Stateless Diasporas and China's Uyghur Crisis in The 21st Century

Stateless Diasporas and China’s Uyghur Crisis in the 21st Century

Işık Kuşçu Bonnenfant, Middle East Technical University
https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.013.751
Published online: 21 December 2022
Summary
Research on contemporary diasporas and their political mobilization strategies has proliferated. The literature
differentiates between the mobilization strategies of stateless and state-linked diaspora. While earlier works have
argued that stateless diasporas pursue more violent strategies with, as an end goal, secession, more recent studies
have suggested that this is not always the case. Research on diaspora has also borrowed extensively from social
movement theory. This has allowed researchers to focus on diaspora as a social group that can mobilize in
convenient political opportunity structures with claim-making ability. A political opportunity structure is the
combination of structural and contextual conditions that permits diaspora mobilization. Mobilizing structures and
frames are the two other analytical tools of social movement theory that have previously inspired diaspora
scholars. Mobilizing structures are formal and informal structures in which diasporas can organize collectively for a
common cause. Various frames, such as human rights, enable a diaspora to make sense of certain events and
conditions in its aim to mobilize members into action.
Nearly 500,000 to 600,000 Uyghurs live as diaspora today; most of them left their homeland, the Xinjiang Uyghur
Autonomous Region in China, because of increasingly repressive policies targeting the very core elements of their
identity. Uyghurs are one of the 55 ethnic minorities in China. Particularly after the end of the Cold War and the
independence of the neighboring Central Asian republics, China perceived a threat of secession from the Uyghurs in
Xinjiang. Later, 9/11 and the subsequent war on terror instigated China to adopt a new rhetoric, one that focused on
the “fight against terrorism” in its policies toward Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities in Xinjiang. Riots and
several terrorist incidents reinforced this discourse and legitimized China’s securitization of the Uyghur issue. Since
2010, China has increased surveillance activities in the region, arbitrarily detained up to a million people, and
violated the basic rights of Muslim minorities in Xinjiang.
Since the 1960s, the Uyghur diaspora has pursued various mobilization strategies, most of which are confined to
nonviolent repertoires of action. Uyghurs abroad have utilized various mobilization structures and political
opportunity structures and frames. The first-generation Uyghur diaspora contributed greatly to the construction of
a national identity and history, and this was an alternative to China’s dominant narratives. The second generation
has benefited from better political opportunity structures and managed to bring various Uyghur diaspora
organizations under one umbrella, the World Uyghur Congress. The Uyghur diaspora vigorously continues its efforts
to create awareness on the plight of its brethren in the homeland within a human rights–based frame using
moderate strategies of action. The Uyghur diaspora leadership has become a legitimate transnational actor, one
that is now taken quite seriously by various states and international organizations.
Keywords: stateless diasporas, diaspora mobilization, China, Uyghur, human rights
Subjects: Conflict Studies, Human Rights, Identity
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Introduction
In today’s globalized world, with its increasingly rapid communication means and technological
advances, contemporary diasporas are important nonstate actors to be reckoned with by
homelands, host states, other states, and international organizations. Diaspora communities
work toward maintaining their social cohesion and preserving their identity in their host states.
They are also concerned with developments in the homelands they left behind. Diasporas can
dynamically and rapidly mobilize to promote a better future for many in their homelands.
However, their views on what is best for their homelands may not always be congruent with their
homeland governments’ vision. This is particularly true for stateless and conflict-generated
diasporas.
The Uyghur diaspora is one such entity residing in various host states. Since the mid-2000s
specifically, it has been able to effectively mobilize toward protecting the rights of their coethnics
in their homeland of Xinjiang, China. Uyghurs are one of the 55 officially recognized ethnic
minority groups in the People’s Republic and predominantly reside in the Xinjiang Uyghur
Autonomous Region (XUAR). Most Uyghurs became diaspora as they regarded the Chinese
government’s policies as discriminatory and increasingly repressive toward Uyghurs native to
Xinjiang.
The article first reviews the main debates surrounding stateless diasporas and their political
mobilization strategies. It then analyzes China’s Uyghur problem, with a brief political history of
the region focusing on China’s policies in XUAR with an emphasis on its nationalities policy
toward minorities. In the final section, the article examines Uyghur diaspora mobilization efforts
from a historical viewpoint.
Stateless Diasporas and Political Mobilization
Vigorous academic debates on contemporary diasporas since the early 1990s have led to a
clarification of some of the essential features of the diaspora: the movement of people from a
homeland to various host states and a maintenance of sociocultural boundaries in those host
states while remaining connected with the homeland through numerous channels (Brubaker,
2005; Cohen, 1995; Safran, 1991). Members of various social science and humanities fields have
contributed to the more clearly articulated present definition of diaspora, as opposed to the fluid
construct of the past.
In his seminal work, Diaspora Politics: At Home Abroad, Gabriel Sheffer (2003) provided a
framework to differentiate between stateless and state-linked diasporas and their repertoires of
action. According to him, state-linked diasporas have their internationally recognized, sovereign
states, whereas stateless diasporas are ethnonational groups from homelands that have not
achieved an internationally recognized independent state status. Many diaspora communities
have fit this definition of stateless entities at varying points in history, such as the Irish, Kurds,
Sikhs, Tamils, Palestinians, Armenians, Croatians, and Uyghurs. Kurds, Palestinians, and
Uyghurs are currently the most famous examples of stateless diaspora.
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Sheffer (2003) highlighted the difference between these two types of diasporas in order to
emphasize the different mobilization strategies that they adopt. For Sheffer, stateless diasporas
tend to lean toward more radical and violent strategies with secession as a goal because their
collective identity is very much defined by statelessness. Therefore, they are keener to actively
mobilize for what they believe is best for the homeland (including secession or independence)
and may embrace more radical strategies to realize this goal (Sheffer, 2003, p. 170). State-linked
diasporas, on the other hand, tend to have a more moderate stance and mostly work toward
establishing a secure and respected existence within their host state communities (Sheffer, 2003,
p. 172).
Shain and Barth further clarify the difference between state-based and stateless diasporas: The
latter aspire to establish an independent state in a “claimed” homeland, while the former have
already formed a majority in their homelands (Shain & Barth, 2003, p. 125). Stateless diasporas
reject leaving the past behind and continue to be concerned about their homelands. For such
ethnonational groups, maintaining primordial roots and keeping their recent history alive is
crucial (Baser & Swain, 2010, p. 38).
Other scholars further delineate the concept of stateless diaspora. Tas (2016) contributes to the
debate by defining a third category of statelessness—“social statelessness”—in addition to the
prevalent concepts of de facto and de jure statelessness, which are related to legal connections
between individuals and the state. Tas argues that statelessness is not always an individual
problem. For members of some ethnic groups, even though they have legal connections with a
state through formal citizenship, they do not feel part of that state. For such individuals,
statelessness is a collective problem, and the concepts of de jure and de facto statelessness are not
sufficient in defining the loose citizenship links of some people with their states. For Tas, this is
often the very reason why such people leave these states and become part of the diaspora (Tas,
2016, p. 10). Eliassi (2016) also argues that the legal or political definition of stateless people
excludes those connected to a state through formal citizenship but who cannot enjoy the benefits
of citizenship to the full extent since they belong to a minority group (p. 1406).
The scholarly literature on stateless diaspora is becoming more varied, with an increasing
number of case studies on the issue (Bamyeh, 2007; Baser & Swain, 2010; Chochiev, 2015; Eliassi,
2016; Fair, 2005; Farah, 2015; Holt, 2015; Kuşçu, 2013, 2014; Kuşçu Bonnenfant, 2018; Natali,
2007; Skrbis, 2007; Tas, 2016). These case studies contribute to our understanding of the
motivations of stateless diasporas and their mobilization strategies. For stateless diasporas, the
very creation and preservation of national identity is a core component of their diasporic
activism. Stateless diasporas feel a responsibility to create an alternative narrative of identity and
history, mostly in opposition to the homeland majority nation’s dominant narratives.
Stateless diaspora communities are more dynamic and diligent in their mobilization efforts to
create awareness surrounding the conditions of their coethnics in the homeland, usually in a
right-based framework at national (host states) and transnational levels. Due to the conditions
that stateless diasporas find themselves in, they have more at stake if they want to mobilize
effectively with claim-making abilities in comparison to state-linked diasporas. However, with
regard to their mobilization strategies, recent case studies indicate that it is too presumptuous to
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label stateless diaspora activism as blatantly radical. The nature and level of mobilization
strategies adopted by stateless diasporas are varied and may have similarities with state-based
diaspora groups.
Diaspora Political Mobilization
Regardless of their status as stateless or state based, there is an increasing tendency to treat
diaspora not as a primordial entity but as a socially constructed one. Rogers Brubaker (2005)
argues that we should consider diaspora as a category of practice or as a stance and a claim.
According to Brubaker, treating the diaspora as a category of practice would allow researchers to
focus on how it mobilizes for claim-making purposes (p. 12). Martin Sökefeld (2006) adds to
Brubaker’s perspective and argues that diaspora as a practical category involves the actions of the
political and cultural elite to mobilize people. Such an approach requires scholars to focus on the
motivations and mobilization strategies of diaspora with the awareness that, like other identities,
diasporic identity is an essentialized construction (p. 266). If diaspora is an imagined community
stemming from discourses of the elite, then it is important to understand why and how this
discourse emerges among a certain group of people and how other members adopt and are
mobilized by it. Sökefeld suggests that studying diaspora from a social mobilization perspective
would be the most appropriate analytical tool as this approach is primarily designed to
understand how and why people mobilize for collective purposes and actions (Sökefeld, 2006, p.
268).
Baser and Swain (2010) further elaborate on why the social movements perspective could be the
most convenient tool to analyze stateless diaspora’s mobilization efforts. According to these
authors, both are oppositional and a challenge to nation-states (p. 44). While stateless diasporas
pose a challenge to some nation-states, they mobilize within the opportunity structures provided
by some other states and international organizations. They also operate within a transnational
space with wider and faster networking and communicative means. There are a lot of parallels
between stateless diasporas’ and transnational advocacy groups’ mobilization and repertoires of
action. Both social groups mobilize around rights and social justice issues and operate on a
transnational scale, transcending the boundaries of nation-states. They both have claim-making
skills in order to pursue the rights of those who have limited means vis-à-vis those (states) who
are more powerful (Baser & Swain, 2010, p. 44).
There are various frames and practices used by diaspora elite for claim-making purposes. The
two dimensions in diaspora mobilization are direction (radical/moderate) and strength (strong/
weak). Radical or transgressive contention includes acts of aggression such as hate speech,
violent demonstrations, fundraising, or other types of support for secessionist groups in the
homeland. Moderate or contained contention, on the other hand, refers to “well-established
means of claim” making such as the lobbying of host states and societies, petitioning, and
demonstrating in a nonviolent manner. The strength of both radical and moderate mobilization
actions depends on the number of diaspora entrepreneurs involved: If many of them are involved,
it makes it a strong one; if there are a few, it will then make it weak (Koinova, 2013, p. 6).
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Brinkerhoff (2008) defines diaspora mobilization (purposive action) as belonging to two

categories: They lead to either constructive or destructive ends. Constructive ones include those
well-intentioned activities that are “non-criminal, non-violent and consistent with liberal
values of human rights including basic freedoms of speech, assembly and self-determination.”
Destructive ones, however, refer to criminal and/or violent activities (Brinkerhoff, 2008, p. 68).
Diaspora mobilization should not be feared because it is a healthy and a natural way to express
identity, particularly for those who perceive that the group identity has been treated unjustly
(Brinkerhoff, 2008, pp. 77–84). Episodic conflict in the homeland may propel diaspora groups to
maintain their mobilized collective identity (Brinkerhoff, 2011, p. 124).
Diasporas’ transnational mobilization efforts can target authoritarian homeland regimes through
various national and transnational political opportunity structures (Adamson, 2020, p. 152).
Diasporas, especially those that operate in liberal contexts, can mobilize freely in distant settings
against homeland governments they consider repressive (Van Hear & Cohen, 2017, p. 181).
Toivanen and Baser (2020) argue that even subsequent generations of diaspora, who would
otherwise be dormant or inactive, can become activated and energized as a result of political
disturbances in the homelands. There may be different modes of action taken by the same
diaspora group depending on their generational differences. While the first generation experience
the conflict in the homeland firsthand, in the subsequent generations, it is remembered.
However, this does not mean the conflict is not as meaningful as it was to the first generation. In
some cases, later generations own the homeland cause with stronger vigor and through enhanced
means available to them as a result of their improved standing in the host society and within the
transnational context (Toivanen & Baser, 2020, p. 54). Technological advances and changing
frames may also benefit the younger generations of diaspora in reaching the desired outcome of
their mobilization (p. 54).
When diasporas are analyzed as a social group with claims-making capacity and when they
mobilize collectively toward homeland-related causes, political opportunity structures,
mobilizing structures, and practices and framing become important analytical tools that are
derived from the social mobilization theory. Political opportunity structures are the contextual
and structural conditions within which diaspora mobilization occur. More specifically, host state,
homeland, or transnational contexts are the defining elements in determining the modes and
limits of diaspora mobilization (Ostergaard-Nielsen, 2006, p. 9; Smith, 2007, p. 9; Sökefeld,
2006, pp. 269–270).
Mobilizing structures are formal and/or informal structures such as social networks and formal
organizations that people can collectively organize with the goal of claim making. In the case of
diaspora mobilization, diaspora organization and diaspora social networks can provide the
platforms via which diaspora mobilization practices, such as demonstrations and information
campaigns, are organized (Sökefeld, 2006, pp. 269–270). According to Brinkerhoff (2008), social
networks are vital as mobilizing structures; they enable a dense network of relations that create
trust and contribute to the emergence of a common identity and solidarity among members (p.
76).
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Framing is the last major concept derived from the social movement theory. Frames are ideas that
help diaspora members to make sense of events and conditions in a particular way so that claims
can be made to mobilize members to action (Sökefeld, 2006, pp. 269–270). Framing defines the
direction of collective energy in terms of what is acceptable and what is not (Brinkerhoff, 2008, p.
84). Successful frames are those that highlight the problems related to the status quo, define
responsible parties, and propose solutions. Major frames such as “injustice,” “global justice,”
and “rights” can be defined as efficient frames that operate both locally and transnationally
(Koinova, 2011, p. 441).
Diasporas—more specifically, stateless and/or conflict-generated diaspora communities—adopt

different modes of action under different conditions. Table 1 presents various modes of action
adopted by stateless diaspora depending on the varying context.
Table 1. Stateless/Conflict-Generated Diaspora: Modes of Action Under Varying Conditions
Condition Mode of Action (Peaceful)
No hot conflict or conflict is in latent form - Sending remittances, giving humanitarian aid to
homeland
- Contributing to homeland’s development via
human capital and development projects
- Activities designed to improve the conditions of
diaspora in host states
- Diaspora institution-building activities
- Diaspora identity-building activities
Homeland conflict is hot or escalating; specific incidents - Violent protests and demonstrations
in the homeland that forced diaspora to flee - Funding terrorist groups
- Lobbying states and international organizations
- Peaceful protests and demonstrations, petitioning
Changes in the host state/homeland political context Adoption of different frames in lobbying host states,
advocacy work, petitions, demonstrations, and
protests
Changes in the transnational context (e.g., increasing Adoption of different frames, organizing diaspora
importance of human rights, growing number of institutions, and mobilization on a transnational
Intergovernmental Organizations/International Non- basis
Governmental Organizations)
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Condition Mode of Action (Peaceful)
Changes in available means to diaspora (e.g., New forms of diaspora mobilization via the Internet.
technology) Many modes of action can be digital such as identity
construction, signing petitions, protesting policies,
and fundraising.
Note: Prepared by the author based on the literature (Baser & Swain, 2010; Brinkerhoff, 2008, 2011; Féron, 2017; Féron &
Lefort, 2019; Koinova 2018; Toivanen & Baser, 2020).
Please note that diaspora modes of action can evolve over time (temporality), diaspora may adopt
more than one mode of action under the same condition, and/or diaspora organizations can vary
in their mode of action regardless of the condition. The modes of action in table 1 may be adopted
by diaspora at a host state level, transnational level, or both (space). As Brinkerhoff (2011) argues,
all these modes of actions can be peaceful or violent, depending on the diaspora groups’ goals and
their belief in whether peaceful or violent (sometimes both) means can lead to the desired
outcomes.
China’s Uyghur Crisis in the 21st Century
Uyghurs are one of the 55 officially recognized minority ethnic groups in the People’s Republic of
1
China (PRC). Most Uyghurs live in the XUAR. Xinjiang means “new frontier” in Mandarin
Chinese, a name given after the Qing conquest of the region in the mid-18th century. Under Qing
rule, Xinjiang was a frontier territory, and the center was mostly interested in establishing
control over the periphery (Gladney, 2009, p. 4; Millward & Tursun, 2004, p. 63). Following the
fall of the Qing in 1911, a period of instability and chaos commenced in Xinjiang—like in the rest
of China—and was followed by a ruthless period of warlord warmongering in the region
(Millward & Tursun, 2004, pp. 72–73). Until 1949, there were two brief periods of independence,
which Uyghurs view as evidence of self-rule (Gladney, 2009, p. 5). The first Eastern Turkestan
Republic (ETR) was proclaimed in 1933 in Kashgar and lasted for a year; the second ETR was
established in Yining (Ghulje) in 1944 and lasted until 1949 (Gladney, 2009, p. 4; Millward &
Tursun, 2004, pp. 77–83).
In 1949, when Chinese communist troops took over Xinjiang, which they defined as a peaceful
liberation, Xinjiang became part of the PRC. In the initial years, the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP) had a difficult time strengthening its power in the peripheries as there was a limited
understanding of local conditions (Millward & Tursun, 2004, pp. 86–87). In 1955, Xinjiang
became one of the autonomous regions in China—the XUAR. In the early period of its rule, while
the CCP was still striving to consolidate its power, it needed the support of the locals; therefore, it
followed a more tolerant approach toward the right of self-determination (Dittmer & Kim, 1993,
p. 275). However, once stronger control was gained, they replaced self-determination with
autonomy within a unitary, multinational China. The CCP clearly stated that all autonomous
regions were inseparable parts of China (Hyer, 2006, p. 77). In terms of its nationalities policy,
the CPP officially defined categories of ethnic groups, following the Soviet model. All of these
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non-Han ethnic minorities would follow the Hans and manage their own social revolutions under
the Han-dominated CCP leadership. The CCP’s nationalities policy was clear about not allowing
secession, Han chauvinism, or local nationalism (separatism). It also aimed to promote
autonomous governance in regions populated mainly by minority groups in order to ensure
equality between nationalities; it did this by endorsing minority languages and cultures to help
with the development of minority regions (Clarke, 2010, p. 217).
As in other autonomous regions, the CCP at times followed a soft policy and at other times a hard
policy toward ethnic minorities in Xinjiang. When the regime needed to win the support of
minorities, it followed affirmative action policies and encouraged the proliferation of national
elements. However, when the regime perceived dissent and nationalism that may have fostered
ideas such as secessionism, it followed harsher policies and strengthened its overall control
(Rudelson & Jankowiak, 2004, p. 301). For instance, in the initial years following 1949, there was a
lot of emphasis on the perils of great Han chauvinism and the need for the protection of minority
cultures, but after the Hundred Flowers Campaign, the CCP clamped down on elements of dissent
and purged non-Han local elements, along with the other critics of the regime (Millward &
Tursun, 2004, p. 93). In addition to such measures of control, the CCP initiated the Xinjiang
Production Construction Corps in 1954; this resulted in massive Han migration to paramilitary
state farms that aimed to promote economic development and greater control over the region
(Millward & Tursun, 2004, p. 90; Rudelson & Jankowiak, 2004, p. 360; Toops, 2004, pp. 245–
246).
Religion and language in Xinjiang are the two elements of culture that have been affected directly
by the alternating policies of the center. During periods of the soft approach, the regime was
tolerant toward institutionalized Islam. Harsher policies followed if religious education was
promoted outside state-sanctioned institutions. In a similar line, the use of the Uyghur language
in education and in the publication of materials on Uyghur political or cultural history was
affected by changes in policy (Clarke, 2010, p. 220). During the Cultural Revolution, the regime
switched to hard policies, and Islam, along with other religions, was suppressed (Mahmut, 2019,
p. 23). Yet, as of the 1980s, the religious restrictions were lifted. Uyghurs were able to construct
new mosques, and the regime permitted them to visit Mecca for pilgrimage as a result of China’s
opening up and due to other reform processes (Mahmut, 2019, p. 23; Rudelson-Jankowiak, 2004,
p. 301). This soft approach came to an abrupt end after the Tiananmen Square events and the
dissolution of the Soviet Union as the regime perceived greater threat from any form of dissent or
secessionist movements organized by minorities (Rudelson-Jankowiak, 2004, p. 307).
In the late 1980s, the political turmoil and the subsequent breakup of the Soviet Union
contributed to the tightening of the CCP’s policies in Xinjiang. The concern was that the
independence of the Central Asian republics might stimulate similar hopes for Uyghurs toward
secession from China (Dittmer & Kim, 1993, p. 277). Throughout the 1990s, there were uprisings
in Xinjiang such as in Baren in 1990, Hotan in 1995, and Yining (Khulja) in 1997. Such events
contributed to the regime’s pursuit of a tight security campaign to fight against Uyghur
separatism throughout the 1990s (Gladney, 2009, p. 2; Hyer, 2006, p. 75; Roberts, 2018, p. 233).
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Besides a tightening of security, Beijing accelerated its policies of economic growth and
development in Xinjiang, which encouraged further Han migration to the region. While such
policies led to certain improvements in the Uyghurs’ living standards, this policy, coupled with an
increase in Han migration and wealth discrepancies between ethnic groups, led to interethnic
tensions between Uyghurs and Hans in the region over time (Byler, 2018, pp. 214–216).
The 1990s ended with the CCP’s instigation of firmer security policies; this, combined with
economic policies targeting growth and development in Xinjiang and the September 11 events and
subsequent U.S. Global War on Terror, opened a new chapter in Beijing’s efforts to quell
separatism in Xinjiang. According to Sean Roberts, linking Uyghurs with terrorism in the post–
September 11 context has resulted in further damaging the relationship between the state and
Uyghurs as citizens of the PRC. The state and PRC media rhetoric has reinforced the image of
Uyghurs as potential terrorists and the propagated perceived links between Islam and violence
(Mahmut, 2019, p. 27; Roberts, 2018, p. 234). While Islam is a major marker of identity for
Uyghurs, the Islamic traditions practiced by a predominant majority of them are far from strict,
jihadist traditions. However, Beijing’s policies in the region, particularly toward religious
practices, which were once acceptable, have become increasingly harsher and labeled religious
extremism (Mahmut, 2019, pp. 27–28).
The July 5, 2009, uprisings in Urumchi further contributed to the deteriorating image of Uyghurs
in China and led to more repressive policies on Uyghurs. The uprising was violently suppressed by
the security forces (Clarke, 2010, p. 213; Millward, 2009, pp. 351–352). Following the July 5
incident, the government’s minority policy—specifically those concerned with affirmative action
—was widely debated, with criticism surfacing that the government’s policies toward ethnic
minorities were too soft (Sautman, 2012, p. 12). Criticism also targeted Uyghurs as potential
terrorists or sympathizers of terrorism in the PRC.
The Chinese government’s response to the July 5, 2009, events was further securitization of the
Uyghur problem. According to Finley, not only was there an increased military and public security
presence but also securitization in three realms: demographic securitization via hastened Han
immigration and ethnic displacement, linguistic securitization via Chinese-medium education,
and religious securitization with the repression of Islamic practices (Finley, 2019, p. 2). The
government increased its surveillance activities, and this was strengthened with new
technologies. High-definition surveillance cameras installed throughout the region with facial
recognition capabilities, GPS tracking of vehicles, and other practices to widely monitor
individual Uyghurs’ actions became the new norm (Roberts, 2018, pp. 243–248). However,
despite such security measures between 2010 and 2014, the number and the intensity of violent
acts by Uyghurs increased. According to Roberts (2018), this vicious, responsive cycle of
government repression and violence escalated to such a point that acts of violence by Uyghurs
were increasingly looked like premediated terrorist attacks targeting ordinary people in public
places (pp. 244–245).
In addition to monitoring Uyghurs in public spaces, the government has initiated other practices
to monitor their private lives. According to Byler, within the “united as one family” program,
civilians, Communist Party members, and civil servants of mostly Han origin visit the homes of
Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities for a few days to surveil and indoctrinate (Byler, 2018, p. 2).
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If the visitor suspects the household members of being too religious or if they show any signs of
radicalization, then he or she reports them; this may result in those being visited being sent to
“education and transformation training centers.” The first of these centers was established in
2017 and later spread all over Xinjiang (Raza, 2019, p. 491). Chinese authorities first denied the
existence of these facilities but later confirmed their presence when the issue was widely debated
in the Western media and by various human rights organizations. Often called internment camps
by the Western media, these facilities share a uniform character and often target a significant
number of the minority population; the basis for inclusion in these centers is religious extremism
(Finley, 2019, p. 7). The ultimate goal of the camps is to rid the mind of religious ideology and
indoctrinate its occupant with the values and ideology of the Chinese state (Mahmut, 2019, p. 28;
Raza, 2019, p. 495). According to Human Rights Watch, there are currently 300–400 of these
facilities, and nearly a million individuals have been detained in these centers so far (HRW
Report, 2021).
Uyghur Diaspora Mobilization
Since the 1950s, the Uyghurs have increasingly left their homeland and settled in various parts of
the world such as in the Central Asian republics and Turkey; later, from the 1990s onward,
Uyghurs moved to various European countries, the United States, Australia, and Canada. It is
estimated that between 500,000 and 600,000 Uyghurs live outside their homeland as diaspora
(Shichor, 2003, p. 284), and these figures have probably increased since then due to the new
exodus. As a stateless, conflict-generated diasporic group, the Uyghurs have been an actively
mobilized one. While their mobilization strategies have varied over time, they have managed to
establish a national history and identity, an alternative to the Chinese one, as well as to create
awareness on the plight of the Uyghurs in the homeland both at host state and transnational
levels. Traditionally, Uyghurs, like other diaspora groups, mobilized in the host states in which
they resided. The combination of technological advances and the diaspora unity they have gained
in the past two decades has helped them organize at a transnational level, as well; thus, because
they have had a wider influence, this has contributed to their success in reaching their desired
mobilization goals. The Uyghur diaspora elite has used diverse framework and practices
concurrent with the time period but also with the political opportunity and mobilizing structures
available to them. Their repertoire of action also evolved in time, yet has been mostly confined to
moderate activities such as the lobbying of host states and societies, organizing nonviolent
demonstrations, petitioning, and seeking the involvement of international organizations at a
transnational level.
The First Wave of Uyghur Diaspora Mobilization in Turkey
Uyghurs migrated from the homeland in different waves starting from 1949. Due to the
geographical proximity, they arrived in massive numbers in Central Asia. However, neither
during the Soviet period nor after the independence of the Central Asian republics could the
Uyghur diaspora have eligible political opportunity structures to mobilize there. Uyghur diaspora
mobilization actually started in Turkey under the leadership of Mehmet Emin Buğra and İsa Yusuf
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Alptekin. These two leaders fled Xinjiang with almost 2,000 followers after the communist
takeover of Xinjiang in 1949 (Shichor, 2003, p. 287). Later, they temporarily settled in the
neighboring Kashmir region (Shichor, 2003, p. 284). In 1952, they were accepted in Turkey along
with the Uyghurs they led. The Turkish government extended a privileged access to citizenship
and provided various aid to facilitate these Uyghurs’ adaptation process (Wilkoszewski, 2010, pp.
264–265). Subsequently, Turkey continued to accept numerous Uyghurs in different migration
waves.
As the real first base for Uyghur diaspora mobilization, Turkey provided a convenient place for
Uyghur diaspora mobilization starting in 1960s because the common cultural and religious
elements promoted host society support for the Uyghur cause. However, political opportunity
structures were still limited compared to what is available to the Uyghur diaspora today. First of
all, Turkey, at the time, was careful to not allow diaspora nationalistic ideas to proliferate because
its foreign policy line was cautious not to intervene in the domestic affairs of other countries.
Second, the country prioritized the development of Turkish nationalism, and therefore the
promotion of separate diaspora nationalisms was not sought (Bezanis, 1992; Bozaslan, 2006, pp.
28–32; Landau, 1995, p. 124).
Despite the limited nature of political opportunity structures, the Uyghur diaspora began to
organize through formal mobilization structures in the form of diaspora organizations as early as
the 1960s. The Eastern Turkestan Foundation (Doğu Türkistan Vakfı), the Association of Eastern
Turkistan Emigrants, the Eastern Turkestan Solidarity Association (Doğu Türkistan Dayanışma
Derneği), and the Eastern Turkestan Cultural and Solidarity Association (Doğu Türkistan Kültür
ve Dayanışma Derneği) are such organizations; they have promoted the unity and solidarity of
Uyghurs in Turkey and were effective in the collective organization of the diaspora for claim
making.
İsa Yusuf Alptekin and Mehmet Emin Buğra were important figures for Uyghur diaspora
mobilization at the time. Like other contemporaneous diaspora elite, they aimed to create an
awareness of the conditions of Uyghurs in the homeland through publication activities. Through
journals and books, they managed to form an alternative national identity and history. It is
particularly important for stateless diasporas to develop subaltern history vis-à-vis the regime in
the homeland. Establishing a legitimate claim on the territory where the claimed homeland is
located is a primary concern for most stateless diasporas. Alptekin (1976) delved on this theme
frequently to prove that Eastern Turkestan (Xinjiang) had been inhabited by Uyghurs since
ancient times and had only been conquered by the Chinese in the 18th century. He referred to the
takeover as a foreign invasion of the homeland (Alptekin, 1976, pp. 113–121; Taşçı, 1985, pp. 24–
31). In their writings, Alptekin and Buğra also emphasized numerous resistance movements by
Uyghurs to highlight their tradition of independent living. They offered an alternative history,
one in which Uyghurs/Turkic Khanates in the homeland established strong states. They did so to
stress the Uyghurs’ ability to self-govern (Alptekin, 1976, pp. 259–278; Buğra, 1959, pp. 8–10;
Buğra & Alptekin, 1955, p. 8).
Alptekin and Buğra’s writings reveal the mobilization frames used by this first generation of the
Uyghur diaspora movement. Repression and discrimination toward Uyghurs under the
communist regime were frequent reference points made by Alptekin. He emphasized how the
Page 11 of 23
initial promise by the CCP to liberate the Uyghurs was in fact a misleading one and that even the
autonomous status given later was not actual autonomy in the real sense. Alptekin argued that
the ultimate goal of the regime was the complete assimilation of the Uyghur populace (Alptekin,
1967, p. 12; Alptekin, 1979, pp. 10–11; Komünizmin Doğu Türkistan’a Girişinin 40, 1989). Given
that the first period of Uyghur diaspora activism overlapped with the Cold War period, emphasis
on the perils of communist regimes and the choice of anticommunism as a frame was a rational
one. Under the rubric of identity and self-determination frames, Turkicness and Islam were
elements frequently mentioned by Alptekin and Buğra. This frame also formed an alternative one
against the dominant narratives created by the Chinese state. The first-generation Uyghur
diaspora elite used these frames to serve a dual purpose: first, to create unity within the diaspora
and, second, to appeal to the international community and host state authorities.
The Second Wave of Uyghur Diaspora Mobilization: Transnational Frame

work
From 1990 onward, a new phase began in Uyghur diaspora mobilization. Political opportunity
structures, mobilizing structures, and frames used by the diaspora elite changed tremendously
due to the change in the international political context and with advances in technology and
communication. First, after the Cold War, democracy, human rights, and minority rights became
important issues for the global community. This gave great leverage to the Uyghur diaspora in
reaching a wider international audience via a rights-based frame. Also, China became more
susceptible to international criticism following post-Mao reforms and its Open-Door Policy
(Shichor, 2003, p. 282; Shichor, 2007). The Uyghur diaspora itself became more cohesive and
more effectively mobilized thanks to changes in technology and communication. While the first-
generation Uyghur diaspora elite pioneered the creation of an alternative national identity and
history and initiated their first mobilizing practices, their overall reach was limited. Their
practices changed in the 1990s, when Uyghur diaspora efforts started becoming more visible and
effective in terms of lobbying other governments to apply pressure on China.
Turkey is the first place where Uyghur diaspora mobilization was initially started. Only after 1990
did the Uyghur diaspora begin to settle in host states in Western Europe and North America. This
movement would facilitate the further migration of Uyghurs to these host states sometime later.
This geographic shift affected the political opportunity structures available to the diaspora. While
the liberal changes in the post–Cold War period positively affected Turkey for diaspora
nationalism and activism, pressure from the Chinese government by the end of the 1990s due to
increased relations between Turkey and China (enabled first with the recognition of the PRC by
Turkey in 1971) led the Uyghur diaspora to relocate diasporic activities to more liberal host states
in Europe (Emet, 2009, p. 59). Therefore, Uyghur diaspora mobilization obtained more favorable
political opportunity structures in the second phase.
As the diaspora moved to Western Europe and North America, they coalesced around newly
established diaspora organizations. Germany became host to one of the largest Uyghur
communities in Europe. Over time, Uyghur activists further established active diaspora
organizations in Sweden, Norway, the United Kingdom, France, and the United States (Reyhan,
Page 12 of 23
2012, p. 6). However, while the number of Uyghur organizations has proliferated, the problem of
coordination and unity among these groups—a necessary condition, especially for stateless
diasporas—has also emerged. The creation of the World Uyghur Congress (WUC) as an umbrella
organization (it currently includes 34 affiliate diaspora organizations all over the world)
remedied this problem to a great extent.
Attempts to unify diaspora mobilization efforts under a single body goes back to the early 1990s.
Following the end of the Cold War and Soviet disintegration, the first Eastern Turkestan National
Assembly convened in 1992 with the representatives of the Uyghur diaspora, including those
from Central Asia (Kellner, 2002, p. 13). The second National Assembly, convened in 1998,
resulted in the creation of the Eastern Turkestan National Center (ETNC) in İstanbul, a first step
in the creation of a transnational Uyghur diaspora organization. However, certain diaspora
communities, particularly those found in Central Asia, did not agree with or appreciate the
Center’s emphasis on nonviolent mobilization strategies (Shichor, 2007). Later, the ETNC had to
relocate to Munich because of China’s pressure on the Turkish government. Finally, in 2004, as a
result of the merge between the ETNC and the World Uyghur Youth Congress, the WUC was
brought into existence (Shichor, 2007).
The WUC has as a goal “to promote democracy, human rights and freedom for the Uyghur
people” and emphasizes that it opts for negotiation and dialogue and peaceful and nonviolent
means to achieve this goal. The organization’s clear emphasis on nonviolence and dialogue is a
rational strategy, considering the fact that following the September 11 events, China has
demonstrated an increasing tendency to accuse Uyghurs of terrorism. This also enables the WUC
to distance itself from other Uyghur organizations that do not explicitly renounce violence
(Kuşçu, 2014, pp. 148–149). Almost two decades following its establishment, the WUC serves as
the legitimate authority representing most Uyghur diasporas today. In addition, various host
state governments and international organizations treat the WUC as a valid authority.
Because the mobilization structures of the Uyghur diaspora have improved with the WUC,
technological advances, particularly the greater use of the Internet, have further contributed to
the enhancement of its mobilization strategies. First of all, the use of the web has strengthened
the transnational connections within Uyghur diaspora members residing in various parts of the
world. The increasing availability of the Internet for the Uyghur diaspora has enhanced Uyghur
national identity and strengthened their feeling of community (Reyhan, 2012, p. 6). Furthermore,
through virtual participation via the web, the Uyghur diaspora movement has reached a grassroot
level. A recent study analyzed how social media platforms such as Facebook have contributed to
the ongoing construction of the Uyghur diaspora identity through everyday communication
(NurMuhammad et al., 2016, p. 2). Discussions on various Uyghur Facebook groups reveal that an
alternative Uyghur identity is being built through resistance to the Chinese regime’s repressive
policies and narratives (NurMuhammad et al., 2016, p. 11).
The Internet has also helped the Uyghur diaspora disseminate news and stories about the plight
of the Uyghurs in the homeland and about ongoing violations of human rights. Some Uyghur
diaspora websites are particularly important and their emphasis on human rights violations and
advocacy initiative quite visible (Petersen, 2006, p. 66; Reyhan, 2012, p. 14). The Uyghur Human
Page 13 of 23
Rights Project and WUC websites are among the ones that prepare regular reports and briefings
targeting international audiences. This is particularly important in case there is an unavailability
of verified information from the homeland (Kuşçu, 2014, p. 151).
While the political opportunity structures and mobilization structures of the Uyghur diaspora
movement have been positively affected by various changes, its mobilization frame has firmly
evolved around human rights. This is partly related to the fact that human rights have been a
prior and prominent theme in the agenda of the international community after the post–Cold
War period. Also, treatment of the Uyghur minority in China since the July 5 events has been hard
to ignore. This is largely due to greater attention paid to the plight of Uyghurs by international
actors, particularly human rights organizations. In recent years, the increasing number of reports
on alleged human rights violations (reeducation centers, forced labor, forced sterilization) in
Xinjiang against Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities has led to even further international
attention.
The Outcomes of Uyghur Diaspora Activism
The Uyghur diaspora has been actively mobilized toward achieving their two major goals:
protecting the national identity and culture, which has been threatened with extinction due to
Chinese communist government policies, and making ongoing violations of human rights
violations public in host state and transnational contexts. They have adopted different modes of
action depending on the conditional context, most of the time using peaceful methods. The
outcomes of these goals can be measured by better looking at their achievements retrospectively.
The first-generation Uyghur diaspora leaders’ efforts to preserve Uyghur national identity and
culture in diaspora are a success considering how this subaltern identity and history discourse is
adopted and further developed by subsequent generations (via the help of Internet), even by
those in the homeland. Also, early attempts to promote unity and solidarity among Uyghurs
abroad were furthered and achieved by the efforts of the second generation. The outcome is
apparent due to the creation of the WUC, an umbrella diaspora institution that has successfully
coordinated Uyghur diaspora activities at a transnational level.
Second, the Uyghur diaspora has succeeded in creating an international, right-based awareness
of the conditions of homeland Uyghurs thanks to the organized efforts of the Uyghur diaspora
under the WUC leadership. The leaders of the WUC are effectively lobbying with host state
governments and international organizations and briefing them about developments in Xinjiang
(Kuşçu Bonnenfant, 2020, pp. 116–117). There are various instances exemplifying this, such as
WUC president Dolqun İsa’s testimony to the European Parliament’s subcommittee on human
rights and relevant subcommittees in the U.S. Congress—as well as to the foreign affairs
committee of the U.K. Parliament—about the gravity of human rights violations against the
Uyghurs in Xinjiang (Unrepresented Nations & Peoples Organization, 2018). Peaceful
demonstrations and other nonviolent activities organized by the Uyghur diaspora in various parts
Page 14 of 23
of the world, often with the participation of host society members, also help to consistently
spread awareness about the issue, WUC Events <https://www.uyghurcongress.org/en/category/
news/wuc-events>.
Uyghur diaspora efforts also have had some impact on China at domestic and foreign policy
levels. Domestically, Uyghur diaspora efforts to publicize the issue with major international
human rights nongovernmental organizations made host state governments and the media
further inquire about the developments in Xinjiang. The satellite images of the internment camps
were made available by an Australian think tank (Doman et al., 2018) and distributed by the
media, and this forced China to no longer deny the existence of the camps. Since the news and
reports about arbitrary detention in these camps and on other inhuman treatment in Xinjiang
toward Uyghurs have emerged, there has been increasing international pressure on China. The
United Nations (UN) Human Rights Council has been a platform where countries, mostly Western
states in which Uyghur diaspora communities are active, have expressed grave concerns about
the arbitrary detention and widespread surveillance of Uyghurs, restrictions on fundamental
freedoms and Uyghur culture, and use of torture and inhuman treatment, including forced
sterilization and forced labor (UN Human Rights Council 47; GOV.UK, 2021). UN High
Commission for Human Rights (UNHCHR) officials have repeatedly asked China to allow them
access to these centers in Xinjiang in order to observe the situation (Richardson, 2021; United
Nations, 2021).
The European Parliament is also actively monitoring developments in Xinjiang and has adopted a
resolution on forced labor and on the situation of Uyghurs there (European Parliament, 2020).
The European Union, along with the governments of the United States, Canada, and the United
Kingdom, imposed sanctions on certain Chinese officials over human rights abuses against the
Uyghur population, to which China responded with its own sanctions on their European
counterparts (European Parliament, 2021; Uighurs: BBC News, 2021).
China has become increasingly susceptible to international criticism since the beginning of its
Open Door Policy. After all, many of its major trading partners are those Western governments
(many hosting Uyghur diaspora) with growing skepticism about China’s minorities policy.
China’s reputation, as a gross violator of human rights of its Muslim minority, does not help its
image as a just, peaceful, global actor, particularly in its relations with non-Western countries.
Perhaps, as a result of such pressure, China has attempted to prove its concerns to be legitimate
ones and stated that the rights violations are exaggerated. After many requests by UNHCHR to
observe the situation in Xinjiang—reportedly denied multiple times previously—China finally
accepted the request in May 2022 (Wintour & Ni, 2022). This may be interpreted as China feeling
the pressure and need to respond to international criticism.
On the other hand, China is very sensitive about international actors’ intervention in its domestic
affairs. Therefore, there have been attempts to reduce this international criticism by simply
silencing the Uyghur diaspora. The firsthand accounts of camp survivors (Uyghurs residing
abroad) have been key in increasing the international community’s attention and reaction to the
issue. Uyghur diaspora activists have stated that they are targeted by the Chinese government’s
Page 15 of 23
foreign missions in an attempt to dissuade them from their activities. Unfortunately, many
diaspora Uyghurs fear that their actions abroad may endanger their families and relatives in
China (Halliday, 2019; Serhan, 2020).
Conclusion
There has been growing interest in research on diaspora mobilization in the past few decades.
Earlier works on diaspora mobilization differentiated between the mobilization practices of
stateless and state-linked diasporas. Stateless diaspora strategies are defined as more radical and
violent and have, as a goal, secession from the homeland governments that they do not recognize
as their legitimate representatives. However, more recent research suggests that stateless
diasporas do not necessarily lean toward violent mobilization strategies. As summarized in table
1, stateless/conflict-generated diasporas adopt various modes of action depending on the
conditions available. While these actions can always evolve in a violent direction, this is not
always the case. It is important to note that stateless diasporas often work more vigorously (as
opposed to state-linked ones) toward the creation and maintenance of their identity, often in
opposition to the majority nation’s dominant narratives in the homeland. In addition, they
relentlessly carry out advocacy work to create awareness about the conditions of their coethnics
in the homeland. Stateless diasporas increasingly do this in a right-based framework at national
and transnational levels. Although their claim-making practices pose a challenge to homeland
states, they do not necessarily choose violent methods in doing so.
As a stateless diaspora over the past 50 years, the Uyghur diaspora has been using various
mobilization structures and frames in different political opportunity structures. The first-
generation Uyghur diaspora established a firm base on which to build an alternative national
identity and history that later generations could build on. They emphasized how Uyghurs were
native to the land and had strong enough traditions and organizational capabilities to govern
themselves—as an alternative approach to the Chinese counterclaims. Although they had limited
political opportunity structures and means, they managed to unite the Uyghur diaspora, keeping
the memories of the homeland alive. They highlighted the CCP’s repressive and discriminatory
policies against Uyghurs that had, as an ultimate goal, complete assimilation. The first-
generation diaspora’s use of the frames of anticommunism and identity (Turkicness and Islam)
was a rational choice, given the particular period and host state conditions. In all of these
mobilization efforts, the first-generation Uyghur diaspora pursued a moderate and nonviolent
strategy within the limits of host state political opportunity structures. Given their concern about
the unjust treatment of coethnics at home, indeed, such mobilization strategies can be considered
a healthy way of expressing frustration.
In the second phase of Uyghur diaspora mobilization, various changes occurred with regard to
political opportunity structures, mobilization structures, and frames. With the end of the Cold
War, the international community more frequently focused on the concepts of human rights,
self-determination, and minority rights. This helped the second-generation Uyghur diaspora use
a right-based framework more effectively. Also, the relocation of Uyghur diaspora activities from
Turkey to the Western sphere has positively benefited the diaspora in terms of political
Page 16 of 23
opportunity structures. Because of technological changes, particularly with the increasing use of
the Internet, the movement has attained a grassroots level that has resulted in increasing
participation of diaspora members in various activities and identity development. The Internet
also helped the diaspora reach international audiences, many of which have shown strong
interest about the Uyghur issue; this was effectuated through regular news and academic reports
on the treatment of Uyghurs in China.
A major development in the second phase was the creation of the WUC, which solved the problem
of coordination and unity within the diaspora to a major extent. As the Uyghur diaspora
movement gained a more transnational nature, the leadership of the WUC adopted more
significant functions. In the eyes of the host states and international organizations, the WUC is
increasingly viewed as a legitimate actor representing Uyghurs abroad. This has helped the
diaspora’s efforts in keeping human rights violations toward Uyghurs on the international
agenda. The WUC has clearly distanced itself from various factions within the Uyghur diaspora
community that are in favor of more violent strategies. The organization states that its goal is to
promote the basic freedoms of Uyghurs in the homeland through negotiation and dialogue.
When Uyghur diaspora modes of action are analyzed historically, it becomes clear that these
actions evolved in time in order to benefit most from the conditions available to them. While the
conflict is in latent form, the first generation focused on identity-building and institution-
building projects that contributed to the foundations of an alternative national identity and
solidarity among diaspora. When the homeland conflict escalates due to particular repressive
policies, the second-generation diaspora utilizes every means to make the issue visible to the
international community. Technological advances facilitated this process through promotion of
the diaspora’s message to a wider audience. Changes in the international and host state contexts,
such as the growing importance of the human rights of minority groups, led the Uyghur diaspora
to transform their mobilization to a new level and change their frames into a human rights one.
In a period where massive human rights violations are taking place against the Uyghur minority,
the Uyghur diaspora relentlessly organize peaceful demonstrations and exhibitions and
relentlessly petition and lobby host state governments and international organizations about the
issue. At the current time, the strength of such moderate mobilization actions is growing, and so
is interest in the issue and participation by previously dormant members of the diaspora
community and members of the host society.
Further Reading
Adamson, F., & Demetriou, M. (2007). Remapping the boundaries of “state” and “national identity”: Incorporating
diasporas into IR theorizing. European Journal of International Relations, 13(4), 489–526.
Berchovitch, J. (2007). A neglected relationship: Diasporas and conflict resolution. In H. Smith & P. Stares (Eds.),
Diasporas in conflict: Peacemakers or peace wreckers (pp. 90–105). United Nations University Press.
Bernal, V. (2006). Diaspora, cyberspace and political imagination: The Eritrean diaspora online. Global Networks, 6(2),
161–179.
Page 17 of 23
Betts, A. (2016). Mobilising the diaspora: How refugees challenge authoritarianism. Cambridge University Press.
Bovingdon, G. (2004). Autonomy in Xinjiang: Han nationalist imperatives and Uyghur discontent. East-West Center
Policy Studies.
Bovingdon, G. (2010). The Uyghurs: Strangers on their own land. Columbia University Press.
Carment, D., & Sadjed, A. (2017). Diasporas as cultures of cooperation: Global and local perspectives. Palgrave
Macmillan.
Clothey, R. (2022). Education and the politics of cultural survival for Uyghur immigrants in Turkey <https://doi.org/
10.1080/15348458.2022.2045202>. Journal of Language, Identity and Education.
Karluk, A. C. (2018). Uyghur refugees living in Turkey and their problems. In M. Dündar (Ed.), Exchange of experiences
for the future: Japanese and Turkish humanitarian aid and support activities in conflict zones (pp. 86–99). Ankara
Üniversitesi Yayınları.
Kouki, H., & Romanos, E. (2011). Protest beyond borders: Contentious politics in Europe since 1945. Berghahn Books.
Laguerre, M. S. (2006). Diaspora, politics and globalization. Palgrave Macmillan.
Roberts, S. (2020). China’s war on the Uyghurs: China’s campaign against Xinjiang’s Uyghurs. Princeton University
Press.
Thum, R. (2014). The sacred routes of Uyghur history. Harvard University Press.
Yom, S. (2001, December 14). Self-determination conflict profile: Uighur Muslims in China. The Self-Determination
Organization.
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Notes
1. The name of the region is a controversial one as most members of the Uyghur diaspora prefer to call the region
Eastern Turkestan and reject the Chinese “Xinjiang.”
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Stateless Diasporas and China’s Uyghur Crisis in the 21st Century

Stateless Diasporas and China’s Uyghur Crisis in the 21st Century

Keywords: stateless diasporas, diaspora mobilization, China, Uyghur, human rights

Subjects: Conflict Studies, Human Rights, Identity

Stateless Diasporas and Political Mobilization

Diaspora Political Mobilization

Brinkerhoff (2008) defines diaspora mobilization (purposive action) as belonging to two

Diasporas—more specifically, stateless and/or conflict-generated diaspora communities—adopt

Table 1. Stateless/Conflict-Generated Diaspora: Modes of Action Under Varying Conditions

Condition Mode of Action (Peaceful)

Condition Mode of Action (Peaceful)

China’s Uyghur Crisis in the 21st Century

Uyghur Diaspora Mobilization

The First Wave of Uyghur Diaspora Mobilization in Turkey

The Second Wave of Uyghur Diaspora Mobilization: Transnational Frame­

The Outcomes of Uyghur Diaspora Activism

Laguerre, M. S. (2006). Diaspora, politics and globalization. Palgrave Macmillan.

Alptekin, İ. Y. (1967). A memorandum concerning Great Turkistan. Şehir Matbaası.

Alptekin, İ. Y. (1976). Doğu Türkistan Davası. Otağ Yayınları.

Emet, E. (2009). 5 Temmuz Urumçi Olayı ve Doğu Türkistan. Grafiker Yayınları.

Landau, J. (1995). Pan-Turkism: From irredentism to cooperation. Indiana University Press.

Reyhan, D. (2012). Uyghur diaspora and Internet <http://www.e-diasporas.fr/working-papers/Reyhan-Uyghurs-EN.pdf>

Sheffer, G. (2003). Diaspora politics: At home abroad. Cambridge University Press.

Ethnicity, Nationalism, and Migration in China, Korea, and Japan

Reform in China and Russia: A Comparative Perspective

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