In common parlance, leverage is a synonym for power.
Power, however, is a broad and
amorphous concept. Robert Dahl, a leading theorist on political power, defines power in these terms: "A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something B would not otherwise do." Power in negotiation may similarly be understood as the ability to affect favorably someone else's decisions. Negotiating power can take many different forms, including status, knowledge and information, organizational control, personal charisma, and superior alternatives.' Leverage is best understood as a subset of power and, like other sources of power, may be used legitimately or illegitimately. Here, I use the term leverage to refer to a specific type of power: power rooted in consequences. That is, a party has leverage when it has the ability to influence another party through the threat of or the imposition of consequences on that party. Leverage is distinct from other sources of power, which derive their force from either psychological processes or social norms such as moral principle, charisma, or rank. Leverage encompasses all forms of power based on a party's ability to confer material benefits or impose material costs on a counterparty. Moving on, the terminology of Peter Westen, "coercion" is a vice word - a word that conveys a derogatory normative judgment. It is contrasted with "freedom", a virtue word conveying a positive normative judgment. Our state constitutions exist in large measure to limit governmental coercion and promote individual freedom of action. A variety of criminal and civil laws proscribe coercion or excuse actions coerced by others in the private sphere. Chief among them are laws prohibiting extortion, the defense of duress to criminal or civil liability, and contract doctrines offering relief from agreements on grounds of duress and unconscionability. If coercion is a social evil, it is a subtle one. Coercion involves a paradox: coercion is an evil because it robs a person of her freedom of action, yet coercion exists only when the coerced person acts under her own volition. For example, I coerce a person if I threaten to break her arm unless she gives me her money; I do not coerce her if I forcibly remove her wallet from her possession. The difference between the two is that in the first case, the success of my venture depends on her taking a volitional action to give me her money. Even if volitional, however, her action arguably is not voluntary. In the lexicon of The Godfather, I made her an offer she could not refuse.