DR.

RAM MANOHAR LOHIYA

NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY, LUCKNOW

INDIAN FEDERALISM

“India’s Federal Structure @75”

Submitted to: Submitted by:

Dr. Shashank Shekhar Sanket Khandelwal
(Assistant Prof.) Enrolment No: 190101127
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I express my gratitude and deep regards to my teacher, Dr. Shashank Shekhar for giving me
such a challenging topic and also for his exemplary guidance, monitoring and constant
encouragement throughout the curse of this project.

I also take this opportunity to express a deep sense of gratitude to my seniors in the college
for their cordial support, valuable information and guidance, which helped me in completing
this task through various stages.
CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT.........................................................................................................2

INTRODUCTION......................................................................................................................4

A UNIQUE FEDERAL DESIGN..............................................................................................4

EVOLVING FEDERAL RELATIONS.....................................................................................5

FIRST PHASE...........................................................................................................................6

SECOND PHASE.......................................................................................................................6

THIRD PHASE..........................................................................................................................7

FOURTH PHASE.......................................................................................................................8

CONCLUSION..........................................................................................................................9
INTRODUCTION

India’s famed federal system has witnessed relentless transformations under ever-changing
political and socio-economic dynamics in a deeply diverse country. As the Indian republic
completes 75 years of its existence, it is imperative to delve into the nature and workings of
India’s federal system and assess its impact on India’s democratic politics and governance.

The Constitution of India establishes the structure of the Indian government, including the
relationship between the federal government and state governments. Part XI of the Indian
constitution specifies the distribution of legislative, administrative and executive powers
between the union government and the States of India. The legislative powers are
categorised under a Union List, a State List and a Concurrent List, representing,
respectively, the powers conferred upon the Union government, those conferred upon the
State governments and powers shared among them.

This federalism is symmetrical in that the devolved powers of the constituent units are
envisioned to be the same. Historically, the state of Jammu and Kashmir was accorded a
status different from other States owing to an explicitly temporary provision of the Indian
Constitution namely Article 370 (which was revoked by the Parliament in 2019). Union
territories are unitary type, directly governed by the Union government. Article 1 (1) of the
constitution stipulates two tier-governance with an additional local elected government.
Delhi and Puducherry were accorded legislatures under Article 239AA and 239A,
respectively.

A UNIQUE FEDERAL DESIGN

Originally, India had adopted a federal political system that had two tiers of government:
The national level and the state level. A crucial third1 tier (at the level of panchayats and
municipalities) was added post the enactment of the 73 rd and 74th Amendments in 1992. The
Constitution makers adopted a unique model of a federal structure for independent India
which is often called ‘centralised federalism’. This is because unlike classical federalism
like the United States (US) or Canada, the Constitution is mandatory for a structurally more

1
https://www.orfonline.org/research/the-paradox-of-centralised-federalism/
powerful Union government in many key areas. The decision of the founding fathers to
create a stronger Centre is attributed2 to their fear of growing secessionist tendencies in a
country which had suffered from the traumatic legacy of partition during independence.
The Union government enjoys superior powers vis-à-vis the states in crucial matters such as
the discretion to reconstruct the boundaries of the states. The Union list contains more
subjects than the State list and its law prevails over states even on the subjects3 in the
Concurrent list. Also, the Parliament can legislate on any state subject under extraordinary
circumstances, importantly, the Centre enjoys massive control over economic resources and
most controversially, the Centre has the power to appoint governors in the states and can
dissolve state governments by proclaiming the president’s rule if the Centre deems fit.
However, it would be erroneous to assume that India’s federal system is entirely tilted
toward the Centre. India’s political system has some major strong4 federal features like dual
polity and demarcated jurisdiction of powers between the Centre and the states provided in
a written Constitution. Also, the amending procedure of the federal provisions of the
Constitution is rigid which is possible only with the consent of the majority of the states.
Institutional safeguards such as an independent judiciary stand as an arbiter in any dispute
between the Centre and the states.

EVOLVING FEDERAL RELATIONS

The relationship between the Centre and the states has evolved with the changing times and
has been largely contingent upon the transformation of political discourse in different
periods. India’s federalism has, right from the outset, been shaped by the complex
interaction between the political actors at the Centre and the state level based on
overlapping determinants such as political partisanship as well as politics of identity and
resources. The dynamics of Indian federalism can be temporally categorised into
four phases5 from independence to the present time which is One-party Federalism (1952-

2
https://discovered.ed.ac.uk/discovery/fulldisplay?
docid=alma995108333502466&context=L&vid=44UOE_INST:44UOE_VU2&lang=en&search_scope=UoE&adapt
or=Local%20Search%20Engine&tab=Everything&query=sub,exact,Federal%20government%20--%20India
3
https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/20656089-indian-polity
4
https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/20656089-indian-polity
5
https://www.orfonline.org/research/the-paradox-of-centralised-federalism/
1967); Expressive Federalism (1967-1989); Multi-party Federalism (1989-2014); and the
return of the Dominant Party Federalism (2014 to present).
India’s federalism has, right from the outset, been shaped by the complex interaction
between the political actors at the Centre and the state level based on overlapping
determinants such as political partisanship as well as politics of identity and resources.

FIRST PHASE

In the first phase, as the party of freedom, the Congress party enjoyed absolute political
hegemony, both at the Centre as well as the states, which prompted political scientist Rajni
Kothari to call it the ‘Congress System’. 6 During this period, though national politics was
dominated by the first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, the regional leaders and chief
ministers of the Congress also had considerable political clout and support base in the
states. Major differences between the Centre and states were resolved in Congress party
forums preventing any major federal conflict, creating a consensual model7 of ‘inner-party
federalism’. Some major exceptions were the controversial decision of the Nehru
government to dismiss the Communist party-led state government in Kerala in 1959 which
is an early sign of the Centre’s assertion of power over states. However, in this period, the
popular regional demands that compelled the Centre to create8 linguistic states and the
strong opposition from the non-Hindi speaking states against the Union government’s
proposal to declare Hindi as the national language are manifestations of regional assertion
for cultural and political autonomy that challenged attempts of the centralised and
homogenous model of nation-building.

SECOND PHASE

In the second phase from 1967 onwards,9 the Congress party was still in power at the
Centre but lost power in many states where many regional party-led and anti-Congress
coalition governments were formed. This phase marked the emergence of an era of
“expressive” and more direct conflictual federal dynamics between the Congress-led Centre
6
https://www.jstor.org/stable/2642550
7
https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-indian-constitution-9780195649598?lang=en&cc=cz
8
https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt183q2cm
9
https://www.orfonline.org/research/the-paradox-of-centralised-federalism/
and the opposition parties-led state governments. Also, the Congress party became
extremely centralised and authoritarian under former Prime Minister Indira Gandhi after the
party split in 1969 and the party’s regional leaders and organisation structures considerably
lost their autonomy. Though Congress won the national elections riding on Mrs Gandhi’s
popularity during this period (except for the 1977 national election), its social base started
eroding due to organisational weakness at the lower level. As a result, the Centre used its
discretionary powers to dismiss Opposition-ruled state governments. Even when the Janata
government came to power at the Centre in 1977 after defeating Congress, it continued with
such coercive techniques to destabilise Opposition-ruled states. Strong regional leaders in
Jammu and Kashmir, Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, and West Bengal emerged
to resist the Centre’s assertion of power leading to conflictual federalism during this era.
The late 1970s and early 1980s witnessed an escalation of massive political crises in states
like Assam, Punjab, Kashmir, and Mizoram, partly due to the centralising tendencies of the
Centre. However, the Rajiv Gandhi government at the Centre, though practised a
centralised model of functioning, ceded some political space to adopt10 a reconciliatory
approach for finding solutions to the regional identarian demands and political conflicts in
Assam, Punjab, and Mizoram.

THIRD PHASE

During the third phase11 called the ‘multi-party federalism’ period, a ‘reconfiguration of
Indian politics’ took place creating conditions for the regionalisation of national politics.
First, as the Congress party’s dominance in national politics considerably declined and the
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) was yet to emerge as a sole national alternative, it created
political space for many powerful regional parties and leaders to play a national role in
coalition governments and impact the national polity. This period allowed many regional
leaders to share national power as no national party was able to garner an absolute
parliamentary majority. As the regional actors played a national political role at the Centre
by joining either of the national coalitions led by Congress (UPA) and BJP (NDA),
acrimonious Centre-state conflicts declined in this era and the Centre’s indiscriminate use
10
https://www.panmacmillan.com/authors/ramachandra-guha/india-after-gandhi/9781447281887
11
https://www.orfonline.org/research/the-paradox-of-centralised-federalism/
of Article 356 to topple state government became rare partly due to changing political
dynamics and to Supreme Court ruling12 (S.R. Bommai vs Union of India case judgement,
1994) against its arbitrary use by the Centre. Also, this period saw the liberalisation of the
Indian economy which gave considerable autonomy to the state governments and the chief
ministers to initiate business endeavours and bring in foreign investments to their respective
states, in turn, creating their own political imprimatur premised on growth and
development. The passing of the 73 rd and 74th Amendment Act in 1992 strengthened the
grassroot level, by bolstering the local self-government. In a true sense, the third phase
opened the doors for genuine federalism via Centre-state contestations and bargaining.

FOURTH PHASE

In the current phase, since 2014, the ‘dominant party’ federalism has returned13 with the
rise of the BJP party. Ending three decades of coalition governments, BJP garnered a
comfortable parliamentary majority in the 2014 and 2019 Lok Sabha elections. At the same
time, the party has captured power in several states establishing the
party’s hegemony14 almost similar to the ‘Congress System’.
Though BJP remains an extremely powerful force at the national level, with the
considerable political weakening of the Congress, it is mostly the regional parties that
have challenged BJP’s inroads in the state elections to some extent. This period witnessed
some major federal discords between the Centre and the Opposition-ruled states as the
latter accused the national ruling party of engineering defections and using the Governor’s
office and central investigative agencies to intimidate opposition leaders and destabilise the
state governments. Regarding questions of governance, there was initial federal consensus
on decisions like passing of GST law, formation of NITI Aayog and GST Council, and
acceptance of the Finance Commission’s proposal to increase states’ share of funds. But
eventually, the non-BJP ruled states remained at loggerheads with the Centre on several
policy issues such as CAA, farm laws, the jurisdiction of BSF in states, GST compensation
and assistance during the peak of the COVID-19 pandemic. Interestingly, the Centre has

12
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/60799/
13
https://www.orfonline.org/research/the-paradox-of-centralised-federalism/
14
https://www.epw.in/journal/2018/33/indias-democracy-today/towards-hegemony.html
also been able to co-opt some Opposition-ruled states on contentious issues such as the
abrogation of Article 370 in Kashmir and CAA built on nationalistic
plank, termed ‘national federalism’. However, during the later stages of the unprecedented
COVID-19 crisis, the Centre recognised the importance of decentralised and localised
governance in such a health emergency and gave the states autonomy to deal with the crisis
with the Centre playing the crucial coordinating role. In short, while the second dominant
party system has arrived with the hegemonic rise of the BJP, the states led by several
regional leaders are resisting the rising trends of centralised federalism.

CONCLUSION

Though India’s federal system has an inherent central bias, the diverse and localised
demands and aspirations of identity, autonomy, and development from different regions
have compelled the polity to be accommodative in many ways. In all four phases, the
attempts of centralisation and homogenisation have been resisted by regional actors
safeguarding the original federal design. The addition of third-tier local-self-government
has also effectively emerged as the strong pillar of Indian federalism by decentralising
power at the lowest level of governance. However, two major challenges inhibit greater
federal cooperation. First, federal relations in India remains heavily marred by concerns of
political partisanship as mutual distrust and electoral competition amongst rival parties at
the Centre and the states obfuscates chances of political dialogue and consensus-making.
Second, due to such festering political divide and suspicion, the inter-governmental
institutions like Inter-State Council, GST Council, NITI Aayog, and Zonal Council remain
largely under-utilised for resolving Centre-state and inter-state differences over vital issues
of governance. Further, the COVID-19 pandemic as recently acknowledged by Prime
Minister Modi has once again reinforced the undeniable need for a robust federal
architecture to deliver effective governance and development in a country as diverse as
India.