ADMIN LAW CASE BRIEFS

SEPARATION OF POWERS
1. Ram Jawaya Kapoor v State of Punjab
Government nationalized publishing of textbooks taught in schools. Petitioners argued that it
is the Executive cannot itself make a monopoly over any business, and this has to be done by
the legislature.
Government recognized SoP in terms of functions of the three branches of the govt. One branch
cannot assume the function of another. The executive can exercise powers of subordinate
legislation when such powers are delegated and can also exercise judicial powers in some cases.
However, this does not mean that for the executive to function there must already be a law in
existence, and that the powers of the executive are limited merely to the carrying out of these
laws.
Suppose now that the Ministry or the executive Government of a State formulates a particular
policy in furtherance of which they want to start trade or business. Is it necessary that there
must be a specific legislation legalizing such trade activities before they could be embarked
upon? We cannot say that such legislation is always necessary. If the trade or business involves
expenditure of funds, it is certainly required that Parliament should authorize such expenditure
either directly or under the provisions of a statute.
RULE OF LAW
1. ADM Jabalpur v Shivkant Shukla
Suspension of fundamental rights during emergency.

The constitution itself is Rule of Law. There are no natural rights. Article 21 is the sole
repository of personal liberty. If right to life and liberty exist as statutory or common law rights
such rights do not have a separate existence with article 21.
EXECUTIVE LAW MAKING
1. Field v. Clark
The case involved the constitutionality of delegation to the President under the Tariff Act,
1890. The Act gave the president the power to suspend tariff rates set by the act if another
country altered its tariffs in a way that the President felt was harmful to the US.
Court held that the president was a mere agent of the legislature. Congress itself prescribed the
duties to be levied, collected and paid during the period of suspension and the President’s
power was only related to enforcement. His discretion was limited to the duration of the
suspension.
President was not exercising legislative powers; this was exercised by the Congress which itself
prescribed that the suspension should take effect upon a contingency. His role was limited to
execution, not making law.
 2. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan
President was empowered to suspend interstate trade in petroleum in excess of state quotas,
and punish violators with fines or jail time under NIRA. This power was further delegated to
the Secretary of the Interior.
Court held the delegation of power to be unconstitutional. It held that the allowance or
prohibition of transportation of goods was one of legislative policy. While admin can make
rules, Congress has to provide policies and standards for their formulation. In the present case,
there were no limits on executive discretion. Admin can make subordinate rules within
prescribed limits and determine facts to which the policy of congress shall apply.
3. L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v United States
The President was authorized to approve ‘Codes of Fair Conduct’ laying down the standard of
fair competition for a particular trade or industry under the NIRA. This was held as
unconstitutional because no standards were prescribed in the act besides the general aims of
rehabilitation, correction and expansion. This was a virtual abdication of legislative powers by
the Congress.
4. National Broadcasting Co v United States
FCC was empowered to make regulations for radio states in public interest, convenience, or
necessity.
5. In Re: Delhi Laws
Three acts were challenged in this case.
- Delhi Act- Provincial govt. can extend British enactments in Delhi with restrictions
and modifications.
- Ajmer Mewar Act- Central govt. can extend from provinces with restrictions and
modifications.
- Part C States- Central govt. can extend from Part A States with restrictions,
modifications, repeal and amendment.
Held as follows-
- SoP not part of Indian Constitution.
- Parliament cannot abdicate or efface itself by creating a parallel legislative body.
- Power of delegation is ancillary to power of legislation.
- Essential legislative powers cannot be delegated. This included laying down the policy
of law and enacting it into a binding rule of conduct.
- Restrictions and modification valid, repeal and amendment invalid as this is excessive
delegation.
6. Hamdard Dawakhana v UOI
Dealt with the Drugs and Magic Remedies Act. A provision empowered the govt. to include a
disease for which advertisement of medicines would be banned. The Court held that the
parliament established no criteria, standard or principle on which a particular disease was to be
specified. This amounted to excessive delegation.
7. Gwalior Rayon Silk v Asst. Commissioner of Sales Tax
The Parliament in this case did not fix the rate of Central Sales Tax but adopted the applicable
rate of the appropriate State in case such a rate exceeded 10 percent. The provision was
challenged on the ground that the parliament abdicated its legislative function by not fixing the
rate itself.
Section was upheld as the Act provided for sufficient guidelines to the executive to fix the rate
of the tax. The legislative policy was to fix the sales tax at minimum 10% to avoid evasion,
and discourage interstate sale of goods to unregistered dealers. Legislative policy cannot be
delegated, and the subordinate legislation to fulfil the purposes of the act can be delegated.
Court should not interfere where a clear policy or standard is laid down.
8. Rajnarain v Chairman, Patna Administration Committee
Patna admin Act passed by legislature of Bihar and Orissa Province-
S. 3- Empowered local govt to extend any provision of the Bengal Municipal Act of 1884.
S. 5- Empowered the local govt to cancel or modify any order under S. 3.
The local govt created a new municipality (Patna admin) and extended certain sections of the
Bengal Act to that area.
Later, the Bengal Act was repealed and replaced with the Bihar and Orissa Municipal Act. This
still meant that the provisions of the Bengal Act which were extended to Patna Admin by virtue
of the Patna Admin Act continued to apply as this was independent legislation. The Patna
Admin Act was amended to allow extension of the New Bihar and Orissa Act, but the existing
provisions of the Bengal Act that were extended continued to remain in force unless such
extension was cancelled by notification. Subsequently, all notifications extending the Bengal
Act were cancelled and the Governor extended the new Bihar and Orissa Act to Patna with
certain modifications.
The Court looked at two things- Whether the notification was ultra vires the Act, and whether
the Act itself was ultra vires.
Vires of the Act- Not only can an act be extended but also a part of one. Picking out a part of
an act and applying it is in effect a modification, and the section that is picked out and applied
can also be modified. But this modification cannot be permitted to effect any essential change
in the Act or an alteration in its policy. When a section of an act is picked out, whether it is
modified or not, mut be done so as to not effect any change of policy or any essential change
in the act rea as a whole. The act was held intra vires subject to these limitations.
Vires of the notification- The notification was held ultra vires the Act as it effected a radical
change in policy, which is because the sections that provided an opportunity to be heard and to
object to a tax being levied were not extended to Patna.
 9. Lachmi Narain v Union of India
Facts- Central govt. extended Bengal Finance Act to Delhi with modification in 1951. In 1957,
it made additional modifications in s. 6.
Rule- The 1957 notification was beyond the power of the Central Government. The power
conferred was one of extension, to bring a law in effect in a State to a UT, with restrictions and
modifications. The power to restrict or modify is not an independent power but is a constituent
of the power of extension. Once the Act is extended, the govt cannot modify or restrict further.
This power can only be exercised once. The power cannot be used for a purpose other than
extension. Restrictions and modifications do not cover such alterations that involve a change
to an essential feature of the enactment or legislative policy. Only those restrictions and
modifications which are necessary to bring the act into operation in the UT will be valid.
Application-
- The power of modification was not exercised contemporaneously with the extension or
for the purposes of extension but 6 years thereafter. Thus, the modification was not
valid as this power was exhausted.
- The modification of ‘not less than 3 months notice’ to ‘reasonable notice’ embodied a
determination of legislative policy and its formulation as a binding rule of conduct, i.e.,
an essential legislative function which could not be delegated.
- The modification also went against the essential features of the legislative policy of the
Bengal Act. The three month notice requirement was essential to give the affected
parties sufficient time to conform to the changes in law.
10. Harishankar Bagla v State of MP
Essential commodities Act- necessary and expedient for regulating the supply of an essential
commodity.
Held valid as legislative policy was laid down with sufficient clarity, which was the
maintenance or increase in supply of essential commodities and of securing equitable
distribution and availability at fair prices.
S. 6 does not repeal any law as it does not remove any law from the statute book, it just allows
the executive to by-pass an existing law.
11. Sharma Rao v UT of Pondicherry
Pondicherry was a UT with a legislature. It passed the General Sales Tax Act, which extended
the Madras Sales Tax Act (as on the date of commencement of the Pondicherry Act) to the UT
with modifications and adaptations. The Pondicherry Act was to come into force on such date
as may be notified by the govt. Thus, there was to be a time interval between the date of passing
and date of commencement of the Pondicherry Sales Tax Act. If, in between the two dates, the
Madras Legislature amended its own Sales Tax Act, that amendment would become applicable
to Pondicherry. The validity of this position was at issue.
The Madras Act was actually amended, and the same was automatically adopted by
Pondicherry. The Pondicherry legislature could not have anticipated whether an amendment
would take place and what the nature of that amendment would be. Therefore, there was a total
surrender in favour of the Madras legislature. The Pondicherry legislature should have applied
its own mind as to how the law would fit into its territory instead of blindly adopting the Madras
Act. Thus, there was abdication and excessive delegation.
Also, In re Delhi does not apply as there is no ‘practical necessity’, since Pondicherry had a
legislature.
12. Ramesh Birch v Union of India
Punjab Reorganization Act- Central govt. to extend, w restrictions and modifications to UT of
Chandigarh any enactment which was in force in a State at the date of notification. UTs were
otherwise within the legislative competence of the parliament.
The Central Govt extended the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction (Amendment) Act, 1985 to
the Chandigarh. This was challenged as excessive.
Court held that this did not amount to abdication or excessive delegation. It would have been
impossible for the parliament to look after all the legislative needs of the UT. The legislature
needs to lay down a coherent policy, but this can be done in broad terms and it’s not necessary
to dot all the I’s and cross the t’s. The policy behind s. 87 seems to be that it was necessitated
by changes resulting in territories coming under the legislative jurisdiction of the Centre. These
were territories situated in the midst of contiguous territories which had a proper legislature.
Once it is held that the delegation of a power to extend a present existing law is justified, a
power to extend future laws is a necessary corollary.
The extension of an enactment which makes additions to the existing law would thus also be
permissible under s.87 of the Reorganisation Act, so long as it does not, expressly or impliedly
repeal or conflict with, or is not repugnant to, an already existing law.
13. Jalan Trading v Mill Mazdoor Union
Henry VIII Clause- If any difficulty or doubt arises in giving effect to the provisions of this Act,
the Central Government may, by order published in the Official Gazette, make such provision,
not inconsistent with the purposes of this Act as appears to it to be necessary or expedient for
the removal of the difficulty or doubt; and the order of the Central Government, in such
cases, shall be final.
Delegation held excessive. Govt. itself authorized to determine purposes of the Act. Normally,
it is for the legislature to remove doubt or difficulty. Alteration of provisions of the Act is
exercise of legislative authority which cannot be delegated. Providing that the legislation must
not be inconsistent with the Parent Act, does not save it from the vice of delegation of
legislative authority. Section 37(2) makes the Executive the final judge of ascertaining whether
all the limitations have been abided by or not.
14. Gammon India v Union of India
Henry VIII Clause- If any difficulty arises in giving effect to the provisions of this Act, the
Central Government may, by order published in the Official Gazette, make such provisions
not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, as appears to it to be necessary or expedient
for removing the difficulty.
This provision was held valid and differentiated from the Jalan Trading case because-

- There was no finality clause.

- The Act did not allow for alteration of the Parent Act.
This provision is an application for the internal functioning of administrative machinery.
Difficulties may arise in the implementation of the Act, which is why the provision does not
amount to excessive delegation.
ULTRA VIRES
1. Atlas Cycles v State of Haryana
Essential Commodities Act provided that every order made thereunder shall be laid before both
Houses ASAP after it is made. There was a notification fixing maximum price of Iron and Steel
which was not laid before parliament.
Whether the order is a nullity? Whether laying was mandatory?
Non-laying does not result in automatic nullification. The use of the word ‘shall’ does not
automatically imply that something is mandatory, the intention of the legislature is to be looked
at after considering the scope, nature and design of the statute. This was declared as directory
for two reasons-there was no provision that provided for a contingency in case laying was not
done, and there would have been serious public inconvenience that would have followed if the
order would be nullified because of non-laying. There was also no time specified during which
the order had to be laid before both houses. This was a case of simple laying, and it did not
require a resolution to approve or disapprove of the same. Thus, laying not mandatory.
2. Dwarka Nath v Municipal Corpn of Delhi
The govt may make rules after- consultation with committee and publishing of draft rules.
Rules to restrict packing and labelling of food articles to prevent the public from being misled
wrt the character, quality and quantity of goods.
Rules provided- Label needs to have batch or code number.
Rule was substantively ultra vires the parent act, as it had no connection with the purpose of
the act. The act envisaged that consumers must not be deceived or misled. Providing batch or
code number, w/o additional details such as mfg date and expiry date would not prevent the
consumer from being misled. There is no rational or remote connection b/w the two. Therefore,
the rule was beyond the rule making power.
3. V Sudeer v BCI
Rule 24 of Advocates Act provides for criteria to be enrolled, subject to BCI Rules. Rule 49
gives general rulemaking power. The BCI Rules provided for pre-enrolment training after
graduation. It was argued that the BCI did not have the power to prescribe pre-enrolment
conditions.
4. Harla v State of Rajasthan
Jaipur Opium Act- All regulations currently in force and those passed from time to time shall
be published in the Gazette.
Mere passing of resolution without further publication was not sufficient to make the law
operative. Natural justice required that the law must have been published.
5. Raza Buland Sugar v Municipal Board
Resolution passed by the Board under the UP Municipalities Act to be published in a local
paper published in Hindi, and where there is no local paper, in such manner as the State Gov.
may, by general or special order, direct. Draft rules framed for objections and comments were
to be published in this manner.
The act of publication in this case was held to be mandatory, as its purpose was to invite
objections from the public, and publication was necessary in this regard. However, the manner
of publication, i.e., which required that it should be in a local paper published in Hindi, was
merely directory to the extent that only substantial compliance was required with the same. The
publication was made in Hindi, in an Urdu local newspaper. This was held to be in substantial
compliance with the provision.
6. Govindlal Chhaggan Lal Patel v APMC, Godhra
6(1)- Notification delineating market area under the Gujarat Agricultural Produce Markets Act
was to be published in Gujarati in a newspaper having circulation in the said area (shall be
published).
6(5)- Director may add or include any area to the area specified under 6(1) by notification in
the official gazette.
Does order under 6(5) need to be published in newspaper?
Yes, ‘this section’ under 6(1) referred to the entire section and the requirement to publish in
the newspaper was mandatory. Violation of this requirement is likely to affect the rights of
traders who should have the opportunity to make objections and offer suggestions.
Use of ‘shall’ or ‘may’ is not conclusive as to whether a requirement is mandatory or directory.
Held mandatory in this case.
7. Banwarilal Agarwalla v State of Bohar
Regulation not to be published until Mining Board has had a reasonable opportunity to
comment on the suitability of the provisions.
Consultation was held to be mandatory, as sufficient opportunity must be given to the board to
come up with report regarding the expediency of the rules. Making regulations without full
consideration as to their practicability would be detrimental to the working of mines.
Concurrance of the board was not required.
8. Naraindas Indurkhya v State of MP
Act empowered State Govt to prescribe text books. Text books shall not be prescribed without
prior consultation with the board.
Petitioner argued that no prior consultation occurred before prescribing textbooks, making the
notification void. Court nullified the notification and held that the consultation was mandatory.
In this case, the consultation was only with the chairman of the board and not with the board
itself. The order was not placed before the board general meeting nor was any resolution passed
recommending any text books. This was not tantamount to ‘consultation’ with the board.
9. Pankaj Jain Agencies v UOI
Once a notification is published in the manner laid down in the act, it is further not necessary
to make it known for its enforceability. It should be published in a manner that a person can, if
they are so interested, acquaint themselves with its contents. Unless the Gazette contained in
the notification is made available to the public, the notification cannot be said to have been
duly published.
Where the parent statute is silent, but the subordinate legislation itself prescribes the manner
of publication, such a mode of publication may be sufficient, if reasonable. If the subordinate
legislation does not prescribe the mode of publication or if the subordinate legislation
prescribes a plainly unreasonable mode of publication, it will take effect only when it is
published through the customarily recognised official channel, namely, the Official Gazette or
some other reasonable mode of publication.
10. Collectors of Central Excise v Tobacco Company
Notification regarding enhanced duty on cigarettes published on 30th November, but placed for
sale to public on 8th December 1982.
This case held that mere publication in Gazette was not enough, and the notification can be
said to have been published only when it is known to the public at large.
11. UOI v Ganesh Das Bhojraj
The law in New Tobacco Co. is not correct. The correct position of law is given in Pankaj Jain.
RETROSPECTIVE APPLICATION
1. State of MP v Tikamdas
Respondent had a liquor license. He applied for a renewal after his license expired. By that
time, the rule was amended to increase to fee. This increased fee was also charged
retrospectively on his leftover stock.
DL cannot have retrospective effect unless it is provided for explicitly or by necessary
implication. Here, retrospective application was provided for in the act as the relevant section
mentioned that the Act shall come into effect on ‘such other date as may be specified in that
behalf’.
2. B.S. Yadav v. State of Haryana
Rules regarding seniority retrospectively changed from date of confirmation to period of
continuous service.
Court held that retrospectivity is allowed under Art. 309, but the rules must have a rational
nexus with the date of retrospective application, especially when retrospective application
extends over a long period of time.
3. A.V. Nachane v UOI
LIC rules retrospectively said that certain classes of employees would not be entitled to
payment of bonus. In this case, there was a settlement reached b/w LIC and its employees
regarding payment of bonus in the DJ Bahadur case. The retrospective application of rules
nullified this settlement.
Court held that retrospective application cannot nullify a writ issued by a court case regarding
a settlement, unless it is superseded by a fresh settlement, an industrial award or relevant
legislation.
4. Miss Raj Soni v Air Officer In-Charge
Petitioner retired from the post of teacher after attaining age of 58 years. Then, after Delhi
Education Code, the age of retirement for teachers who joined before coming into force of the
is 60 years, and as such the management retired her from the service 2 years yearly. The
Respondent’s said that it was common practice to retire people at the age of 58, but they could
not produce any rules to that effect. Therefore, since the Code provided for the age of retirement
at 60, the petitioner was entitled to the same.

UNCONSTITUTIONALITY
1. Air India v Nargesh Meerza
Constitutionality of Air India Employees Service Regulations.
Regulation 46- Female age of retirement is 35 whereas male age is 58. For women, they could
be retired if they got married within 4 years of service or on first pregnancy.
Regulation 47- Managing Director has the discretion to increase the age of retirement at his
behest.
As for marriage there was no violation of Art. 14. Air hostesses and other employees were
different classes owing to the salaries, qualifications, promotional avenues etc. Thus-
intelligible differentia and rational nexus.
First pregnancy- Unconstitutional for violation of Art. 14.
Director’s powers- Struck down for unchanneled discretion to terminate air hostesses- undue
delegation of power.
 2. Chintaman Rao v State of MP
DL is void if parent act itself is unconstitutional.
Here, an Act empowered admin authority to prohibit manufacture of bidis during agricultural
season. An order to this effect was passed. The Court held the parent act to be unconstitutional
for violation of Art. 19(1)(g).
3. Dwarka Prasad v. State of UP
A directive was issued reducing the sale price of coal that made it harder for traders to carry on
their business. This was affirmed through the UP Coal Control Order as well, which also
mandated licenses for coal depot owners. The petitioners were denied this license. They alleged
Art. 14 and Art. 19(1)(g) violation.
The Order was held violative of Art. 14 and 19(1)(g) as it gave broad discretionary powers to
the executive authority to grant licenses.
4. Himmat Lal v Commissioner of Police
Act authorized police commissioner to prescribe rules for behaviour of public assemblies. Rule
7 said that permission was required from the Commissioner of Police. The rule was held
violative of Arts. 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(b).
5. Bijoe Emmanuel v State of Kerala
Circular issued by the Director of Public Instruction obliged school children to sing the national
anthem. Two Jehovah’s Witness children did not sing the anthem as it went against their
religious beliefs. They were expelled from the school.
The circulars were held violative of Article 19(1)(a)( and 25(1) of the constitution, and the
students were allowed to attend the school.
ADMINISTRATIVE DIRECTIONS
1. Kumari Regina v. St Aloysius Elementary School
Case involved a situation where a headmistress was demoted to assistant teacher. Appealed
this decision twice after which the higher authority directed the school management to
reinstate, upon which the management did not act. Appellant filed a suit.
Madras education act provided for rule making powers. However, rules relating to recognition
and grant in aid were not made under the rule making power. We know this because-
- Rules were divided into part I and II.
- Part I was titled ‘rules framed under madras act’ whereas part II was not.
- Part II rules did not relate to any specific provisions contained in the act whereas part I
did. They were not made for the purposes of carrying out of the purposes of the statute.
- No publication as required by the act was done for part II rules.
The rules stipulated that the management must reinstate teacher within 10 days of receipt of
order.
Holding- In the absence of 'statutory provision having the effect of controlling or superseding
the contract of employment agreed to between the parties, the termination would in law be
valid.
The rules thus govern the terms on which the Government would grant recognition and aid and
the Government can enforce those rules upon the management.
But the enforcement of such rules is a matter between the Government and the management,
and a third party, such as a, teacher aggrieved by some order of the management, cannot derive
from the rules any enforceable right against the management oh the ground of a breach or
noncompliance of any of the rules.
The appellant could not have a cause of action for enforcing the directions given by the
Divisional Inspector to restore her as the Head Mistress in the appeal filed by her.
2. K.M. Shanmugan v. S.R.V.S (incomplete)
Transport authority called for applications for issuing a permit. Direction was issued under 43A
of MV Act prescribing ‘place of business’ as one of the considerations for grant of permit. 43A
empowered authority to issue directions of a general character. The appellate tribunal did not
give any marks to the respondent in the ‘residence criteria’.
The transport authority was bound to follow the administrative direction as they were issued to
allow the authority to discharge its duties under S.47 more effectively. Thus, the authority
ignored a relevant consideration while making its order which is manifestly erroneous.
3. UOI v. K.P. Joseph
Respondent was army clerk who was discharged and then re-employed. A general office
memorandum was issued by the MoD providing certain benefits to ex-military personnel on
re-employment. Respondent claimed benefit but this was rejected by the government.

Generally, AD is non justiciable but this is subject to exceptions. Where AD confers rights and
imposes duties, there is no reason why court should not enforce that right. Since such directions
contained assurances on the basis of which third party acted and such assurances were not
outside the executive power, they were held to be binding.
4. BS Minhas v. Indian Statistical Institute
Petitioner challenged appointment of some person because he was less qualified. There was a
bye-law which required the vacancy of the position to be publicized but this was not done.
Appointment quashed, bye-law has to be complied with because institute comes under Art. 12
and has to comply with obligations under Art. 14.
5. State of UP v. Chandra Mohan Nigam
There was a civil servant whose records were examined by a review committee under Rule
16(3) which did not find any impropriety. There was a second review committee set up which
recommended compulsory retirement. Since the rule did not contain any guideline wrt
premature retirement, the MHA issued directions to ensure uniform applicability of the rule.
Since rule 16(3) itself does not contain any guidelines, directions or criteria, the instructions
issued by the Government furnish an essential and salutary procedure for the purpose of
securing uniformity in application of the rule. These instructions really fill up the yawning
gaps in the provisions, and are embedded in the conditions of service. Therefore, a second
review committee could not be formed as this was not contemplated in the rules.
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION & DISCRETION
1. Hukam Chand v. UOI
2 orders disconnecting telephone lines. The Delhi Administrator made an order declaring
public emergency under telegraph act. The General Manager of telephones, relying on this,
disconnected telephone lines as well under Rule 422.
Court held that order under 422 should have been taken keeping in mind only relevant
considerations. Procedure for disconnection of telephones was already given in Rule 427, and
that should have been followed. When it is given that a power should be exercised in a certain
way, it cannot be exercised in any other way. The authority has to apply its own mind while
making the order and cannot merely rely on the order of the Delhi Administrator declaring
emergency.
2. Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar
Petitioner detained under defence of India act on ground of law and order. The statute however,
contemplated public order and not law and order.
The detention order can be reviewed by court, not with respect to FR violation but whether the
authority applied the considerations enumerated in the Act/rules. In this case, law and order is
not the same as public order so the grounds of detention were not in accordance with the statute.
Even though the authority mentioned public safety (which was contemplated in the act), the
detention order is still illegal even if it based on one relevant and one irrelevant consideration.
3. Ashadevi v. K. Shiveraj (irrelevant considerations)
Detention under COFEPOSA. Detenu had made confession but later retracted it. Nevertheless,
the secretary passed the detention order under COFEPOSA relying on the confession and the
above factors were not brought to his notice.
If material or vital facts which would have a bearing on the issue and would influence the mind
of the detaining authority one way or the other are ignored or not considered by the detaining
authority before issuing the detention order. The authority exercising discretion has to take into
account relevant factors and ignore irrelevant ones.
Duty of the Customs Officials to place material before the detaining authority.
 4. Commissioner of Police v. Gordhandas Bhanji (non-exercise)
Commissioner of police empowered to grant license to cinemas.
The Commr granted a licence to the respondent on the recommendation of an advisory
committee but cancelled it later at the direction of the State Government. The court held the
cancellation of the order bad as it had come from the government and the Commr merely acted
as a transmitting agent. The commissioner had to apply its own mind, he cannot put fetters on
your discretion.
5. Kesavan Bhaskaran v. State of Kerala (non-exercise; fettering discretion through
policy)
School leaving certificate requested. While certificate is not granted to students below 15, the
director has the discretion to do so on recommendation from headmaster. In the present case,
the director had self-created a policy whereby he would not consider a case for exemption in
case the age deficiency was greater than two years.
Tribunal vested with the discretion is authorised to follow a policy but that should not be
used as an invariable rule and to preclude exceptional circumstances of a particular case
being decided on merits. In the case before us the authority appears to have made the
invariable rule of not granting exemption unless the applicant's deficiency, in age be less than
two years. By adoption of this policy the authority has disabled and debarred himself from
deciding exceptional cases on their merits. In our opinion fettering of such discretion by
self-created rule of policy is contrary to law.
6. Om Kumar v. UOI (Standard of review)
Doctrine of proportionality to assail administrative action.
- Least restrictive measure to achieve object.
- Whether means are suitable to achieve that aim?.
- Legitimate aim?
When does proportionality or primary review apply?
- When fundamental rights are violated. Where action is assailed as discriminatory under
Art. 14 for e.g
When does reasonableness or secondary review apply?
- Where admin action is challenged as arbitrary or unreasonable.
RULE AGAINST BIAS
1. A.K. Kraipak v. UOI
PNJ applies to admin inquiries. When a person suffers a civil consequence or prejudice from
admin action PNJ can be read into the process even in absence of statutory provision.
In this case, Naqishband, who was the Acting Chief Conservator of Forests, was a member of
the selection board and also a candidate for selection to the All-India cadre of the Forest
Service. Though he did not take part in the deliberations of the board, when his name was
considered and approved, the SC held that there was a real likelihood of bias, for the mere
presence of the candidate on the selection board may adversely influence the judgment of the
other member.
There must be a reasonable likelihood of bias, not actual bias or mere suspicion.
2. J. Mohapatra v. State of Orissa
There was an assessment committee who was supposed to select books for schools. Some of
the authors whose books were in the selection list were on that committee. The individual
member would withdraw when his book was considered, but he participated in the
considerations of other books. The books of the members of the committee were eventually
approved.
Quashing the action, the SC held that when some members whose books were in the list for
selection were members of the assessment committee, there is every likelihood of bias. Actual
bias is not material, but the possibility of such bias in all cases. Therefore the court concluded
that withdrawal of person is not sufficient because the element of quid pro quo with other
members cannot be eliminated. It may be pointed out that the doctrine of necessity does not
apply in this case.
Pecuniary interest, however small it may be in a subject-matter of the proceedings, would
wholly disqualify a member from acting as a judge.
3. D.K. Khanna v. UOI (personal bias)
High Court quashed the selection of the candidate where his son-in-law was the member of the
selection committee.
The challenge to the proceeding need only establish so close a degree of relationship as to give
rise to the reasonable likelihood of the Judge espousing the cause as his own.
4. Manak Lal v. Prem Chand (personal bias)
Professional misconduct case was filed by Prem Chand against Manak Lal. The decision
making body was challenged on the ground of personal bias as the chairman had represented
Prem Chand in an earlier case.
Real likelihood of bias- the test always is and must be whether a litigant could reasonably
apprehend that a bias attributable to a member of the tribunal might have operated against him
in the final decision of the tribunal. Justice must not only be done but also appear to be done.
Waiver as exception- Objection to tribunal can be waived only after it is shown that the party
knows the relevant facts and is aware of his right to object.
5. Mineral Development v. State of Bihar
Petitioners were granted mining licence for 99 years in 1947. Later they were sent show cause
for violation of some sections of mining act. A reply was submitted after which licence was
cancelled. Challenged for personal bias.
The owner of the petitioner company had opposed the minister in the general election. The
minister had also filed a criminal case against the petitioner and there was political rivalry
between the parties. The order was quashed on grounds of personal bias.
6. State of UP v. Mohammad Nooh
DSP appointed as presiding officer to conduct inquiry over police constable. The DSP himself
gave testimony to contradict the prosecution witness.
There was real likelihood of bias, even if we assume that this was not taken into account by the
presiding officer. The person himself cannot judge his own testimony, this would violate PNJ.
7. S. Parthasarathi v. State of AP
The appellant’s director was inimical towards him and harassed him in various ways. He
suspended him from service and framed charges against him. The director himself conducted
the inquiry and did not let the appellant participate. Appellant claimed that the order is vitiated
by bias.
The order was quashed because of bias, as the director was inimical towards the appellant.
There was real likelihood of bias based on the test of a reasonable man fully cognizant of the
facts. Actual bias not required.
8. GN Nayak v. Goa University
A senior officer expressed admiration for a junior officer in his confidential report. The senior
officer was also a member of the Departmental Promotion Committee, which recommended
the promotion of the junior officer. This was challenged on the grounds of personal bias.
The Supreme Court held that unless preference is unreasonable and is based on self-interest
(whether pecuniary or personal), it will not vitiate an administrative decision. Bias and
partiality cannot mean the total absence of preconceptions in the mind of the judge. Every
preference does not vitiate an action. If bias is formed in a rational way then it is not bias.
9. Gullapalli Nageswara Rao v. APSRTC I
Petitioner challenged the order of the government nationalizing road transport. One of the
grounds for challenge was that the Secretary of the Transport Department who gave the hearing
was biased, being the person who initiated the scheme and also being the head of the
department, whose responsibility was to execute it.
The Court quashed the order on the ground that under the circumstances, the Secretary was
biased and hence, no fair hearing could be expected. Bias relevant even if the ultimate decision
being made by someone else.
10. Gullapalli II (subject matter bias)
The Act was thereafter amended and the function of hearing the objection was given over to
the Minister concerned. The decision of the government was again challenged by G. Nageswara
Rao on the ground of departmental bias because the Minister was the head of the department
concerned which initiated the scheme and was also ultimately responsible for its execution.
However, on this occasion, the SC rejected the challenge on the ground that the Minister was
not part of the department in the same manner as the Secretary was. While the Secretary of the
Department was its head and so a part of it, the Minister in charge was only primarily
responsible for the disposal of the business pertaining to that Department/
11. Ashok Kumar Yadav v. State of Haryana (personal bias and necessity)
A few candidates complained that they scored high marks in civil services written test but got
disqualified in interview marks and pushed up marks of their relatives.
Presence of chairman does not vitiate selection. They withdrew when their relatives appeared.
It cannot be the principle of law that a member of a Public Service Commission must
completely withdraw himself from the selection process if their relatives are candidates. That
would make functioning of the commission impossible as there cannot be any substitute of
such members in conducting the selection process (doctrine of necessity). What is required is
that they don’t take part in the interview of their relatives or take part into any discussion w.r.t
the merits or marks of the candidates.
12. Tata Cellular v. UOI
Tenders were invited for cellular phone services. Son of a member of the tender evaluation
committee had also submitted tender which got selected. The biased member was the DG,
Telecom whose presence was required. Therefore, the court applied doctrine of necessity.
13. Election Commission v. Subramaniam Swamy
Dr. Swamy initiated disqualification proceedings against Jayalalitha with the Election
Commission. The chief election commissioner was TN Seshan and Swamy’s wife was his
lawyer. Whether there is bias?
If chief commissioner is removed because of bias then how should the commission conduct
itself? The participation of the Chief Election Commissioner in the backdrop of the findings
recorded by the learned Single Judge as well as the Division Bench of the High Court would
certainly permit an argument of prejudice, should the opinion be adverse to Ms. Jayalalithaa.
Therefore, apart from the legal aspect, even prudence demands that the Chief Election
Commissioner should recuse himself from expressing any opinion in the matter. This would
leave two other commissioners. What happens if they have a difference of opinion? Can the
doctrine of necessity be invoked? In the present case also if the two Election Commissioners
are able to reach a unanimous decision, there is no need for the Chief Election Commissioner
to participate, if not the doctrine of necessity may have to be he invoked.
FAIR HEARING AND EXCEPTIONS
1. State of Orissa v. Dr. Binapani
Suspicion that the date of birth of civil servant was wrong. Initially a show cause notice was
given but later a revised letter was sent which changed the DoB and compulsorily retired her.
Admin action vitiated as the accused did not have any opportunity to defend herself. If there is
power to decide to the prejudice of a person, then there is duty to act judicially and observe
PNJ.
2. G Kondala Rao v. Registrar
Appellant accused of cheating in the exam. The notice which called the appellant for
disciplinary hearing stated that the appellant was found without a question paper. However, the
whole charge of cheating and the questions that were put to him involved questions related to
passing of the question paper and writing answers on the back of the question paper.
Notice was found to be deficient. It must be clear and unambiguous. t must contain, Time/Place
and the Nature of hearing, statements of Charge and such materials necessary to allow the other
party to prepare an effective case. It must also give the other party reasonable Time to prepare
his defense. A person cannot be charged for something of which he does not have notice or
does not have reasonable opportunity to prepare his defense.
Basically, notice was defective because it did not disclose the principal allegation against him.
This defect cannot be clarified during litigation by informing the student of the allegations, a
fresh show cause needs to be issued.
3. Suresh Koshy v. University of Kerala
Report of the inquiry officer not required to be disclosed to the petitioner as no statutory
requirement was there and no prejudice was caused to him. He was allowed to participate in
the proceedings and cross examine the witnesses. Also, he did never asked the Vice Chancellor
for the report at the first instance. PNJ compliance is dependant on the facts and circumstances
of the case.
Also, departure from rules was valid as the principal was Koshy’s father- VC just trying to
follow PNJ.
4. Managing Director, ECL v. B Karunakar
The court held that when the enquiry authority and the administrative/disciplinary authority is
different then the delinquent employee has the right to the copy of the enquiry report before
the disciplinary authority takes any decision on the question of his guilt.
Non-supply of the report is the breach of natural justice. Failure to supply the enquiry report
will not ipso facto render the whole proceeding null and void. It is upon the delinquent
employee to show that the failure to serve the report has caused prejudice and resulted in the
miscarriage of justice. It would apply even to cases where there is the requirement of furnishing
a copy of the enquiry report under the statutory provision and/or service rules. However it does
not mean that the mere fact that the delinquent employee did not ask for the report means that
he has given up his right.
 5. Ravi S. Naik v. UOI
2 people were disqualified by Goa Legislative Assemble. They claimed PNJ violation as notice
of 3 days instead of 7 days given as was required by the rules, and they didn’t have the
opportunity to adduce their evidence before the speaker passed his order.
PNJ is not rigid or inflexible. Court held that this was just a formal defect and would not vitiate
the administrative action if no prejudice is caused. There was substantial compliance with PNJ
in this case.
6. State of J&K v. Bakshi Gulam Muhammad
Commission appointed to inquire into CM of J&K. He approached high court to quash the
proceedings due to violation of PNJ. He was not allowed to go through all the material before
he was called upon to answer allegations. He also wasn’t allowed to cross examine all the
witnesses, just the ones who gave testimony and not those who filed affidavits.
PNJ depends on facts and circumstances. Documents were made available in due process after
allegation was made, therefore no prejudice was caused. Even cross examination is not
essential to PNJ. He had the right to cross examine those who were physically deposed. Right
to be heard does not mean an absolute right to cross examine. There were 400 affidavits in this
case, so Bakshi can file an affidavit to contradict all those affidavits.
7. Hira Nath Mishra v. The Principal
College students expelled for sexual harassment after due hearing but no opportunity was given
to cross examine the girls and report was not given.
The principles of natural justice are not inflexible and may differ in situations. In the present
case, the complaint was of an extremely serious nature and the way to handle it was a delicate
matter, as they needed to be confidentiality involved. (i)The boys had been given full
description of what the charged were against them, (ii) they had been given the opportunity to
state their case, and (iii) the tribunal acted in good faith. Therefore no cross examination was
not fatal to the validity of the procedure
8. J.K. Agarwal v. Haryana Seed Development Corpn
Right to be represented by legal counsel in administrative hearing?
The right to representation by a lawyer may not in all cases be held to be a part of natural
justice. In non-statutory domestic tribunals, when a man’s reputation or livelihood is at stake,
he not only has the right to speak himself but also to speak through a counsel. However, this
ought to provided for in the rules. When the rules are silent about it, there is no absolute right.
Then it becomes a matter of discretion.
In the matter of exercise of this discretion one of the relevant factors is whether there is
likelihood of the combat being unequal entailing a miscarriage or failure of justice and a denial
of a real and reasonable opportunity for defence by reason of the appellant being pitted against
a presenting-officer who is trained in law. In such a case, denial of a reasonable request to
defend oneself is a violation of the principles of natural justice.
The guy against JK Agarwal was a lawyer so it was an unequal battle for him, therefore he had
a right to a lawyer.
9. SN Mukherjee v. UOI
Validity of the finding and sentence recorded by Chief of Army Staff confirming the finding
of the General Court Martial. Should reasons have been recorded?
An important consideration is whether the decision is subject to appeal through writ. However,
reasons should always be recorded to show that there has been consideration by the authority,
the decision has been made with clarity, and the decision is not arbitrary. They don’t need to
be elaborate like court orders, and can differ based on facts and circumstances.
But where it is an appellate or revisional authority where it is just confirming a sentence it does
not need to give separate reasons. There can also be circumstances in which reasons need not
be given if the statute expressly or impliedly says so.
10. Maneka Gandhi v. UOI
Petitioner’s passport was impounded by govt in public interest. The reasons for the same were
not disclosed and the petitioner was denied an opportunity to be heard, bec the act says reasons
and hearing can be dispensed with if it is in public interest. The order and the Act was
challenged for violation of PNJ.
Audi alteram partem rule would, by the experiential test, be excluded, if importing the right to
be heard has the effect of paralysing the administrative process or the need for promptitude or
the urgency of the situation so demands. If post decisional hearing is given after the
impounding of the passport, then the mandate of natural justice would be fulfilled. However,
this is not the general rule and would apply only in exceptional cases. However, there can never
be a circumstance where you don’t give a hearing.
11. Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. UOI (pre-decisional hearing)
Government can make an investigation to take over a business, but it can also take immediate
action w/o investigation in emergent situations. Another section provided for post-decisional
hearing.
The ratio of the majority was that pre-decisional hearing may be dispensed with an emergent
situation where immediate action causes no delay to prevent some immediate danger or injury
or Hazard to Paramount Public interest. Immediate action is in terms of investigation, and
does not mean that the situation itself in emergent. But it depends on facts and circumstances,
not merely going by statute.
However, mere urgency is no reason for excluding the requirement of hearing. The decision to
exclude the decisional hearing would be justiciable where pre decisional hearing is dispensed
with there must be a provision for remedial hearing.
12. K.I. Sheperd v. UOI (pre-decisional hearing)
Employees of bank were terminated without opportunity to be heard.
Post-decisional hearing will not do justice where normal rule of hearing should apply. Court
Pointed out that there is no justification to throw a person out of the employment and then give
him an opportunity of representation and the requirement is that he should have an opportunity
as a condition precedent to the action. Authority that embarks upon a post-decisional hearing
may normally proceed with a closed Mind and there is hardly any chance of getting a proper
consideration of the representation at such a post decisional opportunity.
Therefore, even in cases of emergency situations pre-decisional hearing is necessary which
may not be an elaborate one in special cases specifically where action has grave consequences
such as loss of livelihood.
13. Canara Bank v. VK Awasthy (post-decisional hearing)
Since no prejudice was caused to the petitioner, there is no violation of PNJ.
14. Charanlal Sahu v. UOI
Provision of the Bhopal Gas Processing of Claims Act empowered the Central Govt to
exclusively file suits on behalf of the victims, hence taking away their rights to file suits on
their own. SC gave 470 mil as full and final settlement. No notice of settlement was given to
victims.
Having regard to the urgency of the situation and having regard to the need for the victims for
relief and help and having regard to the fact that so much effort has gone in finding a basis for
the settlement, we, at one point of time, thought that a post-decisional hearing in the facts and
circumstances of this case might be considered to be sufficient compliance with the
requirements of principles of natural justice.
In view of the magnitude of the misery involved and the problems in this case, we are also of
the opinion that the setting aside of the settlement on this ground in view of the facts and the
circumstances of this case keeping the settlement in abeyance and giving notice to the victims
for a post-decisional hearing would not be in the ultimate interest of justice.
LEGITIMATE EXPECTATIONS AND PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL
1. Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills v. State of UP
UP had decided to give sales tax exemption, which was confirmed by the govt to the appellant
who intended to set up a plant. However, the govt later had second thoughts but decided to give
partial exemption to the appellant. The govt later rescinded this concession also.
Was there waiver?
No, waiver requires that the person is fully informed of his right and intentionally abandons it.
Not applicable in present case.
Promissory estoppel?
Doctrine applies even if no pre-existing relationship. It is also not necessary that the promisee
face any detriment, all that is required is that there should be an alteration of his position in
reliance of the promise. PE is not merely a shield, it can also be the basis for a cause of action.
The Government would have to show precisely the changed policy with the reason and
justification therefor, to enable the Court to judge for "itself which way the public interest lies
and what equity of the case demands. It is only if the Court is satisfied, on proper and adequate
material placed by the Government, that over-riding public interest requires that the
Government should not be held bound by the promise but should be free to act unfettered by it
that the Court would refuse to enforce the promise against the Government.
Reasonable notice and reasonable opportunity can also be given if there is change in policy in
case of public interest.
2. MRF v. Asst Commissioner of Sales Tax
Govt incentives to promote industry such as tax. MRF entered into an MoU also with the Kerala
govt which expressly confirmed the tax exemptions. Relying on this, MRF invested
considerable money in expansion. Later, Kerala govt amended the notification to withdraw
incentives but only with prospective effect. Still, asst commissioner of tax levied penalty on
MRF for failure to pay tax.
Court held that the power to withdraw concessions or exemptions cannot be exercised in
violation of estoppel. While overriding public interest would prevail over estoppel, there was
no public interest in this case.
There was also a legitimate expectation created by the representations of the government.
While this can also be overridden by public interest, this was not the case here.
3. Navjyoti Co-op housing society v. UOI (Procedural LE)
Delhi Admin issued public notice to re-open registration of Group Housing Societies for the
purposes of allotting DDA land to them. 1400 societies got registered. Land has to be allotted
on first come first serve basis. This has been determined on the basis of date of registration,
and even a brochure was published to this effect. However, now the policy was changed to date
of approval.
There was legitimate expectation that the past policy will be carried on. When LE is defeated,
opportunity to be heard must be given. We have not been shown any compelling reasons taken
into consideration by the Central Government to make a departure from the existing policy of
allotment with reference to seniority in Registration by introducing a new guideline. Govt has
to act fairly and take into account all relevant factors relating to the LE.
4. Punjab Communications v. UOI (Substantive LE)
Petitioner was shortlisted for a tender floated by the UOI. However, later the loan through
which the project was funded was not taken and the bank withdrew the loan. New scheme and
tenders was introduced.
Legitimacy of expectation can only be conferred by law or custom or established procedure
followed regularly and naturally. LE does not apply in overriding public interest.
Court said that Wednesbury unreasonableness should be applied to test substantive legitimate
expectations.
Rigid SoP- Montesquieu, followed in America. Strict separation between legislative executive
and judiciary, insofar as they each keep a check on each other.

Loose SoP- Westminster model and supremacy of Parliament. No power of judicial review of
the legislature.
Indian Constitution- third model. Three separate bodies, parliament is not sovereign,
constitution is. Laws can be declared unconstitutional. No separation b/w executive and
legislature, functional overlap. Judiciary performs executive functions and executive and
legislature performs judicial functions.
AV Dicey
- Promote individualism against collectivism (classical liberal).
- Hated arbitrary authority of the executive- against rule of law because it empowered
public officials over private ones.
- However, laissez faire collapsed.
Functionalism-
- Called for more state intervention to promote human improvement.
- State is now involved in a number of activities that need to be regulated by public law.