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A Novel Energy Cooperation Framework For Multi-Island Microgrids Based On Marine Mobile Energy Storage Systems2
A Novel Energy Cooperation Framework For Multi-Island Microgrids Based On Marine Mobile Energy Storage Systems2
Energy
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/energy
a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t
Article history: Energy cooperation between multi-island microgrids can improve overall economics. However, some
Received 10 December 2021 island microgrids, especially in the pelagic ocean, do not have the engineering conditions for laying
Received in revised form submarine cables. For such island microgrids, marine mobile energy storage systems, i.e., vessel-
25 March 2022
mounted container energy storage systems, can be used to achieve energy exchange. Nevertheless, it
Accepted 18 April 2022
Available online 26 April 2022
is debatable how to realize energy trading for island microgrids under this scenario. This paper first
proposes a novel energy cooperation framework for multi-island microgrids based on marine mobile
energy storage systems to realize energy sharing. Firstly, an energy transportation operator is defined to
Keywords:
Marine mobile energy storage system
manage marine mobile energy storage systems and trade with island microgrids. Secondly, a bi-layer
Multi-island microgrids energy trading problem is modeled via the analytical target cascading method. The upper layer is en-
Energy cooperation ergy trading between island microgrids and the energy transportation operator, and the lower layer
Analytical target cascading assigns scheduling tasks to each marine mobile energy storage system. Furthermore, a benefit-sharing
Asymmetric Nash bargaining mechanism based on the asymmetric Nash bargaining model is designed. Especially, a nonlinear
contribution mapping method with the exponential function is presented to determine the contributions
of island microgrids. Finally, numerical simulations verify the effectiveness of the proposed energy
cooperation framework.
© 2022 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.energy.2022.124060
0360-5442/© 2022 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
C. Wu, D. Zhou, X. Lin et al. Energy 252 (2022) 124060
whole scheduling system in the above works, centralized optimi- the constraints of the distribution network [17e19]. proposed en-
zation methods are adopted. However, as IMGs may belong to ergy trading strategies for multi-microgrids under diverse un-
different economic entities, centralized optimization is not suitable certainties, where stochastic programming and robust
for practical implementation. Additionally, privacy protection optimization were applied. Although the above works have been
should also be considered. Therefore, it is necessary to explore the studied comprehensively, the proposed non-cooperative strategies
distributed energy sharing problem of multi-IMGs based on are difficult to optimize global energy costs. Moreover, it is also
MMESSs, which has not been discussed in detail. challenging to apply to multi-IMGs directly due to the existence of
With further investigation, many researchers have focused on MMESSs.
the energy sharing for multi-microgrids interconnected by cables. The cooperative strategy has been widely employed in energy
The existing energy sharing strategies fall into non-cooperative sharing for multi-microgrids, which can achieve global optimiza-
strategy and cooperative strategy. In the non-cooperative strategy tion [20,21]. proposed an agent-based energy management coop-
[11], proposed a leader multi-follower optimization for energy erative framework for multi-microgrids, where the Nash
transactions in the multi-microgrids. An energy sharing platform bargaining model was employed. A coalitional operation model for
based on the call auction method with the maximum transaction microgrids to achieve global optimum and a cost allocation method
volume is proposed in Ref. [12]. [13] presented a privacy-preserving based on the concept of the core to achieve local optimum was
energy sharing model based on enhanced Benders decomposition presented in Ref. [22]. [23,24] proposed a collaborative optimiza-
[14]. proposed an energy trading game strategy with non-quadratic tion method for multi-microgrids and the distribution network
payoffs and a distributed Nash equilibrium solution [15,16]. pre- based on Shapley value. Although the above cooperative strategies
sented bilevel transactive energy optimizations of multi-microgrids can minimize the global social energy costs, it is only applicable to
considering network constraints, where the lower level was dedi- the multi-microgrids with cable interconnection. In contrast, the
cated to flexible energy trading between multi-microgrids, and the energy cooperation of multi-IMGs needs to take MMESSs as an
upper level was designed to ensure that the energy trading meets independent entity to participate in energy trading and benefits
2
C. Wu, D. Zhou, X. Lin et al. Energy 252 (2022) 124060
Cable MMESS Centralized Distributed However, there are also some drawbacks:
[6e10] ✓ ✓
[11e24] ✓ ✓ ✓ (1) Its energy transfer efficiency is not as high as submarine
This paper ✓ ✓ ✓ cables because of charging and discharging losses.
3
C. Wu, D. Zhou, X. Lin et al. Energy 252 (2022) 124060
3.2. IMG model paper proposes to split the ETO model into an ETO aggregation
model and M MMESS models to improve the solving efficiency.
IMGs are islanded without the support of the grid. Assume that Therefore, the energy trading problem is modeled as a bi-layer ATC
the load profiles pln;t of IMG n are fixed and non-shiftable. Without model, as shown in Fig. 3.
energy cooperation, IMG n determines the power of energy storage Let define pmg1 et1
n;t , pn;t as sharing power in the upper layer, and
batteries and diesel generators to minimize its own energy cost. pms2 et2 mg1
n;m;t , pn;m;t as sharing power in the lower layer. If pn;t > 0, IMG n
The problem is formulated as follows [21]:
will share extra energy with others; otherwise, IMG n will absorb
Xh i energy from others. pet1
g gmax n;t represents the shared power of IMG n that
min Cn ¼ en pcn;t þpdn;t þ cg;1 pn;t þcg;2 pn dn;t þcst
g sn;t
t2T ETO can satisfy and has the same meanings with pmg1 ms2
n;t . If pn;m;t > 0,
(17) MMESS will charge energy at IMG n; otherwise, MMESS will dis-
charging energy at IMG n. pet2 ms2
n;m;t has the same meaning with pn;m;t .
subject to: To ensure energy power balance, there are the following
g constraints:
pn;t þ pdn;t pcn;t þ pw v l
n;t þ pn;t pn;t ; cn; t (18)
.
pcn;t h pdn;t h where uu1
n;t , un;m;t are the Lagrange multipliers.
l2
socn;t ¼ socn;t1 þ ; cn; t (22) Thus, the energy trading problem is to minimize the social en-
En
ergy costs and can be reformulated by the augmented Lagrangian
method as follows:
X X X X 2
min Cn þ Cm þ uu1 mg1 et1 mg1 et1
n;t pn;t pn;t þ g1 pn;t pn;t
n2N m2M n2N t2T
(28)
X X Xh 2
þ ul2 ms2 et2 ms2 et2
n;m;t pn;m;t pn;m;t þ g2 pn;m;t pn;m;t
n2N m2M t2T
5
C. Wu, D. Zhou, X. Lin et al. Energy 252 (2022) 124060
Alternating iterations of the subproblems achieve the standard A fair benefit-sharing mechanism is the foundation of the en-
ATC for this problem. See Appendix A for the formulation of each ergy cooperation for multi-IMGs, which can ensure the willingness
subproblem. Note that each subproblem is linear and can be solved of IMGs and ETO to cooperate. A well-designed benefit-sharing
by a commercial solver, e.g., GUROBI. The solution flow diagram is mechanism needs to have the following properties: individual ra-
shown in Fig. 4, and the detailed alternating iteration process is tionality, feasibility, monotonicity, budget balance, and Pareto
given as follows. optimality [33]. The asymmetric Nash bargaining theory, as a
widely used method in cooperative games, satisfies the above
Step 1: Let k1, k2 denote the iteration index of the upper layer properties and is expected to obtain a fair benefit-sharing solution
and lower layer. Set the initial parameters of the upper layer: to guarantee the existence of cooperation [34]. The benefit-sharing
n;t ðk1 Þ ¼ 0, un;t ðk1 Þ ¼ 0, g1 (k1), x1.
k1 ¼ 1, pet1 u1 mechanism based on asymmetric Nash bargaining theory can
allocate interests according to the bargaining power of each entity.
Step 2: Each IMG n updates its strategy pmg1
n;t ðk1 þ 1Þ via sub- Therefore, we need to determine the bargaining power of each
problem SP1. entity first, and then adopt the asymmetric Nash bargaining theory
Step 3: Set the initial parameters of the lower layer: k2 ¼ 1, to design the benefit-sharing mechanism.
n;m;t ðk2 Þ ¼ 0, un;m;t ðk2 Þ ¼ 0, g2 (k2), x2.
pms2 l2
Step 4: The ETO updates its strategy pet1 n;t ðk1 þ 1Þ, pn;m;t ðk2 þ 1Þ
et2
4.1. Bargaining power
via subproblem SP2.
Step 5: The MMESS updates its strategy pms2 n;m;t ðk2 þ 1Þ via sub- According to the monotonicity principle, if an entity makes
problem SP3. more contributions to energy cooperation, the entity should get
Step 6: The Lagrange multipliers and penalty coefficients of the more benefits. Therefore, the bargaining power needs to be deter-
lower layer are updated by Eqs. (A6) and (A7). k2 ¼ k2 þ 1. mined by the entity's contribution to the cooperation.
Step 7: Judging whether the error of lower layer is as required, In multi-IMGs, the ETO plays the same role as the distribution
i.e. kpms2 et2
n;m;t ðk2 Þ pn;m;t ðk2 Þk < x2 . If the above equation does not network operators to realize energy transmission. In general, the
hold, it skips to Step 4; otherwise, it continues to the next step. return rate of distribution network operators can be regulated by
Step 8: The Lagrange multipliers and penalty coefficients of the the government in a regulated environment [26]. Similarly, it is
upper layer are updated by Eqs. (A4) and (A5). k1 ¼ k1 þ 1. believed that the return rate of ETO is also regulated. In this paper,
Step 9: Judging whether the error of upper layer is as required, re 2ð0; 1Þ represents the return rate of ETO, which is a pre-
i.e., kpmg1 et1 determined constant. Furthermore, to encourage ETO to improve
n;t ðk1 Þ pn;t ðk1 Þk < x1 . If the above equation does not
energy transmission efficiency, both the renewable energy con-
hold, it skips to Step 2; otherwise, the iteration is terminated.
sumption rate and the predetermined return rate are applied to
measure the bargaining power of ETO.
Note that the problems mentioned above, SP1, SP2, and SP3,
For IMGs, there are two behaviors of energy sharing: providing/
only interact with sharing power information and do not involve
obtaining energy, which can create economic value by reducing the
other internal parameters, which can protect the privacy of IMGs
energy reliance on diesel generators. To encourage IMGs to develop
and ETO. By the bi-layer ATC structure, the optimization speed of
renewable energy generation and increase the advantages of IMGs
the energy trading problem can be significantly improved.
with excess renewable energy, we set that providing energy con-
tributes more than obtaining the same amount of energy. Addi-
tionally, IMG without energy sharing has no contributions to
energy cooperation. Therefore, a nonlinear contribution mapping
method is proposed based on the exponential function. The bar-
gaining powers are determined by their contributions. The details
are as follows:
mg1*
Firstly, denote pn;t as the optimal solution of IMGs. Each IMG
calculates its overall providing energy, obtaining energy, and
abandoned energy by:
X
Enþ ¼
mg1*
maxðpn;t ; 0Þ (31)
t2T
X
En ¼
mg1*
minðpn;t ; 0Þ (32)
t2T
X
Enabd ¼ ðpgn;t þ pdn;t pcn;t pimg* l w v
n;t pn;t þ pn;t þ pn;t Þ (33)
t2T
Fig. 4. The flowchart of solution. The contributions of IMGs are quantified by:
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C. Wu, D. Zhou, X. Lin et al. Energy 252 (2022) 124060
cooperation.
P P
Enþ Enþ En En (35) Theorem 1. The optimal payment of IMG n to ETO is:
wn ¼ e n2N
e n2N
; cn
X
Df ¼ ðCn0 Cn* Þ þ ðCe0 Ce* Þ (41)
where wn can always be non-negative. n2N
Thirdly, the bargaining powers are depicted as:
, where Df is all the benefits of cooperation. For proof, see Ref. [35].
X
tn ¼ ð1 te Þ,wn wn ; cn (37)
n2N 5. Case studies
Due to the exponential function, the contribution of providing
the same energy is more significant than the contribution of In this section, case studies of three IMGs are conducted to
obtaining the same energy, which can encourage IMGs to deploy corroborate the effectiveness of the proposed energy cooperation.
more renewable energy units. Based on a 3.2 GHz Windows-based PC with 16 GB of RAM, all
numerical simulations are modeled in MATLAB 2020a and solved
via GUROBI.
4.2. Asymmetric Nash bargaining
5.1. Basic data
To ensure fairness and rationality, the asymmetric Nash bar-
gaining theory is adopted for benefits sharing. The benefit-sharing This section takes three IMGs in the South China Sea as an
method based on the asymmetric Nash bargaining model is example for numerical simulations, and the geographical locations
formulated as follows: of the islands are shown in Fig. 5. Since IMGs are not available on
!te these islands yet, the deployment of IMGs is based on the expected
X tn future development of the islands, and the parameters are shown in
max Ce0 Ce* þ pn P ðCn0 Cn* pn Þ (38)
n2N Table 2. The load and renewable energy power profiles are shown
n2N
in Fig. 6 [6,9], which are derived from the meteorological station in
subject to: Fiery Cross Reef in the South China Sea. IMG 1 has more loads and
less renewable energy installed capacity due to the limited land
X
Ce0 Ce* þ pn 0 (39) resources. IMG 2 and IMG 3 have fewer loads and more renewable
n2N energy installed capacity with excess clean energy. Besides, the
coefficients of diesel generators are cg, 1 ¼ 0.25, cg, 2 ¼ 0.08,
Cn0 Cn* pn 0; cn (40) cst
g ¼ 500 [9]. The price of diesel is assumed to be 7.5 CNY/L. The
parameters of IMGs’ battery are as follows: socmin ¼ 0.1,
where Ce0 , Cn0 are the energy cost of ETO and IMGs without coop- socmax ¼ 0.9, en ¼ 0.2 CNY/kWh, h ¼ 95%.
eration, and Ce* , Cn* are the energy cost of ETO and IMGs in coop- In the multi-IMGs, there is an ETO with three identical MMESSs.
eration. Eq. (38) is the objective function to maximize the utility of Each MMESS has a 60kW/200 kWh power battery and a 600kW/
cooperation, which is the product of each player's profit. Eqs. (39) 2000 kWh energy storage battery. Due to the high investment
and (40) ensure ETO and IMGs can obtain profits from the costs, the unit degradation price of power batteries is higher and
assumed to be twice as high as that of energy storage batteries, i.e.,
0.40 CNY/kWh. Other parameters of the battery are the same as
those of IMGs. Moreover, the sailing speed of MMESS is 12 km/h.
The navigation loss coefficient h is 0.01. The employment cost of the
driver is 200 CNY per day. Without losing generality, all batteries’
initial state of charge is 0.5. At the beginning of scheduling, MMESS
1, MMESS 2, and MMESS 3 are located at IMG 1, IMG 2, and IMG 3.
Other parameters are as follows: b ¼ 1.06, g1 ¼ g2 ¼ 0.02,
x1 ¼ x2 ¼ 0.1.
Table 2
The parameters of IMGs.
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C. Wu, D. Zhou, X. Lin et al. Energy 252 (2022) 124060
Fig. 6. The load and renewable energy power profiles of IMGs: (a) IMG 1; (b) IMG 2; (c) IMG 3.
5.2.1. Energy performance Furthermore, the energy properties of MMESS are analyzed. As
The operation of multi-IMGs in the cooperation and non- shown in Fig. 7, the charge of MMESS is mainly at IMG 2 and IMG 3,
cooperation is shown in Table 3, where M ¼ 0 represents non- and the discharge of MMESS is mainly at IMG 1. The energy
cooperation and M > 0 represents cooperation. Table 3 presents transportation is primarily from IMG 2 and IMG 3 to IMG 1.
that the total operation cost with M ¼ 0 is the highest, meaning that Moreover, MMESS can also realize the energy transportation of IMG
the cooperation for multi-IMGs based on MMESSs is more 3 across time and improve the load curve. Additionally, the power
economical than the non-cooperation. In addition, the amount of battery will be fully charged in advance for driving consumption
abandoned energy in the cooperation has been greatly reduced. before each trip. The state of charge of the two batteries is in a
Thus, the existence of MMESS can reduce abandoned energy and reasonable range.
improve the economy.
Then, the energy performances of ETO and IMGs in the case with 2) IMGs: Fig. 8 provides the power schedule of IMGs. IMG 1 only
M ¼ 3, vsail ¼ 12 km/h are analyzed below. turns on the diesel generator during peak load (18:00e22:00),
while IMG 1 is supported by MMESSs and its owned battery
1) ETO with three MMESSs: Fig. 7 shows the time-space dynamics during other periods. The diesel generator of IMG 1 is always at a
of MMESSs, the charging/discharging schedule, and the state of high output level to improve the economy, and more productive
charge of batteries. Note that the positive power means the energy is stored in the battery for subsequent use. Besides, IMG
discharging of batteries, and the negative power indicates the 2 and IMG 3 are power balanced by their batteries and MMESSs.
charging of batteries. MMESS 1 is taken as an example to illus- Due to the large energy storage capacity of MMESSs, multi-IMGs
trate the schedule of MMESSs. MMESS 1 discharges at the initial have fully absorbed renewable energy and reduced the use of
position IMG 1 (0:00e5:00) and then goes to IMG 3 diesel generators. Therefore, with a reasonable schedule,
(7:00e14:00) for charging to supplement energy. Finally, MMESSs can achieve energy transportation across time and
MMESS 1 returns to IMG 1 and continues to discharge space and balance the internal power of each IMG.
(16:00e24:00). Moreover, the three MMESSs discharge to IMG1
in turn, staying at IMG 1 in (0:00e5:00, 16:00e24:00),
(11:00e18:00), and (6:00e11:00), respectively.
Table 3
Economies and energy analysis under different MMESS numbers and sailing speeds.
Non-cooperation vsail ¼ 6 vsail ¼ 12 vsail ¼ 24 vsail ¼ 6 vsail ¼ 12 vsail ¼ 24 vsail ¼ 6 vsail ¼ 12 vsail ¼ 24
Abandoned energy (kWh) 5735.82 3975.79 2247.36 1138.69 2228.16 136.3 117.28 0 0 0
Sailing energy (kWh) 0 21.60 207.36 829.44 34.56 328.32 898.56 69.12 259.20 967.68
IMGs cost (CNY) 26 057.70 21838.81 19226.56 16724.94 15655.28 12005.19 12531.5 10755.69 9749.75 11221.15
ETO (CNY) 0 996.56 1564.41 2376.11 2193.66 2617.78 2903.3 2754.12 2998.78 3471.92
Total cost (CNY) 26 057.70 22835.37 20790.97 19101.05 17848.94 14622.97 15434.80 13509.81 12748.53 14693.07
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C. Wu, D. Zhou, X. Lin et al. Energy 252 (2022) 124060
5.2.2. The influence of MMESS degradation price of batteries on the economy. Assuming that the
This subsection discusses the sensitivity of multi-IMGs oper- unit degradation price of power batteries is always twice that of
ating costs to the parameters of MMESS. Firstly, the influence of energy storage batteries, the operation costs with different prices
MMESS's number on the scheduling results is analyzed. From are shown in Fig. 10. When the unit degradation price is constant,
Table 3, with the increase of MMESSs, the abandoned energy and the operating cost increases faster with the fuel price increase in
the use of diesel generators decreases, and the operation economy the non-cooperation. In contrast, the operating cost rises slower in
of multi-IMGs gradually improves. However, it needs to be aware the cooperation. When the fuel price is constant, with the rise of
that an excessive number of MMESSs will increase investment unit degradation price, the operating cost growth in the non-
costs. Therefore, the operation of multi-IMGs requires the proper cooperation is smaller than in the cooperation. The non-
number of MMESSs. cooperation case is more dependent on diesel generators and is
Secondly, the sailing speed of MMESS also has an impact on fuel price-sensitive. But the cooperation case relies more on bat-
operating costs. Table 3 shows that regardless of the number of teries and is battery degradation price-sensitive.
MMESSs, the abandoned energy of the case with 24 km/h is the When fuel price is higher, and unit degradation price is lower,
least, followed by the case with 12 km/h and the case with 6 km/h. the cooperation case is more economically advantageous. When
In other words, the higher the speed, the greater the efficiency of fuel price is lower, and unit degradation price is higher, the non-
energy transportation. However, with the increase of sailing speed, cooperation option is more economical. Therefore, the energy
more sailing energy is consumed, which will increase the cost. cooperation for multi-IMGs based on MMESSs has economic
When the number of MMESSs is one, the case with high speed is advantage and application value only when the unit degradation
more economical; When the number of MMESSs is two or three, price of batteries is low, i.e., low battery investment cost. It is the
the case with medium speed is the best. Therefore, only the limitation of the framework proposed in this paper.
appropriate sailing speed can achieve the best economy of multi-
IMGs.
5.3. Benefits sharing
Finally, the effect of the storage capacity of MMESS on the
operating cost is discussed in Fig. 9. When the storage capacity of
This subsection uses the symmetric Nash bargaining model for
MMESS is small, the operating cost is higher. As the capacity in-
benefits sharing to explain the fairness of the asymmetric Nash
creases, the operating cost decreases significantly. When the stor-
bargaining model proposed in this paper. Assume that ETO's return
age capacity exceeds 2 MWh, the operating cost is no longer
rate re is 0.2, and vsail ¼ 12. Table 4 compares the amount of trading
reduced considerably because the battery resources are already in
energy, bargaining powers, and benefits of IMGs by symmetric
excess. Note that the increase in the storage capacity of MMESS also
Nash bargaining and asymmetric Nash bargaining.
brings an increase in investment costs. Thus, it will be more
According to the proposed nonlinear contribution mapping
economical to equip MMESS with a suitable storage capacity.
method, the contribution rate of IMG 2 and IMG 3 is more
Fig. 9. The operating costs of multi-IMGs at different storage capacities of MMESS with Fig. 10. The operating costs of multi-IMGs with various fuel prices and unit degra-
M ¼ 3. dation prices.
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C. Wu, D. Zhou, X. Lin et al. Energy 252 (2022) 124060
Table 4
The amount of trading energy, bargaining power, and benefits in different methods.
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C. Wu, D. Zhou, X. Lin et al. Energy 252 (2022) 124060
the benefits fairly. The simulation results have verified the effi-
ciency of the energy cooperation framework. Future work will
investigate the energy cooperation for multi-IMGs with sailing
speeds as decision variables and the impact of uncertainties in
renewable energy.
X Xn h i h i2
SP2 : min uu1 mg1 et1 mg1 et1
n;t ðk1 Þ pn;t ðk1 þ 1Þ pn;t þ g1 ðk1 Þ pn;t ðk1 þ 1Þ pn;t
n2N t2T
(A2)
X X Xn h i h i2 o
þ ul2 ms2 et2 ms2 et2
n;m;t ðk2 Þ pn;m;t ðk2 Þ pn;m;t þ g2 ðk2 Þ pn;m;t ðk2 Þ pn;m;t
n2N m2M t2T
11
C. Wu, D. Zhou, X. Lin et al. Energy 252 (2022) 124060
X Xn h i h i2 o
SP3 : min ul2 ms2 et2 ms2 et2
n;m;t ðk2 Þ pn;m;t pn;m;t ðk2 þ 1Þ þ g2 ðk2 Þ pn;m;t pn;m;t ðk2 þ 1Þ þ Cm (A3)
n2N t2T
12
C. Wu, D. Zhou, X. Lin et al. Energy 252 (2022) 124060
Chuantao Wu received a B.S. degree in electrical engi- Quan Sui received a B.S. degree in electrical engineering
neering from Huazhong University of Science and Tech- from Huazhong University of Science and Technology in
nology in 2018. He is a Ph.D. candidate at Huazhong 2017. He is a Ph.D. candidate at Huazhong University of
University of Science and Technology. His research in- Science and Technology. His research interests are
terests are optimal operation and restoration of microgrid scheduling as well as optimal power systems.
microgrids.
Dezhi Zhou received a B.S. degree in electrical engineer- Fanrong Wei received a B.S. degree and a Ph.D. degree in
ing from Huazhong University of Science and Technology electrical engineering from Huazhong University of Sci-
in 2021. He is an M.S. candidate at Huazhong University of ence and Technology in 2013 and 2018. Currently, he is a
Science and Technology. His research interests are optimal lecturer at Huazhong University of Science and Technol-
operation and restoration of microgrids. ogy. His researches mainly focus on optimal power sys-
tem/microgrid scheduling and protective relay.
Xiangning Lin is currently a Professor at Huazhong Uni- Zhengtian Li received a B.S. degree from Wuhan Univer-
versity of Science and Technology. He received an M.S. and sity in 2002 and a Ph.D. degree from Huazhong University
Ph.D. degree in electrical engineering from Huazhong of Science and Technology in 2011. Currently, he is an
University of Science and Technology, Wuhan, China. His Associate Professor at Huazhong University of Science and
research interests are modern signal processing and po- Technology. His research interests are digital protection
wer system protective relaying. relays.
13