EDUCATION AND THE LAW , VOL. 14, NO .

3, 2002

The emergence of self-managing schools

in South Africa: devolution of authority or
disguised centralism?

JOHAN BECKMANN
Department of Education Management and Policy Studies, Faculty of Education,
University of Pretoria, Pretoria, 0003 South Africa

Abstract This paper considers the devolution of authority to public school governing
bodies (SGBs) in the context of self-managing schools. It examines the nature of the powers,
functions and duties assigned to them in legislation and asks whether the manner in which
South African legislation provides for the devolution of authority and power represents
authentic devolution of power, or whether it can be characterised as centralisation in
disguise. The question is answered by examining, against the backdrop of general and
education-speciŽ c legal provisions, two examples of functions of SGBs, namely those to
determine language and admission policies.

Introduction
Devolution of authority to subordinates or to lower hierarchical levels is an essential
element of all education management and administration activities and strategies.
Without a measure of decentralisation or devolution, a system sacriŽ ces effectiveness
and efŽ ciency to a greater or lesser degree. Systems vary in regard to their relative
emphasis on centralisation or decentralisation of authority.
Like all management and administrative actions, decentralisation must be
embedded in enabling or imperative legal provisions. Such provisions have a
signiŽ cant impact on the way in which a system re ects characteristics of centralisa-
tion and decentralisation. It is also commonplace that, in most systems, there are
tensions between forces favouring centralisation and forces emphasising decentralis-
ation. It is also unlikely that there are systems where all conceivable powers are
decentralised to lower levels (Bondesio, 2000). Neither is one likely to Ž nd systems
where there is no decentralisation of authority.
This paper will examine legal provisions impacting on the organisation of public
schools in South Africa. It will scrutinise more speciŽ cally the factors that constitute
the tension between the tendencies to decentralise and to centralise power and
which, consequently, deŽ ne the character and essential tenor of the system.

ISSN 0953-9964 print; 1469-5774 online/02/030153-14 Ó 2002 Taylor & Francis Ltd
DOI: 10.1080/0953996022000027835
154 J. BECKMANN

General legal framework

In order to understand the concept of self-managing schools within the South
African context, some background information on relevant constitutional and other
statutory provisions in South Africa is required.

Constitutional democracy
Section 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (Act 108 of
1996) (Republic of South Africa, 1996c) (hereinafter Constitution) provides that
‘[T]his Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic; law or conduct inconsistent
with it is invalid, and the obligations imposed by it must be fulŽ lled.’ This provision
renders all laws and government action and activity (including delegation) subordi-
nate to the Constitution. If laws or government acts are found to be in contravention
of constitutional provisions, they may be declared invalid and struck down.
Section 7(1) of the Constitution provides that ‘[T]his Bill of Rights is a corner-
stone of democracy in South Africa. It enshrines the rights of all people in our
country and afŽ rms the democratic values of human dignity, equality and freedom.’
The right to participate in decision making on matters that affect one’s interests and
rights is generally regarded as a democratic value. Mgijima (2000, p. 18) states that
the democratisation of education includes the ‘idea that all stakeholders (i.e. par-
ents, educators, learners, and members of the community) must participate in
school activities’. One of the ways in which one could gain access to this right, is if
the power to participate is devolved to one.
Section 7(2) provides that ‘[T]he state must respect, protect, promote and fulŽ l
the rights in the Bill of Rights.’ It would appear that the state has a responsibility
regarding the provision to citizens of participation rights regarding various decision-
making issues in education. This provision implies among others:
· that the state must not interfere unduly with the right to participation in
decision making in education,
· that it must protect the right to participation against violation by private
agencies,
· that it must promote access to the right to participation, and enable citizens,
through appropriate legal measures, to exercise this right.

Co-operative government
Section 40(1) of the Constitution provides that in the Republic, government is
constituted as national, provincial and local spheres of government which are
distinctive, interdependent and interrelated.
Section 40(2) provides that:

All spheres of government and all organs of state within each sphere
must—
 SELF-MANAGING SCHOOLS IN SOUTH AFRICA 155

FIGURE 1. The Spheres of Government (Bray, 2000)

respect the constitutional status, institutions, powers and functions of

government in the other spheres;

not assume any power or function except those conferred on them in terms
of the Constitution;

exercise their powers and perform their functions in a manner that does not
encroach on the geographical, functional or institutional integrity of
government in another sphere; and

co-operate with one another in mutual trust and good faith

The Constitution has federal elements. However, the system of government is not
federal. Neither is it unitary. The above section with its two sub-sections contains at
least the following elements that appear to evoke decentralisation as a natural form
of governance, on one hand, and seem, on the other hand, to contain elements that
will militate against effective decentralisation by giving rise to con ict. It is notice-
able that section 40(1) constitutes national, provincial and local spheres of govern-
ment as distinguished from levels or tiers of government. The fact that these levels
need to be distinctive, interrelated and interdependent suggests that decentra-
lisation of power is not likely to be an uncomplicated process as it is likely that there
will be uncertainty about who holds power in the grey areas where the three spheres
necessarily intersect. One can also anticipate contestations of power.
The fact that the above expectation of contestations of power did indeed occur
is proved by the fact that one of the Ž rst cases originating in the Ž eld of education
after the commencement of the 1993 Constitution scrutinised the powers given to
the national Minister of Education in the National Education Policy Act, 1996 (Act
No 27 of 1996) (Republic of South Africa, 1996a) ‘(hereinafter NEPA)’.1 The
process of decentralisation is not made easier by the provision that the various
spheres of government should inform one another of, and consult one another on,
matters of common interest and that they should co-ordinate their actions and
legislation with one another (S40(2) of the Constitution). Fig. 1 above depicts the
three spheres of government in South Africa.
156 J. BECKMANN

Concurrent and exclusive legislative powers

Section 104(1)(b) of the Constitution gives a province the power to:

pass legislation for its province with regard to—

any matter within a functional area listed in Schedule 4;

any matter within a functional area listed in Schedule 5

According to Rautenbach and Malherbe (1998, 41–42) this means that provincial
legislatures may make laws on matters on which: (a) the provinces share the power
to make laws (legislative authority) with Parliament (the national sphere govern-
ment) and; (b) on matters on which only the provinces may make laws.
The legislative authority or power referred to in: (a) above is called concurrent
legislative authority and the matters concerned are listed in Schedule 4 of the
Constitution. These matters include education at all levels but exclude tertiary
(higher) education. The legislative power referred to in: (b) above is known as
exclusive legislative authority and it applies to the matters listed in Schedule 5 of
the Constitution. Schedule 5 makes no reference to education but by way of inference
we know that higher education is an exclusive national competence. The local
sphere of government has no legislative power regarding education.
The fact that government in South Africa occurs in the national, provincial and
local spheres that support one another means that the traditional model of del-
egation from a higher to a lower level of authority does not apply per se. However,
national laws may prevail over provincial laws subject to the conditions set out in
section 146 of the Constitution. In that sense only one can speak of delegation of
government authority from one government level to another.
One should note that the above does not mean that, in the ordinary course of
managing and administering an institution or system, those that bear authority may
not delegate their functions and responsibilities. Section 62 of the South African
Schools Act, 1996 (Act 84 of 1996) (Republic of South Africa, 1996b) (hereinafter
SASA) provides for delegation of authority.

Some political realities

Decentralisation implies both the letting go and the embracing of power. This
process is often complicated by an unwillingness really to let go of power and / or
a reluctance to assume responsibilities. Pseudo or pretended devolution of power is
not uncommon (Beckmann, 2000). Moving from a centralised to a decentralised
system is complicated by the what the NEPI Report (National Education Co-ordi-
nating Committee (NECC), 1993: 160) terms ‘structural continuity’, that is the
tendency for largely decentralised systems to remain largely decentralised while
largely centralised systems tend to remain centralised despite countervailing tenden-
cies.
The tensions implied above are exacerbated in South Africa by political realities
in the sense that legal provisions on education are a result of a negotiation process
 SELF-MANAGING SCHOOLS IN SOUTH AFRICA 157

which led to a political settlement in South Africa in 1994. They also result from the
fact that the majority political party in the national parliament is not the majority
party in all the provincial legislatures2 and it thus may have to consider other
avenues of exerting its political will on the education system. This has to be
accomplished given the restraints inherent in the principle of concurrent legislative
authority referred to above.
Whereas there is a trend towards the ‘retreating government’ (Potgieter, 1997,
pp. 111–112) in the form of decentralisation and participation in education manage-
ment, among others in the countries of the European Union, Québec in Canada
(Smith et al., 1999) and New Zealand (Bondesio, 2000; Rae, 2000), South Africa,
at this joint in its history, certainly quite understandably exhibits a trend towards an
assertive government.3
What took place in South Africa in 1994 was more than just one political party
replacing another as the ruling party. The Minister of Education, Prof Kader Asmal
(in Mgijima, 2000, p. 3), says that the new government had to ‘transform a
broken-down and corrupted system of separate and unequal education provision’.
The new ruling party took upon themselves the responsibility to transform society
and to:
· Heal the divisions of the past and establish a society based on democratic
values, social justice and fundamental human rights;
· Lay the foundations for a democratic and open society in which government is
based on the will of the people and every citizen is equally protected by law;
· Improve the quality of life of all citizens and free the potential of each person;
and
· Build a united and democratic South Africa able to take its rightful place as a
sovereign state in the family of nations.4
The achievement of this objective calls among others for redress and a strong
government presence in policy, management and administration. This could militate
against forces promoting decentralisation of power.
Arguing in favour of decentralisation, Potgieter (1997, pp. 107–108) points out
that negotiations about SASA were characterised by two con icting points of
departure: to devolve as much authority as possible to the school governing bodies
and to retain as much authority as possible in the national sphere. Proponents of the
former view feared that schools (in particular the former so-called Model C schools
[‘White schools’]) would lose some of their powers and the proponents of the latter
view contended that too much decentralisation could lead to an entrenchment of
‘apartheid’ privileges in certain schools by protecting them from government con-
trol.
One of the technical advisers to the parties who negotiated the education
clause5 in the Constitution also observed the tensions, mistrusts and suspicions
between the forces of centralisation and decentralisation in the negotiation process.
Sayed (2000, p. 143) comments that, for the progressive education movement in
South Africa, ‘the discourse of educational transformation re ected both a commit-
ment to a strong, interventionist state and a belief in the desirability and efŽ cacy of
158 J. BECKMANN

grassroots control.’ Malherbe (1997, p. 66) observes that the eventual formulation
of the education clause was a political compromise with certain shortcomings
although it was not ‘fatally  awed’.
The compromise will naturally be subject to future evolution which could take
any one of three directions: it could re ect greater decentralisation, it could re ect
greater centralisation or it could re ect new and better compromises. Rae (2000)
re ects on another possibility and that is that, in the course of time, the pendulum
will swing to and fro between various emphases. Although there are people who
suggest that those with the greatest political power will inevitably change manage-
ment systems to re ect greater centralisation and a degree of disempowerment of
governing bodies (Federation of South African Schools (FEDSAS), 2000), this is by
no means a foregone conclusion. The constitutional protection of democratic
processes including participation could make it difŽ cult for any government to
merely ‘have its own way.’

Summary
Although the paragraphs above indicate that the devolution of authority is possible
in terms of the general governance framework, it would also appear that there is a
likelihood of con ict and that the traditional conception of delegation taking place
from a higher level to a lower level does not apply per se.

Self-managing schools
Much has been written about the general purpose of self-management of schools
(also known by many other names such as site-based management, decentralisation,
restructuring, school-based autonomy, participatory decision making, administrative
decentralisation, etc. [Cotton, 1992, p. 2]). School-based management is often
understood to signify attempts to transfer authority (power) and resources to school
level by decentralising decision making to units such as governance councils, bodies,
committees or teams (Sturm, 1996, p. 1). Cotton (1992, pp. 3–4) quotes Smith who
points out that school-based management concerns:
· Increased autonomy and the latitude to function independently to a consider-
able degree
· Increased school site accountability
· The power to establish policies
Cotton (1992, p. 4) also observes that site-based management:
· Alters the governance of education
· IdentiŽ es the school as the primary unit of educational change
It is important to note that the above suggests a movement away from viewing
schools as a collectivity towards viewing individual schools as independent, educa-
tional, decision-making units. Efforts to curtail the ability of schools to make
independent decisions within a general framework could be construed as militating
 SELF-MANAGING SCHOOLS IN SOUTH AFRICA 159

against the principle of site-based management and as an effort to retain centralised

forms of control.6
Self-managing schools as a form of organising and governing schools appear to
be an inevitable reality in South Africa. This is evident from a number of sources:
· The Preamble to SASA provides that the acceptance of parents, educators and
learners of their responsibility for the organisation, governance and funding of
schools, in partnership with the State, must be promoted. It is evident that
parents and learners can only accept this responsibility if there is a meaningful
transfer of power in these regards to school level.
· Section 16 of SASA provides that:
(1) Subject to this Act, the governance of every public school is vested in
its governing body.
(2) A governing body stands in a position of trust towards the school.
(3) Subject to this Act and any applicable provincial law, the professional
management of a public school must be undertaken by the principal
under the authority of the Head of Department.
This section places the governance of a public school in the hands of its
governing body and its management in the hands of the principal.
Beckmann et al. (1997, p. 10) distinguish as follows between governance
and management: ‘In general terms, governance implies overall control and
authority of the school and its policies and directions; whereas, management
implies day to day supervision and administration of activities within the
institution.’ This paper deals with the question as to whether the decentralis-
ation of governance to the governing body in terms of SASA is authentic or
whether it is just a disguised form of centralisation. In trying to answer the
question, the paper will consider two aspects of the functions of governing
bodies, namely those regarding language and admission policies at schools.
· Section 23(1) of SASA deals with the membership of the governing body of an
ordinary public school2 and provides that it comprises:
elected members;
the principal, in his or her ofŽ cial capacity;
co-opted members.
· Section 23(1) provides that the elected members shall comprise:
Parents of learners at the school;
educators at the school;
members of staff at the school who are not educators; and
learners in the eighth grade or higher at the school.
· Sections 23(6), (8) and (10) contain provisions regarding co-option:
A governing body may co-opt a member or members of the community to
assist it in discharging its functions.
Subject to subsection (10), co-opted members do not have voting rights on
the governing body.
If the number of parents at any stage is not more than the combined total
160 J. BECKMANN

of other members with voting rights, the governing body must temporarily
co-opt parents with voting rights.
· Section 34(1) of SASA sets out the state’s primary responsibility towards the
funding of public schools as follows:
The State must fund public schools from public revenue on an equitable
basis in order to ensure the proper exercise of the rights of learners to
education and the redress of past inequalities in education provision.
· However, section 36(1) provides that the governing body of a public school
must take all reasonable measures within its means to supplement the resources
supplied by the State in order to improve the quality of education provided by
the school to all learners at the school.
· In general, the National Norms and Standards for School Funding (Republic of
South Africa, 1998) conceptualise the school (through its governing body) as
the unit of decision-making at which decisions will be taken regarding the
allocation of resources to public schools by Provincial Education Departments
(PEDs). They became national policy on 1 April 1999 and do not apply to
funds raised by governing bodies, school funds established by governing bodies
and to school fees levied by governing bodies (section 36, 37 and 39 of SASA).
Funds made available to schools will be increased in terms of levels of poverty
indicators.
· In the Education for All (EFA) 2000 Assessment Mgijima (2000, pp. 12–12)
identiŽ es the following as key challenges and priorities in the development of
the South African education system if it wishes to meet the EFA targets in terms
of the World Declaration on Education for All and Framework for Action to
Meeting Basic Learning Needs adopted by the World Conference on Education
for All (EFA) in Jomtien, Thailand from 5 to 9 March 1990: Building the
capacity of school managers, streamlining school governance and clarifying the
roles of various stakeholders.

SpeciŽ c decentralisation-centralisation issues

This paper considers some legal functions of governing bodies of schools to deter-
mine whether or not these functions display characteristics of disguised centralism
as opposed to authentic decentralisation and self-management. The paper will be
conŽ ned to a discussion of two examples of governance functions of governing
bodies namely those regarding language and admission policies.

General comments
Although it is not disputed that all activities in a school take place within a
framework constituted by the law, the following general comments are nevertheless
considered appropriate:

· SASA makes provision for an extensive range of functions of governing bodies of

public schools e.g.:
 SELF-MANAGING SCHOOLS IN SOUTH AFRICA 161

Determining the admission policy of the school (S5(5))

Determining the language policy of the school (S6(2))
Issuing rules for conducting religious observances at the school (S7))
Adopting a code of conduct for the learners at the school (S8(1) and
S20(1)(d))
Recommending to the provincial Head of Department the appointment of
educators (S20(1)(i) and non-educator staff at the school (S20(1)(j))
Taking all reasonable measures to supplement the resources provided by
the state (S36)
Preparing an annual budget (S38)
Both Potgieter (1997) and Visser (1997) make the point that, although it
would seem that SASA gives comprehensive powers and authority to
governing bodies, one should note that the SASA in reality allocates
functions to them. Visser (1997, p. 140) comments that some functions (for
instance those enumerated in S20) give governing bodies little authority or
power but merely allow them a discretion regarding the manner in which
they perform duties. The concept of functions therefore seems to militate
against the notion that self-managing schools have to have some power or
authority. Although it cannot be denied that, to exercise a function, needs
to be based on at least implicit powers to act, it appears signiŽ cant that the
enabling legislation regarding governing bodies (SASA) does not use the
words ‘power’ or ‘authority’ but the word ‘functions’.
· In addition to the restrictions implied by the word functions, the competences of
governing bodies regarding their functions are further restricted by the follow-
ing:
(a) The exercise of a function is subject to other laws (for instance, the
discretion in S20(4) of SASA is subject to SASA, the Labour Relations
Act of 1995 and the Employment of Educators Act of 1998).
(b) Internal qualiŽ ers may restrict the exercise of a function (for instance,
the issuing of rules for religious observances (S7 of SASA) is subject to
the requirement that they need to be conducted on an equitable basis
and that attendance at them must be free and voluntary for both
learners and educators)
(c) Special policy measures may contain prescriptions regarding the exer-
cise of functions (for instance, the discretion to determine the language
policy of a public school should be exercised taking cognisance of the
Norms and Standards for Language Policy in Public Schools (Republic
of South Africa, 1997)

Comments on speciŽ c functions

Determining language policy (S6(2) of SASA)
In a multilingual country like South Africa (with eleven ofŽ cial languages) language
policy in schools is a sensitive issue. One should also remember that the enforcement
162 J. BECKMANN

of Afrikaans as medium of education in the former so-called Black schools gave rise
to the well-known 1976 uprisings in these schools.
Language policy in schools should give effect to S29(2) of the Constitution which
reads as follows:
Everyone has the right to receive education in the ofŽ cial language or
languages of their choice in public educational institutions where that
education is reasonably practicable. In order to ensure the effective access
to, and implementation of, this right, the state must consider all reasonable
educational alternatives, including single medium institutions, taking into
account—
(a) equity;
(b) practicability; and
(c) the need to redress the results of past racially discriminatory laws and
practices.
S6 of SASA provides as follows:
(1) Subject to the Constitution and this Act, the Minister may, by notice in the
Government Gazette, after consultation with the Council of Education Min-
isters, determine norms and standards for language policy in public schools.
(2) The governing body of a public school may determine the language policy of
the school subject to the Constitution, this Act and any applicable provincial
law.
(3) No form of racial discrimination may be practised in implementing policy
determined under this section.
(4) A recognised Sign Language has the status of an ofŽ cial language for purposes
of learning at a public school.
From the above it is clear that, while a governing body has the power to determine
a language policy for a school, it is not an unfettered power. The language policy
could contain provisions regarding, e.g: the medium(s) of education used at a
school, the language(s) of communication of a school, etc. However, the governing
body:
· Must, in terms of the Norms and Standards for Language Policy in Public
Schools, promote multilingualism in the school and explain what method of
promotion it intends using
· May, in terms of the Norms and Standards for Language Policy in Public
Schools, not offer education through the medium of a certain ofŽ cial language
unless the numbers required per grade of the Norms and Standards are met (35
in a secondary school and 40 in a primary school)
· May not offer education through the medium of a language that is not an
ofŽ cial language
· May not practise any form of racial discrimination in implementing the Norms
and Standards Policy
 SELF-MANAGING SCHOOLS IN SOUTH AFRICA 163

· May not view mother tongue single medium of education as a fundamental

right in terms of the Bill of Rights in Chapter 2 of the Constitution but only as
an alternative that must be considered by the state
· Should remember that the policy is subject to the whole of SASA and the
Constitution.
It is clear that, although the governing body has powers regarding language policy
in the public school, the power is signiŽ cantly curtailed by directives from a national
authority.

Determining admission policy (S5(5) of SASA)

Section 5 of SASA provides that:
(1) A public school must admit learners and serve their educational requirements
without unfairly discriminating in any way.
(2) The governing body of a public school may not administer any test related to
the admission of a learner to a public school, or direct or authorise the
principal of the school or any other person to administer such test.
(3) No learner may be refused admission to a public school on the grounds that
his or her parent—
(a) is unable to pay or has not paid the school fees determined by the
governing body under section 39;
(b) does not subscribe to the mission statement of the school; or
(c) has refused to enter into a contract in terms of which the parent
waives any claim for damages arising out of the education of the
learner.
(4) The Minister may by notice in the Government Gazette, after consultation
with the Council of Education Ministers, determine age requirements for the
admission of learners to a school or different grades at a school.
(5) Subject to this Act and any applicable provincial law, the admission policy of
a public school is determined by the governing body of such school.
(6) In determining the placement of a learner with special education needs, the
Head of Department and principal must take into account the rights and
wishes of the parents of such learner.
(7) An application for the admission of a learner to a public school must be made
to the education department in a manner determined by the Head of Depart-
ment.
From the above it is clear that, although the governing body has the power to
determine an admission policy, it has to operate within the following framework:
· It may not unfairly discriminate against a learner in the process of admission
· It may not administer any admission test or direct or authorise the principal or
any other person to administer such a test
· It may not refuse to admit a learner if the parent of such learner is unable to
pay or has not paid the determined school fees, if the parent does not subscribe
164 J. BECKMANN

FIGURE 2. In uences on Governance Decisions such as Delegation and Decentralisation in Education
(Bray, 2000 (adapted))

to the mission statement of the school or if the parent does not agree to
indemnify the school against possible claims
· It must adhere to the age requirements set by the national Minister of
Education

Summary
Only two powers of governing bodies were considered above. Similar restrictions
apply, among others, to the governing body’s powers regarding religious observances
policy and the appointment of staff (educators and non-educators). Figure 2 is a
summary of in uences on governance decisions such as decentralisation and del-
egation in public schools and shows to some extent why delegation or decentralis-
ation in education is a complex issue in South Africa.

Conclusion
The pivotal question posed in this paper regarding decentralisation or disguised
centralism can be answered only tentatively. The issues examined seem to confer the
assumption that decentralisation of authority is necessarily accompanied by a
measure of centralisation and that both centralisation and decentralisation have
advantages as well as disadvantages (NECC, 1993, p. 160). The powers or functions
of governing bodies are subject to many restrictions which have elements of central-
isation which are mostly aimed at protecting the fundamental right to basic edu-
cation in the Bill of Rights in the Constitution.
 SELF-MANAGING SCHOOLS IN SOUTH AFRICA 165

Notes
[1] In this case (In re: The School Education Bill of 1995 (Gauteng) 1994 4 BCLR (CC)), the
court found that the Act did not give excessive powers to the national Minister of Education.
[2] The African National Congress (ANC) is the majority political party in the national legislative body
(Parliament). It is also the majority political party in seven of the nine provinces, the Western Cape
and KwaZulu-Natal provinces being the exceptions.
[3] Potgieter quotes from a study by Wielemans of the Centre for Comparative Pedagogics at the
Catholic University in which Wielemans conŽ rms the trend towards decentralisation, participation,
increased school and governing body autonomy, remote control and retreating governments in most
policy documents in the states of the European Union.
[4] See the Preamble to the Constitution.
[5] To which all other education provisions in the country are subject.
[6] The Bremisches Schulgesetz (1994) governs the provision of school education in Bremen, one of the
German Länder, and puts the point that self-managing schools should be viewed as individual
educational units succinctly in section 9(1): ‘Every school is an independent (literally “apart-stand-
ing”) pedagogic unit which manages itself in accordance with the measures contained in this Act
and in the Bremen School Administration Act.’ (Author’s own translation)
[7] As distinguished from an independent (private) school and a public school for specialised education.

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