GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL

Author(s): Hasan-Askari Rizvi

Source: Pakistan Horizon , Second Quarter 1982, Vol. 35, No. 2 (Second Quarter 1982), pp.
29-38
Published by: Pakistan Institute of International Affairs

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/41394151

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 GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL

Hasan-Askari Rizvi

The Gulf Cooperation Council, (GCC) set up in 1981, is a concrete

manifestation of the desire of the six Gulf states - Saudi Arabia, Kuwait,
the UAE, Oman, Bahrain and Qatar - to pool their resources for the achie-
vement of the commonly shared goals of economic development, contain-
ment of internal subversion and security against external threats.

What helped these Gulf states to create the GCC was the rich ex-
perience of regional cooperation on bilateral and multilateral levels as
well as on federalist lines which they acquired over the last 14-15 years.
The leading example of the latter category is the establishment of the
United Arab Emirates (UAE), a federal union comprising Abu Dhabi, Dubai,
Sharjah, Ajman, Umm al-Qaywayn, Fujayrah and Ra's al-Khaimah. There
are several arrangements of bilateral and multilateral cooperation in
petroleum related affairs, economic development, trade, cultural and
educational fields amongst these states. The Organization of Arab Petro-
leum Exporting Countries (OAPEC, not to be confused with OPEC), set
up in 1967, is an outstanding example of multilateral cooperation. Its
members are Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, Bahrain, Qater, the UAE and
four non-Gulf Arab states i.e. Libya, Syria, Egypt and Algeria. The OAPEC
has set up a number of subsidiary organizations dealing with pertroleum
industry. These include, among others, the Arab Maritime Petroleum
Transport Company, the Arab Shipbuilding and Repair Company, the Arab
Petroleum Investment Company and the Arab Petroleum Services
Company. These Gulf states also created fi tancial institutions to extend
economic assistance to Arab states as well as other Muslim states, i.e. the
Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development, Abu Dhabi Fund for Arab
Economic Development, and Saudi Fund for Development.

The successful operation of these bilateral and multilateral arrange-

ments strengthened the integrationist forces in the Gulf region. There

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were frequent suggestions of extending the scope and nature of coopera-
tion. Some talked about the need of creating a confederation of the
Gulf states, while others supported the idea of greater cooperation in
economic, political, defence and cultural fields. Still others put forward
proposals of political unification in the backdrop of Pan Arabism.

Circumstances Leading to the Formation of the GCC

The successful implementation of oil embargo in 1973-74 and the

OPEC decision to raise oil prices in the 1970s demonstrated quite effectively
that they could amass political clout if they harmonize their prespectives
on regional and international problems and coordinate their policies. Most
of the Gulf states accumulated surplus capital as a result of the enhanced
oil prices. They used these resources to put their societies on road to
industrialization and modernization. While doing so they realized that
greater cooperation in these fields could accelerate the process of develop-
ment.

The oil embargo and its adverse impact on the Western economies
also underlined the strategic importance of this region. Many in the
West, especially the top policy making circles in the US, talked of using
troops to take over the oil fields, if necessary, to keep the Middle East oil
flowing to the West.1 On top of it was the fear of the Gulf states that
knowing the dependence of the West on the Gulf oil, the Soviet Union
might like to disrupt its supply to the West to strangle their economics.
This was bound to make the Gulf states very security-conscious v/s-a-Ws
external intervention and internal subversion. While a serious thinking
was going on on these issues, three major developments in the Gulf region
during 1978-81 had a profound impact on the Gulf states' perception of
regional security. These developments were: (i) the fall of the Shah's
regime in Iran and the emergence of the Islamic Republic after a long-
drawn mass upsurge (1978-79); (ii) the Soviet military intervention in
Afghanistan (December 1979) and (iii) the Iran-Iraq war (September 1980
to the present).

No doubt, some of the Gulf rulers did not approve of the former
Shah of Iran's imperialistic and paternalistic disposition towards the Gulf
states but a strong, monarchical and pro-American Iran was seen as a useful
guarantee against external threat and internal subversion for these
monarchical, conservative and mostly pro-West states. His exit from the
1 "If pushed too far will US seize Middle East oil", US News and World Report ,
2 December 1974, pp. 13-20.

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political scene not only removed that "guarantee" but also brought to
power a revolutionary Islamic, anti-monarchy and anti-America govern-
ment to power in Iran. This inspired the dissident groups in the Gulf
states who thought that in due course of time they would also be able
to displace the existing monarchical regimes in their states. Many sec-
tions of populaion, hitherto docile, also showed signs of political life
because of the ideological spillover of the Iranian revolution. The Gulf
rulers, therefore, saw the change in Iran as a destabilizing development
and a potential threat to their dynasties.

A number of domestic challenges surfaced in some of the Gulf states

during the last 2-3 years. These ranged from the dissident groups becoming
more active, anti-government agitation to serious attempts to challenge
the authority of government. In November 1979, a fundamentalist group
attempted to take over the kaaba. The Saudi Government had to use force
to overpower this group and free the Grand Mosque from their occupa-
tion. There were 'disturbances' in the oilrich eastern parts of Saudi
Arabia. The Saudis accused the Iranian Government of fomenting trouble
there. The dissident groups were reported active in a number of other
states, especially in Bahrain where the government claimed to have
unearthed a plot to overthrow the government in December 1981. The
Bahrain Government accused Iran of involvement in this plot - a charge
which Iran categorically denied.2

These concerns about internal security were compounded by the

direct Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979.
Relying on the Warm-water Theory of the Soviet conduct they perceived
the Soviet troops marching towards the Gulf and taking over the region.
Another related scenario emphasized the Soviet efforts to strengthen the
existing ties and create new linkages with the dissident groups directly
or indirectly through the pro-Soviet states in the Middle East i.e. South
Yemen, Syria and Libya. 3

When the Iraq-Iran war broke cut in September 1980, the general
impression was that Iraq would inflict a quick and decisive blow on Iran
which would curtail the ideological spillover of the Iranian revolution in
the region. This did not happen and the war became stalemated. The
2 For details, see: The Guardian Weekly , London, 21 March 1982, (report by David
Hirst). The Muslim, Islamabad IS December 1981 and 14 March 1982. Daily Jang ,
Lahore, 17 December 1981.
3 Rizvi, Hasan-Askari, "Super Powers, India, Pakistan and the Indian Ocean", Defence.
Journal , Karachi, Vol. VII, No. 9, September 1981, pp. 7-16, (see especially pp. 9-10)

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non-conclusive war and the inabhity of the international community to
bring about a ceasefire has not only enhanced the prestige or the revolu-
tionary Iran in the region but has also adversely affected normal economic
activity. It also increased the prospects of the conflict engulfing the whole
of the Gulf region.

These developments were bound to increase the anxiety of the

government of the Gulf states about their security. Saudi Arabia took
the lead in suggesting concrete measures to strengthen the detence and
security arrangements. The Saudi Interior Minister, Prince Nayef bin
Abdul Aziz, visited some of the Gulf states and Pakistan in December
1980 to discuss what was later described as the security plan for the Gulf
region. The Saudi plan, identifying the possible external and internal
threats, emphasized that the security of these states was interdependent
and threat to one of them would jeopardise the security of every other
state. Promising Saudi assistance to fight external threat or internal sub-
version, the proposed plan reiterated the need of greater cooperation
amongst the Gulf states because, as the plan put, such cooperation was
"strategically inevitable and urgently required for the general interest
of the region".4 A similar idea was mooted by Kuwait which called for
coordination in defence and security policies.

These proposals were reviewed by Crown Prince Fahd of Saudi

Arabia, Amir of Kuwait Sheikh Jaber al-Ahmad al-Sabah, Sultan Qaboos
of Oman, Khalifa bin Hammad of Qatar, Sheikh Isa bin Khalifa of Bahrain,
and Sheikh Zayad Din al-Nahyan of the UAE at Taif in the last week of
Jannuary 1981 where they had gathered to attend the third Summit
Conference of the Organization of Islamic Conference.5 They indicated
keen interest in the proposals of closer coordination to deal with the
political, economic, and security problems of the region, They deputed
their foreign ministers to make an indepth study of the proposals of
cooperation. The foreign ministers of these states met first in February
1981, and then in March 1981, to prepare a framework and institutional
arrangement for what was named the Gulf Cooperation Council.

Nature and Functions of the GCC

The new organization i.e. the Gulf Securitv Council, was formally
set up in May 1981, when the heads of state/government of these six states
held their meeting and approved the recommendations of the meetings
4 For the text of the Saudi Plan, see: The Middle East, January 1981, pp. 16-17.
5 Dawn , Karachi, 30 January and 3 February 1981.

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of the foreign ministers. The institutional structure of the GCC comprises
a Supreme Council of heads of state which meets in May and November;
a Council of Foreign Ministers or their representatives which meets as and
when agreed upon, and a Secretariat headed by a Secretary General
appointed by the Supreme Council. The Seretariat is based in Riyadh,
Saudi Arabia. The GCC can set up special committees to deal with matters
specified by the Supreme Council and/or the Council of Foreign Ministers.

Saudi Crown Prince Fahd described the goal of the GCC as being
the fostering of "greater unity among the Gulf countries for the welfare
of the people of the region".6 Taking cue from the European Common
Market, these states decided to take necessary steps to "harmonize"
their oil policies, lower down trade tariffs, formulate joint investment
and aid policies, the introduction of unified currency and the free flow
of capital and people in these states including the right to live and work
in any member state. As these states have almost 2/3 of the known oil
resources of the world, they possess enough capital to modernize their
economies and improve the lot of the commom man. They can accelerate
this process by coordinating their economic policies as has been suggested
by the Saudi Crown Prince and other leaders of the region.

Despite the talk about and the prospects of economic cooperation

and development, the main thrust of the GCC is in the field of defence
and security. The major objective is the harmonization and improvement
of their security arrangements by modernizing and integrating their
military capabilities, especially the air defence and communication system.
The communique issued at the conclusion of the meeting of the Minis-
terial Council held in September 1981, began with the issues of politics
and security and called for taking immediate and effective steps to "streng-
then political and security coordination". The subsequent meetings of
the GCC made its security disposition more pronounced. The November
1981 meeting of the rulers of the six Gulf states asked their defence
ministers to prepare a comprehensive plan for collective defence of the oil
rich Gulf region. These defence ministers, in their meeting in January
1982, decided to set up a joint defence command. They also formulated
plans to turning their armed forces into "a mobile, coordinated striking
force."7 It was also decided to devote immediate attention to the regional
air defence system and communication system. These proposals were
reviewed in the meeting of the Chiefs of Defence Forces of these states in

6 Nawa-e-Waqt , Lahore 20 March 1981.

7 Dawn, 25 January 1982; The Muslim , 28 January 1982.

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March 1982. They took a number of decisions to implement the recommen-
dations of the Defence Ministers' meeting.8

The members of the GCC are also taking necessary steps to equip
their armed forces and other security forces with modern arms and
efficient communication system to improve their striking power and
mobility. They are purchasing advanced technology and highly sophisticated
weapons systems from the UK, the US France and West Germany. Some
of the Items purchased by them include, among others, sophisticated
aircraft, Hawk surface to air missiles and their launchers, radar and com-
munication equipment. Plans are also underway to set up defence oriented
industries to put the region on the road to self sufficiency in most, if not all,
defence needs^ A number of Western countries are prepared to extend
technological assistance. It will, however, be several years before sny
significant breakthrough is achieved by the Gulf states in the field of indi-
genous arms production.

Saudi Arabia is setting up an elaborate regional security network in

collaboration with the US. This system has been designated as the Com-
mand, Control and Communication System, or C3, with headquarters at
Riyadh. It will have at least six regional operation centres in the GCC
area. This system will put together the Saudi F-15 aircraft, the AWACS
planes, Surface to Air missiles, and a network от radar stations.10

The GCC has extended full and unconditional support to the struggle
of the Palestinians for the restoration of their right of self determination
under the leadership of the PLO. It supported the often repeated stance
of the Organization of Islamic Conference that "just and lasting" peace in
the Middle East could be achieved only after Israeli withdrawal from the
Arab lands and the abandonment of Jewish settlements in the occupied
areas.11 The Fahd Plan for the permanent settlement of the Arab Israeli
conflict was also endorsed by the GCC. 12

The GCC expressing concern over the prolonged Iraq-Iran war,

promised to extend necessary help to the Organization of Islamic Con-
ference in its efforts to bring this war to a peacefful settlement.13 The
8 The Muslim , 16 March 1982.
^ Down, 4 November 1981.
to The Middle East , October 1981, p. 26 January 1982, pp. 15-16.
и The Muslim , 3 September 1981.
12 /bid 13 November 1981.
Ibid., 3 November 1981 and 13 November 1981.

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Afghanistan crisis was described as a seriousthreat "not onlyto the security
and independence of the region but also to world peace".14

The leaders of the GCC have declared time and again that they would
like to keep their regional security arrangements outside the ambit of
East-West rivalry. They outlined that the stability of the Gulf region was
the exclusive concern of the states of the region and that they were
opposed to any super power intervention in tnis region.15 These states,
it was pointed out, were collaborating with each other to strengthen
their security rather than forming a bloc against any state or a group of
states.1 6

Despite tnis shared desire of maintaining a clear distance from the

two super powers, there is a discrepancy in the approaches of the mem-
bers of the GCC towards the US and the Soviet Union. Oman and
Bahrain provide naval facilities to the US. Oman openly favours effective
American presence in the region and it participated in a joint naval exercise
named Bright Star with American troops. The UAE and Qatar are dis-
posed favourably towards the US, but avoid a very close identification with
it. Kuwait is more forthright in its dealings with the super powers. It
is the only member of the GCC which maintains diplomatic relations
with the Soviet Union. The ruler of Kuwait has visited East European
countries and purchased military hardware from both the super powers.
In fact, the ruler of Kuwait suggested that other members of the GCC
should resume diplomatic ties with the Soviets to demonstrate their
determination to avoid identification with the West. This advice has, so
far, had no effect.

Saudi Arabia is opposed to the presence of American troops on

Saudi territory or any part of the Gulf region but it maintains close poli-
tical ana security ties with tne US. Both wish to contain Soviet influence
and are averse to the spread of radicalism in the Gulf region. The US
views Saudi Arabia as its chief friend in the Gulf and it relies on the Saudis
for moderating oil prices. Saudi Arabia depends heavily on the US for
obtaining sophisticated weaponry and the over-all security of the House
of the Saud.

14 Ibid.

*5 See the communique issued at the conclusion of the meeting of the Foreign Ministers
of the GCC states, ibid., 3 September 1981. Qatar's Information Minister
remarked: "...We want to keep our area neutral and to be left alone". The Middle
East, October 1981, p. 25.
к> The Muslim, 26 January 1982.

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 The varied posture of the member states towards the two super
powers has enabled the GCC to avoid any direct identification with the
West, especially the US but the over all disposition of the GCC is decidedly
pro-West. The proximity in their perceptions of internal and external
threats to the region, the need of regional security arrangements, and
the desire of maintaining status quo in the Gulf region has promoted a better
understanding between the US and the GCC.

Shortly after the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan the

US floated the concept of 'strategic consensus* for strengthening security
in the Gulf region vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. However, quickly realizing
the inherent contradictions in the idea of strategic consensus, the US
dropped this in favour of bilateral ties with the states of the region and
encouragement to the efforts of these states to harmonize their security
arrangements. It was, therefore, natural for the US to extend its blessings
and technological assistance to the GCC through bilateral arrangements
with the member states. A pro-West GCC with its modernized security
measures coupled with the enhanced American presence in the vicinity
of the Gulf will not only provide greater security for American interests
- oil, investments, and containment of Soviet influence - in the region
but will also guarantee, at least for the time being, stability and continuity
to the present conservative and monarchical regimes in the Gulf region.

Response of Other States oí the Region

The formation of the GCC got a mixed reception from other states
of the region. Iraq and Jordan have extended tacit support to the GCC.
Both countries have wide-ranging ties with the GCC states on bilateral
basis.

Iran with emphasis on 'neither West nor East', has been expressing
serious skepticism about the professed goals of the GCC since its inception.
The Iranian leaders see this cooperative defensive arrangement either
?.imed at Iran or meant to maintain foreign power (the US) interests in
the Gulf region. A number of factors have shaped Iranian attitude towards
the GCC. First, though the GCC officially does not support Iraq in its war
against Iran, the main sponsor of the Council - Saudi Arabia - has
extended full diplomatic and military support to Iraq via-a-vis Iran. Iraq
is not its member, but there are several bodies and bilateral treaty arrange-
ments outside the ambit of the GCC between Iraq and the members of
this Council in different fields, i.e., trade, economic, industrial, cultural
and educational. Iran, therefore, thinks that the GCCs enhanced military
power will be used directly or indirectly in support of Iraq.

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 Second, there has been a general deterioration of relations between
the Gulf states and the new Islamic Government of Iran because of dis-
crepancy in their operational, political and ideojogical values - conservative
Islamic and monarchical system and revolutionary Islamic and anti-
monarchical system. The Saudi and Bahrain leaders make no secret of
their contempt for the Iranian revolution and often hold Iran responsible
for promoting discontentment amongst the dissident groups, especially
the Shia community in the GCC states. Iran, on the other hand, accuses
these governments of ploting to undermine the revolution in Iran.

Third, the pro-West posture of the GCC and close political and
military ties of Saudi Arabia, Oman and Bahrain with the US have given
Iran an additional cause of concern because of acrimonious relations
between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the US. The Government of
Iran fears that the GCC might ultimately turn out to be a new American
outpost in the region that would endeavour to subvert the Iranian revolu-
tion. Iran has, thus, declared time and again that if the resources of the
GCC were used against Iran it would retaliate.17

Libya, South Yemen and Syria adopted a rather cautious approach

towards the GCC. Neither supporting it nor condemning it altogether,
they took note of the emergence ot this regional body in the backdrop of
the increased American presence in the region - naval activity in the
Indian Ocean, the establishment of the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF)
and naval facilities in Oman and Bahrain. They held the view that the
increased American presence in the region was not a good omen. This
would benefit Israel because America is hand in glove with Israel. The
major threat to this region, these states maintained, was not the Soviet
Union but 'American and Zionist Imperialism*. Libya and South Yemen
proposed that all states of the Gulf region, the Arabian peninsula and
the Horn of Africa should be invited to a conference to prepare a plan
to deal with Zionism and Imperialism in the region.18

Pakistan maintains cordial relations with all states of the Gulf region.
The Dilaterai ties between Pakistan and these states in economic, tech-
nological, educational, cultural and manpower fields have become inten-
sive as well as extensive over the last decade. Most members of the GCC
have PaKistani technicians, advisers and trainers in their armed forces
on contract basis. They are helping them to modernize their defence
See Hojatalislam Ali Khameini's statement, The Middle East , January 1981, p. 17.
is The Muslim, 23 February 1981. Mushahid Husain, "Pactitis Again?", ibid., 26 September
198!.

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forces. Some of these states send their men for training in the military
institutions of Pakistan.

Pakistan welcomed the formation of the GCC. It hoped that the

Council would emerge as a useful regional organization and that it would
contribute to stability in the region next door to Pakistan. There is a
strong feeling in Pakistan and the GCC that their security is linked up with
each other. They can ward-off external pressures by sharing each other's
concerns. Thus, Pakistan, though not a member of the GCC, is maintaining
deep rooted ties with the GCC members on bilateral basis.

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