Center State Disputes

 They cannot borrow from outside the country.

 Article -293 - The executive power of a State extends to borrowing within the territory of India
upon the security of the Consolidated Fund of the State within such limits, if any, as may from
time to time be fixed by the Legislature of such State by law and to the giving of guarantees
within such limits, if any, as may be so fixed.
 In the domestic market also, there are limitations
o In case they have borrowed from the Union government, and the loan remains outstanding,
they cannot borrow from the market without the permission of the Union government.
o In case they have borrowed from the market. And in such cases the counter-guarantee is
given by the Union, they cannot get fresh loans without the approval of the union.

2) Grants in aids
● Statutory Grants
o Grants under Art 275, provided to needy states.
● Discretionary Grants.
 These are called discretionary because both Union and state governments can give these
grants for any public purpose even when it does not come within their legislative
competence. It comes under Art 282.
 There is also a dispute with respect to discretionary grants between union and states. The
use of Article 282 to implement centrally sponsored schemes remains a source of tension.
 It also created conflict between finance commission and planning commission.

GST and Fiscal Federalism

The constitutional scheme of the distribution of taxes is continuously evolving. The recent
amendment is 101 Amendment Act.
Changes introduced by 101 Amendment Act
1) Introduction of Art 246A.
● Concurrent powers of Union and state to levy GST. Power of Union to levy GST in case of
inter-state trade and commerce.
2) Introduced Art 279A.
● It introduces a new body, the GST Council.
3) GST Council
● Voting pattern – weighted voting. 1/3rd weightage to the vote of union, 2/3rd weightage
to the vote of states. To pass any decision, 3/4th of the votes are required.
● It makes GST a 3 legged race. States have to cooperate with states, Union and states have
to cooperate with each other.

GST and federalism

Whether GST strengthens federalism or weakens federalism will depend on our perception of
federalism. If we define federalism in terms of strengthening of states, GST weakens the states. If
we define federalism in terms of cooperative federalism, GST forces the units of federalism to
cooperate.

GST as anti –federal

 Federalism is a political contrivance where units desire unity without uniformity. Hence
introduction of one tax goes against the spirit of federalism. We can take the example of the
USA. Despite being the most advanced market economy, the USA has not gone for the
introduction of GST.
 Sales tax has been the most important source of revenue for the state governments. Now they
do not have complete freedom to determine the rate of the tax.
 Even in constituent assembly Ambedkar, who always favoured a strong center, had the view

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that state governments should be given complete autonomy in determining the rate of sales
tax. The Constitution should not prescribe any limit.
 There are concerns of manufacturing states because GST is a destination based tax.

Issues with the GST council

 Every decision of the GST Council must be made by a majority of not less than three-fourths of
the weighted votes of the members present, according to The Constitution (One Hundred and
First Amendment) Act, 2016.
 The central government's vote counts for one-third of the total votes cast, whereas the votes
of all state governments combined count for two-thirds of the total votes cast in that meeting.
 This gives a virtual veto to the central government on the decision making side- lining the
principle of consensus.

On the other hand, those who believe in the spirit of cooperative federalism, they believe that
 GST compels all the units to cooperate. They believe that GST will convert tangles of the
relations to tango.
 If states have monopoly over determining rates of sales tax, they also get power to levy service
tax.
 It is believed that in the long term, the revenues of the states will increase, will give them
more resources.
GST Compensation issue: -
 Centre refused from its legal duty to pay compensation to the states in case of shortfall in GST.
 For the first five years ending in 2022, states are promised compensation if revenue growth
falls below 14% (base year 2015-16).
 Cess which was supposed to check these shortfalls have also been retained by the central
government as highlighted by CAG.
 At the end of 2021 GST compensation is likely to be over Rs 3 lakh crore, with a cess collection
of around Rs 65,000 crore. As a result, a compensation shortage of Rs 2.35 lakh crore is
predicted.
 Budget 2022-23 allocated Rs 1.20 lakh crore as compensation cess. One lakh crore of this could
be used to pay the compensation dues to states and the remaining may be used to service the
back to back GST loans.
 The worrying trend is to fill these gaps the central government has allowed States to borrow,
but it comes with certain conditions like:-States need to improve in Ease of Doing Business and
specific standards for implementation of schemes which is an indication of Unitary
Government not a federal Government.

Positive Change in Fiscal Federalism recently

1. Replacement of planning commission by Niti Aayog.
2. Removal of Distinction between Plan and Non Plan expenditure.
3. Increase in devolution of taxes from 32% to 42% by 14th Finance commission and 41% by 15th
FC.
4. Allowing State entities to borrow directly from ODA Partners: - In April 2017, the Union Cabinet
gave nod to financially sound State government entities to borrow directly from the bilateral
Official Development Assistance (ODA) partners, like JICA, for implementation of vital
infrastructure projects.

Finance Commission and Fiscal Federalism

The Finance Commission (FC) is a constitutional authority that sets the mechanism and formula for
allocating tax revenues between the Centre and states, as well as among states, in accordance
with the Constitution and current needs.

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The President of India is mandated by Article 280 of the Constitution to appoint a Finance
Commission every five years or sooner.
15th Finance commission
In November 2017, the President of India appointed the 15th Finance Commission, which is
chaired by NK Singh. It will make suggestions for a five-year period, from 2021-22 to 2025-26.
Report of 15th Finance commission

Recommendations of 15th Finance commission

1) Vertical Devolution (Union Taxes Devolved to States): It has suggested that vertical devolution
be maintained at 41%, as it was in its interim report for 2020-21.
a. It is at the same level as the 14th Finance Commission's recommendation of 42 percent of the
divisible pool.
b. Due to the change in status of the erstwhile State of Jammu and Kashmir into the new Union
Territories of Ladakh and Jammu and Kashmir, it has made the required adjustment of around
1%.

2) Horizontal Devolution (Allocation Between States): It has proposed a 12.5 percent weighting for
demographic performance, 45 percent for income, 15 percent each for population and area, ten
percent for forest and ecological, and 2.5 percent for tax and fiscal initiatives for horizontal
devolution.

3) Revenue Deficit Grants to States: Revenue deficit grants are derived from the need to cover the
States' unmet budgetary needs on their revenue accounts, even after taking into account their
own tax and non-tax resources, as well as tax devolution to them.
a. The gap between revenue or current spending and revenue receipts, including tax and non-
tax, is known as the revenue deficit.
b. It has proposed Rs. 3 trillion in post-devolution income deficit grants during the five-year
period ending in FY26.
c. The number of states eligible for revenue deficit grants has decreased from 17 in FY22, the
first year of the award period, to 6 in FY26, the final year of the award period.

4) Performance-Based Incentives and State Grants: These grants are divided into four categories.
a. The first is in the social sector, where health and education have been prioritised.
b. Second is the rural economy -Rural economy, on the other hand, has centred on agriculture
and the upkeep of rural roads.
c. Third is the governance and administrative reforms. It has advocated funds for the courts,
statistics, and aspirational districts and blocks as part of governance and administrative
reforms.
d. Fourth, for the power sector, it has devised a performance-based incentive scheme.

E) INTER-STATE WATER DISPUTES

Significance of the issue
It has been predicted that future wars are going to be ‘water wars’. Water is now treated as new oil.
South Asia is heavily dependent on water because of the agrarian nature of the economy and one of
the most stressed in terms of water. Per capita availability of water is actually lowest in the world.
India has water disputes with almost all neighbours. Within the country the majority of major rivers
are intra-state. Water dispute is a special category of dispute for which the constitution has special
provision (Art 262). The only dispute which excludes the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
Water is a state subject under entry 17. In case of inter-state rivers, river valleys; union govt. has
vast powers in the public interest under Entry no. 56 of the Union List. Since water is a matter of
politics, the union has preferred to treat inter-state rivers and river valleys as a state subject.

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According to experts like Nirvikar Singh, the biggest responsibility for the continuation of disputes
lies with the union government. The Union government has not utilized its powers in the manner
given by the constitution. Approach of union govt. has led to politicization.

Constitutional Provisions
1. Entry 17 of State List deals with water i.e. water supply, irrigation, canal, drainage,
embankments, water storage and water power.
2. Entry 56 of Union List empowers the Union Government for the regulation and development of
inter-state rivers and river valleys to the extent declared by Parliament to be expedient in the
public interest.
3. According to Article 262, in case of disputes relating to waters:
▪ Parliament may by law provide for the adjudication of any dispute or complaint with respect
to the use, distribution or control of the waters of, or in, any inter-State river or river valley.
▪ Parliament may, by law, provide that neither the Supreme Court nor any other court shall
exercise jurisdiction in respect of any such dispute or complaint as mentioned above.

Mechanism for Inter-State River Water Disputes Resolution

Interstate council (Article -263) Zonal Councils Art 131 – Original jurisdiction
of Supreme Court

● If we talk from the ●
perspective of constituent
assembly, it would have
preferred the route of inter-
state council. (Art 263).
● Because of the ease with ●
which these councils can be
created – by president’s
resolution. Unfortunately,
the facility was never used.
Since water disputes cannot
be solved through legal
routes, this platform should
have been utilized.
One of the major purposes ●
was to offset the negative
consequences of state
reorganization, specifically
in case of water disputes.
The than home minister, G
V Pant (Govind Vallabh
Pant) mentioned that
‘rivers know no linguistic ●
boundaries.’.
Unfortunately, not a single
dispute ever referred.
The least preferred
option had been the
prime option till 1956.
Interstate Water Dispute
Act (ISWD Act) 1956
excludes water disputes
from the jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court.
However the Supreme
Court continues to play
the role of arbiter in such
disputes under Art 136
special leave petition.

The resolution of water dispute is governed by the Inter-State River Water Disputes Act, 1956.
 According to its provisions, if a State Government makes a request regarding any water dispute
and the Central Government is of opinion that the water dispute cannot be settled by
negotiations, then a Water Disputes Tribunal is constituted for the adjudication of the water
dispute.
The Act was amended in 2002, to include the major recommendations of the Sarkaria Commission.
 The amendments mandated a one year time frame to set up the water disputes tribunal and
also a 3 year time frame to give a decision.

River Water Tribunal Composition

The tribunal consists of the Chief Justice of India, a sitting judge from the Supreme Court, and two
other judges who are from either the SC or a High Court.

Inter-State River Water Disputes

Currently in India, water disputes resolution is governed by the Inter-State Water Disputes Act, 1956.
As per this law, the state governments can approach the centre for a tribunal for the resolution of a

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 Center State Disputes

water dispute. The decision of the tribunal is final.

Why interstate water disputes are looming:
 The most prominent problem faced by interstate water dispute is that it does not have any
effective authority for the implementation of the order of the tribunal. The Tribunal can only
give an award but cannot enforce its implementation. It also doesn’t have any powers of
punishment for ‘contempt’.
 The awards of these tribunals, although supposedly final and binding, have been challenged in
the courts. The judicial process is essentially a long process which further delay the dispute. e.g.,
Cauvery water dispute.
 Concerns of environmental impacts, rehabilitation measures have not been effectively assessed.
 There are always inordinate delays in the setting up of tribunals and deciding the award. The
right to have a dispute referred to a tribunal under ISWDA (Inter State Water Dispute Act)is
dependent on the opinion of the Central Government that the matter cannot be settled by
negotiation.
 Center has sometimes intervened directly as well, but in the most intractable cases, such as the
sharing of the Ravi-Beas water among Haryana, Jammu and Kashmir, Rajasthan, and Punjab,
central intervention, too, has been unsuccessful.
 Water is an emotional issue as large parts of the country are dominated by agriculture. This issue
has been frequently used for mobilization of people for political purposes.
 Scarcity of water in certain areas.
 Improper assessment of the river water often creates a situation of threat

Analysis of the role of the Supreme Court

 States approach the Supreme Court against the judgement of tribunals. Thus the entire exercise
of the tribunal becomes waste. It also includes huge wastage of public funds.
o The Supreme Court does activism at the cost of its routine work, there is a huge pendency of
appeals in the Supreme Court.
o Special leave petition is special, to be used rarely, but it has become so routine that it is
hardly special. More than 30,000 special leave petitions are pending in the Supreme Court.
 According to Pratap Bhanu Mehta, the Indian judiciary is ‘self-perpetuating institution’. It means,
it does not leave the opportunity to improve its image and increase its powers.
 It is the only category of dispute where the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is excluded.Hence
Supreme Court should act with restraint.

Comparison with USA

In the USA, these disputes come under the original jurisdiction but the Supreme Court of USA does
not entertain the appeals. Thus compel states to resolve the problem by consultation.
According to Fali S Nariman, it is better if we restore pre 1956 status. Means abolish tribunal system
and restore the original jurisdiction.

Provisions under Art 262

1. The Constitution provides that parliament, if it thinks so, can exclude the jurisdiction of courts.
2. Parliament may, by law, provide for the resolution of the dispute. Accordingly after state
reorganization in 1956, parliament has brought
a. Interstate Water Dispute Act 1956
b. River Boards Act 1956.

Analysis of River Board Act 1956

A proactive approach so that the dispute does not arise at all. It will develop the habit of
cooperation among co-riparian states. They will go for joint planning, development, execution,
monitoring. No River Board has been constituted so far.

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Current development
Centre is planning to bring legislation to fast-track Inter-State river water dispute resolution and also
to better manage work on 13 river basins across the country.
It will replace the River Board Act 1956.
Each authority will have a two-layer system comprising a governing council and executive board.
Chairpersons of governing council will be CM’s of river basin states who will share the post on
rotation.
Bill envisages that CM’s meet twice a year.

Analysis of provision of Interstate Water Dispute Act 1956

The act contains many loopholes, some were plugged by the amendment in 2002. Present
government has proposed an amendment bill to plug further loopholes. Even the proposed
amendment appears to be a half-hearted attempt.

Understanding the loopholes on the basis of the case study of Kaveri:

1) The act lists certain categories /types of disputes as water disputes, primarily related to the use
of water. Disputes related to the other matter e.g. Height of the dam (MullaPeriyar dam) can go
directly to the Supreme Court under Art 131.
2) Procedure
In case any dispute arises, the interested states can approach the central government. Central
government would first try to resolve the dispute by mediation, in case that does not work, it
will constitute the tribunal.

Problems with ISWDA, 1956

Protracted proceedings and extreme delays in dispute resolution
Reasons for delays:
 no time limit for adjudication by a Tribunal
 no upper age limit for the Chairman or the Members
 work getting stalled due to the occurrence of any vacancy, and
 no time limit for publishing the report of the Tribunal
 politicization of the issue compounds the problem e.g. recent eruption of Cauvery dispute as an
identity issue between Tamils and Kannadigas
 Opacity in institutional framework and guidelines
 Procedural complexities + India’s messy federal polity (Water – state list ; Regulation and
development of interstate rivers – union list) = muddled adjudication
 The tribunals have largely failed in ensuring compliance of verdicts, especially in the coalition era
.e.g. Punjab refused to accept the Ravi-Beas Tribunal’s verdict.
 An absence of authoritative water data makes adjudication difficult.

Amendment to the 1956 Act

Delays in the settlement and execution of the resolutions have been a problem with the tribunal
method of dispute resolution.
An amendment was enacted to the Inter-State Water Disputes Act in 2002 which brought about a
few changes such as:
a) The tribunal has to be constituted within one year of the request.
b) The tribunal should give the award within 3 years and in some exceptional cases, within 5 years.
c) If the award is not immediately implemented, the concerned parties can seek clarification within
three months.
d) The tribunal award will have the same force as an order or decree of the Supreme Court. The
award is final and above the SC’s jurisdiction.

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 Center State Disputes

 However, the states could still approach SC through Article 136 (Special Leave Petition)
 Private persons could approach the SC under violation of Article 21 (Right to Life).

Inter-State Water Disputes (Amendment) Bill, 2017

This bill proposes that a single permanent tribunal be set up for the purpose of such disputes. It
proposes a transparent data collection system at the national level for each river basin and a single
agency to maintain a data bank and information system. The government will also set up a Dispute
Resolution Committee comprising of experts from concerned fields. The committee will try to
resolve the dispute within one year. The tribunal will be approached only if the committee fails to
resolve the dispute.

The new system (2017 Bill) vs. the existing system (1956 Act)
● Will address problem 1 (of Delays)
● the Bill proposes defined timelines and qualifications for members, and
● obviates the need for notification of the award in official gazette by the centre
● However it will NOT address the problem – of Opacity – because of procedural complexities
● the DRC’s functions sound similar to the current techno-legal procedures of Tribunals
● India’s messy federal polity will continue to haunt satisfactory resolution as the Bill continues
with the extant constitutional arrangement on ‘Water’
● Will NOT address problem 3 – of Compliance – as today, inter-state water disputes are no longer
just about water allocation, public opinion matters too.
● The Bill lacks a transparent and robust institutional framework to secure public opinion and
ensure quick implementation
● About problem 4 – related to establishment of a data bank and information system
✔ Despite a similar provision in the extant law, tenuous centre-state relations have obscured
success.
✔ The challenge is not about gathering data and information but more about consensus over
the gathered data.
✔ moreover, the capacity to process this data to deliver ‘knowledge’ that could fasten
adjudication remains elusive

Working of permanent tribunal

Not very different from the existing system. Existing system – government refers matters to CJI, CJI
constituted 3 member tribunal.Tribunal consists of at least one judge of Supreme Court and two
other judges either of Supreme Court or High Court.
Now also there will be benches of the tribunal with similar composition. Once the work is over,
either bench will be dissolved or judges will be absorbed in other tribunals.
It is to be noted that tribunals in India, do not differ from courts. Punchhi Commission had
recommended the interdisciplinary tribunal, including the members from other fields. Such a
suggestion is not introduced. Present Bill however makes some reforms.
Earlier, there was no limit on the term of the members, now the bill proposes the limit.
Permanent tribunal will consist of
1) Chairperson (Creation of Benches),
2) Vice-chairperson (Will play the role in absence of chairperson),
3) Six other members. Now, no member can serve after the completion of 70 years of age. The
term of chairman is limited to 5 years or 70 years of age, whichever is earlier.

Award of the tribunal

Earlier there was no fixed time frame, so tribunals took extraordinary time. e.g. Kaveri tribunal gave
award after 17 years. It gave award in 2007, that too when Tamil Nadu approached Supreme Court.
In 2002 the act was amended which made it mandatory that tribunal will give award in 3 years and

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 Center State Disputes

in exceptional situations, two more years. This is also one of the reason, the Kaveri award came in
2007.

Proposed amendments
Now they will have to give an award in 2 years extendible to one more year in exceptional situations.
Total time in earlier process – ( 1 year + 5 years = 6 years)
Now- (1.5 years + 3 years = 4.5 years).
However the proposed Bill does not plug the loopholes completely. In 2002, the provision was made
that in case parties want clarification, they can appeal for it within 3 months. However, it does not
provide a time limit within which the tribunal will provide clarification.

Implementation of the award

This is the biggest challenge. Despite the Act providing that the award will be treated at par with the
decree or order of the Supreme Court and it is the responsibility of the Union government to
implement it, neither union government nor state governments implement the award. Even after
the award of the Kaveri tribunal, which had not been implemented, Tamil Nadu approached the
Supreme Court, Supreme Court directed the Manmohan Singh government to constitute the
authority. Authority was constituted under the leadership of the Prime Minister. Even then nothing
was implemented on ground.

What is the present status?

Intervention by SC. An example of judicial activism. Up till now, the Supreme Court restrained itself
from changing the award of the tribunal. It used to entertain special leave petitions with respect to
the irregularity in the functioning of the tribunal. However in February 2018, for the first time the
Supreme Court changed the award itself.
Highlights of the judgement:
1. It has decreased the share of Tamil Nadu. Increased the share of Karnataka to meet the drinking
water requirement of the global city Bangalore.
2. It has directed that the availability of groundwater will also be taken into account.
3. It declared inter-state rivers as national assets.
4. Priority to be given to the needs of drinking water.
5. It rejected the doctrine of historical rights.
6. It has directed the government to implement the decision within 6 weeks.
The Union government kept on delaying Karnataka elections. With the direction of the Supreme
Court, the Union government has brought the notification to constitute the Kaveri Management
Authority. It will be a two tier body. The first tier will be the management body. Second will be the
regulatory committee which will keep watch on ground level situations.
Above situation shows that even after the Supreme Court’s intervention, it is not necessary that
state governments will implement the award or the union government will show the political will.
The present Bill makes one more change – award becomes enforceable from the date it comes from
the tribunal.

Why this amendment?

● Earlier it was not clear as to which award becomes enforceable from which date?

What can be the possible solution?

 Article 263 of the Indian Constitution envisages establishing an Inter-State Council (ISC). The
council provides a forum for discussion on complex public policy and governance issues having a
bearing on centre-state relations or with an inter-state dimension. Because the council is a
constitutionally mandated body, and has now built a wealth of experience in dealing with

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 Center State Disputes

matters that are of common interest to states, it can play a useful role in facilitating dialogue
and discussion towards resolving conflicts.
 River Basin Organization (RBO) can be set up under the River Boards Act of 1956 (RBA),
legislated under article 56 of the Union list. These are empowered to regulate and develop
inter-state rivers and their basins. The board must comprise members with expertise in fields
such as irrigation, water and soil conservation and finance.
 There should be proper mediation that employs a neutral person or persons to facilitate
negotiations between the disputing parties so as to arrive at a mutually acceptable solution. This
process was successful when the World Bank became a mediator for handling water disputes
between India and Pakistan.
 It has been recommended by the Sarkaria Commission that the tribunal awards should be
equated with the status of the decree of the Supreme Court. Appeals to the court in large
numbers to the cases reflects the failure of the government in handling water related disputes.
 To develop the machinery for settlement of inter-state river Water disputes, Section 4 of the Act
must be amended, setting up a time frame for constituting the Tribunal by the Centre.
 There is a need to set up a permanent tribunal for such disputes instead of creating one at each
time. Then it has been suggested by the NCRWC(National Commission to Review the Working of
the Constitution) that the Inter-State Water Disputes Act, 1956 be repealed and in its place a
more comprehensive parliamentary legislation should be enacted.

Innovative solutions
 Declaration of water as a national resource. This will help in scientific assessment and
distribution of water among the states.
 Interlinking of rivers may also result in solutions to these disputes in the context of availability of
water.

Case study – Cauvery River Water Sharing Dispute

 The Cauvery River has been a source of conflict
between the states of Karnataka and Tamil Nadu
for over 124 years. The primary quarrel, in this
case, has always been about the sharing and
distribution of water of Cauvery River between
the two states. Over the years, repeated
attempts from both the states and central
governments have failed to resolve this dispute
which has now transformed into regional conflict
. The Cauvery Water Dispute has become a very
sensitive topic for common people of both the
states who now regard it as a fight for regional supremacy between the two states.
 The agreement between the state of Madras and State of Karnataka (Mysore) entered into 1924
was to expire in 1974. Hence the government of Tamil Nadu proactively approached the union
government in 1970 to constitute the tribunal. It took 20 years for union government to
constitute the tribunal in 1990, that too when they approached Supreme Court.
Since the tribunal was constituted with a lot of delay, Tamil Nadu demanded that the
tribunalgive interim award. Tribunal denied, Tamil Nadu approached Supreme Court after which
they gave interim award.
Karnataka held that it is not under obligation to implement an interim award. Tamil Nadu
approached the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court directed Karnataka to implement the
award.
Karnataka held that it is under no obligation till the award is not published in the Gazette. Tamil
Nadu approached the Supreme Court. Only then did the Uniongovernment publish the award in

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the Gazette. The Chief Minister of Karnataka called for Bandh. Chief minister of Tamil Nadu
Jayalalitha sat on fast. Local violence took place. Some farmers committed suicide. Hence the
proposed amendment ends the requirement for publication.
In 2007 the tribunal gave its final award. It was later challenged in the Supreme Court, which
gave its final verdict in 2018.

Sutlej-Yamuna Link (SYL) Canal Project

Opposing the Sutlej-Yamuna Link (SYL) canal project
and staking claim to Yamuna’s waters, Punjab CM
warned about the repercussions. Here is a look at the
decades-old issue and why it has come up again now.

What is the SYL canal issue?

● At the time of reorganization of Punjab in 1966,
the issue of sharing of river waters between both
the states emerged.
● Punjab refused to share waters of Ravi and Beas
with Haryana stating it was against the riparian
principle.
● Before the reorganization, in 1955, out of 15.85
Million Acre Foot(MAF) of Ravi and Beas, the
Centre had allocated 8 MAF to Rajasthan, 7.20
MAF to undivided Punjab, 0.65MAF to Jammu and Kashmir.
● Out of 7.20 MAF allocated, Punjab did not want to share any water with Haryana.
● In March 1976, when the Punjab Reorganization Act was implemented, the Centre notified fresh
allocations, providing 3.5 MAF to Haryana.

Inception of the canal project

● Later, in 1981, the water flowing down Beas and Ravi was revised and pegged at 17.17 MAF, out
of which 4.22 MAF was allocated to Punjab, 3.5 MAF to Haryana, and 8.6 MAF to Rajasthan.
● Finally, to provide this allocated share of water to southern parts of Haryana, a canal linking the
Sutlej with the Yamuna, cutting across the state, was planned.
● Finally, the construction of 214-km SYL was started in April 1982, 122 km of which was to run
through Punjab and the rest through Haryana.
● Haryana has completed its side of the canal, but work in Punjab has been hanging fire for over
three decades.

Why has the SYL canal come up again now?

● The issue is back on centre stage after the Supreme Court directed the CMs of Punjab and
Haryana to negotiate and settle the SYL canal issue.
● The apex court asked for a meeting at the highest political level to be mediated by the Centre so
that the states reach a consensus over the completion of the SYL canal.
● The meeting remained inconclusive with the Centre expressing the view that the construction of
the SYL canal should be completed. But Punjab CM refused categorically.

Punjab’s resentment with the project

● The dispute is based on the bloody history around the SYL canal. The trouble-torn days of
terrorism in Punjab started in the early 1980s when work on the SYL started.
● Punjab feels it utilized its precious groundwater resources to grow the crop for the entire
country and should not be forced to share its waters as it faces desertification.

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 Center State Disputes

● It is feared that once the construction of the canal restarts, the youth may start feeling that the
state has been discriminated against.
● The Punjab CM fears Pakistan and secessionist organisations could exploit this and foment
trouble in the state.

Water crisis in Punjab

● Punjab is facing a severe water crisis due to overexploitation of its underground aquifers for the
wheat/paddy monocycle.
● According to the Central Underground Water Authority’s report, its underground water is over-
exploited to meet the agriculture requirements in about 79 per cent area of the state.
● Out of 138 blocks, 109 are “over-exploited”, two are “critical” , five are “semi-critical” and only
22 blocks are in the “safe” category.
● Punjab expects a new tribunal
● The state wants a tribunal seeking a fresh time-bound assessment of the water availability.
● The state has been saying that till date there has been no adjudication or scientific assessment
of Punjab river waters.

Conclusion
As suggested by Scholar Like Srinivas Chokkakula - River governance consensus must be achieved at
two levels at the same time: federal consensus and electoral consensus. A viable solution must
recognise that India's federal dynamics, both between the Centre and the states and among the
states, require confidence-building. Consensus-building, which must be built on long-term political
discourse, must take place in an institutional setting that ensures that all states are fairly
represented.

REFERENCES
● B.L.FADIA-INDIAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS
● IGNOU NOTES
● OXFORD COMPANION TO POLITICS IN INDIA

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