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Petroleum Radicalism: How the politics and economics of oil are related to the emergence
of radical Islamist ideologies and practices throughout the Middle East and North Africa.
Source: Muhlenberg College Special Collections & Archives
Contributed by: Kaldenhoven, Noah J.
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/community.33037104
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Petroleum Radicalism: How the politics and economics of oil are related to the emergence of
radical Islamist ideologies and practices throughout the Middle East and North Africa.
by
Noah Kaldenhoven
A Thesis
Submitted to the Department of Political Science
Muhlenberg College
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
For Graduating with Honors in Political Science
Spring 2022

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CONTENTS
Abstract……………………………………………………………………………………………3
Introduction………………………………………………………………………………………..3
Post-Ottoman Empire……………………………………………………………………………...4
Brief Cold War History……………………………………………………………………………5
Oil & Political Developments in Saudi Arabia……………………………………………………8
Oil & al-Qaeda…………………………………………………………………………………...12
The Oil Curse…………………………………………………………………………………….14
Resentment……………………………………………………………………………………….27
Islamist Radicalism………………………………………………………………………………31
Al-Qaeda…………………………………………………………………………………………37
The Islamic State (ISIS)………………………………………………………………………….45
Origins of Islamist Radicalism…………………………………………………………………...49
ISIS & Oil………………………………………………………………………………………..52
Conclusions & Findings………………………………………………………………………….55

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ABSTRACT
In this thesis, I examine the origins of Islamist radicalism and the relationship between oil wealth
and democratization in the Middle East & North Africa. Throughout history, oil-wealthy autocrats
have engaged in illiberal behavior to not only suppress social movements, but to exploit Muslim
populations in order to gain political power. Many perceive autocratic governments as illegitimate;
this essentially weakens the foundations of autocracy in the region. In states that have never
experienced liberal-democratic politics, oil wealth has created an environment free of civic
organizations and social functions such as labor unions and other non-governmental organizations
that push for democratic reform. Powerful oil industries within Arab and non-Arab states in the
Middle East and North Africa with origins in neocolonialism have exploited, subjugated, and
starved Muslim populations for decades. Those who feel subjugated and exploited as a result of
imperial influence and non-inclusive conceptions of national identity are more willing to seek
membership in Islamist organizations as an alternative to other ideologies. In addition, those who
feel alienated from profit and left out due to the lack of economic diversification within the greater
Middle East has directly led to membership in radical groups such as the Islamic State (ISIS) and
al-Qaeda. I use qualitative evidence from prominent rentier scholars and World Bank data to set
up the clear connections between oil wealth, the lack of democratization, and the subjugation of
disenfranchised peoples as a result of western neocolonial influence and historical control of the
problematic oil industry. This research also finds an answer to why radical Islamist ideologies have
been so popular in the MENA, rather than other ideologies such as Marxism or even Liberalism.
This connection will shape foreign/domestic policy efforts to better cater to the needs of Muslim
populations dealing with severe income inequality, unemployment, and rents.
INTRODUCTION
Oil wealth and Islamist radicalism are two factors that have shaped politics in the Middle
East & North Africa (MENA). Oil wealth has inhibited democratization and has strengthened the
foundations of autocratic regimes while Islamist radicalism has developed into a factor that has
influenced foreign policy across the globe. Oil is one of the most valuable natural resources and
is absolutely essential to fueling powerful industrial and military complexes of both small nation-
states and major world powers like Russia, China, UK, US, and France—the five permanent
members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). On the one hand, autocrats in the
Middle East & North Africa have exploited their oil wealth in order to enhance their political

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power and control over society.1 On the other hand, oil wealth and steady streams of oil revenue
are used to suppress social movements and infringe on human rights listed under the
International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and International Covenant on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). There are four major contributing factors that
support the relationship between oil wealth and the lack of democratization: an absence of
financial transparency, the repression effect, the rentier effect, and the modernization effect.2 The
politics and economics of oil are related to the emergence of radical Islamist ideologies and
practices in the Middle East & North Africa. European and American competition over the oil
industry in the region was an element of neocolonialism3 and led to the creation of weak civic
organizations and non-inclusive conceptions of national identity. Foreign influence and
illegitimate regimes propped up by the United States and United Kingdom created the space for
the identity politics of Islamist radicalism to flourish. Neocolonial influence created the local
politics of Islamist radicalism.
POST-OTTOMAN EMPIRE
Prior to the complete collapse of the Ottoman Empire4 in 1922, British officials engaged
in top-secret discussions regarding the “new” borders that would define the Middle East, or land
that once encompassed the Ottoman Empire.5 The secret meetings between the European powers
1
Jason Brownlee, Tarek Masoud, Andrew Reynolds, The Arab Spring: Pathways of Repression and Reform
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 53.
2
Michael L. Ross, The Oil Curse: How Petroleum Wealth Shapes the Development of Nations (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2012), 66.
3
Neocolonialism is the use of economic, political, cultural, or other pressures to control or influence other countries,
especially former dependencies.
4
The Ottoman Empire was an empire that controlled much of Southeastern Europe, Western Asia, and Northern
Africa between the 14th and early 20th centuries. It was founded at the end of the 13th century in northwestern
Anatolia in the town of Söğüt by the Turkoman tribal leader Osman I - Wikipedia.
5
Jacqueline S. Ismael, Tareq Ismael, Government and Politics of the Contemporary Middle East: Continuity and
Change (United Kingdom: Routledge, 2011), 27.
4

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would later become known as the Sykes-Picot Agreement, which allocated territory and political
power to Russia, France, and Great Britain.6 This agreement also introduced direct and early
European-colonial control over much of the Islamic world.7 Although promises of a sovereign
Arab state born out of the ruins of World War I were discussed, the secretive nature of the Sykes-
Picot Agreement undermined any sort of Arab uprising or social movement that would have led
to the creation of said independent state.8 The Sykes-Picot Agreement marked a political shift
that disregarded Islamic history and traditions. Vast and incredibly problematic territorial
changes to the Middle East & North Africa in the early 1900s led to a series of disputes among
the Islamic and (or) Arab states: Iraq’s sovereignty over Kuwait, Syria’s rejection of Lebanon as
a safe haven for Arab-Christians, and the Kurdish rejection of Turkish, Iraqi, Iranian, and Syrian
independence.9
BRIEF COLD WAR HISTORY
A brief understanding of Cold War history is also important to the conversation around
oil, repression, and the emergence of radical Islamist ideologies. The tense and adversarial
relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union (USSR) found its way to the Middle
East & North Africa. The United States and Soviet Union had a long history of destabilizing
regions (i.e., Korea, Indochina, Afghanistan), so it was no surprise the Islamic world would soon
become a subject of colonial and imperial control. It was not until 1990, when General-Secretary
Gorbachev finally took sides with the US-led coalition forces against the Iraqi invasion of
6
Ibid, 27.
7
Ibid, 27.
8
Ibid, 27.
9
Ibid, 27.
5

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Kuwait when the Soviet Union recognized the US sphere of influence in the Middle East.10
Rewind to the thirty-year period that defined the Cold War (1950-1980), the US and USSR
engaged in an intense period of expansion in the Middle East & North Africa. These two world
powers tried to set up “client” or “satellite” states throughout the Middle East & North Africa, a
move that would find the political and economic future of both states.11 Both the United States
and Soviet Union saw the importance of oil in fueling their military/industrial complexes. For the
United States and Soviet Union, foreign policy aims were centered around two major factors:
economic aid and commercial development.12 Economic aid was defined by the unilateral
transfer of resources and monetary aid from one country (the donor) to another (the recipient).
Furthermore, setting up “rentier states” in the Middle East that ultimately led to the steady stream
of oil from the Middle East into the United States proved to be an economically strategic and
successful move. This financially strategic move and implementation of an aid apparatus coerced
Egypt and Jordan into entering America’s sphere of influence, a sphere of influence that began to
crowd out the Iron Curtain13; Arab states like Egypt and Jordan were really given an offer they
could not refuse.14 Although Egypt and Jordan are not oil-wealthy regimes per say, US influence
and the creation of “rentier states” eventually became a catalyst for political turmoil and harsh
perceptions of the United States due to the presence of American troops movements involved in
the daily-life of Arab citizens in the greater Islamic world.15 Every day, Arab citizens were
reminded of the great power and influence of the United States. Local resentment toward
American intervention in the Middle East & North Africa sparked outrage and resistance within.
10
Beverley Milton-Edwards, Peter Hinchcliffe, Conflicts in the Middle East (London: Routledge, 2004), 36.
11
Ibid, 36.
12
Ibid, 38-39.
13
The Iron Curtain is a term describing the political boundary dividing Europe into two separate areas from the end
of World War II in 1945 until the end of the Cold War in 1991 - Wikipedia.
14
Ibid, 39.
15
Ibid, 47.
6

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For example, the Islamic resurgence16 was in response to the growing notion that Arab regimes
were being stripped of sovereignty and legitimacy in the face of western oil demands.17 Although
the Islamic resurgence has its origins in the 1970s, almost twenty years before Persian Gulf I
(Gulf War), the ‘Islamic revival’ gained traction in response to the failure of leaders to protect
subjugated Muslim populations at the hands of western intervention and the failure of secular
ideologies like Nasserism in Egypt.18 Disappointed with secular nation-states and westernized
ruling elites, Islamism became the dominant force of anticolonialism in the region.19
Born out of the darkness of the attacks on September 11, 2001, the Bush administration
further expanded American military presence in the region, an action that defied international
law and organization. Unlike the H.W. Bush administration before, President George W. Bush
did not gain the support of the United Nations for the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Enhanced
American military intervention then led to foreign and private ownership of Iraqi oil fields.20 Just
as US military personnel were tasked with protecting oil fields in Persian Gulf I, American
troops were once again tasked with securing oil fields for extraction. US influence and
construction projects designed to maximize oil wealth defined life in Iraq and contributed to the
growing irrational and unethical colonial practices in Iraq.21
Close to $13 billion of Iraqi money was lost in fraudulent practices which only led to
further resentment and state weakness during and after the invasion.22 Iraq’s GDP and annual
16
Since the 1970s, a worldwide Islamic revival has appeared, owing in large part to popular disappointment with the
secular nation states and Westernized ruling elites, which had dominated the Muslim world during the preceding
decades, and which were increasingly seen as authoritarian, ineffective and lacking cultural authenticity - Wikipedia.
17
18
Ibid, 38.
19
Ibid, 38.
20
Ibid, 38.
21
Ibid, 38.
22
Ibid, 38.
7

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state budget collapsed after the Gulf War in 1991, so Iraq in 2003 was faced with even more
chaos, corruption, and economic turmoil.23 Between 1991 and 2003, Iraq faced troubling
numbers of income inequality and poverty that severely disrupted the social fabric of the
nation.24 In addition, many people within Iraq in the early 2000s did not understand the full
extent as to why the United States even invaded in the first place: was it an economic
endeavor?25 However, Iraq’s plight represents only a fraction of the destruction colonial and
imperial influence caused. Colonial influence was designed to reshape the political and economic
dynamic of the region to favor the west. Establishing a rentier state while keeping an illegitimate
and unfavorable government was designed to favor the donor state, not the recipient Arab or oil-
wealthy states. Resentment toward foreign influence and American rentierism gave
disenfranchised people an outlet to reject western modernity via Islamism and anticolonial
violence.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the United States appeared as the singular
world power dedicated to expanding its influence throughout the world. This included the
Middle East. Worried that Iraq may seize control of important oil fields throughout the Gulf
nations, President George H.W. Bush prioritized surveillance of Iraqi behavior in the region,
particularly the foreign policy actions of President Saddam Hussein, (the fifth president of Iraq
from 1979 to 2003).26 After the success of the US-led coalition during Persian Gulf I, the US
committed itself to expanding its military presence in the region and set up military bases
23
Zaid Al-Ali, The Struggle for Iraq’s Future: How Corruption, Incompetence and Sectarianism Have Undermined
Democracy (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2014), 193.
24
Ibid, 194.
25
Ibid, 195.
26
8

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throughout Saudi Arabia in order to maintain a footprint in the Arab oil industry.27 Angered by
US foreign policy initiatives centered around oil wealth in the MENA, Osama bin Laden,
founder of the Islamist organization al-Qaeda, publicly denounced and condemned the Bush
administration for stationing American troops in lands near Mecca and Medina, the two holiest
cities in Islam.28 On another note about western intervention in the Middle East & North Africa,
The Project for the New American Century (PNAC) was a neo-conservative (neocon) think tank
that was founded in 1997 and operated till 2006. PNAC was a close partner organization with the
American Enterprise Institute (AEI).29 The ultimate goal of PNAC was to promote American
influence across the world. The Project for the New American Century was advanced under the
Bush administration due to America’s increased involvement in Middle Eastern affairs in the
post-9/11 moment. In its brief history, PNAC maintained a hawkish foreign policy initiative on
Iraq and was able to shape the Bush administration’s policy toward the Middle East.30 Based on
research of former members of PNAC, former Vice President Dick Cheney, Amb. Khalilzad, and
the Bush family had significant ties to the global oil industry. Dick Cheney was the former CEO
of Halliburton Co., an American multinational corporation that specializes in oil field services
and hydraulic fracturing operations. Former UN Ambassador and top member of PNAC Amb.
Zalmay Khalilzad held a strong interest in the global oil production industry.31 Zalmay
Khalilzad, like other top members of the Bush administration kept a hardcore neoconservative
ideology when it came to Middle Eastern affairs. Furthermore, Khalilzad was also working as a
risk assessor for Unocal Oil Company, one of the largest petroleum explorer and marketer
27
Ibid, 37.
28
Ibid, 37.
29
Pierre Bourgois, “The PNAC (1997-2006) and the Post-Cold War ‘Neoconservative Moment,’” E-International
Relations, February 1, 2020.
30
Ibid, 2020.
31
Phyllis Bennis, “U.N. Ambassador’s Oily Past,” Transnational Institute, January 8, 2007.
9

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companies that ran until the early 2000s.32 Moreover, the history of Saudi Arabian oil
development supplies a key answer to the origins of Islamist radicalism and the emergence of
anti-American attitudes that sparked terroristic activity. Perhaps this brief Cold War history and
episodes of intervention can provide an answer to why Islamic extremism thrives in the Middle
East & North Africa historically and today. For example, radical Islamist groups have flourished
and have played a vital role in various events of political turmoil like the Syrian, Iraqi, Afghan,
Libyan, and Yemeni Civil Wars. Looking at the Syrian Civil War, the Islamic State (ISIS) was a
powerful source of politics in the region. The Islamic State follows a very conservative,
fundamentalist view of Sunni Islam and practices Jihadism, yet it outnumbered more moderate
Islamic organizations in the vacuum of power during its resurgence in 2014.33
OIL & POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SAUDI ARABIA
Robert Vitalis in “Black Gold, White Crude” outlined the history of the Saudi and
American oil industries. During the Great Depression in the late 1920s and 1930s, the American
oil industry competed against the British oil industry throughout the Middle East and allowed
Aramco34 to become a significant “state” actor in the solidification of the Saudi American
friendship.35 Although the Anglo-American alliance was stronger than ever before, both of these
nations prioritized the pursuit of self-interest and collection of oil deposits. US foreign policy
was geared to consolidating power with Ibn Saud, the first King of Saudi Arabia who ruled in the
early 1930s during the creation of the Saudi state.36 The “special relationship” between Saudi
32
Ibid, 2007.
33
Barbara F. Walter, “Why extremism thrives in the Middle East today,” The Washington Post, February 12, 2015.
34
Formerly called the Arabian American Oil Company “Aramco,” it was founded by the Standard Oil Company of
California in 1933 and developed into a powerful corporation when an abundance of oil was found in Dhahran,
Saudi Arabia.
35
Robert Vitalis, “Black Gold, White Crude: An Essay on American Exceptionalism, Hierarchy, and Hegemony in
the Gulf,” Diplomatic History 26, no. 2 (2002): 186.
36
Ibid, 189.
10

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Arabia and the United States was rooted in oil wealth and the United States understood that if
they angered Ibn Saud, the monarchy would turn to the British for an oil agreement.37
The history of Aramco is quite troubling. In the early 1930s, Aramco deployed racist
values/ideas that defined the work culture. Aramco, politically motivated, requested increased
US funding and investment in order to preserve corporate profit.38 Although there was some
internal resistance to Aramco’s deployment of racist values in the 1940s and 1950s, it speaks
against the notion that Saudi Arabia was always a place absent of liberal-democratic politics,
repression, and racism.39 Substandard housing, weak healthcare options, and dangerous working
conditions within the Aramco camp helped to preserve an oppressive regime for security
purposes. Officials within Aramco were in close contact with both the US government and Saudi
regime to repress workers’ uprisings and democratic protest.40 The introduction of American
influence in the oil industry came with the introduction of racist values in Saudi Arabia. The
profit-driven relationship between the US and Saudi Arabia was more about corporate interest
than about actual national interest.41 Segregation and discrimination was evident in employment,
housing, healthcare, and education.42 Robert Vitalis noted, “These ideas are better understood as
rooted in Jim Crow - the era of white supremacy, norms of discrimination, and segregation and,
at its margins, of paternalist racial uplift.”43 Aramco was divided into sections: the American
Camp, Saudi Camp, and the Italian Camp.44 Cold War politics and paranoia justified the fake
portrayal of Aramco’s housing as a positive aspect of American development in the Middle East.
Equal housing conditions and workers’ rights for non-white people were fundamentally rejected.
Officials within the Aramco Planning Committee said, “We are going to be faced, one of these
days, with the question of why we furnish the Americans with better free housing than we do the
Arabs.”45 Once faced with poor working conditions, Saudi workers disrupted oil production by
engaging in protest.46 Saudi workers in the 1950s began to understand the deeply twisted
interests of Aramco and the exploitative nature of Saudi American relations. Due to poor
37
Ibid, 189.
38
Ibid, 187.
39
Ibid, 187.
40
Ibid, 187.
41
Ibid, 186.
42
Ibid, 200.
43
Ibid, 200.
44
Ibid, 200.
45
Ibid, 202.
46
Ibid, 202.
11

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working conditions and corporate disregard to the political uprisings within the camps,
revolutionary ideologies like Nasserism, communism, and Islamism became powerful forces of
identity politics that restored dignity and humanity.47 The United States used the growth in
revolutionary ideologies within Aramco’s labor force and further justified American support of
the Saudi regime.
In the 1950s, oil companies chartered to the US with operations in Saudi Arabia produced
material that portrayed the oil industry as a positive force of good in the region.48 The political
economy of oil inhibited democratization and Aramco acted as a “mini-state” that promoted oil
developments in the name of corporate-American interest at the cost of non-American Saudi
workers.49 The American oil empire in the Middle East produced a network of partnerships that
led to the growth and development of transnational economic competition between Britain and
the United States. Control of oil meant regional power. The Roosevelt administration set up open
lines of communication with British officials regarding oil production/distribution. Saudi Arabia
for the most part was absent from these conversations while the US and Britain were committed
to establishing an independent oil partnership that would promote equal oil concessions and
allocate oil production.50 Saudi Arabia was never free from the colonial influence of Britain and
the US. The Saudi monarchy was born out of oil partnerships and the extraction of resources,
nothing else. As a result of Aramco, the social dynamic of Saudi Arabia changed rapidly with
more and more people from the west entering in droves funded by western financial
institutions.51 Aramco expressed the idea that they were essential to economic development
within Saudi Arabia, and that western foreigners played a role in the “expansionist project”
designed to control Saudi oil.52 American national interest was deeply rooted in the corporate
interest of Aramco. The oppressive Saudi American relationship was forged from this paradox of
state-corporate interest. A paradox where Aramco shaped corporate goals and objectives to meet
the demands of the US federal government, thus creating a cycle of investment and corporate
savings.53 Aramco wanted to purchase the support of the US government by framing business
47
Ibid, 204.
48
Ibid, 189.
49
Ibid, 190.
50
Ibid, 25.
51
Robert Vitalis, “Black Gold, White Crude: An Essay on American Exceptionalism, Hierarchy, and Hegemony in
the Gulf,” Diplomatic History 26, no. 2 (2002): 192.
52
Ibid, 192.
53
Ibid, 195.
12

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logic as almost “essential to national interest” in order to boost funding and justify unlawful
practices and inhumane working conditions within Aramco’s camps.54 In response to growing
[internal] concerns regarding the corrupt Saudi American oil partnership, King Ibn Saud once
said, “The whole people are saying that my country is an American colony. They are plotting
against me and saying Ibn Sa’ud has given his country to the United States, even the Holy
Places. They are talking against me. I have nothing, and my country and my wealth I have
delivered into the hands of America.”55 In this quote, Ibn Saud highlighted the political,
economic, and social turmoil of modern Saudi Arabia. Ibn Saud played a key role as the former
custodian of the Hijaz, or the region west of Saudi Arabia that includes the cities of Mecca,
Medina, Jeddah, Tabuk, Yanbu, and Taif. If Ibn Saud was exposed as an “agent of the west,”
then the greater Islamic world would revolt against him. This is one of the reasons Osama bin
Laden declared war against both the Saudi regime and the United States, because the Saudi
monarchy essentially permitted the movement and deployment of US troops in spaces close to
the two holiest cities in Islam: Mecca and Medina.
Oil & al-Qaeda

In the “Declaration of Jihad against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two
Holiest Sites,” Osama bin Laden helped to advance the anticolonial struggle against the western
backed Saudi regime and the United States. Bin Laden claimed that the “Zionist-Crusader
alliance” was at the forefront of Muslim exploitation.56 In this piece of textual evidence, bin
Laden was writing in the context of post-Persian Gulf I, when American troops were stationed all
throughout Saudi Arabia. Bin Laden also argued that much of the Islamic world has been
“asleep” and “vulnerable” to external forces like the United States. In the aftermath of Persian
Gulf I, bin Laden argued that besides the death of the Prophet Muhammed, American occupation
54
Ibid, 195.
55
Ibid, 200.
56
Muhammed Qasim Zaman, Roxanne Leslie Euben, Princeton Readings in Islamic Thought: Texts and Contexts
from al-Banna to Bin Laden (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 437.
13

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of Saudi Arabia is the worst atrocity the Islamic world has ever faced.57 Prior to the attacks on
September 11, 2001, bin Laden urged the United States to stop the implementation of an
American defense apparatus in the Middle East & North Africa. Bin Laden claimed that the
United States were the fanatics that wanted to change the political, social, and economic dynamic
of the Islamic world for the pursuit of profit and extraction of oil.58 Osama bin Laden noted,
To my Muslim brothers everywhere and specifically in the Arabian Peninsula: The money
you pay to buy American goods are transformed into bullets and used against our
brothers in Palestine, and tomorrow; against our sons in the land of the two Holiest sites.
By buying these goods we are strengthening their economy while our disposition and
poverty increase.59
Based on this textual evidence, there was an element of locality to al-Qaeda’s central
mission. Ridding Saudi Arabia of American influence was of paramount importance to the al-
Qaeda doctrine. This notion of Islamist dominance within Saudi Arabia strays away from
traditional dialogue around the transnationality of the al-Qaeda network. In the early 1990s, bin
Laden refrained from planning attacks on civilians and argued that attacking American troops in
the Levant was justified under Islamic law and would do more to prevent the deployment of
more international coalition forces.60 In later text, bin Laden framed terrorism as a weapon of the
weak and argued that forms of asymmetric warfare61 perpetrated by other Islamist groups were
merely designed to overcome the imbalance of power between the Islamic world and the west.62
57
Ibid, 437.
58
Ibid, 437.
59
“Declaration of Jihad against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holiest Sites,” Combating Terrorism
Center at West Point, Accessed December 21, 2021. https://ctc.usma.edu/harmony-program/declaration-of-jihad-
against-the-americans-occupying-the-land-of-the-two-holiest-sites-original-language-2/.
60
J.M.B Porter, “Osama bin-Laden, Jihad, and the Sources of International Terrorism,” Indiana International &
Comparative Law Review 13, no. 3 (2003): 881.
61
Asymmetric warfare is the term given to describe a type of war between belligerents whose relative military
power differs significantly, or whose strategy or tactics differ significantly.
62
Muhammed Qasim Zaman, Roxanne Leslie Euben, Princeton Readings in Islamic Thought: Texts and Contexts
from al-Banna to Bin Laden (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 451.
14

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Bin Laden writes, “You have been disgraced by Allah and you withdrew; the extent of your
impotence and weaknesses became very clear. It brought pleasure to the heart of every Muslim,
and a remedy to the chests of believing nations to see you defeated in three Islamic cities: Beirut,
Aden, and Mogadishu.”63 After the failed US-international humanitarian and military effort in
Somalia, bin Laden claimed that the successful Islamist resistance in Mogadishu restored the
dignity and humanity of subjugated Muslim populations in the greater Islamic world. The idea
that acts of violence against the US brought pleasure to Osama bin Laden and other radical
Islamist organizations is Fanonian in nature64⁠—anticolonial violence provided people with an
outlet for western resistance that shaped international politics. Leaders in al-Qaeda argued that
the only language the US understood was the language of violence, propaganda, and colonialism.
The failed humanitarian-military mission in Somalia reflected the logic of anticolonial violence
which is deeply rooted in the neocolonial footprint in Middle Eastern oil and overall western
presence in the region. Later in the piece, bin Laden writes, "Riyadh and Khubar explosions were
only a warning to this roaring flood, which was caused by suffering, bitter suppression,
subjugation, excessive injustice, degrading oppression and poverty.”65 Bin Laden’s calls of
resistance aimed at the Saudi regime was rooted in the monarchy’s inability to maintain
sovereignty and prevent the occupation of American troops near Mecca and Medina. Bin Laden
reacted with dismay and indignation when the Saudi regime also limited the production of oil
and manipulated the domestic oil market, Saudi behavior bin Laden thought were designed to
improve the economy of the US at the cost of the Saudi people.66
63
Ibid, 451.
64
Fanonian lens, or colonialism as a relationship between domination and subordination. Violence is a key factor in
shaping native populations and shaping the geopolitical region to fit the needs of the settler population abroad.
65
“ Declaration of Jihad against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holiest Sites,” Combating Terrorism
Center at West Point, Accessed December 21, 2021. https://ctc.usma.edu/harmony-program/declaration-of-jihad-
against-the-americans-occupying-the-land-of-the-two-holiest-sites-original-language-2/.
66
Ibid, 3.
15

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In “The Declaration of the World Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Christians,” bin Laden
shifted his attitude and justified the use of violence against citizens (non-combatants). In the late 1990s,
Islamist movements across the world like the Egyptian Islamic Group, Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen
Bangladesh, and Islamist movements in Pakistan gained inspiration from Islamist teachings and joined al-
Qaeda as vocal opponents of US economic influence in the Middle East & North Africa. Osama bin
Laden writes,
Third, if the Americans' aims behind these wars are religious and economic, the aim is
also to serve the Jews' petty state and divert attention from its occupation of Jerusalem
and murder of Muslims there. The best proof of this is their eagerness to destroy Iraq, the
strongest neighboring Arab state, and their endeavor to fragment all the states of the
region such as Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Sudan into paper statelets and through
their disunion and weakness to guarantee Israel's survival and the continuation of the
brutal crusade occupation of the Peninsula.67
In bin Laden’s second declaration, he used inflammatory language and rhetoric to
describe the unstable political situation in the Middle East. Clearly this rhetoric was used to
provoke a response and spark radicalization. The proposed “defensive war” against the United
States and its western allies needed to involve the bulk of the Islamic world because bin Laden
saw it as an essential duty per the Fatwah.68 Bin Laden’s proposed Fatwah was viewed as a
component of an imminent “Holy War” against the United States.69
The Oil Curse

In the Middle East & North Africa, autocratic regimes keep taxes generally low and keep
public spending high. Subsidized goods/services like healthcare, education, infrastructure
67
Ibid, 3.
68
A fatwā is a legal ruling on a point of Islamic law given by a qualified jurist in response to a question posed by a
private individual, judge or government. A jurist issuing fatwas is called a mufti, and the act of issuing fatwas is
called iftar.
69
“Ibid”
16

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improvements in turn buy political support.70 Based on data from The World Bank, Total tax and
contribution rate (% of profit) in the Middle East & North Africa has been consistently lower
than other geopolitical areas. For example, World Bank notes that since 2011, total tax and
contribution rate (% of profit) in the Middle East & North Africa has been between (32.1%-
32.4%); between (40.0%-42.2%) for the European Union; between (36.6%-44%) for the United
States; and between (45.6%-47%) for Latin America & Caribbean.71 In The Oil Curse, Michael
L. Ross argued that the more petroleum reserves an autocratic regime has, the probability of
democratic transition is low.72 In political science and economics, when governments propose
taxes or introduce a system of taxation on income, goods, and services, people demand
representation, hence the age old saying: “no taxation without representation.”73 Since the years
leading up to the end of the Cold War in the 1980s and early 1990s, prominent autocratic
regimes have been replaced by liberal-democratic governments, however, the Middle East &
North Africa have lagged behind.74 Today, Israel and Tunisia are the only established
democracies in the region. Although Tunisia and Israel are classified as “flawed democracies” by
Freedom House, there is a growing rejection of liberal-democratic politics in the region. Ross
writes, “Authoritarian governments that kept taxes low as a percentage of government spending
were more likely to avoid democratic transitions.”75 Autocrats in oil-wealthy regimes understand
the idea of “no taxation without representation” and evidence in The Oil Curse proves that when
taxes are low and public spending is high, there is higher support toward regime rule.76
70
Michael L. Ross, The Oil Curse: How Petroleum Wealth Shapes the Development of Nations (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2012), 63.
71
Source: World Development Indicators – World Bank Group.
72
Ibid, 66.
73
Ibid, 66.
74
Ibid, 65.
75
Ibid, 67.
76
Ibid, 67.
17

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In recent World Bank data from 2019, oil rents (% of GDP) for countries in the Middle
East & North Africa were statistically higher (on average) than other oil-wealthy regimes. World
Bank data shows states in the Middle East & North Africa generate revenue via oil rents and
export earnings. In 2019, oil rents (% of GDP): Algeria (43.888%); Kuwait (42.141%); Iraq
(39.615%); Oman (24.883%); Saudi Arabia (24.24%); Qatar (16.91%); UAE (16.198%);
Bahrain (14.395%).77 According to the World Bank, oil rents (% of GDP) for the United
Kingdom were (.489%); United States (.362%); Germany (0.013%); Canada (1.605%); and
France (0.007%).78 Looking at data from Oil production per capita, 2020, Kuwait produced
(354,429 kWh); UAE (194,753 kWh); Saudi Arabia (173,573 kWh); while Canada produced
(77,710 kWh); Russia (41,792 kWh); and the United States (25,042 kWh).79 Based on this data
above, the oil industry has played a big role in the political, economic, and social life of oil-
wealthy regimes in the Middle East & North Africa. However, oil does not always play a
positive role in Middle Eastern affairs. Autocratic regimes support a system of financial secrecy,
where citizens within oil-wealthy regimes are not privy to budgeting information. Citizens
understand there is another line of revenue from oil wealth but are not aware on how that extra
source of revenue is being spent.80 In non-oil wealthy regimes like Egypt (4.019% of GDP), the
steady stream of foreign aid from the United States via the Camp David Accords has solidified a
rentier state in Egypt. Revenue from external sources lead to a system of financial concealment
and an absence of financial accountability. Ross noted, “Oil revenues are unusually easy for
governments to conceal, since they are set by secret contracts and often channeled through off-
77
Source: World Development Indicators - World Bank Group
78
Source: World Development Indicators - World Bank Group
79
British Petroleum (BP) Statistical Review of World Energy: the Shift Project.
80
Ibid, 70.
18

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budget accounts.”81 In Combining Economic and Political Development, Adeel Malik writes,
“Their operations are unusually opaque, with little public knowledge of their investment
strategies.”82 Citizens in oil-wealthy democratic nations such as Canada, United States, and the
United Kingdom have free and full access to state finances, candidates’ spending, and federal
budget allocations, however, citizens in oil-wealthy autocratic regimes have no such thing.83 For
example, any average American citizen can do some research on the Federal Election
Commission (FEC) and gain some insight on the campaign finance regulatory regime in the
United States. Furthermore, any American citizen can request a copy of the federal budget via
the Federal Depository Library. In oil-wealthy regimes in the Middle East & North Africa, due to
federal regulations on media and communications materials and financial secrecy, citizens are
not aware of where tax and state revenue are going. This is problematic because if governments
conceal revenue and state finances, citizens will falsely think the state is performing well.84
Autocrats essentially trick the public into thinking the spending-to-revenue ratio is in the
public’s favor. Lack of financial transparency rids accountability from the region hence
inhibiting democratization.85
Through an analysis of the Arab Spring protests in 2011, oil resources and rents were a
factor that led to the uprisings’ overall failure in deposing autocrats in Yemen, Syria, and
Bahrain.86 In the discourse around oil wealth and democratization, scholars argue that
81
Ibid, 70.
82
Adeel Malik, Combining Economic and Political Development: The Experience of MENA. “Rethinking the
Rentier Curse” (Netherlands: Brill, 2017), 47.
83
Ibid, 70.
84
Ibid, 70.
85
Ibid, 71.
86
19

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membership in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)87 is a prerequisite to
the classification as an oil-wealthy regime. OPEC members like Algeria, Kuwait, Libya, Qatar,
Saudi Arabia, UAE, Oman, and Bahrain, and non-oil wealthy regimes like Egypt, Jordan,
Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen.88 Table 1.1 “Oil-and gas-producing countries, 2009” is the
estimated value of oil and gas produced per capita in 2009 in current dollars (USD). In 2009,
Qatar received ($24,940) in oil income per capita; Kuwait received ($19,500); UAE received
($14,100); Oman received ($7950); and Saudi Arabia received ($7800).89 In non-oil wealthy
regimes, Iraq received ($1780) in oil income per capita; Syria received ($450); whole Egypt
received ($270). Although Saudi Arabia was ranked 5th in oil income per capita in 2009, this was
still a statistically significant number. Jump to slightly more recent data from the U.S. Energy
Information Administration (EIA), in Table 2 “OPEC per capita net oil export revenues,” in
2018, Saudi Arabia received ($7003); in 2019, Saudi Arabia received ($5933); in 2018, Iraq
received ($2350); in 2019, Iraq received ($2150).90 Although OPEC per capita net oil export
revenues have slightly dropped since 2009, oil-wealthy regimes are still generating immense
amounts of wealth from oil rents. Looking at OPEC net oil export revenues, in 2009, real
(2018$) was $673 billion while the nominal was at $575 billion for all OPEC nations.91 In 2020,
real (2018$) was $557 billion while the nominal was at $580 billion.92 Looking at OPEC per
87
The Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries is an intergovernmental organization of 13 countries.
Founded on 14 September 1960 in Baghdad by the first five members, it has since 1965 been headquartered in
Vienna, Austria, although Austria is not an OPEC member state. OPEC coordinates and combines the policies about
petroleum production and output involving its member nations. It promises a stable oil market that offers petroleum
supplies that are both efficient and economic.
88
89
90
U.S. Energy Information Administration, derived from the October 2020 Short-Term Energy Outlook.
91
Sources: EIA, derived from data published in the August 2019 Short-Term Energy Outlook.
92
Ibid, 2019.
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capita net oil export revenues, in 2009, (real 2018$) was set at $1644 dollars per capita while the
nominal was $1404 dollars per capita.93 In 2020, real (2018$) was set at $1065 dollars while the
nominal was $1109 dollars per capita. Since 2009, OPEC net oil export revenues have fluctuated
from periods of downfall to periods of short-term growth. After 2018, both per capita net oil
export revenues and net oil export revenues steadily decreased for all OPEC countries, not just
oil-wealthy regimes in the Middle East & North Africa.
Oil-wealthy regimes in the Middle East & North Africa engage in behavior that curbs
protest. Oil revenue is used to keep a status quo of oppression. Case studies from the Arab
Spring protests between 2010-2012 exposed various autocratic tactics that stemmed popular
discontent.94 In January of 2011, after the deposition of Ben Ali in Tunisia and about a week
before the onset of the Egyptian Revolution, the National Assembly of Kuwait formulated and
implemented a plan that gave $1000 Kuwaiti dinars (approx.. $3500 USD) to every citizen in
Kuwait regardless of age, sex, and gender.95 Shortly after the distribution of Kuwaiti dinars, the
government also allocated a year of funds that subsidized sugar, oil, rice, and milk.96 The
subsidization of basic necessities and distribution of monetary aid was a collected effort to curb
popular resistance against the Kuwaiti government at a time when various Arab and Islamic
regimes were tested, rejected, and further delegitimized. In February of that year, the Saudi
government passed a $10.7 billion dollar deal that supported public sector workers, unemployed
persons, and students attending public universities.97 Officials within the Saudi regime also
distributed over $70 billion for the creation of low-income housing and public development
93
Ibid, 2019.
94
95
Ibid, 54.
96
Ibid, 54.
97
Ibid, 54.
21

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projects.98 In Qatar, the government raised public sector wages by $8 billion and increased
pensions by 60% percent.99
Income inequality is also a problem in the Middle East & North Africa. Income
inequality has led to an increase in public resentment. Based on data from the World Inequality
Database, the Middle East is the most unequal region in the world. Today, 56% of national
income accrues to the top 10%, while 12% goes to the bottom 50%.100 In short, Gulf states have
been the most unequal countries in the region for the past 20-30 years: 54% of national income
accrues to the top 10% in the oil-wealthy regimes of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, United Arab
Emirates, and Saudi Arabia.101 Key results of (WID) present an extreme concentration of wealth
at the top of the distribution: the top 1% earners in these oil-wealthy regimes owned close to
23% of total income in 2019; earnings for the top 1% were also almost twice as high as income
earnings from the bottom 50% of people.102 In addition, income inequality levels have remained
extremely high even as the gap between Gulf and non-Gulf countries have slightly decreased. In
2019, the top 10% of earners saw a 4% decrease from 60% to 56% in income share.103 Oil prices
and Middle East turmoil are also connected. The successful Arab Spring movements occurred in
countries that had negligible effect on the global supply of oil. Although Libya received ($3497)
of oil revenue per capita in 2019, disruption of Libyan oil production in 2011 did not pose much
of a risk to the global oil market.104 Egypt and Tunisia are also not large suppliers of oil ($260,
$250 in oil revenue per capita, 2009).105 The strong oil economy in Saudi Arabia as well as the
98
Ibid, 54.
99
Ibid, 54.
100
Source: World Inequality Database, 2020.
101
Ibid, 2020.
102
Ibid, 2020.
103
Ibid, 2020.
104
Sources: EIA, derived from data published in the August 2019 Short-Term Energy Outlook.
105
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Emirates did not experience widespread protest to the extent of other non-oil wealthy regimes.
Oil-wealthy regimes used oil wealth to suppress social movements that threatened autocratic
rule.
Circling back to The Oil Curse, Michael L. Ross outlines three theoretical frameworks:
the rentier effect, modernization effect, and repression effect. The three theoretical frameworks
are defined below:
• The rentier effect describes the political economy of various “rentier states” that generate
state revenue via external rents (i.e., oil, foreign aid). In oil-wealthy regimes, the state
budget is completely funded through external sources of wealth and international
financial transactions. In non-oil wealthy regimes like Egypt, the state budget is partly
funded by foreign/military aid from the United States.106
• The modernization effect creates an environment free of civic organizations that lobby for
democratic reforms. Vast and diverse social and cultural changes are essential to the
logical operation of liberal-democratic politics. Improvements to education, urbanization,
and industrialization are all products of extensive economic development. The
modernization effect reduces civic organizations and social forces that foster democracy,
however, the oil industry in the MENA crowd out other economic spheres.107
• The repression effect is the idea that when autocrats use oil wealth to fund extensive
security apparatuses or state-run security forces, the relative success of social movements
and anti-government protests substantially decreases. Wealth from oil rents provide
autocrats with regime stability in the face of popular resistance.108
During the global oil crisis of the 1980s, the price of oil dropped significantly, which
immediately forced the Saudi government to raise taxes in order to replenish lost revenue from
decreased oil rents and exports.109 Once the Saudi regime raised taxes and cut public spending,
the Saudi population revolted.110 Based on the Crude Oil WTI (USD/Bbl) chart, from Dec-30 to
106
Ibid, 78.
107
Michael L. Ross, “Does Oil Hinder Democracy?” World Politics 53, no. 3 (2001): 336.
108
Oil and transitions to democracy 1960-2006. From: Michael L. Ross, The Oil
Curse: How Petroleum Wealth Shapes the Development of Nations (Princeton: Princeton
109
Ibid, 78.
110
Ibid, 78.
23

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Jan-3 of 1985, the global price of oil was ($25.56-$26). By Mar-17 to Mar-21 of 1986, the global
price of oil fell to ($12.75) and even dipped further to $11 in July of 1986.111 After widespread
dissatisfaction with the Saudi regime and the emergence of anti-government social movements,
the Saudi government reverted their tax policy and increased public spending on
goods/services.112 Like the events that unfolded in 2011 in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar,
autocratic regimes offered citizens more subsidized benefits like healthcare, education, and
housing. In 2019, once the Iranian regime raised taxes and cut gas subsidies, Iran was faced with
waves of protest. The price for a liter of gasoline rose to $15,000 rials (13 cents), from $10,000
rials per liter.113 In response to growing protests in Tehran, the nation’s capital, the Iranian
regime shut down internet service essentially isolating social movements and cutting off
underground subversive networks.114 Protestors chanting “we are fed up!” engaged in violent
protests in Behshahr, Shiraz, Tehran, and Karaj; people vandalized monuments, destroyed public
property like government buildings and practiced flag burning, even though gasoline in Iran still
remained relatively cheap compared to other oil-wealthy regimes.115 Fassihi writes, “Iranian
opposition parties are in disarray, with domestic opposition leaders jailed and those abroad
lacking legitimacy among most Iranians inside Iran.”116 The 2019 Iranian opposition movements
demonstrate the extent to regional instability. If it was not for mass arrests, security forces’
violence, government repression, and the early effects of COVID-19, Iranian social movements
would have effective leadership and organization. Instead, social movements are suppressed
111
U.S. Energy Information Administration
112
113
Farnaz, Fassihi, “Protests Incited by Gas Price Hike Grip Iran,” The New York Times, Nov. 16, 2019.
114
Ibid, 2019.
115
Ibid, 2019.
116
Ibid, 2019.
24

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relatively quickly and only happen every few years or so.117 In Turkmenistan, a consolidated
authoritarian regime, the regime has provided the public with very low gas prices and free
electricity.118 In Figure 3.6. Oil income and gasoline prices, 2006, countries that have higher oil
income per capita (log) tend to have subsidize gas prices more than countries with smaller oil
income per capita (log).119 Furthermore, this trend is more common in autocracies than
democracies per the graph. Autocrats are more willing to heavily subsidize gasoline prices in
order to preserve their leadership. In September 2007, Burma (Myanmar) experienced
widespread protests and public resentment toward government cuts of fuel subsidies; they
quickly became violent just as the Iranian protests did in 2019.120 In February 2008, protests
erupted in Cameroon in response to a government mandate that removed fuel subsidies.121 In
April 2010, President Kurmanbek Saliyevich Bakiyev of Kyrgyzstan was deposed of power after
riots triggered by high gas prices and authoritarianism toppled the government. In short,
autocrats have a very good reason to keep gas prices low via public spending and
subsidization.122 Looking at more recent World Bank data on the Pump Price for gasoline (US$
per liter), regimes in the Middle East & North Africa: (Algeria, Bahrain, Kuwait, Libya, Oman,
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates) were organized one cell while liberal-
democratic nations: (Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Spain, United Kingdom, and the
United States) were organized in another cell on an Excel spreadsheet.123 In 2016, the pump gas
prices for gasoline (US$ per liter) in the liberal-democratic cell: United Kingdom was ($1.5);
117
Ibid, 2019.
118
119
Ibid, 80.
120
Ibid, 80.
121
Ibid, 80.
122
Ibid, 80.
123
The link to acquire/visualize data on Pump price for gasoline (US$ per liter) is found here:
https://databank.worldbank.org/reports.aspx?source=2&series=EP.PMP.SGAS.CD&country=.
25

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Belgium ($1.4); Germany ($1.4); France ($1.4); Spain ($1.3); Canada ($0.80); and the United
States ($0.70). In the MENA regime cell: United Arab Emirates ($0.50); Bahrain ($0.40);
Kuwait ($.0.40); Algeria ($.30); Saudi Arabia ($.20); and Libya ($0.10).124 Looking at data from
the World Bank, on average, autocratic regimes classified as oil-wealthy and non-oil wealthy
consistently have lower gasoline prices per liter than liberal-democratic spaces like the European
Union, United Kingdom, Canada, and the US. In short, the resource course has affected the
Middle East regionally as well as other autocratic spaces. The Oil Curse has set up a set of
politically and economically vulnerable states. Throughout the region, unemployment, big state
regulatory regimes, weak private sector, and limited political progression are the products of
states that heavily rely on external modes of wealth (i.e., oil rents, exports).125
The discourse around the repression effect is also related to the negative effects of the
political economy of oil in the region. As mentioned earlier in the paper, oil wealth has allowed
autocrats to finance (fund) strong and loyal militaries, police forces, and security apparatuses that
quickly suppress any form of political opposition or anti-government social movement. These
loyal state-backed security forces starve people of openness and inhibit democratization in the
MENA. States’ funding of security forces can especially prevent transitions to democracy in
countries that have proven and powerful oil markets (i.e., Saudi Arabia, Algeria, and Bahrain).126
Looking at various case studies between (2008-2011), both oil-wealthy and non-oil wealthy
autocratic regimes saw increases in government expenditure of military equipment. In 2008,
Tunisia spent close to $53 per capita on military equipment; Algeria spent $141 per capita on
124
Source: World Development Indicators – World Bank Group.
125
Adeel Malik, Combining Economic and Political Development: The Experience of MENA. “Rethinking the
Rentier Curse” (Netherlands: Brill, 2017), 41.
126
26

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military equipment and experienced far fewer protests.127 Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Algeria
signed the largest international arms purchasing agreements between (2006-2009), the years
leading up the Arab Spring protests in 2011.128 Between (2006-2009), Saudi Arabia spent nearly
$29.5 billion, Bahrain ($14.2 billion), and Algeria ($6.8 billion) on military equipment via these
international arms purchasing agreements.129 Based on Figure 3.2. Oil and transitions to
democracy, 1960-2006, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, Kuwait, Iran, and even Iraq failed
to transition to democracy.130 In this case, states’ oil revenues block transitions to democracy.131
Autocrats classified as getting “0” in Time under democratic rule, 1960-2006 (%), and between
(8-10) under Oil income per capita (log), 1960-2006 have full control over state finances,
therefore they have the utmost capability to fund loyal security forces to smother the threatening
nature of protest and popular dissatisfaction with autocratic regimes.132
In figure 3.3. Number of oil-producing democracies and autocracies, 1960-2008, Oil-
wealthy regimes in the Middle East & North Africa helped to make up the majority of
authoritarian regimes in the world since 1960.133 Not much has changed. The years (1980-2008)
are used as a reference and confidence interval to figure out oil-producing nations and
autocracies. For example, high oil-producing nations made up over ¼ (25%) of all autocracies in
2008 and ½ (50%) by 2008.134 In simpler terms, in 1980, oil-producers made up just 27 of the
127
128
Ibid, 54.
129
Ibid, 54.
130
131
Ibid, 73.
132
Ibid, 73.
133
Ibid, 76.
134
Ibid, 76.
27

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103 classified autocracies; by 2008, oil-producers made up 30 of the 74 autocracies in the
world.135
The modernization effect is one of the main factors shaping international politics in the
MENA. Since the nature of politics is to earn and maintain power, autocrats will engage in
predatory economic behavior designed to maximize profit sometimes at the cost of citizens’
standard of living. Oil-wealthy regimes in the Middle East & North Africa cannot compete with
developed countries that export diverse sets of goods/services, so autocrats promote rents at the
cost of democratization. In oil-wealthy regimes, the oil industry crowds out other economic
spheres of production.136 In the MENA, there is no demand or need for an extensive and
abundant labor force for the production of petroleum resources. A minimal Middle Eastern labor
force has prevented the emergence of civic organizations like labor unions that push for
democratic reforms. Although there is evidence of labor uprisings in Saudi Arabia that produced
change to workers’ conditions, they did not do enough nor were powerful enough to promote
democratization in the region.137 Although citizens within the Middle East & North Africa are
coerced via public spending for generous social services, they are subjects of major
antidemocratic forces that prevent occupational specialization138 and repression that criminalizes
dissent.139
Resentment
As learned throughout the paper, episodes of contemporary protest, social movements,
and anti-government mobilization have threatened the foundations of autocracy in the MENA.
135
Ibid, 76.
136
137
Ibid, 355.
138
This specialization requires workers to give up performing other tasks at which they are not as skilled, leaving
those jobs to others who are better suited for them. An assembly line, where individual workers perform specific
tasks in the production process, is the best example of specialization – Libraries at University of Nebraska-Lincoln.
139
Ibid, 356.
28

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Severe income inequality, unemployment, and repression sparked the Arab Spring protests in
2011. Although economic instability enhanced by neocolonialism have been present in MENA
politics since the 20th century, very real attempts to overthrow governments did not occur until
the mid-2000s.140 “Subversive revolutionism” practiced by groups operating both underground
and overtly creates an environment of regime vulnerability.141 Although Asef Bayat maintained
the notion that the MENA was in a post-Islamist, post-ideological moment, the emergence of the
Islamic State in Syria and Iraq in 2014 pushed back on that notion. In recent years, Islamist
radicalism is still very much a factor that shapes international politics and drives foreign policy
initiatives. Even with international coalitions, civil wars, and state-sanctioned violence, Islamist
organizations have not gone away. In the absence of the state, citizens will resort to other
methods and act in the place of the state. In an environment of weak economic status, working
class populations will engage in street politics and will be met with state-sanctioned violence in
the form of reprisal.142 While subjugated groups became the objects of history due to the
neocolonial footprint in oil, the wealthy became the shapers of history and acted on behalf of the
state.143 Despite the powerful capacity of the state, ordinary citizens alienated from oil wealth
and profit resort to radicalization and alternatives to autocratic leadership.144 People who are
comfortable with their socioeconomic status will not resort to radicalization to escape non-
existent economic and financial pressures.
Street politics and general subversion creates an ideological space and “zones of
freedom” that can be filled by charismatic leaders, religious fundamentalists, or Islamist radicals,
140
Asef Bayat, Life as Politics: How Ordinary People Change the Middle East (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
2010), 2.
141
Ibid, 11.
142
Ibid, 13.
143
Ibid, 13.
144
Ibid, 28.
29

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or ordinary people.145 The Arab Spring protests in 2011 provided people with that “zone of
freedom” that allowed other fostered other ideologies, attitudes, and beliefs. Table 2.2 presents
the Ranking of Arab countries according to the EIU democracy index, 2010-2014. In the 2010-
2014 EIU report, full democracies were given scores between (8-10); flawed democracies (6-
7.9); hybrid regimes (4-5.9); and total autocratic regimes (0-3.9).146 Looking at the 2014 score
for oil-wealthy regimes: Algeria was given a score of (3.83); Kuwait (3.78); Libya (3.80); Qatar
(3.18); Saudi Arabia (1.82); UAE (2.64); Oman (3.15); Bahrain (2.87).147 Non-oil wealthy
regimes like Syria and Iraq were given scores of (1.74) and (4.23) respectively.148 Makdisi
argues that the source of violent civil war and political uprisings in 2011 were the result of oil
wealth and an abundance of petroleum resources.149 The lack of economic diversity and political
turmoil has contributed to the Middle East & North Africa being one of the most conflict-prone
regions in the world with close to 20% of all the world’s conflicts having origins in the
MENA.150 Post-2011, the MENA has experienced an influx of violent Islamist fundamentalist
organizations in Iraq and Syria. The emergence of ISIS in 2014 triggered yet another
international military coalition to attack ISIS strongholds in Syria and Iraq. While the US was
engaging in aerial bombardment against ISIS militants in Northern Syria, Russia also engaged in
aerial bombardment of anti-Ba’ath and anti-al-Assad groups.151 While the Arab Spring protests
may have further increased regime vulnerability, violence originating from civil wars has
increasingly weakened Arab society.
145
Ibid, 28.
146
Samir Makdisi, Combining Economic and Political Development: The Experience of MENA. “Reflections of the
Arab Uprisings,” (Netherlands: Brill, 2017), 23.
147
Source: EIU Reports, 2011-2014.
148
Ibid, 2011-2014.
149
Samir Makdisi, Combining Economic and Political Development: The Experience of MENA. “Reflections of the
Arab Uprisings,” (Netherlands: Brill, 2017), 26.
150
Ibid, 27.
151
Ibid, 30.
30

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In the 2020 EIU democracy-index report, the Middle East & North Africa was the lowest
ranked region in the world. In the report, 7 out of the 20 countries in the region were ranked
toward the bottom 20 in the global report.152 Although the MENA has been defined by steady
decreases in democracy and “openness,” there have been elements of slight stasis with the
average democracy score in the region dropping by 0.05 points between (2015-2019).153 This is
no longer the case. Today, the Middle East & North Africa are dominated by autocratic regimes
that continually suppress civil and political rights. In the 2020 report, 16 of the 20 countries in
the MENA region are classified as authoritarian and only 2 states classified as hybrid regimes;
Israel and Tunisia are the only states classified as “flawed democracies” in the 2020 MENA EIU
report.154 Looking at Chart 8. Middle East and North Africa: Democracy Index 2020 by
category, the index score is out of 10, 10 being the best. In this data, the dark blue shaded areas
are the global average while the light blue shaded areas are the Middle East & North Africa. In
“Election process and pluralism,” the global average was at (5.79) with the MENA lagging
behind at (2.36); in “Functioning of government,” the global average was (4.71) and MENA at
(2.77); in “Political participation,” the global average was (5.42) and MENA (4.50); in “Political
culture,” the global average was (5.56) and MENA (4.78); in “Civil liberties,” the global average
was (5.52) and MENA (2.78); in “Overall score,” the global average was 5.37 and MENA
(3.44).155 Table 9. Middle East and North Africa 2020 shows the regime type, regional rank, and
global rank of both oil-wealthy and non-oil wealthy regimes. In 2020, Israel and Tunisia (as
mentioned before) received regional rankings of 1 and 2 respectively and were both classified as
152
EIU Democracy Index 2020
153
Ibid, 2020.
154
EIU Democracy Index, 2020.
155
Ibid, 2020.
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a “Flawed democracy.”156 In the countries important to the research, Algeria, Iraq, Qatar, Oman,
Egypt, UAE, Bahrain, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Libya, and Syria were all classified as “Authoritarian”
and received very low global rankings. In Islamist Terrorism and Democracy in the Middle East,
Katerina Dalacoura categorized the causes of terrorism:
Ideational causes:157
• Acts of terrorism can be perpetrated by individuals with disturbed personalities.

• People with apocalyptic views of the world may engage in acts of terrorism.
• Terrorism can be related to religious and cultural factors.
• Terrorism as a product of an ideological view and certain understanding of how society
should be.
Material/Structural causes:158
• Social: people who feel alienated and marginalized from political, social, and economic
development.
• Economic: People may be driven to terrorism due to unfair and unequal wealth
distribution. Severe subjugation, deprivation, poverty, and unemployment may create an
environment that fosters illiberal behavior (i.e., Islamist radicalism).
• Political: Political turmoil and unequal political participation due to repression or
authoritarianism.
• Strategic/instrumental: Terrorism can be used as an effective tactic to seek
acknowledgement and advance ideology. Radical ideologies promise people with dignity
and humanity and could serve as an “adventure” to tranquility and happiness for many.
Islamist Radicalism
There are different lenses for studying Islamist radicalism as ideology and political
praxis. Samuel P. Huntington and Frantz Fanon both offered an analytical and theoretical
framework in understanding the origins of violence between ideologies and nations.
Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations and Fanon’s Wretched of the Earth with is understanding of
156
Ibid, 2020.
157
Katerina Dalacoura, Islamist Terrorism and Democracy in the Middle East (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2011), 31.
158
Ibid, 31.
32

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anticolonial violence have gained traction in the world of international politics and theory.
Although Huntington has been discredited due to the orientalist nature of a civilizational clash
between the west and Islamic world, it is still an important work that deserves unpacking. Any
portrayal of Islamic society as backwards, exotic, and at times barbaric is a rejection of the
diversity of Islamic traditions and practices and does not paint a realistic picture of the MENA.
Fanon’s notion of anticolonial violence is a challenge to the Huntingtonian framework. An
analysis and general historical overview of the Islamic State (ISIS) and al-Qaeda, two of the
most well-known Islamist extremist groups will show the origins of Islamist violence as a
response to colonial influence and western intervention. In addition, the MENA supplied the
possible conditions for such extremist organizations to grow, due to the absence of liberal-
democratic politics and lack of democratization for decades. There is unmistakable evidence of
an anticolonial struggle (Jihad)159 that has been used to advance both the al-Qaeda and Islamic
State doctrines.
Huntington argued that in the changing world of international politics, “culture wars”160
would make up the majority of intrastate conflicts and transnational dispute.161 In this changing
world of political theory, economic competition and the emergence of other political ideologies
will be crowded out by grand conceptions of identity.162 In the clash narrative, Huntington
generalizes Islamic traditions and political Islam; scholars in the Islamic world claim that
Islamist practices are more rooted in different cultural beliefs and not a subject of universalism.
Although doctrines from Islamist organizations may bear some resemblance to others, Islamist
159
A struggle or fight against the enemies of Islam.
160
Violence between diverse cultural groups; not violence over classes and other socioeconomic factors.
161
Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the New World Order (New York: Simon
& Schuster Paperbacks, 1996), 28.
162
Ibid, 28.
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radicalism is quite unique and develops differently through local political, economic, and social
conditions. Severe dissatisfaction with regime rule throughout the Muslim world and non-
inclusive conceptions of national identity made people adopt the Islamic faith in order to cope
with the problems of the world.163 Islam as religion, identity, and culture supplied an alternative
to perceived illegitimate rule and the effects of neocolonialism. The Islamic revival did not
merely reject notions of western modernity but offered an alternative to western modernity that
incorporated the pillars of Islam.164 The Islamic resurgence was also in response to growing
western influence throughout the MENA. Huntington argued that multicivilizational characters
must be incorporated into global politics or else it could spark the introduction of violent conflict
and a rejection of western modernity.165 Power of the Islamic resurgence across the Muslim
world was rooted in its sheer popularity and numbers. While the youth, students, and
intellectuals supplied the foundation for Islamist movements, urban middle-class people made up
the bulk of active participation in the revival. During the revival, students and the youth
population formed the “militant cadres and shock troops” that started power.166
In “Islam and the Clash of Civilizations,” Brasted and Khan argued that Huntington’s
view of global politics is unrealistic and fanciful.167 In this close reading of textual evidence, it is
important to understand the diversity of Islamism and prioritize the differences between radical
Islamist doctrines. Huntington generalized Islamist radicalism into a monolithic factor that drives
the clash of civilizations narrative. Edward Said, a former scholar of post-colonial studies
claimed that the Huntingtonian method of treating all of Islamism as a monolithic whole was
163
Ibid, 109.
164
Ibid, 110.
165
Ibid, 21.
166
Ibid, 113.
167
Brasted, Howard V., and Adeel Khan. "Islam and 'the clash of civilizations?' An historical perspective." In
Routledge handbook of political Islam. Routledge, 2011, pg. 274.
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deeply problematic and fell into the trap of orientalism. Categorizing international politics into
“east” and “west” is also equally as problematic, it forces divisiveness, competition, and conflict.
It creates an unequal political world where the winner is always the “west” and the losers are
always the “east,” due to the severe imbalance of political, economic, and social power.168 Said
writes. “The personification of enormous entities called “the West” and “Islam” is recklessly
affirmed, as if hugely complicated matters like identity and culture existed in a cartoonlike world
where Popeye and Bluto bash each other mercilessly, with one always more virtuous pugilist
getting the upper hand over his adversary.”169 Looking at Cold War politics (1945-1991), the
United States treated all forms of communism alike and did not understand that communism
matched the local conditions of certain states. For example, communism in the USSR was vastly
different than communism in Vietnam. Huntington generalized. Islamism and the stereotyping of
Islam is also clear. Interpreting the Islamic world as a monolithic whole on a crash course with
the western world and liberal-secular ways of life is alarming. Huntington painted a picture of
the Middle East & North Africa as a haunting landscape with exotic peoples and cultures. The
notion of the MENA as a shelter for barbaric and uncivilized traditions formed the narrative that
women in the MENA needed to be saved from the oppressive nature of Islamism thus justifying
the use of military expansion throughout the region.170 This Occident-Orient relationship was a
relationship of power and domination where the Orient was exploited and extracted for resources
by the Occident.171
On the one hand, Huntington supported the notion that there is only one version of
Islamist ideology, an ideology that is a constant source of violent-conflict, oppression, and
168
Edward Said, “The Clash of Ignorance,” The Nation, October 2001, 2.
169
Edward Said, “The Clash of Ignorance,” The Nation, October 2001, 2.
170
Edward W. Said, Orientalism (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978), 6.
171
Ibid, 5.
35

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resentment. On the other hand, Huntington’s assumption that followers of Islam will eventually
become totally radicalized is deeply rooted in orientalism.172 Subscribers of radical Islamist
ideologies only make up a minority within the political sphere in the greater Islamic world.
These ideologies are not popular; however, they still have the power to shape international
politics in the region. With the exception of the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, the Taliban in
Afghanistan, though more recent, and the Iranian regime, radical forms of Islamism have failed
to gain concrete political power in the world today. The Fanonian lens is a challenge to the
Huntington framework and serves to better understand the origins of anticolonial violence and
the complicated political situation in the region. In the context of the post-911 world, western
imperialism has politicized Islam. Islamism is in response to methods of violent western
intervention like drone strikes, troop deployments, and special ops programs. Regimes’ failure to
protect Muslim lives and American/European imperialism is related to the emergence of radical
Islamist ideologies and inspired thinkers like Osama bin Laden to promote anticolonial violence.
Grand international military coalitions led by the United States and other European powers as well as the
direct presence of American troops in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Egypt are highlighted all the time by
prominent Islamist thinkers.173 American deployment of troops in Saudi Arabia ultimately inspired bin
Laden’s declaration of Jihad against the US in the late 1990s and other forms of Islamist text.174 Foreign
interference generally fans the flames of Muslim resentment toward the west.175
In Frantz Fanon’s Wretched of the Earth, anticolonial violence is understood as a
response to the dehumanization and subjugation of the colonized.176 Fanon offered a new way of
172
173
Ibid, 279.
174
Ibid, 279.
175
Ibid, 279.
176
Fanon, Frantz. 1963. The wretched of the earth. New York: Grove Press, 210.
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understanding the violence between groups that directly opposed the Huntington framework.
Decolonization is a violent process because natives are exploited both economically and socially
by colonial rule.177 Fanon noted, “During this phase, the Indigenous population is discerned only
as an indistinct mass. The few native personalities whom the colonialist bourgeois have come to
know here and there have not sufficient influence on that immediate discernment to give rise to
nuances.”178 Colonialism is predicated on the division of good and evil, where the colonizer
views themselves as a source of good and the natives as a source of evil.179 Fanon writes, “As if
to show the totalitarian character of colonial exploitation the settler paints the native as a sort of
quintessence of evil.”180 Fanon also writes. “When victims of colonization are dehumanized and
their culture is delegitimized, they have no choice but to engage in forms of anticolonial violence
in order to take back their dignity and humanity.”181 Fanon wrote, “The naked truth of
decolonization evokes for us the searing bullets and bloodstained knives which emanate from it.
For if the last shall be first, this will only come to pass after a murderous and decisive struggle
between the two protagonists.”182 Although Fanon does not sympathize with anticolonial
violence, Fanon tried to convey the argument that understanding the source (origins) of violence
is critical to understanding Islamist behavior and practice. Anticolonial violence is not merely a
“clash of civilizations,” but it is the “wretched of the earth” engaging in violent methods to purge
colonial influence.
Anticolonial violence is a creative process perpetrated by Islamist organizations with
both similar and radically different views/interpretations of the Qur’an. Fanon wrote, “For he
177
Ibid, 35.
178
Ibid, 44.
179
Ibid, 44.
180
Ibid, 41.
181
Ibid, 37.
182
Ibid, 37.
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knows that he is not an animal; and it is precisely at the moment he realizes his humanity that he
begins to sharpen the weapons with which he will secure his victory.”183 For the colonized
populations, engaging in forms of anticolonial violence achieves power. From being portrayed as
objects of history, the colonized become the writers (shapers) of history and try to shift the
balance of power away from the irrational behavior of colonial rule. Anticolonial violence allows
the colonized to confront the lies of colonialism and restore their self-worth and dignity. Fanon
noted, “For a colonized people the most essential value, because the most concrete, is first and
foremost the land: the land which will bring them bread and, above all, dignity.”184 Anticolonial
violence is a tool that is used by various Islamist organizations such as the Islamic State (ISIS)
and al-Qaeda to give adherence to their particular ideology. Fanon writes, “Decolonization is the
veritable creation of new men. But this creation owes nothing of its legitimacy to any
supernatural power; the "thing" which has been colonized becomes man during the same process
by which it frees itself.”185 Fanon here gives us a dialectic of colonialism: native and settler. On
the same note, the colonized become revolutionaries in a violent struggle against colonial rule.
Many are pushed to confront what they perceive as the apostate governments and rulers across
the Middle East and join Islamist organizations in order to take back their humanity and free
themselves from the grips of colonial rule.
In radical Islamist ideologies, violence is a collective response to colonialism. Fanon
wrote, “For the native, this violence represents the absolute line of action.”186 Through the lens
of colonization, they make a mockery of western values through violent means.187 Fanon noted,
183
Ibid, 43.
184
Ibid, 44.
185
Ibid, 37.
186
Ibid, 85.
187
Ibid, 43.
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“In the period of decolonization, the colonized masses mock at these very values, insult them,
and vomit them up.”188 Fanon argued that Islam becomes the radical ideology because it brings
national culture and language for people throughout the Middle East.189“ The struggle for
national liberty has been accompanied by a cultural phenomenon known by the name of the
awakening of Islam.”190 Radical Islamist ideologies resonate in the Middle East because it
creates a past vision of Islamic culture where a sense of dignity and humanity was present.
Members of Islamist organizations want to return to a mythical past that resembled life during
the Prophet Muhammed, a time where the Middle East was free from both colonial European
rule and American military influence. Moreover, there are many ways of understanding and
studying Islamist radicalism as ideology and political praxis. Understanding Islamism through
the Fanonian lens helps to interpret the “clash of civilizations” narrative as the “wretched of the
earth” engaging in forms of violence to free the mind of mental slavery and rid colonialism from
the Middle East. Through an analysis of Islamist thinkers, the Middle East opened itself up to
colonialism because Islamist scholars believed that followers abandoned the philosophies of
Islam. In order to take back that national identity, Islam must be adopted.191 Strindberg and Wärn
noted, “the first generation of the resistance against European exploitation and domination was
guided by Islamic leaders; religion provided a natural organizing principle in societies where the
main point of demarcation between natives and foreigners was religion.”192 The second wave
was the introduction of radical Islamist ideology and its place as the dominant force of
anticolonialism in the Middle East.193 Strindberg and Wärn in the “Fanonian Impulse” argued
188
Ibid, 43.
189
Ibid, 43.
190
Ibid, 213.
191
Anders Strindberg, Mats Wärn, Islamism: Religion, Radicalization, and Resistance (Cambridge: Polity Press,
2011), 45.
192
Ibid, 45.
193
Ibid, 45.
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that Islamic struggles, both nativist and third-wordlist, are inherently anticolonial liberation
struggles.194
Al-Qaeda
Al-Qaeda is one of the most well-known Islamist organizations today, due to their
involvement in the September 11 attacks in the United States. Al-Qaeda was born out of the
anticolonial (liberation) struggle (Mujahideen) against the Soviet Union during the Afghan-
Soviet War in the 1980s. Although al-Qaeda was born out of an anticolonial struggle against a
major imperial force (Fanon), there are still aspects of a civilizational clash (Huntington) built
into the al-Qaeda doctrine written by Osama bin Laden. Furthermore, both Huntington (though
his shortcomings) and Fanon offer plausible readings of textual evidence that were written by
key figures within the al-Qaeda network, namely Osama bin Laden. However, the Fanonian
vision poses a challenge to the Huntington framework. Offering a resolution to those strained
frameworks can help understand Islamist radicalism as not only an anticolonial ideology, but a
political praxis. Islamist radicalism should be interpreted through the Fanonian lens where
violence is used to give adherence to ideology, as previously mentioned in part one.
Al-Qaeda is a Salafi-Jihadist and primarily Sunni movement that has tried to unite the Muslim
world against its internal and external enemies, particularly the United States.195 Al-Qaeda, like
many other Islamist organizations, maintain this notion of ‘going back’ to a historical [mythical]
past that closely resembled life during the Prophet Muhammed.196 In addition, Salafi-Jihadist
movements stress a strict and radical interpretation of the Qur’an and want to create a world
where the only authoritative document is God’s [Allah, Hakimiyya] scripture.197 However, it is
194
Ibid, 55.
195
Haykel, Bernard. “ISIS and Al-Qaeda—What Are They Thinking? Understanding the Adversary.” The
ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 668, no. 1 (November 2016), 71.
196
Ibid, 71.
197
Ibid, 71.
40

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important to note that Al-Qaeda’s version of Islamism has represented a minority within the
greater Islamic world.198 Al-Qaeda views its [external] enemies as both Israel and the United
States, two nations they believe have exploited Muslim populations for the maximization of
profit, specifically oil wealth.199 On the other hand, Al-Qaeda views its [internal] enemies as
other Muslims who have abandoned the teachings of Islam and have rejected the Qur’an as an
authoritative document.200 For Al-Qaeda, violence gives adherence to their Islamist ideology and
serves as an essential ingredient in achieving a political identity.
Osama bin Laden advanced the anticolonial struggle. He saw the United States as a
nation that had “empty” values and only wanted to prioritize the extraction of valuable resources
[oil] from Arab states, particularly Saudi Arabia.201 Fanon noted, “As if to show the totalitarian
character of colonial exploitation the settler paints the native as a sort of quintessence of evil.”202
Osama bin Laden argued that colonial influence throughout Saudi Arabia decimated the
exploited Muslim populations.203 Bin Laden wrote, “It is no secret that the people of Islam have
suffered from the aggression, iniquity, and injustice imposed on them by the Zionist-Crusader
alliance and their collaborators, to the point where Muslim blood has become the cheapest and
their wealth as loot in the hands of their enemies.”204 American influence in Saudi Arabia during
the Persian Gulf War can be interpreted through the Fanonian lens. For bin Laden, injustice and
violence was brought upon the Islamic world by the United States.205 Bin Laden noted, “The
198
Ibid, 71.
199
Ibid, 72.
200
Ibid, 72.
201
Osama Bin-Laden, Declaration of War Against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places
(New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2009), 436.
202
203
204
Ibid, 436.
205
Ibid, 436.
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people of Islam have awakened and realize that they are the main target of the aggression of the
Zionist-Crusader alliance.”206 This notion of an awakening was meant to describe the idea that
much of the Islamic world has been asleep and vulnerable to American [external] forces.207
Although bin Laden may have been primarily concerned with the United States, his notion of an
Islamic awakening and being asleep may have been reaching to a point in history further back
before the introduction of American influence in the Middle East. Osama bin Laden argued that
the Zionist-Crusader alliance is an external project made up of fanatics coming in to change the
Middle East.208 Al-Qaeda’s central mission post-Afghan-Soviet War was to rid Saudi Arabia of
America’s defense apparatus. Although Al-Qaeda is a transnational Islamist organization, there
are still elements of locality to it. Bin Laden was responding to American influence in Saudi
Arabia.209 The focus on Saudi Arabia throughout bin Laden’s work was important because Saudi
Arabia was the location (home) of the two holy cities in Islam: Mecca and Medina. In addition,
bin Laden never referred to it as Saudi Arabia and merely adopted the place of the two holy
cities' names instead.
Fanon argued that anticolonial violence is a creative process that restored the humanity
and dignity of the colonized.210 “The naked truth of decolonization evokes for us the searing
bullets and bloodstained knives which emanate from it. For if the last shall be first, this will only
come to pass after a murderous and decisive struggle between the two protagonists.”211 Fanon
also argued that the colonizer only understands the language of violence; the violent footprint of
206
Ibid, 437.
207
Ibid. 437.
208
Ibid, 437.
209
Ibid, 437.
210
211
Ibid, 37.
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colonialism gives rise to anticolonial movements and ideologies that heavily mobilize people:212
“He of whom they have never stopped saying that the only language he understands is that of
force, decides to give utterance by force. In fact, as always, the settler has shown him the way he
should take if he is to become free.” Osama bin Laden framed terrorism as a weapon of the
weak, and the asymmetric warfare of Islamic terrorism is designed to overcome the severe
imbalance of power between Islamists and the United States.213 Osama bin Laden noted, “But
when tens of your soldiers were killed in minor battles and one American pilot was dragged
through the streets of Mogadishu, you left the area in disappointment, humiliation, defeat,
carrying your dead with you.”214 In bin Laden’s teachings, violence restores the dignity and
humanity of the colonized and that the only language the United States knows is the language of
violence.215 This also reveals the strategic logic of al-Qaeda’s terrorism. They have seen the US
have a distaste for death and be willing to change their foreign policy actions and behavior to
prevent violence against American troops throughout the region. The 1993 humanitarian-military
mission in Mogadishu, Somalia reflected the logic of anticolonial violence. Bin Laden wrote.
“You have been disgraced by Allah and you withdrew; the extent of your impotence and
weaknesses became very clear.”216 The United States lost its appetite of fighting once faced with
anticolonial violence. Once faced with anticolonial violence, the United States lost its appetite
for fighting and ultimately pulled all military forces out of Somalia.217
212
Ibid, 84.
213
214
Ibid, 451.
215
Ibid, 451.
216
Ibid, 451.
217
Ibid, 451.
43

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In “Why We Are Fighting You,” bin Laden offered a mental map that resonated and
appealed to adherents and backers of Al-Qaeda and Islamist radicalism. Bin Laden noted, “When
the Muslims conquered Palestine and drove out the Romans [in A.D. 6381, Palestine and
Jerusalem returned to, Islam, the religion of all the prophets.”218 Here, bin Laden produced and
distributed information that resonated with the demographic who read his work. Bin Laden
noted, “You attacked us in Somalia; you supported the Russian atrocities against us in Chechnya,
the Indian oppression against us in Kashmir, and the Jewish aggression against us in
Lebanon.”219 Furthermore, bin Laden emphasized the ‘just war’ theory where the greater Islamic
world has endured decades of violence and subjugation at the hands of the large colonial powers,
i.e., Soviet Union, United States, etc. Bin Laden wrote, “Thus, if we are attacked, we have the
right to attack back. Whoever has destroyed our villages and towns, we have the right to destroy
their villages and towns. Whoever has stolen our wealth, we have the right to destroy their
economy. And whoever has killed our civilians, we have the right to kill theirs.”220 For Al-
Qaeda, their violence is viewed as a response to western military action and political/economic
influence throughout the region, not unprovoked attacks carried out by religious fanatics.221 For
bin Laden, the United States and the west were the fanatics that tried to change the dynamic of
the Middle East political, economic, and social systems.
As mentioned previously, Fanon argued that the colonizer only understands the language
of violence.222 Osama bin Laden noted, “America does not understand the language of manners
and principles, so we address it using the language it does understand [i.e., a language of
218
Ibrahim, Raymond, Victor Davis Hanson, Ayman Ẓawāhirī, and Osama Bin Laden, The Al-Qaeda Reader (New
York: Broadway Books,2007), 198.
219
Ibid, 199.
220
Ibid, 201.
221
Ibid, 201.
222
44

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force].”223 Here, bin Laden offered us a Fanonian understanding of Al-Qaeda’s violence. In the
“Statement of the Islamic Emirate on the Fifteenth Anniversary of the American Invasion,” the
Taliban argued that the brutal US-led invasion of Afghanistan was a total violation of
international law and organization.224 Furthermore, the Taliban argued that the US used 9/11 as a
platform (foundation) for the justification of the use of violence against the Afghan people.225
According to the Taliban, the US administered elements of “savagery” against Afghan
populations who were not responsible for the attacks on September 11, 2001.226 A quote from the
article noted, “Otherwise the believing Afghan nation will continue their legitimate struggle
under the leadership of the Islamic Emirate, until these invaders are expelled from the country
like the previous ones; by which time you will have lost tens of thousands of more troops and
wasted hundreds of billions more dollars in exchange for a historical and humiliating defeat.”227
The Taliban claimed that their violent liberation struggle was in response to the American
“invaders.” The Taliban had the goal of purging American influence from the land. Similarly, the
Taliban spoke in the language of force to finally get through to the United States about the
horrors that were occurring in Afghanistan. Similarly, for Osama bin Laden, the United States
only understood the language of violence and had no choice but to engage in forms of
anticolonial violence to rid American influence out of Saudi Arabia. Al-Qaeda engages in an
anticolonial struggle against America, the [external] enemy. “How many acts of oppression,
tyranny, and injustice have you carried out, O you "callers to freedom"?”228 Here, bin Laden
223
224
Alex Strick Van Linschoten, Felix Kuehn, The Taliban Reader: War, Islam and Politics. (Oxford: Oxford
225
Ibid, 523.
226
Ibid, 523.
227
Ibid, 524.
228
Ibid, 204.
45

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highlighted the vomiting of western values back in the face of the United States. Bin Laden
articulated principles of anticolonial violence. Fanon wrote, “In the period of decolonization, the
colonized masses mock at these very values, insult them, and vomit them up.”229 Throughout this
piece, bin Laden framed the United States as the enemy of the Islamic world. Moreover, the
United States never took bin Laden’s comments seriously. The US never engaged in a war of
ideology, instead, the US confronted the Islamist threat purely militarily. The United States
needed to declare a Reagan-style ideological war against the Islamist threat. The US needed to
express its democratic and Liberal values as a suitable alternative to life in a revolutionary
regime. Furthermore, life in revolutionary regimes and failed states is substandard and
unendurable. Expressing the importance of being a part of the international framework and the
chance to become economically prosperous was paramount and the Bush administration should
have done a better job at pin-pointing the Islamist threat in the Middle East, rather than painting
other regimes as part of the Islamist apparatus.
Aspects of “Why We Are Fighting You,” which was written in 2002 after the attacks on
September 11, 2001, can be analyzed through a Huntingtonian lens. Throughout this text, bin
Laden painted western civilizations as the worst civilization and argued that western acts of
immorality were a product of personal freedom and the advancement of the separation of church
and state.230 “The second thing we call you to is to stop your oppression, lies, immorality, and
debauchery that has spread among you.”231 There is a civilizational clash element to this work
due to the dramatically different set of practices/beliefs between the western and Islamic worlds.
“It is saddening to tell you that you are the worst civilization witnessed in the history of
229
230
231
Ibid, 202.
46

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mankind.”232 Earlier in this piece, bin Laden stressed the right to engage in a ‘just war’ against
America and framed this violence as a civilizational clash. “You separate religion from your
polities, contradicting the pure nature that affirms absolute authority to the Lord your
Creator.”233 One of the pillars of Liberalism [guiding political philosophy] is the separation of
church and state and absence of religion in political decision making. The separation of church
and state is an idea that was totally rejected by bin Laden and almost all Islamist thinkers. Al-
Qaeda and Osama bin Laden believed that the Qur’an should be the only authoritative document
where all laws/rules are derived from God’s scripture.
Similarly, in Clash of Civilizations, Huntington promotes a clash that results from
radically different civilizational identities coming into contact with each other. This is where
Huntington coins the term “culture wars” to describe the future political and social violence that
will stem from the clash of civilizational identities.234 “Significantly, there seems to be less
adverse comment about the stress Huntington places on civilizational conflict or culture as the
ingredient putting Islam and the West on a direct collision course in the twenty-first century.”235
Understanding Islamist radicalism as a monolithic whole that promotes a friend/enemy clash is
troubling. Huntington created the notion that there is only one version of Islamist ideology, an
ideology that is always a potential source for conflict.236 “In this new world, local politics is the
politics of ethnicity; global politics is the politics of civilization. The rivalry of the superpowers
232
Ibid, 202.
233
Ibid, 203.
234
Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the New World Order (New York:
Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 1996), pg. 28.
235
236
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is replaced by the clash of civilizations.”237 Culture wars are conflicts over the values, beliefs,
and practices of various groups. This could be the struggle over power and influence over social,
political, and economic factors. Osama bin Laden noted, “You are the nation that permits usury,
though it has been forbidden by all religions. Yet you build your economy and investments on
usury.”238 In bin Laden’s writings, he argued that America’s loose morals allowed the flaws of
western society, such as the exploitation of workers and Muslims for the maximization of
profit.239 Throughout this piece, bin Laden is flushing out the differences between the Islamic
world and the United States. Bin Laden noted, “We call you to take an honest look at
yourselves—and I doubt you will do so—to discover that you are a nation without principles and
manners, and that values and principles for you are something that you merely demand from
others—not something that you yourselves practice.”240 Bin Laden argued that it was the United
States’ loose morals that allowed the flaws of western society. Huntington noted, “In the post-
Cold War world, the most important distinctions among peoples are not ideological, political, or
economic. They are cultural.”241 Throughout bin Laden’s piece, he framed who the enemy of the
Islamic world was – the United States.
It is important to understand Islamist radicalism before implementing foreign policy
actions that lack a real solution to Islamism. To study and understand Islamist radicalism as an
ideology and political praxis, it is essential to look at the [local] context of each Islamist
movement/organization. Strindberg and Wärn noted, “As our case studies illustrate, Lewis gets it
237
Ibid, 28.
238
239
Ibid, 203.
240
Ibid, 206.
241
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exactly backwards: the emergence and formation of each Islamist group is a product of local
exigencies and developments, not transcendent narratives of clashing civilizations.”242 Bernard
Lewis (Professor of Near Eastern Studies at Princeton University) argued that the violence
between the Islamic world and the west was a major (global) civilizational clash that involved
“Judeo-Christian heritage” and the secularism of the west.243 However, Strindberg and Wärn
would argue that acknowledging (being aware) of the context of the Islamist movement is
paramount to gaining an understanding of that ideology; they are not all the same!244
Furthermore, even Al-Qaeda [a global Islamist organization] had local elements that drove their
advancement as an established Islamist organization.245 In addition, nations need to take
seriously anticolonial violence. Islamist violence is a creative process that has meaning, it is not
merely barbaric and meaningless in nature. “Whether we like it or not, and regardless of whether
specific courses of action make sense to us, Islamist struggles of both the third wordlist and
nativist kinds are at root anti-colonial liberation struggles.”246 All Islamist radicalism is best
thought of as a subset of anticolonial ideologies and an understanding of Islam as belief, identity,
and ideology is also important.
Although Al-Qaeda was a product of the anticolonial struggle [Fanon] against the Soviet
Union during the Soviet-Afghan War, there are still civilizational clashing elements to Al-
Qaeda’s writings and violence. Although it is important to avoid the trap of orientalism
[Huntington], understanding Islamist radicalism as ideology and political praxis requires
grasping both Fanonian and Huntingtonian ideas. However, understanding/interpreting Islamism
242
Anders Strindberg, Mats Wärn, Islamism: Religion, Radicalization, and Resistance (Cambridge: Polity Press,
2011), 51.
243
Ibid, 51.
244
Ibid, 51.
245
Ibid, 51.
246
Ibid, 55.
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and Salafist-Jihadism through the Fanonian lens is more plausible than understanding Islamism
through the Huntingtonian framework. Avoiding the trap of orientalism is paramount, whilst
keeping the diversity of Islamism and Islamic traditions falls more in line with the Fanonian
framework than the Huntingtonian view. To resolve the tensions between the Fanon and
Huntington frameworks, it is important to look at the context of various Islamist movements
[Are they local or global movements?]. Furthermore, it is critical to sustain an element of
otherness and closeness with anticolonial violence. Understanding Islam as a belief, identity, and
ideology can keep the diversity of Islamic traditions and solidify the idea that Islamism is a
minority within the Islamic world. In conclusion, all Islamist radicalism is best thought of as a
subset of anticolonial ideologies where people with a fundamental dissatisfaction with the world
feel the need to join Islamist organizations to restore dignity and humanity. The politics of oil in
the Middle East has hindered democratization, reduced social functions, and have forced a
fragmentation of society where people have no choice but to engage in forms of anticolonial
violence against both [external] and [internal] enemies. When people are faced with repression
from western-backed regimes and feel the neocolonial effects of oil wealth, they will resort to
alternative ideologies and alternate methods of leadership that fundamentally defy autocratic
rule. In a space of political turmoil and absent equal representation, Islamist organizations will
fill the void and step in as state builders to provide relief for their followers and death to their
enemies.
The Islamic State (ISIS)

The Islamic State (ISIS), also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) is
an Islamist terrorist organization that was born out of the Sunni Insurgency during the Iraq War
in 2003. However, disagreements between the al-Qaeda doctrine and IS’s doctrine led to the
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separation between the two, where Abu Musab al-Zarqawi became the paramount leader of ISIS.
However, in 2014, the former leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi used ISIS and declared a new
caliphate. Determined to swiftly create an Islamic state, al-Baghdadi was proclaimed as the
caliph and called upon ISIS militants to engage in severe forms of violence against Shia Muslims
and support a rejection of Shi’ism throughout Iraq and Syria. In “What ISIS Really Wants,”
Graeme Wood argued that ISIS maintains a notion of going back to a mythical past during the
Prophet Muhammed.247 Wood noted, “In fact, much of what the group does looks nonsensical
except in light of a sincere, carefully considered commitment to returning civilization to a
seventh-century legal environment, and ultimately to bringing about the apocalypse.”248 This
Islamist notion of returning to a pre-colonial past is not new. This is an idea that has been
introduced by key Islamist thinkers throughout the 20th and 21st centuries. Fanon noted, “The
struggle for national liberty has been accompanied by a cultural phenomenon known by the name
of the awakening of Islam. The passion with which contemporary Arab writers remind their
people of the great pages of their history is a reply to the lies told by the occupying power.”249
This notion of going back correlates to Fanon’s understanding of ascribing to post-colonial
national culture. Wood noted, “The most-articulate spokespeople for that position are the Islamic
State’s officials and supporters themselves. They refer derisively to “moderns.””250 This is an
example of Fanon’s understanding of national culture. All throughout IS’s actions and behavior,
they do not stray away from the principles laid out in the Qur’an and even express the
importance of practicing old-world Islamic traditions that abide by early Islamic scripture. Fanon
wrote, “Because they realize they are in danger of losing their lives and thus becoming lost to
247
Graeme Wood et al. “What ISIS Really Wants,” The Atlantic, (Wood 2015), 4.
248
Ibid, 4.
249
250
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their people, these men, hotheaded and with anger in their hearts, relentlessly determine to renew
contact once more with the oldest and most pre-colonial springs of life of their people.”251 What
ISIS really tries to emphasize is following a traditional view of Islam. ISIS does not fully reject
western modernity because members of ISIS effectively use western social media outlets like
Twitter and YouTube to spread (advance) their beliefs and ideology.
Islam as a religion is not what is driving ISIS, but Islam as a political ideology is what
drives the violence of ISIS. The very nature of IS’s ideology is totalizing252 and members of ISIS
want to impose their beliefs on others, particularly other Sunni Muslims throughout the region.
Religion informs the ideology of ISIS; it does not drive it. Furthermore, an issue of failed states,
systematic colonialism, and discrimination throughout the Middle East has given rise to
revolutionary ideologies and individuals. The context for ISIS matters, and it is important to
understand how religion is used to make sense of the world. Fanon noted, “Decolonization never
takes place unnoticed, for it influences individuals and changes them fundamentally. It
transforms spectators crushed with their inessentiality into privileged actors, with the grandiose
glare of history’s floodlights upon them. It brings a natural rhythm into existence, introduced by
a new man, and with a it a new language and a new humanity.”253 This is the Fanonian idea of
providing people with a new meaning and thus become the writers of history, rather than the
products of colonialism. ISIS, as this totalizing ideology gives people the ability to become the
drivers of history. “The reality is that the Islamic State is Islamic. Very Islamic. Yes, it has
attracted psychopaths and adventure seekers, drawn largely from the disaffected populations of
251
252
A totalizing ideology represents a worldview that allows no room for nuance or dissent and that offers itself as
the only acceptable solution to evident political, social, and economic issues.
253
Ibid. 36.
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the Middle East and Europe.”254 People who lack membership in social functions and with a
fundamental dissatisfaction with the world are drawn to IS’s ideology. Violence is a fundamental
aspect of ISIS. Building a new state through violence is an important aspect that ISIS has
practiced. Furthermore, one way of avoiding the trap of orientalism is to look at other totalizing
ideologies throughout the world. Totalizing ideologies are not unique to Islamism and ISIS.
Right-wing Populism has taken the United States and parts of western Europe by storm. People
with a fundamental dissatisfaction with the world, no different than the dissatisfaction of the lone
wolves of ISIS, join and fight against the establishment. This comparison is merely about the
totality of certain ideologies and how totalizing ideologies are not unique to Islamist radicalism.
Various Islamist organizations such as ISIS supply social provisions to their followers.
Islamist groups perform state-like functions and supply healthcare and other goods/services.
Wood noted,
The Islamic State may have medieval-style punishments for moral crimes (lashes for
boozing or fornication, stoning for adultery), but its social-welfare program is, at least in
some aspects, progressive to a degree that would please an MSNBC pundit. Health care,
he said, is free. (!Isn"t it free in Britain, too?” I asked. !Not really,” he said. !Some
procedures aren"t covered, such as vision.”) This provision of social welfare was not, he
said, a policy choice of the Islamic State, but a policy obligation inherent in God"s law.255
When the state fails, Islamist organizations step in and perform the duties of the state.
Because ISIS’s ideology is a totalizing ideology, supplying social provisions is an article of the
revolutionary nature of ISIS. IS’s commitment to go back to a pre-colonial past and engage in
forms of anticolonial violence to create a “just world” is also not unique to Islamist radicalism.
Wood wrote, “They believe that they are personally involved in struggles beyond their own lives,
254
255
Ibid, 19.
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and that merely to be swept up in the drama, on the side of righteousness, is a privilege and a
pleasure—especially when it is also a burden.”256 As mentioned earlier in this paper, this echoes
the Fanonian understanding of a new man being born from the ashes of anticolonial violence.
In Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s “Declaration of the Caliphate,” he laid out the framework for
the Islamic State’s future goals and aspirations as a state-building organization. Baghdadi was
named the caliph and was almost universally rejected by the Muslim community as the caliph.
Baghdadi noted, “So raise your ambitions, O soldiers of the Islamic State! For your brothers all
over the world are waiting for your rescue and are anticipating your brigades. It is enough for
you to just look at the scenes that have reached you from Central Africa, and from Burma before
that. What is hidden from us is far worse.”257 Baghdadi here expressed the need for a ‘just war ’
against those who have subjugated Muslim populations. ISIS argued that those who backed the
Islamic Ummah into a corner will face violence at the hands of those who will break the chains
restraint and control. Baghdadi’s call for a ‘just war ’to end the colonial control of the Ummah is
very Fanonian and anticolonial in nature. In addition, IS’s violence builds a new man dipped in
righteousness and is born to scare the enemies of God [Allah]. Baghdadi wrote, “Terrify the
enemies of Allah and seek death in the places where you expect to find it, for the dunyā (worldly
life) will come to an end, and the hereafter will last forever.”258 This religious devotion to an idea
or cause that the action of installing fear into the hearts and minds of enemies and predicting the
end is important within the ISIS doctrine. The violence of ISIS is not merely random and
meaningless, but it is a creative process designed to give adherence to IS’s ideology. Baghdadi
noted, “They fight in the cause of Allah, so they kill and are killed. [It is] a true promise
256
Ibid, 36.
257
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. “Declaration of the Caliphate.” Baghdadi’s declaration of a caliphate in Mosul’s Grand
Mosque of al-Nuri on June 29, 2014, 574.
258
Ibid, 574.
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[binding] upon Him in the Torah and the Gospel and the Qur'an. And who is truer to his
covenant than Allah? So rejoice in your transaction which you have contracted. And it is that
which is the great triumph} [At-Tawbah: 1111].”259 Here, Baghdadi is outlining the idea that the
violence of ISIS is a creative process. Utilizing the Qur’an and the scripture of God to fulfill a
religious duty. Fanon noted, “The colonized man finds his freedom in and through violence. This
rule of conduct enlightens the agent because it indicates to him the means and the end.”260 Fanon
tried to explain the logic of anticolonial violence, not justify or promote it.
In addition, al-Baghdadi outlined the killing of Muslims all over the world and blamed it
on western influence throughout the Middle East. The [western] violence that is used to
subjugate and exploit Muslims is not considered terrorism by the international framework,
however, any act of violence perpetrated by a member of an Islamist organization is considered
terrorism. Baghdadi noted, “Terrorism does not include the insulting of the Lord of Mightiness,
the cursing of the religion, and the mockery of our Prophet (peace be upon him). Terrorism does
not include the slaughtering of Muslims in Central Africa like sheep, while no one weeps for
them and denounces their slaughter.”261 ISIS justifies their own form of creative violence and
vomits western values back into the face of the west.262 This litany is very Fanonian in nature
and underpins IS’s justification for anticolonial violence. Baghdadi wrote, “Soon, by Allah's
permission, a day will come when the Muslim will walk everywhere as a master, having honor,
being revered, with his head raised high and his dignity preserved. Anyone who dares to offend
him will be disciplined, and any hand that reaches out to harm him will be cut off.”263 Here,
259
Ibid, 574.
260
261
262
263
Ibid, 575.
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Baghdadi talks about how a product of anticolonial violence is the restoration of dignity and
humanity, two elements that were stripped by the settlers (colonizer). “And this the settler knows
very well; when their glances meet he ascertains bitterly, always on the defensive, "They want to
take our place."264 It is true, for there is no native who does not dream at least once a day of
setting himself up in the settler's place.” For ISIS, engaging in Jihad is the direct catalyst to
becoming the most virtuous in the face of colonial adversity. Baghdadi noted, “And there is no
deed in this virtuous month or in any other month better than jihad in the path of Allah, so take
advantage of this opportunity and walk the path of you righteous predecessors.”265 A new man is
born from engaging in anticolonial violence and fighting for a new caliphate.
Islamic State (ISIS) & Oil Trade: A Paradox?

Although the long history of the Islamic State is important, the “relevant” emergence of
the Islamic State in 2014 posed a threat to liberal-democratic polities throughout the world. The
international community, made up of members from the United States, United Kingdom, Iraq,
Turkey, and even Russia formed a grand military coalition to face the threat from the Islamic
State—notably (for Russia), the stress the Islamic State placed on the Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party
led by Bashar al-Assad, the current President of the Syrian autocracy. However, throughout IS’s
brief history as a mega Islamist organization, the local IS government set up a set of principles
centered around Shariah. Furthermore, the IS government was able to promote, set up, and
preserve vast areas of land around Iraq and Syria via revenue from oil production/distribution. In
a way, the Islamic State of Syria and Iraq functioned as a rentier state and received most of their
revenue from foreign governments and regimes with a high demand of Syrian/Iraqi oil—oil that
fell under the control of the Islamic State. Oil is one of the most highly demanded natural
264
265
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resources in the world, there was no surprise ISIS would capitalize on the governments’ need for
oil. This eventual and steadily flow of revenue from oil production/distribution and control of
key oil fields (mentioned later) led to the funding of terror and ethnic cleansing of Shi’a Muslims
throughout the region. Revenue that was used to stabilize regime control and other forms of
territorial conquest in the name of a new Caliphate declared by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi—IS’s
former leader and prominent Islamist militant.
When Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi declared a new caliphate at the Great Mosque of al-Nuri in
Mosul, Syria, it came as a surprise to the international community—the world was faced with yet
another (strong) Islamist organization determined to globalize terrorism and establish a
fundamental Islamist doctrine on all Sunni Muslims.266 Baghdadi went from being an unknown
prisoner of war in 2010 to becoming the face of one of the fastest moving, Jihadist-militant
organizations that shaped international politics in the region.267 In IS’s short-lived history from
really 2014-2019 (some control today), the Islamic State kept information about operations
hidden. Except for execution videos that were made public via social media outlets like Twitter
and YouTube, the Islamic State was really a private organization in nature. Much of the gained
knowledge/information of the Islamic State through journalists and insiders on the ground, as
well as IS’s propaganda videos that exploded on Reddit and Twitter in 2014 and even today.
Scholars like Strindberg and Warn outline IS’s violence as “beyond anything we have seen” due
to the prominence of beheadings, mass executions, and the installation of fear in the hearts and
minds of local Muslims—notably Shi’a Muslims, the [internal] enemy or apostates in the eyes of
ISIS.268 With the increase in the Islamic State’s control of territory throughout Syria and Iraq
266
Graeme Wood, “What ISIS Really Wants,” The Atlantic, March 2015.
267
Ibid, 2.
268
Anders Strindberg & Mats Warn, Islamism: Religion, Radicalization, and Resistance (Chicago: Polity, 2011).
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came control over key oil fields and production centers. In very recent history, 2016, the Islamic
State controlled a majority of Syrian oil production/distribution centers—this led profit from
crude oil from being the single and major source of revenue.269 Based off the image on ISIS oil
movements, ISIS maintained control over key oil fields denoted on the legend from Aleppo to al-
Qaim and held ISIS supported territory from Mosul to Baghdad.270 In 2016, the Islamic State
operated in 6 major oil markets and demonstrated de facto control over mobile refineries.271
Primary oil routes and smuggling routes were actively used throughout Syria and Iraq. In the
middle of the image above, the small city Deir Ezzor was an economic hub for oil
production/distribution. Deir Ezzor was the Islamic State’s main oil producing region where
workers produced anywhere from 34,000 to 40,000 barrels of oil a day.272 Furthermore, looking
east at Qayyara (near Mosul), over 8000 barrels of oil were being produced a day—oil that was
used for economic development and the construction of roads to advance the oil trade.273
Although the Islamic State’s oil markets were disrupted by both US-led coalition groups and
Russian airstrikes, the Islamic State was still heavily profiting off of oil exports. The price of oil
is not fixed, it is variable and subject to change based off of both domestic and international
conditions. From 2014-2019, the al-Omar field, one of Syria’s largest oil fields charged close to
$45 a barrel.274 Based off the international oil price at the time, $45 per barrel of oil was on the
higher end—this was due to complications of oil production during politically unstable and
conflict-driven periods. However, violent conflict and coalition intervention aside, the Islamic
State was making well over $1.5 million a day, revenue that was used to fund terrorism and the
269
Erika Solomon, Robin Kwong & Steven Bernard, “Inside Isis Inc: The Journey of a barrel of oil,” Financial
Times, February 29, 2016.
270
Ibid, 2016.
271
Ibid, 2016.
272
Ibid, 2016.
273
Ibid, 2016.
274
Ibid, 2016.
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forced murder of thousands in places like al-Raqqah.275 In Islamic State controlled territory,
which approximated to around 8 million people under authority, the main consumers of pre-
refined oil was the people and Turkey.276 In addition, much of the pre-refined oil deposited by
the Islamic State was traded across the Turkish border; in southern Turkey near the Syrian
border, a transnational market for global terrorism and oil trade were formed.277
Conclusion & Findings
In this thesis, I have examined the origins of Islamist radicalism and the relationship
between oil-wealth and democratization in the Middle East & North Africa. Oil is one of the
most valuable natural resources and is essential in fueling the world’s military and industrial
complexes. Even with increased investments in green energy and biofuel, small states and world
powers are still in demand of oil. In the post-Ottoman Empire space, the Sykes-Picot Agreement
established new borders under European and Russian supervision. This agreement immediately
led to Middle Eastern social, political, and economic turmoil. Territorial changes led to intra-
Arab disputes such as Iraq’s sovereignty over Kuwait, Syria’s rejection of Lebanon, and the
Kurdish rejection of Turkish, Iraqi, Iranian, and Syrian independence. Prior to the Cold War,
western influence in the Middle East was clearly evident and the colonial-economic aspirations
found its way in the MENA sphere.
Fast-forward to the 1990s, Persian Gulf I was an event that would shape MENA politics
forever. The US-led coalition forces against the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait were the first time a
leader of the Soviet Union, General-Secretary Gorbachev, took sides with the international
coalition and supported the US in preserving Kuwait’s sovereignty, or perhaps Kuwait’s oil.
275
Ibid, 2016.
276
Lucy Al-Khatteeb, Eline Gordts, “How ISIS Uses Oil to Fund Terror,” Brookings, September 27, 2014.
https://www.brookings.edu/on-the-record/how-isis-uses-oil-to-fund-terror/.
277
“Ibid.”
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However, from 1950 to about 1980, both the United States and the Soviet Union engaged in
‘hawkish’ behavior and were determined to establish client (satellite) states throughout the
MENA. Rentierism ultimately established a steady stream of oil into the west as well as a steady
stream of cash into the MENA. This ongoing cycle made oil-wealthy regimes both richer and
systematically more undemocratic.
In this thesis, Saudi Arabia was the case study of importance. Looking at oil and political
developments in Saudi Arabia, the political economy of oil inhibited democratization. The
Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO), originally a subsidiary of the Standard Oil Co.
(Chevron), Aramco needed to compete with other Anglo-Petroleum companies. What better
place than to start in Saudi Arabia, one of the most oil-wealthy empires in the history of the
world. The oppressive Saudi regime was forged from the Saudi American oil partnership. In this
case, Aramco shaped corporate goals and objectives to meet the demands of US interest, thus
creating a cycle of investment and corporate savings. Ibn Saud, the first king of modern Saudi
Arabia, was attacked, and many argued he was an agent of the west and a product of state-
corporate interest. Osama bin Laden was given fame and fortune from both the success of the
Islamist-coalition during the Afghan-Soviet War and family oil-wealth. Although the al-Qaeda or
Saudi network held global initiatives, bin Laden’s dissatisfaction with the political situation in
the MENA was rooted in American influence in the Saudi political economy of oil.
The Oil Curse establishes the negative effects brought on by the modernization effect,
rentier effect, and repression effect. As mentioned earlier, the three theoretical frameworks are
defined below:
• The rentier effect describes the political economy of various “rentier states” that generate
state revenue via external rents (i.e., oil, foreign aid). In oil-wealthy regimes, the state
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budget is completely funded through external sources of wealth and international
financial transactions. In non-oil wealthy regimes like Egypt, the state budget is partly
funded by foreign/military aid from the United States.
• The modernization effect creates an environment free of civic organizations that lobby for
democratic reforms. Vast and diverse social and cultural changes are essential to the
logical operation of liberal-democratic politics. Improvements to education, urbanization,
and industrialization are all products of extensive economic development. The
modernization effect reduces civic organizations and social forces that foster democracy,
however, the oil industry in the MENA crowd out other economic spheres.
• The repression effect is the idea that when autocrats use oil wealth to fund extensive
security apparatuses or state-run security forces, the relative success of social movements
and anti-government protests substantially decreases. Wealth from oil rents provide
autocrats with regime stability in the face of popular resistance.
Oil developments are deeply rooted in the political space of the MENA. Autocrats
understand that no taxation is equal to no representation. With the help from World Bank data
regarding total tax & contribution rate (% of profit), taxes are generally lower in the MENA.
Furthermore, a large percentage of MENA GDP is found in oil rents via oil exports. Based on
World Bank data regarding oil rents (% of GDP) mentioned earlier in the thesis, there is no
economic diversification in the MENA. Most of MENA's GDP originates in oil revenue. Due to
the lack of economic diversification and the conditions brought about by the political economy
of oil, the MENA is largely regarded as the most unequal region in the world by the World
Inequality Database. The MENA is plagued by income inequality, poverty, and unemployment.
The oil industry within the Middle East & North Africa does not require a robust and diverse
labor force, leaving millions of young-educated people unable to seek employment in diverse
economic sectors. A system of weak civic organizations and weak state building has caused
outrage within the young-educated population (i.e., Arab Spring protests). As soon as an
autocratic state reduces public spending on goods/services and increases taxes, people revolt.
This activity occurred in Burma (Myanmar), Cameroon, Kyrgyzstan, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Kuwait,
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and Qatar. Moreover, the weak democracy score index in the MENA has also made opportunities
for alternatives to authoritarian regimes more accessible and (or) possible. Resentment is real.
Ideational causes for Islamist radicalism as well as social, economic, political, and strategic are
rooted in the political economy of oil. Repression, lack of financial transparency, lack of
economic diversification, and the neocolonial origins of the oil industry have created the ‘perfect
storm’ for radical Islamist ideologies. Based on the research presented in the thesis, there are
three explanations for the rise of radical Islamism as an alternative to other radical ideologies
that thrived in other spaces:
• Islamist radicalism as ideology and political praxis serves as an effective recruiting tool.
For example, al-Qaeda and ISIS promised people dignity and humanity and recruited
people willing to sacrifice their lives for the effort.278
• In an environment of oppressive governments and the subjugation of Muslim populations

whether from domestic or foreign regimes, Islamist radicalism provided people with an
honest form of leadership. Islamist organizations promised people wealth and good
fortune, and many argued they follow through on those promises. In a political landscape
full of corruption, illegitimacy, and repression, this strategy of recruitment worked.279
• The Islamic State (ISIS), al-Qaeda, and other prominent Islamist organizations were
successful in differentiating themselves from other extremist groups. The Islamic State
claimed they were the most legitimate organization in the region and argued that other
Islamist organizations did not do enough to rid the Middle East & North Africa of
western influence. Radical groups engaged in this type of behavior. When Abu Bakr al-
Baghdadi declared a new caliphate in Mosul, it was quite easy for the Islamic State to
criticize other Islamist groups for not committing to the teachings of the Qur’an and
acting on ideas.280
278
279
280
Oil and transitions to democracy 1960-2006. From: Michael L. Ross, The Oil
Curse: How Petroleum Wealth Shapes the Development of Nations (Princeton: Princeton
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In the thesis, I present a large literature review on Islamist radicalism as ideology and
political praxis. Because the Huntingtonian framework is too corrupted by its orientalist
undertone and understanding of MENA culture and traditions, the Fanonian lens captures better
the true nature of Islamist radicalism. In the Fanonian reading of anticolonial violence, Islamist
radicalism is best understood as a subset of anticolonial ideologies. In radical Islamist ideologies,
violence is a collective response to colonialism—western colonialism and historical western
control/coercion of oil-wealthy oil regimes. Through an analysis of Islamist thinkers in this
thesis, many claim that the MENA was opened up to western influence because followers
abandoned the philosophies of Islam. Islamic struggles (Jihad) are inherently anticolonial
liberation struggles and a rejection of western modernity.
In al-Qaeda doctrine, bin Laden advanced the anticolonial narrative. In bin Laden’s
writing, he saw the United States as a nation that had “empty” values and only wanted to
prioritize the extraction of valuable resources (oil) from the oil and non-oil wealthy regimes in
the MENA, particularly Saudi Arabia. In bin Laden’s notion of the “awakening,” the Islamic
world was asleep and became vulnerable to western influence. American troop deployments
throughout the Gulf in the 1990s did not sit well with the al-Qaeda network. The attacks on
September 11, 2001, were designed to force the US military into backing out of the Middle East.
It did not work out like that. After 9/11, much of the western world has led the fight on terrorism
that has resulted in increased foreign military intervention and more political instability in the
MENA. After major attacks in Madrid, Islamabad, London, and New York, the rise of the
Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, and the recent rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan, people all over
the world understand that nations are vulnerable to Islamist radicalism—especially Islamist
radicalism that is rooted in decades of neocolonialism.
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In the Islamic State (ISIS) doctrine, an issue of failed states, historical colonialism, and
discrimination throughout the MENA has given rise to revolutionary and totalizing ideologies
such as Salafist-Jihadism. The Islamic State maintains a totalizing ideology that gives people the
ability to become the writers or shapers of history, rather than the neocolonial subjects of western
influence or the subject of authoritarian leadership. Although ISIS has drawn psychopaths and
people seeking an adventure, the Islamic State has solidified their membership in a demographic
of disaffected populations. The roots of Islamist radicalism are incredibly complex. In this thesis,
economic instability has led to regime vulnerability. Regime vulnerability and vacuums of power
create an environment that allows ideological alternatives to thrive. Going back to the
socioeconomics of the MENA, based on data from Statista, close to ⅔ of the MENA population
is under the age of 30. The median age in states like Yemen, Palestine, Iraq, and Syria are close
to 20. Furthermore, in the Arab countries’ population, young people are the fastest growing
segment of the population. Based on data from Youth Facts, 60% of the population in the MENA
is under 25, with a median age of 22 compared to the global average of 28.281 Looking at data
from the World Bank regarding Unemployment, youth total (% of total labor force ages 15-24)
(modeled ILO estimate) - Middle East & North Africa, from 2000 to 2020, unemployment (15-
24) has remained relatively high. In 2015, the unemployment rate was close to 27.5%. In 2019,
the unemployment rate dropped to 24% with a large increase back to 27% during the Covid-19
pandemic. Due to the effects of the modernization effect, government jobs have slowed due to
281
See www.shababinclusion.org/section/about/facts. Facts are drawn from the World Bank, UNDP, and recent
Middle East Youth Initiative (MEYI) publications, including the brochure on “Inclusion: Meeting the 100 Million
Youth Challenge” and six working papers on “Social Exclusion: Comparative Analysis of Europe and Middle East
Youth,” “Youth Exclusion in Egypt: In Search of Second Chances,” “Youth Exclusion in Iran: The State of
Education, Employment, and State Formation,” “Youth Exclusion in Syria: Social, Economic, and Institutional
Dimensions,” “Youth Exclusion in Morocco: Context, Consequences and Policies,” and “Economic Imperatives of
Marriage: Emerging Practices and Identities Among Youth in the Middle East”, the U.S. Census Bureau
(International Data Base).
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economic turmoil and policies have been implemented that hinder the expansion of a private
sector labor force. Based on the data above, the MENA is filled with a large (angry) group of
young-educated people that cannot seem to find employment. When the Islamic State emerged as
a rentier state between 2014-2019, much of the territorial conquest and terrorism within Iraq and
Syria was fueled by oil revenue from the Assad regime and Turkey. In addition, many members
of the Islamic State are members of disaffected populations from states that lack democracy and
strong civic organizations like labor unions that promote dignity, humanity, and fair
working/employment conditions. In this thesis, it can be found that democracy results in less
terrorism. The Islamic State utilized oil-wealth to promote terroristic behavior and inflict
violence as well as install fear into Shi’a groups. The oil paradox within the Islamic State can
represent a notion of profit-driven behavior.
In this thesis, I have also tried to bridge the gap between literature on Islamist radicalism
as well as literature surrounding oil rents. On the question of oil politics that encompass
rentierism, modernization, and repression, oil emerged as a source of colonial and neocolonial
incursions throughout the MENA. If oil is related to colonial and neocolonial behavior, then oil
has got to be responsible for the rise in Islamist radicalism. If we look at the United States,
Canada, and Norway (all oil-wealthy states), we do not see any evidence of radicalism. When
Canada, Alaska, Norway, and other states in the US maintained strict control over oil production
and distribution, many of the institutions of government were liberal-democratic in nature. The
oil industry in the MENA has matured in autocratic conditions. That is the major difference
between MENA and “western” oil production. When oil-wealthy and non-oil wealthy regimes in
the MENA look like tools of the west, people will revolt against the government and express
claims of illegitimacy--just like Osama bin Laden. We are no longer in a post-Islamist world.
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With the rise of the Islamic State in 2014, IS became one of the strongest Islamist militant groups
to date. If it happened before, it could happen again.
Additional Figures & Tables
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Source: World Inequality Database (https://wid.world); See (Moshrif, 2020).
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Petroleum Radicalism: How the politics and economics of oil are related to the emergence

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Submitted to the Department of Political Science

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Brief Cold War History……………………………………………………………………………5

Oil & Political Developments in Saudi Arabia……………………………………………………8

Oil & al-Qaeda…………………………………………………………………………………...12

The Oil Curse…………………………………………………………………………………….14

The Islamic State (ISIS)………………………………………………………………………….45

Origins of Islamist Radicalism…………………………………………………………………...49

ISIS & Oil………………………………………………………………………………………..52

Conclusions & Findings………………………………………………………………………….55

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organizations and non-inclusive conceptions of national identity. Foreign influence and

politics of Islamist radicalism.

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BRIEF COLD WAR HISTORY

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growing irrational and unethical colonial practices in Iraq.21

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Islamic organizations in the vacuum of power during its resurgence in 2014.33

OIL & POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SAUDI ARABIA

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Oil & al-Qaeda

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Islamist organizations is Fanonian in nature64⁠—anticolonial violence provided people with an

improve the economy of the US at the cost of the Saudi people.66

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In bin Laden’s second declaration, he used inflammatory language and rhetoric to

component of an imminent “Holy War” against the United States.69

The Oil Curse

public spending high. Subsidized goods/services like healthcare, education, infrastructure

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oil-wealthy regimes in the Middle East & North Africa.

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pensions by 60% percent.99

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are defined below:

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order to preserve their leadership. In September 2007, Burma (Myanmar) experienced

erupted in Cameroon in response to a government mandate that removed fuel subsidies.121 In

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autocratic regimes saw increases in government expenditure of military equipment. In 2008,

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nature of protest and popular dissatisfaction with autocratic regimes.132

In figure 3.3. Number of oil-producing democracies and autocracies, 1960-2008, Oil-

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