Media Diplomacy

Author(s): Patricia A. Karl

Source: Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science, Vol. 34, No. 4, The Communications
Revolution in Politics (1982), pp. 143-152
Published by: The Academy of Political Science
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 Media Diplomacy

PATRICIA A. KARL

The symbioticrelationshipbetween the media and government

officialsin theconductof public diplomacyhas a Jekylland Hyde quality.The
actorsare perceivedby thepublicas crusadersor as culpritsin a fiercecompeti-
tion for headlinesand high ratings.Both the journalistand the diplomatare
constrainedby theelementsof time,space, and distance;but thejournalist,un-
like thediplomator head of state,has nothingto lose by promotingmedia di-
plomacy.The correspondent always getsa story,whethertheforeignpolicyis a
success or a failure.Like thecorrespondent, thediplomator head of statemay
manipulate the media. The dangeris thatin an age of prime-time leaders,air-
time-attempted assassinations,televisedcoups, and prerecordedrevolutions,
the constantneed for a new foreign-policy scriptmay encouragediplomatic
comedies or tragediesresplendentwith disinformation. Governmentsand the
media have performedas ministersof mythinformation in tryingto createand
participatein public diplomacy.
The fall of the shah of Iran and the seizureof the UnitedStates Embassyin
Tehran set the stage for one of the longestmedia-orchestrated foreign-policy
sagas in networkhistory.The traditionaldiplomatcould notcompetewith"ter-
rorvision"and radio revolutionaries.During the hostage crisis,debate raged
withintheAmericanpublic and thegovernment over therole of presscoverage
of the embassytakeover.For a while, half of theUnitedStates networknews
was preemptedeach nightby the latest broadcast by satellitefromTehran.
CriticschargedthatAyatollahKhomeiniand hiscohortswerebeinggivenrights
of what amountedto censorshipthatno Americannetworkwould ever give to
an Americanpresidentor a Sovietpremier.The "students" holdingthehostages
at the embassywere tryingto pressuretheirown governmentand the United
Statesgovernment and public. To ensurethattheirprogramswould notbe cen-
sored by any government,theyinstalledthreecamerasof theirown in theem-
bassy compound, along with a dish antenna to relay signals, via satellite,
throughthenetworksin theUnitedStatesand thenintoAmericanhomes. Part
of thisproductionincludeda show forviewersin whichIranianmobs shouted
slogansin English(and in Frenchforone Canadian televisioncrew) and shook
fistson cue.

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144 I PATRICIA A. KARL

If Vietnamwas the living-roomwar, Iran was the living-roomrevolution.

Iran establishedthe preeminenceof televisionin instantdiplomacy. Both the
UnitedStatesgovernment and publicbecamehostagesto thishorriblespectacle.
In Washington,PresidentCarterand Secretaryof StateCyrusVance weretalk-
ing to whoeverin Tehranor Qom mightbe listening,not throughtheirhelpless
charge d'affaires,L. Bruce Laingen, but throughpress spokesman Hodding
Carter.The administration did not know exactlywhom in Iran it was address-
ingthroughthemediaand was miffedthattheUnitedStatesmediahad access to
power sources in Iran that was denied to officialemissaries. In Tehran,
AyatollahKhomeinibecame so dissatisfiedwithAmericantelevisionreporting
thathe eventuallyran a full-pageadvertisement in theNew York Timesto "de-
fine[his]stancein respectto [the]embassytakeover."More recently,of course,
theIraniangovernmenthas allowed Americanreportersback into Iran to film
(and therebyconfirm)Iran'svictoriesin theIran-Iraqwar and thepurportedIra-
nian captureof 15,000 Iraqi militaryprisoners.
The media are increasinglya part of theprocess(ifnot theentireprocess)in
thecommunications betweengovernments and publicsabout international poli-
tics. A recentexample of the media's abilityto informthe public immediately
and to preemptgovernmentsin an analysis of foreigneventsis the television
coverageof theassassinationof EgyptianPresidentAnwar el-Sadaton October
6, 1981. The threetelevisionnetworkstreatedtheAmericanpublicto an almost
immediatemediabarrageof oftendetailedand contradictory information about
theassassination.It took hoursbeforetheAmericanpublic, theEgyptianpub-
lic, and foreignpublicsheardany wordfromtheEgyptiangovernment, theU.S.
State Department,or PresidentReagan. In the UnitedStates, the printmedia
followed the UnitedStates governmentline and devoted theireulogies to the
"hero" legend that PresidentSadat's own public diplomacy had persuaded
editorsand reporters in theUnitedStatesto create.The factthatPresidentSadat
was a pariah in the Arab world was largelyignoredby theUnitedStatesprint
media.
Membersof thegovernment or of themediahave oftenattemptedto manipu-
late thepublic'sperceptionof foreign-policyissues.For example,fora whilethe
pressacceptedat facevalue theReagan administration's "WhitePaper"reporton
El Salvador. This reportapparentlyattemptedto substantiateSecretaryof State
AlexanderM. Haig's allegationsof Soviet supportfor"international terrorism,"
thoughthereportconflictedwitha CentralIntelligenceAgencyanalysispartly
exculpatingMoscow. The State Departmentversionwon front-pagetreatment
in the New York Times; it was two weeks laterbeforethemedia- alarmedby
reportsthatSalvadoran governmentforceswere engagingin terrorism-began
to concentratecriticismon the"WhitePaper."By thespringof 1982, theReagan
administrationhad backed itselfinto a public-relationscornerbecause of its
priorpublicsupportfortheDuarte government and junta. Despite thefactthat
no partiesof thelefttook partin theMarch 30, 1982, Salvadoran electionsand
the fact thatthe right-wing partieswon the election(an outcomeWashington

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 MEDIA DIPLOMACY 1145

did not want), the Reagan administration feltconstrainedto pronounceitself

pleased withtheresults.
The UnitedStates'sCentralAmericanpolicy was damaged earlierin March
1982 when the State Departmentarrangeda pressconferencefora Nicaraguan
guerrillafighterwho, thegovernmentclaimed,would confirmthe chargethat
foreignCommunistsweretrainingrevolutionaries to promotesubversionin the
Caribbean. The pressconferenceturnedinto a disasterfortheReagan adminis-
trationwhen the Nicaraguan informedtelevisionviewersthat his confession
had been obtainedundertorturein a Salvadoran prisonand that,infact,he had
not been trainedby the Communistsat all. He was quicklyusheredout of the
countryto sparetheadministration furtherembarrassment. Given thisovertat-
tempt to create a media event, the Americanpublic must have been amused
when the State Departmentsuggestedthat the United States governmenthad
been "set up" in thiscase.
The Reagan administration'sembarrassmentshave not been restrictedto
UnitedStatespolicytowardCentralAmerica.The publicforeign-policy debates
between Secretaryof Defense Caspar W. Weinbergerand Secretaryof State
AlexanderM. Haig regardingtheNorthAtlanticTreatyOrganization(NATO)
strategicdoctrine,forexample,have alarmed and angeredthe UnitedStates's
allies and have presentedthe Soviets withunearnedpublic-relations successes.
Secretary of State Haig's suggestion thatUnited States doctrine
strategic might
allow forthe demonstration detonationof a nuclearweapon in Europe should
the Soviets attemptconventionalaggressionenabled Leonid Brezhnevto win
over WesternEuropeanpublic opinionwithstatementsthatthe Sovietgovern-
mentwould not considersuch a policy. Secretaryof DefenseWeinbergerthen
statedthattherewas no such contingency.The WhiteHouse compoundedthe
public confusionby statingthatboth thesecretaryof defenseand thesecretary
of statewere correct.
The UnitedStatesgovernment, of course,is not alone in havingpublicdiplo-
macy resultin publicdisaster.Before ArgentinainvadedtheFalklandIslandson
April2, 1982, Britishgovernmentspokesmenpubliclytriedto blufftheArgen-
tinegovernmentinto believingthatBritainhad the militarycapabilityto pre-
vent the invasion. When the bluffwas challengedby 4,000 Argentinetroops,
theBritishgovernment's credibilitywas seriouslyundermined.This public em-
barrassmentcost the internationalcommunitythe resignationof one of the
world's most successfultraditionaldiplomats, Lord Carrington,the British
foreignsecretary,and threatenedthe survivalof the Thatchergovernmentif
Britishprestigehad not been restored.The ensuingmilitarycrisisalso threat-
ened thesurvivalof theArgentinemilitaryjunta. Clearly,thepublicstatements
of both the Britishand the Argentinegovernments, by placing the prestigeof
bothpartieson theline,made itdifficult foreitherside to negotiatea solutionto
the crisis.
While Britishand Argentineforcesfoughta real war over theFalklands,the
Britishand Argentinegovernments foughta mediawar withconflicting pressre-

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146 I PATRICIA A. KARL

portsof casualties,capabilities,and damages. Both Britainand Argentinacen-

soredtheirwar reportsand attemptedto manipulatemediacoverageof thewar.
Journalistsreportingfor both countriesbecame almost totallydependenton
theirgovernments'informationabout the war. In Argentina,while the local
newspaperspromotedpublic optimismwith news of victories,factionsof the
Argentinegovernmentwere intimidating residentforeigncorrespondents.Re-
porters, including Norwegian and American journalists,were kidnapped,
harassed,and threatenedwithdeath. In an attemptto redressthenegativeim-
pact of theseepisodes, GeneralGaltieri,head of theArgentinejunta, publicly
apologized to fourNorwegiancorrespondents.One La Prensa journalistwas
also criticalof themediacoverageof thewar: "The officialand privateradio sta-
tionscontinueadding advertisements to theirnews 'flashes'and war communi-
ques as if thiswas a soccer game."1
The Britishalso attemptedto manage thewar news. Almostall of thereports
and photographsfromtheFalklandspassed throughBritishMinistryof Defense
censorship.Britishjournalistswere well aware thattheywere being "used"by
theirgovernment. Many wereespeciallyannoyedwhen,a day beforetheBritish
landings on the East Falkland Island, Ministryof Defense spokesmentold re-
porters that theBritish militaryplans consistedof "hit-and-run raids,"not a full-
scale invasion. Newspapersin the UnitedKingdomfaithfully printedthe gov-
ernment'sstory,but a day latertheBritishmilitarylanded an invasionforceat
San Carlos Bay. As one Britishgovernmentspokesmansuggested,thegovern-
mentdid not want to telegraphits punches.
The Britishgovernmentalso manipulatedthe timingof thereleaseof photo-
graphs and informationto serve theirpublic-relationsinterests.Althoughit
took weeksformanyphotographsto appear in thepress,thephotographof the
raisingof theBritishflagat San Carlos Bay was relayedin hours.The two dozen
journalistsaboard ships with the Britishnaval task force were permittedto
broadcastlive to confirmBritishgovernment reportsof battlesand losses. BBC
correspondents, forexample,countedthenumberofaircraftleavingand return-
ing to Britishships and were thus able to confirmBritishreportsand to deny
Argentineclaims of the numberof Britishaircraftdamaged or lost. Indeed,
whentheBritishwerenotentirelysuccessfulin controllingthewar news and an
uncensoredreportappeared in The GuardianthattheBritishhad capturedthe
Goose Green airstrip,a governmentspokesmannoted that thiswas the "first
timesuch a thinghad happened in the two monthoperation,"and announced
thattherewould be an investigationof thematter.
The media,likegovernments, oftenbecomevictimsof theirattemptsto shape
the public's image of foreignpolicy issues. A recentexample is the storyby
ChristopherJonesin theDecember20, 1981, issue of theNew York TimesMag-
azine- a fabricatedtale of a four-weekexperiencewithKhmerRouge guerrillas
in Cambodia. The newspaperapologized to itsreaders,and ExecutiveEditorA.
M. Rosenthalstated: "We do not feel thatthefactthe writerwas a liar and a
hoaxerremovesour responsibility. It is our job to uncoverany falsehoodor er-

1New York Times,May 24, 1982.

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 MEDIA DIPLOMACY I 147

rors."However, the public mustwonder how many otherfalse reportshave

been publishedand neverdiscovered.Like a governmentpursuingthegame of
public diplomacy,the media may jeopardize prestigeand credibilitywith the
public and governmentsif "stories"become more importantthan substance.

Open ConvenantsOpenly Connived

From the traditionaldiplomacy prescribedby de Colliere and Sir Harold
Nicolson,theUnitedStateshas moved to a slightlyrevisedversionofWoodrow
Wilson'sconceptof diplomacy:open covenantsopenlyconnived. The collab-
orationbetweengovernmentsand themedia has recentlyprovidedstudentsof
diplomacyand an unsuspecting publicwitha curioussituationthatmay lead to
a furtherdistortionof eventsand issues.
In an attemptto bolsterthe Reagan administration's supportforthe Duarte
regimein El Salvador and to quiet congressionaland publiccriticismof theSal-
vadoran junta, PresidentReagan invitedPresidentDuarte to the UnitedStates
fora seriesof public-relationsexercisesbeforethe Salvadoran electionsthatin-
cluded a congressionalappearance,interviewswithreporters,and appearances
on severalUnitedStatesnetworknews programs.PresidentDuarte assuredthe
UnitedStates thathis governmentneeded economic,not military,aid; and he
thoughtfully disclosed that his governmenthad dismissedapproximately600
membersof the militaryjunta for "excesses."This public-relationscampaign,
sponsoredby theReagan administration in an attemptto gain approval forin-
creasingaid to the Duarte regime,neglectedto mentionthe numberof Salva-
doran troops being trainedin the United States, the typesof weapons being
used, thetechniquesof counterinsurgency thesepersonnelwerelearning,and for
what purpose thesetechniqueswould be used once the troopsreturned.
PresidentDuarte'sgovernment was evidentlyfightinga differentmedia battle
againstthepressin El Salvador, as indicatedby themurderof fourDutchnews-
menin March 1982. The journalistswerecoveringtherebelside of El Salvador's
civil war. The Salvadoran armed forcespress officetreatedthe incidentas
routineand issued a veiled threat:"Journalists should not riskthemselvesvisit-
ingrebelcamps." Surely,theUnitedStatesand othercountriesmighthave been
criticalof a UnitedStatesadministration thatencouragedPresidentDuarte'sac-
cess to the UnitedStates media when PresidentDuarte'sown governmentwas
discouragingmedia freedomsto the domesticand foreignpressin El Salvador.
More than ever, selectivemedia transmissions,like traditionaldiplomatic
omissions,may lead to whatmightbe called "fractured foreignpolicytales"tail-
ored to attractpublicand media attention.AfterSecretaryof StateHaig's accu-
sations of Soviet support for "internationalterrorism,"Soviet Ambassador
Anatoly Dobrynin responded with an open letterto Haig, which in turn
promptedPresidentReagan'sown open letterto LeonidBrezhnev.More recent-
ly, theDefenseDepartment'sreportSoviet MilitaryPower drewa fastrebuttal
fromtheSovietgovernment, and bothaccountsappearedtogetherin theUnited
Statespress.The SovietUnionis learningto use theAmericanmediaeffectively.
DuringthePolish crisis,when theSoviet militarymaneuversin EasternEurope

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148 1 PATRICIA A. KARL

failedto impressthe Polish unions as a crediblethreat,Moscow used both its

own and theWesternpress to warn the Polish governmentand the Solidarity
movementthatit would interveneifPoland's economicand politicalcriseswere
not broughtundercontrol.
These Soviet media maneuverswere counteredwhen a memberof the Soli-
daritymovementarrivedin New York in September1981 to marchin theLabor
Day Parade and to open a public-relationsofficein that city. In its turn,the
AmericanFederationof Labor and Congressof IndustrialOrganizations(AFL-
CIO), called its own workers'marchin Washington"SolidarityDay." Not to be
outdone by eitherPolish or Americanworkers,the Soviet pressadded to the
media meleeby callingRobertPoli, representative of theProfessionalAir Traf-
ficControllersOrganization(whose memberswerefiredforstrikingagainstthe
government),the "LechWalesa of theUnitedStates."
Potential adversariesare not the only actors who seek to manipulatethe
American press. Prime MinisterMenachem Begin of Israel recentlywrote a
letterto PresidentReagan reassuringhimthatIsraelwould not attackpositions
in southernLebanonunlessitwas provoked.The timingwas interesting. Begin's
letterreceivedfront-pageattentionin the UnitedStatesa fewweeks beforethe
scheduledIsraeli departurefromthe Sinai on April 25, 1982, and a few days
afterextensiveUnitedStatesmedia reportsof violenceand Israelipresscensor-
ship of theArab press on theWest Bank.
The Americanpublic'sabilityto comprehendAmericanforeignpolicy on a
varietyof mattersmay also be strainedby itsgovernment providingtoo much
or too littleinformation.The UnitedStatesgovernment's public relationscon-
cerning the issue of the MX missile, for example, must have confusedthe
average television-news viewer or newspaper reader. There have been at least
fivegovernment to
plans deploy thatweapon. Noting this,Hedrick Smithofthe
New York Timessuggested:"In manyways thecontroversialMX has become a
missilein searchof a hole in theground."2In contrast,duringthepublic debate
over the AWACS and enhancementsale to Saudi Arabia, what was not said
was most significant. The publicityover thissale centeredon questionsof the
threatof theplanes to Israelisecurity,concernswithtechnologytransfer, and
thewisdom of sellingsophisticatedequipmentto a moderateArab ally in light
of the fall of the shah in the Iranian revolution. Several other questions,
however,werelargelyignoredby themedia, probablymuchto theReagan ad-
ministration's satisfaction.Why was RichardAllen, thennational securityaf-
fairsadviser,chosen to wage thegovernment's publicand congressionalbattles
on the AWACS issue? It was certainlya no-winsituationforMr. Allen. The
choice did affordtheReagan administration a convenientpublicpersuader(and
a possiblescapegoat)withdomesticand foreigncriticsshould thesale fail. Also
largelyignoredwas thegoverment's majorreasonforsupportingthesale - since
a large and visibleAmericanmilitarypresencein Saudi Arabia was not viable
foreithertheAmericanor Saudi governments, a substitutemilitarycapability

2
Ibid., February23, 1982.

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 MEDIA DIPLOMACY 1149

was needed to complementthe creationof theRapid DeploymentForce (RDF)

in the Middle East.
The Reagan administration has, in fact,been plagued by a numberof self-in-
flictedforeign-policy media wounds sinceit took office.When a secretestima-
tionof therealdefenseexpenditures was releasedto thepress,Pentagonofficials
took polygraphtests.More recently,the leak of Secretaryof State Haig's pri-
vate staffnotes provokedcries of foul play by administration spokesmen,al-
thoughtheleaks mayhave beenintentionalin orderto improvetheimageof the
secretaryof state.
Dr. JeaneJ.Kirkpatrick, UnitedStatesambassadorto theUnitedNations,is
well acquainted with the consequences of being caught between theoryand
practice. Beforeher UN appointment,Dr. Kirkpatrickhad enunciatedwhat
would become the administration's distinctionbetween"totalitarian"and "au-
thoritarian"regimes.The former(whichincludestheSoviet Union and regimes
of theleftin developingcountries)weretagged"repressive," whileauthoritarian
regimesof the rightwere consideredtolerable,if not desirable,providedthey
werestrictanti-Communists, like theGaltierigovernment in Argentina.During
the Falkland Islands crisis, Kirkpatrickindicated that there really was no
distinctionin her mindbetweena rightistauthoritarianally and a democratic
alliancepartner.This was theimplicitmessageof herdinnerappearanceat the
ArgentineEmbassyon the nightof April 2, 1982, afterPresidentReagan had
been unsuccessful in tryingto persuadetheArgentinegovernment not to invade
the FalklandIslands on thatmorning.

Foreign-PolicyProgramming
Governmentstodaytalknot so muchto each otheras at each otherthroughthe
media. "Theaterwarfare"and "diplomaticchannels"have taken on new mean-
ingsin an age when communicationssatelliteshave replacedtraditionalmeans
of communication.The use of the media to preemptgovernmentsmay often
delay normaldiplomaticrelationsor createforeign-policy criseslargelyunanti-
cipated by governments.Governmentmisuse of the media has also led to a
numberof dangersthatmisleaddomesticpublicopinionand foreignpublicsand
governments.
Two currenttrendsin public diplomacyare debasingtraditionaldiplomatic
communication.First,the recentpropaganda wars betweenthe United States
and foreigngovernments have createda situationin whichseriousforeign-poli-
cy issueshave been packaged as a formof entertainment both fordomesticand
foreignconsumption.Especially in the West, the electronicmedia affordthe
listeneror vieweran escape fromreality.Whenforeign-policy issuesare manu-
facturedand eventsare "created"to projectan imageof a policy,foreign-policy
crises become distortedand less real. This may lead to misperceptionsof a
foreign-policyquestionand of theactionsthattheUnitedStatesgovernmentis
taking. Second, a government'suse of electronicpropaganda may convey to
domesticand foreignpublics a false image that the governmenthas a policy

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150 1 PATRICIA A. KARL

when,in fact,it does not. In short,publicdiplomacyhas recentlybeen a substi-

tuteforpolicy. Deliberateattemptsat informalmedia penetrationmay lead the
domesticpublic and foreignpublics and governmentsto conclusionsthat are
false,embarrassing,and difficult to correct.
The use of public diplomacymay be directedat a particularaudienceto pro-
motesupportforor antagonismagainsta particularpolicyor actionofa foreign
government.However, in thisage of media diplomacy,a governmentor media
personalitiescannotdetermineto whomtheforeign-policy programming willbe
communicatedor how it will be perceivedor used by foreigngovernmentsor
foreignmedia. The result of public diplomacy resemblesthat of air war-
fare- the targetand nontargetpopulationsbecome subjectto thesame battery
of fire.
Recently,it seems that governmentshave been most adept at utilizingthe
media to promotespecificpoliciesaimedat limitedaudiences.The netresulthas
been, as MarshallMcLuhan had predicted,an "electronic of informa-
battlefield
tion and images"3thathindersthepublics'comprehensionof theirown or for-
eigngovernments' definitionsof an issue. Such battlesalso make it more diffi-
cultforthemediaor governments to correcttheirown falseimagesor thosethat
have been createdthroughthe domesticor foreignpress.
During the hostage crisisin Iran, the captorsof the UnitedStates Embassy
evidentlydiscovered,among otherdocuments,a classifiedCIA reporttitled
"Israel: ForeignIntelligenceand SecurityServices,"a forty-seven-page docu-
mentissued in March 1979. Why the documentwas at the embassyis stillun-
known. The study indicatesthat not only have the Israelis spied on United
Statescitizensbut thattheyhave also "blackmailed,bugged,wiretappedand of-
feredbribesto U.S. governmentemployees."4The studyalso containedan ap-
praisal of Israeliintelligence
agenciesand theirtop personnel.The Iraniangov-
ernmentdecidedto publishthisdocumentas a paperbackbook in English,and
it was on sale in Tehran when WilliamWorthy,an Americanjournalist,pur-
chased several copies of it. Some of the books were checked on a Lufthansa
flightto New York, and otherswere apparentlyin a separatepiece of luggage
that accompanied the journalistupon his arrival in the United States. The
checkedbooks were confiscatedby customsagentsin New York who called in
FBI agents. However, the otherbooks were undetectedand later formedthe
basis fora seriesof articleson thesubjectin the WashingtonPost in February
1982.
As a resultof these stories,Israeli and United States governmentagencies
were forcedto deal withtheissue duringa period of alreadystrainedrelations
betweenthe two nations. Clearly,the technologicalcapabilitiesof the Iranian
government(or any government)to mass produce a classifiedUnited States
documentindicatethatin thefuturea government may be able to declassifythe
information of anothergovernment.This capabilitymay createforeign-policy
3Marshall McLuhan, UnderstandingMedia: The Extensionsof Man (New York: The New
AmericanLibrary,1964), p. 294.
4 WashingtonPost, February1, 1982.

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 MEDIA DIPLOMACY 151

issuesbetweengovernments and/orthirdpartiesthatwould notbe issuesifthe

information had not been published.The publicationof the CIA studysurely
damaged therelationshipbetweenUnitedStatesand Israeliintelligence agencies
and embarrassedboth countries.
Recently,as well, themedia wereused by two Americanallies in criseswhen
public diplomacywas an expedientsubstitutefora lack of policy. In October
1981, when a Soviet submarinewas strandedin Swedish waters,the Swedish
government was successfulin embarrassing theSovietUnion afterthecrisishad
been resolvedby providingSwedishmilitaryand international mediaescortsfor
theSovietsubmarineas itleftSwedishwaters.Similarly,at thetimeof theinva-
sion of the FalklandIslands, when the Britishnaval capabilityin the area was
minimal,theBritishBroadcastCorporation(BBC) increaseditsdailybroadcasts
to the Falkland Islands by an hour daily. With reportsthat the Falkland
IslandersmightacceptArgentinesovereignty of theislands,theBritishgovern-
mentevidentlyfeltit necessaryto bolsterdomesticand FalklandIsland public
opinionsto reinforcetheirpreviouspublic position.
One of themostcontroversialattemptsto manipulatethemediafora foreign-
policy "coup" was the UnitedStates government's televisionshow "LetPoland
Be Poland." This mediaextravaganzanecessitatedspecialcongressionalapprov-
al and featuredHollywood stars as well as world politicalleaders (including
PresidentReagan) who were adept at wearingtwo hats (politicaland media).
Centralcastingfortheshow was engineeredby CharlesZ. Wick, directorof the
InternationalCommunicationAgency(ICA).
While PresidentReagan has been promotingforeign-policy informationpro-
ductionfordomesticand foreignconsumption,he has been waginga different
media battlein the UnitedStates,wherethe goal has been containmentof the
press. One mightlook, forexample,at thepresident'sproposednew executive
orderon nationalsecurity,whichwill restrict thepublic'sand themedia'saccess
to governmentinformation now protectedby theFreedomof Information Act.
Similarly,a directiveto cabinetofficialsnot to grantmajor with
interviews the
media may further to
reducepublic access government information.Actually,
on foreign-policy mattersthe media in the UnitedStateshave givenPresident
Reagan relativelysofttreatment.
PresidentReagan's press conferenceon March 31, 1982, dealt with a major
foreign-policy issue, nucleararms-controlnegotiationswiththe Soviet Union.
At thispress conferencethe presidenttriedto accomplisha numberof goals.
First,Reagan hoped to quell criticismthathis previoustelevisedpress confer-
ences had been duringhourswhen theaudiencewas limitedand thepresident's
statements could be editedbeforetheairingof thenightlynewscasts.Second,he
tried to counter foreignand domesticcriticswho opposed his programof a
nuclear buildup and arms expendituresprior to a negotiatedfreezewith the
SovietUnion on forcelevels.Third,he soughtto counterSoviet proposalsfora
"constructivedialogue"on thearmsissueand proposalsfora freezeon thetypes
and levels of nuclear weapons now. Fourth, President Reagan hoped to
demonstratethathe could get his factscorrecton foreign-policy matters.

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152 I PATRICIA A. KARL

Laterin thespring,thepresidentcontinuedto wage a media campaignto per-

suade domesticand foreignpublics to supporthis nuclear-armsproposals. On
May 7, 1982, Reagan senta letterto Leonid Brezhnevin whichhe suggesteda
June1982 meetingwiththeSovietleaderand outlinedtheUnitedStatesposition
on what Reagan called StrategicArms ReductionTalks (START). On May 9,
1982, the presidentpublicized theseproposals in a speech in Eureka, Illinois.
Whilecallingfor"substantial" cutson bothsides,includinga one-third reduction
in land- and submarine-based missiles,thepresidentrejected-afreezeat current
levelsand neglectedto informhisaudiencethathisone-third reductionproposal
was one-sidedbecause the Soviets maintaina numericalsuperiorityin vulner-
able land-basedmissiles,whiletheUnitedStatesretainsthelead in SLBMS and
strategicbombers. Nor did the presidentaddress domesticand foreigncritics
who have suggestedthattheadministration's plans to build and deploytheMX
missileand theB-1bombermightindicatethattheUnitedStateswas attempting
to createa first-strike
capabilityagainstthe Soviet Union.
As thepresidentheld out the"carrot"of arms-reduction negotiationswiththe
Soviets, William P. Clark, national security affairsadviser,outlinedthe"stick":
Reagan's new Global for
Strategy dealing with theSoviet Union. This strategyis
an attemptto convincea reluctantWesternEuropeto restricttechnologytrans-
fersand creditsto theSoviet Union. While theanti-Sovietrhetoricof theearly
period of the Reagan administration has cooled down, the ambiguousmedia
signals about the Soviet Union remain. Adding to thepublicconfusionand ap-
prehension about United States policy toward theUSSR in May 1982 was Presi-
dentReagan'seight-pageNational SecurityDecision directivethatevidentlyset
theprioritiesfortheuse of militarypower in theeventof a global war withthe
Soviet Union. While this document publicly placed the responsibilityfor
strategicplanningand prioritiesin the WhiteHouse and attemptedto resolve
the internaladministration bickeringon strategicissues, the public remained
confusedbecause governmentspokesmendeclinedto state what, in fact, the
government's geographicprioritieswere.
In an age of media diplomacy,statecraft may have become the hostage-if
not the victim- of stagecraft.Only the media have a first-strike capabilityon
both thenationaland international levels. As theUnitedStatesmoves froman
era of advocacy and adversaryjournalismto one of participatorydiplomacy,
thetraditionalmethodsand practitioners of themedia and diplomacyare being
undercutand entangled.Internationalpoliticsis a theaterin whichtraditional
diplomacyis increasinglyan ignoredunderstudy.
In an age of front-page foreignpolicy,"jet-journalism," and networknegotia-
tions,thecoalitionof technologyand foreignpolicy is one of necessity.Media
diplomacyis conditioningtheformulationand executionof foreignpolicy and
thepublic'sunderstanding ofinternational affairs.Yet themarriageofthemedia
and diplomacymay be an unholyalliance. In a democraticsociety,propaganda
fordomesticand foreignconsumptioncannotbe manufactured withoutrisking
credibilityand prestigewithboth audiences.

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