution
betweentwo modes,theintervalrepresenting that
minimum wastakenas theboundaryseparatingthe
two zones,providedthatthestatesfallingin that
intervalhad not entered(via the three-intervals
moving average)inthedetermination
ofoneorboth
ofthetwomodes.Theboundaries determinedinthis
way were the perimeterofthe (PP1-PP2)
periphery
for1950and1965andtheperimeter ofthecore(PC1-
PC2) for1950.
(2) If the distributionhad only one local minimum

betweentwo modes, but the states fallingin the
corresponding intervalhad enteredin thedetermina-
tionofbothmodes,thedistribution wouldhavebeen
considerednon-trimodal and discarded.Thiscase did
not arisein anyof thedistributions considered.
(3) If the distributionhad only one local minimum
between two modes and the states fallingin the
corresponding intervalhad enteredin thedetermina-
tion of one of the two modes, the intervalwas
includedin thezone, and theboundarywas defined
bya lineratherthanan interval.The perimeters ofthe
core forthe years 1960, 1965,and 1970 weredeter-
minedin thisway.
(4) Ifthedistribution had morethanone local minimum
betweentwomodes(as happenedin mostinstances),
we discardedtheminimathathad frequencies higher
thaneitherofthetwomodes.Ifwe wereleftwithonly
one minimum,we set the boundariesfollowingthe
proceduresetoutabove.The perimeters oftheperiph-
eryfor1938and 1948weresetin thisway.Ifwe were
stillleftwithmorethan one minimum,we took the
twominimawiththelowestfrequency and definedthe
perimeters of the zones as consistingof all the
intervalsenclosed by (but excluding)the intervals
corresponding to thetwo minima.The perimeters of
theperiphery for1960,1970,1975,1980,and 1983as
wellas theperimeters ofthecorefor1938,1948,1975,
1980,and 1983weredetermined in thisway.
Havingdetermined theboundariesbetweenthezones,states
wereclassifiedaccordingto whethertheirloggedGNPPC fell
in one of thethreezones or in one of thetwo perimeters.
By
addingup thepercentage ofworldpopulationaccountedforby
the statesin each zone and in each perimeter,
we determined
the relativesize of the threezones shown in Figure 4. In
addition,thisclassificationwas used to analyze the upward
and downwardmobilityof statesdiscussedin AppendixIII.
Stratification
of World-Economy 65
AppendixIII:
ProcedureFollowed in Classifying States
in Tables 1, 2, and 3 and in Determiningthe
"Organic" Members of Each Zone
InAppendix II wehaveseenhowstateswereclassified infive
groupsor"classes":periphery (P), perimeter oftheperiphery
(PP), semiperiphery (S), perimeter ofthecore(PC), andcore
the
(C). Notwithstandingsmoothing procedures weusedand
alreadyembodiedin ourdata base,thepositionofa statein
anyparticular yearis stillsubjectto strongconjunctural and
random influences III.
(see 2). Tables 1,2,and 3 (andTables 1a,
2a, 3a, below) were constructed with the purpose,one, of
"averaging out"theseinfluences overthreeobservations (1938,
1948,and 1950;1960,1965,and 1970;1975,1980,and 1983),
and,two,ofcomparing the"average"positionin oneperiod
withthe"average"positionina subsequent period.
Unfortunately, wedidnothavenineobservations forallthe
countries.As showninTablesla, 2a, and3a below,formany
peripheralcountries weonlyhadoneortwoobservations for
theearlierperiod,and in someinstanceswe onlyhad two
observations forthelaterperiod.Fortunately, however, we
hadnineobservations forall thestatesthatmostconsistently
fellinthecoreclassanditsneighborhood; formostsemiperiph-
eralstates;andformostofthelargerperipheral states.The
oftheoverallpicture
reliability thatemerges fromthetables
and discussedin thetextcan thusbe considered morethan
satisfactory.
The positionofstatesin eachperiodhas beendetermined
according to thefollowing procedure:
(1) Whenthreeobservations wereavailable,a statewas
classified:
- inthecore,ifthethreeobservations wereC, C, C;
or C, C, Pc;
- in thesemiperiphery, if thethreeobservations
wereS, S, S; or S, S, Pc; or S, S, Pp;
- intheperiphery, ifthethreeobservations wereP,
P, P; or P, P, Pp;
TABLE la
Position
ofStatesin1975-83Compared
toTheir
Positionin 1938-50
Position in 1938-50
C PC S PP P
u A B C D E
00 -
I
£ u F G H I J
<^ PL,
T-H ___ ___ -__ __
•h co K L M N 0
c
o
II pl, P Q R S T
•H ÇU
œ
* U
p, V W X Y
NOTE: Countriesin Table la:

A: Australia,Canada, Denmark, Germany,Netherlands,New Zealand,
Norway,Sweden, Switzerland,UnitedKingdom,UnitedStates
B: Austria,Belgium,Finland,France
C: Italy,Japan,Libya (1)
D:
E:
F:
G: Ireland
H: Hong Kong (1), Israel (2), Spain, Trinidad/Tobago
I:
J:
K:
L: South Africa
M: Algeria (1), Argentina,Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Congo (1), Costa
Rica (1), Greece, Hungary (2), Iran (1)(3), Jamaica,Malaysia (1),
Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Romania, Syria (1), Turkey,Uruguay
(2), U.S.S.R., Venezuela, Yugoslavia(2)
N: DominicanRepublic,Equador, Guatemala (2), Paraguay,Peru
O: South Korea (1)
P:
Q:
R: IvoryCoast, Morocco (1)
S: El Salvador,Papua New Guinea (1), Zambia, Zimbabwe (2)
Stratification
of World-Economy 67
T: Nigeria(1), Philippines
U:
V:
W: Ghana (1)
X: Angola (1)(3), Egypt,Honduras(2), Senegal (1)
Y: Afghanistan(1), Bolivia, Burma (2), Burundi(1), Cameroun,China,
Central African Republic (1), Ethiopia (1), India, Indonesia (2),
Kenya (2), Madagascar (1), Malawi (1), Mali (1), Mauritania (1),
Mozambique (1), Nepal (1), Pakistan (1), Rwanda (1), Somalia (1),
Sri Lanka, Sudan (1), Tanzania (1), Thailand (2), Togo (1), Uganda
(1), Upper Volta(l)
(1) One observationonly for1938-50.
(2) Two observationsonly for 1938-50.
(3) Two observationsonly for1975-83.
-in theperimeter ofthecore,ifthethreeobserva-

tionswereoneofthefollowing Pc,Pc,Pc; Pc,Pc,C;
Pc, Pc, S; C, C, S; C, S, S;
-in theperimeter of theperiphery, if thethree
observations wereoneofthefollowing: Pp,Pp,Pp;
Pp, Pp, P; Pp, Pp, S; S, S, P; P, P, S.
(2) Whentwoobservations wereavailable,a statewas
classified:
- inthecore,ifthetwoobservations wereC, C;
- inthesemiperiphery, ifthetwoobservations were
S,S;
- intheperiphery, ifthetwoobservations wereP, P;
- in theperimeter ofthecore,ifthetwoobserva-
tionswereoneofthefollowing: C, Pc; Pc,Pc; S, Pc;
- in the perimeter of the periphery, if the two
observations wereone ofthefollowing Pp, Pp; S,
P,
Pp; Pp.
(3) Whenonlyoneobservation wasavailable, stateswere
classifiedaccording to thatobservation.
On thebasis of thesetables,we proceededto definethe

"organicmembers" ofthethreezonesas follows:
( 1) Organicmembersofthecorezone: Statesthatappear
in all threetablesin one of theupperleftblocks
TABLE 2a
ofStatesin 1960-70
Position toTheir
Compared
Position in 1938-50
Position in 1933-50
C PC S PP P
o A B C D E
o
r^
I
vo cj F G H I J
ON P*
tH _____ __ __ __ __ __
•S w K L M N 0
G
o
II pu P Q R S T
•H P*
W
* U V W X Y
pm
NOTE: CountriesforTable 2a:

A: Canada, Sweden, UnitedStates
B:
C:
D:
E:
F: Australia, Denmark, Germany,New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland,
UnitedKingdom
G:
H:
I:
J:
K:
L: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Ireland, Netherlands, South
Africa
M: Argentina,Chile, Hungary (2), Israel (2), Italy, Jamaica, Japan,
Panama, Spain, Trinidad/Tobago(1), U.S.S.R., Venezuela, Yugo-
slavia (2)
N:
O:
P:
Q:
R: Costa Rica (1), Greece, Hong Kong (1), Libya (1), Mexico, Turkey,
Uruguay(2)
Stratification
ofWorld-Economy 69
S: Peru
T:
U:
V:
W: Algeria (1), Brazil, Colombia, Congo (1), Ghana, Iran (1), Iraq (1),
IvoryCoast (1), Malaysia(1), Morocco (1), Nicaragua(1), Syria(1)
X: Angola (1), DominicanRepublic,Egypt,El Salvador,Equador, Guate-
mala, Honduras (2), Papua New Guinea (1), Paraguay,Senegal (1),
Zambia, Zimbabwe (2)
Y: Afghanistan(1), Bolivia, Burma (2), Burundi (1), Cameroun (1),
Central AfricanRepublic (1), China, Ethiopia (1), India, Indonesia
(2), Kenya (2), Madagascar(1), Malawi (1), Mali (1), Mauritania(1),
Mozambique (1), Nepal (1), Nigeria (1), Pakistan (1), Philippines,
Rwanda (1), Somalia (1), South Korea (1), Sri Lanka, Sudan (1),
Tanzania, Thailand (2), Togo (1), Uganda (1), Upper Volta (1)
(1) One observationonly for1938-50.
(A,B,F,G). Therewere 10 such states:Australia,

Canada,Denmark, NewZealand,Norway, Sweden,
Switzerland, U.K., U.S.A.,WestGermany.
(2) Organicmembers ofthesemiperipheral zone:States
thatappearinallthree tablesinoneoftheninecentral
blocks(G,H,I,L,M,N,Q,R,S). Therewere20 such
states:Argentina,Chile,(CostaRica),Greece, (Hong
Kong),Hungary, Ireland,(Israel),Jamaica,Mexico,
Panama, (Portugal),Romania,S. Africa,Spain,
Turkey, Uruguay, U.S.S.R., Venezuela, Yugoslavia.
(3) Organicmembers oftheperipheral zone:Statesthat
appear inallthreetablesin oneofthe fourlowerright
blocks(S, T, X, Y). Therewere44 such states:
(Afghanistan),(Angola),Bangladesh, (Benin),Boliv-
ia, Burma,(Burundi), (Cameroun), (CentralAfrican
Republic),(Chad), China,Egypt, El Salvador,(Ethi-
opia),(Guinea),(Haiti),Honduras, India,Indonesia,
Kenya,(Liberia),(Madagascar),Malawi, (Mali),
(Mauritania),(Mozambique), (Nepal),(Niger), (Nige-
ria), Pakistan,(Papua New Guinea),Philippines,
(Rwanda),(Senegal),(Somalia),SriLanka,(Sudan),
(Tanzania), Thailand,(Togo), (Uganda), (Upper
Volta),Zambia,Zimbabwe.
TABLE 3a
Positionin 1960-70
Position in 1960-70
C PC S PP P
o A B C D E
oo ___ ____ _ _ __ _ _ __
!C o F G H I J
ON £4
rH
•S co K L M N 0
o - ---- - - -
G
U * P Q R S T
•H PL4
CO ._.._.___.,___.._______,__
* U V W X Y
*
NOTE: Countriesin Table 3a:

A: Canada, Sweden,UnitedStates
B: Australia, Denmark, Germany,New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland,
UnitedKingdom
C: Austria,Belgium,Finland,France,Italy,Japan,Netherlands
D: Libya, Saudi Arabia
E:
F:
G:
H: Ireland,Israel,Singapore,Spain, Trinidad/Tobago
I: Hong Kong
J:
K:
L:
M: Argentina, Chile, Greece, Hungary, Jamaica, Panama, Romania,
U.S.S.R., South Africa,Venezuela, Yugoslavia
N: Costa Rica, Mexico, Peru,Portugal,Turkey,Uruguay
O: Algeria, Brazil, Colombia, Congo, Dominican Republic, Equador,
Guatemala, Iran (1), Iraq (1), Malaysia, Nicaragua,Paraguay,South
Korea, Syria,Tunisia
P:
Q:
R:
S:
Stratification
of World-Economy 71
T: El Salvador, Ivory Coast, Morocco, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea,

Philippines,Zambia, Zimbabwe
U:
V:
W:
X:
Y: Afghanistan(1), Angola (1), Bangladesh, Benin, Bolivia, Burma,
Burundi,Cameroun,Central AfricanRepublic, Chad, China, Egypt,
Ethiopia, Ghana (1), Guinea, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia,
Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar,Malawi, Mali, Mauritania,Mozambique
(1), Nepal, Niger, Pakistan, Rwanda, Senegal, Somalia, Sri Lanka,
Sudan, Tanzania, Thailand,Togo, Uganda,Upper Volta (1)
These threegroupsconstitute the constant"basketsof

states"onthebasisofwhichtheindexesofFigures 5 and6 have
beenconstructed. In Figure5 we haveplottedthelog ofthe
GNPPC ofeachgroupas a whole,as wellas therange(meanof
loggedGNPPC of the statesin each group+/- standard
The plotsfor1950-83refer
deviation). to all thestateslisted
above,whiletheplotsfor1938-48 excludethestatesshownin
bracketswhichare not coveredby the Woytinsky and
Woytinsky data. The data in
plotted Figure 6 are simple
averages.Thepercentages ofthelaborforceinindustry (Figure
6 parta) havebeentakenfromBanks(n.d.) fortheperiod
1938-60andfromWorldBank(1984)fortheperiod1960-80.
Whiledatafrom thelattersourcecovermostofthestateslisted
above, Bank'sdata cover most ofthecoreandsemiperipheral
statesbut only minority the peripheralstates.The
a of
percentagesofGDP in manufacturing aretakenfromWorld
Bank(1984,1978-85) whichprovide complete seriesfor9 ofthe
10corestates,for12ofthe20semiperipheral states,andfor35
ofthe44 peripheral states.
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The Stratification of the World-Economy: An Exploration of the Semiperipheral Zone

Mexico, and Brazil; of South Africa;and of most Southern

Palat), Portugal(Carlos Fortuna),SouthAfrica(WilliamG. Martin),Taiwan(Dennis

1. Thesetendencies arestillevidentinmorerecentstudies.Thus,on theone hand,

tanceofintermediate positions.Mostlypresented as qualifi-

commoditychain and peripheralactivitiesare those that

2. Wallerstein arescatteredinbooks and articles

toplaya keyroleinpromoting thelegitimacy andstability of

is notbased on thetwocriteriagivenabove. It includesstates

question,but also to observesome interestingpatternsof

II. The Conceptof Semiperiphery

This ambiguity is compounded by thefactthattheterm

interrelated. On thecontrary,we wantto emphasizethatthe

4. "Take an ultimateconsummableitemand traceback the set of inputsthat

laborincomes)withoutclearlydefining itsmeaningin thenew

depends on how aggregaterewardsare distributedbetween

7. This differentiatesour positionfromthat of Prebischand the Economic

orientedinnovations definedas "the settingup of a new

Whilethesethingsare beinginitiatedwe have briskexpenditureand

Justas Schumpeterassumed that profit-oriented innova-

fromone activityto otheractivities), the successof an

theproximity to thelargeand stablemarketsaffordedby the

Iftheworld-system had a singleoverarching stateappara-

is wantingin political command because "wealth" can be

inantly peripheral activities,and thecoreend,consisting of

10. On thecircumstances in questioncan be assumed

arenotan obstaclebutan incentive to thecontinuousstreamof

11. Anotherreasonlowerwagesintheperipheralzone failto attractcoreactivities

semiperipheral statesthechanceto resistperipheralization by

vativecombinationof economicpoliciesand/or blessedby a

Figure1: HypotheticalDistributionof WorldPopulation (Percentageof World

12. The term"perimeterofthecore"(and, byanalogy,theterm"perimeter ofthe

Betweenthesetwo thresholdslies thesemiperipheral zone,

III. The Stratification

///./.It must be stated at the outset that there is no

Fortunately, wedo notneedtoundertake suchan exercise.

III.2. Usingdata fromthesourcesspecifiedin AppendixI,

Theyderivefromthefactthatexchangeratesreflect whatcurrencies commandon the

world-economy. Long low-frequency stretches,however,do

Grantedall this,the observeddistributions of Figure2

in 1983 it stillwas at its 1960 level. Secondly,as can be seen

16. In interpreting itshouldbe borneinmindthata constantdegreeof

peripheral zonehas remained remarkably constant through-

individualstatesis thusnot excludedbut consideredexcep-

Core PC PP ^^^ Total

NOTE: (a) # of states,(b) % of populationin 1950; (c) % of populationin 1970.

In sum,95% ofthestatesforwhichwe could finddata (and

Core PC PP ^P'^ Total

Core PC PP ^WW Total

statesand for80% ofthetotalpopulationand thatofTable 3

centraldiagonals.Thecorresponding percentages are87% of

revolutionized and a new"standardof coreness"established.

economicand politicalinstitutions have beenshapedby a

In sum,a comparisonof Figures3 and 5 suggeststhat,once

presencein thesemiperipheral zone ofstatesinvolvedin a transition to thecore or to

experienced a decline,butthedeclineofthesemiperiphery was

subsequent twentyyears a weakened positive correlation

becameincreasingly overcrowded sothatnotonlythespectac-

But whenall is said and done,it seemsto us thatour

2 1. The factthatsemiperipheralstateshaveto runveryfastinorderto remaininan

whichtheWorldBankdoes notprovideanydata,we have

theperipheral modeandthreeintervals to theleftofthecore