Kruti Shah - Moot Court No. 3 - Appellant

INDIAN YOUNG LAWYERS ASSOCIATION & ORS. VS. THE STATE OF KERALA & ORS.
ASSIGNMENT ON MOOT COURT PROBLEM NO. 3
FOR APPELLANT
(THROUGH THE UNIVERSITY OF MUMBAI)
SUBMITTED BY
MS. KRUTI SHAH
(ROLL NO. 2223345)
SUBJECT TEACHER:
PROF. DIPAK PAWAR
THROUGH
LALA LAJPATRAI COLLEGE OF LAW
MUMBAI
SEPTEMPBER 2022
MOOT COURT CASE NO. 3 | MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT Page |1

BEFORE THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 373 OF 2006
IN THE MATTER OF
INDIAN YOUNG LAWYERS ASSOCIATION & ORS……..………APPELLANT
Versus
THE STATE OF KERALA & ORS...........................DEFENDANT
UPON SUBMISSION TO THE HON’BLE SESSIONS JUDGE
UNDER ARTICLE 32 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
WRITTEN SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS........................................................................................4
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES..........................................................................................5
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION.............................................................................7
STATEMENT OF FACTS.............................................................................................9
STATEMENTS OF ISSUES........................................................................................12
ARGUMENTS...............................................................................................................13
PRAYER FOR RELIEF...............................................................................................28

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
ABBREVIATION FULL FORM
AIR All India Reporter

Anr. Another
Art. Article
& And
Ed Edition
Govt. Government
HC High Court
Hon’ble Honourable
ICCPR The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
Ltd Limited
No. Number
Ors Others
Pvt Private
SC Supreme Court
SCC Supreme Court Cases

Sec Section
v. or vs. Versus
Vol Volume
CrPC Criminal Procedure Code
IPC Indian Penal Code
SCR Supreme Court Reporter

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
LEGISLATIONS REFERRED
1. THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, 1950

2. THE AUROVILLE (EMERGENCY PROVISIONS) ACT, 1980
3. THE INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1860
4. THE KERALA HINDU PLACE OF PUBLIC WORSHIP (AUTHORISATION OF
ENTRY) ACT, 1965
5. THE MADRAS HINDU RELIGIOUS AND CHARITABLE ENDOWMENTS ACT, 1951
6. THE PROTECTION OF CIVIL RIGHTS ACT, 1955
7. THE PUNJAB EXCISE ACT, 1914
8. THE SCHEDULED CASTES AND THE SCHEDULED TRIBES (PREVENTION OF
ATROCITIES) ACT, 1989
CASES REFERRED
Sr. No. NAME OF THE CASE
ADI SAIVA SIVACHARIYARGAL NALA SANGAM AND OTHERS V.

1
GOVERNMENT OF TAMIL NADU AND OTHERS, (2016) 2 S.C.C. 725
2 ANUJ GARG V. HOTEL ASSOCIATION (1989) 2 S.C.C. 145
3 AZEEZ BASHA V. UNION OF INDIA A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 662
4 BHIMSAYA & ORS V. JANABI (SMT) ALIAS JANAWWA (2006) 13 S.C.C. 627
5 DEOKI NANDAN V. MURLIDHAR AND OTHERS, A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 133
6 DURGAH COMMITTEE, AJMER V. SYED HUSSAIN ALI (1962) 1 SCR 383
7 NALSA V. UNION OF INDIA (2014) 5 S.C.C. 438
NAR HARI SASTRI AND ORS. V. SHRI BADRINATH TEMPLE COMMITTEE,
8
1952 S.C.R. 849
9 NAVTEJ SINGH V. UNION OF INDIA AND ORS (2018) 8 SCALE 72
10 RAJA BIRA KISHORE DEB V. STATE OF ORISSA A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 255
RIJU PRASAD SARMA AND ORS. V. STATE OF ASSAM AND ORS., (2015) 9
11
S.C.C. 461

12 SHAYARA BANO V. UNION OF INDIA (2017) 6 M.L.J. 378

13 S.P. MITTAL V. UNION OF INDIA (1983) 1 S.C.C. 51
SHASTRI YAGNAPURUSHADIJI V. MULDAS BHUNDARDAS VAISHYA 1966
14
(3) S.C.R. 242
SRI RADHAKANTA DEB AND ANOTHER V. COMMISSIONER OF HINDU
15
RELIGIOUS ENDOWMENTS, ORISSA (1981) 2 S.C.C. 226
WEBSITES REFERRED
 https://privacylibrary.ccgnlud.org/case/indian-young-lawyers-association-and-ors-vs-the-state-
of-kerala-and-ors
 www.indiankanoon.com
 www.legalserviceindia.com
 www.livelaw.com
 www.indconlawphil.wordpress.com
 www.legalcrystal.com
 www.india-seminar.com
 https://www.a-and-s-jurisprudentia.com/post/case-brief-indian-young-lawyer-association-ors-
vs-state-of-kerala-ors#:~:text=It%20is%20legally%20binding.,21%20and%2025(1)
 https://aishwaryasandeep.com/2022/02/28/indian-young-lawyers-association-vs-the-state-of-
keralacase-details/
 https://main.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2006/18956/18956_2006_Judgement_28-Sep-2018.pdf
BOOKS AND COMMENTARIES
 MAHENDRA PAL SINGH, V N SHUKLA’S CONSTITUTION OF INDIA (13TH EDITION

2019)
 M LAKSHMIKANT, INDIAN POLITY (5TH EDITION 2017)
 M.P JAIN, INDIAN CONSTITUTION LAW (6TH ED. REPRINT 2012)
 THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: LEGAL AND

POLICY ISSUES

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
THE APPELLANT HUMBLY SUBMITS THIS MEMORANDUM FOR THE PETITION FILED
BEFORE THE HONOURABLE COURT. THE PETITION INVOKES ITS WRIT JURISDICTION
BEFORE THE HONOURABLE SC OF INDIA UNDER ART. 32 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF
INDIA. IT SET FORTH THE FACTS AND THE LAWS ON WHICH THE CLAIMS ARE BASED.
ART. 32
a) THE RIGHT TO MOVE THE SC BY APPROPRIATE PROCEEDINGS FOR THE

ENFORCEMENT OF THE RIGHT CONFERRED BY THIS PART IS GUARANTEED.
b) THE SC SHALL HAVE POWER TO ISSUE DIRECTIONS OR ORDERS OR WRITS,

INCLUDING WRITS IN THE NATURE OF HABEAS CORPUS, MANDAMUS,
PROHIBITION, QUO WARRANTO AND CERTIORARI, WHICHEVER MAY BE
APPROPRIATE, FOR THE ENFORCEMENT OF ANY OF THE RIGHT CONFERRED BY
THIS PART.
c) WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE POWERS CONFERRED ON THE SC BY CLAUSES (1)

AND (2), PARLIAMENT MAY BY LAW EMPOWER ANY OTHER COURT TO
EXERCISE WITHIN THE LOCAL LIMITS OF ITS JURISDICTION ALL OR ANY OF THE
POWERS EXERCISABLE BY THE SC UNDER CLAUSE (2).
d) THE RIGHT GUARANTEED BY THIS ART. SHALL NOT BE SUSPENDED EXCEPT AS

OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR BY THIS CONSTITUTION.
THE CASE WAS FILED IN 2006 BY THE INDIAN YOUNG LAWYER’S ASSOCIATION
THROUGH PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION (PIL) BEFORE THE HONOURABLE SC OF INDIA.
THE CASE DEALS WITH AN IMPORTANT ASPECT I.E. “ENTRY OF WOMEN IN
SABARIMALA TEMPLE”. THERE WERE MANY ISSUES RAISED IN WHICH IT WAS ARGUED

BY PETITIONERS THAT PROVISIONS RELATED TO THE RESTRICTION OF THE WOMEN

ENTRY IN TEMPLE ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS IT VIOLATES ART. 14, ART. 15, ART. 17,
ART. 25, ART. 26 OF THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION. THE SABARIMALA TEMPLE IS
SITUATED IN THE PERIYAR TIGER RESERVE IN THE WESTERN GHAT MOUNTAIN
RANGES OF PATHANAMTHITTA DISTRICT, KERALA. THIS TEMPLE IS FAMOUS FOR LORD
AYYAPPA. IT FORBIDS THE ENTRY OF WOMEN IN THEIR MENSTRUATING AGE THAT
ARE BETWEEN THE AGE OF 10 TO 50 YEARS STATED THAT IT IS A PLACE OF WORSHIP.
THE EXCLUSIONARY PRACTICE IS BASED ON PHYSIOLOGICAL FACTORS EXCLUSIVE TO

THE FEMALE GENDER AND THIS VIOLATES ART. 14, 15 AND 21 OF THE CONSTITUTION.
THE PRACTICE OF EXCLUSION BASED ON MENSTRUATION CONSTITUTES A FORM OF
UNTOUCHABILITY AND IS PROHIBITED BY ART. 17 OF CONSTITUTION.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
INDIAN YOUNG LAWYERS ASSOCIATION & ORS……………..APPELLANT
VS.
THE STATE OF KERALA & ORS……………..DEFENDANT
1) The observation that regulations contemplated by Art. 25 cannot obliterate essential religious
practices is understandable as regulations are not restrictions.
2) In these circumstances, we are clearly of the view that there is no distinctive name given to the
worshippers of this particular temple; there is no common faith in the sense of a belief common to a
particular religion or section thereof; or common organization of the worshippers of the Sabarimala
temple so as to constitute the said temple into a religious denomination. Also, there are over a
thousand other Ayyappa temples in which the deity is worshipped by practicing Hindus of all kinds.
3) That Art. 13 of the Constitution does not apply to the present case. Art. 25 and 26 of the
Constitution protect religious matters including ceremonial issues and the exclusion of women is an
exercise of this right;
4) The exclusion of women is not based on gender and satisfies the test of intelligible differentia and
nexus to the object sought to be achieved.
5) That a separate trial would be required for the determination of facts.
6) The Sabarimala temple is a denominational temple and the exclusion of women is in exercise of
denomination rights under Article 26 of the Constitution.
7) Located in the Periyar Tiger Reserve in the Western Ghat Mountain Ranges of Pathanamthitta
district of Kerala, the Sabarimala Temple is visited by lakhs of pilgrims all year round. Pilgrims
trek the Neelimala to reach the shrine, which has eighteen sacred steps, to worship Lord Ayyappa
after undergoing strict religious vows for forty- eight days.

8) The temple is dedicated to Lord Ayyappa also known as Dharma Sastha. According to belief he is
the son of Shiva and Mohini, the feminine incarnation of Vishnu. The temple is maintained by the
Travancore Devasom Board.
9) It has a selective ban on women of menstruating age i.e. between ten and fifty entering the temple
so as to uphold the respect towards the celibate nature of the deity. This ban, however, is applicable
only in this particular temple of Sabarimala. No other Ayyappa temples have imposed any kind of
ban on women.
STATEMENT OF FACTS AS PER THE WITNESSES:
1991: Kerala High Court upheld an age-old restriction on women of a certain age-group entering
Sabarimala temple. A two-judge bench decreed (on April 5) that the prohibition by the Travancore
Devaswom Board that administers the hill shrine does not violate either the Constitution or a pertinent
1965 Kerala law.
2006: A famed astrologer conducted a temple-centric assignment called ‘Devaprasnam’, and declared
having found signs of a woman’s entry into the temple some time ago. Soon, a well-known Kannada
actress-politician Jayamala claimed publicly that she had entered the precincts of Sabarimala in 1987 as
a 28-year-old. Even she claimed to have proudly touched the deity inside the sanctum sanctorum as part
of a film shoot, adding doing connivance with the priest.
2006: The allegation led the Kerala government to probe the matter through its crime branch, but the
case was later dropped.
2008: Kerala’s LDF government filed an affidavit supporting a PIL filed by women lawyers questioning
the ban on the entry of women in Sabarimala
2016: The India Young Lawyers Association filed a PIL with the SC, contending that Rule 3(b) of the
Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorisation of Entry) Rules 1965 that states “Women who are
not by custom and usage allowed to enter a place of public worship shall not be entitled to enter or offer
worship in any place of public worship” violates constitutional guarantees of equality, non-
discrimination and religious freedom.
November 2016: Kerala’s Left Front government favoured the entry of women of all age groups filing
an affidavit to the effect.
MOOT COURT CASE NO. 3 | MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT P a g e | 10

28 September, 2018: The Honourable SC of India, by a 4:1verdict, granted women, of all age groups,
entry into Kerala’s Sabarimala temple, breaking the temple’s age-old tradition of restricting
menstruating women from entering its premises.
The reasons put forward by the Temple Authorities are that Lord Ayyappa is a Naishthika
Brahmmachari (one who has vowed to remain celibate) and that it is not possible for women to put up
with the physical hardship, austerity and days of celibacy like men. They also claim to be a religious
denomination and subsequently, the right to decide the rules and regulations of the temple.
However, in spite of such restrictions, there have been earlier instances of women entering the temple.
The Sabarimala Tantri performs the purification ceremony whenever the rules are violated. In 2011 the
last purification ceremony was performed after a 35 year old woman had managed to climb the
Pathinettam Padi.
In the petition that follows it is contended that discrimination on the basis of sex in the name of customs
and rituals is not only anti-Hindu but also unconstitutional. There is no real evidence of women not
entering the temple 1500 years ago and under such circumstances the petitioners have approached the
Supreme Court seeking a direction to allow the entry of women into the temple without age restrictions.
The Honourable High Court of Mahadeshamin its judgement held that:
1. The restriction imposed on women aged above 10 and below 50 from trekking the holy hills of
Lord Shivappa and offering worship at Lord Shivappa Shrine is in accordance with the usage
prevalent from time immemorial.
2. Such restriction imposed by the Temple Trust Board is not violative of Art. 14, 15. 25 and 26 of
the Constitution of Indostan.
3. Such restriction is also not violative of the provisions of Indu Place of public worship
(Authorization of Entry) Act, 1965 since there is no restriction between one section and another
section or between one class and another class among the Indus in the matter of entry to a temple
whereas the prohibition is only in respect of womenof a particular age group and not women as a
class. The Original Petitioner hereby prefers an Appeal against the Verdict of the Honourable
high court in the Honourable SC of Indostan.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
I. WHETHER THERE IS ANY VIOLATION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT OR ANY

PROVISION OF THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION?
II. WHETHER AYYAPPA TEMPLE HAS A DENOMINATIONAL CHARACTER AND, IF

SO, IS IT PERMISSIBLE ON THE PART OF A ‘RELIGIOUS DENOMINATION’
MANAGED BY A STATUTORY BOARD AND FINANCED UNDER ART. 290-A OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF INDIA OUT OF THE CONSOLIDATED FUND OF KERALA AND
TAMIL NADU TO INDULGE IN SUCH PRACTICES VIOLATING CONSTITUTIONAL
PRINCIPLES/MORALITY EMBEDDED IN ART. 14, 15(3), 39(A) AND 51A(E)?
III. WHETHER RULE 3 OF THE KERALA HINDU PLACES OF PUBLIC WORSHIP

(AUTHORISATION OF ENTRY) RULES PERMITS ‘RELIGIOUS DENOMINATION’ TO
BAN ENTRY OF WOMEN BETWEEN THE AGES OF 10 TO 50 YEARS AND VIOLATES
THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS?
IV. WHETHER THE WRIT PETITION FILED UNDER ARTICLE 32 THE CONSTITUTION
OF INDIA IS MAINTAINABLE?

ARGUMENTS
ISSUE I
WHETHER THERE IS ANY VIOLATION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT OR ANY

PROVISION OF THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION?
It is humbly submitted that definition of “law” under Art. 13 includes “custom and usage” - hence the court
can invalidate any religious custom which violates fundamental rights. Even if the said practice is
considered to be a custom, it has to still pass the test of constitutional morality and constitutional
legitimacy. SC have every power to decide whether any practice is an integral part of the religion or not,
on the basis of evidence. Merely because a practice has continued for long that by itself cannot make it
valid if it has been expressly declared to be impermissible.
The public character of the temple gives birth to the right of the devotees to enter it for the purpose of
darshan or worship and this universal right to entry is not a permissive right dependent upon the temple
authorities but a legal right in the true sense of the expression.
Provisions like Art. 15(2) and 25(2)(b) are the results of movements that were expressly framed in the
language of civil rights for individuals against their communities, even at the cost of the “integrity" of
the community, understood as the continuation of strongly held beliefs and practices.
India is a party to ICCPR and Article 18(1) of the ICCPR affirms that the right to freedom of thought,
conscience or religion includes a person’s “freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice,
and freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his
religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching”.
COUNSEL FURTHER SUBMITS:
There is a clear cut violation of fundamental right mentioned in Art. 14.
 It is humbly submitted before this Honourable court that Art. 14 guarantees to every person,

including non-citizens and transgender, the right to equality before law the law or the equal
protection of laws.
 In the present case, the selective ban on women aged between 10 and 50 years, that is those who
are in menstruating age is direct violation of the aforesaid fundamental right.
 The act of exclusion results in a forced involuntary disclosure by a woman of her menstruating
status which violates her privacy.
 In the present case, the temple should be considered within the ambit of “other authorities” under
Art. 12 which defines State. Thus, the temple is susceptible to claims of Art. 14.
 The exclusionary practice is based on physiological factors exclusive to the female gender and this
violates Art. 14 of the Constitution.
 Menstruation is not impure, and that women have equal right to enter the temple and by denying,
the Travancore Devasom Board, which maintains the temple is violating the fundamental rights of
women which has been mentioned in the aforesaid Art. The illogical belief and superstition that
women are impure, based on the physiological process of menstruation, is gender discrimination.
The ban also violates the fundamental right mentioned in Art. 15.
 It is humbly submitted before this Honourable Court that the selective ban on women entering into
temple directly violates the very basic purpose of Art. 15(1) and 15(2).
 Section 3(b) is consistent with the parent Act, the larger question of constitutionality arises. Insofar
as the Act and the Rules are invoked to justify the exclusion of women from the Sabarimala
Temple, therefore, there is a clear violation of Art. 14 and 15(1) of the Constitution.
 The pleaded custom violates Art. 15 and is unreasonable. This Honourable court in Bhimsaya &
Ors v Janabi (smt) Alias Janawwa, while adjucating the share of a person claiming to be an
adopted son to be deceased by custom in ancestral property held that ancestral property held that
custom must be ancient, certain and reasonable and cannot be opposed to public policy.
 In the case of Navtej Singh v Union of India and Ors., SC held that “discriminatory act will be
tested against constitutional values. A discrimination will not survive constitutional scrutiny when
it is grounded in and perpetuates stereotypes about a class constituted by the grounds prohibited

in Art. 15(1). If any ground of discrimination, whether direct or indirect is founded on a

stereotypical understanding of the role of the sex, it would not be distinguishable from the
discrimination which is prohibited by Art. 15 on the grounds only of sex”.
 The SC vide a two judge bench in Anuj Garg v. Hotel Association while adjucating a challenge to
Sec 30 of the Punjab Excise Act, 1914 which prohibited the employment of any man under the age
of 25, and any women, in any part of an establishment in which liquor or another intoxicating drug
was being consumed, rejected the gender stereotypical arguments that said Act was essential to
ensure the “security” of women. The court observed that legislation amounted to “invidious
discrimination perpetrating sexual differences” and struck it down. In other words, the impugned
provision encourages sexual stereotypes.
The ban violates the fundamental right mentioned in Art. 17.
 It is humbly submitted before this Honourable Court that one of the most fundamental provision of
the constitution of India is Art. 17, it applies to both state and non- state actors.
 The logic behind the ban was that presence of women deviated men from celibacy. This was
placing the burden of a men's celibacy on women thus, stigmatising women and stereotyping them.
Individual dignity of women could not be at the mercy of a mob. Morality was not ephemeral. It
transcended biological and physiological barriers.
 Art. 17 of Indian Constitution enacts two declarations. Firstly, it announces that “untouchability” is
abolished and its practices in any form is forbidden, and secondly, it declares that the enforcement
of any disability arising out of “untouchability” shall be a punishable offence punishable in
accordance with law. In the present case, the selective ban on women of a particular age group
means putting the mensuration in disability criteria. The latter part of the same also declares that:
‘that shall be a punishable offence’.
The ban violates the fundamental right mentioned in Art. 25.
 It is humbly submitted before this Honourable court that the fundamental right of women between
the ages of 10 and 50 to enter the Sabarimala temple is undoubtedly recognized by Art. 25(1).
 The exclusion of (a class of) women from the Sabarimala Temple should not be justified on the
basis of ancient custom, which was sanctioned by Rule 3(b), framed by the Government under the

authority of the 1965 Kerala Hindu Places of Worship (Authorisation of Entry Act).
 Sect 3 of the Act required that places of public worship be open to all sections and classes of
Hindus, subject to special rules for religious denominations. Rule 3(b), however, provided for the
exclusion of “women at such time during which they are not by custom and usage allowed to enter
a place of public worship.” These pieces of legislation, in turn, were juxtaposed against
constitutional provisions such as Art. 25(1) (freedom of worship), Art. 26 (freedom of religious
denominations to regulate their own practices), and above mentioned Articles.
 There is no need to go into all the case laws in respect of Art. 25 and 26 because by now it is well
settled that Art. 25(2)(a) and Art. 26(b) guaranteeing the right to every religious denomination to
manage its own affairs in matters of religion are subject to and can be controlled by a law
contemplated under Art. 25(2)(b) as both the Art. are required to be read harmoniously. It is also
well established that social reforms or the need for regulations contemplated by Art. 25(2) cannot
obliterate essential religious practices or their performances and what would constitute the
essential part of a religion can be ascertained with reference to the doctrine of that religion itself.
 Temple is a public place of worship of the Hindus, the right of entrance into the temple for
purposes of ‘darshan’ or worship is a right which flows from the nature of the institution itself, and
for the acquisition of such rights, and no custom or immemorial usage need be asserted or proved.
 In the celebrated, Shirur Math case, viz., The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments,
Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt,. This case concerned itself with
the settlement of a scheme in connection with a Math known as the Shirur Math, which, legislation
in the form of the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951, sought to
interfere with. In history, the Shirur Math is stated to be one of the eight Maths situated at Udipi in
the district of South Kanara and reputed to have been founded by Shri Madhwacharya, the well-
known exponent of dualistic theism in Hinduism. This judgment being a seminal authority for a
large number of aspects covered under Art. 25 and 26 needs to be quoted in extensor.

ISSUE II
WHETHER AYYAPPA TEMPLE HAS A DENOMINATIONAL CHARACTER AND, IF

SO, IS IT PERMISSIBLE ON THE PART OF A ‘RELIGIOUS DENOMINATION’
MANAGED BY A STATUTORY BOARD AND FINANCED UNDER ART. 290-A OF
THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA OUT OF THE CONSOLIDATED FUND OF
KERALA AND TAMIL NADU TO INDULGE IN SUCH PRACTICES VIOLATING
CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES EMBEDDED IN ART. 14, 15(3), 39(A) AND 51A(E)?
It is humbly contended before the Court that the Lord Ayyappa devotees does not constitute a separate
religious denomination. Ayyappa devotees does not constitute a denomination as there is no specific
Ayyappa sect. Hindu faith has only pre-established denominations with zero scope to have developed
new denominations over a period of time.
A religious entity cannot claim to have a ‘denomination’ simply on account of differences from the
mainstream practice. For a religious denomination to maintain the religious institution, it has to be first
established by the denomination claiming such right. As in the case of Azeez Basha v. Union of India
the court refused to grant Aligarh Muslim University protection under Art. 26(a). Since it was
constituted under a statute and not by Muslims, the community does not have the exclusive right to
administer it.
The Sabarimala Temple does not fulfil the characteristic of Denominational character.
 The counsel humbly submits that one of the key factors is a sense of ‘exclusive belongingness’, as
the first abiding principle for a religious denomination to exist.
 The religious ceremonies at Sabarimala Temple are not distinct from any other Hindu temples.
 There is no separate administration, Sabarimala Temple is regulated by the statutory board

constituted under the Travancore-Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act, 195 and gets state
funding under Art. 290-A of the Constitution. So if the temple gets funding from state then the
government should make sure that temple should not discriminate on the basis of sex.
 It has been put forth by them that the aforesaid enactment has been subject to various amendments
over a period of time, the last amendment being made in the year 2007 vide Amending Act of 2007
which led to the inclusion of women into the management Board. The petitioners have also
referred to Sec 29A of the said Act which stipulates that all appointments of officers and

employees in the Devaswom Administrative Service of the Board shall be made from a select list
of candidates furnished by the Kerala Public Service Commission. It has been submitted by the
petitioners that after the 1950 Act, no individual Devaswom Board can act differently both in
matters of religion and administration as they have lost their distinct character and Sabarimala no
more remained a temple of any religious denomination after the takeover of its management.
 It is urged that since all Devaswoms are Hindu Temples and they are bound to follow the basic
tenets of Hindu religion, individual ill-practice of any temple contrary to the basic tenets of Hindu
religion is impermissible, after it being taken over by statutory board and state funding in 1971. It
is propounded that for the purpose of constituting a ‘religious denomination’ not only the practices
followed by that denomination should be different but its administration should also be distinct and
separate. Thus, even if some practices are distinct in temples attached to statutory board, since its
administration is centralized under the Devaswom Board, it cannot attain a distinct identity of a
separate religious denomination.
 In the case of Sardar Syedna Taher Saifuddin Saheb v. State of Bombay, Raja Bira Kishore Deb v.
State of Orissa, Shastri Yagnapurushadiji v. Muldas Bhundardas Vaishya and S.P. Mittal v. Union
of India wherein the concept of religious denomination was discussed by this Court. It is the stand
of the petitioners that some mere difference in practices carried out at Hindu Temples cannot
accord to them the status of separate religious denominations.
 In Durgah Committee, Ajmer v. Syed Hussain Ali, Justice Gajendragadkar, clarified that clauses
(c) and (d) of Art. 26 of the Constitution of India do not create any new right in favour of religious
denominations but only safeguard their rights. Similarly, in matters of religious affairs, it is
observed that the same is also not sacrosanct as there may be many ill-practices like superstitions
which may, in due course of time, become mere accretions to the basic theme of that religious
denomination. So it can be concluded that even if any accretion added for any historical reason has
become an essence of the said religious denomination, the same shall not be protected under Art.
26(b) if it is so abhorring and is against the basic concept of our Constitution.
 Discrimination in matters of entry to temples is neither a ritual nor a ceremony associated with
Hindu religion as this religion does not discriminate against women but, on the contrary, Hindu
religion accords to women a higher pedestal in comparison to men and such a discrimination is
totally anti-Hindu, for restriction on the entry of women is not the essence of Hindu religion.
Further Submitting that even if Sabarimala temple is taken as a religious denomination, their basic
tenets are not confined to taking of oath of celibacy for certain period of pilgrimage as all pilgrims

are allowed freely in the temple and there is no such practice of not seeing the sight of women
during this period.
 In the case of Sri Venkatramana Devaru v. State of Mysore has been cited to submit that a
religious denomination cannot completely exclude or prohibit any class or section for all times. All
that a religious denomination may do is to restrict the entry of a particular class or section in
certain rituals.
Even if the Lord Ayyappa’s devotees form a separate denomination, it cannot exclude women.
 The Counsel humbly submits that even if it is assumed that Sabarimala is a religious denomination,
the exclusion of women is not an essential practice as it does not satisfy the test of essential
practice as has been laid down by this Court in Commissioner of Police v. Acharya
Jagadishwarananda Avadhuta.
 Even if assuming so, the exclusion of women’s entry violates the rights conferred under Art. 26 of
the Constitution of India. The denomination’s right to manage its affairs in matters of religion are
subject to Art. 25(2)(b).

ISSUE III
WHETHER RULE 3 OF THE KERALA HINDU PLACES OF PUBLIC WORSHIP

(AUTHORISATION OF ENTRY) RULES PERMITS ‘RELIGIOUS DENOMINATION’ TO
BAN ENTRY OF WOMEN BETWEEN THE AGES OF 10 TO 50 YEARS AND VIOLATES
THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS?
A two bench judge of this Honourable court in Adi Shivachariyargal Nala sangam and Ors v. The
Government of Tamil Nadu and Ors., while holding that appointments of Archakas will have to be made
in accordance with the Agamas but subject to constitutional principles, also held in Paras 3 and 36 that
Art. 26 is subject to 25(2)(b) and constitutional legitimacy supersedes all religious beliefs.
The socio-religious malady is due to rule 3(b) of the Kerala Hindu Places of public worship
(Authorisation of Entry) Rules, 1965 framed in exercise of powers conferred by Sec 4 of the Kerala
Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorisation of Entry) Act, 1965 wherein under women were not
allowed to enter temple premises at such time during which they were not by custom or usage allowed
enter a place of worship.
Art. 17 read with The Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955.
 It is submitted that one of the most fundamental provision of the Constitution of India is Art. 17, it
applies to both state and non-state actors.
 Art. 17 reads as:

“Abolition of Untouchability: “Untouchability” is abolished and its practice in any form is
forbidden. The enforcement of any disability arising out of “Untouchability” shall be an offence
punishable in accordance with law.”
 It is submitted that the use of the expression “in any form” includes untouchability based on social
factors and is wide enough to cover menstrual discrimination against women.
 Art. 17 has been made operative through the central legislation of the Protection of Civil Rights
Act, 1955.
 Particularly, Sec 3(a) and 3(c) of the Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955 criminalize the act of

preventing any person form, entering a place of public worship and form worshipping or offering
prayers there at.
 Acts of enforcing a form of social disability and social boycott based on custom or usage in regard
observance of a religious ceremony are criminal offences under section 4 of the Protection of Civil
Rights Act, 1955 [Particularly Sec 4(v) and 4(x)].
 The acts of obstructing the rights of persons that have arisen out of abolition of untouchability on
grounds of religion, are liable under Sec 7(1)(a) and 7(1)(a) of the Protection of Civil Rights Act,
1955.
 It shall be borne in mind that Sec 13 of the Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955 bars courts from
recognizing customs or usages perpetuating untouchability.
 It is submitted that the judgment of the High Court of Kerala in S. Mahendran v. Secretary,
Travancore Devaswom Board is not in consonance with the provisions of the Protection of Civil
Rights Act, 1955 (Sec 3, 4, and 7) and is thus hit by Sec 13.
 Hence, it is submitted that the act of prohibiting women’s entry into temples or places of public
worship is a statutory offence under the Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955.
Provisions of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989:
 It is pertinent to mention that the impugned rule preventing women from entering places of public
worship based on custom or usage applies to Dalit and SC/ST women and is thus not only a form
of untouchability which is prohibited under Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955 but also under the
Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (as amended in
2015) (SC/ST Act) and thus is ultra vires of the SC/ST Act as well.
 It is submitted that that impugned rule that prevents SCs and STs Women from entering any place
of worship that is open to the public and imposes social boycotts on them perpetrates atrocities that
are criminalized under the SC/ST Act.
 It is submitted that the impugned rule perpetuates an atrocity which is an offence under Sec 3(1)
(za) of the SC/ST Act. Sec 3(1)(za) criminalizes atrocities facilitating social boycott in relation to
entry into places of public worship.
 It is submitted that the impugned rule perpetuates an atrocity which is an criminal offence under
Sec 3(1)(zc) of the SC/ST Act. Sec 3(1)(zc) criminalizes atrocities imposing social boycott on
SC/STs.

 Sec 2(1)(eb) of the SC/ST Act defines social boycott as: “Social boycott” means a refusal to permit
a person to render to other person or receive from him any customary service or to abstain from
social relations that one would maintain with other person or to isolate him from others.
 Thus, it is submitted that that impugned rule that prevents SC/ST women from entering places of
public worship facilitates an offence that is liable to be punished under the SC/ST Act and is ultra
vires the SC/ST Act.

ISSUE IV
WHETHER THE WRIT PETITION FILED UNDER ART. 32 THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
IS MAINTAINABLE?
The petition have Locus standi as the Supreme Court has now considerably liberalized the rule of Locus
Standi. The Court now permits the public-spirited persons to file a writ petition for the enforcement of
constitutional and statutory rights of any other person or class, form if that person or class is unable to
invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court due to poverty or any social economic disability. And the
Fundamental rights of women are being violated.
Petitioners have locus standi-
The traditional rule is that a person whose constitutional or legal right is infringed can apply for relief
under Art. 226 of the Indian Constitution. But the SC has now considerably liberalized the above rule of
Locus Standi. The Court now permits the public-spirited persons to file a writ petition for the
enforcement of constitutional and statutory rights of any other person or class, form if that person or
class is unable to invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court due to poverty or any social economic
disability.
Now, a public-spirited person can avail this provision on behalf of socially or economically
disadvantaged persons, if such persons are unable to defend themselves.
In case of public interest litigation, the strict rule of Locus Standi applicable to private litigation in
relaxed and a broad rule is evolved by the Courts in Modern Times. The right of Locus Standi can be
given to any member of the public acting bonafide and having sufficient interest in instituting an action
for redressal of public wrong or public injury, but who is not mere busybody or a meddlesome
interloper:
Since the dominant object of Interest Litigation is to ensure all observance of the provisions of the
Constitution or the law which can be best achieved to advance cause of community or disadvantaged
groups and individuals or Public Interest by permitting any person, having no personal gain or private

motivation or any other oblique consideration but acting bonafide and having any sufficient interest in
maintaining an action or judicial redress for public injury to put the judicial machinery in motion like
actio popularis of Roman law whereby any citizen could bring such an action in respect of public delict.
In the case of Sabarimala, the fundamental right of the women coming the age group are violated. And
the Indian Young Lawyers Association only helped these women to claim their violated rights.
Bandhu Mukti Morcha vs. Union of India, In this case, the Court held that the Public Interest Litigation
is not adversary litigation but a challenge and opportunity to the Government and its officers to make
basic Human Rights meaningful to the deprived and vulnerable sections of the society. The court is thus
assistant them in the realization of the constitutional objectives. The court has the power under Art. 32 to
appoint a Commission for making inquiry concerning the violation of human rights.
Violation of Fundamental Rights-
The Ayyappa temple in Sabarimala, Kerala, prohibits women of menstruating age (between ten and 50
years of age) from entering it – a prohibition enforced under Rule 3(b) of the Kerala Hindu Places of
Public Worship (Authorisation of Entry) Rules, 1965: “Women who are not by custom and usage
allowed to enter a place of public worship shall not be entitled to enter or offer worship in any place of
public worship.” The Young Lawyers’ Association filed a petition in the Supreme Court challenging this
rule in 2006. Rule 3(b) of the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorisation of Entry) Rules,
1965 violates the Fundamental rights of women coming under the age group 10 to 50.

JUDGMENTS
Ratio Decidendi: Ratio Decidendi is the rule of law on which judicial decision is based. It is legally
binding. On 28th September 2018, the court delivered its verdict in this case by 4:1 majority which held
that the practice violated the fundamental rights to equality, liberty and freedom of religion, Art. 14, 15,
19(1), 21 and 25(1). It struck down Rule 3(b) of the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship Act as
unconstitutional. Rule 3(b) allowed for Hindu denominations to exclude women from public places of
worship, if the exclusion was based on custom.
The apex court has allowed entry of women of all age groups to the Sabarimala Temple, and held that
“Devotion cannot be subjected to Gender Discrimination”.
Obiter Dictum: Obiter Dictum is a judge’s expression of opinion uttered in court or in written judgment,
but not essential to the decision and therefore not legally binding as a precedent. In this case, the court
ruled thus:
 “We have no doubt in saying that such practices infringe the right of women to enter a temple and
freely practice Hindu religion”.
 “Devotion cannot be subjected to gender discrimination”.
Hon’ble Chief Justice of India stated in his judgment that religion is way of life linked to the dignity of
an individual and patriarchal practices based on the exclusion of one gender in favor of another could
not be allowed to infringe upon the fundamental freedom to practice and profess one’s religion.
The Apex court has declared that the practice of restricting women of a specific age group in their ‘
menstruating years’ from Sabarimala Temple is unconstitutional.
Current status of case: There are review petitions filed challenging the judgment pending.

OBSERVATIONS MADE BY THE JUDGES
 Justice Deepak Mishra and Justice Khanwilkar observed that any rule which undermines and
discriminates women’s dignity violates of Art. 14, 15 and also of Art. 25, which equally grants,
irrespective of their sex, right to freely practice religion. The ambit of Art 17 has widened as
exclusion of women from religion place because they menstruate is a form of discrimination
considered under the article. The contention made by the APPELLANT about mensuration was
held as unconstitutional.
 Justice Chandrachud found that exclusion of women fails to ground itself on the basis of either an
obligatory part of religion or has been a consistent practice from many years as no evidence has
been shown to back the contention made by APPELLANT. The practice only commenced in 1950
and therefore cannot be called as an ageless practice, practiced since immemorial and cannot be
considered as “essential religious practice” under Art. 25.
 Considering the nature of the Sabrimala temple, where all Hindus and people belonging to other
regions can go and worship and along with other Ayyappa temples where women are not
prohibited, it was found that the temple does not constitute a separate ‘denomination’ and it was
held that fundamental rights chapter applies to the temple as it is funded under Art. 290-A of the
constitution.
 It was held that Rule 3(b) of the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorisation of Entry)
Rules, 1965 is in contravention with its parent act, wherein under Sec 3, discrimination against any
‘class’ of Hindu is prohibited and women between the age group of 10-50 did form a ‘class’, which
are subjected to discrimination on the basis of sex. Such an exclusion is in contravention with the
dignity of women and is at odds with constitutional values. Moreover, Justice Nariman held it
contrary to Art. 15(1) of the Constitution and strikes it down along with Justice Chandrachud,
Justice Mishra and Justice Khanwilkar.
 Justice Malhotra was the only judge to give a dissenting verdict and observed that the exclusionary
practice is in accordance with the tenets of Ayyappan community and does not violate Article 25 as
it guarantees every individual to freely profess, propagate and practice their faith in accordance with
the ‘tenets’ of their religion. She said that ‘Ayyappan community’ is a separate religious
denomination, which is protected under Art. 26. Justice Malhotra observed that courts do not have
any power to intervene in personal religious matter and such practices should not be viewed with
rationality.

CONCLUSION
The social exclusion of women from entering the Sabarimala shrine is violative of several dimensions.
This violates gender equality and discriminates mostly on the basis of sex. Just by exclaiming that Lord
Ayyappa belonged to Brahamcharya cult does not mean that this will hamper the rights of women.
There are thousands of Ayyapan temples where women are not denied entry, then why in this temple
only? Another argument to this question is the existence of other bramacharya gods and their temples all
over India. For example - Lord Hanuman was also a Brahamchari but entry is not denied to women in
the temples of Hanuman. Liberty in matters of belief, faith and worship, must produce a compassionate
and passionate and humane society marked by the equality of status among all its citizens.
The freedom to believe, to be a person of faith to be a human being in prayer has to be fulfilled in the
context of a society which does not discriminate between its citizens. Combined together, individual
liberty, equality and fraternity among citizens is indispensable to a social and political ordering in which
the dignity of the individual is realized.
A Creative Connect International Publication 35 Indian Politics & Law Review Journal (IPLRJ) ISSN
2581 7086 Volume 4- 2019 Mankind since the time immemorial, has been searching for the justification
for a point of view that hurts humanity. Basically, the theoretical human values always remain on paper
and from the time immemorial the status of women is the same as before and treated with inequality and
other dogmatic notions of biological and physiological factors affecting their lives adversely. It is always
seen that women are treated unequal on the path of approach to understand the divinity. “In the theatre
of life, it seems, man has put the autograph and there is no space for women to even put her signature”.

PRAYER
In the light of the arguments presented, cases referred and authorities cited, the counsel for the Appellant
humbly pray this Honourable Court to:
1. Allow the appeal filed;

2. Issue any appropriate writ or direction commanding the government of Kerala, Dewaswom board
of Travancore, Chief Thanthri of Sabarimala Temple and District Magistrate of Pathanamthitta and
their officers to ensure entry of female devotees between the age group of 10 to 50 at the Lord
Ayyappa Temple at Sabarimala which has been denied to them; and consequently challenging the
valadity of rule 3(b) of Kerala Hindu places of public worship (Authorisation of Entry) Rules,
1965 framed in exercise of powers conferred by section 4 of the Kerala Hindu places of public
Worship (Authorisation of Entry) Act, 1965 for being violative of Art. 14, 15, 17, 25 and 51A(e) of
the Constitution of India; and/or
3. Issue any appropriate writ or direction commanding the defendants to deploy police personnel in
order to ensure the safety of the women pilgrims at the Ayyappa Temple at Sabarimala.
4. Issue any appropriate writ or direction laying judicial guidelines in matters of gender inequality
related to religious practices in place of worship, and/or
5. Pass any other order, other order that it deems fit in the interest of Justice, Equity and Good
Conscience.
For This Act of Kindness, the Appellant Shall be Duty Bound Forever Pray.
Place: Maharashtra, India
Date: --/--/--
(COUNSEL ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT)

Kruti Shah - Moot Court No. 3 - Appellant

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INDIAN YOUNG LAWYERS ASSOCIATION & ORS. VS. THE STATE OF KERALA & ORS.

ASSIGNMENT ON MOOT COURT PROBLEM NO. 3

(THROUGH THE UNIVERSITY OF MUMBAI)

MS. KRUTI SHAH

(ROLL NO. 2223345)

PROF. DIPAK PAWAR

LALA LAJPATRAI COLLEGE OF LAW

MOOT COURT CASE NO. 3 | MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT Page |1

CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 373 OF 2006

INDIAN YOUNG LAWYERS ASSOCIATION & ORS……..………APPELLANT

THE STATE OF KERALA & ORS...........................DEFENDANT

UPON SUBMISSION TO THE HON’BLE SESSIONS JUDGE

UNDER ARTICLE 32 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA

WRITTEN SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT

MOOT COURT CASE NO. 3 | MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT Page |2

PRAYER FOR RELIEF...............................................................................................28

MOOT COURT CASE NO. 3 | MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT Page |3

ABBREVIATION FULL FORM

AIR All India Reporter

SCC Supreme Court Cases

SCR Supreme Court Reporter

MOOT COURT CASE NO. 3 | MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT Page |4

1. THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, 1950

Sr. No. NAME OF THE CASE

ADI SAIVA SIVACHARIYARGAL NALA SANGAM AND OTHERS V.

MOOT COURT CASE NO. 3 | MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT Page |5

12 SHAYARA BANO V. UNION OF INDIA (2017) 6 M.L.J. 378

BOOKS AND COMMENTARIES

 MAHENDRA PAL SINGH, V N SHUKLA’S CONSTITUTION OF INDIA (13TH EDITION

 M LAKSHMIKANT, INDIAN POLITY (5TH EDITION 2017)

 M.P JAIN, INDIAN CONSTITUTION LAW (6TH ED. REPRINT 2012)

 THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: LEGAL AND

MOOT COURT CASE NO. 3 | MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT Page |6

a) THE RIGHT TO MOVE THE SC BY APPROPRIATE PROCEEDINGS FOR THE

b) THE SC SHALL HAVE POWER TO ISSUE DIRECTIONS OR ORDERS OR WRITS,

c) WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE POWERS CONFERRED ON THE SC BY CLAUSES (1)

d) THE RIGHT GUARANTEED BY THIS ART. SHALL NOT BE SUSPENDED EXCEPT AS

MOOT COURT CASE NO. 3 | MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT Page |7

BY PETITIONERS THAT PROVISIONS RELATED TO THE RESTRICTION OF THE WOMEN

THE EXCLUSIONARY PRACTICE IS BASED ON PHYSIOLOGICAL FACTORS EXCLUSIVE TO

MOOT COURT CASE NO. 3 | MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT Page |8

INDIAN YOUNG LAWYERS ASSOCIATION & ORS……………..APPELLANT

THE STATE OF KERALA & ORS……………..DEFENDANT

5) That a separate trial would be required for the determination of facts.

MOOT COURT CASE NO. 3 | MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT Page |9

STATEMENT OF FACTS AS PER THE WITNESSES:

MOOT COURT CASE NO. 3 | MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT P a g e | 10

The Honourable High Court of Mahadeshamin its judgement held that:

MOOT COURT CASE NO. 3 | MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT P a g e | 11

I. WHETHER THERE IS ANY VIOLATION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT OR ANY

II. WHETHER AYYAPPA TEMPLE HAS A DENOMINATIONAL CHARACTER AND, IF

III. WHETHER RULE 3 OF THE KERALA HINDU PLACES OF PUBLIC WORSHIP

MOOT COURT CASE NO. 3 | MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT P a g e | 12

WHETHER THERE IS ANY VIOLATION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT OR ANY

COUNSEL FURTHER SUBMITS:

There is a clear cut violation of fundamental right mentioned in Art. 14.

MOOT COURT CASE NO. 3 | MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT P a g e | 13

MOOT COURT CASE NO. 3 | MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT P a g e | 14

in Art. 15(1). If any ground of discrimination, whether direct or indirect is founded on a

The ban violates the fundamental right mentioned in Art. 17.

The ban violates the fundamental right mentioned in Art. 25.

MOOT COURT CASE NO. 3 | MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT P a g e | 15