TC-08

THE 4TH EDITION OF BAL GANGADHAR TILAK NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION
ORGANISED BY LOKMANYA TILAK LAW COLLEGE, PUNE

BEFORE THE HON’BLE

SUPREME COURT OF INDUS LAND
ORIGINAL AND CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
(UNDER ARTICLES 32 AND 136 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDUS LAND)
W.P. (CRIMINAL) NO. ………/2024

[ASHFAQ & ORS.] [PETITIONER]

versus

[STATE OF UDAYAN PRADESH] [RESPONDENT]

WITH
SLP (CRIMINAL) NO. ………/2024

[ASHFAQ & ORS.] [PETITIONER]

versus

[STATE OF UDAYAN PRADESH] [RESPONDENT]

MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

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 A. TABLE OF CONTENTS
B. INDEX OF AUTHORITIES……………………………....……………………………………3
C. LIST OF ABBREVIATION…………………………………………………………………….5
D. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION……………………….….……………………………….6
E. STATEMENT OF FACTS.……………………………………………………………..............7
F. ISSUES RAISED……………….………………………………………………………….……9
G. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS………………………………………………........................11
H. ARGUMENTS ADVANCED………………………………………………………………….12
ISSUE 1: WHETHER THE PRESENT SLP IS MAINTAINABLE OR NOT?......................13
ISSUE 2: WHETHER THE UDAYAN PRADESH PROHIBITION OF UNLAWFUL
RELIGIOUS CONVERSION ACT, 2021 IS CONSTITUTIONALLY VALID OR NOT?...15
ISSUE 3: WHETHER THE DENIAL OF BAIL TO ASHFAQ’S FAMILY AND ISSUANCE OF
A NON-BAILABLE WARRANT AGAINST ASHFAQ U/S. 498A OF IPC IS VALID OR
NOT?..…………………………………………………………………………29
I. PRAYER FOR RELIEF……………………………………………………………………….40

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 B. INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

I. CASES:
1. Durga Shankar v. Raghu Raj, AIR 1954 SC 520.
2. Narpar Singh v. Jaipur Development Authority, AIR 2002 SC 2036.
3. A.V.Papayya Sastry v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 2007 SC 1546.
4. Zahira Habibullah Sheikh v. State of Gujarat, AIR 2004 SC 3467.
5. N Suriyakala v. A Mohan Doss & Ors. (2007) 9 SCC 196.
6. Suresh Chandra v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 2005 SC 3120.
7. Punjab State Electricity Board v. Darbbara Singh, AIR 2006 SC 387.
8. Chief Administrator cum Jt. Secretary, Government of India v. D. C. Dass, AIR 1999 SC 186
9. Siemens Eng & Mfg. Co. v. Union of India, AIR 1976 SC 1785.
10. Clerks of Calcutta Tramways v. Calcutta Tramways Co. Ltd., AIR 1957 SC 78.
11. City Corner v. P.A. to the Collector, AIR 1976 SC 143.
12. Mohan Lal v. Management, Bharat Electronics Ltd., AIR 1981 SC 1253.
13. Pritam Singh v. The State, AIR 1950 169.
14. Sripur Paper Mills v. Commissioner of Wealth Tax, (1970) AIR 1520.
15. Divisional Manager A.P.S.R.T.C v. P. Lakshmoji Rao, AIR 2004 SC 1503.
16. K.M. Nanavati v. State of Bombay, AIR 1961 SC 112.
17. Shafin Jahan v. Ashokan K.M., (2018) 16 SCC 368.
18. Lata Singh vs State of Udayan Pradesh and Ors., (2006) 5 SCC 475.
19. Soni Gerry v. Gerry Douglas, (2018) 2 SCC 197.
20. Shakti Vahini v. Union of India and Ors, (2018) 7 SCC 192.
21. Kesavananda Bharati & Ors v. State of Kerala & Anr, (1973) 3 SCC 225.
22. KS Puttaswamy v Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1.
23. Rev Stanislaus v. Madhya Pradesh 1977 SCR (2) 611.
24. Banka Sheela Sneha v. State of Telangana, (2021) 9 SCC 415.
25. Salamat Ansari and Ors vs State of Udayan Pradesh and Ors., Cri. Misc. W.P No. 11367 of
2020.
26. Evangelical Fellowship of India & Anr. v. State of H.P., (2012) SCC Online HP 5554.
27. ¶ 215, Indian Young Lawyers Association v. The State of Kerala, (2019) 11 SCC.
28. Anuj Garg v. Hotel Association Of India & Ors (2008)3 SCC 1.
29. Bommai v. Union of India, (1994) 3 SCC 1.
30. Anuj Garg vs Hotel Association Of India & Ors., (2008) 3 SCC 1.
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31. Shreya Singhal (2015 5 SCC 1) and Shayara Bano., (2017) 9 SCC 1.
32. Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar, (2014) 8 SCC 273.
33. State of Punjab v. Dalbir Singh : (2012) 3 SCC 346, Paras 46, 52 & 85.
34. Surendran v. State of Kerala, (2022) SCC OnLine SC 621.
35. State of Karnataka By v. Ramakrishna s/o Late Narasimhaiah, CRL.A No. 167 of 2011
36. Rangan Das v. The State of West Bengal & Anr. (CRA 16 of 2019).
37. State of U.P. v. Poosu & Anr., (1976) 3 SCC 1.
38. Rana Pratap Ghosh & 4 Others v. Unknown, CRM 4480 of 2020.
39. Grayson Variety Store, Inc. v. Shaffer, 402 S.W.2d 424, 425 (Ky. 1966)
40. 83 Nev. 75, 79, 423 P.2d 398, 401 (1967).
41. Preeti Gupta & Anr. v. State of Jharkhand & Anr. (2010) 7 SCC 667.
42. Sushil Kumar Sharma v. Union of India and Ors., AIR 2005 SC 3100; see also Rajesh Sharma
and Ors. v. State of U.P. & Anr., AIR 2017 SC 3869; see also Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar
and Anr., (2014) 8 SCC 273.
43. Joginder Kumar v. State of U.P., (1994) 4 SCC 260.
44. Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. (2014) 2 SCC 1.
45. Gian Singh v. State of Punjab : (2012) 10 SCC 303, Para 61; See also: Rajesh Sharma and others
v. State of U.P. & Anr. AIR 2017 SC 3869 : 2017 (8) SCALE 313
46. Mukesh Bansal v. State of U.P. & Anr. CRIMINAL REVISION No. 1126 of 2022
47. Law Commission of India, Report No. 243:S.498A of Indian Penal Code 9 (2012).
48. K. Subba Rao v. The State of Telangana, (2018) 14 SCC 452.
49. Kahkashan Kausar @ Sonam & Ors. v. State of Bihar (2022) 6 SCC 599.
50. Inder Mohan Goswami & Anr. v. State of Uttaranchal & Ors. (2007) 12 SCC 1.
51. Satender Kumar Antil v. CBI & Anr., 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 577

II. BOOKS REFERRED:

1. Dr. Durga Das Basu, Commentary on The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (Lexisnexis
Butterworths Wadhwa Nagpur, 2015).
2. Dr. Durga Das Basu, Introduction to The Constitution Of India (Lexisnexis Butterworths
Wadhwa Nagpur, 2015).
3. Dr. J.N. Pandey, Constitutional Law of India (Central Law Agency, 2020).
4. Dr. K.N. Chandrasekharan Pillai; Abhinandan Malik, R.V. Kelkar’s Criminal Procedure
(Eastern Book Company Lucknow, 2014).
5. Prof. K.D. Gaur, Textbook on Indian Penal Code, (Lexisnexis) Universal, 2023.

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III. STATUTES:
1. The Constitution of India
2. The Indian Penal Code, 1860
3. The Uttar Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Religious Conversion Act, 2021
4. The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973

IV. ARTICLES:
1. ‘After ‘love jihad’ law, Uttar Pradesh to now withdraw 4 decade-old incentive scheme for
interfaith marriages’ dated 02.12.2020 published by Times Now.
2. ‘Age, caste, job, education: What data on couples in India shows’ dated 03.10.2018 published
by Hindustan Times.
3. The Muzaffarnagar Model” dated 05.09.2014 published by NDTV.

V. DYNAMIC LINKS:
1. Manupatra www.manupatra.com
2. SCC Online www.scconline.co.in
3. All India Reporter www.aironline.in

C. LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Additional District Magistrate ADM

Section §/S.
District Magistrate DM
Under u/
Schedule Sch.
Article Art.
Read With r/w
Rule R.
Order O.
Supreme Court SC
High Court HC
Sections Ss
World Health Organisation WHO
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Constitution of Indus Land Constitution
Indian Penal Code, 1860 IPC
Versus v.
First Information Report FIR

D. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
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 The Petitioners have approached before the Hon’ble Court under Article 32 and
Article 136 of the Constitution of Sindhu.

 The Hon’ble Court has jurisdiction over the present matter.

 The counsels for the Petitioners humbly submit to the jurisdiction of this Hon’ble

Court.

 The Petitioners have approached this Hon’ble Court in apprehension of the violation
of rights.

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 E. STATEMENT OF FACTS

I.
The Republic of Indus Land stands out as the most ethnically and religiously diverse country
globally, boasting a tapestry of cultures, beliefs, and traditions within its borders. However,
this diversity also brings along the looming threat of communal conflicts, a danger that
remains constant and unlikely to diminish anytime soon.
II.
In March 2019, the issue of Love Jihad garnered attention within the nation. Reports
surfaced, indicating a concerning trend of religious conversions. It was revealed that over the
past four years, an estimated 3,000 to 4,000 conversions had taken place in Indus Land,
sparking debates and discussions across the country.
III.
Various High Courts across Indus Land have weighed in on the matter of religious
conversion, emphasizing its significance and implications. In a notable judgment in 2014, the
High Court of Udayan Pradesh highlighted that conversions carried out with the sole
intention of securing certain rights could be deemed as fraudulent, underscoring the legal
complexities surrounding such matters.
IV.
The narrative takes a personal turn with the story of Meera, a Hindu woman, and Ashfaq, a
Muslim man, whose journey from acquaintances to lovers unfolds against the backdrop of
societal norms and familial expectations. Their relationship traverses through stages, from
initial meetings on a dating app to eventually embracing a live-in relationship before deciding
to formalize their union under the Special Marriage Act, 1956.
V.
However, their decision to marry across religious lines isn’t without its challenges. While
Ashfaq’s family extends acceptance, Meera encounters resistance from her own parents due
to the inter-religious nature of their union. Despite familial opposition, Meera decides to
convert to Islam as a gesture of love and respect towards Ashfaq’s family, culminating in
their marriage in January 2022.

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VI.
The marital bliss is short-lived as conflicts arise within the union, exacerbated by differences
in religious beliefs. Meera’s possession of idols from her previous faith becomes a point of
contention, leading to arguments and, eventually, physical altercations resulting in injuries.
VII.
Amidst the turmoil within their marriage, external factors further complicate matters. A surge
in Covid cases prompts a lockdown, restricting Meera’s access to her family for support.
Additionally, her brother’s accident adds to the family’s distress, amplifying concerns about
Meera’s well-being.
VIII.
As tensions escalate, Meera’s parents, alarmed by the circumstances surrounding her
marriage and conversion, intervene. Suspicions of coercion and wrongful restraint prompt
them to take legal action, filing a First Information Report (FIR) against Ashfaq’s family
under relevant sections of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and the Udayan Pradesh Prohibition
of Unlawful Religious Conversion Act, 2021.
IX.
The legal battle unfolds as Ashfaq’s family faces arrest, followed by a denial of bail and the
issuance of a non-bailable warrant against Ashfaq himself. In response, they challenge the
validity of the Udayan Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Religious Conversion Act, 2021,
through a Special Leave Petition and a writ petition before the Supreme Court, raising
fundamental questions of law and constitutional interpretation.
X.
The culmination of this tumultuous journey awaits a judicial resolution, with both petitions
scheduled for hearing before a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court on April 12, 2024.
As the legal proceedings unfold, the fate of Meera and Ashfaq’s relationship, as well as the
broader implications for religious freedom and personal choice, hang in the balance.

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 F. ISSUES RAISED

ISSUE 1: WHETHER THE PRESENT SLP IS MAINTAINABLE OR NOT?

ISSUE 2: WHETHER THE UDAYAN PRADESH PROHIBITION OF

UNLAWFUL RELIGIOUS CONVERSION ACT, 2021 IS CONSTITUTIONALLY

VALID OR NOT?

ISSUE 3: WHETHER THE DENIAL OF BAIL TO ASHFAQ’S FAMILY AND

ISSUANCE OF A NON-BAILABLE WARRANT AGAINST ASHFAQ UNDER

SECTION 498A OF IPC, 1860 IS VALID OR NOT?

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 G. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

ISSUE 1. WHETHER THE PRESENT SLP IS MAINTAINABLE OR NOT?

It is submitted that Art. 136 empowers the Supreme Court to grant in discretion Special leave
to Appeal from any judgement, decree, determination, sentence, or order in any cause or
matter passed or made by any court or tribunal. The instant petition under Art. 136 satisfies
all grounds required under Art.136. There is a clear violation of procedures of arrest. Hence,
the Petition is maintainable before this Hon’ble Court and the Hon’ble Court grant orders that
could remedy the injustice that is being caused to the Petitioner.

ISSUE 2. WHETHER THE UDAYAN PRADESH PROHIBITION OF UNLAWFUL RELIGIOUS

CONVERSION ACT, 2021 IS CONSTITUTIONALLY VALID OR NOT?

[2.1] The counsel submits that the provisions of the impugned Act violate Art. 21 of the
Constitution, as they empower the State to suppress personal liberty. The Act assumes all
conversions are coerced and subjects individuals to unnecessary state scrutiny, which is
detrimental to freedom.
[2.2] The Act imposes unjustifiable burdens on individuals to justify their personal choices,
infringing upon their freedom of choice.
[2.3] The Act violates the fundamental right to privacy by requiring individuals to seek
validation from authorities for personal choices such as religious conversion. Involvement of
the state in personal matters undermines privacy rights and individual autonomy.
[2.4] Furthermore, the Act infringes upon the freedom of conscience and the right to religious
conversion, particularly for marriage purposes, protected under Article 25 of the Constitution.
Restricting religious conversion violates fundamental rights and the principles of unity in
diversity.
[2.5] The impugned Act violates constitutional principles by discriminating against
individuals exercising their freedom of conscience and perpetuating gender stereotypes.
[2.6] It also encroaches upon legislative competence by indirectly amending central marriage
laws without proper constitutional procedures.
[2.7] The notion of "Love Jihad" is debunked as illusory and divisive, with the Act
exacerbating societal rifts and undermining Indus Land’s international reputation.

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[2.8] The Act impinges upon the administration of the criminal justice system in the country.
[2.9] Finally, the Act violates international human rights standards outlined in various
international instruments such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) rendering it constitutionally
invalid.

ISSUE 3: WHETHER THE DENIAL OF BAIL TO ASHFAQ’S FAMILY AND ISSUANCE OF A NON-
BAILABLE WARRANT AGAINST ASHFAQ U/S. 498A OF IPC IS VALID OR NOT?

It is submitted that the authorities failed to adhere to the guidelines established by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar. These guidelines emphasized that
arrests should not be made solely because the offense is non-bailable and cognizable.
However, it's noted that such offenses, like the one in question, have been misused as a
weapon rather than a shield, often resulting in the unjust arrest of husbands and their
relatives. Moreover, that there was a failure to comply with procedural requirements
mandated by statutory enactments, such as Section 41 and Section 41A of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973. Furthermore, the authorities failed to comply with standard
judicial protocols established by legal precedents in handling cases related to Section 498A.
Additionally, the issuance of a non-bailable warrant against the petitioner u/s. 498A of IPC is
invalid, and there are serious consequences of such warrants on personal liberty. Hence, the
denial of bail to Ashfaq’s family and issuance of a non-bailable warrant against Ashfaq u/s.
498A of IPC is invalid.

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 H. ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

ISSUE 1. WHETHER THE PRESENT SLP IS MAINTAINABLE OR NOT?

[1.1] SLP FILED UNDER ARTICLE 136 IS MAINTAINABLE

1. Art. 136 empowers the Supreme Court to grant in discretion Special leave to Appeal from
any judgement, decree, determination, sentence, or order in any cause or matter passed or
made by any court or tribunal. It is submitted that powers under Art. 136 can be exercised
against any kind of judgement or order which is causing injustice to any party, and to
serve the need, the power under Art. 136 is unfettered.1
2. It is submitted that Art. 136 is an over-riding power where under the Court may generally
step in to impart justice to remedy injustice 2 and that there has been serious miscarriage of
justice. The counsel for the Petitioner would humbly request this Hon’ble Court to correct
the same and hear this matter.
3. The power has been held to be plenary, limitless, 3 adjunctive and unassailable.4 The
Supreme Court with regard to scope of Art. 136 held that it is a residual power which
enables the Supreme Court to interfere with the judgement or order of any court or
tribunal in its discretion.5

[1.1.1] The instant petition satisfies all grounds required under Article 136
4. It is submitted that if special leave is granted and the same is restricted to a particular
question, the Court is not constrained in any manner to restrict itself to hearing only those
matters,6 insofar as an opportunity of being heard is giving to the opposite party also. 7
Hence, it is submitted that this Hon’ble Court can dwell into all matters, including
question of fact and decide this matter on merits grant justice.
5. The Supreme Court has exercised its Jurisdiction under Art. 136 under the following
circumstances-

1
Durga Shankar v. Raghu Raj, AIR 1954 SC 520.
2
Narpar Singh v. Jaipur Development Authority, AIR 2002 SC 2036.
3
A.V.Papayya Sastry v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 2007 SC 1546.
4
Zahira Habibullah Sheikh v. State of Gujarat, AIR 2004 SC 3467.
5
N Suriyakala v. A Mohan Doss & Ors. (2007) 9 SCC 196.
6
Suresh Chandra v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 2005 SC 3120.
7
Punjab State Electricity Board v. Darbbara Singh, AIR 2006 SC 387.

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 (i) When the Tribunal ostensibly fails to exercise its patent jurisdiction.8
(ii) When there is an apparent error on the face of the decision.9
(iii) The tribunal has erroneously applied well-accepted principles of jurisprudence.10
(iv) The tribunal acts against the principles of Natural Justice, 11 or has approached the
question in a manner likely to cause injustice.12
6. In the instant case, there is an overwhelming error on the part of the Ld. Magistrate. The
Ld. Magistrate has committed an apparent error on the face of the decision and has
approached the question in a manner likely to cause injustice leading to loss to the
Petitioner; thus, the counsel for the Petitioner would like to invoke the jurisdiction of this
Hon’ble Court and remedy the above injustice.
7. The Art. 136 uses the wording ‘in any cause or matter’. This gives widest power to this
court to deal with any cause or matter. 13 It is, plain that when the Supreme Court reaches
the conclusion that a person has been dealt with arbitrarily or that a court or tribunal has
not given a fair deal to a litigant, then no technical hurdles of any kind like the finality of
finding of facts, or otherwise can stand in the way of the exercise of this power.14
8. It is submitted that the case directly and substantially affects the rights of the parties as
the order is erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the petitioners.

[1.1.2] There is violation of procedures of arrest

9. An FIR was lodged against the petitioner's family at Rainbow Police Station under
Sections 498A/340 of the Indian Penal Code, along with provisions of the Udayan
Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Religious Conversion Act, 2021. Subsequently, the
petitioner's family members were mechanically arrested on May 20, 2022.
10. The arrest procedures followed by the police blatantly violate legal protocols. No
investigation was conducted u/ S. 41 of the CrPC before the arrest of the petitioner's
family. Additionally, S. 41A, which necessitates the issuance of a notice of appearance,
was not adhered to.

8
Chief Administrator cum Jt. Secretary, Government of India v. D. C. Dass, AIR 1999 SC 186.
9
Siemens Eng & Mfg. Co. v. Union of India, AIR 1976 SC 1785.
10
Clerks of Calcutta Tramways v. Calcutta Tramways Co. Ltd., AIR 1957 SC 78.
11
City Corner v. P.A. to the Collector, AIR 1976 SC 143.
12
Mohan Lal v. Management, Bharat Electronics Ltd., AIR 1981 SC 1253.
13
Pritam Singh v. The State, AIR 1950 169.
14
Sripur Paper Mills v. Commissioner of Wealth Tax, (1970) AIR 1520.

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11. Despite these procedural irregularities, the Learned Trial Court overlooked these factors
when rejecting bail for the petitioner's family and issuing a non-bailable warrant against
the petitioner.
12. There is a substantial question of law pertaining to the misinterpretation of guidelines
established in the cases of Arnesh Kumar regarding mechanical arrests and Lalita
Kumari regarding the necessity of preliminary investigation, alongside the failure to
adhere to the judgment of Inder Mohan Goswami that mandates the issuance of
summons followed by a bailable warrant, and only thereafter, in cases of non-compliance,
the issuance of a non-bailable warrant.

[1.1.3] Reliefs that could be granted by this Hon’ble Court

13. Under Art. 136, the Supreme Court can give whatever relief that might be necessary and
proper in the facts and circumstances.15 The Supreme Court may even invoke its power
under Art. 142 for this purpose.16 Hence, it is submitted that the Petition is maintainable
before this Hon’ble Court and the Hon’ble Court grant orders that could remedy the
injustice that is being caused to the Petitioner.

ISSUE 2. WHETHER THE UDAYAN PRADESH PROHIBITION OF UNLAWFUL RELIGIOUS

CONVERSION ACT, 2021 IS CONSTITUTIONALLY VALID OR NOT?

[2.1] The Impugned Provisions Violate Right To Personal Liberty And Autonomy
14. This counsel humbly submits that the provisions of the impugned Act violate Art. 21 of
the Constitution, wherein it empowers the State to suppress an individual’s personal
liberty. The impugned provisions herein lay down the procedure to be followed by people
who wish to convert from one religion to another, not restricting to only interfaith
marriages. Thus, the Act prima facie seemed to be premised on conspiracy theories and
assumes that all conversions are illegally forced upon individuals who may have attained
the age of majority.
15. This counsel further submits that this Hon’ble Court itself in Shafin Jahan v. Ashokan
K.M,17 had flagged “concerns on Love Jihad/Jehad” wherein adjudicating the matter in
fact, upheld the principles of pluralism and diversity in the society and perceives

15
Divisional Manager A.P.S.R.T.C v. P. Lakshmoji Rao, AIR 2004 SC 1503.
16
K.M. Nanavati v. State of Bombay, AIR 1961 SC 112.
17
Shafin Jahan v. Ashokan K.M., (2018) 16 SCC 368.

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 excessive state intervention to be damaging to an individual’s liberty and autonomy. It
was held,
¶ “86. The right to marry a person of one’s choice is integral to Article 21 of the
Constitution. The Constitution guarantees the right to life. This right cannot be
taken away except through a law which is substantively and procedurally fair,
just and reasonable. Intrinsic to the liberty which the Constitution guarantees as
a fundamental right is the ability of each individual to take decisions on matters
central to the pursuit of happiness. Matters of belief and faith, including whether
to believe are at the core of constitutional liberty. The Constitution exists for
believers as well as for agnostics. The Constitution protects the ability of each
individual to pursue a way of life or faith to which she or he seeks to adhere.
Matters of dress and of food, of ideas and ideologies, of love and partnership are
within the central aspects of identity. The law may regulate (subject to
constitutional compliance) the conditions of a valid marriage, as it may regulate
the situations in which a marital tie can be ended or annulled. These remedies are
available to parties to a marriage for it is they who decide best on whether they
should accept each other into a marital tie or continue in that relationship.
Society has no role to play in determining our choice of partners.”
16. That such encroaching and scrutinising powers of the State in an individual’s intimate
choice to convert on his/her own volition is a grave assault on an individual’s personal
liberty. That this Hon’ble Court in Shafin Jahan (Supra), emphasised on the ill effects of
State intervention in such matters as under:
¶ “23. . The strength of our Constitution lies in its acceptance of the plurality
and diversity of our culture. Intimacies of marriage, including the choices
which individuals make on whether or not to marry and on whom to marry, lie
outside the control of the state”
“Interference by the State in such matters has a seriously chilling effect on the
exercise of freedoms. Others are dissuaded to exercise their liberties for fear
of the reprisals which may result upon the free exercise of choice. The chilling
effect on others has a pernicious tendency to prevent them from asserting their
liberty. Public spectacles involving a harsh exercise of State power prevent
the exercise of freedom, by others in the same milieu. Nothing can be as
destructive of freedom and liberty. Fear silences freedom.”

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17. The counsel raises the concern that the Act makes “convincing for conversion” a criminal
act. In this regard, while abetment and conspiracy are recognized in law, ‘convincing’ is
not, and thus becomes pure fiction. If so, permitted under this law, it could mean that if
four Muslims happen to be discussing the merits of Islam at a teashop while a Hindu
customer is also present and taking part in the conversation, they could be trying to
“convince” him to convert to Islam.
18. Additionally, S. 12 tyrannically places the burden of proof regarding the lawfulness of the
conversion solely on the person who purportedly caused the conversion, without
considering the opinion of the individual who underwent the conversion – thereby
disregarding their perspective entirely. It appears that the government is more focused on
prosecuting and harassing the alleged “convertor.”
19. S. 4 of the Act provides who can register an FIR against an alleged accused in cases of
forced conversions. As per Section 4, any aggrieved person, his/her parents, brother,
sister, or any other person who is related to him/her by blood, marriage, or adoption may
lodge an FIR of such conversion which contravenes the provisions of Section 3 (that
stipulates what is prohibited). It is a known fact that inter faith couples have often faced
harassment, torture, social ostracism at the hands of the merciless society, family
members and in many instances’ death, popularly known as ‘Honour Killing.’ These
sections give arbitrary powers to people to bring in frivolous and false complaints
implicating innocent people into an offence that is a cognisable and non bailable offence
under section 7 of the Act. On one FIR registration, Police officials can arrest an alleged
accused without a warrant and may or may not be released on bail. Such provisions will
act as a legal cover and incentive for further honour crimes against men and women of
Udayan Pradesh.
20. That this Hon’ble Court had taken a strict view against Honour Killings in Lata Singh vs
State of Udayan Pradesh and Ors.,18 as under:
1. “This is a free and democratic country, and once a person becomes a major, he or
she can marry whosoever he/she likes. If the parents of the boy or girl do not approve
of such inter-caste or inter-religious marriage the maximum, they can do is that they
can cut off social relations with the son or the daughter, but they cannot give threats
or commit or instigate acts of violence and cannot harass the person who undergoes
such inter-caste or inter- religious marriage.

18
Lata Singh vs State of Udayan Pradesh and Ors., (2006) 5 SCC 475.

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 2. “We sometimes hear of `honour’ killings of such persons who undergo inter-caste or
inter-religious marriage of their own free will. There is nothing honourable in such
killings, and in fact they are nothing but barbaric and shameful acts of murder
committed by brutal, feudal minded persons who deserve harsh punishment”

[2.2] The Impugned Provisions Violate The Freedom Of Choice Of Adults

21. This counsel submits that the entire act is founded on unfounded conspiracy theories,
presuming that all conversions are coerced upon individuals, even those who have
reached the age of majority. In cases where conversions are not coerced, individuals are
subjected to a labyrinth of procedures both before and after conversion, requiring them to
convince the State of the informed and voluntary nature of their decision.
22. The counsel contends that this places an undue burden on individuals to justify their
personal choices for State approval, a practice that is constitutionally objectionable and
runs counter to a citizen’s right to freely exercise their freedom of choice.
23. Moreover, this Hon’ble Court itself in Soni Gerry v. Gerry Douglas,19 this Hon’ble Court
has upheld the rights of adult citizens who are capable of making their own choices as
under:
“It needs no special emphasis to state that attaining the age of majority in an
individual’s life has its own significance. She/he is entitled to make her/his choice.
The Courts cannot, as long as the choice remains, assume the role of parens patriae.
The daughter is entitled to enjoy her freedom as the law permits and the Court should
not assume the role of a super guardian being moved by any kind of sentiment of the
mother or the egotism of the father. We say so without any reservation.”
24. Furthermore, the inherent human right to absolute liberty and freedom of choice is
paramount. Yet, under this Act, individuals are compelled to undergo a burdensome
process and submit themselves to inquiries by District Magistrates and Police in order to
exercise their independence. In Shakti Vahini v. Union of India and Ors,20 this Hon’ble
Court had said:
“The choice of an individual is an inextricable part of dignity, for dignity cannot be
thought of where there is erosion of choice. True it is, the same is bound by the
principle of constitutional limitation but in the absence of such limitation, none, we
mean, no one shall be permitted to interfere in the fructification of the said choice. If

19
Soni Gerry v. Gerry Douglas, (2018) 2 SCC 197.
20
Shakti Vahini v. Union of India and Ors, (2018) 7 SCC 192.

18 | PAGE
 the right to express one’s own choice is obstructed, it would be extremely difficult to
think of dignity in its sanctified completeness. When two adults marry out of their
volition, they choose their path; they consummate their relationship; they feel that it
is their goal and they have the right to do so. And it can unequivocally be stated that
they have the right and any infringement of the said right is a constitutional violation.
The majority in the name of class or elevated honour of clan cannot call for their
presence or force their appearance as if they are the monarchs of some indescribable
era who have the power, authority and final say to impose any sentence and
determine the execution of the same in the way they desire possibly harbouring the
notion that they are a law unto themselves or they are the ancestors of Caesar or, for
that matter, Louis the XIV. The Constitution and the laws of this country do not
countenance such an act and, in fact, the whole activity is illegal and punishable as
offence under the criminal law.”
25. This counsel, under the pretext of the aforementioned argument, submits that the act
obstructs and undermines the autonomy of individuals who possess the unrestricted
freedom to determine the trajectory of their lives, including choosing a specific faith,
marrying someone from a particular faith, or embracing the moral and ethical tenets of a
faith for personal reasons, without necessitating intrusive State oversight.
26. That this Hon’ble Court in Lata Singh (supra) has upheld an (adult) individual’s choice
to marry whoever he/she wants even if it is inter-caste or inter-religious marriage and
further directs the police authorities to protect such inter-faith or inter-caste couples from
being harassed by anyone and to institute criminal proceedings against such person(s). It
appears that the impugned Act and Act are contravening the precedent set and the
directions issued by this Hon’ble Court by initiating criminal proceedings in cases of
inter-religious marriages and prohibiting conversion by way of marriage.
27. Moreover, individual’s freedom of choice encompasses the rights enshrined in the
Constitution, including the right to exercise those rights. The provisions of the challenged
Act encroach upon an individual’s rights to freedom of choice, life, and liberty, as well as
freedom of religion.
28. The counsel submits that the act entirely disregards an individual’s freedom of choice and
operates on the assumption of parens patriae, suggesting that all religious conversions are
somehow influenced or coerced, and it criminalizes conversions by reason of marriage.
This inference can be drawn from a plain reading of the Act, as it neither provides
exceptions for voluntary conversions nor imposes unreasonable restrictions on a person’s

19 | PAGE
 choice to convert, thereby involving the secular state in personal matters such as marriage
and religious affiliation.
29. This counsel submits that thjis Hon’ble Court in Kesavananda Bharati & Ors v. State of
Kerala & Anr,21 when delineating the fundamental structure of the Constitution, this
Hon’ble Court affirmed that the basic framework of the Constitution is constructed upon
the fundamental cornerstone of individual dignity and freedom. The Court emphasized
that the duty of the State transcends mere protection of individual interests; it extends to
actions aimed at promoting the general welfare wherever feasible.

[2.3] The Impugned Provisions Violate Right To Privacy

30. This counsel humbly submits that the citizens of Indus Land possess the fundamental
right to privacy. In the case beforehand the Act in question is unconstitutional as it seeks
to regulate the lives of the residents of Udayan Pradesh, depriving them of the ability to
make significant decisions autonomously. The Act permits unwarranted intrusion into the
lives of individuals whose autonomy is undermined by the State.
31. “This Hon’ble Court in KS Puttaswamy v Union of India,22 had laid down that privacy is
an important facet of human dignity and that choosing a life partner is a matter of privacy.
32. This counsel contends that requiring individuals under S. 8 of the Act to seek validation
from the District Magistrate for their conversion, whether for marriage or other purposes,
violates their fundamental right to privacy and undermines their autonomy.
33. Moreover, If the State seeks to scrutinize an individual’s personal choice of partner, it not
only breaches constitutional principles but also severely compromises their right to
privacy. Involving the police to ascertain the true intention and purpose of the conversion
forces individuals to disclose personal information, further contravening the right to
privacy in both principle and practice.
34. That in essence, this Hon’ble Court had observed in K.S Puttaswamy(Supra) that the right
to be left alone is also fundamental to the right to privacy and to have to inform the State
about family matters, violates the exercise of liberty.
35. That the right to privacy is a natural inalienable right available to every citizen of the
country and the disrespect of such rights renders human existence worthless and
powerless. Involving the State in matters of following a path based on the tenets of a
particular faith or religion that appeals to your conscience is an unreasonable interruption

21
Kesavananda Bharati & Ors v. State of Kerala & Anr, (1973) 3 SCC 225.
22
KS Puttaswamy v Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1.

20 | PAGE
 by the State. Privacy is an important condition precedent to the enjoyment of life. This
Hon’ble Court held that:
“In the Indian context, a fundamental right to privacy would cover at least the
following three aspects:
521. Privacy that involves the person i.e. when there is some invasion by the State of
a person’s rights relatable to his physical body, such as the right to move freely;
Informational privacy which does not deal with a person’s body but deals with a
person’s mind, and therefore recognises that an individual may have control over the
dissemination of material that is personal to him. Unauthorised use of such
information may, therefore lead to infringement of this right; and the privacy of
choice, which protects an individual’s autonomy over fundamental personal
choices.”
36. Moreover, the disclosure of personal information to the State infringes upon an
individual’s capacity to manage their life free from mental pressures and to exercise
autonomy in choosing their faith. The preservation of privacy, whether mental or
physical, is indispensable for safeguarding fundamental freedoms. It is an established
stance that any encroachment upon an individual’s sanctified personal space, be it
physical or mental, constitutes a violation of protection against arbitrary state action. This
highlights the importance of upholding the integrity of personal autonomy and the
freedom of thought, belief, and self-determination.23

[2.4] The Impugned Provisions Violate Right To Conscience

37. This counsel humbly submits that Art. 25 of the Constitution guarantees individuals the
freedom of conscience and the right to freely profess, practice, and propagate religion.
Conscience, defined as one’s moral sense of right and wrong, can align with a particular
faith or be non-religious.
38. This Counsel contends that an individual retains the right to freely convert to another
religion as he/she may be willing whether the reason is getting influenced on his/her own
by reading scriptures or growing up in the community or out of love for another person
and a desire to convert to the religion of the spouse cannot be curbed or curtailed by the
government.

23
¶298, K.S Puttaswamy (supra)

21 | PAGE
39. This counsel, herein wants to bring in light that despite the validation of anti-conversion
laws by a Five-Member Bench in Rev Stanislaus vs Madhya Pradesh,24 the ruling did not
explicitly prohibit conversion for the sake of marriage. However, the impugned
provisions herein forbid religious conversion through marriage, rendering the Stainislaus
judgment inapplicable to interfaith marriages. Thus the decision in Rev Stainislaus
(Supra) does not affect interfaith couples intending to marry and convert by their own
choice.
40. Moreover in the context of fundamental rights, this has been subsequently interpreted to
mean that there has to be a necessary and proximate connection between the (disruption
to) public order and the restriction imposed on a right. 25 To frame a personal matter of
bodily and mental autonomy as that of public order, would make the right to liberty and
dignity redundant. That if there are communal elements that oppose conversion from one
faith to the other, the responsibility and duty of the State is to impose restrictions on those
opposing voices rather than attempting to determine the ‘correct intentions’ and validity
of someone’s belief. The states of Udayan Pradesh derive power from this impugned Act
and Act to impose restrictions on religious conversion that may appeal to some
individual’s conscience, is a blatant violation of the said fundamental right.
41. That in Salamat Ansari and Ors vs State of Udayan Pradesh and Ors.,26 the Division
Bench of the Allahabad High Court held that its previous rulings stating that religious
conversion per se for contracting a marriage was prohibited and said marriage has no
sanctity in law are incorrect and did not lay down “good law.” The judgment passed in
Salamat Ansari has overturned the previous rulings of the same court of 2014 and 2020
where interfaith couples were not allowed to get protection from the Police as their
marriage was held illegal. The important portions from the judgment are hereunder:
“We fail to understand that if the law permits two persons even of the same sex to live
together peacefully then neither any individual nor a family nor even State can have
objection to relationship of two major individuals who out of their own free will are
living together,”
To disregard the choice of a person who is of the age of majority would not only be
antithetic to the freedom of choice of a grown up individual but would also be a
threat to the concept of unity in diversity. An individual on attaining majority is

24
Rev Stanislaus v. Madhya Pradesh 1977 SCR (2) 611.
25
Banka Sheela Sneha v. State of Telangana, (2021) 9 SCC 415.
26
Salamat Ansari and Ors vs State of Udayan Pradesh and Ors., Cri. Misc. W.P No. 11367 of 2020.

22 | PAGE
 statutorily conferred a right to choose a partner, which if denied would not only
affect his/her human right but also his/her right to life and personal liberty,
guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.”
42. This counsel submits that the right under Art. 19(1)(a) is violated. With religious speech,
such as proselytization, there is an additional violation of Art. 25 of the Constitution, for
the individual’s right to propagate gets affected. As the eminent jurist HM Seervai
pointed out : “To propagate religion is not to impart knowledge and to spread it more
widely, but to produce intellectual and moral conviction leading to action, namely, the
adoption of that religion. Successful propagation of religion would result in conversion.”

[2.5] The Impugned Provisions Violate Right Against Discrimination

43. This counsel humbly submits that Art. 14 mandates that every citizen is equal before the
law and is subject to the same principles of justice. Furthermore, Arts. 15 and 16 obligate
the State to treat all citizens without discrimination. However, with the Act in effect, only
residents of Udayan Pradesh will be subjected to such scrutiny and State intervention if
and when they opt to convert from one faith to another.
44. The counsel submits that this constitutes a discriminatory and arbitrary practice against
every mature individual seeking to exercise their freedom of conscience, which would be
undermined by the enforcement of such laws.
45. Moreover, Illegal conversion under the Act incurs a penalty of 1-5 years of imprisonment
under Section 5. However, if the victim of illegal conversion is considered, a harsher
punishment of up to 10 years of imprisonment would be invoked. Nevertheless, the
provision treats all women, including those who are economically disadvantaged,
marginalized, or privileged, as susceptible to illegal conversions.
46. That S. 12 of the Act states that the burden of proof as to whether a religious conversion
was affected lies on the person who has caused the conversion and, where such
conversion has been facilitated by any person, on such other person. In criminal cases, the
Burden of Proof is on the prosecution to prove the guilt whereas the accused is treated
innocent until proven guilty. It is only under this Act; all alleged accused will have to
prove their innocence which is bleak as it is a non bailable offence and under a
circumstance where they are pitched against hostile communities and family members
who masquerade in the glory of protection of women. The complaints could be
prosecuted at the mere ipse dixit of family members and any other third party without any
evidence. This law will lead to a disproportionate consequence by terrorizing inter-faith

23 | PAGE
 couples and acting as a deterrent as under section 4, apart from an aggrieved person,
his/her parents, brother, sister, or any other person who is related to him/her by blood,
marriage, or adoption may lodge an FIR against illegal conversions.
47. Moreover, the Hon’ble High Court of Himachal Pradesh in Evangelical Fellowship of
India & Anr. v. State of H.P.,27 has stated that the concept of not giving a person not
having to give a notice when converting back to his original religion is ultra vires of Art.
14 and that the State has no right to demand declaration from a person about his religious
decisions, which is a matter of his privacy which is a part of his dignity that ultimately is
encompassed within Art. 21. Additionally held that the right to change belief cannot be
taken away under the garb of maintaining ‘public order’.
48. Additionally, That the Act will further the harmful cause of stereotyping women and
leave them with no agency of their body and mind. A stereotypical attitude of a particular
sex shall not hold legitimate claims under the Constitution of India.
49. This counsel reiterates that this Hon’ble Court in Indian Young Lawyers Association v.
The State of Kerala,28 highlighted the need of equality between sexes, the importance of
human liberty in matters of faith, belief, expression and worship. In Anuj Garg v. Hotel
Association Of India & Ors,29 this Hon’ble Court highlighted the unconstitutionality of
laws perpetuating gender stereotypes and victimizing women instead of empowering
them.
50. Moreover, the impugned provisions herein makes the government assume the role of
protecting religious identities of the people and demonstrates intolerance towards the
religious choices of the people. This, in itself is an attack on the secular fabric that holds
Indus Land democracy together.
51. This counsel brings in light that the Constitutional scheme of secularism is not a negative
concept of religious tolerance. It is a positive concept which envisages that the State
should have equal respect for all religions and refrain from discriminating between
religions. This was recognized in the case of Bommai v. Union of India,30 in which it was
observed that
“.. while the citizens of this country are free to profess, practice and
propagate such religion, faith or belief as they choose, so far as the
state is concerned i.e., from the point of view of the State, the religion,
27
Evangelical Fellowship of India & Anr. v. State of H.P., (2012) SCC Online HP 5554.
28
¶ 215, Indian Young Lawyers Association v. The State of Kerala, (2019) 11 SCC.
29
Anuj Garg v. Hotel Association Of India & Ors (2008)3 SCC 1.
30
Bommai v. Union of India, (1994) 3 SCC 1.

24 | PAGE
 faith or belief of a person is immaterial. To it, all are equal and all
entitled to be treated equally.”
52. To underline the significance of secularism as a part of the basic structure the Court in
Bommai (1994) (supra) also stated that “Any step inconsistent with constitutional policy
is, in plain word, unconstitutional”.
53. This counsel contends that the law in question demonstrates overt partisan intervention by
states in regulating the right to religious conversion. Furthermore, it establishes a wide-
ranging and punitive framework that has the potential to hinder propagation efforts and
scrutinize genuine conversions. Such actions contradict the principle of secularism and
violate the fundamental structure of the Constitution.31
54. Moreover, The data from the National Family Health Survey 2015-16 indicates that only
2.6% of marriages in India are inter-religious marriages. Despite this small percentage,
this particular state in the country is attempting to further reduce this already minimal
number. Instead of attempting to suppress the occurrence of inter-religious marriages, as
society progresses, it is imperative to promote diversity and unity. Encouraging a society
that embraces the myriad cultures present in India should be the priority.32

[2.6] State Does Not Have Legislative Competence to Enact Such an Act
55. This counsel humbly submits that this Hon’ble Court in Supriyo @ Supriya Chakraborty
& Anr. v. Union of India, has established a position wherein it is left it to the Union and
state legislatures to reform or enact family laws to realise marriage equality, affirming
that state legislatures possess the jurisdiction to undertake such reforms.
56. The counsel further submits that the provisions allowing state legislatures to reform
family laws demonstrates the significant role they can play in achieving marriage
equality. State legislatures have the authority to either amend central marriage laws or
enact separate legislation to address specific policy priorities.
57. Moreover, This authority is evident from examples such as Tamil Nadu’s amendment to
the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, which introduced the concept of ‘self-respect’ marriages,
allowing individuals to solemnize their marriage without Brahminical rituals. Similarly,
Kerala abolished the concept of Hindu joint family property through the Kerala Joint
Family (Abolition) Act, 1976, ensuring equal rights to ancestral property for women.
31
‘After ‘love jihad’ law, Uttar Pradesh to now withdraw 4 decade-old incentive scheme for interfaith
marriages’ dated 02.12.2020 published by Times Now.
32
‘Age, caste, job, education: What data on couples in India shows’ dated 03.10.2018 published by Hindustan
Times.

25 | PAGE
58. Additionally, States like Tamil Nadu and Karnataka have also granted unmarried women
equal coparcenary rights through state amendments to the Hindu Succession Act. These
examples underscore the pivotal role of state legislatures in promoting an anti-caste vision
and upholding gender justice through family law reforms.
59. This counsel contends that the Entry 5 of the Concurrent List of the Seventh Schedule to
the Constitution empowers both state legislatures and Parliament to enact laws related to
marriage. This provision grants states the authority to make amendments to central
marriage laws with the assent of the President. However, the proviso of Section 6 of the
Act indirectly amends the Special Marriage Act (SMA) without seeking presidential
assent, instead obtaining only the Governor’s assent. This raises concerns about the
legislative process and adherence to constitutional procedures.

[2.7] Illusion Of “Love Jihad” And Its Socio-Political Ramifications

60. The counsel herein brings to light that the concept of Love Jihad is an illusory construct
based on rhetoric to promote divisiveness in society, generate permanent suspicious
attitudes towards Islam and the Muslim community, and create enmity between
communities and breach harmony. ‘Love Jihad’ is not a notion that has developed
overnight, and it has been the constant effort of the sectarian government to place extra-
constitutional trust in the hands of the Police. The idea developed from setting up, within
the echelons of the state police, certain cells to ‘investigate cases of inter-community and
inter-caste marriages.
61. Furthermore, these contested provisions are poised to deepen societal rifts, fostering bias
and discrimination against marginalized groups who will bear the brunt of the
consequences. Moreover, they are likely to impede the country’s socio-economic
progress. In addition to contravening the Basic Structure Doctrine and essential rights like
the Right to Equality, Right to Non-discrimination, and Right to Equal Treatment by the
State, the legislation significantly undermines Indus Land’s reputation as the largest
democracy globally and its position in the international community and global order.
62. The counsel further strengthens the same that this “Love Jihad” catalyzed the escalation
of extensive communal riots in 2013, which devastated the region of Muzaffarnagar,
Uttar Pradesh, resulting in the loss of lives of 62 individuals and the displacement of
approximately 50,000 innocent individuals. The casualties included individuals from both
the Hindu and Muslim communities33.
33
The Muzaffarnagar Model” dated 05.09.2014 published by NDTV.

26 | PAGE
63. This counsel submits that the term “Jihad” in the Holy Quran signifies striving and
struggle in the path of God, yet deliberate narratives circulated through social media have
distorted its meaning to connote the mindless killing of non-Muslims. Consequently, the
term “Love Jihad” has been weaponized to further stigmatize the Muslim community,
with propaganda alleging that certain Muslim organizations are financially supporting
Muslim youth to entice non-Muslim girls into marriage, purportedly to increase the
Muslim population.

[2.8] The Impugned Provisions Violate The Principles Of Criminal Justice System
64. This counsel submits that the impugned provisions exhibit characteristics that extend
beyond the bounds of public order and impinge upon the administration of the criminal
justice system in the country.
65. Additionally, the concerned provisions also encroach upon Entry 1, List III, which
encompasses “Criminal law, including all matters included in the Indian Penal Code at
the commencement of the Constitution but excluding offences against laws in respect of
any of the matters specified in List I or List II and excluding the use of naval, military, or
air forces or any other armed forces of the Union in aid of the civil power.” This domain
is already occupied by the Indian Penal Code (IPC), which serves as the primary
framework for criminal law in the country.
66. Moreover, the current legislation equates conversion and attempts to convert on the same
footing, prescribing identical penalties for both under S. 3 r/w S. 5, where any attempt is
punishable by a term of one to five years.
67. This counsel submits that IPC establishes a comprehensive scheme for punishing
“attempts,” aligning the severity of the punishment with the gravity of the offense. Thus,
uniform punishment for both offenses and attempts is envisioned solely in extraordinary
cases involving offenses such as sedition, counterfeiting, dacoity, etc. (For example, refer
to Sections 121, 124, 124 A, 125, 131, 213, 239, 240, 241, 250, 251, 385, 387, 389, 391).
68. This counsel herein iterates that apart from these, specific offences explicitly provide for
separate penalties for attempts (For example, refer to Sections 307, 308, 309, 393, 398).
In such instances, the punishment for attempts is not commensurate with the punishment
for the actual commission of the crime but is proportionately lesser.

[2.9] The Impugned Provisions Violate International Law

27 | PAGE
69. This Counsel submits that Art. 16 of the UDHR protects the right to marry without
limitations based on race, nationality, or religion, emphasizing equality within marriage
and the family’s fundamental role in society. In case before hand the impugned provisions
in the Act intrudes into personal decisions like marriage choices, assuming all
conversions are forced for marriage purposes and must be annulled.
70. Additionally, Art.18 of guarantees freedom of religion or belief, including the right to
change one’s religion or belief and practice it publicly or privately. This Act violates
international clauses aimed at upholding individuals’ rights to choose and practice their
faith according to their conscience.
71. Furthermore, Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
emphasizes the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, including the
freedom to adopt a religion or belief and to manifest it through worship, observance, and
teaching. These impugned provisions not only perpetuate social inequalities but also
jeopardize India’s cultural institution of marriage.
72. This counsel submits that in a report presented to the United Nations General Assembly’s
72nd Session identified anti-conversion laws as intrusive expressions of religious
intolerance, frequently leading to discrimination and violence against individuals based
on their religion or belief. Such laws have been criticized for their discriminatory
enforcement and their tendency to exacerbate religious intolerance rather than fostering
harmony. The report called anti-conversion laws to be “invasive manifestations of
intolerance based on religion”.
73. This counsel further submits that the Constitutional courts play a pivotal role in the
evolution of rights,34 and with time, tests and interpretations in these courts have
expanded individual and collective rights, responding to real-life situations. Initially,
challenges u/ Art. 14 relied on the reasonable classification test, but recent cases 35
introduced the ‘manifest arbitrariness’ test. This allows a law to be struck down even if
classifications are valid but the legislation is manifestly arbitrary.
74. In light of the foregoing, The Udayan Pradesh Prohibition Of Unlawful Religious
Conversion Act, 2021 is constitutionally invalid.
ISSUE 3: WHETHER THE DENIAL OF BAIL TO ASHFAQ’S FAMILY AND ISSUANCE OF A NON-
BAILABLE WARRANT AGAINST ASHFAQ U/S. 498A OF IPC IS VALID OR NOT?

34
Anuj Garg vs Hotel Association Of India & Ors., (2008) 3 SCC 1.
35
Shreya Singhal (2015 5 SCC 1) and Shayara Bano., (2017) 9 SCC 1.

28 | PAGE
[3.1] AUTHORITIES FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE GUIDELINES
ESTABLISHED BY THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT.

75. This counsel humbly submits that this Hon’ble Court in Arnesh Kumar v. State of
Bihar,36 stated that,
“We believe that no arrest should be made only because the offense is non-bailable and
cognizable and therefore, lawful for the police officers to do so”.
Additionally, it has been observed that the aforementioned offense, which is cognizable and
non-bailable, has acquired a dubious distinction as a tool frequently used as a weapon rather
than a shield by aggrieved wives. The easiest method of harassment often involves initiating
arrests of the husband and his relatives under this provision.
76. The Hon’ble court opined that “Power to arrest greatly contributes to its arrogance so
also the failure of the Magistracy to check it. Not only this, the power of arrest is one of
the lucrative sources of police corruption. The attitude to arrest first and then proceed
with the rest is despicable. It has become a handy tool to the police officers who lack
sensitivity or act with oblique motive.”
77. This counsel submits that , specific procedures were outlined in the form of guidelines
known as the “Arnesh Kumar Guidelines.” It is evident that any failure to comply with
or adhere to these guidelines would render subsequent arrests and proceedings illegal.
This is particularly significant in light of Art. 21 of the Constitution, which unequivocally
states that deprivation of life and liberty shall only occur through “due process of law, 37
given that a just and fair procedure is an integral component of the fundamental right to
life, it is imperative to interpret penal provisions in a manner that ensures their application
is not unjust, unfair, or unreasonable.
78. This counsel humbly submits that there has been a failure to comply with the “Arnesh
Kumar Guidelines” along with other relevant guidelines, necessitating the establishment
of precedents. The concerned guidelines are hereinbelow reproduced :-
Ҧ11. Our endeavour in this judgment is to ensure that police officers do not arrest the
accused unnecessarily and Magistrate do not authorise detention casually and
mechanically. In order to ensure what we have observed above, we give the following
directions:

36
Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar, (2014) 8 SCC 273.
37
State of Punjab v. Dalbir Singh : (2012) 3 SCC 346, Paras 46, 52 & 85.

29 | PAGE
 ¶11.1. All the State Governments to instruct its police officers not to automatically
arrest when a case under Section 498-A IPC is registered but to satisfy themselves
about the necessity for arrest under the parameters laid down above flowing from
Section 41 CrPC;
¶11.2. All police officers be provided with a check list containing specified sub-clauses
under Section 41(1)(b)(ii);
¶11.3. The police officer shall forward the check list duly filled and furnish the reasons
and materials which necessitated the arrest, while forwarding/producing the accused
before the Magistrate for further detention;
¶11.4. The Magistrate while authorising detention of the accused shall peruse the
report furnished by the police officer in terms aforesaid and only after recording its
satisfaction, the Magistrate will authorise detention;
¶11.5. The decision not to arrest an accused, be forwarded to the Magistrate within two
weeks from the date of the institution of the case with a copy to the Magistrate which
may be extended by the Superintendent of Police of the district for the reasons to be
recorded in writing;
¶11.6. Notice of appearance in terms of Section 41-A CrPC be served on the accused
within two weeks from the date of institution of the case, which may be extended by
the Superintendent of Police of the district for the reasons to be recorded in writing;
¶11.7. Failure to comply with the directions aforesaid shall apart from rendering the
police officers concerned liable for departmental action, they shall also be liable to
be punished for contempt of court to be instituted before the High Court having
territorial jurisdiction.
¶11.8. Authorising detention without recording reasons as aforesaid by the Judicial
Magistrate concerned shall be liable for departmental action by the appropriate High
Court.”
[3.1.1] The factual context indicating the failure of authorities to comply with the guidelines
79. This counsel further submits that the allegations against Ashfaq and his family concerning
the purported injury marks on Meera are entirely speculative and malicious in nature.
Meera has neither acknowledged the source of these alleged injury marks nor presented
them to any credible witness or authority.
80. Furthermore, the marriage between the two individuals took place on January 10th, 2022,
under the Special Marriage Act (SMA), highlighting the parties’ clear intention to unite

30 | PAGE
 despite their religious differences. Additionally, the parents of Ashfaq warmly and
amicably welcomed her.
81. Additionally, the complainant did not disclose the alleged injuries to any individual apart
from her parents, who were not present during the alleged incident communicated via
WhatsApp. It is pertinent to note that the parents, being closely affiliated with the
complainant, may be regarded as interested witnesses at best.
82. This counsel further submits that in the case of Pappu Singh & Ors. v. State of Jharkhand,
the Hon’ble High Court of Jharkhand held that delay in lodging the FIR and seeking
medical treatment constitutes a just ground for raising doubts about the allegations. In the
present case, the point of concern is that no medical treatment was ever sought.
83. This counsel submits that there is a clear question regarding the veracity of the witnesses,
which does not justify the preliminary test for arrest. This Hon’ble Court in Surendran v.
State of Kerala,38 reiterated the well-settled principle of law that,
“the evidence tendered by the related or interested witness cannot be discarded on that
ground alone. However, as a rule of prudence, the Court may scrutinize the evidence
of such related or interested witness more carefully.”
84. It was held that the concept of “cruelty” as contemplated in Section 498A of the IPC
differs from ordinary day-to-day discord between spouses. The Court further elucidated
that vague and sweeping allegations cannot serve as a basis for concluding that an offense
under Section 498A of the IPC has been committed. This principle was also upheld in the
case of State of Karnataka v. Ramakrishna s/o Late Narasimhaiah 39 by the High Court
of Karnataka, which, despite convicting the accused under Section 323, held that the
ingredients under Section 498A could not be met even though the wife was assaulted.
85. This counsel further submits that the injuries inflicted on the petitioner’s wife do not fall
within the purview of Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). In support of this
contention, reference is made to the decision of the Hon’ble High Court of Calcutta in the
case of Rangan Das v. The State of West Bengal & Anr.,40 wherein it was held that the
concept of “cruelty” as contemplated in Section 498A of the IPC differs from ordinary
day-to-day discord between spouses.
86. The Court further elucidated that vague and sweeping allegations cannot serve as a basis
for concluding that an offense under Section 498A of the IPC has been committed. This

38
Surendran v. State of Kerala, (2022) SCC OnLine SC 621.
39
State of Karnataka By v. Ramakrishna s/o Late Narasimhaiah, CRL.A No. 167 of 2011
40
Rangan Das v. The State of West Bengal & Anr. (CRA 16 of 2019).

31 | PAGE
 principle was also upheld in the case of State of Karnataka v. Ramakrishna s/o Late
Narasimhaiah (supra) by the Hon’ble High Court of Karnataka, which, despite
convicting the accused under S. 323, wherein it is held that the ingredients under S. 498A
could not be met even though the wife was assaulted.

[3.2] AUTHORITIES FAILED TO COMPLY PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS AS

MANDATED BY STATUTORY ENACTMENTS

[3.2.1] Section 41 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was not complied with
87. This counsel thus submits the contention that all of the aforementioned grounds meet the
standard outlined in S. 41 of the CrPC. Therefore, the arrest of Ashfaq’s family and the
issuance of a non-bailable warrant against Ashfaq appear to be erroneous, conducted
mechanically, perverse, and without the application of mind. With the above, the test for
police to arrest as given in the “Arnesh Kumar Guidelines” must be read out, it states,
¶7.1. “From a plain reading of the aforesaid provision, it is evident that a person
accused of an offence punishable with imprisonment for a term which may be less
than seven years or which may extend to seven years with or without fine, cannot be
arrested by the police officer only on his satisfaction that such person had committed
the offence punishable as aforesaid. A police officer before arrest, in such cases has
to be further satisfied that such arrest is necessary to prevent such person from
committing any further offence; or for proper investigation of the case; or to prevent
the accused from causing the evidence of the offence to disappear; or tampering with
such evidence in any manner; or to prevent such person from making any
inducement, threat or promise to a witness so as to dissuade him from disclosing such
facts to the court or the police officer; or unless such accused person is arrested, his
presence in the court whenever required cannot be ensured. These are the
conclusions, which one may reach based on facts.”

[3.2.2] Section 41A of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was not complied with
88. This counsel submits that the fundamental principle of justice rests on the opportunity for
all parties involved to fully engage in the legal process. In the present case, it is evident
that the petitioners were deprived of this fundamental opportunity to comply.
89. Moreover, deprivation of this opportunity not only violates the principles of fairness and
due process but also undermines the integrity of the legal system and hampers the pursuit
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 of justice. It is imperative that all parties are given a fair chance to present their case and
engage in the legal process. Therefore, it is crucial that the petitioners be granted the
opportunity to comply and fully participate in the proceedings, ensuring that justice is
served.
90. The counsel contends that the arrest of the petitioners raises concerns regarding
procedural non-compliance, notably under S. 41A of the CrPC, which requires police
officers to issue a notice to a person before arresting them for offenses punishable for up
to seven years in prison.
91. Further, S. 41A of the CrPC also mandates arrest only in exceptional circumstances with
recorded reasonable grounds, having regard, inter-alia, to the nature and seriousness of
the offence involved; the past conduct of the accused; his age and the possibility of his
absconding.41
92. Moreover, the absence of such reasonable grounds for arrest is apparent. Given the
petitioners’ cooperation, custodial interrogation appears disproportionately extreme.
Therefore, there is a compelling need for a comprehensive review of the arrest process
and a reassessment of the necessity for custodial interrogation in this case. This Hon’ble
court in Rana Pratap Ghosh & 4 Others v. Unknown 42 upheld the above-mentioned
position.
93. Additionally, it is crucial to note that the learned Magistrate overlooked the possibility of
Meera choosing to reside with her parents, who had arrived to meet her amidst the
volatile environment exacerbated by the two-week lockdown starting from March 15,
2022, which had just elapsed when her parents arrived in May. This highlights the
improbability of the alleged offence recurring, particularly considering Meera’s residence
in Pumbai while Ashfaq and his family reside in Lumnow.
94. This counsel submits that the circumstances of the case at hand preclude any potential
tampering with evidence. The alleged evidence relies solely on statements made by
Meera and her parents. Moreover, given the significant geographical distance between the
two cities, it is improbable for any inducements, threats, or promises to have been
exchanged. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that Ashfaq was employed and working in
Lumnow at the time, further reducing the likelihood of any such interference.

41
State of U.P. v. Poosu & Anr., (1976) 3 SCC 1.
42
Rana Pratap Ghosh & 4 Others v. Unknown, CRM 4480 of 2020.

33 | PAGE
95. Finally, as per Satender Kumar Antil v. CBI & Anr.,43 this Hon’ble Court held in clear
terms that any non-compliance with S. 41 and S. 41 of CrPC would ensure immediate
bail.

[3.2.3] Offence under Section 340 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 is not made out.
96. The counsel further submits that allegations u/s. 340 are not tenable as the Petitioners
contend that there was a bonafide reason, that being, COVID-19 pandemic and the family
of Ashfaq being aged.
97. Moreover, In the Qur’an, men of the Islamic faith are designated as the
“QAWWAMUN,” signifying their role as protectors and maintainers of women. These
verses hold significant importance and thus, are hereinafter reproduced: -
a. “And they (women) have rights (over their husbands as regards living expenses)
similar (to those of their husbands) over them (as regards obedience and respect) to
what is reasonable, but men have a degree (of responsibility) over them. And Allah is
All-Mighty, All-Wise” [al-Baqarah 2:228]
b. “Men are the protectors and maintainers of women, because Allah has made one of
them to excel the other, and because they spend (to support them) from their
means…” [al-Nisa’ 4:34]
98. This counsel submits that the limitation on visiting her brother was purely physical;
Ashfaq and his family did not hinder her from using video or voice calling, common
means of communication. Moreover, she was not confined to a room with the key
withheld by anyone. It is relevant to note that all family members were coexisting
harmoniously.
99. Moreover, It is an established position that the mere verbal direction of another,
unaccompanied by force or threats of any character, does not constitute wrongful
restraint.44 That this Hon’ble Court in Grayson Variety Stores, Inc. v. Shaffer, where the
employee told plaintiffs that they had better come back to the store, the necessary
restraint was held not to have been established. Likewise in Lerner Shops of Nevada v.
Matin, the court refused to find the requisite restraint in the defendant’s verbal request
that plaintiffs accompany him back to the store.45

43
Satender Kumar Antil v. CBI & Anr., 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 577
44
Grayson Variety Store, Inc. v. Shaffer, 402 S.W.2d 424, 425 (Ky. 1966)
45
83 Nev. 75, 79, 423 P.2d 398, 401 (1967).

34 | PAGE
100. This counsel herein wants to refer to legal maxim “lex necessitas non cognoscit” i.e.
necessity knows no law, herein is squarely applicable. Particularly, the same has been
implemented as a general defence, specifically as S. 81. of IPC, it reads as:
“Act likely to cause harm, but done without criminal intent, and to prevent other
harm. Nothing is an offence merely by reason of its being done with the knowledge
that it is likely to cause harm, if it be done without any criminal intention to cause
harm, and in good faith for the purpose of preventing or avoiding other harm to
person or property.”
101. This counsel contends that, based on the aforementioned arguments, a genuine necessity
arose for Ashfaq to safeguard his wife, parents, and himself from the risks associated with
COVID-19, a global pandemic declared by the WHO.
102. Therefore, concern is particularly significant in this instance, given that Meera’s brother
was hospitalized due to injuries. It is essential to recognize that hospitals, as treatment
facilities for COVID-19, pose a heightened risk of transmission, especially with the influx
of new patients seeking treatment. Therefore, the decision to limit physical visits was
made in good faith and not out of any ulterior motive.

[3.3] AUTHORITIES FAILED TO COMPLY WITH STANDARD JUDICIAL PROTOCOLS

ESTABLISHED BY LEGAL PRECEDENTS IN HANDLING CASES RELATED TO SECTION 498A.
103. This counsel humbly submits that this Hon’ble court in Preeti Gupta & Anr. v. State of
Jharkhand & Anr.,46 has observed:-
¶32. “It is a matter of common experience that most of these complaints under section
498A IPC are filed in the heat of the moment over trivial issues without proper
deliberations. We come across a large number of such complaints which are not even
bona fide and are filed with oblique motive. At the same time, rapid increase in the
number of genuine cases of dowry harassment are also a matter of serious concern.”
¶34. “Unfortunately, at the time of filing of the complaint the implications and
consequences are not properly visualized by the complainant that such complaint can
lead to insurmountable harassment, agony and pain to the complainant, accused and
his close relations.”
¶35”To find out the truth is a herculean task in majority of these complaints. The
tendency of implicating husband and all his immediate relations is also not
uncommon.[…]The courts have to be extremely careful and cautious in dealing with
46
Preeti Gupta & Anr. v. State of Jharkhand & Anr. (2010) 7 SCC 667.

35 | PAGE
 these complaints and must take pragmatic realities into consideration while dealing
with matrimonial cases.”
104. This counsel highlights that there is a wide prevalence of frivolous complaints under S.
498A of the Indian Penal Code, often filed impulsively and without genuine merit. 47
Moreover, there is a difficulty in discerning the truth in many of these cases, often
characterized by broad accusations targeting not only the husband but also his immediate
family members. The case beforehand is the best replica of the same.
105. This Hon’ble Court in Joginder Kumar v. State of U.P.,48 while voicing its concern
regarding complaints of human rights pre and after arrest, observed thus:-
¶20”[…]A person is not liable to arrest merely on the suspicion of complicity in an
offence. There must be some reasonable justification in the opinion of the officer effecting
the arrest that such arrest is necessary and justified. Except in heinous offences, an arrest
must be avoided if a police officer issues notice to person to attend the Station House and
not to leave the Station without permission would do.”
¶9.”A realistic approach should be made in this direction. The law of arrest is one of
balancing individual rights, liberties and privileges, on the one hand, and individual
duties, obligations and responsibilities on the other; of weighing and balancing the
rights, liberties and privileges of the single individual and those of individuals
collectively; of simply deciding what is wanted and where to put the weight and the
emphasis; of deciding which comes first—the criminal or society, the law violator or the
law abider….”
106. This counsel herein submits that the preliminary enquiry may be held in
matrimonial/family disputes,49 which seems to be absent in the present case. The court has
incidental power to quash even a non-compoundable case of private nature, if continuing
the proceedings is found to be oppressive.50
107. That the Hon’ble HC of Allahabad in Mukesh Bansal v. State of U.P. & Anr.51 has
issued guidelines/directions to be strictly adhered while dealing with cases u/s. 498A of
IPC, the same are reproduced hereinunder for judicial notice:
¶35 “Thus, It is directed that :-

47
Sushil Kumar Sharma v. Union of India and Ors., AIR 2005 SC 3100; see also Rajesh Sharma and Ors. v.
State of U.P. & Anr., AIR 2017 SC 3869; see also Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar and Anr., (2014) 8 SCC 273.
48
Joginder Kumar v. State of U.P., (1994) 4 SCC 260.
49
Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. (2014) 2 SCC 1.
50
Gian Singh v. State of Punjab : (2012) 10 SCC 303, Para 61; See also: Rajesh Sharma and others v. State of
U.P. & Anr. AIR 2017 SC 3869 : 2017 (8) SCALE 313
51
Mukesh Bansal v. State of U.P. & Anr. CRIMINAL REVISION No. 1126 of 2022

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 (i) No arrest or police action to nab the named accused persons shall be
made after lodging of the FIR or complaints without concluding the
“Cooling-Period” which is two months from the lodging of the FIR or the
complaint. During this “Cooling-Period”, the matter would be
immediately referred to Family Welfare Committee(hereinafter referred to
as FWC) in the each district.
(ii) with, no injury [S] 307 and other sections of the IPC in which the
imprisonment is less than 10 years. Only those cases which would be
transmitted to FWC in which Section 498-A IPC along
(iii) After lodging of the complaint or the FIR, no action should take place
without concluding the “Cooling-Period” of two months. During this
“Cooling-Period”, the matter may be referred to Family Welfare
Committee in each districts.”
108. It is in this vein that the Petitioner was not afforded a cooling-period of two (2) months
in which the matter was first to be sent to the Family Welfare Committee where amicable
settlement and understanding would have been met.
109. This counsel herein wants to refer to the Statistics of the Law Commission of India
Report No. 243 of 2012 show that in the year 2011, 3,40,555 cases under S. 498A were
pending in various Courts and there were as many as 9,38,809 accused.
110. Moreover, the conviction rate in these cases, according to the National Crime Records
Bureau is 21.2%, which is a low average in comparison with the number of cases filed.
The Report also indicates that Complainant women do not usually evince an interest to
pursue such Complaints to their logical end, and instead chose to enter out of Court
settlements. There have been hundreds of circumstances of cases being filed under these
Sections and on investigation being found baseless and hollow. All these facts and the
array of statistics on the subject, evidence the misuse that S. 498A is capable of and is
being put to, which ought to be stopped at once.52
111. This counsel further submits that in K. Subba Rao v. The State of Telangana .,53 it was
held in ¶6 that,
“[…]The relatives of the husband should not be roped in on the basis of omnibus
allegations unless specific instances of their involvement in the crime are made out.”

52
Law Commission of India, Report No. 243:S.498A of Indian Penal Code 9 (2012).
53
K. Subba Rao v. The State of Telangana, (2018) 14 SCC 452.

37 | PAGE
112. Along with the above-mentioned case, the Hon’ble Court in ¶18 of Kahkashan Kausar
@ Sonam & Ors. v. State of Bihar,54 held that
“[…] this court by way of its judgments has warned the courts from proceeding against
the relatives and in-laws of the husband when no prima facie case is made out
against them.
113. This counsel humbly submits that applying the afore-mentioned principles to the present
case, it becomes apparent that the entire family of Ashfaq warmly welcomed Meera.
Furthermore, it is an established legal precedent that distant relatives of the husband
cannot be implicated in such matters.
114. Additionally, Meera has not disclosed to date the identity of any family member who
allegedly harmed or confined her. Given these circumstances, the allegations against the
family members fall into the category of general, unsubstantiated accusations and warrant
consideration for bail.

[3.3.1] Non-Bailable Warrant issued against Ashfaq Under S. 498A is invalid

115. This counsel further wants to bring in light the already established position by this
Hon’ble Court in the case of Inder Mohan Goswami & Anr. v. State of Uttaranchal &
Ors.,55 observed as under:-
“51. The issuance of non-bailable warrants involves interference with personal liberty.
Arrest and imprisonment means deprivation of the most precious right of an
individual. Therefore, the courts have to be extremely careful before issuing non-
bailable warrants.”
116. The Hon'ble Court further elaborated on the circumstances warranting the issuance of a
non-bailable warrant: -
53. Non-bailable warrant should be issued to bring a person to court when summons of
bailable warrants would be unlikely to have the desired result. This could be when:
* it is reasonable to believe that the person will not voluntarily appear in court; or
* the police authorities are unable to find the person to serve him with a summon; or
* it is considered that the person could harm someone if not placed into custody
immediately.
54. As far as possible, if the court is of the opinion that a summon will suffice in getting
the appearance of the accused in the court, the summon or the bailable warrants

54
Kahkashan Kausar @ Sonam & Ors. v. State of Bihar (2022) 6 SCC 599
55
Inder Mohan Goswami & Anr. v. State of Uttaranchal & Ors. (2007) 12 SCC 1.

38 | PAGE
 should be preferred. The warrants either bailable or non-bailable should never be
issued without proper scrutiny of facts and complete application of mind, due to the
extremely serious consequences and ramifications which ensue on issuance of
warrants. The court must very carefully examine whether the Criminal Complaint or
FIR has not been filed with an oblique motive.
55. In complaint cases, at the first instance, the court should direct serving of the
summons along with the copy of the complaint. If the accused seem to be avoiding the
summons, the court, in the second instance should issue bailable- warrant. In 3 the
third instance, when the court is fully satisfied that the accused is avoiding the courts
proceeding intentionally, the process of issuance of the non-bailable warrant should
be resorted to. Personal liberty is paramount, therefore, we caution courts at the first
and second instance to refrain from issuing non-bailable warrants.
56. The power being discretionary must be exercised judiciously with extreme care and
caution. The court should properly balance both personal liberty and societal interest
before issuing warrants. There cannot be any straight-jacket formula for issuance of
warrants but as a general rule, unless an accused is charged with the commission of
an offence of a heinous crime and it is feared that he is likely to tamper or destroy the
evidence or is likely to evade the process of law, issuance of non-bailable warrants
should be avoided.
57. The Court should try to maintain proper balance between individual liberty and the
interest of the public and the State while issuing non-bailable warrant.”
117. The counsel rests this submission by concluding that the above-mentioned established
stance has not given due consideration in the case beforehand and therefore the principle
that bail is the rule and jail is the exception has been well recognised.

I. PRAYER FOR RELIEF

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Wherefore, in the light of the issues raised, arguments advanced, reasons given and
authorities cited, it is most humbly prayed that this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to:

A. Issue a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ order or direction to declare the
impugned Act - Udayan Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion
Act, 2021, and ultra vires of the Constitution of Indus Land.
B. Grant bail to the Ashfaq’s family in connection with F.I.R. No. ……/2022 registered
against the petitioners.
C. Quash the non-bailable warrant against Ashfaq issued by the Ld. Trial Court.
AND/OR

Pass any other order/direction that the Hon’ble Court may be pleased to grant in the interest
of justice, equity and good conscience, all of which is respectfully submitted.

And for this act of kindness the Petitioner duty bound shall ever pray.

Place:. (S/d)
Date:
(Counsel for the Petitioner)

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