Robotics and Autonomous Systems 144 (2021) 103839

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Robotics and Autonomous Systems

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/robot

An arrovian analysis on the multi-robot task allocation problem:

Analyzing a behavior-based architecture
∗
Wallace Pereira Neves dos Reis a , , Gustavo Leite Lopes b , Guilherme Sousa Bastos b
a
Federal Institute of Education, Science, and Technology of Rio de Janeiro - IFRJ, campus Volta Redonda, Volta Redonda - RJ, Brazil
b
Institute of System Engineering and Information Technology, Federal University of Itajubá, Itajubá - MG, Brazil

article info a b s t r a c t

Article history: Research in multi-robot systems is a rich field that has attracted much attention in recent decades.
Received 6 November 2020 However, robot coordination and task allocation to a correct mission accomplishment are still
Received in revised form 23 June 2021 challenging even with technological advances. Despite many proposals presented in the literature,
Accepted 24 June 2021
the applications and theories about the task allocation problem are not yet exhausted. Thus, this
Available online 26 June 2021
work proposes an axiomatic framework based on Social Choice Theory to analyze the task allocation
Keywords: problem in intentional cooperation multi-robot systems. It uses Kenneth J. Arrow’s framework of his
Multi-robot system famous Impossibility Theorem. The conditions imposed by Arrow aim to create an ideal for preference
Task allocation aggregation mechanisms through axiomatic analysis. This paper aims to transport this analysis to
Social choice the multi-robot domain. A behavior-based Multi-robot Task Allocation architecture is used to present
Arrow’s theorem simulation results and discuss two cases in the ordinal preference domain. The analysis results show
Preference aggregation that using the proposed framework to analyze, under the Arrovian perspective, implemented MRTA
architectures is feasible.
© 2021 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction decision-making. Also, it proposes social choice mechanisms for

According to Kenneth J. Arrow [1], Social Choice theory starts
with reasonable conditions relating choice outcomes to commu-
nications or interactions. The imposed conditions support feasible
preference communication. Assuming that social choice depends
on individual well-being, then the individual should communi-
cate its preference. Therefore, the collective outcome is a function
of individuals’ communications [1]. Gaertner [2] affirms that the
theory intends to obtain a verdict (a collective homologation)
based on society members’ opinions and values. In this way, social
preference results from individual preference aggregation, and it
should reflect the general opinion of society. This work focus on
the Welfare Economics and Social Choice Theory to establish sim-
ilar premises applied to Robotics, mainly to Multi-Robot Systems
(MRS) and to the Task Allocation problem.
When working with a Multi-robot Task Allocation (MRTA) ar-
chitecture with heterogeneous robots, robots may have different
capabilities, e.g., different sensors. They may also have different
metrics and utility functions, managing well-defined and individ-
ual variables, such as battery level, distance, and communication
range. The paper’s contribution is the proposal of an ordinal pref-
erence comparison over the alternatives set for a robot society
∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: wallace.reis@ifrj.edu.br (W.P.N. dos Reis),
gustavollps@unifei.edu.br (G.L. Lopes), sousa@unifei.edu.br (G.S. Bastos).
task allocation that attend, even if relaxed, Arrovian conditions.
The primary objective of this article is to establish an anal-
ogy between the Social Choice Theory and the MRTA problem.
The paper aims to address Arrow’s axiomatic framework to pro-
pose an analysis of social choice mechanisms on the MRTA do-
main. We first described the conditions and the Arrovian MRTA
problem in [3] defining the Arrovian framework from a general
multi-agent perspective. Also, it discusses the Arrovian condi-
tions briefly from the standpoint of Single-task robots, Single-
robot tasks, and Instantaneous task assignment (ST-SR-IA) and
Single-task robots, Multi-robot tasks, and Time-extended task
assignment (ST-MR-TA) multi-robot task allocation problems. The
present paper revisits and extends the Arrovian conditions with
more straightforward definitions in the problem domain of MRTA,
further discussing succinctly other MRTA problem classifications.
It exemplifies the proposed analysis using an MRTA architecture
simulation based on the well-known ALLIANCE architecture, a
behavior-based architecture proposed by Parker [4].
The work focuses on multi-robot architectures with inten-
tional cooperation, heterogeneous robots, and decentralized
decision-making. It focuses on the single-task robot problems, fol-
lowing Gerkey and Matarić’s [5] taxonomy definition, and briefly
extends the discussion to the other cases. We define the required
conditions for the problem domain to avoid the impossibility of
the group of robots’ collective decisions. Also, we examine the
allocation mechanisms based on social choice rules observing the

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.robot.2021.103839
0921-8890/© 2021 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
W.P.N. dos Reis, G.L. Lopes and G.S. Bastos
Nomenclature
R Set of m robots, with m ≥ 3
T Set of n tasks, with n ≥ 3
⪰ Weak preference binary relation
≻ Strict preference binary relation
∼ Indifference preference binary relation
⪰i Preference of robot ri over two tasks,
the same stands for ≻i , and ∼i
R Set of individual non-strict possible, or
logically possible, rational preferences.
⪰r i Robot ri individual preferences ordering
vector over the n tasks
[⪰]R Preference profile, the preference set of
the m robots in R over the n tasks in T
execution preference
uri (x) Robot ri utility value over a preference
profile x, where x = [⪰]R or x = [⪰]T R
C (x) Social choice function over a preference
profile x, where x = [⪰]R
W (x) Social welfare function over a pref-
erence profile x, where x = [⪰
]R
π Policy, the sequence robots choose
tasks
conditions met and those that should be relaxed. Moreover, the
goal is to establish an ordinal comparing structure of individual
preferences rather than comparing scalar utility.
Arrow’s axiomatization [6] is not a structure of task allocation.
Instead, it is a standard to state when a given structure meets the
basic requirements of a democratic social choice that maximizes
social welfare. Thus, the paper does not propose a new MRTA
architecture but an analysis framework based on Social Choice
Theory.
This paper follows the organization: Section 2 presents the
related works on the MRTA problem; Section 3 introduces the
Social Welfare and Social Choice in Multi-robot systems; Section 4
examines the MRTA problem from an Arrovian point of view; Sec-
tion 5 analyzes a problem from Gerkey and Matarić’s MRTA prob-
lem taxonomy [5] under the Arrovian framework, while Section 6
presents simulation results of an MRTA architecture; Section 7
discusses the results from the proposed Arrovian framework view
and other aspects of the proposal. Finally, Section 8 renders the
conclusions.
2. Related works
Multi-robot Systems have several advantages if compared to
a single-robot. To a monolithic robot, i.e., with various tools
to allow the application in several different tasks, can be very
complex to complete a series of tasks in a specific time interval,
leading to reduced system performance [7]. For dynamic envi-
ronment applications and where the priority of an emergency
task may eventually appear, such as a hospital environment,
Das et al. [8] recommended an MRS composed of heterogeneous
robots, instead of developing a single robot capable of performing
all tasks. However, as the number of robots increases, so the robot
coordination difficulty does.
Using different approaches, several pieces of research ad-
dressed the MRTA problem over the past years. This paper consid-
ers only distributed decentralized strategies. Although centralized
systems achieve optimal solutions, it incurs a communication
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Robotics and Autonomous Systems 144 (2021) 103839
bottleneck [5]. In decentralized systems, all robots make deci-
sions about task execution. Cao [9] divided those systems into
hierarchical or distributed. On hierarchical architectures, usually
used in applications with a large number of robots, each group
defines one of the robots as the local leader, centralizing the
group’s decisions. Whereas, in distributed architectures, all robots
are equal in decision-making, even with a heterogeneous team.
Intentional cooperation approaches can be divided into
behavior-based, market-based, and optimization-based. In
behavior-based techniques, task allocation commonly occurs
without explicit discussions between the robot team [10]. Robots
use knowledge of the environment (from sensors readings), ac-
tions, and the mission status, in addition to knowledge of internal
parameters, to determine which robot should perform a par-
ticular task. Among behavioral strategies, we cite Alliance [4,
11], Broadcast for Local Eligibility (BLE) [12], Monad [13], and
Automated Synthesis of Multi-robot Task solutions through soft-
ware Reconfiguration (ASyMTRe) [14] as fundamental references.
Alliance is a fully decentralized fault-tolerant behavior-based
MRTA architecture for heterogeneous robots. It is a seminal work
that inspired the simulated architecture used to exemplify and
validate the paper proposal. About Alliance complexity, Parker
[15] formulated the Alliance Efficiency Problem (AEP), arriving at
the conclusion that it is a strongly N P -hard problem. To attack
the AEP, Parker proposed a learning extension to Alliance, the
L-Alliance. The robots learn both their utility estimates and the
other team members’ performances. More recent architectures
include [16,17], and [18]. Wang et al. [16] proposed a behavior-
based distributed affective robot pursuit task allocation algorithm
based on robot self-awareness. The robots can make decisions
autonomously based on the environment information and their
self-awareness. Vinagre et al. [17] propose a behavior-based task
allocation for an assistive environment using different devices,
like single sensors and actuators, and robots. Aiming to over-
come the lack of communication during a task assignment, Dai
et al. [18] proposes a game-theoretic model of MRTA applied to
a robotic soccer team.
The work of [19] presents a differentiation between market-
based approaches dividing it into three types: market-based,
auction-based, and trade-based. The differences among the cate-
gories are small. Market-based approaches involve two-way com-
munication between robots, as task allocation requires prior ne-
gotiation [10]. Based on the Market Theory, the robots involved in
the mission seek to optimize the global utility based on their util-
ities to perform a task. As key market-based architectures, we cite
Murdoch [20], TraderBots [21], and M+CTA (M+ Cooperative
Task Allocation) [22,23], based on the M+ Protocol [24]. Recent
publications include [25–28], and [29]. Optimization strategies
employ an optimization algorithm to solve the task allocation
problem [30]. Recent publications include [31] and [32]. Since it is
not the focus of the present work, more information on market-
based and optimization-based architectures can be found in the
review papers [33] and [34].
The MRTA problem is N P -hard [5], even with few robots
and tasks. This work focuses primarily on behavior-based ar-
chitectures with no more than a dozen robots. However, [35]
and [36] are examples of large-scale MRTA architectures. Liu
and Shell [35] deal with a maximum number of 500 robots. The
allocation algorithm identifies a partitioning formulation for the
assignment problem, mixing the centralized and decentralized
decision-making concerning the task allocation. Also, it uses a
complete or partial utility matrix on task assignments. The utility
matrix represents the utility of each robot regarding each task.
Hooshangi and Alesheikh [36] propose a large-scale instance with
200 agents to a search and rescue problem. Based on Contract Net
Protocol, the architecture aim to reflect the uncertainty in the
W.P.N. dos Reis, G.L. Lopes and G.S. Bastos
Fig. 1. The three-axis division of the assignment architectures taxonomy
proposed by [5].
Source: Adapted from [37].
agents’ decision-making during the task allocation. It proposes
a central agent to deal with a large number of agents, called
coordinator agents, and the rescue agents in a hierarchical net of
task assignment. The cited references validate the proposal using
simulations. An Arrovian analysis of such architectures is future
work.
The present paper follows the MRTA problem taxonomy de-
fined by [5] and the Arrovian framework first defined by [3]. An
MRTA solution seeks to maximize task performance considering
the environment, the constraints, task priorities, and performance
metrics. Regarding the system taxonomy, the work follows the
MRTA taxonomy proposed by [5]. The taxonomy has three axes,
shown in Fig. 1, dividing the problem into robots, tasks, and
assignments. Robots can execute a single task (ST) or multiple
tasks (MT) simultaneously. Tasks may need a single robot effort
(SR) or a group effort, meaning a multi-robot task (MR). Finally,
the system can assign tasks instantaneously (IA) or along time
(time-extended assignment - TA).
3. Social welfare and social choice in multi-robot systems
According to [38], investigations in social choice are expanding
to the Artificial Intelligence community of multi-agent systems
(MAS), particularly regarding preference and mathematical mod-
els. Many works deal with voting problems [39,40]. Fischer [41]
investigated the efficient use of cardinal and ordinal preferences
in random assignment situations. MRS differs from MAS because
of the embodiment and performance in a real environment of
the former. However, MAS developments can be applied to MRS.
Before analyzing MRS Social Welfare, let us review the basic
concept of welfare and Social Welfare.
The term welfare encompasses several aspects and meanings.
Often related to monetary criteria, according to Greve [42], some-
times it is necessary to include other aspects such as happiness.
The word derives from well in its still familiar sense and fare
as a food supply [42]. As a sociological approach to welfare,
Allardt [43] (as cited in [42]) suggests that welfare is related to
having, loving, and being. So, welfare is essentially about fulfilling
the essential needs of individuals and families. However, the
two main areas of study are Social Sciences and Economics. The
former analyzes the Welfare State and State intervention in soci-
ety. The latter studies ‘‘the possible effects of various economic
policies on the welfare of society’’ [44]. Not only this, but it
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Robotics and Autonomous Systems 144 (2021) 103839
also worries about a welfare measurement and, consequently, its
maximization.
In Welfare Economics, welfare is commonly related to utility.
The comparison between welfare and Bentham’s idea of utility
in the 18th century is clear [42]. Besides, welfare and social
welfare has been associated with the individual perception of
utility. Thereby, social welfare results from individuals’ welfare
(utility) sum. In other words, ‘‘total happiness of a society is often
understood as the aggregation of individuals’ perceptions of their
lives’’ [42].
The term utility brings the idea of a decision or choosing
process. An individual chooses the alternative (over all possible
alternatives) according to the highest utility value. For Van Praag
and Frijters [45], to attach utility values to possible alternatives
is an efficient method to describe a choice problem. Utility mea-
surement still a hazy subject. Economists have presented many
cardinal utility approaches, such as summarized in [45]. However,
on the opposite side, many are critics. Vilfredo Pareto (1904) (af-
ter [46]) analyzed indifference curves of goods (alternatives). He
noticed the relations between two goods that kept the individual
at the same welfare level quantified by a utility function. Thus,
it maintained an ordering between the possible combinations of
consumption. In doing so, he realized simple ordering among the
alternatives was sufficient for the Utility Theory. As a result, it
suppressed the concept of cardinal utility [46].
According to Barberà et al. [47], only the publication of Social
Choice and Individual Values [6], the seminal work of Kenneth J.
Arrow, popularized the formalism of binary preference relations.
After this, it was recognized as a distinct technical entity. The
landmark in the modern Social Choice Theory is Arrow’s Impos-
sibility Theorem. The negative result had significant influence
after its publication, above all, by bringing the axiomatic method
contribution [48]. Arrow [6] advocates the ordinal analysis of
utility because ‘‘it seems to make no sense to add the utility
of one individual, a psychic magnitude in his mind, with the
utility of another individual’’. Still, according to [6], ‘‘if we can-
not have measurable utility, [...], we cannot have interpersonal
comparability of utilities a fortiori’’.
As seen, the measurement of the utility as a quantity has
always been a problem. Moreover, according to [3], a cardi-
nal estimate of utility for decision-making in MRS presents its
problems. Mainly because of measurement and environmental
uncertainties. Ordinal analysis of preferences will then replace
the non-negative estimate of the robot’s performance efficiency
rate for each task (utility). This analysis considers the robot pref-
erence ordering related to task execution. The preference order-
ings follow the binary comparison between two alternatives, and
the pairwise comparisons will form a complete and transitive
ordering. In that sense, to maximize social welfare is to reach the
sub-optimal solution to the task allocation problem.
4. The multi-robot task allocation problem under the Arrovian
view
The preference ordering has advantages for the analysis of
the collective decision in the task allocation problem. According
to Fleurbaey and Maniquet [49], the ordinalism concept follows
from the fact that any utility function can be replaced by any
strictly increasing transformation of it, so only the ranking of
bundles matters. The intensity will no longer take place in a
decision-making process but rather the preference order.
Each robot keeps its internal utility function in an MRS to
calculate the utility (or cost or fitness) for each task. However,
in the proposed framework analysis, this value will no longer
be compared between agents. Following the Non-comparability
principle: considering that the utility function transformations
W.P.N. dos Reis, G.L. Lopes and G.S. Bastos
are as many as the agents involved, i.e., each agent may have its
own utility function, no ordinary meaning can be attributed to
utility levels or utility differences [49]. Thus, under the principles
of ordinalism and non-comparability, robots’ individual prefer-
ences define society preference directly without generality loss.
On the other hand, scalar utility values allow an explicit search
for an objective function maximization.
Thus, achieving social welfare in the task allocation problem is
to obtain a preference ordering that respects Completeness and
Transitivity Axioms, defined in Section 4.2, because, according
to [50], ‘‘as with any type of behavior described by maximization,
the measurability of social welfare need not be assumed; all that
matters is the existence of a social ordering satisfying [those]
Axioms’’.
In this paper, the objective functions in which the maximiza-
tion is sought are called Arrovian social welfare and social choice
functions. The functions must satisfy a set of conditions similar
to those established for Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem. The next
section presents these conditions translated into the domain of
the MRTA problem.
4.1. Social choice formal model of MRTA problems
The word society means a group of individuals who live to-
gether in an organized way, making decisions about doing things
and sharing the work that needs to be done. Then, the term is
appropriate to denote a group of robots programmed to express
cooperative behavior on executing a mission task. Thus, R is the
set of robots, mobile or not, that compose society, subjecting itself
to the same task allocation architecture.
Additionally, the paper considers only loosely coupled tasks
whose interdependence in execution is nil. This consideration
simplifies the model. So, consider T the set of possibly weighted
independent tasks, requiring one or more robots to perform each
task.
Consider the binary relation ⪰. It is called weak preference
meaning ‘‘at least as preferable as’’ or ‘‘better than or equal in
value to’’. For robot ri , with i = (1, 2, . . . , m), if the execution of
task τ1 is as preferable as the execution of task τ2 , then τ1 ⪰i τ2 .
Using it as a primitive relation, one can define the strict
preference relation ≻ and indifference relation ∼. The execution
of task τ1 is strictly preferable to running task τ2 , with notation
τ1 ≻i τ2 , if and only if (τ1 ⪰i τ2 ) ∧ ¬(τ2 ⪰i τ1 ). And if the
agent ri is indifferent to the execution of both tasks, the notation
τ1 ∼i τ2 is used if and only if (τ1 ⪰i τ2 ) ∧ (τ2 ⪰i τ1 ). Using the two
previous established binary relations, the weak preference can be
denote by the reciprocity (τ1 ⪰i τ2 ) ↔ [(τ1 ≻i τ2 ) ∨ (τ1 ∼i τ2 )],
contrasting with the indifference relation.
Still, considering only transitive preferences, the preference
orderings will be considered non-strict or weak. The weak pref-
erence ordering allows ties, i.e., the robot is indifferent to the
execution order of two tasks when: (i) the calculated utility (cost,
fitness, score) value for both tasks is equal, or (ii) it is unable to
perform the tasks, for instance. In doing so, ⪰r i = (τ1 ⪰ τ2 ⪰
... ⪰ τn ) denotes robot ri preferences ordering. Likewise, the
non-strict ordering admits ties in a robot preference over robots,
following the same analysis.
The set R denotes the set of individual non-strict possible
rational preferences. The set of preference orderings, here also
called the preference profile, is denoted by [⪰]R ∈ Rn , represent-
ing robots individual preference orderings concerning to the task
execution.
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Robotics and Autonomous Systems 144 (2021) 103839
4.2. Arrovian conditions for the MRTA problem
The present section defines analogous axioms and conditions
for the robot society in the multi-robot domain considering Ar-
row’s axiomatization [6]. The number m of robots of the society is
at least three, i.e., m ≥ 3. Besides, the number n of tasks presented
to individuals is at least three, i.e., n ≥ 3. Such considerations
are essential so that theorem definitions are still valid. If n < 3,
the problem solution is trivial as the Arrow’s impossibility cannot
arise.
The Completeness Axiom 1 defines that the robots of society
must order the available alternatives according to their individual
preference. With ties being allowed. We emphasize that prefer-
ence ordering considers the internal utility calculation performed
by the robots. However, team members do not compare the
internal values with other robots.
Axiom 1 (Completeness Axiom for the MRTA Problem). Society must
order the given tasks, with {τ1 , τ2 } ∈ T , considering (τ1 ⪰ τ2 ) or
(τ1 ≻ τ2 ) or (τ2 ≻ τ1 ) or (τ1 ∼ τ2 ).
Moreover, decisions must be rational. Thus, individuals pref-
erences ordering must be transitive, following the Transitivity
Axiom for the MRTA problem.
Axiom 2 (Transitivity Axiom for the MRTA Problem). Given a pref-
erence ordering over tasks, with {τ1 , τ2 , τ3 } ∈ T , if (τ1 ⪰ τ2 ) and
(τ2 ⪰ τ3 ), then (τ1 ⪰ τ3 ).
The Transitivity Axiom is a reasonable requirement to avoid a
cyclic ranking. If an individual preference is non-transitive, then
the relationship between the alternatives may be as follows: x1 ⪰
x2 , x2 ⪰ x3 , but x3 ⪰ x1 . Which is not a rational behavior [51].
The Unrestricted Domain condition imposes that a social or-
dering results from the individual preference orderings without
preference restrictions. In MRTA problems, this condition es-
tablishes that the preference relation can rank the alternatives
unrestrictedly, according to individual preference. However, these
orderings are weak since they do not exclude indifference re-
lations and encompass all the logically possible rankings. This
observation is essential when a robot is not able to perform two
or more tasks. In this case, if a robot cannot execute two or more
tasks, its degree of preference over the execution of these tasks
must be the lowest. Moreover, the order of execution between
them must be indifferent.
Condition 1 (Unrestricted Domain). Regardless of the individual
preference ordering performed over T , there is a social ordering
resulting from individuals preferences aggregation.
Returning to social choice theory, the Independence of Irrel-
evant Alternatives (IIA) condition states that the judgment of
preferences should be pairwise, regardless of a third alternative.
The Independence of Irrelevant Tasks condition (Condition 2)
refers to the task ordering. Thus, the preference between the two
tasks depends only on the binary relation between these two
tasks. Also, it is independent of the preference information of a
third alternative. This ordering is also independent of the irrel-
evant alternative utility information. The term irrelevant in this
case means that the third task is unimportant to the preference
ordering between any other two tasks and not that the task is
irrelevant to the mission.
Condition 2 (Independence of Irrelevant Tasks). Given {τ1 , τ2 , τ3 } ∈
T , the social ordering take the tasks τ1 and τ2 ranking pairwise,
despite the third alternative. And the same holds for the other
pairwise preferences over {τ1 , τ2 , τ3 }.
W.P.N. dos Reis, G.L. Lopes and G.S. Bastos
Together with Axioms 1 and 2, the welfare maximization is
attained with the Pareto Principle or Unanimity Principle. Before
defining the Unanimity Condition for MRTA problems, let us
redefine Pareto-dominance and Pareto Optimality concepts for
the MRS domain. Consider uri (x) a utility measurement of robot
ri individual welfare over its preference profile.
Definition 1 (Pareto-dominance in the MRTA Problem). The pref-
erence profile [⪰]R ∈ Rm is Pareto-dominant related to the
preference profile [⪰]′R if for all ri ∈ R, uri ([⪰]R ) ≥ uri ([⪰]′R ),
and exists some individual rj ∈ R for which urj ([⪰]R ) > urj ([⪰
]′R ).
The Definition 1 determines that a preference profile is dom-
inant if there is no other preference profile that is capable of
improving robot team welfare without impairing any of the team
members.1 If society reaches this state, then it is in Pareto Opti-
mal condition.
According to Definition 2, given a preference profile over the
set T that is dominant over all other society preference profiles,
then the preference aggregation is Pareto-efficient.
Definition 2 (Pareto-optimality in the MRTA Problem). The prefer-
ence profile [⪰]R is Pareto-optimum, or Pareto-efficient, if there
is no other preference profile [⪰]′R ∈ Rm such that it dominates
[⪰]R .
Thus, Condition 3 set out the Unanimity condition for the
MRTA problem.
Condition 3 (Unanimity Principle). A social welfare function in MRS
domain is Pareto-efficient if for any {τ1 , τ2 } ∈ T , ∀ri ∈ R, if
(τ1 ≻ri τ2 ) then (τ1 ≻R τ2 ).
Before the last condition of the Arrovian framework, Defi-
nition 3 defines the concept of dominance. Dominance occurs
whenever a single team member preference surpasses the others,
thus dominating the social preference profile.
Definition 3 (Dominance in the MRTA Problem). A social welfare
function is said to be dominant, or dictatorial, if there exists an
individual ri such that, for all τ1 and τ2 , (τ1 ≻ri τ2 ) implies that
(τ1 ≻R τ2 ), independently of the orderings {⪰r 1 , . . . , ⪰r i } of the
other robots, where ≻R is the social strict preference relation
corresponding to {⪰r 1 , . . . , ⪰r m }.
The characteristic of Definition 3 is not beneficial to a pref-
erence aggregation seeking social welfare maximization. Further-
more, since the paper focuses on decentralized multi-robot archi-
tectures, a dictatorship perverts the decentralized characteristic
by centralizing the preferences and, consequently, the decisions.
Therefore, Condition 4 states that the social welfare function
should not allow a single member to govern the task allocation
based on their individual preferences.
Condition 4 (Non-dictatorship). A social welfare function should not
be dominant or dictatorial.
Given the existence conditions for social choice, Problem 1
revises the multi-robot task allocation problem from the Arrovian
viewpoint.
Problem 1 (Arrovian MRTA Problem). Given a society R of m
robots, each one capable of performing one or more tasks si-
multaneously, and the set T of n tasks, requiring one or more
robots to perform each task. Also, given for each robot ri an weak
1 Adapted from Shoham and Leyton-Brown [51].
5
Robotics and Autonomous Systems 144 (2021) 103839
preference ordering ⪰ri related to tasks execution order (if robot
ri is not capable of performing a task, then this task is the least
preferred). Then, the goal is to assign robots to tasks in order to
maximize social welfare, i.e., satisfy the Axioms 1, and 2; and the
Conditions 1, 2, 3, and 4, resulting a social preference ordering
[⪰]R that aggregates individual preferences.
4.3. Arrovian social welfare and social choice functions
Social Welfare Functions (SWF) result in a society’s total or-
dering of available alternatives. This ordering is a mapping of
social choices according to individual preferences. That is, a social
welfare function mapping generates total planning of the task
allocation. Social welfare functions result in a total ordering of
society members’ preferences. This ordering is a social choice
mapping according to individual preferences. A social welfare
function on the task set T aggregates robots’ individual pref-
erences over tasks, generating a complete task execution plan
(Definition 4).
Definition 4 (Multi-robot SWF Over the Set T ). A multi-robot social
welfare function over the set of tasks T means a process or a rule
which, for each individual preference relation over the alternative
tasks {⪰r i , . . . , ⪰r m }, results in a social ordering corresponding to
the alternatives, W ([⪰]R ) : Rm ↦ → T .
Social Choice Functions (SCF) select the top-ranked alterna-
tive (Definition 5). In this way, the multi-robot domain’s social
choice functions define the best-classified task for execution or
the best-classified robot to execute a given task.
Definition 5 (Multi-robot Social Choice Function Over T ). A multi-
robot social choice function over the set of tasks T is a process or
a rule that, for each individual ordering of tasks, {⪰r i , . . . , ⪰r m },
results in only one choice, the top-ranked one: C ([⪰]R ) : Rm ↦ →
T.
The existence conditions of the welfare functions defined in
Section 4.2 are based on that defined by [6,52,53] for the exis-
tence of a social welfare and social choice functions, respectively.
5. Arrovian analysis of MRTA problem taxonomy
The analysis of task allocation problems that Gerkey and
Matarić’s taxonomy [5] defines will be done individually, under
each characteristic axis, i.e., robot, task, and allocation types. An
initial structure was proposed by dos Reis and Bastos [3], which
this paper expands. Some assumptions are considered for this
analysis:
i. All the robots tell the truth and are not envious.
ii. The number of tasks is greater than or equal to the number
of robots, so n ≥ m and n ≥ 3.
iii. All mission tasks are known in advance to the task alloca-
tion process. Even if the mission is not previously known,
the robots are aware of the resources and capabilities re-
quired to perform the tasks.
iv. All orderings are rational, i.e., complete and transitive.
v. Robots must order (strictly) all available alternatives.
vi. If a robot cannot perform a task, then that task must have
the least preference in this robot preference ordering.
vii. Robots pursue to maximize social welfare, not exclusively
individual welfare.
viii. Robots can calculate their utility for each task. From this
value, they establish their preference ordering.
W.P.N. dos Reis, G.L. Lopes and G.S. Bastos
ix. Robots have no external strategies or incentives to lie about
their intentions or utility functions and, so, about their
preference ordering, as well as they are embedded in a
cooperative and non-competitive environment.
The following analysis considers the following conditions are
satisfied to all situations [3]:
• Unrestricted Domain: Considering the task independence, the
preference ordering over these alternatives has any transi-
tive and complete possible form.
• Non-dictatorship: There is no robot ri whose preferences are
dominant related to the other’s preferences.
• Independence of irrelevant tasks: The preference ordering of
each robot is pairwise, and a third task do not influence
the preference ordering of any pair. However, all the mis-
sion tasks are considered by the robots and relevant to the
mission execution.
The next sections introduce characteristic conditions to each sit-
uation.
5.1. ST-SR-IA
According to [54], ST-SR-IA is the most straightforward task
allocation problem. The literature presents different solution ap-
proaches of this allocation type, such as Greedy Heuristics, Linear
Programming, and Combinatorial Optimization [54,55]. From an
Arrovian view of the problem, the robot society’s social welfare
level increases as the task assignment respect the robot’s highest
preferences. Thus, in the following analysis, we will first consider
the problems that fulfill the assumption (iii).
Assigning a task to a single robot is instantaneous, having
no future allocation. Just one alternative is a winner (SCF) for
each allocation. Although each iteration needs only one result, the
mechanism performs complete preferences ordering (SWF) as the
mission tasks are known.
The problem analysis considers Condition 2. Thus, the task or-
der must be carried out pairwise, with comparisons independent
of each other. Also, the Pareto Principle (Condition 3) means that
the social choice must follow the optimization principle. So, the
solution is Pareto-optimal if robot ri welfare increases without
decreasing the other group members’ welfare.
An SWF applies to the problem since it maps the social pref-
erence from the robot team individual preferences. Besides, one
can discuss the relative simplification in applying a centralized
allocation mechanism, either in a robot of the team or a central
device. As the present study’s objective is to present a methodol-
ogy for an actual application in an MRS, it always considers the
advantages of distributed systems. In this way, it introduces an
allocation mechanism that meets the conditions imposed for SWF
existence.
Gerkey [54] proposes a variation of the Greedy Algorithm for
iterative task allocation. It presents a very close form to the
simple serial dictatorship (SD) mechanism. In the SD mechanism,
for a preset ordering of agents, the top-ranked agent chooses its
most preferred alternative; the secondly ranked agent chooses
its most preferred alternative among the remaining alternatives,
and so on [56]. According to Brandt et al. [57], the mechanisms
present Pareto-optimal solutions. The term Allocation Mechanism
used in this paper was borrowed from the Mechanism Design
research area, studied by Social Choice and Computational Social
Choice researchers. A mechanism is not necessarily an algorithm,
but the ‘‘optimal rules for collective decision making and/or the
allocation of scarce resources by the convergence of a collection
of such principles’’ [57].
6
Robotics and Autonomous Systems 144 (2021) 103839
Bade [58] states that the mechanism is Pareto-optimal be-
cause it maps each Pareto-optimal allocation profile to a Pareto-
optimal allocation in this profile and is strategy-proof since there
is no preference profile or agent such that a false preference
communication benefits it. However, the order in which the
agents are processed influences the final result (a path-dependent
mechanism). Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez [56] propose the Ran-
dom Serial Dictatorship (RSD) allocation mechanism to avoid the
problem of sorting agents. The mechanism establishes a uniform
probability distribution that orders agents. Thus agent makes its
choice according to its individual preferences.
Consider a uniform probability 1/m that sequences the m
choosing robots, i.e., the probability of a first robot to choose its
top-ranked preference, then a second robot choose its top-ranked
– or second-ranked, depending on available tasks – preference,
and so on, based on [56] proof.
Allocation Mechanism 1 (Task-centered MRTA-RSD).
1. With uniform probability 1/m, select a robot ri still available
in R and assign it the task of its highest preference.
2. Remove the robot from the list of available robots and the task
from the list of possible alternatives.
3. Repeat steps 1. and 2. until all robots have been assigned to
some task.
4. If n > m, when robot ri finishes its task execution, return ri to
the list of available robots.
5. Repeat steps 3. and 4. until there are no more available tasks.
Allocation Mechanism 1 satisfies the conditions of an SWF
existence with a slight relaxation in Non-dictatorship condition,
with consideration of the Pareto ex-post Efficiency, and consid-
ering it strategy-proof. Kato [59] considers serial dictatorship
mechanism a ‘‘dictator-maker’’, in a sense that it elects dicta-
tors (agents whose individual preference will be the only one
recognized) serially. In the Allocation Mechanism 1, the first
robot chosen is the dictator to the others, who are affected by
it regarding the available alternatives (tasks) but cannot affect
it back. However, he is not a dictator in the broader sense of
task allocation since he does not impose any choice on the other
agents, in line with [60] affirmation. As well, the second robot
chosen is the dictator for the others, and so on.
Bade [58] states that any two agents who submit the same
preference face the same lottery over the alternatives, i.e., they
are both likely to choose their highest preference alternative. ‘‘So
random serial dictatorship treats equals equally’’ [58]. Consider-
ing the difficulty of meeting the non-dictatorship criterion, [60]
introduced the non-bossiness concept. A mechanism is non-
bossiness if there is no agent capable of changing the choice
of another agent without changing its own [58]. As mentioned,
the mechanism is strategy-proof and meets the Pareto Principle.
Reinforcing the consideration that the mechanism is strategy-
proof, the assumption (i) states that robots tell the truth and are
not envious, so there is no possibility of manipulating individual
preferences for higher individual welfare.
The ex-post efficiency means the mechanism is efficient af-
ter the agents announce their preferences. According to [61],
this feature causes the mechanism to randomize over the set
of Pareto-optimal alternatives. Formally, Definition 6 describes a
Pareto ex-post efficient mechanism. Consider π , called policy, the
sequence in which robots make their task choices, i.e., their task
allocation.
Definition 6 (ex-post Pareto-efficient Mechanism). A mechanism
is ex-post Pareto-efficient if, ∀⪰r i ∈ [⪰]R , there is no policy π
such that π ⪰ri π ∗ for all ri ∈ R and π ≻rj π ∗ for some rj ∈ R.
W.P.N. dos Reis, G.L. Lopes and G.S. Bastos
5.2. ST-SR-TA
ST-SR-TA problem class is similar to the previous one, how-
ever, with the time-extended task assignment. According to
Gerkey [54], this problem reflects knowing the future utilities
(preferences) of robots. Also, it requires a thorough understanding
of mission tasks or a model of how the system includes new tasks.
These considerations reflect the number of tasks must be greater
than the number of robots, that is, n > m.
Because it is a problem that requires future planning, the func-
tion applied will be SWF over the set T . However, the function
outputs a possible subset Bri ⊆ T of tasks allocated to each
robot ri . This subset of tasks is the planning for each robot task
execution, following its preferences ordering. And, after assigning
tasks, Br1 ∩ Br2 = ∅.
Brandt et al. [57] call this a picking sequence situation. Objects
or resources are allocated to the agents involved incrementally in
a predetermined sequence. The author also points out that this
mechanism has two desirable properties: ‘‘it is effortless to im-
plement and explain, and it also frees the central authority from
the burden of provoking agent preferences’’ [57]. Fundamentally,
agents sequentially choose the alternative of their highest pref-
erence that is still available. The question is how to determine
the sequence to meet the conditions for social choice presented
in this paper.
For the case where each agent chooses more than one object,
there are two possibilities: it reveals one alternative at a time or
a bundle of alternatives, with all its preferences. In this paper, we
consider the simplest case: one alternative at a time. The combi-
natorial nature of the problem and the simplification regarding
the preferences profile and, consequently, the choice mechanism
justify this proposal.
Bouveret et al. [62] point out that the number of bundles
grows exponentially with the increase of alternatives. For exam-
ple, with a set of twenty alternatives, the agent can classify more
than one million bundles, considering an unrestricted domain for
the orderings. It is considered, for simplicity, that if the agent
presents the preference ordering (τ1 ⪰ τ2 ⪰ τ3 ⪰ τ4 ), indi-
rectly, it establishes the preference ordering of bundles (τ1 , τ2 ) ⪰
(τ3 , τ4 ), without loss of generalization. Aziz et al. [63] point out
that the ‘‘well-known mechanisms like serial dictatorship fall un-
der the umbrella of sequential mechanisms’’. Thus, time-extended
is an extension of the instantaneous assignment problem.
5.3. ST-MR-IA
ST-MR-IA issue requires the joint effort of several robots to do
the same task. According to Gerkey [54], this case must consider
the associated utility of robots, but not necessarily the sum of
these utilities. With the Arrovian problem, the robots’ prefer-
ences must be aggregated to result in a coalition. Gerkey and
Matarić [5] further emphasize that this problem is somewhat
more difficult than those presented above, restricted to single
robot tasks. The problem is equivalent to the Partitioning Prob-
lem. Furthermore, although literature proposes heuristics for its
solution, no MRTA solution immediately derives from such propo-
sitions. Some works propose MRTA solutions as ASyMTRe [14]
and RACHNA [64] architectures.
From the social choice point of view, the most straightforward
case occurs when the number of robots required to complete
each task is equal to m, the number of robots in society. Here,
the preference aggregation must result from an SWF over T
that elects a single task at a time through an SCF over T . From
individual preferences, the m society robots decide which task
τ ∈ T to execute. At each execution term, society makes a
new choice. However, in pragmatic terms, this condition presents
7
Robotics and Autonomous Systems 144 (2021) 103839
complications. With this design, an MRTA architecture has a low
robustness level since all tasks need all robots. Even a partial
failure of a robot dooms the whole mission. Still, this arrangement
does not apply one of the main advantages of a multi-robot
system, the task division.
Another possible arrangement is a centralized task allocator,
which holds all environment information, including individual
preferences of each robot on the task execution and possible
coalitions. It is a combinatorial problem since the optimum allo-
cation is a combinatorial solution from the complete environment
information. The number of possible states grows exponentially
with increasing tasks and/or robots in the system. This solu-
tion likewise does not address the MRTA problem in pragmatic
calls. The centralized feature is not beneficial in MRS with mo-
bile robots, and such a mechanism requires high computational
capacity.
It demands a more general approach. The MR characteristic
of the problem generates a need to form coalitions between
robots and assign tasks to these coalitions. To the framework
proposed in this work, both the coalition formation and the task
allocation need to consider individual preferences. Thus, one can
understand the two processes as distinct processes, not being
executed by merely one mechanism.
5.4. ST-MR-TA
As discussed by dos Reis and Bastos [3], such a problem
includes coalition formation and time-extended task allocation.
Nonetheless, [5] indicates a relaxation of the problem by ignoring
the assignment component in time, approximating the ST-MR-IA
problem. Consider the individual ordering ⪰r i of the robot ri . dos
Reis and Bastos [3] present the robot rm preferences ordering as
a pairwise comparison on the set of alternative tasks T , ⪰rm =
{τ1 ⪰ τ2 ⪰ τ3 . . . ⪰ τn }. Also, the work presents the set R = {⪰r1
, ⪰r2 , . . . , ⪰rm } of individual preferences orderings.
Consider the simplest case: the number of robots required to
perform each task is equal to m. That is the same number of mem-
bers in the robot society. The SWF has a preference profile [⪰]R
input and maps the complete task ordering to society execution.
In addition to the coalitions task assignment, it also schedules
coalitions for the time-extended task execution. Therefore, robot
ri has a bundle of allocated tasks similar to the ST-SR-TA problem.
However, task execution depends on coalitions with different
robots.
5.5. The multi-task robots problem
This class of MRTA problems involves multi-task robots (MT)
and allows the execution of at least two tasks simultaneously by
the same robot. Gerkey and Matarić [5] describe that the solutions
of the MT–SR–IA and MT–SR–TA problems are equivalent to the
mathematical solutions described for the ST-MR-IA and ST-MR-
TA problems, respectively. Korsah et al. [37] affirm they are
unaware of MRTA architecture work that encompasses MT-SR-IA,
MT-SR-TA, and MT-MR-TA problems. Likewise, the research for
this article found no proposition for these problems.
6. Behavior-based MRTA architecture simulation
The section presents an MRTA architecture simulation based
on Alliance implemented in Robot Operational System (ROS)
to illustrate the proposed ordinal axiomatic analysis of MRS. It
analyzes two cases: (a) when the individuals have the same
preference profile and (b) when individuals have a different pref-
erence profile. In the last case, the simulations aim to show that a
W.P.N. dos Reis, G.L. Lopes and G.S. Bastos Robotics and Autonomous Systems 144 (2021) 103839

social ordering emerges despite the individual preference profile

and individual robot motivation.
The Alliance architecture is a cooperative control of teams
of heterogeneous mobile robots and with missions of loosely
coupled tasks. Further, the mission tasks may have ordering de-
pendencies. The robots’ control in the Alliance is based on low-
and high-level behaviors, based on the subsumption paradigm
proposed by Brooks [65]. The low-level behaviors are the survival
behaviors, Layer 1 and 2 of Fig. 2(a). In contrast, the high-level
ones correspond to more complex actions, Layer 3 and 4. For
instance, survival behavior is avoiding obstacles or charging the
battery, and a high-level behavior is exploring the environment or
building the environment map. The low- and high-level behaviors
have internal modules, as shown in Fig. 2(b), and adequately
grouped, they form a function of performing high-level tasks,
also called behavior sets. Each behavior set is a mission task.
Therefore, the mission tasks are previously known by the robot
because the robot designer also knows them.
The behavior sets receive the input signals from the sensors
and control the outputs to the actuators simultaneously, in a cer-
tain way. High-level behaviors can suppress or inhibit low-level
behavior when necessary. The adaptive selection of actions and,
consequently, the task allocation are based on the motivational
behavior mechanism. The robot control uses the behavior set of
the robot. It monitors a set of inputs (sensor readings, communi-
cation messages between robots, inhibition feedback signals from
other motivational behaviors and motivations internal to the
robot, called impatience and acquiescence) to activate or not the
output of each behavior set. Robot motivation is the individual
utility function employed to order the mission tasks according to
its preferences.
Each behavior set has a motivation function. A motivation
function grows over time and depends on five inputs: robot impa-
tience, sensory feedback, activity suppression, impatience reset,
robot acquiescence. Robot impatience input has two time param-
eters that affect how the motivation function grows over time. It
depends on the frequency of received messages concerning the
task. If a robot stops receiving messages of a particular task, the
motivation evolves faster. Sensory feedback is a binary input. If Fig. 2. The typical layer structure of a behavior-based architecture, based on the
the behavior is applicable, i.e., the robot can execute that task, it subsumption paradigm.
is equal to one; otherwise, it is null. Activity suppression is also a
binary input. If the behavior is not inhibited, it is equal to one and
zero otherwise. The impatience reset input resets the motivation on the mission tasks description and the number of robots. The
level at the first message received from another robot regarding previous works aim to implement an Alliance-based architecture
the behavior set. After this, the impatience level grows at a slower on ROS. The simulated architecture of this paper preserves the
level. Finally, robot acquiescence deals with its ability to execute premises proposed by [11] and uses the same mission tasks
the task related to the behavior set. The parameter value is equal of [66].
to one if the task execution duration respects an internal time
parameter. Otherwise, i.e., the task execution takes too long, the 6.1. Simulation setup
parameter value turns to zero, resetting the motivation level so
other robots can allocate the behavior set. Eq. (1) shows a mo- The simulations used the architecture proposed in [66], but
tivation function m(t). When a behavior set motivation function on a different simulator, V-REP, instead of using the MobileSim
reaches a threshold value, the behavior set is activated, meaning simulator. Fig. 3 shows the simulation environment. For the simu-
the related task allocation. For further information on motivation lations, we use m = 3 robots, {r1 , r2 , r3 }, and n = 4 tasks. Pioneer
functions, see [11,66]. 3DX is the model of simulated robots. Although the simulated
robots use the same model, we consider them heterogeneous
m(0) = 0, (1) because of their possible different settings, such as motivation
m(t) = [m(t − 1) + impatience] × (sensory_feedback) functions and available behavior sets.
Following the described in [66], the architecture behavior sets,
× (activ ity_suppression) and consequently, the tasks used in the next simulations are:
× (impatience_reset) × (acquiescence)
τ1 Wander right: as the robots know the map previously, the
Robots do not have access to other society members’ moti- task is to wander at the correct map side avoiding obstacles
vation levels. Each robot broadcasts the activation of a behavior until the robot covers a determined distance;
set, so assigning a task. So, the team does not compare individ- τ2 Wander left: similar to τ1 , but at the left side of the map;
ual motivations. This paper uses an Alliance-based architecture τ3 Boundary patrol: the task is a perimeter patrol, following the
implemented with ROS, previously presented in [66,67], differing environment wall until a complete round; and
8
W.P.N. dos Reis, G.L. Lopes and G.S. Bastos
Fig. 3. Simulation environment using V-REP simulator.
τ4 Report: the robot must go to a report area on the map and
publishes the mission status in a defined ROS topic.
Each task has a motivation function with several parameters,
as explained by [66,67], which set the motivation level that
increases over time. The motivation function is the individual
utility function that the robot uses to order tasks according to its
preference. The robot allocates a task when the related behavior
set motivation level reaches its activation threshold level. Each
task has its threshold, but the behavior set activation threshold
level is 2000 units in the simulations for simplicity.
As the robot chooses the task, it communicates to other society
members that suppress the task execution. While the robot exe-
cutes the task, the others maintain a growing impatience level. If
the first robot cannot complete the task, it gives up, and another
one, if idle, can activate the same behavior set. Robots broadcast
task-related messages over a ROS topic, in which all society
members are publishers and subscribers. The message content
is simply the active behavior set and no further information on
individual motivation levels. Neither negotiation occurs.
Although the simulated architecture was not developed under
an Arrovian point of view, we show it follows the Arrovian
conditions the paper established and operates as described in
Allocation Mechanism 1. Step 1 requires the robots to have the
same probability of choosing their top-ranked task. As the sim-
ulation launch starts the robots’ ROS nodes in different instants,
we added a random delay – in the range from 0 to 1 s – in each
robot initialization to emulate a real robot delay initialization,
for instance. It prevents the first initialized robot node from
always allocates its top-ranked task first. In the second step, a
robot with an allocated task is not available to allocate another
one. In Alliance, when a robot activates a behavior set, the
other motivation levels remain null, meaning the other behavior
sets are inhibited. While the robots motivation levels increase,
robots choose their top-ranked available tasks, i.e., behavior sets
not inhibited by other society members. Thus, the architecture
accomplishes step 3. When a robot finishes a task, the motivation
levels of inhibited behavior sets increase overtime. So the robot
can choose an available task. And so on, until accomplishing
the mission. It is equivalent to steps 4 and 5 of the Allocation
Mechanism 1.
Both situations implement the random delay on robots startup,
meeting the Allocation Mechanism 1 first step. However, the
random startup impacts similar preference profiles. The second
case preference profiles and motivation level settings do not
impact the task assignment. Besides, the architecture is ex-post
Pareto-efficient, Definition 6. No other policy π increases the
welfare of a robot without decreasing from another, i.e., no other
task allocation sequence improves the social welfare. Further,
with the same preference orderings, in the first case, all possible
9
Robotics and Autonomous Systems 144 (2021) 103839
policies are ex-post Pareto-efficient, depending entirely on the
random robot startup.
The architecture satisfies Condition 1, considering robots can
order tasks in any logically possible way.2 It also satisfies Con-
dition 2, as shown in the analysis of the transitivity and com-
pleteness of the preference ordering. As the individual preference
orderings, Conditions 3 and 4 are automatically met. Therefore,
the architecture performs a Social Welfare Function over the set
T , mapping the individual preferences into a complete social
preference ordering.
6.2. Robots have the same preference ordering
In this situation, the preference ordering of all individuals is
equal, as Eq. (2) shows.
⪰r 1 = ⪰r 2 = ⪰r 3 = (τ3 ≻ τ1 ∼ τ2 ≻ τ4 ) (2)
From Eq. (2) one can infer the pairwise preferences: if (τ3 ≻
τ1 ) and (τ1 ∼ τ2 ), then (τ3 ≻ τ2 ); if (τ1 ∼ τ2 ) and (τ2 ≻ τ4 ), then
(τ1 ≻ τ4 ); and, therefore, (τ3 ≻ τ4 ). So the preference ordering
is complete and transitive. It is not hard to conclude that the
emerging social ordering of this setting the same as the above
preference orderings. And, as Fig. 4 shows, the sequence as the
robots allocate the tasks follows the social ordering. Fig. 4 shows
the task allocation over time. The vertical axis is the mission task.
So, the graph shows the system works and which robot executes
each task. All the robots start at idle behavior. As each behavior
set motivation grows, as shown in Fig. 5, the task allocation
occurs. The graph Detail on task allocation presents the behavior
sets activation within the first seconds of simulation.
Considering the robots have the same preferences, the random
delay of initialization implemented in the simulation defines the
task allocation order. The first instantiated robot node starts the
motivation levels calculation first, then reaches the threshold
first. Fig. 5 shows the robots’ motivation evolution over time. The
plot x-axis presents a time scale for the first 10 s of simulation
and another time scale for the remaining. It aims to highlight the
period of task allocation. Looking at the robot r1 plot, it has a
delay of 1 s. So, it took longer than the other robots to start the
motivation calculation. Despite the difference in the initialization
time, observe the motivation levels of the behavior sets have the
same growth rate in all the society.
In this case, according to the graphs in Fig. 5, r3 is the first
instantiated robot, so it chooses the top-ranked task first, the
boundary patrol task. After its allocation, the motivation of the
2 Here, as a logically possible way, we mean an order that considers tasks
ordering dependencies as defined in Alliance. For instance, a task like find the
box must come first, then a task such push the box to position A.
W.P.N. dos Reis, G.L. Lopes and G.S. Bastos Robotics and Autonomous Systems 144 (2021) 103839

Fig. 4. Task allocation and execution over time in a situation that robots have the same preference ordering.

Fig. 5. Evolution of motivation values over time.

same behavior set in r1 and r2 drops to zero. After a while, r2

chooses its second preference, the wander left task. Robot r1 is
the last one to choose a task. It chooses the wander right task
over the report task. The first robot to finish its task, r1 enables
the behavior set of the report task. Observe r2 motivation for τ4
also grows because of its impatience. But, as r1 communicates its
status with no failure, r2 motivation falls to zero.
Then, the task allocation when society has the same preference
ordering was defined due to the random startup of the robots.
This characteristic is related to the random individual sorting of
the RSD-based algorithm [56].
6.3. Robots with different preference orderings
In this analysis, we run three different simulations with three
different preference profiles, shown in Eqs. (3), (4), and (5).
⪰r 1 τ3 ≻ τ1 ≻ τ2 ≻ τ4
[ ] [ ]
[⪰a ]R = ⪰r 2 = τ1 ≻ τ2 ≻ τ3 ≻ τ4
⪰r 3 τ3 ≻ τ2 ≻ τ1 ≻ τ4
⪰r 1 τ1 ≻ τ2 ≻ τ3 ≻ τ4
[ ] [ ]
[⪰c ]R = ⪰r 2 = τ3 ≻ τ2 ≻ τ1 ≻ τ4 (5)
⪰r 3 τ3 ≻ τ1 ≻ τ2 ≻ τ4
Examining the preference profiles, the emerging social order-
ing is (τ3 ≻ τ1 ≻ τ2 ≻ τ4 ). Despite the preference profile and
the random delay to robot initialization, task allocation follows
the social ordering, as Fig. 6 shows. In each situation, robots
allocate their top-ranked task at specific intervals, but society
accomplishes the mission. Even when a task took longer to be
finished – observe τ3 for preference profiles a and b in Fig. 6 – or
a robot fails, as happened in preference profile b simulation.
Fig. 7 shows the motivation level evolution for robots r1 , r2 ,
and r3 in the case of preference profile b. It has two different
time scales, as Fig. 5, to detail the beginning of the simulation and
the first task allocation. Perceive the different slope in motivation
level with individual preference ordering. The allocation of τ3 ,
τ2 , and τ1 presents no problems. After finishing τ1 , r3 starts τ4
execution but fails3 before completing the task, as Fig. 8(c) and
(3) (d) show. As r3 fails, r2 impatience grows (Fig. 6, between 70 and
90 s, see r2 and r3 graphs for the motivation levels), so it takes up

⪰r 1 τ3 ≻ τ2 ≻ τ1 ≻ τ4
[ ] [ ] 3 We simulate a robot failure by closing its control node in ROS, killing
[⪰b ]R = ⪰r 2 = τ3 ≻ τ1 ≻ τ2 ≻ τ4 (4) its process. As an Alliance characteristic, robot r3 gave up the task execution
⪰r 3 τ1 ≻ τ2 ≻ τ3 ≻ τ4 because of the robot acquiescence, and robot r2 finished it.

10
W.P.N. dos Reis, G.L. Lopes and G.S. Bastos
Fig. 6. Task allocation and execution over time for three preference profiles.
Fig. 7. Evolution of motivation values over time in the case of preference profile b, with a fail of robot r3 .
τ4 and closes the mission, in Fig. 8(f) and (g). See Fig. 8 for more
details. Nevertheless, the fault-tolerant characteristic of Alliance
does not affect the social ordering and Arrovian analysis. Even
with a robot failure, social ordering remains the same.
7. Discussion
This paper’s allocation mechanisms do not consider certain
practical aspects of task allocation architectures in MRS. From the
hardware point of view, some of these aspects are communication
means, computational power, actuators, and sensors’ limitations.
The simulation discussion shows the MRTA problem can be an-
alyzed from the Arrovian point of view even in a task allocation
architecture implemented in another domain.
11
Robotics and Autonomous Systems 144 (2021) 103839
The consideration of independent tasks simplifies the propo-
sitions of this article. In the ordinal preference, a greater depen-
dence relation among alternatives demands a conditional prefer-
ence definition among them. Consider the tasks as alternatives.
The utility calculation performed on each robot must incorporate
a conditional function to evaluate the influence of a new state
of the system on the other alternatives. For example, robot rm
allocates the task τk . Does this new state change preferences
among other alternatives? If the answer is yes, then the tasks
have a dependency the allocation mechanism must consider.
Another critical point is the number of robots and tasks in real
MRS. The number of robots does not exceed a dozen, in general.
Likewise, situated systems, i.e., not simulated, usually do not
present a high number of tasks, even on account of the execution
time. So preference orders do not involve a large number of
W.P.N. dos Reis, G.L. Lopes and G.S. Bastos
Fig. 8. Simulation of preference profile b: r1 has a gray trail, r2 has a white trail, and r3 has a black one.
alternatives, being it tasks or robots. Nevertheless, future work
must verify the scalability of the algorithms when applied to
large-scale MRS.
8. Conclusion
This paper proposes a Social Choice-based Arrovian struc-
ture to evaluate task allocation mechanisms in multi-robot sys-
tems. Moreover, it addresses the use of individual ordinal prefer-
ences and preference aggregation mechanisms for social decision-
making. The proposed Arrovian view is another perspective to
address the MRTA problem analysis. Applied to MRTA problems, it
contributes to the theoretical and practical study of such problem
solutions. Like Arrow’s axiomatic method, the paper proposes
12
Robotics and Autonomous Systems 144 (2021) 103839
an analysis framework based on Social Choice Theory and not a
new MRTA architecture. It addresses the single-task robot prob-
lem and presents the results in a behavior-based architecture.
However, we can extend the same framework for other MRTA
taxonomy problems and other architectures.
Although it is not the intent of this work since it introduces
the research, a scheme that obeys the axioms of social choice can
focus on preference communication and aggregation rather than
individual preference ordering. The hypothesis for future research
is that an individual’s utility function can be as simple as possible,
using its metrics, and it will not impact the social decision. Also as
future work, we can cite the implementation of a market-based
and optimization-based architecture and their simulation and the
Arrovian analysis of other architectures.
W.P.N. dos Reis, G.L. Lopes and G.S. Bastos
Declaration of competing interest
The authors declare that they have no known competing finan-
cial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared
to influence the work reported in this paper.
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interests are AGV Dispatching and AGV Position Control Design.

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