HALFORD MACKINDER AND THE

PIVOTAL HEARTLAND
Brian W. Blouet
A century ago, Halford Mackinder proposed that controlling the landmass of Euro-Asia could lead to
global dominance. He called this region the "Geographical Pivot of History" or the Heartland. This
area included the basins of rivers draining into the Arctic, the Aral Sea, and the Caspian Sea.
Mackinder believed that land power could outweigh sea power, shifting the balance of global
control. He saw history as a struggle between land power and sea power, with Europe initially
dominating through sea routes. However, he predicted that control would shift towards the land,
particularly the Heartland. After World War I, Mackinder expanded his ideas, including the Black Sea
and the Baltic Sea in the Heartland. He warned that whoever controlled Eastern Europe would
eventually control the Heartland, and consequently, the entire "World-Island," which meant global
dominance.

Within twenty years of Mackinder's Democratic Ideals and Reality, Germany, under Hitler's regime,
started expanding its territory aggressively in Eastern Europe. This began with the remilitarization of
the Rhineland in 1936, followed by the annexation of Austria in 1938 and the taking of German-
speaking areas from Czechoslovakia in the same year. In 1939, Germany invaded the rest of
Czechoslovakia and reached an agreement with the Soviet Union to divide Poland between them.
This marked the beginning of World War II.

One key figure influenced by Mackinder's ideas was General Karl Haushofer, who ran a geopolitics
institute in Munich and advocated for German expansion to include all German-speaking peoples
and control over central Europe. Haushofer believed Germany could become a world power by
cooperating with the Soviet Union and expanding overseas. He influenced Hitler but was not entirely
successful in persuading him to follow Mackinder's theories.

Hitler, instead of pursuing overseas colonies, aimed for "lebensraum" or living space in the east,
particularly in Ukraine, the Urals, and Siberia. This expansion aligned with Haushofer's ideas to some
extent. However, Hitler's ambitions led to conflict with the Soviet Union and other European powers.

The signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop non-aggression pact in 1939 divided Eastern Europe between
Germany and the Soviet Union, allowing Germany to attack Poland without interference.
Subsequently, Germany expanded further into Western Europe, occupying countries like Denmark,
Norway, Belgium, and the Netherlands. By the spring of 1940, much of Western and Central Europe
was under German control, while Japan expanded its influence in the Far East. This marked a
significant shift in global power dynamics, as Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union controlled a vast
portion of Eurasia.

By the end of June 1940, Germany had gained control over the western coast of Europe, stretching
from Norway's North Cape to the border of France with Franco's Fascist Spain. Previously, the Royal
Navy and the Royal Air Force could monitor ship movements from the Baltic and the Elbe rivers.
However, German forces now operated from bases across Norway's fjords to Lorient near Bordeaux,
allowing them to project sea power across the Atlantic towards the Caribbean, Gulf of Mexico, and
the east coast of the United States. Additionally, Germany had acquired resources and manufacturing
capabilities in western Europe, particularly from France, which supplied agricultural products, raw
materials, and goods.
From June 1940 to June 1941, the situation closely resembled what Mackinder had warned about in
1904. Through a "sort of alliance" with the Soviet Union, Germany had forcefully dominated much of
western and central Europe. Britain, reliant on sea power, found itself isolated, with the resources of
the Continent, including those supplied by the Soviet Union, used to build a submarine fleet aimed at
weakening Britain.

Despite the Battle of Britain where the Royal Air Force defended against German invasion, Britain's
outlook was grim by the end of 1940. The country depended on imports for food and materials,
which were vulnerable to attacks by German surface raiders and submarines.

At the end of 1940, British Prime Minister Churchill feared that Vichy France might align with Hitler's
New Order, potentially leaving Britain at the mercy of Germany. However, Hitler's focus shifted
towards the Soviet Union again, with the Barbarossa attack beginning in June 1941. Hess's flight to
Scotland in May 1941 failed to secure a deal with Britain, and Hitler became enraged with Haushofer,
whose influence weakened as Germany abandoned the non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union.

If Hitler had listened to his generals and focused on defeating the Soviet Union swiftly, the outcome
might have been different. However, Hitler's insistence on spreading his forces across multiple fronts,
including Leningrad, Moscow, Ukraine, Caucasus, and Volga, complicated logistics. The pivotal battle
shifted to Stalingrad in the winter of 1942-1943, where the longer lines of communication proved
challenging for the German forces. The German attack on the Soviet Union in 1941 changed the
global balance of power. Hitler hoped that by attacking the USSR, Japan would be free to expand in
the Pacific against the US, preventing America from aiding Britain.

However, by the end of 1941, Hitler's plans had gone awry. The war in the east didn't end quickly as
he anticipated. The Soviet Union didn't collapse, and a Soviet counter-attack in December 1941
halted the German advance near Moscow. Meanwhile, Japan attacked Southeast Asia and Pearl
Harbor, prompting Germany to declare war on the US. Despite initial gains, Germany couldn't match
America's vast resources in manpower, minerals, and industrial capacity. The Soviets also relocated
their industries eastward, denying Germany the resources it hoped to gain from the USSR. Some
advisors suggested negotiating with the Soviet Union, but Hitler rejected this.

If negotiations had occurred between Stalin and Hitler in October 1941, and a ceasefire in the east
had been reached, Germany could have maintained control over much of Europe. This would have
posed a significant threat to the Middle East and Persian Gulf. However, Hitler refused to consider
peace talks with the Soviet Union.

As it became clear that the USSR wouldn't collapse, some in Britain and the US argued against
handing control of Europe to the Soviets after defeating Nazi Germany. Churchill shared this view,
and although Roosevelt initially supported plans to dismantle Germany, other perspectives emerged
during the war.

In 1942, Isaiah Bowman, a prominent geographer and advisor to President Wilson, warned against
breaking up Germany, arguing that a Russian-controlled state extending from the Urals to the North
Sea would be no better than a German-controlled one. Nicholas Spykman, a political scientist at Yale,
echoed this sentiment in his book "America's Strategy in World Politics," emphasizing the strategic
importance of the Rimland, a concept derived from Mackinder's Heartland thesis. Spykman
advocated for regional defines alliances like NATO to contain Soviet expansion, foreshadowing the
policy of containment adopted by the US after World War II.
Mackinder's ideas gained traction in the US during this time, with publications like Newsweek and
Reader's Digest featuring articles on geopolitics and the Heartland. In 1943, Mackinder outlined his
vision for the post-war world in Foreign Affairs, suggesting that Germany should be contained by
powerful neighbours to prevent future conflicts. He predicted that the Soviet Union would emerge as
the greatest land power, holding a strategically strong defensive position in the Heartland.

After the war, Germany was divided into West and East Germany, with the western portion joining
NATO to counterbalance the Soviet Union. As the Soviet Union grew into a military superpower
during the Cold War, fear of the Heartland concept peaked in the Pentagon. The Cold War,
characterized by containment, lasted until the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the USSR.
Despite being dismissed during the Soviet era, Mackinder's ideas have resurfaced in Russia and
Uzbekistan, where they are widely studied and discussed today.

Origins of the Pivot paper

In the early 20th century, Britain experienced a period of strategic reflection following the Boer War.
Halford Mackinder, the renowned geographer, traced his geopolitical concerns back to his childhood
in Lincolnshire, where he witnessed the aftermath of the Franco-Prussian War, instilling in him a fear
of German power. Mackinder also recognized Anglo-Russian rivalry in Asia, but his attention shifted
to the Boer War, Russo-Japanese tensions, and German naval expansion under von Tirpitz.

During this time, Mackinder held various roles simultaneously, including director of the Oxford
School of Geography and lecturer at the London School of Economics. His views on Britain's global
role evolved, initially advocating for free trade but later expressing doubts about Britain's future
dominance and calling for imperial unity and military preparedness. By 1903, Mackinder's views
aligned with Joseph Chamberlain's call for tariff reform and imperial unity. Mackinder left the Liberal
Party to join the Conservatives, although not all Conservatives supported tariff reform.

In 1902, Mackinder participated in discussions with influential figures like Sidney and Beatrice Webb,
where the idea of a Co-Efficient dining club emerged. These discussions often focused on policy
issues, including Britain's relations with European powers. The turning point came with Mackinder's
presentation of the Pivot paper in 1904, where he argued that the age of sea power was ending, and
land power would dominate. He divided the world into three zones: the Geographical Pivot of
History (Eurasia's heartland), the inner or marginal crescent of Euro-Asia, and the outer crescent
encompassing the Americas, Britain, and Japan. Mackinder warned that if Germany allied with
Russia, it could lead to world domination.

Although no power has fully realized Mackinder's fears, both World Wars and the Cold War were
fought to prevent such a scenario. Germany's territorial gains in both world wars and the subsequent
Soviet control of Eastern Europe reinforced the significance of Mackinder's geopolitical theories. The
policy of containment, epitomized by Truman's declaration in 1947 and the creation of NATO in 1949,
aimed to prevent further communist expansion, reflecting Mackinder's concerns about power
dynamics in Eurasia.

Criticism of the Pivot paper

Following Mackinder's presentation of the Pivot paper, members of the audience engaged in
discussions, offering various insights and critiques. L.S. Amery, for instance, speculated about the
future of transportation, suggesting that air travel would become increasingly important, potentially
diminishing the significance of geographical distribution and favoring nations with strong industrial
bases.
D.G. Hogarth questioned Mackinder about the economic development of inner Eurasia, to which
Mackinder responded by emphasizing the potential industrial wealth of regions like Siberia and
European Russia, which could support a powerful fleet necessary for global dominance.

Critics have pointed out that the railways Mackinder envisioned were never fully realized, and the
harsh climate and geographical isolation of certain areas limited economic development. However,
investments made under Stalin's regime significantly developed regions like the Volga River valley,
the Ukraine, and Siberia, although many of these proved unsustainable after the collapse of the
Soviet Union.

Criticism of Mackinder's theories has persisted over the years, with some arguing that his geopolitical
perspectives were too territorially focused and not suited to the increasingly interconnected world of
globalization. Mackinder, however, believed that the rise of large, self-sufficient great powers
competing for resources and dominance posed a significant threat in the early 20th century.

Mackinder's views were also challenged for being Eurocentric and underestimating the importance
of North America. However, Mackinder's exposure to the economic vibrancy of cities like
Philadelphia and Chicago during his travels in the United States informed his understanding of
industrial power.

The Pivot paper remains a subject of interest and interpretation, with contributors offering diverse
perspectives on its relevance and implications. Some analyse it in the context of imperial defence
debates, diplomatic currents, and historical events like the Great Game in Central Asia. Others
explore its implications for the future, including its relevance in the space age. David Hooson, a
longtime student of Mackinder's ideas, provides closing remarks in the volume, drawing on his
extensive research and understanding of Mackinder's theories.