University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria

Postgraduate College
Faculty of Art
Department of History

Course Title: Nigeria: Problems of Building a Nation

Course Code: HIS 712

Lecturer in Charge: Prof. S. Ademola Ajayi

Seminar Paper Topic: The Nigerian Civil War and the Nigerian State

Presented on: August 7, 2019

Presented by: ADEGBENLE, Semiu Adefemi

Semiu Adefemi Adegbenle studied History and International Studies at the Osun State
University, Osogbo, and is presently a graduate student at the Department of History, University
of Ibadan, Nigeria. He is interested in exploring the interplay between politics and development.
His other research interests include Social History and African Political Economy. He can be
reached via: adegbenles@gmail.com
Introduction

The Nigerian Civil War was a cataclysmic episode and a major landmark in the national
development of Africa’s most populous state. Also known as the Biafran War, the conflict
imploded the nascent Nigerian state following irreconcilable differences between the Federal
Military Government (FMG) of Nigeria headed by Lt. Col. Yakubu Gowon and the legitimately
aggrieved Eastern Region headed by Lt. Col. Emeka Ojukwu. Following the failure of all efforts
to forestall the outbreak of this fratricidal war, the Eastern Region seceded and declared
independence on May 30, 1967, prompting the FMG to respond in order to protect Nigeria’s
territorial integrity and to reclaim the sections of her territory occupied by the “rebel” forces of
Biafra. Fired by nationalist zeal, both sides expected the war to be over in weeks but this hostility
would last thirty agonizing months of indiscriminate loss of lives, wanton destruction of
properties and avoidable carnage on both sides.1

Having stressed this, it is important to state that countless works have been written on the
Nigerian Civil War,2 including but not limited to autobiographies/ biographies of actors on both
sides of the conflict; victims/ witness accounts of the war and disparate publications from
scholars and historians alike, this seminar paper intends to examine the civil war in relation to
the challenge of nation building in postcolonial Nigeria. Though the Nigerian Civil had ended on
the battlefront, its ember has continued to glow like a time-bomb waiting to explode. This paper
attempts to historicize this phenomenon and why it is pertinent to continue to teach a proper
history of the Nigerian Civil War in the spirit of national healing and nation building.

1
J. Isawa Elaigwu, Gowon: The Biography of a Soldier-Statesman (Ibadan: West Books, 1986), p.115; Billy J.
Dudley, "Nigeria's Civil War: The Tragedy of the Ibo People," The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of
International Affairs, 58:229, p.28
2
Numerous works exist on the Nigerian Civil War, some of which include: Emeka Odumegwu-Ojukwu, Because I
am involved (Ibadan: Spectrum Book, 1989); Obafemi Awolowo, Awo on the Nigerian Civil War (Lagos: John
West, 1981); J. J. Oluleye, Military Leadership in Leadership, 1966 – 1979 (Ibadan: University Press, 1985); J.
Isawa Elaigwu, Gowon: The Biography of a Soldier-Statesman (Ibadan: West Books, 1986Adewale Ademoyega,
Why we Struck (Ibadan: Evans Publishers, 1981); Alexander Modiebbo, The Nigerian Revolution and the Biafran
War (Enugu: Fourth Dimension, 1980); Lindsay Barret, Danjuma: The Making of a General (Enugu: FDP, 1979);
Olusegun Onasanjo, My Command (Ibadan: Heinemann, 1980); Frederick Forsyth, The Biafran Story: The Making
of an African Legend (Yorkshire: Pen & Sword Books, 1969); Siyan Oyeweso (ed.), Perspective on the Nigerian
Civil War (Lagos: OAP, 1992); Diliorah Chukwurah, Last Train to Biafra (Ibadan: Constellation Publishers, 2014);
Chinua Achebe, There was a Country: A Personal History of Biafra (London: Penguins, 2012), to mention but a
few.

1
To properly execute this task, accessible extant literature were consulted, prompting the need to
structure this paper into five sections, the first being this introduction; the second discusses the
inter-ethnic relations in pre-colonial and colonial Nigeria; the third section briefly examines the
politics of the First Republic as a prelude to the war; the fourth analyses the impact of the civil
war on nation-building; while the fifth and last section summarizes and terminate the paper with
a conclusion.

Before delving into the business of this paper proper, it is expedient to clarify the meaning of
civil war. What is a civil war and what makes a war “civil”? Mark Gersovitz and Norma Kriger
define a civil war as “a politically organized, large-scale, sustained, physically violent conflict
that occurs within a country principally among large/ numerically important groups of its
inhabitants or citizens over the monopoly of physical force within the country.”3 What this
definition infers is that a civil war is any violent insurrection orchestrated by a section (or
sections) within a state with the explicit intention of achieving a political end, which is, the
demise of the government at the centre or the creation of a new state that is radically different
from the status quo. After all, Carl von Clausewitz was unequivocal when he defined war as “the
continuation of politics by other means.”4 Civil war is therefore a continuation of intra-state
politics on a violence scale, especially one occasioned by unprecedented bloodshed. The United
States (1861-1865), Russia (1918-1921), Korea (1950-1953), China (1929-1950), to mention but
a few, are examples of advanced economies with civil war experience in their national history.
Hence, the Nigerian experience cannot be classified as epochal but rather as a gory episode of a
nascent state on the course to nationhood as would be proven by this paper.

Inter-Ethnic Relations in Pre-Colonial and Colonial Nigeria

Prior to the 1914 amalgamation of the Northern and Southern Protectorates of Nigeria, the
country had existed as disparate kingdoms and acephalous states with varying forms of
relationships. Internally, some of these kingdoms were an amalgam of disparate ethnic groups

3
Mark Gersovitz and Norma Kriger, "What is a Civil War? A Critical Review of Its Definition and (Econometric)
Consequences," The World Bank Research Observer, Volume 28, Issue 2, August 2013, pp.160-161
4
Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, edited and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (New Jersey: Princeton
University Press,1976) p.7

2
wedged together by an emperor, sultan, emir or Oba. For instance, the Ilorin Emirate was home
to Yoruba, Nupe and Fulani-speaking people. The same applies to the Sokoto Caliphate that
contained Hausa, Nupe, Fulani and many other Northern minority groups. Also, the Edo-
speaking Benin Empire extends to the coast of Lagos while Old Oyo, geographically would fall
largely in Northern Nigeria. Still, there exist other people that saw no need for a centralized state,
like the Tiv in North-Central and the Igbo people of Eastern Nigeria. Scholars have justifiably
argued that the pre-colonial Nigerian people maintained largely a peaceful and cordial
relationship5 before the coming of the European colonizers but this does not excuse the fact that
the century that occasioned the imposition Pax Britannica was dominated by ceaseless inter-
tribal and regional conflicts across Nigeria.

Invariably, the bulk of the centralized states maintained an army, which served defensive and
offensive purpose. With an army, it was not unexpected that most kingdoms take glory in war
and this explains why most rulers were military leaders.6 In Northern Nigeria for example, the
Sokoto Caliphate founded as a result of Uthman Dan Fodio Jihad has grown into an empire that
made daring raids into the pagan enclaves of the Jukun and Tiv peoples of North-Central.
Among the Igbo of South-eastern Nigeria, border skirmishes had cemented primordial sentiment
that occasionally led to war. Ayandele explains that this was the condition on the eve of Pax
Britannica.7 The Yoruba in the southwest were not different. From the fall of Old Oyo to 1893,
the entire Yoruba country was embroiled in a fratricidal war that still fuel primordial sentiments
till date. With these primordial sentiments, the Nigerian-state as conceived by the British in 1914
was bound to be contested by centrifugal forces that constantly question the essence of the new
state. To reduce the centrifugal tendency inherent in the new state, the colonial authority
invented sectional ethno-nationality that grouped the people along imaginary borders. Prior to

5
See: S. Ademola Ajayi, “From Amalgamation to the Quest for National Integration: Issues, Challenges and
Prospects,” Paper presented at the 40th Anniversary Lecture of the Department of History & Int’l Studies, University
of Ilorin, Nigeria on Thursday, 18, May, 2017. pp.15-19
6
C. B. N. Ogbogbo, “Leadership and the Development Crisis in Africa,” in C. B. N. Ogbogbo (ed.), Perspective in
African History (Ibadan: Bookwright Publisher, 2011), p.5; Osarhieme Benson Osadolor, “The Military in Africa,”
in C. B. N. Ogbogbo (ed.), Perspective in African History (Ibadan: Bookwright Publisher, 2011) p.13
7
E. A. Ayandele, The Educated Elite in Nigerian Society (Ibadan: University Press, ,1974), p.12

3
then, the people of Nigeria never identified themselves as Yoruba, Hausa, Igbo, Urhobo or
Itsekiri until the European and their collaborators consistently labelled them as such.8

Starting with the conquest and annexation of Lagos in 1861, Britain set the pace for the
subjugation and unification of the disparate peoples of Nigeria. In 1914, following instruction
from the colonial office, the geographically contiguous British Northern and Southern
Protectorates were amalgamated by Lord Frederick Lugard. Interestingly, this marriage of the
disparate people of Nigeria into a nation was contracted without the consent of the Nigerian
people. In acknowledgement of the frailty of this arranged marriage and in furtherance of its
divide et impera, Britain kept the two protectorate apart. This is more evidenced in the
continuous use of Hausa language as the lingua franca in the North while English became the
official language in the South.9 This arrangement ensured that the Northern parts of the country
was largely immune from the revolutionary impact of Christianity and western education that
was grooming a radical elite eager to become equal partners or successor in the European
civilizing mission. Frustrated at the slow pace of development in the country, the educated
southerners began to agitate for more political and economic investment in the country.

In response, the colonial authority slowly but gradually groomed the southerners for government,
beginning with the 1922 Clifford Constitution that introduced Elective Principles to the
emergence of national political parties with branches across major southern cities. Whereas
liberal democracy was being introduced in the South in piecemeal, the North was kept behind the
veil and governed by proclamations.10 In 1939, the country was split into three administrative
blocs of North, West and East. Ingeniously, the British had craftily partitioned the country in a
way that the North was geographically a behemoth and a bulwark to forestall the raging
decolonisation demands from the southern elites.11 In 1944, the administrative units were
consolidated into political regions, prompting a race by the various regional elites to consolidate
their control of their regional enclave.

8
Toyin Falola and Saheed Aderinto, Nigeria, Nationalism, and Writing History (New York: University of Rochester
Press, 2010) p.160
9
Falola and Aderinto, Writing History, p.161
10
Toyin Falola and Matthew M. Heaton, A History of Nigeria (Cambridge: University Press, 2008), p.116
11
Larry Diamond, Class, Ethnicity and Democracy in Nigeria: The Failure of the First Republic (London:
Macmillan, 1988), p.37

4
It is interesting to note that prior to the Richard Constitution of 1946, the amalgamated people of
Nigeria have been kept apart by the political machination of the British colonial authority.
Hence, the 1946 provision of a central legislation was not only novel but also revolutionary.
Though the expansion of the country democratic space elicited national enthusiasm among the
educated elites, their exclusion from the polity prompted vehement criticism that necessitated the
review of the constitution.12 At the forefront of this national protest was the National Council of
Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC) led by the indefatigable Herbert Macaulay and Nnamdi
Azikwe. This role projected Azikwe into further national limelight. This did not augur well for
the cross-cultural harmony in Lagos as the Yoruba elites worried that the Igbo – whom
considered Azikwe as a source of cultural pride – would eventually dominate the politics of the
emerging nation.13 This apprehensive feeling is best captured in Chinua Achebe’s conception of
power, that: “power does not only entice, intimidate and subdue; it may also incite resentment
and rebellion.”14

The political tension among the Lagos elite heightened primordial sentiment, prompting other
dominant ethnic-groups to fashion out their own political parties. The Action Group (AG),
formed by Obafemi Awolowo, and drawing its support base from the Yoruba-speaking of
Western Region was the first major response to perceived Igbo-domination of the NCNC. This
was followed by the formation of the Northern Peoples’ Congress in the Northern Region. With
the exception of the NCNC, the two other political parties saw themselves as the political voice
and champion of their peoples’ cause. This sectarian cleavage did not dawned on Azikwe until
he was bullied out of the Western Region House of Assembly and sent scampering to the Eastern
Region where he hailed from.15 With the removal of Azikwe from the Western Regional scene,
the ground was now set for the continuous dominance of the national politics by three major
political parties that can be described as vanguards of sectarian interests.

Expectedly, hostile political contest became the order of the day as each political leader attempts
to consolidate his hold of his regional enclave. One example that stands out is the 1953
independence motion made by AG backbencher, Anthony Enahoro, that the country should

12
Kalu Ezera, Constitutional Development in Nigeria (Cambridge: University Press, 1960), pp.76-77
13
Diamond, Class, Ethnicity and Democracy in Nigeria, p.47
14
Chinua Achebe, The Trouble with Nigeria (Ibadan: Heinemann Educational Books, 1984), p.31
15
M. J. Balogun, The Route to Power (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), p.152; Ezera, Constitutional
Development in Nigeria, pp.156-157

5
become independent in 1956. Caught unaware, the NPC stalwarts rejected this reckless and
selfish demand that did not put into consideration the relative backwardness of the Northern
Region. The Southern parties were unyielding and the NPC representatives were escorted out of
Lagos amidst jeers and insults. This affront on their representatives did not go down well with
the Northern leaderships. Ahmadu Bello, the NPC leader publicly confessed that the “mistake of
1914 has come to light.”16 The AG in its determination to take its decolonisation message to the
North decided to send some party delegates to enlighten the Northern masses. The NPC
considered this endeavour an invasion of its political turf and the AG delegates barely managed
to escape alive.17Innocent civilians however did not as many lost their lives in what is dubbed the
Kano Riot. The NPC capped this protest with an 8-Point Agenda that, if unmet will compel the
North to secede from the rest of the country.

In the ensuing conferences set-up by Oliver Lyttleton, the Colonial Secretary of State, a federal
constitution was finally agreed by the political elites. The status of Lagos nonetheless became a
bone of contest as both the NPC and the NCNC insisted that the Federal capital be excised out of
the Western Region.18 The AG leadership vehemently protest this decision and even threatened
to secede if the colonial authority approves the excision of Lagos, to which the colonial
government responded in stern words to caution such centrifugal tendency. Defeated, Awolowo
requested that a “secession clause” be included in the constitution peradventure any region
decided it wanted a divorce from the federation.19 This request was rejected by the two other
major political parties who were sided by the colonial authority. A clause was however inserted
to allow regional governments become self-governing insofar it is within the Nigerian
Federation. The Western and Eastern Regions activated this clause in 1957 before the North
followed suit in 1959, a year before independence.

At this junction, it is expedient to emphasize that the tensed relationship amidst the political
elites had spewed into other section of the society. Amidst the three dominant ethnic groups in
Nigeria, the Igbo-ethnic group is arguably at the receiving end of this hostile relationship due to
her geographical spread across the nation. Apart from being the major fulcrum of the major

16
Kunle Amuwo, “The Historical Roots of the Nigerian Civil War,” in Siyan Oyeweso (ed.), Perspective on the
Nigerian Civil War (Lagos: OAP, 1992), p.7
17
Obafemi Awolowo, Travails of Democracy and the Rule of Law (Ibadan: Evans Brothers, 1987), pp.3-5
18
Ezera, Constitutional Development in Nigeria, pp.182-186
19
Obafemi Awolowo, Awo on the Nigerian Civil War (Lagos: John West, 1981), pp.-64-65

6
opposition party in the Western Region, the Igbo also dominated the clerical, administrative and
technical jobs available in Northern Region.20 Though the Igbo were native to the North (Lower
Benue) and the West (Delta)21, their presence was inconveniently tolerated in the public sectors,
rather than accepted. This has been termed as the “Igbo Problem,” one of the national problems
that were not solved by the colonial authority in their hurried transfer of political power in 1960.

The First Republic as a Prelude to the Nigerian Civil War

On October 1, 1960, Britain grudgingly handed over political power to elected Nigerian elites
albeit retaining her control of the country’s military and economy. Up to1963, the Nigerian
Army was still regarded as the Queen’s Owned Regiment headed by a Briton, Gen. Christopher
Welby-Everard (left in 1965) due to the slow pace of the Nigerianization of the armed force.22
Nevertheless, the various political parties rejoiced at the opportunity of replacing their erstwhile
colonial mentor while investing as much zeal to consolidate and expand their territorial control to
the chagrin of rival political parties. The NPC, the dominant party in the ruling coalition had
taken advantage of the Nigerianization of the military to fill the armed force with Northerners in
a skewed recruitment process that awarded 50 percent of recruitment slot to the North.23

At independence, Nigeria continued to operate an incongruent political system dominated by

three regional-based political parties. By virtue of its sheer size and bequeathed mandate, the
NPC and its southern ally, the NCNC, dominated the polity at the centre. The AG played the
“embittered opposition”24 as required in any parliamentary government. The AG was right to be
aggrieved as it felt betrayed by the NCNC with whom it had intended to form the central
government. The NCNC on the other had decided that her interest was best served by being the
junior partner in a “North-East” coalition that conceded some of the juiciest ministries to the

20
Max Siollun, Oil, Politics and Violence: Nigeria's Military Coup Culture, 1966 - 1976 (New York: Algora
Publishing, 2009), p.16
21
Ezera, Constitutional Development in Nigeria, p.3
22
Oluleye, Military Leadership, p.25
23
Siyan Oyeweso, “Kaduna Nzeogwu, the Coup and Prelude to the Nigerian Civil War,” in Siyan Oyeweso (ed.),
Perspective on the Nigerian Civil War (Lagos: OAP, 1992), p.11
24
Margery Perham, "Reflections on the Nigerian Civil War," International Affairs, Vol. 46, No. 2(Apr., 1970),
p.232

7
Eastern Region. Obviously not satisfied at their control of the centre, the ruling coalition decided
to destroy the opposition.

An opportunity to achieve this presented itself in the Western Region crisis that emerged shortly
after independence. As noted earlier, the Western Region was dominated by the Action Group,
the official opposition party at the centre. Unlike Ahmadu Bello, the NPC leader who had chosen
to remain the premier of Northern Nigeria in lieu of becoming the Prime Minister, the AG leader,
Obafemi Awolowo had decided in 1959 to venture into the centre as the leader of the opposition.
In the absence of Awolowo, Samuel L. Akintola became the premier of the Western Region but
still loom largely under the overbearing shadow of Obafemi Awolowo. Sensing Akintola’s
ambition, the ruling coalition exploited the feud between the AG leaders to disrupt the Western
Region. During the ensuing crisis, the AG leaders were rounded up and charged with corruption
and treasonable felony.25 They were found guilty and sentenced to varying years in prison.
Having destroyed the opposition, the NCNC was able to fully penetrate into the West by forming
a regional ruling coalition with Akintola’s faction of AG. Interestingly, this was against a Privy
Council judgment that recognized the validity of Akintola’s earlier impeachment.

Having destroyed the main opposition leadership, the ruling coalition decided to split the
Western Region – the smallest of the three federal regions – into two. The mere fact that the
Mid-Western Region was created in 1963 after the incarceration of Awolowo and without
corresponding modification of the bigger regions smeared of vindictive politics. This destruction
of the AG leadership heightened minority fear.26 Prior to the incarceration of the AG leadership,
Awolowo, the Willink Commission and even the NCNC had agitated for the restructuring of the
three regions to cater for and allay minority fears. In the North, separatist agitation were
preponderant in the Middlebelt; in the East, the Calabar-Ogoja-Rivers axis craved for their own
state; while the Bendel axis and oil-producing areas of the Niger-Delta also agitated for their
own state.

25
Adewale Ademoyega, Why we Struck (Ibadan: Evans Publishers, 1981), pp.22-23
26
Falola and Heaton, A History of Nigeria, p.168

8
Worthy of note is the fact that some of these agitations sometimes manifest themselves in
separatist tendency and verbal secession from the Federation.27 Political agitations sometimes
often degenerate into open conflicts that necessitate the involvement of the police force or armed
force. For instance, the Tiv Riots in Benue Division, the declaration of Delta Peoples’ Republic
and Western Region Operation Wetie are examples of sectional agitation to re-negotiate the
political space of the Nigerian Federation.28 Still, none of these insurrections led to a civil war as
the conflicts were localized and instantly clamped by the Federal Government. A radical shift
however occurred following the breakdown of the relationship between the ruling coalitions of
the First Republic.

This trouble started in 1962 when the Census result accorded more population to the Southern
regions than the geographical larger Northern Region. If accepted, the census would have altered
the country political landscape by assigning more federal legislative seats to the southern
political parties at the detriment of the North. The NPC contested this affront on her dominant
status by rejecting the result to the chagrin of its southern ally, the NCNC. In the re-scheduled
1963 Census, the NPC reclaimed its leadership role in a rigged census. Displeased by its partner
reckless politics, the NCNC leadership went into an alliance with some minority parties and the
remnants of Awolowo’s AG with the hope of toppling the NPC at the centre. This alliance
birthed UPGA – the United Progressive Grand Alliance – for the 1964 federal election. In
response, the NPC formed NNA – the Nigerian National Alliance – with Akintola led AG
faction.

The 1964 election was marred by unprecedented electoral irregularity and political malfeasance.
Rigging and voters intimidation were deployed to bully the opposition out of power. The UPGA
leadership saw that there was no way it was going to win the election hence the decision to
boycott from partaking in the election. The NNA politicians were undeterred and proceeded to
conduct an election that was won by a landslide. Nigeria’s president, Nnmadi Azikwe refused to
recognize the NNA victory and decided to drag the military to intervened, only for him to be
countered by the Prime Minister, Tafawa Balewa. Politically defeated and constitutionally
handicapped, Nnmadi Azikwe voiced his scepticism about the country’s fate when he remarked:

27
Tekena N. Tamuno, "Separatist Agitations in Nigeria since 1914" The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 8,
No. 4 (Dec., 1970), p.564
28
Tamuno, “Separatist Agitations,” p.577

9
 ...It is better for us and for our admirers abroad that we should disintegrate in
peace and not in pieces. Should the politicians fail to heed this warning, then I
will venture the prediction that the experience of the democratic [sic] Republic of
the Congo will be child's play if it ever comes to our turn to play such a tragic
role.29
As usual, the Nigerian political class refused to heed this warning and one tends to agree with
Chinua Achebe when he rightly posited that “the trouble with Nigeria is simply and squarely a
failure of leadership.”30 Nevertheless, what the political elites were unwilling to do, military
officers, aptly described as "politicians dressed in uniform"31 decided to intervene to recalibrate
the direction of the nation’s ship. Important to stress is the fact that the military officers who
decided to intervene in the polity were not of the same ilk as the political elites who had polluted
the country with their ethnic bigotry, corruption, nepotism and partisan politics. Though the top
echelon of the military freely fraternize with the political class 32 and there were soldiers who had
joined the armed force for “fame,”33 the five major who violently interrupted the First Republic
on January 15, 1966 were rightly fired by nationalist fervour.34 Prior to their intervention, the
country had degenerated into chaos with political instability in virtually every corners of the
Federation. Rather than deploy astute statesmanship in the management of legitimate political
grievance, the ruling government constantly deployed the armed force to pacify turbulent
divisions while making plans to use a greater force to “wallop” the West.35

On the eve of January 15, 1966, the military boys struck the political elites in a coup that was
intended to sanitize the country politics from the shameful divisive politics of the First Republic.
One of the leaders of the coup, Major Kaduna Nzeogwu articulate the aspiration in his radio
address aired immediately after the coup had succeeded in the North. In his words:

The aim of the Revolutionary Council is to establish a strong united and

prosperous nation, free from corruption and internal strife...
Our enemies are the political profiteers, the swindlers, the men in high and low
places that seek bribes and demand 10 percent; those that seek to keep the country

29
Tamuno, “Separatist Agitations,” p.574
30
Achebe, Trouble with Nigeria, p.1
31
Siollun, Oil, Politics and Violence, p.30
32
Oluleye, Military Leadership, p.25
33
Emeka Odumegwu-Ojukwu, Because I am involved (Ibadan: Spectrum Book, 1989), p.63
34
Ademoyega, Why we Struck, p.36; Odumegwu-Ojukwu, Because I am involved, p. X; Oluleye, Military
Leadership, 26
35
Diamond, Class, Ethnicity and Democracy in Nigeria, pp.271-272

10
 divided permanently so that they can remain in office as ministers or VIPs at
least, the tribalists, the nepotists, those that make the country look big for nothing
before international circles, those that have corrupted our society and put the
Nigerian political calendar back by their words and deeds.
Like good soldiers, we are not promising anything miraculous or spectacular. But
what we do promise every law abiding citizen is freedom from fear and all forms
of oppression, freedom from general inefficiency and freedom to live and strive in
every field of human endeavour, both nationally and internationally. We promise
that you will no more be ashamed to say that you are a Nigerian.36
Rather than resolve the multifarious problems that afflict the state, the January 15 Coup had torn
the fragile seam that wedged the people together by activating primordial sentiments and ethnic
tension across the country. Aside from the fact that the coup was unsuccessful in the Eastern and
Western Region, it was also marred by reckless bloodshed of non-Igbo political elites and
military officers. Tafawa Balewa, Ahmadu Bello and wife, Samuel L. Akintola, Festus Okotie-
Eboh, Brig. Zakari Maimailari, Brig. Samuel Ademulegun and wife, Col. Ralph Sodehinde and
wife, Col. Kur Muhammed, Lt. Col. Abogo Largema and Lt. Col. James Pam are some of the
non-Igbo elites that fall casualty in the First Coup.37 Only one Igbo officer was lost to the coup
and this heightened suspicion that the coup was an Igbo plot to seize the country. T. Y. Danjuma,
a key player in the July 29 Counter-Coup and the civil war would attest to this impression when
he argued that the coup was perceived as a plot by a particular group in the country to
simultaneously control both the country’s politics and military.38

Whereas Major Adewale Ademoyega, a Yoruba-man and one of the leaders of the January 15
Coup would want to downplay the popular label of the coup as an ethnic-gang-up instead a
sincere patriotic effort to reposition the country and install Obafemi Awolowo as the Prime
Minister, his other comrade, Major Kaduna Nzeogwu was straightforward when he confessed
that:
We wanted to gun down all the big-wigs on our way. This was the only way. We
could not afford to let them live if this was to work. We got some but not all. Gen.

36
Vanguard Newspaper, “ Radio broadcast by Major Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu – announcing Nigeria’s first
military coup on Radio Nigeria, Kaduna on January 15, 1966.”, Accessed on: https://www.vanguardngr.com/
Retrieved date: August 2, 2019
37
Oluleye, Military Leadership, p.27; Akachi Odoemene, “The Nigeria-Biafra Civil War,” in C. B. N. Ogbogbo
(ed.), Perspective in African History (Ibadan: Bookwright Publisher, 2011) pp.93-94
38
Lindsay Barret, Danjuma: The Making of a General (Enugu:FDP, 1979), pp.45-47

11
 Ironsi was to have been shot. But we were not ruthless enough. As a result, he and
other compromisers were able to supplant us. 39
The failure of the January 15 coup saw the emergence of Gen. Aguiyi Ironsi, an ethnic Igbo as
the first Military head of state. Though he was the most senior military officer, Ironsi was ill-
prepared to govern Nigeria at this tumultuous period. In the North, his Igbo kinsmen did not help
matter as they go about ridiculing their Northern host for losing out in the “Major’s Revolution.”
Here, Chinua Achebe highlighted the Igbo-man hubris as his penchance for being a ”noisy
exhibitionist,” “over-weening pride and thoughtlessness.”40 Remnants of the “gun down” NPC
leaders capitalised on this hubris to stroke primordial sentiments against the Igbo.

As an accidental head of state, Gen. Ironsi made concerted effort to restore sanity to the country
but went about it in the most unwise way. For example, within four and a half months in office,
the new head of state had pronounced 33 decrees meant to consolidate power in the FMG. In
addition, out of the 21 promotions he sanctioned, 18 of these were for Igbo officers and the
remaining 3 for officers of Northern origin. This policy did not improve the popularity of the
head of state amidst Northern officers who crave the setting up of a court martial for the January
15 Coupists. Ironsi’s reluctance to grant this request and his pronunciation of the Unification
Decree (Decree 34) were the last trigger that forced the Northern officers to intervene under the
guise of averting a second suspected Igbo coup.41

On July 29, 1966, military officers of largely Northern origin mount a counter-coup that
drenched all the major military barracks in blood. Imprisoned officers involved in the January 15
coup were not spared as Northern soldiers visited the Agodi Prison, Ibadan to eliminate two of
them.42 While about to arrest the military head of state, T. Y. Danjuma, one of the key leading
figure in the bloody coup voiced out the Northern officers grievances when he challenged Ironsi
that:
You are under arrest. You organised the killings of our beloved brother officers in
January and you have done nothing to bring the so-called dissident elements to
justice because you were part and parcel of the whole.43

39
Oyeweso, “Kaduna Nzeogwu,” p.39
40
Achebe, Trouble with Nigeria, p.46
41
Barret, Danjuma: The Making of a General, pp.42-43, 46
42
Barret, Danjuma: The Making of a General, p.57
43
Barret, Danjuma: The Making of a General, p.55

12
Inherent in this T. Y. Danjuma’s accusation is the ethnic scape-goating that becloud most
national discourse in Nigeria. First and foremost, Ironsi was never a party to the January 15 coup
but rather was a fortunate survivor. Major Nzeogwu had specifically marked Ironsi for
elimination and it was the astute management of the GoC that he was able to rally other military
officers like Ojukwu to suppress the rebellion. Nonetheless, Ironsi and his host, Lt. Col. Fajuyi
was gunned down in Ibadan by mutinous elements in the Armed Force. Just like their Northern
officers, the Northern masses went on rampage and started the massacre of people perceived to
be southerners, specifically those of Eastern origin. In the ensuing chaos, the scream of
“ARABA,” a Hausa term that connotes secession echoes across the North.44 Wise counsel from
the United States and Britain however prevailed, prompting the Northerners to consolidate their
hold of political power in lieu of succession.

Lt. Col. Yakubu Gowon was nominated as the Northern officers’ candidate for the office of head
of state. His candidacy however met fierce opposition from Lt. Col. Emeka Odumegwu-Ojukwu,
the governor of Eastern Region.45 Ojukwu proposed the option of Brig. Babafemi Ogundipe,
Col. Adeyinka Adebayo, Lt. Col. Hilary Njoku and even himself as more befitting choice for the
vacant position of head of state. This position did not go down well with the Northern officers
whom obviously held the levers of power and were unwilling to relinquish it. While this
bickering was going on, the Igbo were being prosecuted in a coordinated pogrom across
Northern Region. These discriminate targeting of ethnic Igbo peaked within the months of
August and September, causing untoward hardship for Ojukwu kinsmen.

A call was made for the safe return of all people of Eastern origin to their region of birth. This
was followed by the repatriation of Northern soldiers posted to the East to their region of birth
and vice versa. For a people who had embraced the idea of Nigeria better than any other major
ethnic groups, the pogrom of 1966 was a bitter pill too hard to swallow for the Igbo.46 Spurred by
the suffering of the Igbo people, Ojukwu rightly demanded for the re-negotiation of the Nigerian
Federation. In place of the present contraption, Ojukwu suggested the confederal system as a
temporary measure to forestall an impending war. His stance was also shared by Kaduna

44
Ademoyega, Why we Struck, p.168
45
Balogun, Route to Power, p.175
46
Frederick Forsyth estimated that there was 1.3 Million ethnic Igbo in the North and about 500 thousands in the
West on the eve of the pogrom. See: Frederick Forsyth, The Biafran Story: The Making of an African Legend
(Yorkshire: Pen & Sword Books, 1969), p.15

13
Nzeogwu and Obafemi Awolowo as a better alternative to secession.47 Awolowo would go
further to threaten that a war between the North and East would be tantamount to an “unholy
crusade” that the West would take no part in. He pledged that, were the East frustrated to secede,
the West would follow suit.48

Out of their determination to arrest the tensed atmosphere, the Nigerian military and their
civilian associates decided to resolve their differences at Aburi, a suburb of Accra, the capital of
Ghana between January 4 and 5, 1967. After the amicable two day conference, the Eastern
Region government and the FMG came out with different interpretation of the Aburi Accord.
Accusations and counter-accusations of betrayal became the order of the day. Worthy of note is
the fact that the Ojukwu government had started to prepare for war a year earlier49 and was
therefore convinced that a war against the FMG was the way out. As a last measure of keeping
the recalcitrant Ojukwu in check, Gowon repudiated the Aburi Accord on May 27, 1967 through
the creation of 12 states, 3 of which were carved out of the Eastern Region.50 Ojukwu responded
three days when he pulled the old Eastern Region out of the Nigerian Federation by declaring the
Republic of Biafra on May 30, 1967.

The FMG responded with a “surgical police action” to arrest the rebel leader, Ojukwu. This
troop was defeated and rounded up by the Biafran soldiers. A month later (June 30, 1967),
Ojukwu decided to take the fight to the FMG by launching an "outright, open and total war"51 on
Nigeria. This was followed by the bombing of Ofante, Akpanya, Obale, Kaduna, Kano,Otukpo,
Makurdi and Ogurugu – villages in Northern Nigeria.52 The civil war officially commenced on
July 6, 1967 with the Biafran Armed Force on the offensive. By August 9, the Biafran Army had
“liberated” the Mid-West and installed a puppet government following the desertion of Lt. Col.
Ejoor. Lagos was subsequently bombed53 and from the Mid-West, the Biafran soldiers proceeded
to Ore in Western Region with the intention of toppling the Gowon government in Lagos.

47
Oyeweso, “Kaduna Nzeogwu,” p.49; Elaigwu, Gowon Biography, p.81
48
Awolowo, Nigerian Civil War, pp.21, 64-65; Elaigwu, Gowon Biography, p.116
49
Zach Levey, "Israel, Nigeria and the Biafra civil war, 1967–70," Journal of Genocide Research, Vol. 16:2-3,
p.267
50
Billy J. Dudley, "Nigeria's civil war: The Tragedy of the Ibo People," The Round Table: The Commonwealth
Journal of International Affairs, 58:229, p.29
51
Dudley, "Nigeria's civil war,” p.29
52
Elaigwu, Gowon Biography, p.115
53
Dudley, "Nigeria's civil war,” p.30

14
Though Awolowo had promised to secede if the Eastern Region goes through with secession, the
decision of the FMG not to withdraw troops of Northern origin to their region of birth rendered
him handicap. Also, his new role as the FMG deputy chairman and the invasion of the West by
the Biafran soldiers influenced Awolowo’s decision to cast his die for the FMG.54 Nonetheless,
the nascent Biafran state got modest support and later international recognition in their struggle
against the FMG. Tanzania, Zambia, Haiti, Gabon, France, Portugal, Israel, South Africa, Ivory
Coast, Vatican City are some of the states that rendered either covert or overt support to the
Biafran State.55 Outgunned and outmanned, the Biafran State lost the war after fighting back and
forth for 30 months. On January 12, 1967, Major Gen. Phillip Effiong, deputy leader of Biafra
announced a total and unconditional surrender of the Biafran Army. This was after Ojukwu had
left a day earlier to seek asylum in Ivory Coast. On January 15, the civil war came to a belated
end. 56

Since space may not permit a more detailed account of the war, a brief summary is given thus by
Lt. Col Yakubu Gowon. Following the declaration of secession, the war started with “Police
Action” which ended on August 11, 1967. This was followed by the FMG offensive in the
Midwest that resulted in the fall of Port Harcourt and Onitcha. Late 1968 to early 1969 saw a
stalemate before the FMG final assault around late 1969 to early 1970 that brought the war to a
decisive victory for the FMG.57

Impact of the Nigerian Civil War on Nation-Building

Nation-building as used in this paper is conceived as the creation or development of a nation,

especially one that has recently gained independence. This could also be the construction and
structuring of a national identity using the power of the state. It is incontrovertible that a civil
war is the exact opposite of these. A civil war tends to destroy the state through the deliberate
secession of a part or the toppling of the recognised government and its replacement with a new

54
Elaigwu, Gowon Biography, pp.97,116
55
Levey, "Israel, Nigeria and the Biafra civil war,” p.269
56
Ademoyega, Why we Struck, p.253
57
Elaigwu, Gowon Biography, p.115

15
state government radically different from the status quo. Civil wars therefore usually have
catastrophic impact on national development and nation-building.

Prior to the secession of Biafra, the gory experience of Igbo was amplified by Ojukwu’s
propaganda which fuelled public discontent against the FMG, thereby shifting loyalty away from
the centre government58 to the Eastern Regional Government. This is a gross breach of what
nation-building entails and till date, the Nigerian state has been unsuccessful in its efforts at
convincing the Igbo that they truly have a place in the Federation.

Though Biafran Civil War was the second revolution against the British contraption called
Nigeria59 and was born out of the need for self-preservation and self-determination, the Biafran
state was the first time a major ethnic group will be pulling out of the Nigerian union. This
“divorce” turned out to be more agonizing than the brutal maiming of innocent Easterners that
preceded the war. Without doubt, assessing the impact of the Nigerian Civil on the structural
aspect of nation-building is a controversial task that this writer may not be able to do justice to.

The civil war led to the wanton destruction of valuable lives on both sides. Sometimes termed as
genocide, the Biafran side suffered more casualties as a result the FMG indiscriminate use of
sophisticated weapons to prosecute the war. Conflicting figure put the death tolls at hundreds of
thousands or millions on the Biafran end. Whereas some of these individuals had lost their lives
on the battle field, the real battle was at the home front where thousands more lost their lives as a
result of starvations.60 Kwashiorkor, diarrhoea and war time court martial all combined to
deprive the country of highly skilled manpower willing or unwillingly trapped in the civil war.

Rarely discussed is the impact of the war on the bio-diversity of Eastern Region. In the quest for
survivals, Biafrans feasted on any animal in sight. Even dogs, rats and lizards were not spared.61
At the end of the war, survivors’ accounts attest to this low bio-diversity and the reduced
presence of domestic animals in Eastern Region. Also, the FMG and the Biafran troops in their
58
Wayne Norman, Negotiating Nationalism: Nation-Building, Federalism, and Secession in the Multinational State
(Oxford: University Press, 2006), p.7
59
The Delta Peoples’ Republic was the first. Led by Isaac Boro, Sam Owonaro, and Nottingham Dick, the Niger-
Deltan declared independence on February 23, 1966 and fought the Nigerian State in a 12-Day War that led to the
quashing of the Republic. See: Tamuno, “Separatist Agitations,” p.577
60
Odoemene, “Nigeria-Biafra Civil War,” p.97
61
The accounts of Diliorah Chukwurah and Chinua Achebe richly capture this experience. See: Diliorah Chukwurah
Last Train to Biafra (Ibadan: Constellation Publishers, 2014) and Chinua Achebe, There was a Country: A
Personal History of Biafra (London: Penguin Books, 2012)

16
bid to eliminate the other indiscriminately dropped bombs on forests, destroying a host of animal
colonies and rare herbs. Even after the war, some undetonated bombs continued to wreck havocs
in Biafran Forests in the post-war years.

Corollary to the destruction of lives is the destruction of properties. Awolowo estimated the
calculable loss at £300 million.62 Imagining the infrastructural development the country could
have gone through if these resources were channelled into more constructive national project
would make one conclude that the war was nothing but a national nightmare. National landmarks
like the Niger Bridge and the University City of Nsukka were destroyed. Sadly, a lot of human
and material resources were invested in the annihilation of the opponent, leaving a lot of ghost
towns in its wake. At the end of the war, arms proliferation and different strands of criminality
and social vices became the other of the day. Many resort to hemp-smoking and prostitution as
survival tactics. All these listed issues left the country with a major social problem in the post-
war years.

Important to note is the fact that the civil war left the country with a set of federal war veterans
who continued to imposed their will on the country through military coups. Muritala
Muhammad, Olusegun Obasanjo, Theophilus Danjuma, David Mark, Hassan Katsina,
Muhammadu Buhari, Ibrahim Babangida, Sani Abacha,63 to mention a few, are some of the civil
war veterans that fall into this category. Occasionally, a few have successfully transformed from
military dictators to elected government officials. This has prevented the influx of fresh ideas by
forestalling a radical transformation of the country’s political landscape.

On the positive side, the war saw to the reunification and liberation of some Nigerian people who
may not have subscribed to the Biafran dreams of Ojukwu.64 Aside from the Igbo, the Eastern
Region is home to the Efik, Anioma, Ibibio and other minority groups whom vehemently
resented the idea of living under an Igbo dominion. Also, rather than liberate Nigerians from the
Northern oligarchy, a victory for the Biafra state would have turned the country into Ojukwu’s

62
Awo, Civil War, pp. 135-137
63
See: Balogun, Route to Power, pp.44-45, 165, 181.
64
Some Minority groups had actually gone to Lt. Col. Gowon to express their fear and to distance themselves from
Ojukwu’s secessionist plan. See: Gowon Biography, p.97

17
personal empire in which he would easily partitioned amidst his loyalists.65 Ojukwu’s defeat
marked an end to this imperial ambition thereby providing an opportunity to re-fashion the
country into a more stable polity. Gowon post-war policies built around the 3Rs: Reconciliation,
Rehabilitation and Reconstruction was a bold initiative to actualise this objective. N120 Million
was allocated for this task in the first fiscal year after the war (1970-1971) and Gowon ensured
that there were no summary trials or executions of Biafran war veterans.66

Financially, the civil war victory led to the reinstatement of the country’s ownership and control
of rich oil fields in the Niger-Delta. Revenue from oil would go on to define Nigeria’s post-war
policies. Domestically, oil rents were used to embark on ambitious infrastructural projects and to
re-construct some of the state infrastructures destroyed during the fratricidal war.67 Many
scholars have disappointedly argued that the Nigerian Civil War was a war fought on the ground
for the control of something below the ground. Such simplistic explanation falls short of the
national fervour that inspired the violent events that culminated in the Nigerian Civil War.

Diplomatically, the war broadened the country’s international networks from the limited pro-
Western First Republic cleavage to a broader one that incorporated states with Socialist ideology.
The country also deemed it proper to improve relations with other neighbouring West Africa
states in order to forestall a repeat of the civil war experience where some of these countries
covertly supported the Biafran State. Likewise, the country intensified its campaign for the rapid
decolonisation of the continent and the end of the racist apartheid regime in South Africa.

To foster internal peace and encourage peace, the National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) was
also formed after the civil war. The NYSC deploy fresh Nigerian graduates out of their region of
birth/ education to other parts of the country in order to broaden their knowledge of the country.
This scheme has significantly strengthened the bond among the country’s educated elite and has
led to broader national integration. Sadly, the merit of the scheme is gradually waning with
years, and like the Nigerian state, the NYSC is in a continuous battle to legitimise its existence.

65
Ojukwu had gifted the “liberated” Midwest to his Igbo kinsman, Major Albert Okonkwo and had promised Lagos
and the Western Region to Victor Banjo and Adewale Ademoyega respective. See: Adewale Ademoyega, Why we
Struck (Ibadan: Evans Publishers, 1981)
66
Elaigwu, Gowon Biography, pp.144-145
67
Elaigwu, Gowon Biography, p.145

18
Conclusion

The Biafran Civil War is a significant milestone in the evolution of the Nigerian State.
Antedating the civil war is a history of tensed inter-ethnic relations that occasioned the onset of
partisan politics. This hostile relationship culminated in the secession of the Eastern Region and
the declaration of the Republic of Biafra. A thirty months fratricidal war ensued between the
Federal Military Government and the Biafran State between July 6, 1967 and January 15, 1970.
Though the war was protracted by the devious role of foreign collaborators like France, Israel,
Gabon and Ivory Coast, the sheer determination of the Igbo to renegotiate their place in the
Nigerian Federation more or less contributed to the tenacity with which the Easterners
prosecuted the conflict.

Though the civil war ended on the battlefield some 49 years ago, the underlining factors that
propelled the Igbo secession is yet to be ironed out. The country is still plagued by corruption,
nepotism, ethnic bigotry, religious riots, mutual suspicion and rivalry, to mention but a few. The
political elites have continued to gloss over these blights, resulting in the emergence from
sectarian and religious insurrection across the country at the turn of the century. One worrying
example is the renewed agitation for the recreation of the Biafran State that is being peddled by
the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) and the
Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB).

Whereas it is incontrovertible that all these secessionist tendencies have their origin in the frail
and faulty 1914 amalgamation, the country’s leadership would have averted these crises through
equitable justice and stringent adherence to the rule of law. Rather than resort to the reactionary
way of tackling the nation’s problem, Nigerian leadership would be better served using
consensus building and the teaching of history to enlighten or shape national discussion. By
teaching the civil war’s history, the nation stands to gain the benefit of hindsight in the
navigation of the country’s ship out of the trouble waters it has sank since 1914; and obviously to
avert a repeat of the politics that drove the country to a thirty months fratricidal war.

19
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