The joint enterprise/parties to crime ambit in the criminal law is all about the criminal situations that involve

multiple people with

mutual involvement in executing a crime, which call for taking into account proportional liabilities applicable on the persons
involved. Under this law, more than one person can be convicted on the same offence. Looking at it in retrospectivity, this law was
governed under the Accessories and Abettor’s Act 1981, which divided the crime into four parts of; aiding, abetting, procuring and
counselling. Although, the only two most relevantly liable for the crime committed are the accomplice and principal (in view of the
Bryce case). Principals are all the people directly involved in execution of the crime, and who may be the prime convicts that may
be charged with the same offences; for instance, two main people who kill another to people in the same criminal event. Whereas,
the accomplice element includes the secondary persons who are involved in the commission of the crime, let’s suppose someone
who knowingly, gives a place to an absconder to hide.

Another renowned case in reforming the criminal law ambit of joint enterprise is the authority of R v Jogee, which we shall discuss
later in detail and how it has impacted the law of complicity, assisted in clarifying the mens rea aspects of foreseeability and
intent. Parsons in one of his articles talked about the ambiguity and restriction that the law of parties to crime puts forth, and how
it is controversially difficult and complex at times. As common law presents a larger spectrum of interpretation, this law relies
upon it quite a lot. Two of the many concerns that arise when speaking of this law are the distinguishing how normal elements of
crime differ from the proving the elements of complicity, and the other one is determining how parasitic the crime is or can be.

As per the authority of R v Osborne, the court maintained that determining or specifying the principal and the accomplice is not
necessary, but the proving the commission of act done mutually must be proved, and beyond reasonable doubts. The actus reus
criteria of the offence was defined in R v Calheam, where it was held that the act must be committed actually, by the person
mutually involved or counseled, should be within the scope of the advice provided, and there must exist a visible causal
connection between the offence and the counselling. Further looking into the AR of complicity, we must not ignore the authority
of Gianetto, where it was stated that the prosecution has a benefit of not being required to specify the P and the A, because in the
AAA 1861, the elements of aiding, abetting, counselling, or procuring are nowhere categorically distinguished, neither is the
participation in crime. Although the courts have elaborated in detail on various occasions, the very wide spectrum of facts of this
offence. It was also witnessed in the authority of Tally, that the relevance between the offences committed and the advice is
irrelevant.

Moreover, the mens rea requirement of this offence is that the assistance and the encouragement provided in the act by the
accomplice must be done knowingly. It has also been defined in NCB v Gamble, that intention to be an accomplice, with express
knowledge of the circumstance must exist for the mens rea requirement to be fulfilled. As seen in the precedent of Clarkson,
aiding or abetting a crime does not include silently watching an offence being committed. Intention means express knowledge of
the fact that the offence will be committed by the act of the person, and still going forth with in as a party to it (Woolin case).
Another essential element of this offence is the foresight. One of the D in the Bainbridge case was convicted of the offence
because he had helped in providing the tools for the offence to be committed, similar circumstances were also witnessed in the
Ireland v Maxwell case.

The previous law is mostly based on the foresight element and the Chan Wing-Siu v The Queen, but there is a side of the judiciary
and laureates of the legal world who consider it obsolete. This is a controversial aspect in regards to this ambit of the criminal law,
as many eyebrows have been raised over the possible unfairness that may exist in it to the extent, that it has been heard to be a
reason for the destruction of many families. Although, the very significant case of Jogee has contributed in reforming the mens rea
element of the act. The case was of the murder of an ex-policeman, in which Jogee was seen to have encouraged his friend in
committing the act, and both the defendants were charged with murder, but the appeal of Jogee against his conviction was
allowed, in which Lord Neuberger who wrote the leading judgment, stated that the courts have previously erred and even though
this court is hesitant in derailing from the previously set precedents, but the mistakes made by the courts previously must be
corrected in order to put the law on the right track.

Although keeping this judgment in view there is no specific right that may allow the previously convicted under this offence to
appeal, but the Jogee judgment has substantially and positively impacted the law of complicity, as the rotten previous precedent
which had in numerous scenarios ruined many lives, and is now being transformed. All the criticism made upon this law of joint
enterprise has gradually negated and this judgment has been agreed upon. The complicity law can be views as a substantially
impacting move in terms of widening the spectrum of justice, but we cannot neglect the fact that still more refinement is needed
to erase the vagueness that is created for the persons involved, including the victims. Also keeping before us, the fact that many
questions may sprout against the 6th Article of ECHR.