In partial fulfillment of the requirements for PSCM 3242, 8-710 (7:30P - 9:00P)

or otherwise known as International Organizations

Awas, Kenneth Ray

Duguil, Gabrielle Angelo

Gosingco, Carl Gerard

Jacobe, Louie Izak G. Jacobe

Pacaldo, Theody Robin M.

Topic: North Atlantic Treaty Organization or N.A.T.O.

Objectives:

● Understand the nature and purpose of N.A.T.O. as an international organization.

● Dissect and understand the important clauses and articles that steers the operations and
mandates of the organization.
● Understand the structural operation of the organization in order to understand how it
executes certain actions.
● Look into how the organization’s mandate is being enforced to the member states and
how members are obliged to follow the mandates of the organization.
● Utilize these understanding in different case studies, such as the context of N.A.T.O.
expansion and other internal problems of the organization.
● Utilize the learning in analyzing and reviewing the different articles that tackles important
issues of the organization.

Outline

Key Facts:

Headquarters: Boulevard Leopold III in Brussels, Belgium.

NATO Headquarters is the political and administrative centre of the Alliance. It is located at
Boulevard Leopold III in Brussels, Belgium. It offers a venue for representatives and experts
from all member countries to consult on a continuous basis, a key part of the Alliance’s
consensual decision-making process, and to work with partner countries. The Headquarters
hosts roughly 6,000 meetings every year. Initially based in London, the Headquarters was
moved to Paris in 1952 before being transferred to Brussels, Belgium in 1967. (NATO, 2023).
Members:

Albania (2009), Belgium (1949), Bulgarian (2004), Canada (1949), Croatia (2009),
Czech Republic (1999), Denmark (1949), Estonia (2004), Finland (2023), France (1949),
Germany (1955), Greece (1952), Hungary (1999), Iceland (1949), Italy (1949), Latvia (2004),
Lithuania (2004), Luxembourg (1949), Montenegro (2017), Netherlands (1949), North
Macedonia (2020), Norway (1949), Poland (1999), Portugal (1949), Romania 2004), Slovakia
(2004), Slovenia (2004, Spain (1982), Turkey (1952), The United Kingdom (1949), The United
States (1949).

Mandate:

NATO's purpose is to guarantee the freedom and security of its members through
political and military means. NATO promotes democratic values and enables members to
consult and cooperate on defense and security-related issues to solve problems, build trust,
and, in the long run, prevent conflict.

NATO is committed to the peaceful resolution of disputes. If diplomatic efforts fail, it has
the military power to undertake crisis-management operations. These are carried out under the
collective defense clause of NATO's founding treaty – Article 5 of the Washington Treaty or
under a United Nations mandate, alone or in cooperation with other countries and international
organizations.

NATO is committed to the principle that an attack against one or several of its members
is considered as an attack against all. This is the principle of collective defense, which is
enshrined in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. So far, Article 5 has been invoked once – in
response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States in 2001. The principle of collective
defence is at the very heart of NATO's founding treaty. It remains a unique and enduring
principle that binds its members together, committing them to protect each other and setting a
spirit of solidarity within the Alliance.

NATO is an alliance of countries from Europe and North America. It provides a unique
link between these two continents, enabling them to consult and cooperate in the field of
defense and security, and conduct multinational crisis-management operations together.
Key Structure:

At the very top of the hierarchy is the member countries. NATO's organizational structure
is designed to facilitate decision-making, coordination, and cooperation among its member
countries. At the political level, the highest authority is the North Atlantic Council (NAC),
composed of representatives from each member state. The NAC is responsible for making key
decisions on matters affecting the alliance, and it provides overall political guidance. It is also
the ultimate authority at the head of a network of committees. The Secretary General chairs the
NAC and its decisions have the same status and validity at whatever level it meets. It was the
only body established by the North Atlantic Treaty (Article 9) in 1949 and the only one with the
authority to set up subsidiary bodies.

Below the NAC are NATO delegations, which consist of permanent representatives from
each member state. These delegations serve as the primary channel for communication
between member countries and the NATO headquarters. The Nuclear Planning Group (NPG)
operates within this framework, focusing on issues related to nuclear policy and planning. NPG
has comparable authority to the NAC, but only for matters within its specific area of
competence, i.e., nuclear policies, planning and consultation procedures. On the military side,
the Military Committee is the highest military authority within NATO. It consists of the Chiefs of
Defense (or their representatives) from each member country and is responsible for advising the
NAC on military matters. The Military Representatives form a link between the Military
Committee and the NATO delegations, ensuring effective communication and coordination
between political and military authorities.

The Military Committee oversees two key commands: the Allied Command Operations
(ACO) and the Allied Command Transformation (ACT). ACO is responsible for the operational
planning and execution of NATO's military missions and activities. It is the operational arm of the
alliance, overseeing forces and conducting military operations as directed by the NAC. On the
other hand, ACT focuses on developing and transforming NATO's military capabilities, ensuring
the alliance remains adaptable and responsive to emerging security challenges. The Secretary
General, appointed by member states, serves as the chief executive officer of NATO. This
individual plays a crucial role in coordinating the work of the alliance, representing it externally,
and providing leadership at the political level.
 NATO's structure encompasses both political and military dimensions, with the North
Atlantic Council and Military Committee serving as the highest authorities in each respective
domain. The various committees and commands underneath these bodies work collaboratively
to address the diverse challenges and responsibilities faced by the alliance.

Key Obligation:

The key obligation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is outlined in Article
5 of the NATO Treaty, commonly known as the collective defense clause. This article states that
an armed attack against one or more of the NATO member countries in Europe or North
America is considered an attack against them all. In the event of such an attack, each member
agrees to take action to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Article 5 is the cornerstone of NATO's collective defense principle, emphasizing the idea
that an attack on one member is an attack on the entire alliance. It underscores the commitment
of NATO members to come to the aid of any ally under attack, demonstrating solidarity and unity
in the face of a common threat.

The practical implementation of Article 5 involves consultations among the member

states to determine the appropriate response, which can include political, diplomatic, and
military measures. While military force is not the only option, the possibility of using force
underscores the seriousness of the commitment to collective defense.

This collective defense obligation is at the core of NATO's purpose and serves as a
deterrent to potential aggressors, as it signals the alliance's unwavering commitment to the
security and protection of its members. While NATO has evolved to address a range of security
challenges, the fundamental commitment to collective defense remains a central tenet of the
organization's mission.

- Article 5 - collective defense clause

- ARTICLE 5 NATO is the cornerstone of the NATO’s collective defense principle.
- An attack on one member is an attack on the entire alliance.
- The collective defense main obligation of NATO serves as a counter for potential
aggressors
Enforcement:

NATO, as a military alliance, possesses the capability to enforce its obligations primarily
through its military forces and structures. The organization's collective defense principle, as
outlined in Article 5 of the NATO Treaty, is the foundation of its enforcement abilities. In the
event of an armed attack against any NATO member, the alliance can deploy military force to
counteract the aggression and restore the security of the North Atlantic region.
 The enforcement mechanism involves a coordinated response by member states, with
each contributing according to its capabilities to form a united front against the common threat.
NATO's military forces, comprising ground, air, and naval assets, are organized and prepared to
respond swiftly to various types of security challenges. The alliance's integrated military
command structure facilitates effective decision-making and execution of military operations.

NATO's readiness forces, such as the NATO Response Force (NRF), play a crucial role
in enhancing the alliance's ability to respond rapidly to emerging crises. While NATO has other
tools at its disposal, including political and diplomatic measures, the enforcement of its
obligations often involves a credible military capability, underscoring the alliance's commitment
to collective defense and the security of its members.

- NATO as a military alliance has the capability to enforce military forces and structures to
the allied countries to counter attack the aggressors enable to restore the security.
-
Key Clauses:

The key clauses of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) are outlined in its
founding document, the North Atlantic Treaty, signed on April 4, 1949. The primary and most
crucial clause, the collective defense clause, is embodied in Article 5. Article 5 stipulates that an
armed attack against one or more NATO members in Europe or North America is considered an
attack against all members, and each agrees to take necessary measures to restore and
maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. This collective defense principle underscores
the alliance's commitment to mutual assistance and deterrence against potential aggressors.

Another significant clause is Article 4, which provides for consultation among member
states when, in the opinion of any of them, their territorial integrity, political independence, or
security is threatened. While Article 4 does not invoke the automatic response of Article 5, it
emphasizes the importance of political consultation and cooperation among member
countries in addressing potential threats or challenges.

The treaty also includes provisions related to the organization's structure and
decision-making processes. For example, Article 3 emphasizes the commitment of each
member to maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.
Additionally, Article 6 establishes that the treaty does not affect the rights and obligations of the
member states under the United Nations Charter.

These key clauses collectively form the legal framework that governs NATO's purpose
and functioning, emphasizing the principles of collective defense, consultation, and cooperation
among its member countries in addressing security challenges and maintaining peace in the
North Atlantic region.

Key provisions or clauses of the obligations of member states:

 The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), forged by signing the Washington Treaty
on April 4, 1949, is a beacon of collective security among member states. Embedded within this
treaty are pivotal articles that articulate the organization's fundamental principles, shaping its
mission and fostering international cooperation. This essay delves into the critical provisions of
the NATO treaty, exploring the core tenets that underpin the alliance's commitment to mutual
defense, diplomacy, and peaceful resolution of disputes.

At the nucleus of NATO's mission is Article 5, the cornerstone of the alliance's mutual
defense commitment. It unequivocally states that an armed attack against any NATO member is
deemed an attack against all members. In response, each member pledges to take necessary
actions, including armed forces, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic region.
Article 5 embodies NATO's solidarity, emphasizing the shared responsibility of member states to
safeguard each other against external threats.

Article 3 underscores the commitment of member states to maintain and develop their
individual and collective capacities to resist armed attacks. This article highlights not only the
sovereign responsibility of each member to ensure its defense capabilities but also the collective
effort required for the alliance's overarching security. It reinforces the idea that a robust alliance
necessitates the continual strengthening of the capabilities of its constituents.

Diplomacy takes center stage in Article 4, which establishes a mechanism for

consultation among member states. This article emphasizes the importance of open dialogue
and coordination. Consultation becomes imperative when any member perceives a threat to
another party's territorial integrity, political independence, or security. Article 4 fosters a sense of
unity among member states, enabling a coordinated and collective response to emerging
challenges.

Article 2 encapsulates NATO's commitment to the peaceful resolution of international

disputes. Member states pledge to settle conflicts peacefully and refrain from the threat or use
of force inconsistent with the principles of the United Nations. This commitment to diplomacy
underscores NATO's dedication to upholding international law and promoting stability through
non-violent means.

The final article broadens the scope of NATO's goals. Beyond defense, member states
commit to contributing to developing peaceful and friendly international relations. This involves
strengthening free institutions, fostering a deeper understanding of the principles underpinning
these institutions, and promoting conditions of stability and well-being.

NATO treaty's key provisions are the bedrock for a robust and cooperative alliance. From
the core principle of collective defense in Article 5 to the commitment to the peaceful resolution
of disputes in Article 2, each article plays a vital role in shaping NATO's mission. These
principles guide member states toward fostering security and cooperation and advancing
peaceful international relations as the world faces evolving challenges.
How does NATO make a member state abide by the obligations of the Organization?

International alliances, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), rely on
diplomatic, political, and internal mechanisms to ensure member states adhere to their
obligations. Despite lacking direct coercive authority, these alliances employ strategic
approaches to foster compliance and maintain collective security. Within the NATO treaty, Article
4 outlines provisions for diplomatic consultation among member states in response to threats
against territorial integrity, political independence, or security. This allows the organization to
address concerns collaboratively through discussions and consultations, promoting adherence
to shared obligations.

Built on the principle of collective security, NATO establishes a normative expectation

that member states actively contribute to alliance goals. Peer pressure, coupled with the desire
to maintain positive relations with fellow members, is a powerful influence, shaping the behavior
of member states within the alliance.

While direct punitive measures are absent, member states within NATO may face
political repercussions for perceived non-compliance. Consequences may include strained
diplomatic ties, reduced influence, or damage to international reputation, prompting states to
fulfill their commitments to avoid such outcomes. Public opinion plays a pivotal role in shaping
government decisions. By generating awareness and securing public support for NATO's
objectives, member states are under pressure to meet their obligations, recognizing the
influence of a supportive citizenry in driving compliance.

Despite lacking direct enforcement powers, NATO employs regular reporting and peer
reviews to monitor adherence, particularly regarding specific guidelines such as the 2% defense
spending target. Member states may face criticism if they fall short of agreed-upon targets,
incentivizing compliance through accountability. NATO's internal structure, comprising
committees, working groups, and coordination mechanisms, facilitates addressing concerns and
sharing information among member states. These internal avenues contribute to the alliance's
ability to navigate challenges, fostering cooperation and adherence to shared objectives.

Ensuring compliance within international alliances is a nuanced process that demands a

strategic blend of diplomatic finesse, political considerations, and adherence to shared norms.
The success of these mechanisms hinges on the commitment and willingness of member states
to collaborate in upholding their obligations, ultimately reinforcing the spirit of collective security
within alliances like NATO.

Do member states comply with the obligations? How does the organization make these
member states abide?

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) relies on various mechanisms to

encourage member states to fulfill their commitments. While compliance is generally pursued,
variations exist based on national priorities, political considerations, and resource constraints.
This essay explores the mechanisms employed by NATO to foster adherence to shared
obligations.

NATO, grounded in principles of consultation and cooperation, utilizes political and

diplomatic efforts to address concerns and ensure alignment with its objectives. Engaging in
dialogue allows member states to resolve issues and maintain a collaborative approach to
shared challenges.

Operating on a consensus basis, NATO decisions require unanimous agreement. Peer

pressure influences compliance, stemming from the desire to maintain positive relationships.
Public criticism of non-compliance can serve as a diplomatic tool, reinforcing the importance of
meeting commitments. NATO provides a platform for member states to engage in regular
consultations. These forums facilitate the exchange of information, identification of shared
concerns, and development of common strategies to address security challenges, fostering
mutual understanding.

Collective decision-making is central to NATO's governance. Involving member states in

shaping policies and initiatives enhances their sense of ownership and commitment to
agreed-upon obligations, reinforcing a shared responsibility. NATO employs strategic
communication to emphasize the alliance's goals and the importance of fulfilling commitments.
Public statements and official communiqués play a role in reinforcing the principles of the
coalition, fostering a shared understanding.

NATO utilizes internal mechanisms to monitor and report member states' contributions,
including defense spending. Regular assessments identify areas requiring attention, promoting
transparency and accountability among member states. The alliance's effectiveness in
responding to security challenges hinges on member states' cooperation and contributions.
Participation in NATO-led operations demonstrates commitment and solidarity, influencing a
state's standing within the alliance.

While NATO lacks the authority to impose legal sanctions on member states, it employs various
tools to encourage compliance. The willingness of member states to collaborate and uphold
commitments is crucial for the effectiveness of these mechanisms. Political, economic, and
diplomatic pressures influence compliance within NATO, reinforcing the alliance's commitment
to collective security.
Case Study:

Case Study 1: "NATO's Aggressive Reach: A Critical Investigation into the Detrimental
Consequences of Unbridled Expansionism"

Looking at the current events happening in our world, one of the most significant crisis
that shaped the current geopolitical crisis for the last two years is the war in Ukraine. The
Russian-Ukraine war involves the military giant Russia and its former soviet territory of Ukraine.
According to Masters (2023), “Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 marked a dramatic
escalation of the eight-year-old conflict that began with Russia’s annexation of Crimea and
signified a historic turning point for European security.” As of now, the war continues to rage on
as both sides dug in trenches and experience occasional major to minor shifts in military
movements or achievements. Based on the latter portion of the paper, it is natural to assume
that Russia is this evil empire with Putin on the helm being irrational and filled with a lust for war.
However, not everything is black or white. Being a leader of Russia for more than 24 years (Al
Jazeera, 2023), we could assume that Russian President Vladimir Putin is a rational and smart
actor that managed to steer his country over the crisis ridden 21st century. Because of this, we
must also take into consideration the series of events and different contexts that led to the
invasion of Ukraine.

NATO originally during the end of the Cold War in 1991 only consisted of 16 member
states. The organization began its expansion on former soviet allies on eastern bloc states with
the accession of The Czech Republic (formerly Czechoslovakia) , Hungary, Poland in 1999.
Since then, NATO welcomed 12 additional new member states where the majority of which
came from the former eastern bloc states like the Baltic states and the latest addition of Finland
which was welcomed during the height of the Russian-Ukraine war in 2023 ( Notre Dame
International Security Center, 2023). Some might argue that this is a right of a sovereign state to
choose or enter any alliances that it sees satisfies its concerns and interests, or that Russia’s
invasion was a substantive justification for the countries close to Russia to seek NATO
application. However, we must also take time to understand the perspective of Russians on
such expansionism to understand why they support such invasion as well as why President
Putin initiated such a ruinous invasion. By understanding this, we can then proceed on the
detrimental implications such policy provides to the members of NATO. In understanding the
perspective of Russians on the expansionist policy of NATO, the authors will be using journal
articles such as of Mary Elise Sarotte as a foundation, as well as supplement it with new articles
and studies to improve relevance while also finding the impacts to the organization. This case
study will attempt to meticulously assess the historical context, geopolitical ramifications, and
the adverse impacts of NATO's expansionist endeavors, this thesis aims to shed light on the
potential destabilizing effects on international relations, emphasizing the urgency for a
reassessment of the alliance's strategic priorities.

In a retrospective look, after the Mas (1994) pointed out that after the collapse of the
Soviet Union and the New Russian Federation, there has been a divide on the political and
military spheres within Russia on the expansion of NATO to formerly held Soviet territories. The
author pointed out that, many in the opposing side of the government in Russian politics views
this and the leniency of the former President Yeltsin in seeking cooperation with NATO as a
sellout move. The author cited the letter sent by the communist-dominated Duma (parliament) to
former President Clinton where it stated that, “the new expanded alliance is a “cordon sanitaire”
around Russia… on, "you are trying to draw a new and truly artificial line, which, as a result of
Russia's temporary weakness would be several hundred kilometers nearer to our borders…”
The letter finally closes with the statements, “The decision of the NATO Council's Madrid
session quite clearly shows that the Cold War against Russia never ended. It has merely been
camouflaged by propagandistic rhetoric with the aim of misleading the world public… the plans
to advance the North Atlantic alliance eastward are laying the foundation for unfriendly and even
confrontational relations between Russia and NATO states in the future." Many of the Russian
Elites also share the similar view that, “, NATO expansion has violated a tacit agreement with
the West. In their view, Moscow agreed to quit Eastern Europe, allow German reunification, and
accept the continued existence of an alliance that had been hostile to it. In return, they say,
Moscow received assurances from the US and its allies that it would not take geopolitical
advantage of this situation in a way that would threaten Russian security.” Although many
Russians share this belief, it was later revealed that no such promise was set in paper or in
words. According to the former Soviet Premier Gorbachev in an interview, “The topic of ‘NATO
expansion’ was not discussed at all, and it wasn’t brought up in those years… ” In the latter part
of the interview the former Soviet president criticized NATO enlargement and called it a violation
of the spirit of the assurances given Moscow in 1990, but he made clear there was no promise
regarding broader enlargement (Pifer, 2014). Based on this, we could confirm that there is no
presence of written or spoken assurance in the negotiations. However, the Soviet leadership
and fellow Russians held the belief of unspoken assurance from NATO of halting expansion only
on the unified German Border. The US secretary of State Baker wrote in his memoirs about the
smart maneuvering of the US against the USSR but left a warning, “Almost every achievement
contains within its success the seeds of a future problem.” By design, Russia was left on the
periphery of a post-Cold War Europe. A young kgb officer serving in East Germany in 1989
offered his own recollection of the era in an interview a decade later, in which he remembered
returning to Moscow full of bitterness at how "the Soviet Union had lost its position in Europe.
His name was Vladimir Putin, and he would one day have the power to act on that bitterness
(Sarotte, 2014).

The implication of such context to NATO can be collectivized to Three problems. 1.) It
needlessly provokes Russia. 2.) It would remilitarize and sharpen conflicts in the region. 3. It
would cost both Europe and the U.S. a great deal of money (Feffer, 1996). In terms of
needlessly provoking Russia, Russia has steadfastly opposed NATO expansion. Virtually all
political forces within the country view this policy as an encirclement, a containment that will
lead to greater isolation. Because of this provocation and the organization being a military
alliance, the remilitarization and chances of escalations between the organization and Russia
will further intensify the prospects of conflicts. As NATO encroaches on the borders of Russia,
tensions will continue to rise and instances of miscalculated conflicts also increase. New NATO
members would also have to devote enormous funds to buy the weapons and communication
systems necessary to mesh with the Western command structure–an increase by one estimate
of at least 60 percent and possibly 80 percent over current military expenditures. These defense
budget hikes would put enormous pressure on strained budgets and divert money from the
reform of productive sectors at a time when the region is cutting its military spending (Feffer,
1996). Nevertheless, NATO still observes an open-door policy which is based upon Article 10 of
the Washington Treaty. This article states that membership is open to any "European State in a
position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North
Atlantic area" (NATO, 2023).

In the face of this quagmire of Dilemma, some of the possible solutions that could help
de-escalate and prevent further tensions between NATO and Russia is, 1.) For NATO to
reassess and revise Article 10 which is the “Open door policy” 2.) NATO should provide an open
line and be open to the concerns of Russia 3.) Be open about concessions and assurances for
Russia. Provided the main context explains to us the harms of the policy may bring which is
expansionism. Russia views the expansionism of NATO as a threat to its national security as it
sees itself being isolated by NATO member countries such as the Baltic States and potential
former soviet states that borders Russia to join. As cited by Crace (2023), “In her memoir,
Madeleine Albright, Clinton’s secretary of state, concedes that “[Russian president Boris] Yeltsin
and his countrymen were strongly opposed to enlargement, seeing it as a strategy for exploiting
their vulnerability and moving Europe’s dividing line to the east, leaving them isolated.””
According to Benson and Smith (2022), “Potential new alliances can often provoke hostility, but
the path NATO lays out for potential members all but invites armed conflict — however
inadvertently.” The authors also advised that, “the alliance might consider replacing its road map
for future members with a more opaque, private, deliberative process, so that adversaries aren’t
encouraged to preempt membership by instigating fights.” In addition, any efforts on the part of
NATO to uphold its open door policy by admitting Georgia and Ukraine could trigger significant
instability in Europe—thereby undermining the Alliance’s stated aim of projecting stability in the
Euro-Atlantic area (Gheciu, 2009).

In the second possible solution, NATO continues to provide an open line for diplomatic
concerns between them and Russia. In the past during the problematic ascension of Hungary
and the other states, where Russia echoed their concerns and warned foreign ministers of the
(OSCE) meeting, to avoid moves that could divide Europe but the west ignored these concerns
(Mas, 1998). Opening diplomatic channels is vital for peacebuilding and ensuring security for
the members in NATO. As expressed by Haass (2022), “Diplomacy is a tool of national security
to be used, not a favor to be bestowed, and it should continue to be pursued with Russia.
Private meetings between senior civilian and military officials of Western countries and Russia
should resume, in order to reduce the risk of a miscalculation that could lead to confrontation or
worse, and to explore opportunities for limited cooperation.” This can be further expanded by
Feffer (1996), “ engage Russia, not alienate it. Instead of provoking Russia with a
neo-containment policy, the United States must include Moscow in regular discussions with top
security institutions such as the North Atlantic Council, the Defense Planning Committee, and
the Nuclear Planning Group. It must encourage constructive relations between Russia and its
European neighbors, not defensiveness and mistrust. The U.S.-Proposed NATO-Russia Charter
is a step in the right direction, but not if it acts as a mere fig leaf for expansion.” To open us In
the lens of Russians, “In relations between Russia and NATO, it is important to consider
international law, but also that NATO accounts for the interests of Russia in its future decisions
as well as for the specific interests of each individual country.” as stated by a Russian
Ambassador (Bećirević et al. 2008).

Moving on to the last possible solution which is for NATO to be open to provide
concessions and assurances for Russia. According to Marten (2017), U.S. policymakers can
deter Russian aggression with robust support for NATO, while reassuring Russia of NATO’s
defensive intentions through clear words and actions based in international law. Carpenter
(2022) explained that the final chance to prevent a heated conflict in eastern Europe was
created by events that occurred in the previous few months. This is when Putin insisted that
NATO offer assurances on a number of security-related matters. The Kremlin specifically
demanded legally-binding guarantees that the alliance would never consider admitting Ukraine
as a member and would scale down its expanding military posture in eastern Europe. He made
a significant military build-up along Ukraine's borders to support their demands. Yet, the Biden
administration’s response to Russia’s quest for meaningful western concessions and security
guarantees was tepid and evasive. In addition, one of the most voiced out rhetoric of Russian
nationalist is the notion that Gorbachev had made unilateral concessions to the West (Marten,
2017). Showing a willingness to concessions and assurances between Russia and NATO is
crucial for building trust, reducing misunderstandings, and promoting diplomatic solutions. It
addresses security concerns, prevents conflicts, and creates a positive atmosphere for
cooperative security measures. Ultimately, it contributes to regional and global stability by
fostering a more secure and predictable international environment.

In conclusion, the Ukraine conflict underscores the complex interplay between NATO's
expansion and geopolitical tensions. The paper examines the historical context and adverse
impacts of NATO's expansion, emphasizing the need to consider Russia's historical
perspectives. The lack of clear assurances during the post-Soviet era contributed to tensions.
Three main issues with NATO's expansion are identified: provoking Russia, escalating conflicts,
and economic burdens. Proposed solutions include reassessing NATO's open-door policy,
opening diplomatic channels, and providing concessions to Russia. Diplomacy is crucial for
understanding and addressing concerns, and concessions can build trust and promote stability.
Ultimately, by engaging in diplomatic dialogue and addressing Russia's concerns, NATO can
contribute to a more secure international environment.
Case Study 2:

Title: Crisis of Commitment: Analyzing the Challenges and Consequences of NATO Members
Falling Short on the 2% GDP Rule

NATO is an intergovernmental organization that is funded by its member countries.

NATO is resourced through the direct and indirect contributions of its members. NATO’s
common funds are composed of direct contributions to collective budgets and programmes,
which equate to only 0.3% of total Allied defense spending (around EUR 3.3 billion for 2023).
These funds enable NATO to deliver capabilities and run the entirety of the Organization and its
military commands. The financial commitments of NATO members have been a critical aspect of
the alliance's effectiveness. The 2% of GDP defense spending guideline, established during the
Wales Summit in 2014, serves as a benchmark for members to contribute proportionately to
collective defense (NATO, 2023). However, the persistent issue of some members failing to
meet this target raises concerns about the alliance's overall capability and cohesion. One key
critic of this disparity is the running president of the US Donald J. Trump who’s criticisms are
new and much more divisive than the disagreements between previous presidents and U.S.
allies (Benitez, 2019). This case study critically analyzes the challenges posed by NATO
members consistently falling short of the 2% GDP defense spending guideline, exploring the
root causes, implications, and potential solutions to address the fiscal fractures within the
alliance and sustain its collective defense capabilities.

Since the end of the Cold War, NATO members had significantly reduced defense
spending, downsized their forces, and underinvested in modernizing their forces (Bergmann and
Cicarelli, 2021). However In 2014, following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and seizure of Crimea,
NATO leaders met in Wales for a critical summit. Russian aggression against Ukraine shook the
alliance. This made the NATO leaders agree in Wales that defending Europe would be a top
priority and committed to spending at least 2 percent of gross domestic product on defense by
2024 (Bergmann and Cicarelli, 2021). NATO's 2% GDP commitment was devised to ensure that
member nations invest adequately in defense capabilities, fostering collective strength against
emerging security threats. Despite this agreement, several NATO members consistently fall
short of the prescribed spending threshold. During his tenure as president, has been critical of
the inequality of financial responsibility between the US and many of its members. According to
Trump in twitter, “By some accounts, the U.S. is paying for 90% of NATO, with many countries
nowhere close to their 2% commitment,” This can be backed up from the paper of Pederson et
al. from the findings of Sandler and Shimizu where they stated, “large GDP member states may
have yet again started carrying a greater share of the burden. A member state of an alliance
protects its citizens and industry by avoiding war. The size of a member state’s GDP is therefore
expected to affect the percentage of GDP spent on defence. In NATO, high-GDP member states
are expected to demand a larger amount of defence capabilities, whereas small-GDP member
states are more likely to free ride.” There are a number of negative implications for the
organization and its members if this issue continues to persist. According to Techau (2015), “the
dependence of European NATO allies on the United States has further increased since the end
of the Cold War, not decreased.” As more countries join the organization and fail to meet its
monetary obligation, the financial bill to run the organization and meet the needs of its members
continues to widen. In line with the earlier finding, Techau (2015) also added that as the US
shifts its necessity to be involved in Europe. The reduction of US presence in Europe and the
European inability and unwillingness to step in, a power and security vacuum emerge that would
embolden other hostile states or organizations to attack a member. Furthermore, Persistent
disparities in contributions may strain alliances within NATO, eroding trust and cooperation
among member nations. In the looming potential of war such as with Russia and the potential
for the reelection of the Anti-NATO former president Trump, This issue must be dealt with as
soon as possible.

Since the entry of a potential member state in the organization, these states have
already been made aware of the obligations of the organization; particularly the monetary
aspect. Such as in relation to the “Open Door Policy” of NATO which states, “...any country in
Europe is free to join NATO if it is prepared to meet the standards and obligations of
membership, contributing to the security of the Alliance… (NATO, 2023)” Hence, we must not
easily conclude that these states are refusing to pay the expected amount they are obligated to
follow. This study identified three potential root causes for these states to behave in this manner.
1.) Economic Constraints 2.) Differing Threat Perceptions

Economic Constraints:
Before comparing equity of responsibility, we must also understand that not all nations in
NATO are as prosperous as the other members such as the US or the UK. Some NATO
members face economic challenges, hindering their ability to allocate the recommended
percentage of GDP to defense. According to Gay (2019), “stricting our viewpoint only to defense
expenditures ignores the economic policies a nation has chosen to prioritize and address. Each
country is endowed with its unique and finite economic resources or factors of production, which
are identified in a narrow sense as the natural resources, labor, and capital inputs to produce
goods and services.” the author further added that, “nation’s contribution of forces and
capabilities to NATO missions should also be considered. For example, neither Denmark
(1.17%) nor Italy (1.11%) qualifies for the “Two-Percent Club,” yet contribute substantial forces
to ongoing alliance missions.”

Differing Threat Perceptions:

Aside from differing economic problems, each member also has different international
policies and interests. Varied threat perceptions among member states may influence their
commitment to defense spending, leading to disparities in contributions. One example of this
issue is Hungary, which has a low threat perception from the collective threat of Russia but also
sees Russia in a good light compared to other members. According to the US ambassador,
“The Hungarian government continues to maintain close relations with Russia and supports the
Russian war machine in various economic ways.(Gosling, 2023)” Reuters (2023) further added,
“Hungary cultivates closer ties with Russia than other EU states… Russian President Vladimir
Putin and his closest ally… Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban… reaffirmed their
commitment to bilateral ties amid international tensions over the war in Ukraine.” In addition,
“Roughly a quarter in Hungary believe Russia is not a threat. (Fagan et al., 2023)”

Case Example:

Country A:
Despite having a strong economy, Germany routinely falls short of the 2% GDP target
due to conflicting domestic priorities, prompting concerns about its commitment to collective
security. According to a Cornell University Press article, in August 2023, the German
government withdrew a clause from their budget that promised to reach the aim every year,
instead vowing to meet the target over a five-year period.

The projected defense budget for 2024 is now only 52 billion euros, or about 19 billion
short of 2% of the country's GDP. This is not a new problem. Germany's defense
underinvestment has persisted since the 1990s, resulting in ongoing combat readiness
shortages. But Germany has not always punched below its weight. During the Cold War,
Germany provided the majority of NATO's personnel on the front lines against the Soviet Union,
and US leaders successfully convinced Berlin to spend huge sums on American military
equipment.

Country B:
Economic challenges and a perception of lower immediate threats lead Luxembourg to
prioritize other budgetary areas over meeting the 2% GDP commitment. Pugnet (2023) writer of
the article entitled “Luxembourg strikes special deal on NATO defense spending target” said that
despite their spending commitments and higher military budgets, the majority of NATO members
are still falling short of the alliance's spending goal in 2022, with only seven hitting NATO's 2014
defense spending objective of 2% of GDP.

Almost ten years later, in a new security climate sparked by Russia's war in Ukraine,
NATO has begun to reexamine its promise "as a floor, not a ceiling." As a result, members will
commit to spending at least 2% of their GDP on defense, rather than striving for that objective.
NATO countries are expected to support the new vow and promise further investment at their
major summit in Vilnius next week.

As part of the agreement, Luxembourg will enhance its overall contribution to NATO's
collective defense in a means other than general defense spending. This may include using its
space assets, sending a small number of troops to help on the Eastern Front, or donating
money to various NATO funds to help alliance allies like Ukraine and Moldova.

Possible Solutions:

1. Flexible Approaches:
NATO could adopt a more flexible approach, considering unique economic situations
and allowing member nations to demonstrate commitment through alternative means, such as
capability contributions. According to Gary Graves (2017), NATO's hard power illustrates the
prerequisite to expand its mandate: Specifically, understanding the character of war, its impact
within the different warfighting domains, and defining what constitutes an act of aggression. For
example, in the framework of Article 5, "any action initiated by an external state or non-state
actor that threatens the political and economic security or territorial integrity of a NATO member
will engender a collective response." This means that NATO should maintain an effective
military deterrent and a broader response capability that accounts for the potential threats that
may operate in the virtual realms.

2. Diplomatic Engagement:
Encouraging open dialogues among member states to address concerns and align
threat perceptions could foster a shared understanding and commitment to defense spending.
According to Clarence Striet (1957), part of the difficulty lies in the fact that NATO is a union
based on units of diplomacy or sovereign nations rather than a more democratic federal union
based on sovereign citizens. The body politic is an artificial unit hampered by national rather
than international allegiances. A solid and effective Atlantic federal union must be built up by
splitting up these bodies' politics and then reuniting these men into a more excellent and
internationally minded organization.

In summary, NATO faces significant challenges as some members fall short of the 2%
GDP defense spending target. Economic constraints and differing threat perceptions contribute
to this issue. Criticism from leaders, notably former President Trump, highlights the urgency of
addressing disparities. Potential consequences include increased dependence on the U.S. and
strained alliances. Solutions may involve flexible contributions and diplomatic dialogues. Prompt
action is crucial to maintain NATO's credibility, unity, and collective defense capabilities in a
changing security landscape.

Conclusion (What contributions does the organization provide in ensuring a stable

international regime?)

Among all the international organizations, NATO, or the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization, has become an especially important alliance ensuring stability and security. NATO
has been instrumental in defining international security dynamics by means of its distinctive
construct, indispensable duties, and mechanisms for implementation.

The first and most important mission of NATO, according to its mandate, is ensuring
freedom from fear for all its members in political and military ways. Indeed, the alliance has
always been encouraging democratic values initiations and helping in cooperating in matters
related to defense and security as well as preventing the occurrence of conflicts. The guiding
principle of collective self-defense, which forms section 5 of the NATO Treaty, reinforces that a
member will not be left alone in case it is attacked, insisting on solidarity and unity among
member states. The organization's main structure, which includes the North Atlantic Council,
Military Committee, and several commands, makes it possible to make effective decisions that
are not contrary to political or military authorities. Ground, air, and naval forces are the military
potential of NATO states that act as a sort of enforcement mechanism by which this alliance can
fairly quickly respond to certain security challenges based on its obligations.

Certain responsibilities undertaken by the member states when they enter into
agreements with NATO, specified in Articles 4 and 5, lay much emphasis on principles of mutual
aid obligation, consultation, and cooperation. Although member states are only practical, NATO
has a track record of adaptation to evolving security threats. The pledge to spend at least 2% of
one's GDP on defense serves as a quantitative indicator or political commitment that
theoretically will support the joint defense effort.

NATO takes diplomatic and political steps as part of the intervention, not approach itself.
The NATO contributions are such that they move beyond military enforcement. The alliance's
involvement in crisis management and conflict resolutions, as shown through the invocation of
Article 5 after the attacks on September 11th, reveals its dedication to keeping peace within the
North Atlantic. Nevertheless, problems remain to be solved, and the issue of authority for
engagement in using violent methods is among them. Such divergent views are seen within
NATO, such as the case of France's focus on U.N. Security Council approval and that of
America about independent action by NATO, highlighting how challenging it would be to realize
multilateral decision-making.

Article Review:

First Article

The first article of our choosing is authored by Clifford Kupchan and Charles Kupchan in
the year 1995, entitled “the promise of collective security” which tackles on the principle of
collective security that is highly centralized in the foundations of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization or N.A.T.O. as commonly known by the masses. What the authors argue can be
summarized by three points, the importance of defining collective security, the advantages of
collective security and the poverty of structural realism.

Clifford and Charles Kupchan started to define collective security as a necessity, as a

law in a lawless world, and saw it as order amidst all the chaos. But they emphasized that this
principle of collective security is not the ultimate answer to preventing war. From that sentence
alone, we begin to understand that collective security is by no means a cure nor is it a deterrent
but is a means of safeguarding the peace, sovereignty, and lives of the nations that are affiliated
to a defensive organization like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Amidst all of this, this
article is a critique of Mearsheimer who critiqued the idea of collective security in his journal
article entitled “The False Promise of International institutions”.

Regardless of their definition, the authors began to touch up on whether institutional

balancing is preferable to unregulated balancing under anarchy. Collective security refers to a
type of institution where countries work together based on certain principles, like regulated
balancing and a united stance against any threat. The text argues that when talking about the
value of institutions, it's essential to discuss general ideas rather than specific variations of
institutions.

Which I quite agree with since situations are ever evolving, there is a need to keep up with the
times, therefore it is understandable to discuss much more flexible and general ideas than
following an arbitrary and fixed scope that limits the institution and create the inability to act
which will cripple any defense collective security organizations or any organizations on that
matter.

This part of the article mentions "concerts" as a type of collective security family.
Concerts involve a regulated and norm-governed environment, with the logic of everyone
working together against a common threat, rather than each country pursuing its own interests.
The author argues that this terminology, referring to a range of collective security organizations,
helps capture the main conceptual issues involved.

The authors’ criticizes a viewpoint, attributed to Mearsheimer, that suggests concerts are
largely consistent with realism (a political theory emphasizing self-interest and power), but at the
same time, acknowledges that concerts involve coordinated balancing among powerful nations
with shared rules. The author argues that these features are actually fundamental to collective
security and contradict the competition and self-help strategies of realism. In simpler terms, the
argument is that concerts, as a form of collective security, do align with certain realist ideas,
contrary to what Mearsheimer suggests.

Moving forward, the article then tackled the advantages of collective security which starts
off as categorizing into two. Those two being (A) more effective balancing against aggressors,
(B) Promotes Trust and Cooperation. In simple terms, the text discusses the concept of
collective security and criticizes the perspective of a scholar named Mearsheimer.

Mearsheimer seems to misunderstand the essence of collective security, arguing that it

requires states to ignore traditional power dynamics and balance-of-power considerations.
However, the text contends that this interpretation is flawed. Collective security aims to address
realist concerns about the competitive nature of international relations, intending to prevent
conflicts and manage power more effectively.

The central argument is that collective security offers a better mechanism for dealing
with aggressors compared to the traditional approach of balancing power in an anarchic
international system. Under collective security, more states are likely to join forces against an
aggressor, not only due to commitments but also because they have shared interests in
maintaining international order. The text suggests that even when collective security fails, it is no
worse than the traditional balancing of power.
 A good example of this is in the context of World war 2, wherein despite the best efforts
of Adolf Hitler and his Nazis, because of the allied powers, their collective and unified strength
ultimately led to the defeat and death of Adolf Hitler and the discontinuation or dissolution of
Nazism in Germany. During world war 2 however, Germany knew that it could win without
allies, so along with countries like Japan and Italy they formed the Axis powers. Balancing it out
with the Allied powers that comprised multiple countries at that time.

A critique is presented against the idea that collective security, at its worst, may leave
directly threatened states unprepared for war. The counter-argument emphasizes that the
potential unraveling of collective security would happen gradually, giving warning to threatened
states. Additionally, directly threatened states would maintain adequate military strength,
understanding the possibility of some members defecting.

One example comes to mind in regards to this paragraph, in World war 1, The Triple
Alliance was a defensive military alliance between Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy. At the
start of world war 1, Italy was not bound to fight for the triple alliance since their terms which
was built as the foundation of their alliance was for it to be a defensive alliance. Because of that,
in the latter part of the war, Italy chose to ally themselves with the opposing party, the Allies that
led to the defeat of the central powers in 1918.

The text also addresses concerns about free riding, where some states may not
contribute enough to the collective security effort. However, it argues that this problem exists in
all coalitions, including traditional alliances, and the key question is whether collective security is
more effective in deterring and blocking aggressors than the traditional balancing of power in an
anarchic system. The issue of free riding is present in today’s N.A.T.O with the United States of
America being the only country in their defense alliance armed with Nuclear weapons. Which
causes allied countries to rely too much on the United States of America.

The promotion of trust and cooperation. The passage discusses the effectiveness and
advantages of collective security as a method for maintaining international stability and
preventing conflicts among nations. Collective security is seen as preferable to the balance of
power approach because it not only helps in balancing against aggressors but also creates an
environment where aggression is less likely to occur. The text acknowledges that trust among
states is crucial for collective security, and while basic compatibility among major powers is
essential, the system builds on this by reinforcing confidence and deepening cooperation
through diplomacy, military joint training, and secure relationships with allied countries.

Institutionalizing a collective security system is argued to have great advantages over

letting a self-help system take its course. It helps alleviate the security dilemma, enhancing
stability and reducing the likelihood of unintended hostility. Collective security encourages states
to focus on absolute gains rather than relative gains, thus facilitating cooperation.

NATO is used to illustrate how collective security institutions can have a lasting impact.
NATO, initially formed in response to the Cold War division of Europe, continues to play a role in
shaping the security landscape. Its influence extends beyond its original purpose, impacting
how member states interact and even influencing the security needs of former Soviet bloc
states. The passage suggests that NATO's future decisions, such as expansion, can impact
geopolitical relationships and define spheres of influence.

Russia should be gradually integrated into a European collective security system to

promote peace. Which will be highly unlikely since the expansion of NATO threatens Russia in
waging a war against Ukraine to strengthen their borders against enemies of their state. Yet the
author's argument is made that including Russia in such a system, unless it demonstrates
malign intentions, is more promising than leaving it exposed to the uncertainties of a self-help
world. The overall message is in favor of collective security as a means to foster cooperation,
reduce conflict, and contribute to a more stable international order.

Lastly, the third topic of Clifford and Charles Kupchan was the poverty of structural
realism. In this debate about the value of international institutions, the fundamental
disagreement revolves around differing views on the causes of war and peace.

The argument presented challenges Mearsheimer's structural realism, which asserts that
all great powers are essentially equal and will act in their self-interest, rendering collective
security and international institutions mostly irrelevant. The opposing perspective contends that
major states are not created equal, emphasizing the influence of domestic politics, beliefs, and
norms in addition to balance-of-power considerations.

The proponents of this view argue that wars like World War I, World War II, and the Cold
War were not solely driven by international competition but also resulted from aggressive states
with ideological and domestic pathologies. They assert that collective security can be effective if
it considers both power politics and the nature of domestic and international societies. The case
for collective security is rooted in a nuanced understanding of international politics, challenging
the simplicity of structural realism. Being frank, we have yet to fully understand this part of the
journal and I am still at a loss to explain, yet we provided insights as to how we understand this
portion of the article.

The post-Cold War era is seen as a test for these perspectives, with the potential
success or failure of collective security in Europe serving as evidence for or against these
theories. The conclusion emphasizes the importance of giving collective security a chance to
preserve peace, as failure could lead to a reconsideration of theoretical assumptions and
continued debates between structural realists and institutionalists.

Second Article

The General Analysis of the article by Reiter (2001) on ‘Why NATO Enlargement Does
Not Spread Democracy’ would be its critical assessment of the influence on democratization
processes in Eastern European countries during the post-Cold War period through membership
in NATO. Reiter (2001) infers with regard to NATO enlargement by denouncing a very common
opinion that it spreads democracy significantly in terms of individual cases where he argues that
commitment or devotion to democratization for these nations' role more vigorously compared to
the process.

In Reiter’s analysis, the author looks at Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic as
credible cases to contend that these countries would have remained committed to democracy
regardless of whether they were in NATO or not. An intention towards democracy before NATO
was formed was highlighted through establishing competitive electoral systems and by holding
elections by 1990 in the aforementioned states. The concerns in the article are raised about
civilian control of the military in NATO member states. In this regard, it asserts that NATO
accession did not produce noticeable results regarding civilian control improvement; above all,
activities carried out by the Partnership for Peace group can have undesirable implications in
improving people’s relationships with soldiers. The first question raised by the article is related
to whether widening NATO is not an effective method of propagating democracy. It implies that
the attitude of NATO membership may not have been a final point in many democratization
processions, as seen in the case of Slovakia and Romania.

The main point made in the piece calls into question the notion that NATO membership
has had a profound impact on democratization. NATO is depicted as a kind of actor that can
only be useful through input or assuming a secondary position to internal state commitment to
democratic principles. This approach reveals that the limitations of NATO on acting as a main
leading force for democratization arise in member or aspiring countries. This reinforces the fact
that, as much as there are implications that stand out from NATO’s role with regard to civilians
controlling their military, there also seem to be plenty of consequences regarding internal affairs
in the alliance. On the other hand, while NATO’s military-to-military contacts approach may
appear initially as effective in spreading norms of military acceptance of civilian control, the
article implies that this might not be the case.

The article of Reiter (2001) puts up the already preceding argument of the convention
that NATO enlargement naturally leads to democracy. This calls into question the effectiveness
of NATO’s mission public policy and democracy as a problem in its reputation, changing its
concept of political change. The next step is the hint of costs that might be incurred if NATO
continues to expand its sphere of influence and negative associations with Russia. In such a
context, these factors are central given the continuation of debates for NATO expansion,
prompting that fine line agreement needs to be struck between fostering democracy and
geopolitical constraints. Discussion of the possibility that, from its side, the EU could prove more
capable of supporting and reinforcing democratization begs the question concerning NATO and
EU cooperation. NATO might have to reconsider its approach and potential cooperation with the
EU, as this question includes all these complicated interrelations between democracy, security,
and regional stability
 In all, the article presents an alternative perspective to the common perception of
NATO’s equivalence with democratization and prompts a critical reflection on how member
states can affect political matters in either members or aspirants. The insights, on the one hand,
shed some light into the internal dynamics of NATO and its relations wherever it is involved; so it
takes a perspective that would not classify NATO as simplistically ‘a coincidence’ but also make
sense of it in shaping policy within the frameworks under which the countries operate.

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