TAEDE A.

SMEDES

Technology and Imago Dei

Technology as a Focus of Theological Anthropology

Abstract – Since the 1960s, a new dialogue between theology and the natural
sciences has emerged. In this dialogue, technology is hardly considered. Technology
still is very much seen as being merely relevant to ethical discussions, although phi-
losophers of technology have long gone beyond the ethical. This article aims to show
– although briefly and fragmentarily – how technology is relevant to fundamental
theological discussions. In this article technology is considered from the perspective
of theological anthropology: the theological reflection on the origin, nature, and
destiny of humanity in light of the relationship between God and creation.
It explores some of the issues involved in discussing technology in the framework
of a theological anthropology. After an introduction, the issue of a ‘natural history’
of the human use of technology is addressed, as well as the question whether tech-
nology is the defining characteristic of human beings. Thereafter the ‘naturalness’ of
human technology and Andy Clark’s idea of humans as ‘natural-born cyborgs’ is
considered. It aims to show, contra to claims that technology is external to human
beings, that technology comes quite naturally to humans. Finally there is a brief look
at the different theological responses by Philip Hefner and Noreen Herzfeld who
both interpret technology within the theological framework of humans as being
created in the image of God (imago Dei) but do so in quite different ways. While
Hefner accepts the ‘natural history narrative,’ and considers technology as natural,
Herzfeld defends the view that there are biological boundaries between humans and
machines which have consequences for our attitudes towards technology.

Introduction: theology and science, but not technology

Since the 1960s, theology has become engaged in a new dialogue with the
natural sciences. Although in the first half of the twentieth-century fierce debates
concerning creationism and evolutionary theory took place in the US that made
many scientists extremely cautious of engaging with theology, it was predomi-
nantly the view that theology and science are ‘separated’ and have nothing to
do with each other that triggered some scholars to engage in what is now known
as the science-and-religion dialogue (Smedes 2007, 185-201).

ET-Studies 1/1 (2010), 25-37. doi: 10.2143/ETS.1.1.2053951

© 2010 by ET-Studies. All rights reserved.

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The idea that science is irrelevant to theology was promoted by theologians

influenced by Karl Barth. It was the opinion of those who wanted to renew the
dialogue between science and theology that a separation between science and
theology would eventually lead to a cultural isolation of theology. If theology has
anything to do with the world that people live in, it should engage the natural
sciences. Moreover, the sciences are challenging religious assumptions, such as the
claim that God created the world which is challenged by the theories of the Big
Bang and evolution, or the claim that God acts in the world. If theology wants to
avoid being relegated to a cultural ghetto, it has to face these challenges.
Whereas the natural sciences have been the focal point of those engaged in
the science-and-religion dialogue, technology has to a large extent been ignored.
The second series of Ian Barbour’s 1990-1991 Gifford Lectures were on tech-
nology, but the title of the volume that was the result of those lectures – Ethics
in an Age of Technology – already indicates that Barbour considers technology
almost singularly from an ethical point of view. As Barbour writes in the preface:
‘The first volume in this series (Barbour 1990) examined the challenges to
religion presented by the methods and theories of science. This second volume
deals with the challenges to ethics arising from technology and applied science’
(Barbour 1993, xv). It seems that whereas the natural sciences present challenges
to the theological understanding of the world and of the relationship between
God, humans and world, and is the focus of the theological discipline of
systematic theology, technology is merely interesting from the point of view of
theological ethics.
Nowadays this situation is slowly changing. First of all, since the late 1990s
a true renaissance of the discipline of the philosophy of technology has occurred.
Philosophers have recognized that recent developments in technology call for
renewed reflection on issues of knowledge (epistemology), values (axiology),
and a reassessment of the implications of technology for our view of reality
(metaphysics). Secondly, this renewed reflection on technology is triggered by
developments in a range of scientific disciplines, such as computer and infor-
mation sciences, the medical sciences, the cognitive sciences and the study of
artificial intelligence, but also biological disciplines such as paleoanthropology
(especially the brand that studies the emergence of human tool-use) and ethology
(the study of animal behavior, especially the branch that studies the ways some
animals use tools).
Why should these developments have triggered a renewed interest in a philo-
sophical reflection on technology? I believe part of the answer lies in what the
French philosopher Dominique Janicaud writes:

There is now an unprecedented uncertainty about human identity. This uneasiness

(and that is putting it mildly) is due to a widespread subversion. This subversion

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 TECHNOLOGY AND IMAGO DEI 27

relates first to knowledge of the origins of man and his point of attachment to the
chain of beings: neither his genetic code, nor the use of tools, nor a certain lan-
guage, nor social codes differentiate him in an absolute manner. The subversions
that revolve round his future could prove to be more radical still, especially if, at
some point in the future, genuine biotechnological mutations were to transform
‘the human race’ to the point of rendering it unrecognizable, biologically, techni-
cally, culturally (Janicaud, 2005).
As Janicaud describes in his book, the knowledge gained by the sciences com-
bined with the powers invoked by technology together lead to new reflections
on the question ‘What is it to be human?’ For science and technology seem
to erase age-old boundaries, such as between human beings and animals (in
the light of evolutionary theory) and ‘between what man is now and potential
humanoid mutants’ – humans that have overcome their creaturely limitations
via technology and have gone ‘beyond’ humanity (Janicaud, 2005). Technology,
as Janicaud acknowledges, is riddled with mythical and religious connotations,
especially if one thinks about ‘monstrous’ aspects of technology (e.g. Franken-
stein) or mythical views of cyborgs. One also finds this curious combination
of technology with mythical and religious imagery in the recent film trilogy
The Matrix.
It thus seems that theologians are cordially invited to join the table, yet if
one looks at theological handbooks, systematic theologies, or theological
anthropologies, one hardly finds reflections on the relation between technology,
human beings, and God. It seems that theologians are thinking that whereas
science has major impact on the way we think about the world and ourselves,
many theologians still hold that dealing with technology is merely relevant for
ethical reflection. Yet, what philosophers of technology such as Don Ihde,
Andy Clark and others are saying is that technology itself is a mode of being
human: technology influences the way we see ourselves and determines our
perception on reality.
Theological anthropology deals with the origin, nature, and destiny of humans
in light of the relationship between God and creation. It is thus the task of
theological anthropology to reflect on the question what it means to be human
from a theological perspective. If these philosophers of technology are right that
technology itself is a mode of being human, theologians should take notice of
developments in the philosophy of technology. Based on a number of publica-
tions that came out in recent years, it seems that interest in the relations between
technology and religion is growing (Cobb 1998, Drees 2009, Foerst 2004,
Noble 1997, Pattison 2005, Szerszynski 2005). Yet, things move slowly.
This article explores some of the issues involved in discussions about tech-
nology in the framework of a theological anthropology. Especially, I point to
the blurring of boundaries between humans and animals, the ‘naturalness’ of

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 28 TAEDE A. SMEDES

human technology and the idea of humans as ‘natural-born cyborgs,’ and finally
to the theological responses by Philip Hefner and Noreen Herzfeld who inter-
pret technology within the theological framework of humans as being created
in the image of God (imago Dei).

1. A natural history of the human use of technology

A crucial issue with reflections on technology has to do with the question of

whether technology is an inherent part of human nature, or whether technology
is an influence that can lead to an estrangement from our inner selves. Two
twentieth-century thinkers, the philosopher Martin Heidegger and the theologian
Jacques Ellul, were of the opinion that technology would lead to an estrangement
from nature and from ourselves (Heidegger 1977, Ellul 1980). Technology
tends to instrumentalize nature and would create a system which might lead to
a new slavery, where people would become prisoners of the technological system.
Technology, according to Heidegger and Ellul, was not an inherent part of
human nature. One could also point to the use of metaphors, such as ‘playing
God’ which is used often in contexts related to genetic engineering, which indi-
cate that by using technology, humans are doing something they shouldn’t; they
are crossing a boundary which is taboo.
Indeed, an answer to this issue hinges on the question as to what we mean
by ‘technology’. So far, I have used this concept more or less intuitively, since
most readers will have an intuitive grasp as to what technology is. Yet, one who
looks for definitions of technology will often find that no consensus exists as to
what technology is. In a recent introduction to the philosophy of technology,
Val Dusek considers several approaches to technology. Technology, Dusek writes,
has been considered as pure ‘hardware’ (machines), as a set of rules (the notion
of ‘technique’ as used by Jacques Ellul), as a system (including hardware, human
skills, and organizations), or as applied science (Dusek 2006, 31-35). Dusek
writes that these different definitions have led many to abandon definitions of
technology altogether.
Dusek himself proposes a ‘consensus definition’ where technology is ‘the
application of scientific or other knowledge to practical tasks by ordered systems
that involve people and organizations, productive skills, living things, and
machines’ (Dusek 2006, 35). This definition shows that technology involves:
(a) the application of knowledge to practical tasks, using (b) a range of different
instruments. One could also say – this is my own working definition – that
technology is the intelligent use and development of material elements which
are designed, made, used and modified for a specific, practical purpose. Now,
is technology defined as such alien to human nature?

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 TECHNOLOGY AND IMAGO DEI 29

Most archeologists, paleontologists, and paleoanthropologists agree that the

use of tools is a defining characteristic of human nature. Humans have never
been without technology. The famous periodization of human history into
Paleolithic (‘ancient stone’ age, the period of chipped stone artifacts), Mesolithic
(‘middle stone’ age), Neolithic (‘new stone’ age, the period of polished stone
artifacts), Bronze Age (when copper and bronze artifacts appear), and Iron Age,
was inspired by human tool production and tool use. This periodization mirrors
the conviction, corroborated by archeological findings (a) that all species of
homo that have ever existed have been able to use, manufacture and/or modify
tools, and (b) there has been a progressive evolution in human tool use.
The pervasiveness of tool-use among humans raises the question whether
the capacity to use tools is restricted to humans. Kenneth Oakley wrote in the
early seventies that ‘man may be distinguished as the tool-making primate’
and that ‘employment of tools appears to be his chief biological characteristic’
(Oakley 1972, 1). Though Oakley points to tool-use among chimpanzees, he
argues that this ‘is a far cry from the systematic making of stone tools, the earliest
known examples of which evidently required much premeditation, a high order
of skill and an established tradition implying some means of communication’
(Oakley 1972, 2f). Nowadays, biologists know that tool-use among animals is
ubiquitous. There are examples of otters using stones to crack crab shells, birds
that use stones to crack snail shells, and chimpanzees that use twigs to catch
termites, ants, or honey from a honey comb. In all these cases, artifacts are
being used to manipulate nature. Humans thus are not the only species that use
technology.
If that is agreed upon, then the question is: how special are humans in their
use of technology? Does human tool use differ qualitatively from those of other
species, and if so, in what way? Or are humans simply expanding possibilities
that are also present in ‘lower’ creatures? Otters and birds are using stones to
acquire food, but they may have mastered the use of stones as tools through
trial-and-error learning. If so, does this imply that they understand the under-
lying principles of the problem? Are they aware of the cause-and-effect relations
inherent in their tool use? Some Tanzanian chimpanzees that are fond of
termite-fishing and ant-dipping seem to have some clue about what they are
doing. Ian Tattersall writes:

Twigs of different kinds are selected for different purposes, and recent observa-
tions reveal that stouter branches are used as levers or to dig out honey from
bees’ nests. Significantly, twigs are not necessarily discarded when they become
bent or frayed; as long as they can, chimpanzees will usually break off the end
of such a tool to ‘refresh’ it and will continue using it as long as such modifica-
tion is possible. Chimpanzees have also been observed to break off branches for

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 30 TAEDE A. SMEDES

use in hooking in fruit from otherwise inaccessible tree limbs, for attacking
potential predators, and for expelling the occupants of holes in trees. Branches
[instead of twigs] are also brandished to enhance the effectiveness of aggressive
displays, and rocks and sticks are thrown in attempts to intimidate competitors
or predators (Tattersall 2000, 52f).
Clearly then, as Tattersall acknowledges, those chimpanzees have some insight
into the principles of using twigs and, perhaps, using the power of analogous
reasoning, the use of branches. Yet, ‘this does not mean that chimpanzees are
toolmakers (or even tool users) in the sense that modern humans are – clearly,
they are not – but it shows that chimpanzees are capable of forming a mental
picture of what attributes some simple tools, at least, need to have to accomplish
a particular aim’ (Tattersall 2000, 53).
Non-human primates such as chimpanzees seem to grasp the underlying prin-
ciples. However, one of Tattersall’s central claims is that the cognitive abilities
of humans go beyond those of chimpanzees and other non-human primates;
there is a ‘cognitive gap’ between humans and chimpanzees. Tattersall is not
alone: there seems to be a growing consensus among scientists that the human
species, which already had made a cognitive leap compared to other species such
as the chimpanzee, somewhere and somehow during evolution crossed another
critical threshold, which led to the ‘big bang of culture’ which led eventually
to art, religion, science, and advanced technology. However, if nature led to
the ‘big bang of culture,’ it seems logical to conclude that the evolution of tech-
nology no longer stands opposed to nature – as is so often thought, but is part
of nature.

2. Technology and what it means to be human

In the last couple of hundred years, human technology has advanced up to a

point where we seem to have lost contact with our natural environment entirely.
Present-day humans inhabit a ‘technosphere’ which seems quite remote from
the nature from which we emerged. It is not surprising that philosophers such
as Heidegger and Ellul argued that humans have become estranged from nature,
and downgrade nature to nothing more than a set of resources that they use for
their own well-being. There is a constant threat to see nature as the realm of the
wild that has to be tamed, of that which does not belong to culture or has
not (yet) been cultivated, of that over which humankind has dominion. Such
an attitude that mirrors an existential remoteness of culture from nature can lead
to patterns of behavior that result in the destruction of other living beings,
the biosphere and even the destruction of our habitat and of our own species
through technology.

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 TECHNOLOGY AND IMAGO DEI 31

Getting rid of technology is no option. Because of our dependence on (medical)

technology we can no longer survive without it. Our relation to technology has
become one of symbiosis between humans and machines. Philosophers and
theologians search for a perspective that can reconnect humans, human culture,
and technology to the natural environment in which they are embedded. One
such perspective, and one that has gained some prominence recently, is that of
humans as natural-born cyborgs.
Consider for a moment enhancement technology, such as cochlear implants
or ‘simple’ hearing devices, or the pair of glasses or contact lenses that you are
wearing. Consider pacemakers, artificial hearts and hips, or the medical applica-
tion of steel pens in a human body. Human lives depend on these technological
feats. And as the theologian Gregory Peterson writes, using medication ‘merges
us in the most intimate way with our technology, as our bodies absorb chemicals
that may never have existed in nature’ (Peterson 2003, 217).
The symbiosis between a human person and machine is known under the
name of cyborg, the abbreviation of cybernetic organism. The term ‘cyborg’ was
coined in 1960 in a paper on space travel by Manfred Clynes and Nathan Kline
(Clynes & Kline 1995, 29-33). Clynes and Kline describe a cyborg as an entity
that incorporates external elements in its physical constitution as a survival
strategy to adapt to changing influences from the surroundings. Cyborgs feature
extensively in science fiction films and books, but the cognitive scientist and
philosopher Andy Clark argues that the cyborg nowadays may be an appropriate
metaphor describing our technological human condition. Clark draws heavily
on the recent neuroscientific approach of ‘embodied’ or ‘situated’ cognition – an
approach that strongly emphasizes the role of embodiment and in cognitive
processes. Clark’s central point is: ‘What makes us distinctively human is our
capacity to continually restructure and rebuild our own mental circuitry, cour-
tesy of an empowering web of culture, education, technology, and artifacts’
(Clark 2003, 10). The term ‘cyborg’ for Clark is not limited to the inhabitants
of science fiction, but signifies the fundamental human ability ‘to enter into
deep and complex relationships with nonbiological constructs, props, and aids’
(Clark 2003, 5). Humans possess a peculiar though natural flexibility in being
able to use all kinds of external objects to solve certain problems (in the broad-
est sense of the word). Therefore Clark speaks about humans as natural-born
cyborgs: the use of technology comes as naturally as walking, talking, eating,
and having sex.
Consider, as an example, a blind person using a stick to find her way around
in the world. How are the person and the stick related? On a physical level, there
may be a demarcation between body and the tool (stick). However, in using the
tool, that demarcation disappears: the tool at hand becomes an extension and
hence part of the body. This example was used by philosophers such as Michael

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 32 TAEDE A. SMEDES

Polanyi and Maurice Merleau-Ponty to argue the same point: that our ‘body
scheme’ is not spatially fixed but dynamic. What I see as belonging to ‘me’
(i.e. inherent to my body scheme) and ‘not-me’ (i.e. external to my body scheme)
is context-dependent. The boundaries between our bodies and the world can
become fluid. The car that is parked on my driveway is external to my body
scheme. Yet, when I drive my car, my car becomes part of my body scheme,
and what happens to my car feels like it is affecting me directly. Such reflections
lead Gregory Peterson to conclude: ‘Human beings are tool users, and modern
human beings are tool users par excellence. So familiar has our technology
become that it is often invisible to us. But any individual who wears glasses or
contacts is in a sense a cyborg’ (Peterson 2003, 217).
Cyborg technology can be a replacement of biology. Someone who has
a cochlear implant is (after a long and sometimes arduous process of getting
used to it) no longer consciously aware that the implant is present – unless it
malfunctions. Or cyborg technology can function as an extension of biology.
Telescopes and microscopes extend the visual senses because they reveal things
that under normal circumstances are hidden from human sight.
The idea of bodily extensions via technology is not new among philoso-
phers of technology. In 1877 the German philosopher Ernst Kapp (1808-1896)
wrote that many technological developments were rooted in ‘organ projection’
(Kapp 1877). A hammer looks like a fist, a saw like a row of teeth, and the
telescope is a technological copy of the eye. Much of technology was according
to Kapp an enlargement and externalization of human organs, such that technol-
ogy supersedes human capacities. The link between technology and human
embodiment was also perceived by the philosophical anthropologist Arnold
Gehlen (1904-1976). In 1957 Gehlen wrote a classic essay on the relationship
between humans and technology (Gehlen 1957). Gehlen speaks of Organentla-
stung (‘organ relief’) in the case of a car or a boulder car, which makes the
physical pulling or lifting of objects unnecessary. Organverstärkung (‘organ
reinforcement’) is the case when technological artifacts enhance and reinforce
human capacities, as is the case with the hammer or a microscope. In the case
of Organersatz (‘organ replacement’) there is the adding of functions that are
otherwise not present to humans: we are able to fly with airplanes, which
‘replace’ our absent wings.
But Clark wants to go further. He believes humans as natural-born cyborgs
are not only capable of creating extensions of their physical bodies, they also
extend their minds. Pens and pencils are extensions of our hands. But the paper
we use to write things down becomes an extension of our cognitive apparatus.
By writing things down, we no longer need to remember them. Papers with notes,
but also paper calendars, electronic PDAs that synchronize with MS Outlook,

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 TECHNOLOGY AND IMAGO DEI 33

reference books and encyclopedias – Clark believes these are all external elements
that are being used by us as extra-neural memory banks. Moreover, the cyber-
space of the internet is starting to become a collective memory bank. E-mail and
chatrooms extend our communicative abilities (as did the telegraph, telephone
and fax machine earlier). The end of these developments is not yet in sight:
‘telepresence’ (a three-dimensional projection of one’s physical appearance in
e.g. a global business meeting) is one of the future possibilities that may make
business trips unnecessary.
Clark’s concept of the natural-born cyborg is a powerful and imaginative
metaphor to emphasize the natural character of human technology and the
continuity between humans and the rest of nature, without denying or ignoring
the peculiarity of human tool-use in comparison with animal tool-use. There is
a fundamental but natural ability in humans to build up a very intimate and
flexible relationship with non-biological, external tools and technologies. Using
technology apparently is what comes naturally.

3. Technology and thinking theologically about human being

Two theologians have begun to reflect on the theological significance of

technology: the Lutheran Philip Hefner, and the Quaker Noreen Herzfeld
(Hefner 1993, Hefner 2003, Herzfeld 2002, Herzfeld 2009). Both agree that
the issue of technology and what it means to be human are intimately linked,
though both have a different view on how technology relates to humans and
to God.
According to Philip Hefner, technology is nature and nature can appear in
the mode of technology:
The hybridized navel orange, the automobile, the asphalt parking lot, the computer
– these are nature. We call them techno-nature, recognizing that techno-nature is,
in a real sense, the only nature that now exists on our planet. … There is essentially
no difference between the phenomenon of the bee producing honey and the human
being fashioning a fast-food burger. The technological overlay that characterizes
the production of the burger is as much a part of nature as is the bee, performing
in a manner appropriate to the evolutionary context of human culture (Hefner
1993, 154).

Moreover, technology is deeply intertwined with the process of what Hefner

calls ‘human becoming,’ and which expresses the idea that being human means
being always in process. The journey ‘is a religious reality, a journey of the spirit,
and if technology is a part of it, then technology is also a religious and spiritual

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 34 TAEDE A. SMEDES

reality’ (Hefner 2003, 5f). He even goes so far as to say that spiritual reality
and our selfhood become ‘technologized’. Hefner uses the word intentionally,
so as to point out the alienation people feel when using the term (Hefner 2003,
22ff). Technology is ambivalent: it calls for wonder and amazement, but
also for fear, repugnance and anxiety for loss of self. This aspect of alienation
calls for reconciliation, for, as humans we are also cyborgs, ‘techno-selves’.
This means that alienation runs deep: ‘Our attitudes toward technology are
a very sensitive and reliable litmus test of our alienation from contemporary
life’ (Hefner 2003, 25). A reflection on technology thus implies, according to
Hefner, a reflection on what it means to be human. Moreover, such a reflec-
tion is deeply religious, since alienation and reconciliation are at the heart of
religion.
For Hefner, religion is about the Absolute, about the ‘depth of life’ (Hefner
2003, 74). To relate to the depth-dimension of life means relating to the
Absolute. But if one speaks about the depth of human life, one cannot ignore
technology, since ‘technology is not … outside us, but within us, shaping who
we are and how we live our lives. Cyborg is a relatively recent term that
expresses the dimension of techno-nature within human nature’ (Hefner 2003,
74). Reflecting on what it means to be human in light of religion thus means
reflecting on the theological significance of technology. For Hefner this comes
down to the following:
Now that we have broken down the walls that separate humans from both nature
and technology, now that we are crossing the boundaries between these domains,
we see that humans and their technology are a set of nature’s possibilities. … If we
speak in Jewish-Christian-Muslim terms, we must say that technonature is creation
and cyborg is created in the image of God. If we subscribe to Religious Naturalism,
we will have to say that technology is as much a dimension of the natural as the
sea, the landscape, the biosphere, and other elements of the evolutionary process.
Technology is now a phase of evolution, and it is now creation, a vessel for the
image of God (Hefner 2003, 77).

Noreen Herzfeld, a computer scientist and a Quaker theologian, in her book

In Our Image: Artificial Intelligence and the Human Spirit agrees with Hefner
that technology and the image of God are deeply connected: ‘Genesis 1 states
that human beings are created in the image of God. But God is not the only one
to create in the creator’s own image. As humans, we too have shown a perennial
desire to create in our image’ (Herzfeld 2002, 1). The search for Artificial Intel-
ligence (AI), according to Herzfeld, is an expression of the human urge to create
creatures in their own image. In her book she interprets technology theologically
by taking the imago Dei as a hermeneutical key.

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 TECHNOLOGY AND IMAGO DEI 35

According to Herzfeld, the notion of the imago Dei has had various interpre-
tations which can be categorized in three ways:
The substantive interpretation views the image of God as a property or set of
properties intrinsic to each of us as individuals, with reason a frequently mentioned
property. A second interpretation views the image, not as a property, but as a title
given to humans by virtue of what we do, in particular, our function, as God’s
representatives, of exercising dominion over the rest of creation. Third, relational
interpretations understand the image of God to be manifested in human-divine
and human-human relationships. According to this understanding, the image is not
something found in any individual but is always corporate in nature, arising in
interaction (Herzfeld 2002, 7).

Herzfeld’s book is an extensive argument for the third interpretation – the imago
Dei as relationality that ‘affirms the importance of relationship, not only with
God but also with others, as an active component of any serious Christian
spirituality’ (Herzfeld 2002, 87). Influenced by Barth, for whom every form of
relationality is always founded in a previous relationship between every human
and God, Herzfeld argues that human existence is characterized by a fundamen-
tal reciprocity: ‘Being is at root relational. Thus authentic relationship between
one human and another finds its basis and origin in the human-God relation-
ship’ (Herzfeld 2002, 86). This relationality is not limited to human-human
interaction, but also extends to the relationship between human and non-human
living creatures, and between humans and computers.
However, Herzfeld argues that the relationship between humans should never
be replaced by or seen as equal to the relation between humans and computers.
The theological context of relationality that is present in relationality between
humans is absent in the case of computers: ‘We must be prepared for difference
in the thinking, action, and, ultimately, values of an artificial intelligence that
does not share in the biological aspects of humanity. It is dangerous for us to
confuse or conflate humans and machines’(Herzfeld 2002, 93).

Conclusion

Whereas Hefner accepts a blurring of boundaries between the human and non-
human, and between the biological and artificial, Herzfeld draws a distinction
between ‘machines’ and humans ultimately based on the distinction between
biology and silicon. Hefner accepts technology as a biological category, Herzfeld
does no such thing. The differences between Hefner’s and Herzfeld’s positions
are thus based on fundamental issues which have to do with both theological
and extra-theological (e.g. biological) data. This already shows that theological

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 36 TAEDE A. SMEDES

anthropology – the reflection on the origin, nature, and destiny of humans created
in the image of God in an age of technology – has thus become a truly interdis-
ciplinary endeavor that complements the ongoing dialogue between theology and
the natural sciences.

Literature

BARBOUR, I. G., 1990. Religion in an Age of Science: The Gifford Lectures 1989-1991,
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BARBOUR, I. G., 1993. Ethics in an Age of Technology: The Gifford Lectures 1989-1991,
Vol. 2, New York.
CLARK, A., 2003. Natural-Born Cyborgs: Minds, Technologies, and the Future of Human
Intelligence, New York, Oxford.
CLYNES, M. E., and KLINE N. S, 1995. Cyborgs and Space, In The Cyborg Handbook,
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Author

Taede A. Smedes (1973) is a research fellow at the Radboud University Nijmegen.

He has specialized in the field of science and religion, with particular interest in debates
concerning the connection between evolutionary theory and theological anthropology,
debates about divine action, and science and religion. His publications include Chaos,
Complexity, and God: Divine Action and Scientism (Leuven: Peeters Publications, 2004).
Address: Faculty of Religious Studies, Radboud University Nijmegen, PO Box 9103,
6500 HD, Nijmegen, the Netherlands. E-mail: tasmedes@tasmedes.nl.

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