For the exclusive use of T. Nguyen, 2023.

W25637

BDP INTERNATIONAL: DELIVERING WHAT MATTERS IN GLOBAL

CHEMICAL TRANSPORTATION

Neha Mittal wrote this case solely to provide material for class discussion. The author does not intend to illustrate either effective or
ineffective handling of a managerial situation. The author may have disguised certain names and other identifying information to
protect confidentiality.

This publication may not be transmitted, photocopied, digitized, or otherwise reproduced in any form or by any means without the
permission of the copyright holder. Reproduction of this material is not covered under authorization by any reproduction rights
organization. To order copies or request permission to reproduce materials, contact Ivey Publishing, Ivey Business School, Western
University, London, Ontario, Canada, N6G 0N1; (t) 519.661.3208; (e) cases@ivey.ca; www.iveycases.com. Our goal is to publish
materials of the highest quality; submit any errata to publishcases@ivey.ca. i1v2e5y5pubs

Copyright © 2022, Ivey Business School Foundation Version: 2022-01-27

The first quarter of 2021 had just ended, and April 2021 was the start of a new and busy season for the maritime
shipping industry. The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic had increased demand in the global marketplace, which
strained carrier capacity and caused freight rates to surge. Amid the tough trade conditions, Michael Ford, the
vice-president of Government and Industry Affairs at BDP International Inc. (BDP), along with Angela Davis,
the director of Transportation at BDP, were working in their Philadelphia office on a key account that required
an export shipment of fifteen containers per month, for a year. These containers carried a chemical used for
coatings in the electronics industry and were labelled as dangerous goods.

The status of the dangerous goods required Ford and Davis to carefully balance available modal and carrier
choices, transit time, cost, and available capacities. The planning was not easy, and when they thought they
had chosen the optimal route and carrier and had processed all required documentation for their client,
ConCoat Chemicals, a fire erupted on one of the vessels during its voyage and destroyed a few of the
customer’s containers. This emergency required the BDP team to use their expertise and devise a way to
not only inform their customer ConCoat as well as the buyer of the products, but also address the incomplete
shipment order.

EVOLUTION OF BDP INTERNATIONAL

BDP was one of the world’s leading privately-held, non-asset-based freight logistics companies, based in
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Its origins traced to 1966, when Richard J. Bolte Sr. formed the R.J. Bolte
Company in Philadelphia. Through a series of mergers, the company became BDP International in 1972.1

A single father, Bolte Sr. started BDP with a typewriter and a $1,200 loan, and grew the company into a
global business. He was an early adopter of information technology for managing and organizing
international freight movements and other aspects of global shippers’ supply chains. In the following half-
century, he grew the business into a network of wholly owned operations, joint ventures, and affiliates in
1
BDP International, “Global Logistics Leader BDP International Celebrates 50th Anniversary,” August 19, 2016,
https://www.bdpinternational.com/news/global-logistics-leader-bdp-international-celebrates-50th-anniversary.

This document is authorized for use only by Thai Nguyen in 2023.

 For the exclusive use of T. Nguyen, 2023.

Page 2 W25637

nearly 140 countries, with over 270 offices across the world and more than 4,400 employees. The company
was later led by Richard J. Bolte Jr., who kept BDP as a family-owned business. Having worked for BDP
since age fifteen, Bolte Jr. knew he was interested in pursuing a career in logistics, so he studied business
and finance while at university. Upon graduating in 1979, Bolte Jr. returned home to work at BDP’s
Philadelphia office, where he was the company’s twenty-fifth employee. He helped BDP flourish into a
global leader in transportation (by 2021, it employed more than 4,500 employees), import/export,
warehousing and distribution, trade, security and environmental regulatory compliance, process
improvement, and global logistics modelling and management.2

After fifty years in service, BDP’s annual global net revenue was reported at over US$2 billion3 in 2017, with
200,000 monthly transactions.4 BDP’s value proposition was built on best-in-class processes, global presence,
client-driven systems, flawless tactical execution, and a nimble, small-company customer service culture.

BDP’S RANGE OF SERVICES

BDP provided a range of services, such as ocean, air, and ground transportation; export freight forwarding;
import customs clearance and regulatory compliance; and its web-based BDP Smart Suite® of shipping
transaction and tracking management and visibility applications. It had over 4,000 clients worldwide,
including chemical companies, industrial and manufacturing firms, life sciences and health care, and retail
and consumer. BDP was a leading fourth-party logistics (4PL) company; it assumed many of the same roles
supporting shipping operations as third-party logistics (3PL) providers but with much broader responsibility
and accountability to help clients reach strategic goals. BDP had built expertise in analytics and
optimization, regulatory compliance, trade compliance management, export and import facilitation, and
warehousing and distribution.

BDP took pride in calling itself “chemical experts.” Sixty-five per cent of its business served the chemical
industry and eight of the world’s top ten chemical companies called BDP a preferred provider. According to
the company, as of 2020 it handled 1.5 million twenty-foot equivalent units (TEUs)5 of chemicals and 55
million kilograms of air freight chemicals on an annual basis.6 BDP built its internal operating practices and
information systems to handle the unique logistics requirements of chemical-related shipments. It provided
training and information for clients and employees about hazardous materials safety and environmental and
security compliance regulations. The company had thrice received the Responsible Care® Partner of the Year
Award from the American Chemistry Council. The Responsible Care awards program was the chemical
industry’s health, safety, and environmental performance improvement initiative and was recognized as one
of the most successful initiatives advanced by the industry since being launched in 1988.7

2
Kelly Flynn, “Like Father, Like Son: Bolte Working to Preserve Three Legacies,” The Sun Newspapers, July 23, 2018,
https://thesunpapers.com/2018/07/23/like-father-like-son-bolte-working-to-preserve-three-legacies.
3
All dollar amounts are in US dollars.
4
BDP International, BDP International, accessed July 7, 2021,
https://www.bdpinternational.com/uploads/attachments/cj9hepr4l02e49xqpemxt61ht-bdp-at-a-glance-english.pdf.
5
TEUs were a unit of measurement to determine cargo capacity for container ships and terminals, derived from the dimensions
of a 20-foot standardized shipping container.
6
BDP International, Chemical Logistics, 2020, https://www.bdpinternational.com/uploads/attachments/ck805m0clxdxlksqpvow9bxgs-
bdp-chemical-brochure-2020.pdf.
7
BDP International, Shipping Safely and Responsibly, accessed November 29, 2021, https://www.bdpinternational.com/who-
we-are/environmental-social-governance/responsible-care.

This document is authorized for use only by Thai Nguyen in 2023.

 For the exclusive use of T. Nguyen, 2023.

Page 3 W25637

CHEMICAL SHIPPING: THE HAZMAT INDUSTRY

Hazardous materials (hazmat) were substances that posed a risk to property, health, and safety of the public
when misused or involved in an accident. Hazmat products could be poisonous, explosive, corrosive,
flammable, or radioactive, and they varied in shape, size, and utility. Daily household objects such as
batteries, products ranging from paints to medical supplies, and acidic chemicals all fell under hazmat. They
required careful handling for the sake of public and environmental safety. Proper handling involved special
packaging, clear marking, placards, and accurate paperwork identifying all hazardous goods.

The chemical supply chain was a highly complex business and required skilled personnel for the
manufacturing, handling, and transportation of hazardous goods. Chemical logistics companies were
responsible for safely transporting and storing these potentially dangerous products, and they typically
offered global transportation services by sea and, when required urgently, air freight services for bulk
commodities and raw materials.

According to a report by Grand View Research Inc., the size of the global chemical tanker shipping market
was anticipated to reach $2.5 trillion by 2025.8 The triggers for expected growth in the global trade for
chemicals and derivatives were rising manufacturing activities and disparity in regional production (thus
necessitating shipment of materials for manufacturing).

The United Nations Committee of Experts on the Transport of Dangerous Goods classified dangerous goods
by nine categories.9 The level of risk and type of reaction associated with dangerous and hazardous
substances varied according to the class division and properties of the substance. The quantity, location,
and properties of other materials within the vicinity also played an important role in determining the level
of risk associated with a substance.

Shipping dangerous goods internationally by vessel was regulated through the International Maritime
Organization (IMO), a specialized agency of the United Nations. The IMO used the International Maritime
Dangerous Goods (IMDG) Code—a global, international reference adopted in 1965—to regulate shipping
dangerous goods by maritime vessel. These regulations were updated every two years, with each
amendment valid for three years. The IMDG Code, 40th Amendment, was released in 2020. It included
detailed recommendations for individual substances, materials, and articles; standard requirements for all
aspects of handling dangerous goods and marine pollutants in sea transport; and recommendations for good
operational practice, including advice on terminology, packing, labelling, storage, separation, and handling
emergency response action. The recommendations and advice applied to manufacturers, packers, shippers,
feeder services such as road and rail, port authorities, and mariners.10

SHIPPING REQUIREMENTS OF CONCOAT CHEMICALS

ConCoat Chemicals manufactured conformal coating material used in the electronics industry. It operated
in a highly competitive market and demanded high-quality service and resourceful solutions from its
logistics service provider so the company could focus on its core competencies. Knowing BDP’s
capabilities, ConCoat Chemicals reached out to Ford in April 2021 to request that BDP meet one of its
shipping requirements. Ford asked Davis to work on the assignment with him, and he assured ConCoat

8
Grand View Research, “Chemical Tanker Shipping Market Size Worth $2.50 Trillion by 2025,” November 2017,
https://www.grandviewresearch.com/press-release/global-chemical-tanker-shipping-market.
9
United Nations, Part 2: Classification, 2009, https://unece.org/DAM/trans/danger/publi/unrec/rev16/English/02E_Part2.pdf.
10
“The IMDG Code—IMO Dangerous Goods Regulations,” Label Master, accessed July 7, 2021,
https://www.labelmaster.com/imdg-code.

This document is authorized for use only by Thai Nguyen in 2023.

 For the exclusive use of T. Nguyen, 2023.

Page 4 W25637

Chemicals, a key account for BDP, that he would take the utmost care to plan for a safe and timely delivery
of its containers.

ConCoat Chemicals had two separate shipping requirements. For the first requirement, it needed to ship 10
TEUs each month for a year. Shipments were to originate in Baltimore, Maryland, destined for the port of
Shanghai, China. The consignee was A-One Wiring, who was a new client for ConCoat Chemicals. The
commodity was a chemical used in the electronic industry for coatings, which carried a dangerous goods
label. BDP was to select the routing and carrier to China.

The second requirement was to ship 5 TEUs per month for a year. Again, the shipments would originate in
Baltimore, Maryland, but these shipments were destined for Antwerp, Belgium. The commodity for these
shipments was also a chemical used in the electronic industry for coatings, which carried a dangerous goods
label, but the consignee was SineChem, who was an existing client for ConCoat Chemicals.

BDP was tasked to select the right routing and water carrier for the freight orders. Ford and Davis needed
the optimal shipping plan (route and carrier) to ensure a timely and economical delivery of ConCoat
Chemicals’ containers.

CHOOSING THE SHIPPING PLAN

Route Choice

BDP had two route choices for ConCoat Chemicals’ shipping order to Shanghai, China. The containers
could be shipped using an all water service (AWS) from Baltimore, Maryland, or they could be sent by a
mini land bridge (MLB), transported first by truck or train to the ports of Los Angeles or Long Beach,
California, and then by water to their final destination in China (see Exhibit 1).

With AWS, cargo ships sailed from their point of origin to their destination using only water routes.
Historically, AWS was considered a cost-effective and environmentally friendly way to ship cargo, but
with the need for quick deliveries in recent years, AWS was found to be slower than other intermodal freight
transport options. AWS routes for ConCoat Chemicals’ shipments to Shanghai could go across the Pacific
Ocean or they could travel the Atlantic Ocean by going through the Suez Canal (see Exhibit 2).

If BDP elected to use the MLB, the shipments would use an intermodal freight service, using truck or rail
to transport the goods in their shipping containers to a port, and then an ocean vessel to ship the goods in
their shipping containers to the destination port in their shipping containers to the destination port (see
Exhibit 3). For the last few decades, the North American land bridge had provided a straightforward and
effective solution for cargo bound to and from Asia. Even though AWS had its advantages, the North
American land bridge saved time, taking the least travel time between the two trade regions. For instance,
a container shipped AWS between New York and Singapore would take thirty days by way of the Panama
Canal but would take only nineteen days if the MLB was used with double-stacked rail transport.11

Another advantage to the MLB was that the average number of containers moved for each vessel that called
into port (average call size) in Los Angeles or Long Beach was much higher—about 8,000 to 12,000
containers per call—as compared to only 2,500 to 4,500 container moves per vessel call on the East Coast

11
Jean-Paul Rodrigue, “The North American Landbridge,” Geography of Transport Systems, 2020,
https://transportgeography.org/contents/applications/transcontinental-bridges/north-america-landbridge.

This document is authorized for use only by Thai Nguyen in 2023.

 For the exclusive use of T. Nguyen, 2023.

Page 5 W25637

ports.12 However, since the summer of 2020, West Coast ports had been burdened by issues with vessel
bunching (when vessels arrived within a short amount of time between each other, causing port congestion,
delays, and disruption in the supply chain) and delays in berthing (ships were anchored offshore waiting to
berth and unload), congested marine terminals, long truck lines at terminal gates, and shortages of chassis
on to which to load the containers for land transport because so many were in use with the trucks sitting
idle waiting to unload.13

The cargo surge that had exploded at the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach continued into the new year.
Cargo numbers at the port of Los Angeles were up by 3.6 per cent in January 2021 compared to the same
month a year earlier, before the COVID-19 pandemic. Meanwhile, the port of Long Beach had a nearly 22
per cent jump, making the month its busiest January on record.14 Reports from both ports indicated that the
surge would likely continue in the months ahead. Both Los Angeles and Long Beach had a backlog of ships
either in port or at anchor waiting to pull into port.15

On the East Coast ports, things were not very different. In November 2020, East Coast ports were
challenged in handling a year-over-year 30 per cent increase in imports from Asia.16 Mounting container
dwell times at marine terminals and chassis dwell times at warehouses were reported across the US East
Coast. The gains were prompting concerns among drayage17 providers that a chassis shortage could also be
imminent if cargo owners could not unload containers fast enough.

These trade conditions and the demand–supply imbalance left Ford and Davis with a decision-making
problem: should they ship ConCoat Chemicals’ containers over water directly from the East Coast to
Shanghai or should they use the MLB? Thankfully, the route decision for shipping containers to Belgium
was relatively straightforward, although Ford and Davis needed to pay attention to delivery times and costs.

Carrier Selection

After choosing the route (AWS or MLB), BDP needed to determine which water carriers to use for ConCoat
Chemicals’ container shipments.

BDP reviewed various factors, such as the carriers’ financial stability, geographical coverage, reliability
(on-time pickup and delivery), technical capabilities, ability to share information, and experience with
freight damage, and then narrowed the choice to four carriers (see Exhibit 4). But Ford and Davis still
needed to consider the cost, transit time between origin and destination, and equipment availability of these
four carriers. They knew that if the goods did not arrive within the tolerance limit of plus or minus five–
seven days, the shipper would be assessed an additional penalty for late delivery, which was 1 per cent of
the invoice value at five–seven days late and 3 per cent of the invoice value beyond the seven-day timeline.

12
Bill Mongelluzzo, “Increasing Vessel Sizes a Red Flag for US Ports,” Journal of Commerce, December 21, 2020,
https://www.joc.com/maritime-news/container-lines/increasing-vessel-sizes-red-flag-us-ports_20201221.html.
13
Veronica Nigh and Daniel Munch, “Congestion at West Coast Seaports Hinders Trade Boom,” Market Intel (blog for
American Farm Bureau Federation), June 9, 2021, https://www.fb.org/market-intel/congestion-at-west-coast-seaports-
hinders-trade-boom.
14
Donna Littlejohn, “Cargo Surge Shows No Sign of Letting up in Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach,” Daily Breeze,
February 17, 2021, https://www.dailybreeze.com/2021/02/17/cargo-surge-shows-no-sign-of-letting-up-in-ports-of-los-
angeles-and-long-beach.
15
“Backlog of Cargo Ships at Southern California Ports Reaches an All-Time High,” The Guardian, October 20, 2021,
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2021/oct/20/supply-chain-crisis-california-ports-cargo-ships.
16
Bill Mongelluzzo, “US East Coast Ports Avoid Gridlock Despite Rising Volumes,” Journal of Commerce, December 16, 2020,
https://www.joc.com/port-news/us-ports/us-east-coast-ports-avoid-gridlock-despite-rising-volumes_20201216.html.
17
Drayage is short-distance transportation of goods.

This document is authorized for use only by Thai Nguyen in 2023.

 For the exclusive use of T. Nguyen, 2023.

Page 6 W25637

Ford and Davis needed to rank their shortlist of four carriers and decide whether one carrier could handle
all the shipments or if BDP would need to book separate carriers for each of ConCoat Chemicals’ two
requirements.

RISKS WITH GLOBAL TRANSPORTATION

When goods were sent overseas, they became vulnerable to sea threats. Irrespective of how well the
transportation was planned, uncertainties existed in global transportation, and the risks increased when
containers were labelled “dangerous goods.” Traditionally, common cargo shipping risks included natural
disasters, mechanical failures, and human error. However, with the rapid growth of international trade and
the introduction of new technologies, newer risks had been introduced.

The common risks in maritime transportation were extensive. Weather was a significant concern, with
weather catastrophes such as hurricanes, large waves, and high winds having hurt the cargo shipping
industry’s supply chain model for ages. It was not uncommon for natural weather events to cause cargo
ships to lose some, or all, of the cargo on board.

Cyber risks were another concern. Most computer systems aboard cargo ships were self-contained, but they
were still vulnerable to insider threats, such as human error or disgruntled employees with conflicting
motives. With some computer systems needing to be connected outside the ship, hacks from the outside
were also possible, which could steer the ship off course.

Piracy, typically thought of as an historical problem, was, in fact, still very much a modern problem. Several
cargo shipping thefts were closely linked with piracy at sea. Human error was also, and always, a risk.
Shipments on international cargo ships were found mislabelled, improperly handled, or carrying other
safety risks. This could result in onboard fires and containers falling off the ship.18

Container Ship Fires

Ship fire was one of the most widely reported risks when carrying dangerous goods onboard a vessel. Since
2010, there had been substantial increases in the number of fires in containers carried onboard container
ships and roll-on/roll-off (ro-ro) ships, which carried wheeled cargo driven on and off the ship. Major fires
on container vessels were becoming one of the largest hazards for the global shipping industry. According
to an article published in April 2021, there was, on average, a fire onboard a container ship every week,
with a major container fire occurring on average every sixty days.19

Despite IMO requirements that shippers must declare container contents, there were a growing number of
instances where cargo was not being properly declared. The increasing volume of containers on a ship also
increased the likelihood of transporting dangerous goods that might ignite or explode on board. A survey
reported by Campbell Johnston Clark in 2020 found that about 10 per cent of laden containers, or 5.4 million
containers, contained declared dangerous goods. Of those, about 1.3 million were poorly packed or

18
Costas Paris, “Spate of Fires Has Shipping Industry Looking at How Dangerous Goods Are Handled,” The Wall Street
Journal, November 24, 2019, https://www.wsj.com/articles/spate-of-fires-has-shipping-industry-looking-at-how-dangerous-
goods-are-handled-11574600400.
19
Andrew Gray, “Top Maritime Trends of 2020: Tackling the Scourge of Containership Fires,” Marine Link, December 9, 2020,
https://www.marinelink.com/news/top-maritime-trends-tackling-scourge-483775.

This document is authorized for use only by Thai Nguyen in 2023.

 For the exclusive use of T. Nguyen, 2023.

Page 7 W25637

incorrectly identified, indicating the scale of potential risk.20 Dangerous goods cargo that was incorrectly
secured could shift during the voyage, generating heat from friction and leading to a fire. Additionally, due
to the distance out to sea, volumes, stack heights, and lack of access and reach, once a fire ignited the
potential for damage and the challenges with firefighting were significant.

Both those in the supply chain and those working with the on-board firefighting systems were attempting
to deal with this problem. To contain financial risk, shippers purchased an insurance policy before shipping
the cargo to cover for uncertainty and risks involved in shipping overseas. Ship owners declared a “general
average” if their ships and cargo suffered damage or delay. This contractual obligation required cargo
owners to shoulder part of the loss, based on the value of their cargo and its percentage share of the total
value of the ship plus all cargo on board, called the “value of voyage.”

BDP’S CRISIS

In April 2021, Ford and Davis booked their client’s order for the shipping requirements destined for both
China and Belgium. They had meticulously considered all the requirements and shipping options, and
everything seemed right. The vessel for Belgium was on time and arrived as scheduled at the port of loading
in Baltimore. All five containers were loaded on board and the vessel sailed to the next port of call in
Savannah, Georgia. Shipping documentations were processed on behalf of ConCoat Chemicals, and the
ocean bill of lading21 and commercial invoice were sent to the final client in Belgium so that it could begin
to clear the goods through Belgian customs.

Everything was going according to plan until the ship caught fire while crossing the Atlantic Ocean,
damaging some of the containers on board. Ford and Davis were immediately informed of the incident, but
the name of the consignee, exact number of containers affected by the fire, and the contents of the containers
remained unknown at that time. After twenty-four hours, some details emerged and BDP’s team was
informed that three of its client’s containers had been engulfed by the fire and were damaged beyond use.
The entire value of the containers was lost.

THE DECISION

Based on the DI Chemical’s requirements, how should Ford and Davis (1) implement an optimal shipping
plan (route and carrier) to ensure a timely and economical delivery of the containers, and how should Ford
and Davis handle the incident with the onboard fire, address the partial delivery of the client’s order, and
make whole on the order after the fire had damaged a few of the client’s containers beyond use?

Now Ford and Davis needed to handle the incident with the onboard fire. How would they address the
partial delivery of the client’s order and make whole on the order after the fire had damaged a few of the
client’s containers beyond use?

20
Andrew Gray, “Tackling the Scourge of Container Ship Fires,” Campbell Johnston Clark, October 22, 2020,
https://www.cjclaw.com/site/news/tackling-the-scourge-of-container-ship-fires.
21
Bill of Lading refers to a detailed list of a shipment of goods in the form of a receipt given by the carrier to the person
consigning the goods.

This document is authorized for use only by Thai Nguyen in 2023.

 For the exclusive use of T. Nguyen, 2023.

Page 8 W25637

EXHIBIT 1: LAND BRIDGE, MINI LAND BRIDGE, AND MICRO BRIDGE IN NORTH AMERICA

A land bridge is a connection between two maritime segments over a land mass. It is a multi-modal transport
option in which containerized cargo is first sent to a port on one coast, unloaded to ground transport (truck
or train) to be moved to a port on another coast, and then again loaded on to another water vessel to reach
its final destination. The North American land bridge represents the most efficient land bridge in the world,
which considerably reduces distances between the East and the West Coasts of the United States. The
North American land bridge is mainly the outcome of growing transpacific trade, with goods from China
being sent to consumers in Europe and the United States.

Three are three major types of land bridges:

A land bridge is a link between a foreign origin and a destination. The continental mass is used as a link
(bridge) between two maritime systems. The transport mode in most cases is rail because it offers a faster
long-distance service. For example, using the North American land bridge to ship a container from China
or Japan to Europe bypasses the detour imposed by the Panama Canal.

A mini land bridge involves a foreign origin but a destination that is at the end of the landmass of the port
of entry. For example, containers from the Far East may arrive on the West Coast of North America and be
shipped by rail to a final destination on the East Coast, such as New York.

A micro land bridge involves a foreign origin and a landmass that is used as a link from the port of entry
to an inland destination. For example, containers from the Far East may arrive on the West Coast of North
America and then be shipped by rail or truck to an inland destination such as Chicago or Houston.

Source: Created by the case author based on Jean-Paul Rodrigue, “Types of Landbridges,” Geography of Transport Systems,
2020, https://transportgeography.org/contents/applications/transcontinental-bridges/types-landbridges.

This document is authorized for use only by Thai Nguyen in 2023.

 For the exclusive use of T. Nguyen, 2023.

Page 9 W25637

EXHIBIT 2: OCEAN ROUTE DISTANCES BETWEEN SHANGHAI AND NEW YORK

Note: km = kilometres.
Source: Created by the case author.

EXHIBIT 3: ALL WATER SERVICE AND MINI LAND BRIDGE ROUTE CHOICES TO CHINA

Cost per TEU

Origin Destination Via Distance Transit Time
(China bound)
Panama Canal
Baltimore Shanghai 19,500 km 24 days US$1,646
(AWS)
Cape Horn
Baltimore Shanghai 30,500 km 37 days US$1,690
(AWS)
Suez Canal
Baltimore Shanghai 26,000 km 28 days US$1,559
(AWS)
Mini Land Bridge 19 days via port
Baltimore Shanghai 14,500 km US$2,725
(MLB) of LA/LB

Note: AWS = all water service; LA = Los Angeles; LB = Long Beach; MLB = mini land bridge; TEU = twenty-foot equivalent
units; km = kilometres.
Source: Company documents.

This document is authorized for use only by Thai Nguyen in 2023.

 For the exclusive use of T. Nguyen, 2023.

Page 10 W25637

EXHIBIT 4: CARRIER CHOICES

Carrier A Carrier B

• Allocation: 12 × TEUs per sailing • Allocation: 8 × TEUs per sailing

• Rate to Antwerp: US$1,137.00 (per TEU) • Rate to Antwerp: US$1,483.00 (per TEU)
• Rate to Shanghai: US$1,690.00 (per TEU) • Rate to Shanghai: US$1,646.00 (per TEU)
• Transit time to Antwerp: 18 days • Transit time to Antwerp: 15 days
• Transit time to Shanghai: 38 days • Transit to Shanghai: 24 days

Carrier C Carrier D

• Allocation: 14 × TEUs per sailing • Allocation: 10 × TEUs per sailing

• Rate to Antwerp: US$1,516.00 (per TEU) • Rate to Antwerp: US$1,200.00 (per TEU)
• Rate to Shanghai: US$1,559.00 (per TEU) • Rate to Shanghai: US$2,725.00 (per TEU)
• Transit time to Antwerp: 11 days • Transit time to Antwerp: 20 days
• Transit time to Shanghai: 28 days • Transit time to Shanghai: 19 days MLB

Note: MLB = mini land bridge; TEU = twenty-foot equivalent units.

Source: Company documents.

This document is authorized for use only by Thai Nguyen in 2023.