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of East Asian Studies
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EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF
EAST ASIAN STUDIES 15 (2016) 257-288
of
East Asian Studies
BRILL brill.com/ejea
Beyond Actorness
Structure and Agency in E u-asean Interregionalism
University of Freiburg
Lukas, maximilian. mueller@poUtik uni-freiburg. de
Abstract
This paper is concerned with the determining factors of the interregional relationship
between the European Union (eu) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(asean), specifically its institutional proliferation on the three institutional levels of
EU-to-ASEAN relations (bi-regionalism), relations inside as e m (trans-regionalism) as
well as relations between the eu and individual asean member states (region-to-
state). Commonly, interregional relations are seen as depending on the actorness of the
regional organisations involved. This paper proposes an alternative approach, focusing
on structural interdependence and agency on the part of both regional actors as the
two main determinants of the institutional proliferation. The analysis suggests that
levels of political and economic interdependence are low at the bi-regional level and
higher at both the trans-regional and region-to-state level, leading to a proliferation of
institutional structures at these levels. Additionally, the analysis reveals three unique
strategies by asean and the eu contributing to the design of their interregional rela-
tionship. For asean, these strategies consist of (1) omni-enmeshment, (2) vertical and
horizontal hedging, and (3) the rule of relative institutionalisation. For the eu, these
strategies consist of (1) a pragmatic approach towards asean, (2) a widening of inter-
est towards East Asia, and (3) capacity-building bi-regionalism.
Keywords
* The author wishes to thank Astrid Carrapatoso, Arndt Michael, Stefan Rother, Jürgen Rüland,
and Anne-Kathrin Weber for constructive comments at different stages of the study. Natu-
rally, the author bears full responsibility for any errors of omission and commission.
Introduction
The interregional relationship between the European Union (eu) and the Asso-
ciation of Southeast Asian Nations (asean) is the oldest genuine group-to-
group dialogue between regional organisations and the one that has attracted
the majority of scientific attention on interregionalism. Despite keen and con-
stant analytical interest, researchers have been challenged by the very intangi-
ble nature of interregionalism, consisting of shallow institutions, diffuse objec-
tives and unclear institutional dividends, both in the relationship per se as well
as in multilateral forums such as the un. Despite high expectations following
the end of the Cold War, a deepening of political or economic cooperation
between the eu and asean has not materialised. In recent years, frustration has
crept into many analyses of their relationship. Mainstream approaches have
chalked up the lack of legal deepening and intensification of the eu-asean
dialogue to the asymmetry between the organisations in terms of their institu-
tional capability and coherence.
In a wider political context, the original eu-asean group-to-group dialogue
is increasingly rivalled by other interregional linkages between the organisa-
tions, both trans-regional (institutional relationships containing at least one
regional organisation as well as other states) and region-to-state (institutional
relationships between a regional organisation and individual states). Specifi-
cally, these are the Asia Europe Meeting (as em) as well as the recent Free Trade
and Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (ftas and pc as) between the eu
and individual asean states. At the time of their creation, both types of rela-
tionships were expected to revive interregional cooperation that had stalled
for a variety of reasons and provide a way to bypass the group-to-group dia-
logue at least temporarily. While this did indeed happen in some cases, the
trans-regional and region-to-state dialogues have not only become a perma-
nent feature of the interregional relationship between the eu and asean, but
appear to fulfil similar functions in the realm of economic and political gov-
ernance. An additional feature of the interregional relationship is the financ-
ing of the asean secretariat by the eu with €240 million from 2007 to 2020,
which has puzzled many observers. These persistent overlaps in membership
and objectives have led researchers to the employment of the term 'complex
interregionalism' in order to denote the permanently multilayered system of
interregional relations on different political levels.1
1 Alan Hardacre and Michael Smith, 'The eu and the diplomacy of complex interregionalism',
The Hague Journal of Diplomacy , No. 4 (2009), pp. 167-188.
Interregionalism re
determines interreg
increasingly focused o
posing few questions
relations. While the
such as the one betw
not yet led to a reinv
there are a range of st
and the ftas and pca
factors influencing
encompassing all three
is difficult to accept
ally and theoretically
fact, the problem lies
orising of particular p
from the under-rese
of interregionalism o
erated in the 1990s a
dialogues, and bilater
ing regional integrat
This paper challenges
ting forward interreg
ables for the system
First, the prevailing
the theoretical alter
operationalised. Thir
highlighted. For asea
vertical and horizont
2 Christopher M. Dent, T
economy?', in J. Rüland
(London: Routledge, 2006)
3 Anjajetschke and Clara P
security significance?', gi
4 Francis Baert, Tiziana S
regionalism', in F. Baert
ism: Regions, Global Gove
12.
6 Gunnar Sjöstedt, The External Role of the European Community (Farnborough, Hampshire:
Saxon House, 1977).
7 David Allen and Michael Smith, 'Western Europe's presence in the contemporaiy interna-
tional arena', in M. Holland (ed.), The Future of European Political Cooperation: Essays on
Theory and Practice (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1991).
8 Joseph Jupille and James A. Caporaso, 'States, agency and rules: the European Union in
global environment polities', in C. Rhodes (ed.), The European Union in the World Community
(Boulder, co: Lynne Rienner, 1998).
tures, a state-centric
legalised regional pr
autonomy.9
The ability of the eu
asean has been of part
political conditionalit
in the behaviour of th
to the acceptance of
characterised as an in
of its organisational s
economic and political
and are generally non
place. This has often
coordinating commo
In line with this, the
been highlighted as b
Conversely, asean of
partners, which were
negotiate their positio
the case of the polit
throughout the 199
such as the cases of
terrorism, with the r
as being under the p
been highlighted is th
meaning that there
unite the positions a
statements.
9 Mathew Doidge, ' "East is east ...": inter- and transregionalism and the eu-asean relation
ship', dissertation, University of Canterbury (2004).
10 Dent, 'The Asia-Europe Meeting (asem) process'; Doidge, '"East is east Alfred
C. Robles, 'The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (asean) and the Europea
Union - limited interregionalism', in J. Rüland and R. Roloif (eds), Interregionalism and
International Relations (London: Routledge, 2006), pp. 97-112.
1 1 Doidge, '"East is east
12 David M. Jones and Michael L. Smith, 'Making process, not progress: ASEAN and th
evolving East Asian regional order', International Security , Vol. 32, No. 1 (2007), pp. 148
184.
The describe
demics as th
the reasonin
theregional
between the
interregional
butable to th
asean as a re
ism, is curre
is that the s
tion is reduc
This observed
themselves. G
from dissatis
often found
exemplified b
Union offici
a hurdle th
real bloc, te
acknowledge
constitute on
EU.16
14 Laura Allison, The e u, asean and Interregionalism: Regionalism Support and Norm Diffu-
sion between the E u and asean (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015); T.J. Fehrmann,
Die Effektivität interregionaler Kooperation: Eine vergleichende Untersuchung der interre-
gionalen Handlungsfähigkeit von Regionalorganisationen am Beispiel von asean, eu und
Mercosur (The Effectiveness of Interregional Cooperation: A Comparative Analysis of
the Interregional Capacity for Action of Regional Organisations Using the Example of
asean, the eu and Mercosur), (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2014).
1 5 Doidge, ' "East is east p. 152.
1 6 Mathew Doidge, 'Joined at the hip: regionalism and interregionalism', Journal of European
Integration, Vol. 29, No. 2 (2007), pp. 229-248.
asean relationship is d
gation of other relatio
cooperation may be d
advantage of eu-us int
compared to those wh
trade agreements with
The use of actornes
be criticised empirica
approach purely by l
There are several cas
the shallowness of its
factors other than an
eu-asean interregiona
Looking at the agenc
maintenance of institu
that the structure of
lowest common denom
dependent on a certain
from what interregion
Testing Actorness
access follow
to engage a p
been noted,
more an outc
Looking at t
argument bec
bi-regional c
forum is clea
ment with N
membership
Economic Ca
eu also suppo
faction with
China and Ea
tional transi
strategic pre
When it com
actorness arg
states are see
lowness of re
clusion of th
cient econom
which asean
New Zealand
argument fal
state institu
other point i
over time.
This leads to a more general line of criticism that can be held against the
actorness argument: the fact that it is not a good explanatory variable owing
20 Doidge, '"East is east Paul J. Lim, 'asean's relations with the eu: obstacles and
opportunities', eu External Affairs Review (2012), pp. 46-58; Jetschke and Portela, 'asean-
eu relations'.
EUROPEAN JOURNAL
Interdepen
26 Ralf Roloff
Interregionalis
27 Hänggi et
process, not pr
Europa, Ameri
28 R.O. Keohane
Little Brown, 1
29 Roloff, 'Inte
EUROPEAN
a set of strategies a
a situation in which
alternatives such as
cultivate a middle po
side (or one straigh
another.33
EUROPEAN JOURNAL
recognise the
of overlapping
Interdepen
The Bi-Regi
Taking Keoha
confronted w
dence actually
there is a lac
making some
a proper venu
the eu only p
not perceived
dialogues con
dependence, t
embodying p
cept supposes
common gro
United Natio
dence of inter
the bi-regiona
gionalism actu
to the multil
a convergenc
critique of th
Cambodia in t
ment on Trad
of General A
additional cle
common nego
34 Evelyn Goh,
security strategi
35 Camroux, 'In
3 6 Jetschke an
37 Doidge, '"Ea
and the Europe
EUROPEAN
contingent on the in
peting interests of
in the WTO and as re
process of supranati
The first conclusion
fore that the failure
of a lack of overlap i
dialogues.
Casting the analytical net a bit wider to consider competing interregional
and trans-regional arrangements, the lack of multilateral utility as an outcome
of interregionalism is not limited to eu-asean bi-regionalism. Forums such
as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (apec) and the East Asia Summit
(eas), as well as as em, have also failed to provide much in the way of multilat-
eral utility. This is no surprise given the even more heterogeneous membership
of these forums: apec, maybe the most diverse forum of all, includes a dazzling
array of states, many of which have no history of economic or political cooper-
ation. asem, with its membership drawn along the lines of Asia and Europe
instead of developed and developing countries, has also not contributed to
multilateral negotiations in a tangible fashion.39 While both forums, particu-
larly apec, have been used to draft agreements that were then discussed in
the context of the wto, neither of them have managed to establish themselves
as reliable clearing-houses.40 This observation highlights two points. First, the
potential for a convergence of political interests at the interregional level has
been overstated in the past. This may be due to a lack of political interde-
pendence between the members of these interregional arrangements. Second,
multilateral utility may be the wrong yardstick by which to judge interregional
institutional arrangements. Two other types of political interdependence at the
interregional level which have more merit with regard to empirical evidence
still need to be investigated: social interaction and collective identity-building,
as well as legalisation and political conditionality, which operate more strongly
at the trans-regional and region-to-state-level, respectively.
Another feature of the bi-regional relationship that may be seen as political
interdependence is the technical capacity-building between the eu and central
asean institutions. Through its development cooperation budget, the eu pro-
vides financing to asean's central institutions as well as for additional projects
38 Robles, The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (asean) and the European Union'.
39 Gilson, 'New interregionalism?'.
40 John Ravenhill, 'apec and the wto: which way forward for trade liberalization?', Contem-
porary Southeast Asia, Vol. 21, No. 2 (1999), pp. 220-237.
in the field o
health and no
cant funding
for the 2014-
paid,41 techn
ating at the b
the section o
With regard
tionship also
The bi-regio
integration o
interdepende
edged that a
mentary, wh
the region, e
trade has rem
eu has rema
on external
dependencies
regional level
dence: While
makes up on
Asia, bi-regi
eu and East A
level with individual asean member states.
All things considered, neither political nor economic interdependence
seems to provide an argument for institutional engagement between the two
regions. No political issues unite the eu and asean and since asean is not a
customs union, much less a common market, economic interdependence may
not be translated into a closer relationship between the two regions.
4 1 Allison, 'The E u, as e an and Interregionalism'. D. Martin, 'Toes in the water. The "makabil-
ity" of asean and European Commission support to economic integration in Southeast
Asia under apris', in D. Lombaerde and M. Schulz (eds), The eu and World Regionalis: The
Makability of Regions in the 21st Century (London: Ashgate, 2009), pp. 83-100.
42 Lim, 'as e an's relations with the eu'; Katharina L. Meissner, A case of failed interregion-
alism? Analyzing the eu-asean free trade agreement negotiations', Asia Europe Journal,
Vol. 13, No. 3 (2016), pp. 1-18; e e as bureaucrat, personal communication (16 June 2015).
43 All statistics taken from 1 M F Direction of Trade Statistics
The Trans-Regiona
While asem was at f
opening a channel t
of the eu- asean dia
to those affecting pr
While asem, replacin
did not push the inte
cooperation between
as a forum which 'p
making decisions'.45
in relation to multila
is its function as a f
then be articulated t
in his view that ase
that their relationshi
appears to fulfil fr
of an alternative ven
of a conflict of objec
asem, however, doe
record of eu-asean b
of conflict between
and multilateral dia
Political interdepend
more merit when th
tion are considered. Both the eu and asean derive discursive benefits from
between sm
improved in
the develop
well as norm
Collective ide
alism on the
and externall
has taken pl
by asean, soli
external acto
been noted, t
main, objecti
cess of intera
formation is
trans-regiona
of social inte
bi-regional p
ical interdepe
members, as
affects a larg
forum for th
ber states, w
Cold War. Ad
benefit of p
Stone,
Europe selectively an
endemic to asymmet
55 Julie Gilson, The Asia-Europe Meeting (asem)', in M. Beeson and R. Stubbs (eds), Rout-
Ledge Handbook of Asian Regionalism (New York: Routledge, 2012), pp. 394-405.
56 Eurostat, available at http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/main/home.
Put together
highlights th
more intense
unclear wheth
a forum, soci
both asean an
larger trans-r
The Region-
The region-to
the eu strateg
ative economi
duce political
in the case o
tively ties ec
making politi
to avoid a po
ical condition
been geared
states signing
vidually rema
the eu-asean
key documen
Joint Declara
negotiations
Preferences (
ing Committ
moved toward
notably, the e
prior to lettin
the failed neg
terms on poli
issue, the eu h
its current jo
The fact that
recently, inev
57 Lim, 'asean's
58 Lim, 'as e an
EUROPEAN
organisation lacked a
agreements with exter
ments with partner
individual agreements
remains questionable
ducive to the eu's poli
in the 1990s highlight
When untangling th
ent that when it co
are created equal. The
asean states, namely
the eu is currently ne
negotiated (Singapor
Thailand and Vietnam
is relevant in terms o
the four fta partner
well as 76.5 per cent
interdependence tha
to-state patterns is
up about 40 per cen
located in the region.
in Indonesia, 0.5 per
states falling below th
inward fdi. Out of 1.9
eu, 1.8 per cent comes
Taken together, pol
region-to-state level w
ment cooperation. Tak
consideration, it is c
of political and econom
appear to be politicall
tion. The region-to-st
legalisation. In the e
levels appear to have
level.
Agency
To make judgements about as ean's and the eu's political strategies with regard
to one another, one must first assess what objectives both actors have been
trying to accomplish. Starting with asean, three key elements have featured
prominently in its regional and interregional strategies: first, the principle
of omni-enmeshment of potentially hegemonic actors; second, the principle
of horizontal and vertical institutional hedging, allowing for more room in
negotiations when faced with asymmetrically distributed institutional power;
third, the logic of relative institutionalisation with the objective of preventing
a displacement of as ean's institutional norms and mechanisms through other
institutions set up by outsiders, such as apec or asem.
Having discussed as ean's strategy vis-à-vis the eu, the opposite perspective
needs to be considered, eu strategy towards asean interregionalism also has
three dimensions. First, there has been a move towards pragmatism in the
relationship with asean in order to maintain engagement in the region with
regard to competing actors; second, the eu has refocused its regional relations
from bi-regionalism to East Asia more generally, with an increasing focus on
China; third, there is a continuation of capacity-building with the aim of future
political interdependence and closer partnership at the bi-regional level.
ASEAN
Omni-Enmeshment
The changing distribution of power after the end of the Cold War led to discord
inside asean as perceptions of threat differed between asean states.61 While
states like Indonesia and Malaysia at first were more concerned with China,
Singapore had stronger concerns about a re-emerging Japan. As of today, states
like Singapore and Malaysia have adopted a Look East policy,62 cooperating
with East Asian partners, while new cleavages have opened up in the region,
particularly concerning states' perspective on China. A point on which asean
positions have mostly galvanised, however, was the desire for a continued us
presence in the region. These conflicting interests led to what Goh describes
as a strategy of omni-enmeshment of the us and asean's powerful Northeast
As has previously b
could credibly propos
igniting fears of heg
economic and finan
general East Asian dia
bours, asean has supp
with the intention o
of powers.65 asean u
has commonly been in
us security interests
recently India shows
order to contribute to
described best by Si
should be kept open
as this is most likely
countries big and sma
While the eu is not
ment may nonetheles
iour in the region an
involvement may also
in institutions, to giv
to criticise non-confor
the realm of economi
The Asian financial crisis has made asean states feel the need to reduce finan-
ciai dependenc
extremely un
of the eu in
be used to rai
versely, asean
relevance as a
membership.
nal process bu
move from b
function of th
What is impo
with regard
partner in its
and Japan, as
eu in its insti
the eu in rela
logue throug
asean requires
alliance-build
may build an
age against an
nomic bargain
on as e an's s
pursue a stra
on individual
ment partner
trade interd
the ASEAN-C
the two and
for closer eco
opment has ag
relations, wit
with outside a
of statist act
EUROPEAN
EUROPEAN JOURNAL
is particular
states and th
tionship. Clos
states such a
the us in or
more densely
Philippines, V
trans-region
actors, while
cooperation.
A similar log
processes in
asymmetry
institutional
is important
tal hedging i
the addition
ferent chann
ment of insti
made possib
groups to c
interregiona
aged to extra
opposition fr
mentation o
through the
political con
fully used th
push for cert
never manag
The same lo
organisation
Asian partne
individual a
of the inter
Cooperation (a
(eds), Interregi
74 Goh, 'Great
75 Robles, The
EUROPEAN
be soft. But a
individual as
to politically
the past.79 Th
always emerg
assessment le
remains the
states.
EU
Pragmatic Approach
The limited institutional dividends in the 1990s and a general reframing of eu
foreign policy from a strong normative inclination towards a more pragmatic
approach has also had an effect on the eu-asean relationship. Particularly
after the completion of the eu common market, the eu came to be increasingly
eager in seeking foreign growth markets as opposed to its previous preoccupa-
tion with internal economic integration.80 Southeast Asia has some of the high-
est regional growth rates in the world and has been a key area of competition for
states seeking investment opportunities. The rapid increase in extra-regional
FDi inflow in asean is an indicator of how economically attractive and com-
petitive the region has become: extra-regional fdi increased from $36 billion
in 2005 and $63 billion in 2010 to $100 billion in 2013. Meanwhile, the compo-
sition of investors has remained much the same, indicating that investors are
increasing their stakes in asean economies.
Outside powers have also been competing to sign trade and investment
agreements with asean throughout the 2000s. There is a correlation in the
timing of region-to-state ftas between asean and its partners, starting with
China and India in 2003, followed by Japan, Russia and South Korea in 2004,
Australia in 2005, the us in 2009 and the eu in 2012. It is notable that these
economic agreements only materialised after the signing of the Treaty of Amity
and Cooperation (tac) (with the exception of China), a fact that speaks for
asean's strategic preference of ensuring the commitment to ASEAN-led East
Asian regionalism prior to accepting economic cooperation. The response of
EUROPEAN JOURNAL
of 31 per cen
particularly s
negotiations o
and the Philip
rights clause
Malaysia and
is willing to p
recent climat
At this point
an outsize inf
been relevant
prior to its a
particularly i
nature and th
German and Southeast Asian statesmen. Allison has noted that eu-asean
interregional dialogues made significant leaps under German presidencies in
1978, 1994 and 2007.89 In her survey of policy-makers, the uk, France and
Germany were identified as the members with the most significant impact on
the eu's Southeast Asia policy.
Still, it must be noted that a modicum of political conditionally remains in
the eu-asean bi-regional relationship. It has commonly been accepted that
the reason for the failure to conclude a bi-regional fta has been the inability of
both regions to settle on human rights issues in Myanmar, although it has since
emerged that the proposed economic characteristics of an interregional fta
were also a stumbling block.90 While other competitors in the region such as
China,Japan, Australia and South Korea did in fact negotiate ftas with asean
as a region (although caveats remain in all cases), the eu apparently refused to
settle for a bi-regional agreement due to the non-fulfilment of a certain thresh-
old of political conditionality on the bi-regional level. This suggests that the
eu still has certain strategic objectives in mind for its future relationships on
the bi-regional level, a fact which will be further addressed in the eu strategic
agency relating to capacity-building inside asean.
Widening to East A
A shift towards mor
complemented by an
relationship into the e
the need to increase it
advantage of its econ
undertaken with rega
network links in Sout
China, Japan and the
with China.91 Starting
of engaging asean and
high growth. This has
East Asia, which hav
more trans-regional
In the case of the eu,
more generally were
laid out plan for e a
relationship as a 'corn
been described as a r
asean as it did not a
Tellingly, this announ
as the emergence of a
interregional dialogu
with the East Asian r
Asia: a strategic fra
its Asia strategy in
main channel of inter
initiatives such as arf
economic objectives w
The trans-regional e
the current dynamic
asean is in the proces
as the origin of raw m
role of interlocutor
EUROPEAN JOURNAL
Apart from
also be seen a
of a trans-reg
into a commo
Asia as contai
is a symptom
of relying on
considers the r
to the emerg
relations.95 The fact that no similar reaction has been noted in the case of
asean lends support to the view that the eu strategy of regional engagement
was consistent with the objectives of asean.
Conclusion
98 Naila Maier-Knapp, The European Union as a normative actor and its external relations
with Southeast Asia', Journal of Contemporary European Research , Vol. 10, No. 2 (2014).
focus from So
economic int
building at th
asean partner
European and
The main obj
vailing actor
gionalism. Wh
organisations
level have sad
agency of as
remain under
both to mor
arrangements
Western regio
tions of West
EUROPEAN