Memo

Team Code: T-9
BEFORE THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF ARYAVARTTA
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 32 OF THE

CONSTITUTION OF ARYAVARTTA
IN THE MATTER OF
JAN JAGRUKT AND ORS. … PETITIONERS
VERSUS
UNION OF ARYAVARTTA …RESPONDENT
WRITTEN SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF PETITIONERS
COUNSEL APPEARING ON BEHALF OF PETITIONERS

INTRA-COLLEGIATE MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2023-2024
TABLE OF CONTENT
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES……………………………………………3
CASE CITED……………………………………………………………3
LEGISLATION………………………………………………………….4
LEGAL DATABASE………………………………………………..…4
BOOKS REFERED……………………………………………………....4
LIST OF ABBRIVATION………………………………………………5
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION……………………………………6
STATEMENT OF FACTS………………………………………………7-8
STATEMENT OF ISSUES……………………………………………….9
SUMMARY ARGUMENTS……………………………………………..10-11
ARGUMENT ADVANCE
1. Whether the Petition is Maintainable before the Hon’ble Supreme Court
of Aryavartta under Article 32 of the Aryavarttan Constitution?
……. 12- 16
2. Whether the abrogation of Article 370 is valid with special reference to
Articles 14, 19and 21 of the Aryavarttan Constitution?
…… 17-22
3. Whether the method followed to abrogate Article 370 is violative of
…… 23-27
4. Does The Jaish and Kaish (Reorganisation) Act, 2019 violate Article 3
and Part III ofthe Aryavarttan Constitution?
……. 28-33
PRAYER…………………………………………………… 34
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF PETITIONERS

2
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
CASE CITED
Sr. Case Name Page No.
No.
1 Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar Union (regd.) Sindri V. UOI, (1981) 1 12
SCC 568
2 Kochunni v State of Madras, AIR 1959 SC 7252 13
3 Prem Chand Garg v Excise Commissioner, AIR 1963 SC 996 13
4 State of Madras v VG Row, AIR 1952 SC 196 13
5 MC Mehta v UOI, AIR 1987 SC 1086 13
6 Hindi Hitrashak Samiti v UOI, AIR 1990 SC 851 13
7 L. Chandra Kumar v. UOI, ( (1997) 3 SCC 261 14

8 Manohar Lal Sharma v Principal Secretary, (2014) 2 SCC 532 14
9 Dattaraj Nathuji Thaware v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2005 SC 540 14
10 B. Singh (Dr) v. Union of India, ((2004) (3) SCC 363 14
11 Bodhisattawa v. Subhra Chakraborty (1996) 1 SCC 490 15
12 Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar Union (regd.) Sindri V. UOI, (1981) 1 15
SCC 568
13 Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras, 1950 SCC 436 15
14 Kavalappara Kottarathil Kochunni alias Moopil Nair v. The State of 16
Madras
15 K.C. Gajapati Narayan Deo vs State of Orissa, AIR 1953 SC 375 18
16 Nazeer Ahmed v King Emperor, 1936 SCC OnLine PC 41 18
17 Kesavananda Bharati v State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225 19
18 20
Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India, 2020 SCC Online SC 25: AIR
2020 SC 1308
19 (PUCL) v. Union of India, (1997) 1 SCC 301 21
20 Kharak Singh v. State of U.P, AIR 1963 SC 1295 22
21 Mohd. Maqbool Damnoo v State of Jammu and Kashmir, AIR 1972 SC 23

3
963
22 NCT of Delhi v Union of India (2018) 8 SCC 501 24
23 Nazeer Ahmed v King Emperor, 1936 SCC OnLine PC 41 25
24 Kesavananda Bharati v State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225 25
25 Gopalan's case (Gopalan V. State of Madras, (1950) SCR 88 29
26 Makhan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1964 SC 381 30
27 Chiranjit Lal vs. Union of India (1950) SCR 869 31
LEGISLATION
I. The Constitution of India
II. Jammu and Kashmir Reorganization Act, 2019
III. The Gazette of India dated 19/12/2018
IV. The Gazette of India dated 05/ 08/2019
LEGAL DATABASE
I. http://www.manupatra.com
II. http://www.supremecourtcaselaw.com
III. http://www.scconline.com
IV. https://www.livelaw.in
V. http://www.scobserver.in
VI. http://www.barandbench.in
VII. http://www.aironline.in
BOOKS REFERED
1. Basu, Durga Das. Indian Constitutional Law. Lexisnexis butterworths wadhwa,
8th Ed. Reprint 2011.
2. H.M.SEERVAI, CONSTITUTION OF INDIA 313 (4thEdn., Reprinted 2013

4
LIST OF ABBRIVATION
Aryavartta India
Jaish and Kaish Jammu & Kashmir
AIR All India Report
Art. Article
PIL Public Interest Litigation
SC Supreme Court
HC High Court
V. Versus
Hon’ble Honorable
Cl. Clause
UOI Union of India
Ors Others
Pg. No. Page Number
Sr. No. Serial Number
v. Versus
¶ Paragraph

5
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
It is humbly submitted that the Counsel on behalf of the Petitioners has approached the
Hon’ble Supreme Court of Aryavartta which has the jurisdiction in this matter under
Article-32of the Constitution of Aryavartta which reads as follows-
ARTICLE 32 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF ARYAVARTTA

READS AS FOLLOWS:
Remedies for the enforcement of rights conferred by this part-
(1) The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement
of the rights conferred by this part is guaranteed,
(2) The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or orders or writs including
writs in the nature of Habeas Corpus, Mandamus, Prohibition, Quo warranto and
Certiorari, whichever may be appropriate, for the enforcement of any of the rights
conferred by this part.”

6
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1⁋ The Union of Aryavartta is Sovereign, Socialist, Secular, Democratic Republic with a

quasi-federal structure which is governed by Written constitution of Aryavartta and has
largest democracy in the world. The Union of Aryavartta was previously under British
Rule and gained independence in 1947 presently constituting of 28 states with separate
legislative assemblies and 8 union territories. When Aryavartta gained independence from
British rule in 1947, Princely States were given the choice to join either Aryavartta or
Rakistan.
2⁋ Jaish and Kaish, located in the northernmost part of Aryavartta, has a rich history
culturally and geographically dating back to ancient times. Maharaja Ravi Singh, the then
Ruler of Jaish and Kaish, decided to accede to Aryavartta in October 1947 subject to
signing the "Instrument of Accession", with certain conditions which are read as follows:
2(i)⁋ It restricted the Dominion Legislature from authorizing the compulsory acquisition of land
for any purpose.
2(ii)⁋ The Instrument denied commitment in any way or to fetter discretion to enter into an
arrangement with the Government of Aryavartta under any future constitution of
Aryavartta.
2(iii)⁋ It empowered the Sovereignty of the State and specifically mentioned that this Instrument
will not affect the same.
2(iv)⁋ The Parliament was not permitted to make any laws that were applicable to the Stateof
Jaish and Kaish except laws on the subject of Defence, External Affairs, Communications,
Elections, Judiciary, etc.
3 ⁋ The Constitution of Aryavartta was adopted in the year 1950. Article 370 was incorporated
in the Constitution, granting special autonomous status to the region of Jaish and Kaish
allowing the state to have it’s own Constitution, flag and significant autonomy. Article
35A was inserted into the Constitution through a Presidential Order in 1954, that granted
special rights and privileges to the permanent residents of the State of Jaish and Kaish.
4⁋ Aggrieved by the special provisions provided to the residents of Jaish and Kaish, citizens
of Aryavartta had been retaliating for many years and they contended that the separate set
of laws for the people of Jaish and Kaish is affecting the sovereignty and integrity of the
nation. There was a sense of civil unrest for a long time in the State of Jaish and Kaish.In
June 2018, Governor’s rule was imposed in the state of Jaish and Kaish due to the failure

7
of the state machinery and following the lapse of 6 months of the Governor’s rule, an
imposition of the Presidents rule was seen in December, 2018, under the article 356 of the
Aryavarttan constitution.
5⁋ Considering the public appeal at large, in the year 2019, the President of Aryavartta passed
an order stating that all the laws of Aryavartta shall apply to Jaish and Kaish and the move
resulted in the effect of the following changes:
5(i)⁋ The Special rights and privileges granted to the residents of Jaish and Kaish were
abrogated.
5(ii)⁋ The State of Jaish and Kaish was bifurcated into two Union ie. Jaish and Kaish and
Radakh with new administrative and constitutional arrangements.
6⁋ Following the abrogation of Article 370 and Article 35A, J & K were fully integrated into
Aryavartta, and Aryavarttan laws were uniformly applicable across the region of J & K.
The abrogation of the said Articles led to protests which resulted in curfews imposed by
the Central Government in various parts of J & K, leading to restrictions on movement
along with curtailment of the internet and mobile services resulting into the complete
shutdown in the region.
7⁋ Fraction of population termed this move of the Central government as undemocratic due
to sudden abrogation of the said Articles (35A and 370) following which a number of
petitions arose alleging that the President’s order of 2019 of abrogating article 370 and
35A is unconstitutional and thus should be struck down. Jan Jagrukt an organization also
filed a Public Interest Litigation, under Art. 32 of the aryavarttan constitution before the
Apex Court.
8⁋ The Apex Court clubbed all the petitions with the petition of Jan Jagrukt and the following
issues are now pending before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Aryavartta, to be decided.

8
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
The following issues are presented before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Aryavartta:
ISSUE 1
Whether the Petition is Maintainable before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of
Aryavartta under Article 32 of the Aryavarttan Constitution?
ISSUE 2
Whether the abrogation of Article 370 is valid with special reference to
ISSUE 3
Whether the method followed to abrogate Article 370 is violative of
ISSUE 4
Does The Jaish and Kaish (Reorganisation) Act, 2019 violate Article 3
and Part III ofthe Aryavarttan Constitution?

9
SUMMARY ARGUMENTS
1. Whether the Petition is Maintainable before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of

Aryavartta under Article 32 of the Aryavarttan Constitution?
This Hon'ble Court has the power to entertain the present Writ petition as Article 32 is
applicable in cases where there is a question of enforcement of fundamental rights or its
violation. The Central Government of Union of Aryavartta imposed curfews and curtailed
the internet and mobile services which resulted in the restrictions on movement and
freedom of speech and expression, which is an imminent threat to the Fundamental Right
of freedom of speech and expression and Personal Liberty of the citizens of J&K. The
Petitioners has no alternative remedy, much less an equally efficacious remedy, with
respect to the subject matter of the present Writ Petition. Furthermore, the court also has
the jurisdiction under article 32 to entertain the Petition as a PIL.
2. Whether the abrogation of Article 370 is valid with special reference to Articles
14, 19and 21 of the Aryavarttan Constitution?
The Petitioners humbly submits that the President’s order of 2019 abrogating Art. 370 is
unconstitutional and invalid as the impugned abrogation is in violation of the Art. 14, 19
and 21 of the said constitution which are Fundamental Rights enshrined under part III of
the constitution of Aryavartta and are guaranteed to the citizens.
3. Whether the method followed to abrogate Article 370 is violative of Articles 356, 367
and 368 of the Aryavarttan Constitution?
The Petitioners humbly submits that that the method utilized for the abrogation of Article
370 in J&K was, in fact, violative of Article 356, Article 367, and Article 368 of the
Aryavarttan Constitution. We contend that the process employed was not in line with the
legal and constitutional mandates, and it infringed upon the core principles enshrined in
these provisions.
4. Does The Jaish and Kaish (Reorganisation) Act, 2019 violate Article 3 and Part III

10
of the Aryavarttan Constitution?
In seeking to downgrade the status of the State of J&K into a Union Territory (with a
legislature), the J&K (Reorganisation) Act, 2019 is ultra vires Article 3 of the Constitution
of Aryavartta. It is respectfully submitted that Article 3 provides a range of powers
involving the inter-se alteration of states, the inter-se alteration of Union Territories, but
conspicuously does not authorise the degradation of the status of a state into a Union
Territory. The J&K (Reorganisation) Act, 2019 violates Fundamental Rightscontained
inter-alia in Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Aryavarttan Constitution. Theimpugned
presidential orders violate the basic principle associated with the Rule of Law that what is
prohibited to be done directly cannot also be done indirectly. The Impugned Act is contrary
to the Constitutional Scheme and basic structure of the Constitution.

11
ARGUMENTS ADVANCE
1. WHETHER THE PETITION IS MAINTAINABLE BEFORE THE HON’BLE
SUPREME COURT OF ARYAVARTTA UNDER ARTICLE 32 OF THE
ARYAVARTTAN CONSTITUTION?
[1.1] Fundamental rights of the Petitioners s are violated

1⁋ It is humbly maintained before the Hon'ble court of law that the present petition filed
by the Petitioners s under Art. 32 of the Constitution of Aryavarttan challenges the
Presidents Order of 2019 abrogating Articles 35A and 370 is as unconstitutional and
invalid in eyes of laws and therefore should be struck down as they are violative of the
Petitioner’s Fundamental Rights under Art 14,19 and 21 of the Constitution of J&K
Aryavartta. Article 370 was incorporated in the Constitution of Aryavartta contained in
Part XXI under the category of Temporary, Transitional and Special Provisions which
granted special autonomous status to the region of J&K. Art. 35A was inserted in the
said Constitution through a Presidential Order in 1954 which defined its permanent
residents and provided them with certain exclusive rights in various aspects for the
welfare of the permanent residents of J&K. Through the Presidential Order of 2019, Art.
35A and Art. 370 were abrogated from the Constitution of Aryavartta following which
the Constituent Assembly of J&K was dissolved; special rights and privileges granted
to permanent residents of J&K were abrogated and few other changes. The
constitutional changes of abrogating the said Articles aim to integrate J&K more
seamlessly into mainland India, concerns about the potential infringement of
Fundamental Rights of its permanent residents cannot be ignored.
[1.1.1] Infringement of fundamental rights
2⁋ Violation of a Fundamental Right is Sine qua non of the exercise of the rights conferred
by Art 321. Art-32 (1) guarantees the right to move the Supreme Court, by appropriate
proceedings, for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights enumerated in the
Constitution. Art 32 (2) empowers the Supreme Court to issue appropriate orders or
directions, or writs including writs in the nature of Habeas corpus, Mandamus,
Prohibition, Quo Warranto and Certiorari, whichever may be appropriate, for the
enforcement of Petitioners ’s Fundamental Rights. When once the court is satisfied that
______________________________
1. Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar Union (regd.) Sindri V. UOI, (1981) 1 SCC 568

12
the Petitioner’s Fundamental Right has been infringed, it is not only its right but also its
duty to afford relief to the Petitioners . It was further held that when the Petitioners
establishes the infringement of his Fundamental Right, the court has no discretion but
to issue an appropriate writ in his favour 2. For the maintainability of the present petition,
it is expedient to note that the Central Government imposed curfews; there were
restrictions on the movement; Internet and mobile services were curtailed which led to
a complete shutdown in the region of J&K. The said move was completely undemocratic
and the voices of the people of J&K should have been were not considered violating
their fundamental right considered.
3⁋ In Prem Chand Garg v Excise Commissioner3, the Supreme Court has described the
significance of Article 32 where the court appropriately described that the fundamental
right to move to Supreme Court as the corner stone of democratic edifice raised by the
constitution and stated that in discharging the duties assigned to it the court has to play
the role of a ‘sentinel on the qui vive’ and it must always regard. It as its solemn duty to
protect the said Fundamental Rights zealously and vigilantly4.
4⁋ The court has explained the position of Supreme Court in MC Mehta v UOI5 that the
court under Article 32(1) is free to devise any procedure appropriate for the particular
purpose of the proceedings namely, enforcement of a Fundamental Right under Article
32(1) the court has the implicit power to issue whatever direction, order or writ is
necessary in a given case, including all incidental or ancillary power necessary to secure
enforcement of the Fundamental Right. In order to establish the violation of Fundamental
Right, the court has to consider the direct and inevitable consequences of the action
which is sought to be remedied or the guarantee of which is sought to be enforced 6.
[1.1.2] Power of Judicial Review of Supreme Court
5⁋ The Apex court has not only been granted with the powers to issue writs or orders or
constitutionality of a legislation. The SC in the present case has an extensive original
jurisdiction to test out the constitutionality of legislation under Art. 32. The power of
Judicial Review granted to SC and HC was recognized as a constituent of basic structure
doctrine which subjects the legislative actions to the scrutiny of a superior court whereby
_____________________
2. Kochunni v State of Madras, AIR 1959 SC 7252
3. Prem Chand Garg v Excise Commissioner, AIR 1963 SC 996
4. State of Madras v VG Row, AIR 1952 SC 196
5. MC Mehta v UOI, AIR 1987 SC 1086
6. Hindi Hitrashak Samiti v UOI, AIR 1990 SC 851

13
the test of a statute's constitutional validity can never be ousted or excluded 7. The courts
have been of the view that if certain provisions of a legislation arbitrarily or excessively
infringe the fundamental rights of the Petitioners, it cannot contain the quality of being a
reasonable restriction. A balance between the freedom of a person and the social control
permitted to the state has to be achieved.
6⁋ In Manohar Lal Sharma v Principal Secretary8, it was observed that Constitutional courts
i.e., Supreme Court and the High Court are sentinels of justice and have been vested with
extraordinary powers of Judicial review to ensure that the rights of citizens are duly
protected
1.2] Petitioners have the required Locus Standii
7⁋ A PIL can be filed against the State under Article 32 of the Constitution in the event of a
violation of fundamental rights. One of the necessary conditions for a PIL is that it should
involve public interest, The Hon'ble Supreme Court has ruled that a person acting bona fide
and having sufficient interest in maintaining an action for judicial redress for public injury
to put the judicial machinery in motion will be believed to have the requisite locus standi9.
a) ⁋ Locus standi refers to the place of standing, a right of appearance in a court of Justice,
It signifies the right to bring an action and to be heard, and a person acquires locus
standi, when he has to have a personal or individual right that has been violated or
threatened to be violated.
b) ⁋ A PIL should be filed by a public spirited individual. A Petitioners is having locus

standi to ask the Court to treat the matter as a PIL as though a community might be
benefitted by the judgment of the Court.
c) ⁋ It is humbly submitted that in the present instance, the petition filed by Petitioners is a
PIL, as they do have locus standi, and it represents any under privilege group who
cannot approach the court. Further, it is for public interest that they have filed a petition
under Article 32, as one of the essentials of a PIL is that it has some pecuniary interest,
or some interest by which their rights and liabilities are affected. Interest shared by
citizens in general in affairs of Local, State or National Government should involve
public interest 10.
__________________________
7. L. Chandra Kumar v. UOI, ( (1997) 3 SCC 261
8. Manohar Lal Sharma v Principal Secretary, (2014) 2 SCC 532
9. Dattaraj Nathuji Thaware v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2005 SC 540
10. B. Singh (Dr) v. Union of India, ((2004) (3) SCC 363

14
d) ⁋ It is, therefore, humbly submitted that since the rights of the Petitioners have been
infringed, they have the required locus standi before this Hon’ble Court.
[1.4] That the Right to approach this Hon’ble Court is a fundamental right in itself
8⁋ Art. 32 constitutes the basic right of citizens to seek constitutional remedies which works
on the doctrine ‘Ubi Jus Ibi Remedium’, i.e. ‘where there is right, there is a remedy’. Courts
have time and again acknowledged the role of SC as ‘Sentinel on the qui vive’. The right
to seek remedy under Art. 32 is contained in Part III of the Constitution of Aryavartta which
makes it a Fundamental Right in itself 11. Right to approach SC under Art. 32 is not only
conferred as the cornerstone of the democratic edifice raised by the constitution but has
also been recognized as one of the most highly cherished rights12. It not only confers
powers to SC but also lays upon a duty to guard and uphold the Fundamental Rights of the
citizens of the country. The SC has affirmed that fundamental rights are not only intended
to protect an individual's basic rights but they are based on high public policy which makes
these rights the essence of the Constitution and obliges the Apex court to render its duty as
its custodian. The court cannot refuse to entertain or issue an appropriate writ unless it is
provided by the Constitution.
[1.5] Availability of Alternative Remedy Is No Bar to Seek Writ Under Article 32

9⁋ The power granted to approach SC under Art. 32 and the right to approach HC under Art.
226 fall in the category of constitutional remedies whereby both the courts enjoy concurrent
jurisdiction. The Petitioners having the liberty to approach any of the courts, filed a writ
petition under Art. 32 invoking its original jurisdiction and the contention of availability of
alternative remedy cannot become a bar against the Petitioner's right to access SC
directly.The Apex court has acknowledged that it is not necessary to approach HC first and
then knock on the doors of the SC. It is humbly submitted before the Hon'ble court that
Art. 32 is a fundamental right in itself, whereas Art. 226 is a constitutional right. In the
landmark judgment of Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras13, rejecting the preliminary
___________________________
11. Bodhisattawa v. Subhra Chakraborty (1996) 1 SCC 490
12. Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar Union (regd.) Sindri V. UOI, (1981) 1 SCC 568
13. Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras, 1950 SCC 436

15
objection of the respondents, the court held that SC cannot refuse to entertain writ
petitions merely on the ground of availability of an alternative remedy because it is a
fundamental right and casts a duty on the court to protect the interest of citizens upon the
infringement of their fundamental rights. In Kavalappara Kottarathil Kochunni alias
Moopil Nair v. The State of Madras14, the SC elaborated on the scope of Art. 32 and
rightfully elucidated, “the view that this court is bound to entertain a petition under Art.
32 and to decide the same on merits may encourage litigants to file many petitions under
Art. 32, instead of proceeding by way of a suit. But that consideration cannot by itself be
a cogent reason for denying the fundamental right of a person to approach this Court for
the enforcement of his fundamental right which may, prima facie, appear to have been
infringed.”
_____________________________
14. Kavalappara Kottarathil Kochunni alias Moopil Nair v. The State of Madras

16
2. WHETHER THE ABROGATION OF ARTICLE 370 IS VALID WITH SPECIAL

REFERENCE TO ARTICLES 14, 19 AND 21 OF THE ARYAVARTTAN
CONSTITUTION?
10⁋ In 1950 Art. 370 was incorporated in the said Constitution which granted special
autonomous status to the region of J&K and the state to have its own Constitution, flag
and significant autonomy. In 2019, there was a sudden abrogation of the said Articles
through a Presidential Order while the state was under the President’s rule under
Article 356.
11⁋ Provision of Art. 370 (3) clearly mandates that a declaration by the President is subject
to approval by the Constituent Assembly, the President has attempted to indirectly
amend Art 370 as he cannot do it directly. The President has exceeded the confines of
power delegated to him under Article 370(1)(d). He can’t use the power given to him
under the constitution to do to the constitution that which the constitution never
intended for him to do. Also, the fundamental rights i.e. Art. 14, 19 and 21 of the
citizens of J&K are violated due to this sudden abrogation of the art. 370 and 35A
which is not valid in the eyes of the law.
2.1] Violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of Aryavartta
12⁋ It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that the sudden abrogation of Art.
370 has violated the Fundamental Right of Equality before Law protected under Art.
14 of the said Constitution of the people of J&K.
13⁋ Right to equality before law is one of the basic features of the constitution and is an
eminent part of Fundamental Rights provided to the people. Equality doesn't mean
equal treatment unjustly but instead implies that all people in similar circumstances
may be treated equally in hopes of equal justice. The right to equal justice of the
Petitioners is being hindered due abrogation of Art. 370 which gave a special
autonomous status to the residents of J&K. Art. 14 permits Reasonable Classification
and not Class Legislation.
13(i) ⁋- The classification must be founded on intelligible differentia, distinguishing grouped
together persons or goods from the left out ones of the group.
13(ii) ⁋- The differential must be in a rational relation with the sought object that is to be
achieved by the act. The object of the act and differential on the basis of classification

17
are two separate things. It is essential that there must be the presence of nexus between
the object of the act and the basis of classification. When a reasonable basis is not
present for classification then such classification made classification made by the
legislature must be declared discriminatory.
14⁋ Likewise in the present petition, it was obligatory on the respondents to ensure that
before making the changes, a proper methodology for ascertaining the will of the
people was followed in line with the constitutional imperatives of Art. 370 and a
reasonable basis should be present which were not. The sudden abrogation of Art. 370
without the consideration of the relevant factors and not giving a hearing to the affected
people of the Jaish and Kaish and without ascertaining the will of the people of J&K
has undermined the basic principle of democracy.
15⁋ There are two features laid in Art. 14; - Equality before the law and Equal protection
of the law. In the present case the abrogation of Art. 370 was sudden and abrupt as
mentioned in the facts of the present case. The move made by the respective authorities
did not consider the voices of the people before law, which should have been
considered through a democratic process. The said move violates provision of Equality
before Law as it means that among equals the law should be equal and should be
equally administered, that like should be treated alike.
16⁋ The concurrence ought to be set aside for violating Art. 14 of the said Constitution for
non-consideration of relevant factors and for not giving a hearing to affected parties –
including the people of J&K.
17⁋ The Presidential Order of 2019 is colorable action of legislative as this doctrine
basically means when one does not have the power to do it directly, one can't do it
indirectly. This doctrine was discussed in K.C. Gajapati Narayan Deo vs. State of
Orissa15. In the present case, the union has done something similar. The union could
not amend article 370 directly as it required the concurrence of the constituent
assembly. In Nazeer Ahmed v King Emperor16, the rule laid was that, “Where a
power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way the thing must be done in that
way or not at all, other methods of performance are necessarily forbidden.
__________________________
15. K.C. Gajapati Narayan Deo vs State of Orissa, AIR 1953 SC 375
16. Nazeer Ahmed v King Emperor, 1936 SCC OnLine PC 41

18
18⁋ This decision to rewrite a part of the Constitution is unconstitutional as it would

involve abrogating the basic structure as laid down by the Supreme Court in the
landmark Kesavananda Bharati v State of Kerala17, case where it is said that the
power to amend does not include the power to alter the basic structure of the
Constitution so as to change its identity. The majority of the judges in that case held
the Federal character of the Constitution to be a part of its basic structure.
2.1] Violation of Article 19 with special reference to abrogation of Art. 370
19⁋ It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that the sudden abrogation of Art.
370 has violated the Fundamental Right of Freedom of Speech as protected under
Art. 19 (of the Aryavarttan Constitution) of the people of J&K.
20⁋ As stated in the facts of the present case (point 7 ) the aftereffects of abrogation of
Art. 370 was followed by curfews imposed by the Central Government, there were
restrictions on movement, internet and mobile services were curtailed leading to a
complete shutdown in the region of J&K.
21⁋ Under Art.19(d) which provides that all citizens shall have the right to move freely
throughout the territory of India, Residents of J&K were deprived of this particular
right as there were restrictions imposed on their movement. Further Art. 19 (5)
provides that “Nothing in [sub-clauses (d) and (e)] of the said clause shall affect the
operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State from making
any law imposing, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of any of the rights
conferred by the said sub-clauses either in the interests of the general public or for
the protection of the interests of any Scheduled Tribe.
22⁋ The Constitution of India empowers the State to impose restrictions upon the above
freedoms only if they come into the purview of the Reasonableness of Restrictions.
Reasonableness of Restrictions;
22(a) ⁋ Substantive Aspect- A restriction will be unreasonable if it is in excess of the

requirement having regard to the object which justifies the legislation; or does not
____________________________
17. Kesavananda Bharati v State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225

19
provide an objective test as to the person against whom it could be applied. The
duration of an externment provided for by the law is a relevant consideration in
determining the reasonableness of the restriction. Ordinarily a restriction upon the
freedom of movement should be upheld as reasonable only if it is of a temporary
duration. But the question of duration must be considered along with the attendant
circumstances, such as the object of the legislation, nature of the persons dealt with.
A law which provides for externment for an indefinite period would, prima facie, be
an unreasonable restriction.
22(b) ⁋ Procedural Aspect. The general rule is that a restriction upon the freedom of
movement would be procedurally unreasonable if it offends against the principles of
natural justice and in the present case as it is clear by the facts of the case that the
voices of the people involved were not heard and because of these aspects the
restrictions imposed were of unreasonable nature.
23⁋ Here in the present Petitions, restrictions on the movement of people of J&K were
not reasonable as the voices of people of J&K weren’t considered through a
democratic procedure, thus it was not in the interests of the general public. The
sudden abrogation affected the residents of J&K tremendously.
24⁋ Following the restrictions on movement, the main source of communication, the
need of todays generation Right to Internet and mobile services was also violated as
they were curtailed and there was a complete shutdown in the region.
25⁋ In the aftermath of restrictions on the freedom of movement, a fundamental facet of

contemporary communication, namely the Right to Internet and mobile services, was
ostensibly infringed upon. Internet Access comes under the parameter of the Golden
Triangle. This infringement manifested in the form of constraints imposed on access
to these services, resulting in a comprehensive shutdown within the region.
26⁋ It was held in Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India18, 33“… Expression through the
internet has gained contemporary relevance and is one of the major means of
information diffusion. Therefore, the freedom of speech and expression through
the medium of internet is an integral part of Article 19(1)(a) and accordingly,
any restriction on the same must be in accordance with Article 19(2) of the
__________________________
18. Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India, 2020 SCC Online SC 25: AIR 2020 SC 1308

20
Constitution.”
27⁋ It was held in (PUCL) v. Union of India19 that Right to freedom of speech and
expression is guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. 19. This
freedom means the right to express one's convictions and opinions freely by word of
mouth, writing, printing, picture, or in any other manner. When a person is talking
on telephone, he is exercising his right to freedom of speech and expression.
Telephone-tapping unless it comes within the grounds of restrictions under Article
19(2) would infract Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution.
Therefore, in the present petition, it is crystal clear from the facts of the case and relying
upon the above-mentioned cases and their judgements that the sudden abrogation of
Art. 370 was violative of the Right to Freedom of Speech along with other significant
rights such as Right to Internet, Freedom of Press, and other such rights of the people
of J&K.
2.3] Violation of Article 21 with special reference to abrogation of Art. 370
28⁋ Art. 21 encompasses a broad and sacrosanct protection against the arbitrary or unlawful
deprivation of an individual's life or personal liberty. The important components of Art.
21 are the following: - (i) person; (ii) deprivation of life; (iii) deprivation of personal
liberty; (iv) procedure established by law.
28 (i)⁋ In the present petitions, it has been stated in the factsheet that public at large
have been affected by the said abrogation of art. 370,
28 (ii)⁋ Any act or omission that leads to the curtailment of life, whether directly or
indirectly, falls within the purview of this critical component. The curfews
imposed by the central government; curtailing of internet and mobile services;
public at large were affected by the said acts.
28(iii)⁋ Integral to the protection afforded by Article 21 is the safeguarding of personal
liberty. This includes the right to be free from arbitrary arrest or detention and
extends to securing one's freedom of movement, association, and the pursuit of
one's chosen vocation. The deprivation of personal liberty refers to any unjust
or unwarranted restriction on an individual's freedom.
28(iv)⁋ The concept of "procedure established by law" in Article 21 underscores the
____________________________
19. (PUCL) v. Union of India, (1997) 1 SCC 301

21
requirement that any deprivation of life or personal liberty must be in accordanc

accordance with a prescribed legal process. This principle seeks to ensure that
the state's actions, whether legislative or executive, conform to a valid and just
legal framework. It emphasizes the need for procedural fairness, transparency,
and adherence to constitutional principles in the deprivation of fundamental
rights.
29⁋ The word “life” and the expression “personal liberty” in Article 21 were elaborately
considered by this Court in Kharak Singh v. State of U.P20, AIR 1963 SC 1295. The
majority read “right to privacy” as part of the right to life under Article 21 of the
Constitution on the following reasoning: “...We do not entertain any doubt that the word
‘life’ in Article 21 bears the same signification. Is then the word ‘personal liberty’ to
be construed as excluding from its purview an invasion on the part of the police of
the sanctity of a man's home and an intrusion into his personal security and his
right to sleep which is the normal comfort and a dire necessity for human existence
even as an animal? It might not be inappropriate to refer here to the words of the
preamble to the Constitution that it is designed to ‘assure the dignity of the individual’
and therefore of those cherished human values as the means of ensuring his full
development and evolution.
30⁋ The abrogation of Art. 370 has led to violation of Art. 21 as all the components have
been established. It can be briefly concluded that the abrogation of Article 370 has
resulted in a prima facie violation of Article 21 on the life and personal liberty of
individuals and due to the imposition of various unlawful restrictions such as on the
movement, internet and mobile services etc.
__________________________________
20. Kharak Singh v. State of U.P, AIR 1963 SC 1295

22
3. WHETHER THE METHOD FOLLOWED TO ABROGATE ARTICLE 370 IS

VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLES 356, 367 AND 368 OF THE ARYAVARTTAN
CONSTITUTION?
31⁋ It is most respectfully submitted on behalf of the petitioner, that the method utilized for
the abrogation of Article 370 in J&K was, in fact, violative of Article 356, Article 367,
and Article 368 of the Aryavarttan Constitution. We contend that the process employed
was not in line with the legal and constitutional mandates, and it infringed upon the core
principles enshrined in these provisions.
3.1] The impugned orders do violate Article 356 of the Aryavarttan constitution.
32⁋ As the Presidential Order has been made when the State of J&K has been under the
Presidential Rule, the consent of the people has been in fact substituted with that of
President himself acting on the advice of Union Cabinet. This effectively, amounts to
the same constitutional functionary taking its own consent, to effect a fundamental
structural change without consultation or concurrence of the persons affected by that
change, or their elected representatives. This, it is respectfully submitted, is contrary to
the rule of law, and is manifestly arbitrary. It is respectfully submitted that in any event
"Government" cannot be equated with "Governor" in matters involving the fundamental
and permanent restructuring of the State itself. Therefore, in the context of Art 370,
therefore the Hon'ble Court ought not to read 'Government' to include 'Governor', in
cases involving irreversible alteration of the relation between the States and Union of
Aryavartta.
33⁋ In Mohd. Maqbool Damnoo v State of Jammu and Kashmir21," the court stated that
an amendment to mean Sadar-i-Riyasat who was the Head of State to mean Governor,
was allowed as it did not change the fundamental nature or character of the entity of the
Head of State. But in the present case there is clear change in the character of the entity
when the "Constituent Assembly", having powers in realm of constitutional amendment
and abrogation, is sought to be substituted by the "Legislative Assembly", which has
___________________________
21. Mohd. Maqbool Damnoo v State of Jammu and Kashmir, AIR 1972 SC 963

23
legislative powers of a house of the State Legislature conferred under and thus limited
by the constitution by vesting the constituent power of a Constituent Assembly in a
single house of the State Legislature. Therefore, this amendment which would change
the very basic structure should be declared inoperative.
34⁋ It is respectfully submitted that in NCT of Delhi v Union of India22, a Constitution
Bench of the Hon'ble Court made it clear that representative democracy is a basic
feature of the constitution, and that the constitution should be interpreted to advance-
and not retard- this principle. It is respectfully submitted that in interpretation of Art
370(1) (d) that would include "Governor" within the meaning of "Government" during
the imposition of President's Rule would destroy the principle of representative
government for the reasons stated above.
3.2] Violation of the Powers
35⁋ It is well established in law that the Governor has no other discretion except as provided
under the Constitution of India. In all other cases, he is required to act under the aid and
advice of the council of ministers. Giving of consent under Article 370 even post the
amendment would imply that before giving the consent the Governor was required to
seek the aid and advice of a council of ministers. As a matter of fact, the elected
Legislative Assembly of J&K was not in place. V. Because the objective of transferring
the power of the State Legislature to the Parliament in a state of emergency under
Article 356 of the Constitution is of a purely temporary nature during the existence of
the proclamation under Article 356. In the present case, the said power has been abused
for an unconstitutional purpose, i.e., to change the very nature of the State/federal unit
and to denude the power of the State legislature itself. In the present case, the
recommendation of Parliament, as a substitute for the State Legislative Assembly is
non-est in law, as it purports to exercise the power in an unconstitutional manner i.e.,
not for the purpose of law making in the State but to alter the nature of the State itself.
Because the impugned presidential orders, particularly when viewed in the context of
the prevailing situation of President’s Rule in J&K, violate the constitutional principle
of Separation of Powers inasmuch as they conflate the executive function with the
legislative function, whereas the two are separate and distinct powers and functions, to
be exercised by separate and distinct constitutional bodies/ functionaries.
36⁋ Because, it is respectfully submitted that in NCT of Delhi v Union of India democracy,
_______________________________
22. NCT of Delhi v Union of India (2018) 8 SCC 501

24
and that the Constitution should be interpreted to advance - and not retard - this
principle. It is respectfully submitted that an interpretation of Article 370(1)(d) that
would include “governor” within the meaning of “government” during the imposition
of President’s Rule would destroy the principle of representative government, for the
reasons stated above.
3.3] The impugned orders do violate Article 367 of the Aryavarttan constitution.
37⁋ It is most humbly submitted before this Hon'ble Supreme Court of Aryavartta that the
enforcement of the Constitution (Application to J&K) Order, 2019 in the State of J&K
is not valid. The Presidential Order is tantamount to the President doing indirectly what
he cannot do directly i.e., amending Art 370 through Art 367 because he has no power
to amend Art 370 directly. In Nazeer Ahmed v King Emperor23, the rule laid was that.
"Where a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way the thing must be done
in that way or not at all, other methods of performance are necessarily forbidden.
38⁋ This decision to rewrite a part of the Constitution is unconstitutional as it would involve
abrogating the basic structure as laid down by the Supreme Court in the landmark
Kesavananda Bharati v State of Kerala24," case where it is said that the power to amend
does not include the power to alter the basic structure of the Constitution so as to change
its identity. The majority of the judges in that case held the Federal character of the
Constitution to be a part of its basic structure.
39⁋ The Centre's assault on Article 370 did not end with replacing it with a new provision
and completely changing the identity of the old provision. As the centre could not have
done so without the recommendation of the State's Constituent Assembly, as required
under Art 370(3), as the Constituent Assembly dissolved itself way back in 1956
without clarifying whether Art 370 should Continue to operate or not, something more
was required to facilitate an assault on Art 370.
40⁋ Therefore, the President sought to amend Art 367 for the purpose by adding an
additional clause (4). The Art-367 deals with the interpretation of the constitution. Now
Clause (4) reads: "In proviso to clause (3) of Art 370 of this Constitution, the expression
Constituent Assembly of the State' referred to in clause (2) shall be read as "Legislative
Assembly of the State." The power under Art- 370(1) (d), therefore, extends to
amending or modifying the applications of the provisions of the Constitution to the
______________________
23. Nazeer Ahmed v King Emperor, 1936 SCC OnLine PC 41
24. Kesavananda Bharati v State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225

25
State of J&K.This power does not extend to creating a fresh Constitutional provision
(in this case Art- 367(4)).
41⁋ This circuitous route taken by the Centre to achieve its purpose is completely
impermissible as the Presidential Order could only be used to make exceptions or
modifications but cannot be used to amend other provisions of the constitution. Art 367
could only have been amended under procedure laid down in Art 368. An amendment
under Art 368 could only be carried out when the bill for that purpose is passed in each
house by a majority of the total membership of that house and by a majority of not less
than two-thirds of the members of the house present and voting. If the constitution
elaborately lays down a procedure for the amendment of the constitution and the
President evades that procedure to achieve same purpose, the result could only be
described as a fraud on the constitution.
3.4] The impugned orders do violate Article 367 of the Aryavarttan constitution
42⁋ It becomes imperative to evaluate Article 370 on the yardstick of the basic structure.
Introduced by the Court in Kesavananda Bharti v State of Kerala (“Kesavananda
Bharati”),the basic structure doctrine postulates that the Parliament may amend any
provision of the Constitution provided the core features and principles of the
Constitution remain unchanged. Now, one may hypothetically argue that Article 370
falls outside the ambit of the basic structure doctrine because the basic structure
doctrine was propounded in relation to the constituent power of Parliament under
Article 368 and Article 370 cannot be amended by the Parliament through Article 368.
However, such an argument would be wholly misconceived as it fails to address
whether Article 370 is such an inalienable feature of the Constitution that it cannot be
amended or abrogated by the President even upon a recommendation of the Legislative
Assembly of the State. Therefore, the restriction on the amending power of Parliament,
in the form of the basic structure doctrine, would also extend to the President and the
Legislative Assembly if Article 370 is deemed to have attained the status of a basic
feature of the Constitution.
43⁋ An amendment to constitution can only be made by virtue of Article 368 by 2/3rd
majority of the Parliament present and voting, but in case of Article 370(1), it gives the
power to the President of India that nullify the article anytime but only could have done
in concurrence with the recommendation of State Government of Jammu and Kashmir.
44⁋ In the present situation the state of J&K has not had a government for months, so the

26
order was passed in consultation with the Governor of the State, and as per Article 155
of Constitution of India, the Governor of a state is appointed by President of India, and
it can be said that Governor of a State is representative of the Union Government,
hereby the Union Government has consulted itself, violating the principles of Article
370(1).
45⁋ Article 368 (Parliament’s power to amend the Constitution) would not apply to Article
370 given the special procedure already present to modify or repeal this provision under
clause (3) of Article 370.

27
4. DOES THE JAISH AND KAISH (REORGANISATION) ACT, 2019 VIOLATE

ARTICLE 3 AND PART III OFTHE ARYAVARTTAN CONSTITUTION?
4.1] Violation of Art. 3 of the Aryavarttan Constitution by the J&K Reorganisation Act,
2019.
46⁋ It is most humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that, the reorganisation of State
of J&K into two Union Territories of J&K and Radakh is Invalid. It is submitted that in
seeking to downgrade the status of the State of J&K into a Union Territory (with a
legislature), the J&K (Reorganisation) Act, 2019 is ultra vires of the Art 3 of the
Constitution.
47⁋ Aryavartta is a Union of States, bound together by a quasi-federal structure. This federal
structure has evolved organically over the years, based on the needs, requirements, and
history of the Nation. The Union Government cannot unilaterally unravel this unique
federal scheme, under cover of President’s Rule, while undermining crucial elements
of due process and the rule of law. It is respectfully submitted that the Aryavarttan
federal scheme – as exemplified by Art 1 and Art 3 of the Aryavarttan Constitution –
does not permit Parliament to retrogressively downgrade Statehood into a less
representative form such as a Union Territory.
48⁋ Art 3 authorises the formation of new States, and the alteration of areas, boundaries or
names of existing States, but it does not authorise the degradation of the status of an
existing State into a Union territory. This is made even clearer by Explanations I and II
to Art 3, where the word “State” is to be read to include a “Union Territory”, and
Parliament’s power is deemed to include “the power to form a new State or Union
Territory by uniting a part of any State or Union territory to any other State or Union
Territory.” It is respectfully submitted that Art 3 provides a range of powers involving
the inter-se alteration of states, the inter-se alteration of Union Territories, but
conspicuously does not authorise the degradation of the status of a State into a Union
Territory.
Art 1 of the Constitution of Aryavartta stipulates that “Aryavartta shall be a Union of
States.” Art 1(3) of the Constitution further stipulates that “the territory of Aryavartta
shall comprise - (a) the territories of the States”;
(b) the Union territories specified in … the First Schedule…”

28
49⁋ It is therefore submitted that for the purposes of Art 1, “States” and “Union Territories”
are treated differently, and “States” remain the constituent units of the Aryavarttan
Union. Consequently, it is respectfully submitted that the Art 3 of the Constitution
cannot be read to grant the power to the Union to convert the status of States into Union
Territories, as this power carries with it the necessary implication that the Union could
- if it chose - convert Aryavartta into a “Union of Union Territories” instead of a “Union
of States.” It is respectfully submitted that the framers of the Constitution could not
have - and did not - vest so wide or untrammelled a power in the Union Government.
It is respectfully submitted that this interpretation is supported by the consistent history
of our Nation, where the movement has always been from the status of Union Territory
to Statehood, and never the other way around. This interpretation is further supported
by the fact that Union Territories (with legislatures) have always been the creations of
Constitutional amendments, and not under the plenary power of Art 3. Examples
include Pondicherry (Art 239A) and the National Capital Territory of Delhi (NCT) (Art
239AA). Indeed, at the time of the framing of the Constitution, the concept of a Union
Territory with a legislature did not even exist. It is therefore submitted that Art 3 could
not have been intended to authorise the degradation of a State into a Union Territory
and this J&K Reorganisation Act, 2019 is violative of the Art. 3 of the Aryavarttan
Constitution.
4.2] Violation of Part III of the Constitution.
4.2.1] Violation of Art. 21
50⁋ The right to autonomous self-government and the right to an identity within the federal
framework are fundamental rights flowing from the Right to life and other provisions
contained in Part III of the Constitution. Their removal in a manner that has made a
mockery of the “procedure established by law” is clearly in violation of fundamental
rights and ought to be struck down forthwith.
'Procedure established by law’. -1. In the interpretation of this Article the Supreme
Court of India has made the amplest use of the engine of judicial review, undaunted
by the cramping language of the Article, so much so, that the resultant today is just the
opposite of what it was at the beginning.
51⁋ In Gopalan's case (Gopalan V. State of Madras25, the view of the court was that the
word 'law' had been used in the sense of State-made or enacted law natural justice.25
___________________________
25. Gopalan's case (Gopalan V. State of Madras, (1950) SCR 88

29
Hence,the expression 'procedure established by law' in the same Article meant the
procedure prescribed by the law of the State. It was not proper to construe the expression
in the light of the meaning given to the expression 'due process of law' in the American
Constitution. 'Procedure established by law' in Art. 21 meant the law prescribed by the
Legislature at any given point of time. The Legislature has the power to change the
procedure by enacting a law or amending it, and when the procedure is so changed, it
becomes the 'procedure, established by law'.
52⁋ At the same time, the court was obliged to concede that in order to be a 'law' within the
purview of this Article, it must be a 'valid' law, and that it is a valid law only if it is
enacted by a competent Legislature and if it does not violate any of the other
fundamental rights declared by the Constitution, e.g., Art. 14 or Art. 21. Hence,
notwithstanding Art. 21, it is open to challenge the constitutionality of a law which
deprives a personal liberty on the ground-
(a) that it has not been enacted by a competent Legislature
(b) that the law suffers from the vice of excessive delegation
(c) that it constitutes a colourable exercise of the legislative power26
(d) that if the law is a subordinate legislation, it is ultra vires or if it is an order,
that it is mala fide
(e) that it contravenes any of the fundamental rights other than Art. 21.26
53⁋ The actions taken appear to be in contravention of Article 14 of the Constitution of
India, a fundamental tenet that ensures equality before the law. This constitutional
provision demands that any differentiation or classification made by the government
must be both rational and justifiable. In the absence of a well-reasoned explanation or
a set of objectives behind the reorganization of the State into a Union territory, the
constitutionality of this act is brought into question.
54⁋ The principle of reasonable classification is accepted in constitutional law, but such
classification must have a valid and substantial basis, closely related to the intended
purpose, and must not be arbitrary or capricious in nature. In other words, if there is no
clear and sensible rationale for the division of the State into a Union territory, it may be
___________________________________
26. Makhan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1964 SC 381

30
deemed unconstitutional.
52⁋ In the case of Chiranjit Lal vs. Union of India26 (1950) SCR 869, the Indian judiciary
has emphasized that classification should not be arbitrary and must be rooted in a
legitimate and substantial distinction that directly serves the purpose sought to be
achieved.
53⁋ However, in the present case, the Respondent have failed to provide any discernible
reasons for the reorganization of the State of J&K into a Union territory. This apparent
lack of transparency and reasoning behind the action calls into question its compliance
with the fundamental rights guaranteed in Part III of the Constitution of Aryavartta
(India). It raises concerns about the arbitrary nature of this reorganization and its
potential infringement upon the principles of equality and justice enshrined in the
Aryavarttan Constitution.
54⁋ The Aryavarttan Constitution, recognizes certain fundamental rights as inherent to the
dignity and liberty of individuals. Among these rights, Article 19 enshrines the freedom
of speech and expression as a fundamental right. It is the cornerstone of a vibrant
democracy and is essential for the free exchange of ideas, opinions, and information.
This fundamental right is not absolute and subject to reasonable restrictions, as
stipulated under Article 19(2) of the Constitution. These restrictions are permissible
only in specific circumstances, such as in the interest of sovereignty and integrity of
India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign countries, public order,
decency, or morality.
55⁋ In the case of the bifurcation of J&K, the government imposed a communication
shutdown, including restrictions on internet and mobile services, and curfews in various
regions. The critical question that arises is whether these actions were in conformity
with the constitutional provisions and the established legal precedents.
56(a)⁋ Right to Information and Communication Shutdown:
The communication shutdown, encompassing internet and mobile services, effectively
limited the flow of information and restricted the right to access and disseminate
information, which is a fundamental aspect of the right to freedom of speech and
expression. In the case of Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India, the Supreme Court of
________________________
27. Chiranjit Lal vs. Union of India (1950) SCR 869

31
India emphasized the necessity of adhering to the principles of proportionality and

necessity when imposing restrictions on communication services. The court held that
any such restrictions must be temporary and for a valid reason, and it also mandated
regular review of these restrictions. In the context of J&K, where a prolonged
communication shutdown was enforced, one could argue that it failed to meet the
standards of proportionality and necessity as set out by the judiciary. The lack of
transparency in the reasons behind such an extended shutdown and the absence of
regular reviews raise concerns about its compliance with the legal framework.
56(b) ⁋ Curfews and Public Order:
The imposition of curfews, particularly when combined with a communication
shutdown, is a potent tool for maintaining public order. However, such measures must
be in compliance with the principles established by the judiciary. The case of State of
Madras v. V.G. Row held that restrictions on fundamental rights should not be
arbitrary or excessive, and the restriction must be related to the purpose of maintaining
public order. In J&K, curfews were imposed following the reorganization, raising
questions about their necessity, proportionality, and potential impact on individual
liberties.
57(c)⁋ Voice of the People:
In a democratic society, the voice of the people is paramount. The Reorganisation Act,
2019 and the related actions were executed at a time when the region was under a
lockdown. This stifled the voice of the people and hindered their ability to participate
in the decision-making process. The alleged lack of consultation and transparency in
the decision-making process may be seen as running counter to the principles of
democracy and the right to be heard, especially in matters directly affecting the
residents of J&K. The bifurcation of the State of J&K and the subsequent
communication shutdown and curfews raise important legal questions regarding their
compatibility with the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression as
guaranteed by the Constitution of India. While the government has the authority to
impose restrictions in the interest of public order and security, these restrictions must
adhere to the principles of necessity, proportionality, and reasonableness. The
prolonged communication shutdown and curfews in Jammu and Kashmir necessitate
careful legal scrutiny to determine whether they meet these constitutional standards.
It is a clear understanding of law that “A total prohibition imposed upon the freedom of

32
speech and expression would be prima facie unconstitutional” and in the present case
after the Reorganisation Act, 2019 was brought into effect, there were curfews imposed
by the Central Government in various Regions of J&K which was even followed by
the curtailment of the internet and mobile services which led to a complete
communication shutdown within the region. The voices of the people were not heard
and were not taken into consideration which violated the Art. 19 of the Aryavarttan
Constitution.

33
PRAYER
Wherefore in the light of the Issues Raised, Argument Advanced and

Authorities Cited, it is most humbly prayed by the Petitioners before the
Hon’ble Supreme Court of Aryavartta to adjudge and declare:
a. This Hon’ble court may be please to issue a writ of Mandamus

order or direction declaring Presidential order passed in 2019
unconstitutional, void, and inoperative; and
b. This Hon’ble court may be please to issue an appropriate

Order declaring the imposition of Presidential Rule in State of
Jaish and Kaish as unconstitutional, void and inoperative; and
c. This Hon’ble court may be please to issue an appropriate

Order declaring the enforcement of The Jaish and Kaish
(Reorganization) Act, 2019 as invalid and restrain the
respondent from taking any action.
d. This Hon’ble court may be please to grant stay on the

operation of this aforesaid project till disposal of this petition.
e. Pass such other and further orders as this Hon’ble Court may
deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of this case
and/or pass any other order, direction, or relief that this
f. Hon’ble Court may deem fit in the interests of justice,

equality and good conscience.
For this act of Kindness, the Petitioners, as in duty bound, shall humbly pray.
Place:
Date: Respectfully submitted
Sd/-
COUNSEL FOR PETITIONERS

34

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BEFORE THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF ARYAVARTTA

WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 32 OF THE

JAN JAGRUKT AND ORS. … PETITIONERS

UNION OF ARYAVARTTA …RESPONDENT

WRITTEN SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF PETITIONERS

COUNSEL APPEARING ON BEHALF OF PETITIONERS

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF PETITIONERS

7 L. Chandra Kumar v. UOI, ( (1997) 3 SCC 261 14

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF PETITIONERS

II. Jammu and Kashmir Reorganization Act, 2019

III. The Gazette of India dated 19/12/2018

IV. The Gazette of India dated 05/ 08/2019

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF PETITIONERS

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF PETITIONERS

ARTICLE 32 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF ARYAVARTTA

Remedies for the enforcement of rights conferred by this part-

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF PETITIONERS

1⁋ The Union of Aryavartta is Sovereign, Socialist, Secular, Democratic Republic with a

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF PETITIONERS

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF PETITIONERS

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF PETITIONERS

1. Whether the Petition is Maintainable before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF PETITIONERS

of the Aryavarttan Constitution?

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF PETITIONERS

[1.1] Fundamental rights of the Petitioners s are violated

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF PETITIONERS

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF PETITIONERS

b) ⁋ A PIL should be filed by a public spirited individual. A Petitioners is having locus

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF PETITIONERS

[1.5] Availability of Alternative Remedy Is No Bar to Seek Writ Under Article 32

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF PETITIONERS

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF PETITIONERS

2. WHETHER THE ABROGATION OF ARTICLE 370 IS VALID WITH SPECIAL

2.1] Violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of Aryavartta

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF PETITIONERS

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF PETITIONERS

18⁋ This decision to rewrite a part of the Constitution is unconstitutional as it would

2.1] Violation of Article 19 with special reference to abrogation of Art. 370

22(a) ⁋ Substantive Aspect- A restriction will be unreasonable if it is in excess of the

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF PETITIONERS

25⁋ In the aftermath of restrictions on the freedom of movement, a fundamental facet of

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2.3] Violation of Article 21 with special reference to abrogation of Art. 370

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requirement that any deprivation of life or personal liberty must be in accordanc

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3. WHETHER THE METHOD FOLLOWED TO ABROGATE ARTICLE 370 IS

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MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF PETITIONERS

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF PETITIONERS

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF PETITIONERS

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF PETITIONERS

4. DOES THE JAISH AND KAISH (REORGANISATION) ACT, 2019 VIOLATE

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MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF PETITIONERS

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF PETITIONERS

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF PETITIONERS

India emphasized the necessity of adhering to the principles of proportionality and

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF PETITIONERS

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF PETITIONERS

Wherefore in the light of the Issues Raised, Argument Advanced and