T-9 Respondent Memorial

INTRA-COLLEGIATE MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2023-2024
Team Code: T-9
BEFORE THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF ARYAVARTTA

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 32 OF THE

CONSTITUTION OF ARYAVARTTA
IN THE MATTER OF
JAN JAGRUKT AND ORS. … PETITIONERS
VERSUS
UNION OF ARYAVARTTA …RESPONDENT
WRITTEN SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT
COUNSEL APEARING ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT

1
TABLE OF CONTENT
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES……………………………………………3
CASE CITED…………………………………………………………3
LEGISLATION……………………………………………………….4
LEGAL DATABASE…………………………………………………4
BOOKS REFERED…………………………………………………..4
LIST OF ABBRIVATION………………………………………………5
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION……………………………………6
STATEMENT OF FACTS………………………………………………7-8
STATEMENT OF ISSUES……………………………………………….9
SUMMARY ARGUMENTS……………………………………………..10-11
ARGUMENT ADVANCE
1. Whether the Petition is Maintainable before the Hon’ble Supreme Court
of Aryavartta under Article 32 of the Aryavarttan Constitution?
……. 12- 14
2. Whether the abrogation of Article 370 is valid with special reference to
Articles 14, 19and 21 of the Aryavarttan Constitution?
…… 15-19
3. Whether the method followed to abrogate Article 370 is violative of
…… 20-25
4. Does The Jaish and Kaish (Reorganisation) Act, 2019 violate Article 3
and Part III ofthe Aryavarttan Constitution?
……. 26-29
PRAYER…………………………………………………… 30

2
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
CASE CITED
Sr. Case Name Page No.
No.
1. Northern Corporation v. UOL AIR 1991 SC 764 12
2. S.P. Gupta v. U.O.L. AIR 1982 SC 149 12
3. Devendra Dwivedi v. UOI, 1936 SCC OnLine PC 41 14
4. Lokesh Katara v. High court of Gujarat (2017) 2 SCC 427 14
5. Ashutosh Gupta v State of Rajasthan, (2002) 4 SCC 34 16
6. Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India, (2020) 3 SCC 637 17
7. Shahzad Hasan Khan v. Ishtiaq Hasan Khan, (1987) 2 SCC 684 19
8. Masroor v. State of U.P., (2009) 14 SCC 286 19
9. Rajesh Rajan Yadav v. CBI, AIR 2007 SC 451 19
10. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248 19
11. J.K. Industries Ltd. Vs. Chief Inspector of Factories & 21
Boilers, (1996) 6 SCC 665
12. Puranlallakhan pal V. President of India, A.I.R 1961 S.C. 1519 22
13. CST vs. Mangalsenshyamlal, A.I.R 1975 S.C. 1106 22
14. M. Pentiah V. Veeramallappamuddala, A.I.R 1961 S.C 1107 22
15. Whitney V. I.R.C, (1926) A.C 37 22
16. Northern terri tory V. Collins, (2008) 83 A.L.J.R. 1 22
17. Charles Robert leader V. George F. Diffey, (1888) 13 A.C 23
18. Administrator – General of Bengal V. 23

Premlalmaullick,(1895) I.L.R 22 Cal. 788
19. Puranlal Lakhanpal v. President of India (1962) 1 SCR 688 24
20. State of West Bengal v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1241 26
21. Manohar Lal v. Union, A.I.R. 1970 Delhi 178 26
22. Chintaman Rao v. State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 1951 SC 118 27

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23. State of Karnataka v. Union of India, 1978 SCR (2) 1 28
LEGISLATION
I. The Constitution of India
II. Jammu and Kashmir Reorganization Act, 2019
III. The Gazette of India dated 19/12/2018
IV. The Gazette of India dated 05/ 08/2019
LEGAL DATABASE
I. http://www.manupatra.com
II. http://www.supremecourtcaselaw.com
III. http://www.scconline.com
IV. https://www.livelaw.in
V. http://www.scobserver.in
VI. http://www.barandbench.in
VII. http://www.aironline.in
BOOKS REFERED
1. Basu, Durga Das. Indian Constitutional Law. Lexisnexis butterworths wadhwa,

8th Ed. Reprint 2011.
2. H.M.SEERVAI, CONSTITUTION OF INDIA 313 (4thEdn., Reprinted 2013)

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LIST OF ABBRIVATION
Aryavartta India
Jaish and Kaish Jammu & Kashmir
AIR All India Report
Art. Article
PIL Public Interest Litigation
SC Supreme Court
HC High Court
V. Versus
Hon’ble Honorable
Cl. Clause
UOI Union of India
Ors Others
Pg. No. Page Number

Sr. No. Serial Number
v. Versus
¶ Paragraph
Sr. No. Serial Number
¶ Paragraph

5
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Counsels for the respondent, most humbly and respectfully, submit that this Hon’ble
Supreme Court of Judicature of Aryavartta has no requisite jurisdiction to entertain this
instant Public Interest Litigation filed under Article 32.
It is further submitted that all procedural requirements have been adhered by the respondent
in the prescribed manner as set under the laws.
The present memorandum sets forth the facts, contentions and arguments in the present case.

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STATEMENT OF FACTS
1⁋ The Union of Aryavartta is Sovereign, Socialist, Secular, Democratic Republic with a

quasi-federal structure which is governed by Written constitution of Aryavartta and has
largest democracy in the world. The Union of Aryavartta was previously under British
Rule and gained independence in 1947 presently constituting of 28 states with separate
legislative assemblies and 8 union territories. When Aryavartta gained independence from
British rule in 1947, Princely States were given the choice to join either Aryavartta or
Rakistan.
2⁋ Jaish and Kaish, located in the northernmost part of Aryavartta, has a rich history
culturally and geographically dating back to ancient times. Maharaja Ravi Singh, the then
Ruler of Jaish and Kaish, decided to accede to Aryavartta in October 1947 subject to
signing the "Instrument of Accession", with certain conditions which are read as follows:
2(i)⁋ It restricted the Dominion Legislature from authorizing the compulsory acquisition of land
for any purpose.
2(ii)⁋ The Instrument denied commitment in any way or to fetter discretion to enter into an
arrangement with the Government of Aryavartta under any future constitution of
Aryavartta.
2(iii)⁋ It empowered the Sovereignty of the State and specifically mentioned that this
Instrument
will not affect the same.
2(iv)⁋ The Parliament was not permitted to make any laws that were applicable to the Stateof
Jaish and Kaish except laws on the subject of Defence, External Affairs, Communications,
Elections, Judiciary, etc.
3 ⁋ The Constitution of Aryavartta was adopted in the year 1950. Article 370 was
incorporated in the Constitution, granting special autonomous status to the region of Jaish
and Kaish allowing the state to have it’s own Constitution, flag and significant autonomy.
Article 35A was inserted into the Constitution through a Presidential Order in 1954, that
granted special rights and privileges to the permanent residents of the State of Jaish and
Kaish.
4⁋ Aggrieved by the special provisions provided to the residents of Jaish and Kaish, citizens
of Aryavartta had been retaliating for many years and they contended that the separate set
of laws for the people of Jaish and Kaish is affecting the sovereignty and integrity of the
7
nation. There was a sense of civil unrest for a long time in the State of Jaish and Kaish.In
June 2018, Governor’s rule was imposed in the state of Jaish and Kaish due to the failure
of the state machinery and following the lapse of 6 months of the Governor’s rule, an
imposition of the Presidents rule was seen in December, 2018, under the article 356 of the
Aryavarttan constitution.
5⁋ Considering the public appeal at large, in the year 2019, the President of Aryavartta passed
an order stating that all the laws of Aryavartta shall apply to Jaish and Kaish and the move
resulted in the effect of the following changes:
5(i)⁋ The Special rights and privileges granted to the residents of Jaish and Kaish were
abrogated.
5(ii)⁋ The State of Jaish and Kaish was bifurcated into two Union ie. Jaish and Kaish and
Radakh with new administrative and constitutional arrangements.
6⁋ Following the abrogation of Article 370 and Article 35A, J & K were fully integrated into
Aryavartta, and Aryavarttan laws were uniformly applicable across the region of J & K.
The abrogation of the said Articles led to protests which resulted in curfews imposed by
the Central Government in various parts of J & K, leading to restrictions on movement
along with curtailment of the internet and mobile services resulting into the complete
shutdown in the region.
7⁋ Fraction of population termed this move of the Central government as undemocratic due
to sudden abrogation of the said Articles (35A and 370) following which a number of
petitions arose alleging that the President’s order of 2019 of abrogating article 370 and
35A is unconstitutional and thus should be struck down. Jan Jagrukt an organization also
filed a Public Interest Litigation, under Art. 32 of the aryavarttan constitution before the
Apex Court.
8⁋ The Apex Court clubbed all the petitions with the petition of Jan Jagrukt and the following
issues are now pending before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Aryavartta, to be decided.

8
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
The following issues are presented before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Aryavartta:
ISSUE 1
Whether the Petition is Maintainable before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of
Aryavartta under Article 32 of the Aryavarttan Constitution?
ISSUE 2
Whether the abrogation of Article 370 is valid with special reference to
ISSUE 3
Whether the method followed to abrogate Article 370 is violative of
ISSUE 4
Does The Jaish and Kaish (Reorganisation) Act, 2019 violate Article 3
and Part III ofthe Aryavarttan Constitution?

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SUMMARY ARGUMENTS
1. Whether the Petition is Maintainable before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of

Aryavartta under Article 32 of the Aryavarttan Constitution?
It is humbly contended before this Hon’ble Court that the present Petitions are not
maintainable, and the court has no power to hear the merits of the case. This
contention is made in light that the Petitioners in the present matter has no locus
standi in case of violation of Fundamental Rights and exhaustion of alternate remedy
is not a bar. Therefore, it is humbly submitted to the Hon’ble Court that the writ
petition is not maintainable.
2. Whether the abrogation of Art. 370 is valid with special reference to Art. 14, 19
and 21 of the Aryavarttan Constitution?
The Respondents respectfully submit to this Hon'ble Court that the abrogation of
Article 370 is legally sound, as the impugned abrogation is asserted to be in
consonance with the constitutional tenets encapsulated within the golden triangle of
the Aryavarttan Constitution, namely Articles 14, 19, and 21. The contention is that
the abrogation process adheres to the principles of equality before the law (Article
14), fundamental freedoms (Article 19), and the right to life and personal liberty
(Article 21), thereby affirming its constitutional validity.
3. Whether the method followed to abrogate Article 370 is violative of Articles 356,
367and 368 of the Aryavarttan Constitution?
It is humbly submitted on behalf of the respondent, that the process followed for the
abrogation of Article 370 in J&K was conducted in full compliance with the
provisions of Article 356, Article 367, and Article 368 of the Aryavarttan
Constitution. The actions taken were in line with the law and constitutional
principles, and that there was no violation of these provisions during the said
process."

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4. Does The Jaish and Kaish (Reorganisation) Act, 2019 violate Article 3 and Part
III ofthe Aryavarttan Constitution?
It is humbly submitted that the J&K Reorganisation Act, 2019 is absolutely essential
for the law and order, sovereignty and security and integrity of the country of
Aryavartta. With a view to containing the poor situation in J&K, it is very important
to bring about a change in the administrative system. It is not illegal to bring
alteration. Any provision of the Constitution can be altered in accordance with the
essential requirements in the country. Now, J&K and Radakh being a Union
Territory, the Central Government can formulate strategies on the border activities
with well formulated policies without any restrain and which is necessary for the
native people there. With legal and social perspective, the reorganization of the State
of J&K into Union Territories of Radakh and J&K is valid.

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ARGUMENTS ADVANCE
1. WHETHER THE PETITION IS MAINTAINABLE BEFORE THE HON’BLE
SUPREME COURT OF ARYAVARTTA UNDER ARTICLE 32 OF THE
ARYAVARTTAN CONSTITUTION?
1⁋ It is humbly contended before this Hon’ble Court that the petitions are not maintainable
and the court has no power to hear the merits of the case. This contention is sought to
be proved by two-fold argument. [1.1] The petitioners in the present matter has no locus
standi in case of violation of fundamental rights; [1.1.1] Whether the court should
exercise judicial restraint in a matter of State policy [I.2] Exhaustion of Alternate
Remedy is not a bar.
[1.1] The Petitioners In The Present Matter Has No Locus Standi Due To No Violation
Of Fundamental Rights
2⁋ It is humbly submitted that the petitioners in the present matter has no Locus Standi to
file a Writ Petition under Art.32. The term Locus Standi means a place of standing, a
right of appearance in court of Justice. It signifies right to bring an action & to be heard1.
A person must have a sufficiency of interest to sustain his standing to sue. In addition
to this, a person acquires a locus standi, when he has to have a personal or individual
right which has been violated or threatened to be violated.Thus, in the present case, no
of petitioners has been infringed, he has no locus standi before the Court.
3⁋ Furthermore, in ", it was held that for invoking Art 32, there must be a clear breach of
fundamental right along with the requisite locus standi2. Nevertheless, the traditional
rule of locus standi in a Public Interest Litigation is that any member of public can
file it, but further needs to prove that the petition is being filed on behalf of a
group of people who are incapable of protecting themselves. In the Judges Transfer
case3". J. Bhagwati stated that: Where a legal wrong is caused to a person or a
determinate class of people by a reason of violation of any constitutional or legal
rights and such person or determinate class of people is by reason of poverty,
helplessness of disability or socially or economically disadvantaged position unable to
_______________________________
1. Aiyar Ramantha P The Law Lexicon (2 edition. Reprint 2000)
2. Northern Corporation v. UOL AIR 1991 SC 764
3. S.P. Gupta v. U.O.L. AIR 1982 SC 149

12
approach the Court for relief, any member of public can maintain an application for an
appropriate direction, order or writ in SC under Article 32.
4⁋ In the light of the aforementioned reason, it is submitted that the petitioners has no locus
standi and this Petition is not maintainable.
[1.1.1] Interference by Courts in disputes arising out of certain instruments is barred
5⁋ Art. 370 states that “All provisions of this Constitution, as amended from time to time,
without any modifications or exceptions, shall apply to the State of Jammu and Kashmir
notwithstanding anything contrary contained in Art. 152 or Art. 308 or any other article
of this Constitution or any other provision of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir
or any law, document, judgement, ordinance, order, by-law, rule, regulation,
notification, custom or usage having the force of lawin the territory of India, or any
other instrument, treaty or agreement as envisaged under Art. 363 or otherwise
Art. 152 of Part VI. of the Constitution states that “In this Part, unless the context
otherwise requires, the expression “State” 2[does not include the State of Jammu and
Kashmir].”
6⁋ Art. 308 of Part XIV states that “In this Part, unless the context otherwise requires, the
expression “State” [does not include the State of Jammu and Kashmir].”
6(i) ⁋ Art. 363 state that “(1) Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution but subject
to the provisions of article 143, neither the Supreme Court nor any other court shall
have jurisdiction in any dispute arising out of any provision of a treaty, agreement,
covenant, engagement, sanad or other similar instrument which was entered into or
executed before the commencement of this Constitution by any Ruler of an Indian State
and to which the Government of the Dominion of India or any of its predecessor
Governments was a party and which has or has been continued in operation after such
commencement, or in any dispute in respect of any right accruing under or any liability
or obligation arising out of any of the provisions of this Constitution relating to any
such treaty, agreement, covenant, engagement, sanad or other similar instrument. (2) In
this article— (a) “Indian State” means any territory recognised before the
commencement of this Constitution by His Majesty or the Government of the Dominion
of India as being such a State; and (b) “Ruler” includes the Prince, Chief or other person
recognised before such commencement by His Majesty or the Government of the
Dominion of India as the Ruler of any Indian State.”
6(ii)⁋ Reading the above provisions of the Constitution and when interpreted together,

13
the dispute arising out of the abrogation of Art. 370 is related to the Instrument of
Accession which was signed before the commencement of Constitution which restricts
the interference of the Supreme Court or any other court as such. Only the Opinion of
the Supreme Court may be taken if the situation demands so and the Supreme Court
may report its opinion to the President as per the provisions of Art. 143 of the
Aryavarttan Constitution.
[1.2] Exhaustion of Alternate Remedy is not a bar.
7⁋ Though Art. 2 and 226 enjoy concurrent jurisdiction, the former can only be invoked
for the enforcement of fundamental rights whereas the latter may be invoked for ‘any
other purpose’ along with the enforcement of fundamental rights. While there is no rule
that lay the redressal of HC first but the courts, including the Apex court have
observed otherwise owing to the non-exhaustion of alternative remedies.
8⁋ In the case4, the SC while disposing of the writ petition filed under Art. 32 left it
open to the petitioners to pursue other remedies established under the law by
approaching the High court under Art. 226. To challenge the constitutional validity of
provisions of the statute in dispute, the petitioners have an efficacious remedy in the
form of Art. 226, where this court will have the benefit of the considered view of the
HC. The judgment further emphasized that though the petitioners in the case invoke
Article 21, this case essentially challenges the constitutional validity of the revenue
legislation in dispute. The SC affirmed that while Art. 32 is a salutary constitutional
safeguard, the court must be considerate of its role in enforcing the fundamental rights
in issue but also exercise equal judicial discretion in order to allow the writ petition or
not. Short-circuiting the way to Art. 32 can flood this court where an alternate remedy
competent forum should be approached.
9⁋ In the instant case, it is clear that substantial issues of law are involved in the present
writ petition which directly challenges the constitutional validity of the abrogation of
Art. 370 and 35A. Hence, considering the view of the SC in the above case, the
petitioners in the instant case have not exhausted all of their remedies, for which they
ought to be relegated to the alternative remedy available under Art. 226. In the case 5,
the bench of SC dismissed a writ petition 32 by directing the petitioners to take alternate
remedy by moving to the judicial 226 of the Constitution.
____________________________________
4. Devendra Dwivedi v. UOI, 1936 SCC OnLine PC 41
5. Lokesh Katara v. High court of Gujarat (2017) 2 SCC 427

14
2. WHETHER THE ABROGATION OF ARTICLE 370 IS VALID WITH SPECIAL

REFERENCE TO ARTICLES 14, 19 AND 21 OF THE ARYAVARTTAN
CONSTITUTION?
2.1] Abrogation of Art. 370 is valid with reference to Art. 14

10⁋ The abrogation of Article 370, an exceptional constitutional provision conferring
special autonomous status, allowed to have J&K its own constitution, flag, etc. upon
the erstwhile state, has stirred constitutional scholars and legal practitioners alike. The
abrogation, when subjected to the crucible of Article 14, stands not only as
constitutionally justifiable but also as an imperative step towards ensuring the uniform
application of laws and dismantling regional exceptionalism.
11⁋ Right to equality before law is enshrined under Article 14 of the Aryavarttan
Constitution which is recognized and held to be a fundamental right of the citizens of
Aryavartta. Article 14 States that there should be equality before law and equal
protection of laws.
12⁋ Article 14 permits Reasonable Classification and prohibits Class Legislation. Class
Legislation means making of improper discrimination by conferring certain privileges
upon a class of persons arbitrarily selected from a huge number of people. Thus, Class
legislation violates equal protection and abrogating Art. 370 and 35A removed this class
legislation concept which was creating an inequality before the law violating Art. 14 of
the Aryavarttan Constitution whereas, Reasonable Classification is always based on
real and substantial distinction of persons, objects, and transactions by the legislature
for the purposes of achieving specific ends. Classification to be reasonable should fulfil
the two tests 1) It should not be arbitrary and 2) It should be based on an intelligible
differentia. The differentia adopted as the basis of classification must have a rational or
reasonable nexus with the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question.
13⁋ Where persons or groups of persons are not situated equally, to treat them equals would
itself be violative of Article 14 as this would itself result in inequality. As all the persons
are not equal by nature or circumstances, the varying needs of different classes or
sections of people require differential treatment. This leads to classification among
different groups of persons and differentiation between such classes. According to the
present petitions, to apply the principle of equality in a practical manner, the courts
15
have evolved the principle that if the law in question is based on rational classification
it is not regarded as discriminatory6.
14⁋ Thus, the constitutional validity of the abrogation of Article 370, when subjected to the
constitutional touchstone of Article 14, emerges as a cogent and imperative measure
that not only withstands legal scrutiny but also underscores the constitutional
imperative of ensuring equality before the law across the diverse tapestry of the Union.
2.2] Abrogation of Art. 370 is valid with reference to Art. 19
15⁋ The differential legal framework for the permanent residents of the region of J&K
impugned upon the sovereignty and integrity of the nation. Central to this exploration
is the contention that the unique provisions emanating from Article 370 were not only
a source of discontent among the people of India but also, crucially, encroached upon
the fundamental rights enshrined in Article 19.
16⁋ As stated in the facts, citizens of Aryavartta were aggrieved by the special provisions
provided to the residents of J&K. Citizens contended that the separate set of laws for
the people of residents of J&K had been affecting the sovereignty and integrity in the
nation, the following differences led to civil unrest in the region of J&K. After
considering the public appeal at large, President of Aryavartta passed an order
abrogating the Art. 370 forthwith, Aryavarttan laws were uniformly applied in line with
the rest of the country.
17⁋ The unique provisions afforded by Article 370, excluding external affairs, defense, and
communication, engendered a legal framework that conferred disparate rights upon the
residents of Jammu and Kashmir. This differential treatment inherently undermined the
equality envisaged in Article 19, fostering discontent and a perception of unequal
citizenship within the broader populace.
18 ⁋ The government's action of curtailing internet and mobile services is valid. Internet was
never restricted in the J&K regions. Social media which allows people to send messages
and communicate with a number of people at the same time, could be used as a means
to incite violence. The purpose of the limited and restricted use of internet is to ensure
that the situation on the ground would not be aggravated by targeted messages from
outside the country. Further, the internet allows for the transmission of false news or
fake images, which are then used to spread Violence. The dark web allows individuals
to purchase weapons and illegal substances easily. It is not possible to ban only certain
___________________________________
6. Ashutosh Gupta v State of Rajasthan, (2002) 4 SCC 34
16
websites/parts of the Internet while allowing access to other parts. The substantive law
concerning the right to internet and the restrictions that can be imposed on the same,
we need to turn our attention to the procedural aspect. The procedural mechanism
contemplated for restrictions on the Internet, is twofold: first is contractual, relating to
the contract signed between Internet Service Providers and the Government, and the
second is statutory, under the Information Technology Act, 2000, the Criminal
Procedure Code, 1973 and the Telegraph Act. Section 69A of the Information
Technology Act. 2000 read with The Information Technology (Procedures and
Safeguards for Blocking for Access of Information by Public) Rules, 2009 allows
blocking of access to information. The constitutional validity of this Section and the
Rules made thereunder. Section 5(2), Telegraph Act is as follows: "Power for
Government to take possession of licensed telegraphs and to order interception of
messages, the above two pronouncements of this Court, what emerges is that the
prerequisite for an order to be passed under this subsection, and therefore the
Suspension Rules, is the occurrence of a "public emergency or for it to be "in the interest
of public safety". Although the phrase "public emergency" has not been defined under
the Telegraph Act, it has been clarified that the meaning of the phrase can be inferred
from its usage in conjunction with the phrase "in the interest of public safety" following
it.
19⁋ The imposition of curfews by the central government emerged as a critical and,
arguably, unavoidable measure to restore public order and safeguard the lives and
properties of the citizens in the face of prolonged unrest. The necessity of such
restrictions, though infringing upon individual liberties, was construed as a measured
response aimed at precluding the potential escalation of unrest and ensuring the safety
of the populace. The sudden abrogation of Article 370 is posited as a necessary measure,
responding to the long-standing grievances of the Aryavarttan populace and striving to
rectify a perceived imbalance in the constitutional fabric. The contention is that the
unique set of laws, particularly emanating from Article 370, contributed to discontent
and, consequently, necessitated a decisive and immediate recalibration to restore
equilibrium.
20⁋ In Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India7, it was held; 36. Having explained the nature of
fundamental rights and the utility of internet under Article 19With respect to the
_________________________________
7. Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India, (2020) 3 SCC 637
17
freedom of speech and expression, restrictions are provided under Article 19(2) of the
Constitution, which read as under:“19. (2) Nothing in sub-clause (a) of clause (1) shall
affect the operation of any existing law, or prevent the State from making any law,
insofar as such law imposes reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right
conferred by the said sub-clause in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of
India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order,
decency or morality or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an
offence.” 37. The right provided under Article 19(1) has certain exceptions, which
empower the State to impose reasonable restrictions in appropriate cases. The
ingredients of Article19(2) of the Constitution are that:
(a) The action must be sanctioned by law;
(b) The proposed action must be a reasonable restriction;
(c) Such restriction must be in furtherance of interests of the sovereignty and integrity
of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order,
decency or morality or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to
an offence.
38. At the outset, the imposition of restriction is qualified by the term “reasonable” and
is limited to situations such as interests of the sovereignty, integrity, security, friendly
relations with the foreign States, public order, decency or morality or contempt of
court, defamation or incitement to an offence. Reasonability of a restriction is used in
a qualitative, quantitative and relative sense.
21⁋ In the present situation the imposition of restrictions were reasonable as established by
facts; citizens of Aryavartta had been retaliating for many years and contended that the
separate set of laws for the residents of J&K is affecting the sovereignty and integrity
of the nation which led to civil unrest for a long time in the state of J&K.
22⁋ Thus, abrogation of Art. 370 is valid and constitutional as the move was in the interest
of the sovereignty and integrity of the nation.
23⁋ In conclusion, the constitutional validity of the abrogation of Article 370, when
compared against the liberties conferred by Article 19, emerges as a cogent response to
address longstanding grievances and restore constitutional equilibrium. The imperative
of curbing civil unrest, necessitating curtailing internet and mobile services and
constraints on movement, is underscored as an essential to preserving public order and

18
safeguarding the sovereignty and integrity of the nation. The abrupt abrogation,
therefore, is portrayed not merely as a legal measure but as an imperative recalibration
indispensable for the constitutional well-being of the Aryavartta Union.
2.3]Abrogation of Art. 370 is valid with reference to Art. 21
24⁋ Art. 21 states that “No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except
according to procedure established by law”.It is humbly submitted before this Hon'ble
Court that Article 21 of the Constitution prohibits depriving any individual of his right
to life and personal liberty. However, the same does not prohibit if the said right has
been restricted according to the procedure established by law.
2.3.1]Right to personal liberty of an Individual v. Collective interest of the society
25⁋ The right to personal liberty has been enshrined in the Constitution and forms the most
inherent rights. However, it cannot be absolute in every situation. It is essential that the
liberty of an individual is to be secured through the process of law, and that it is also
essential to keep in mind the collective interest of the society8. And in certain situations,
the collective interest of the community may outweigh the right to personal liberty of
an individual9. Hence, the individual right to liberty and liberty at the societal level must
be balanced10.
26⁋ The abrogation of Art. 370 does not deprive an individual do have the effect of
depriving an individual of his personal liberty, however, it so happens in the collective
interest of the community, which is not in violation of Art. 21. Art. 21 states that a
person cannot be deprived of his right to life and personal liberty, except according to
the procedure established by law. It is, therefore, the rule that before a person is
deprived of his life and personal liberty, the procedure established by law has strictly
to be followed. It is not a general principle that a person can be deprived of his liberty,
except if there exist cogent grounds. The protection under Art. 21 of the Constitution,
therefore, is not only against the executive action but also against the legislation,
unless the law for deprivation is reasonable, just, and fair, both procedurally, and
substantially11.
27⁋ It is, therefore humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the abrogation of Art.
370 is constitutionally valid and reasonable under Art. 21.
_________________________
8. Shahzad Hasan Khan v. Ishtiaq Hasan Khan, (1987) 2 SCC 684
9. Masroor v. State of U.P., (2009) 14 SCC 286
10. Rajesh Rajan Yadav v. CBI, AIR 2007 SC 451
11. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248
19
3. WHETHER THE ABROGATION OF ARTICLE 370 IS VALID WITH SPECIAL

REFERENCE TO ARTICLES 14, 19 AND 21 OF THE ARYAVARTTAN
CONSTITUTION?
3.1] ARTICLE 356

3.1.1] The imposition of President’s rule is valid
28⁋ It is humbly submitted that the power under Article 356 (1) is an emergency power.
Emergency is a situation, which calls for the immediate remedial action. 12
29⁋ Article 356 confers powers to the President to discharge the obligation imposed upon
him by Article 355. And is a measure to preserve, protect and defend the Constitution.
The President’s power under this article is conditional on the satisfaction of the
President as contemplated under this Article.In the instant case the imposition of
President’s rule is valid under Article 356 of the Constitution of Ayarvartta. Since there
is a situation in which government of the State of J&K cannot be carried according to
the provisions of the constitution.
3.1.2] President’s rule in J&K differs from that of others
30⁋ It is contended that on account of J&K’s special status, it has a slightly different
mechanism in place when it comes to the Governor’s rule and President’s rule. Here
the failure of governmental function results in Governor’s rule under Section 92 of the
constitution of J&K. The Governor later obtains the consent of the President of India.
It is only when the Governor’s rule is not revoked for six months that the President’s
rule is imposed in the state under Article 35613.
31 ⁋ In the case of State of J&K as according to the section 92 The Constitution of Jammu
and Kashmir, 1956-1957 of state’s constitution with the consent of the President of
Ayarvartta in case of failure of constitutional machinery, Governor’s rule is imposed
for 6 months. Assembly is either dissolved or suspended during the Governor’s rule. If
the constitutional machinery is not restored before the expiry of the said 6 months
period, the provision of Article 356 is applied to the State of J&K and thereby
President’s rule is imposed that is the state is under the direct central rule.
_________________________________
12. Durga Das Basu, Shorter Constitution of India,2166 (14th edn., reprint 2012
13. The Constitution of India, 2019 edition
3.2] The impugned orders do not violate Article 356 of the Indian constitution.

20
32⁋ It is humbly submitted that in respect of J&K, Article 356 of the constitution of
Aryavartta was extended to the state of J&K Constitution (Application to J&K) Third
Amendment Order, 1964. Accordingly, it became permissible for the President of India
to assume the powers of the Governor under the Constitution of India as applicable to
J&K Constitution. There being no challenge to the proclamation issued by the President
of India under Article 356 (1) of the Constitution of India, any application of the
doctrine of constitutional morality, as pleaded in the Writ Petitions, remains debatable
and may not survive the tide of practical implications flowing out of the President's
Rule under Article 356 (1) of Constitution of India.
33⁋ Having said that, the larger question that begs consideration is "Whether the two
provisos to Article 370 (1)(d) of Constitution of India divide the entire Constitution of
India. This question is significant as the fulcrum of the petitioner's argument. The
answer is an emphatic Yes. The salutary principle of interpretation of a proviso states
that it qualifies the generality of the main enactment by providing an exception and
taking out from the main provision, a portion, which but for the proviso would be part
of the main provision14.
34⁋ It is therefore submitted that the aforesaid rule of interpretation was applied to a
proviso, it would mean that two previous to Article 370(1)(d) of the constitution do not
exhaust the main provision for their application of J&K either with consultation or
concurrence.
35⁋ Till date the Hon’ble Supreme Court has never allowed any office established under the
constitution either be it parliament, or state legislature or executive to abrogate basic
structure of the constitution. The same theory applies to Article 370(1) of the
constitution.
36⁋ Elaborating on the constitutional mechanism, the Centre claimed that as per Article
356, the President by proclamation assumes all the functions/powers of the state
government Governor except the legislative power of the state Assembly. However, the
President under Article 356(1)(b) can declare that the legislative powers of the state
would be exercised by the Parliament. It is therefore submitted that the impugned order
and the Act are constitutional and does not violate the Art. 356 of the Aryavarttan
_______________________________
14. J.K. Industries Ltd. Vs. Chief Inspector of Factories & Boilers, (1996) 6 SCC 665

21
Constitution.
3.3] The impugned orders do not violate Article 367 of the Indian constitution.
37⁋ The term ‘constituent assembly’ is making whole provision of article 370 (3) non–
functional. As the constituent assembly of state of J&K ceased functioning in 1957. The
only way to repeal Article 370 would be by the President through a notification but not
without the concurrence of the Constituent Assembly of State of J&K. The Constituent
Assembly, of course, disbanded in 1956 and almost all members are presumably dead.
Before dissolution, the Constituent Assembly neither recommended abolishing Article
370 neither, did they advocate for it to be permanent.The president brought the
ordinance through the article 367 as the 370 (1) (d) permits president for modification.
The power to ‘modify’ includes the power to enlarge or add to an existing provision, or
to abrogate it, if necessary. It is co- extensive with the power to amend and is not
confined to the minor alteration only15.
38 ⁋ Ut res magisvaleat quam pereat - The principle of interpretation ut res magisvaleat
quam pereat means that law should be made functional and workable. Lest the intention
of the legislature may go in vain or be left to evaporate into thin air 16. () The provision
will never lead to its implementation which the amendment as the objective of this
provision cannot be fulfilled. The courts strongly lean against construction which
reduces the statute to a futility17. A statute is designed to be workable, and the
interpretation thereof by a court should be to secure that object, unless crucial
omission or clear direction makes that end unattainable18. As the constituent assembly
ceases to exist so the whole provision if 370 (3) is non – functional.
39 ⁋ exvesribusactus-The principle of interetation ex vesribusactus means to construe one
part of a statute by another part of the same statute, for that best expressed meaning of
the maker. So, the controversial provision (article 370) must be read in the context of
statute as a whole, and the statute as a whole should be construed in the historical
context of the situation which led to its enactment. To put the words in their context it
is therefore necessary to say something about historical background 19. Lord Halsbury
and inconsistency; you must, if you can, ascertain what is the meaning of the instrument
______________________
15. Puranlallakhan pal V. President of India, A.I.R 1961 S.C. 1519
16. CST vs. Mangalsenshyamlal, A.I.R 1975 S.C. 1106
17. M. Pentiah V. Veeramallappamuddala, A.I.R 1961 S.C 1107
18. Whitney V. I.R.C, (1926) A.C 37
19. Northern terri tory V. Collins, (2008) 83 A.L.J.R. 1

22
said that, “you must look at the whole instrument in as much as there may be inaccuracy
taken as a whole in order to give effect, if it is possible to do so, to the intention of the
framer.”20.The legislature whilst enacting one clause in plain term might introduce into
some extent qualifies its effect 21.
40 ⁋ The power of president under article 370 (1) to amend article 370 (3) through
presidential order is used. Article 367 provides various guidelines about how the
constitution may be interpreted. This order adds sub-clause 4. Article 370, via orders,
has been modified so many times, it can be expelled from the Constitution as well
without taking ‘concurrence’ of the now-defunct Constituent Assembly. The
Constitution has been recognized as a living document, after all. The substantial and
material change in the circumstances must lead to modification of statute.
41⁋ Reducing the legislation futility shall be avoided and in a case where the intention of
the Legislature cannot be given effect to, the Courts would accept the bolder
construction for the purpose of bringing about an effective result. The Courts, when
rule of purposive construction is gaining momentum, should be very reluctant to hold
that the Parliament has achieved nothing by the language it used when it is tolerably
plain what it seeks to achieve.
42⁋ "Further we wish to clarify that it is a cardinal principle of interpretation of statute that
the words of a statute must be understood in their natural, ordinary or popular sense and
construed according to their grammatical meaning, unless such construction leads to
some absurdity or unless there is something in the context or in the object of the statute
to suggest to the contrary. The golden rule is that the words of a statute must prima facie
be given their ordinary meaning. It is yet another rule of construction that when the
words of the statute are clear, plain and unambiguous, then the courts are bound to give
effect to that meaning, irrespective of the consequences. It is said that the words
themselves best declare the intention of the law-giver. The courts have adhered to the
principle that efforts should be made to give meaning to each and every word used by
the legislature and it is not a sound principle of construction to brush aside words in a
statute as being inapposite surpluses, if they can have a proper application in
circumstances conceivable within the contemplation of the statute.
43⁋ In Dyson holding ltd. V. Cox (1976) Q.B. 503, raised a related question as to what
________________________________
20. Charles Robert leader V. George F. Diffey, (1888) 13 A.C.
21. Administrator – General of Bengal V. Premlalmaullick, (1895) I.L.R 22 Cal. 788
23
happens when a word used in a statute, changes its meaning by the passage of time. The
question for decision was the word ‘family’ in the expression ‘member of family’. The
judges held that whatever may have been the position in1950 the meaning of the word
‘family’ had clearly changed.
3.4] The impugned orders do not violate Article 368 of the Indian Constitution.
44 ⁋ It is humbly contended before this Hon’ble Court that the President of Ayarvartta has
the authority and power to pass impugned orders with respect to State of J&K by
invoking sub-clause (d) of clause (1) of Article 370 of the Constitution of Ayarvartta.
As per the said sub-clause, the President is empowered to extend the provisions of the
Constitution to the State of J&K subject to certain ‘exceptions’ and ‘modifications’ by
way of an order22. However, such an order must be issued with the concurrence of the
Government of the State if the matter in question is beyond the Instrument of
Accession.
45 ⁋ With regard to the aforementioned contention, the terms ‘modification’ and
‘Government of the State’ are explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and clause (2)
of Article 370 respectively. In Puranlal Lakhanpal v. President of India23, the court
interpreted the word ‘modification’ in sub-clause (d) of clause (1) of Article 370 which
is to be given the widest amplitude. The court said that when the Constitution used the
word “modification” in Article 370(1) the intention was that the President would have
the power to amend the provisions of the Constitution if he so thought fit in their
application to the State. The word ‘modification’ includes an amendment as well.Ibid.
Whereas, clause (2) of Article 370 provides that if the State Government has given its
concurrence with respect to the Presidential Orders issued under sub-clause (d) of
clause (1) of Article 370, it shall be placed before the State’s Constituent Assembly 22.
46 ⁋ In the instant case, the Presidential Order of 1954 was promulgated by the President of
Aryavarttan under sub-clause (d) of clause (1) of Article 370, extending the
constitutional provisions of Aryavarttan to the State of J&K. The Order of 1954, also
‘modified’ the Constitution with the introduction of Article 35A to Part III of the
Aryavarttan Constitution as the power to modify also includes the power to add by such
an order. The Presidential Order of 1954, however, was made while the State’s
Constituent Assembly was alive. The State’s Constituent Assembly had given its
_________________________________
22. MP Jain, Indian Constitutional Law, 8th Edition 2019
23. Puranlal Lakhanpal v. President of India (1962) 1 SCR 688

24
concurrence regarding the Order24.

47⁋ The proviso to Article 368 of the Aryavarttan Constitution States the powers of the
Parliament under Article 370 must be exercised from time to time in order to bring into
effect in State of J&K amendments made by Parliament in the Constitution in
accordance with Article 368. Article 368 was not a non-obstante clause during the
Presidential Order of 1954. It was only after the twenty-fourth amendment of the
Aryavarttan Constitution that the Article was made to be non-obstante in nature. Article
370 of the Constitution, having a non-obstante clause, empowers the President to make
amendments to the State of J&K by way of issuing Orders. In the instant case, addition
of Article 35A to Part III of the Constitution through the Presidential Order of 1954 can
be regarded as a special provision applicable only to the State of J&K and cannot be
regarded as a constitutional amendment.
48 ⁋ Article 368 clearly says that an amendment to the Constitution can be made only with
the introduction of the Bill in either houses of Parliament.This is the sole legislative
competence of the Parliament and cannot be delegated as it is the essential or primary
power of the legislation. The essential power of the legislature, namely, laying down
legislative policy, cannot be delegated. However, in the instant case, the order made by
the President did not amend the Constitution but merely added an Article of special
characteristic. Article 370 of the Ayarvattan Constitution conferred an executive power
upon the President to issue orders with regard to the State of J&K and cannot render it
as violation of Doctrine of Separation of Powers.
49⁋ That the Article 368 is not primarily intended for amending the Constitution as
applicable in J&K, but is for the purpose of carrying the amendments made in the
Constitution for the rest of India into Constitution as applied in the State of J&K. Even,
in this process, the powers of the President under Article 370 have to be exercised and,
consequently, it cannot be held that the applicability of this Article would necessarily
curtail the power of the President under Article 370.
50⁋ Therefore, it is humbly submitted to this Hon’ble Court that the Presidential Order of
1954 made under sub-clause (d) of clause (1) of Article 370 is valid and that the
executive did not encroach upon the powers conferred upon the Parliament under
Article 368 as the Doctrine of Separation of Powers was not violated.
________________________
24. AG Noorani, A Constitutional History of J&K, page,12.
25
4. DOES THE JAISH AND KAISH (REORGANISATION) ACT, 2019 VIOLATE

ARTICLE 3 AND PART III OFTHE ARYAVARTTAN CONSTITUTION?
4.1] J&K Reorganisation Act, 2019 is Constitutional
51⁋ It is contended that there is no constitutional guarantee of continuing existence of a

State that existed at the commencement of the Constitution or came into existence
later25. And under the constitution of Aryavartta, Article 370(1)(c) explicitly lists the
two constitutional articles that will apply to J&K that are Article 1 which enumerates
Aryavartta’s constituent divisions and Article 370 itself. Article 370(1)(d) explains how
other constitutional provisions may discretionarily be applied to the state as modified
by the president of India through an order, along with the "concurrence" of the
"Government of the State." In this way, Article 370(1)(d) has been used to "incorporate"
other provisions of the Constitution of Aryavartta to the State of J&K. Moreover, in the
instant case important situation to stimulate 370(1)(d) for the application of other
constitutional provisions to Jammu and Kashmir, there is presently no "Government of
the State" in J&K to "concur" with the president. There was a failure of state machinery
in 2018. Since then, after the Governor's Rule the state has been under the direct rule of
the President of Aryavartta.
52⁋ As according to the Art. 1, Constitution of Aryavartta, J&K is part of territory of
Aryavartta. It would be possible for the Parliament of Aryavartta to increase or decrease
the area of J&K, to alter its name or boundaries in the manner provided in Arts. 3-4
only if the Legislature of the J&K consents26, but in the instant case in the State of J&K
there is failure of constitutional machinery thereby imposition of President's Rule under
Art. 356. Since according to Art. 356, President can suspend that part in respect the
operation of any provisions of Constitution relating to any authority in the State." In the
instant case there is a suspension of Proviso to Art. 3 and it is valid under Art. 356 as
in a very landmark Case whose situation is somehow similar to the instant case
Manohar Lal v. Union27, the petitioner contended that the Punjab Reorganisation
Act, 1962, was invalid because the Bill which was subsequently enacted into the
_____________________________
25. State of West Bengal v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1241
26. (51 DURGA DAS BASU, SHORTER CONSTITUTION OF INDIA 25 (12th Edn., Reprinted 2012
27. Manohar Lal v. Union, A.I.R. 1970 Delhi 178

26
impugned Act had not been referred to the State legislature as required by the Proviso
to Art. 3. In rejecting the contention, the court held that the President had issued a
proclamation under Art. 356(1)(c) had suspended the operation of the proviso to Art. 3
in so far as it referred to sending the Bill to the State Legislature for its opinion and also
suspended Art. 174(1) and 2(a). The impugned law was validly enacted because the
exercise of power under Art. 356 prevailed over the requirement of the relevant part of
the proviso to Art. 328.
4.2] Presidential Order is not violative of Part-III of the Constitution of Aryavartta
53⁋ Fundamental Rights and Their Limitations; Fundamental rights, as enshrined in Part-
III of the Indian Constitution, are the bedrock of individual liberties and serve as a
safeguard against arbitrary state actions. However, these rights are not absolute and are
subject to reasonable restrictions in the interest of the general public and the state's
security.
• It is most respectfully submitted that 'The Constitution (Application to J&K)
Order 2019 is not violative of the Part-III, since, no fundamental rights are
absolute and are subject to reasonable restrictions.
• Reasonable restrictions under the scope of Article 19(2) have been upheld to not be
violative of Fundamental Rights under variety of cases. In the case of Chintaman Rao
v. State of Madhya Pradesh29 it was held that: "The phrase "reasonable restriction"
connotes that the limitation imposed on a person in enjoyment of the right should not
be arbitrary or of an excessive nature, beyond what is required in the interests of the
public. The word "reasonable" implies intelligent care and deliberation, that is, the
choice of a course which reason deliberate.
• And therefore, the situation in the State of J&K was such that the restrictions imposed
as given in the factsheet" could be justified in view of maintenance of the "security of
the State."
4.3] Not violative of the Federal Constitutional Framework
54⁋ It is humbly submitted before the Hon'ble Court of Justice that, The Constitution
(Application to J&K) Order,2019 is not violative of the Aryavarttan Federal
Constitutional Framework. It is so because the federalism followed in Aryavartta is not
true federalism rather Aryavartta is quasi-federal. It has been made evident by different
________________________________
28. H.M.SEERVAI, CONSTITUTION OF INDIA 313 (4thEdn., Reprinted 2013)
29. Chintaman Rao v. State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 1951 SC 118

27
cases decided by this Hon'ble court. In the case of State of Karnataka v. Union of
India30, it was held that the Constitution of India is not truly federal in character.
55⁋ Moreover, most respectfully it is submitted that federation exists only if the Union and
units are co-equal, however, B.R.Ambedkar said that the Indian Federation was a
"Union" because it was indissoluble and no state has the right to secede from it. The f
ederation is a Union because it is indestructible i.e., Strong centre to secure the nation.
56⁋ It is therefore contented that the present order of the President does not violate the
Aryavarttan Federalism Constitutional Framework. Rather, it would enhance the
federal relation between Union of J&K and the Centre as Aryavartta enjoys with the
others.
4.4]For the sake of Social Interest the legal status of State of J&K changed
57⁋ Sometimes the social changes are necessary so as to overcome the problems prevalent
due to the formal legal practices such as in the case off Triple Talaq and in strict sense,
the concern of the law is with the social interest of the people. Since according to
Jhering, the real force which moves man to action is interest. To him action without
interest is absurdity. As in this case, from the social perspective the J&K Reorganisation
Act, 2019 establishes equality among all Aryavarttan citizens that is enshrined in our
Constitution." This historic move also extends the policies of union to all marginalized
strata of society in J&K and Radakh. This great move will pave the way for much
needed economic growth of the union territories of J&K and Radakh " With the
reorganization of J&K and Radakh, especially Radakh emerging as a separate Union
Territory, the opportunities for economic growth and human development would be
opened up for the poor people of Radakh. So, the move towards the reorganization of
the State of J&K into the union territories is for the sake of social interest.
As over the past decades, the State of J&K is used for political opportunism." It is used
for the purpose of fulfilling personal political requirements. Even though from 2000-
2016, 10% of all Central funds despite having 1% population still there is very less
economic growth and funds were not directly invested for the welfare of the people of
the State of 94 J&K. So, to concentrate the funds over the economic and social welfare
of the State, the legal status of the State of J&K is changed into the union territories of
____________________________
30. State of Karnataka v. Union of India, 1978 SCR (2) 1
28
J&K and Radakh as funds from the centre will be directly invested in these union
territories.
58⁋ Moreover, the region of Radakh has great geostrategic importance over the past. Yet it
had received step-motherly treatment from the State legislators in terms of required
funds as most of their members belong to the region of J&K, despite occupying some
60% of the State's geographical area. And in this region 90% of the population are tribes
who having limited means of livelihood, poor roads, impossible telecom and internet
connectivity, undeveloped markets for their produce and low employment
opportunities." Hence, to overcome these problems, the J&K Reorganisation Act, 2019
is come forward so, that by the direct control of the central government there will be
allocation of funds and the welfare schemes to be implemented effectively, exclusively
for the people of these union territory.

29
PRAYER
Wherefore in the light of the issues raised, arguments advanced and the authorities cited, it is
humbly prayed that this Hon'ble Supreme Court of Aryvartta may be pleased to adjudge and
declare:
a) That, the writ petition under Art. 32 filed ought to be held unmaintainable
b) That, the abrogation of Art. 370 is valid
c) That, the constitutionality of Jaish and Kaish Reorganization Act 2019 be upheld
And/or, pass any other order as it deems fit in the interest of justice, equity and good
conscience.
For this act of kindness, the Respondent shall duty bound forever pray.
Place:
Date: Respectfully submitted
Sd/-
COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENT

30

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INTRA-COLLEGIATE MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2023-2024

Team Code: T-9

BEFORE THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF ARYAVARTTA

WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 32 OF THE

JAN JAGRUKT AND ORS. … PETITIONERS

UNION OF ARYAVARTTA …RESPONDENT

WRITTEN SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT

COUNSEL APEARING ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT

13. CST vs. Mangalsenshyamlal, A.I.R 1975 S.C. 1106 22

14. M. Pentiah V. Veeramallappamuddala, A.I.R 1961 S.C 1107 22

15. Whitney V. I.R.C, (1926) A.C 37 22

16. Northern terri tory V. Collins, (2008) 83 A.L.J.R. 1 22

17. Charles Robert leader V. George F. Diffey, (1888) 13 A.C 23

18. Administrator – General of Bengal V. 23

21. Manohar Lal v. Union, A.I.R. 1970 Delhi 178 26

22. Chintaman Rao v. State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 1951 SC 118 27

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT

23. State of Karnataka v. Union of India, 1978 SCR (2) 1 28

II. Jammu and Kashmir Reorganization Act, 2019

III. The Gazette of India dated 19/12/2018

IV. The Gazette of India dated 05/ 08/2019

1. Basu, Durga Das. Indian Constitutional Law. Lexisnexis butterworths wadhwa,

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT

Pg. No. Page Number

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT

1⁋ The Union of Aryavartta is Sovereign, Socialist, Secular, Democratic Republic with a

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT

1. Whether the Petition is Maintainable before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT

2. WHETHER THE ABROGATION OF ARTICLE 370 IS VALID WITH SPECIAL

2.1] Abrogation of Art. 370 is valid with reference to Art. 14

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT

3. WHETHER THE ABROGATION OF ARTICLE 370 IS VALID WITH SPECIAL

3.1] ARTICLE 356

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT

concurrence regarding the Order24.

4. DOES THE JAISH AND KAISH (REORGANISATION) ACT, 2019 VIOLATE

4.1] J&K Reorganisation Act, 2019 is Constitutional

51⁋ It is contended that there is no constitutional guarantee of continuing existence of a

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT

Date: Respectfully submitted

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT

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