KAIRA MARIE CARLOS
Ang Tibay v. CIR, 69 Phil 635 (1940)
FACTS:
Toribio Teodoro, owner of Ang Tibay, a leather
company which supplies the Philippine Army,
averred that a number of his employees were
temporarily laid off due to alleged shortage of
leather soles.
On the other hand, the National Labor Union, Inc
prayed for the vacation of the judgement rendered
by the majority of this Court and the remanding of
the case to the Court of Industrial Relations for a
new trial, contended that:
The reason for employees lay off is entirely false
and unsupported by the records of the BOC and
the Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather.
The supposed lack of leather materials was but a
sched to systematically prevent the forfeiture of
the bond with the Philippine Army, despite the
breach of contract
The National Worker’s Brotherhood registered
employee’s union dominated by Teodoro is illegal
for its existence and functions.
Teodoro was guilty of unfair labor practice for
discriminating against the NLU Inc. and unjustly
favoring the National Worker’s Brotherhood
Ang Tibay, has filed an opposition both to the
motion for reconsideration of the respondent
National Labor Union, Inc.
The case then reached the CIR and eventually
elevated to the SC, but a motion for new trial by
the NLU contending there were inaccessible
documents which could not be offered in the
CIR. That these documents, which NLU have now
attached as exhibits are of such far-reaching
importance and effect that their admission would
necessarily mean the modification and reversal of
the judgment rendered therein.
ISSUE: Whether or not the National Labor Union
Inc, was deprived of due process
RULING:
1|Poli – Atty. Butch Jamo n
YES. The SC concluded that the Court of Industrial
Relations is a special court whose functions are
specifically stated in the law of its creation
(Commonwealth Act No. 103). Unlike a court of
justice which is essentially passive, acting only
when its jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only
cases that are presented to it by the parties litigant,
the function of the Court of Industrial Relations, as
will appear from perusal of its organic law, is more
active, affirmative and dynamic. It not only
exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions in the
determination of disputes between employers and
employees but its functions in the determination
of disputes between employers and employees but
its functions are far more comprehensive and
expensive. It has jurisdiction over the entire
Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and
settle any question, matter controversy or dispute
arising between, and/or affecting employers and
employees or laborers, and regulate the relations
between them, subject to, and in accordance with,
the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 103
(section 1).
The SC had occasion to point out that the Court of
Industrial Relations is not narrowly constrained by
technical rules of procedure, and the Act requires
it to "act according to justice and equity and
substantial merits of the case, without regard to
technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound
by any technicalities or legal forms and shall not
be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence
but may inform its mind in such manner as it may
deem just and equitable." (Section 20,
Commonwealth Act No. 103.)
Further the SC enumerated the requisites of
administrative due process embodied as primary
rights:
1. The right to a hearing, which includes the
right of the party interested or affected to present
his own case and submit evidence in support
thereof.
Ateneo vs CA
Fact: In a letter-complaint dated December 13,
1967 addressed to Rev. William Welsh S.J., Dean of
Men, Dean of Resident Students, and Chairman of
the Board of Discipline, College of Arts and
KAIRA MARIE CARLOS
Sciences, Ateneo de Manila, Carmelita Mateo, a
waitress in the cafeteria of Cervini Hall inside the
university campus charged Juan Ramon Guanzon,
son of private respondents Romeo Guanzon and
Teresita Regalado, and a boarder and first year
student of the university with unbecoming
conduct committed on December 12, 1967 at about
5:15 in the evening at the Cervini Hall’s cafeteria.
that Mr. Guanzon struck the complainant in the
left temple. The university conducted an
investigation of the slapping incident. On the basis
of the investigation results, Juan Ramon was
dismissed from the university. The dismissal of
Juan Ramon triggered off the filing of a complaint
for damages by his parents against the university
in the Court stating that Juan Ramon was expelled
from school without giving him a fair trial in
violation of his right to due process and that they
are prominent and well known residents of
Bacolod City, with the unceremonious expulsion
of their son causing them actual, moral, and
exemplary damages as well as attorney’s fees.
After due trial, the lower court found for the
Guanzons and ordered the university to pay them
P92.00 as actual damages; P50,000.00 as moral
damages; P5,000.00 as attorney’s fees and to pay
the costs of the suit. Upon appeal to the Court of
Appeals by the university, the trial court’s decision
was initially reversed and set aside. The complaint
was dismissed. However, upon motion for
reconsideration filed by the Guanzons, the
appellate court reversed its decision and set it
aside through a special division of five. In the
resolution issued by the appellate court, the lower
court’s decision was reinstated. The motion for
reconsideration had to be referred to a special
division of five in view of the failure to reach
unanimity on the resolution of the motion, the vote
of the regular division having become 2 to 1.
Issue: Whether the petitioner deprived the
respondent due process in the administrative
proceeding? adrianantazo.wordpress.com
Held: No, the respondent was accorded
administrative due process in his dismissal cases
according to the minimum standards laid down by
the Court to meet the demands of procedural due
process are:
2|Poli – Atty. Butch Jamo n
(1) the students must be informed in writing of the
nature and cause of any accusation against them;
(2) they shall have the right to answer the charges
against them, with the assistance of counsel, if
desired:
(3) they shall be informed of the evidence against
them;
(4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in
their own behalf and
(5) the evidence must be duly considered by the
investigating committee or official designated by
the school authorities to hear and decide the case.
When the letter-complaint was read to respondent,
he admitted the altercation with the waitress and
his slapping her on the face. petitioner did not stop
with the admission. The Board of Discipline was
made up of distinguished members of the faculty
and there is nothing in the records to cast any
doubt on their competence and impartiality
insofar as this disciplinary investigation is
concerned. respondent himself appeared before
the Board of Discipline. He admitted incident, then
begged to be excused so he could catch the boat for
Bacolod City. Juan Ramon, therefore, was given
notice of the proceedings; he actually appeared to
present his side; the investigating board acted
fairly and objectively; and all requisites of
administrative due process were met.
NON V. JUDGE DAMES GR 89317, 20 May
1990
FACTS:
Petitioners (Ariel Non, Rex Magana, Alvin Agura,
Normandy Occiano, Jorge Dayaon, Lourdes
Banares, Bartolome Ibasco, Emmanuel Barba,
Sonny Moreno. Giovani Palma, Joselito Villalon,
Luis Santos and Daniel Torres), students in Mabini
Colleges, Inc. in Daet, Camarines Norte, were not
allowed to re-enroll by the school for the academic
year 1988-1989 for leading or participating in
student mass actions against the school in the
preceding semester. They thus filed a petition in
the Regional Trial Court of Daet (Branch 38)
seeking their re-admission or re-enrollment to the
KAIRA MARIE CARLOS
school, but the trial court dismissed the petition in
an order dated 8 August 1988.
A motion for reconsideration was filed, but this
was denied by the trial court on 24 February 1989;
stating that they waived-their privilege to be
admitted for re-enrollment with respondent
college when they adopted, signed, and used its
enrollment form for the first semester of school
year 1988-89.
In addition, for the same semester, they duly
signed pledges "to abide and comply with all the
rules and regulations laid down by competent
authorities in the College Department or School in
which I am enrolled."
Hence, the affected students filed the petition for
certiorari with prayer for preliminary mandatory
injunction before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
WON there was a violation of the students’ right
to freedom of speech and assembly.
HELD:
YES. The contract between the school and the
student is not an ordinary contract. It is imbued
with public interest, considering the high priority
given by the Constitution to education and the
grant to the State of supervisory and regulatory
powers over all educational institutions. The
authority for schools to refuse enrollment to a
student on the ground that his contract, which has
a term of one semester, has already expired, cannot
be justified. Still, institutions' discretion on the
admission and enrollment of students as a major
component of the academic freedom guaranteed
to institutions of higher learning.
The right of an institution of higher learning to set
academic standards, however, cannot be utilized
to discriminate against students who exercise their
constitutional rights to speech and assembly, for
otherwise there will be a violation of their right to
equal protection.
Thus, an institution of learning has a contractual
obligation to afford its students a fair opportunity
to complete the course they seek to pursue.
3|Poli – Atty. Butch Jamo n
However, when a student commits a serious
breach of discipline or fails to maintain the
required academic standard, he forfeits his
contractual right; and the court should not review
the discretion of university authorities. Excluding
students because of failing grades when the cause
for the action taken against them undeniably
related to possible breaches of discipline not only
is a denial of due process but also constitutes a
violation of the basic tenets of fair play.
Further, the failures in one or two subjects by some
cannot be considered marked academic deficiency.
Neither can the academic deficiency be gauged
from the academic standards of the school due to
an insufficiency of information. Herein, the
students could have been subjected to disciplinary
proceedings in connection with the mass actions,
but the penalty that could have been imposed
must be commensurate to the offense committed
and it must be imposed only after the
requirements of procedural due process have been
complied with (Paragraph 145, Manual of
Regulations for Private Schools).
But this matter of disciplinary proceedings and the
imposition of administrative sanctions have
become moot and academic. Petitioners, who have
been refused readmission or re-enrollment and
who have been effectively excluded from
respondent school for four (4) semesters, have
already been more than sufficiently penalized for
any breach of discipline they might have
committed when they led and participated in the
mass actions that, according to respondents,
resulted in the disruption of classes. To still subject
them to disciplinary proceedings would serve no
useful purpose and would only further aggravate
the strained relations between petitioners and the
officials of respondent school which necessarily
resulted from the heated legal battle here, in the
Court of Appeals and before the trial court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
orders of respondent judge dated August 8, 1988
and February 24, 1989 are hereby ANNULLED.
Respondent Mabini College is ORDERED to
readmit and to allow the re- enrollment of
petitioners, if they are still so minded, without
prejudice to its taking the appropriate action as to
KAIRA MARIE CARLOS
petitioners Ariel Non, Joselito Villalon, George
(Jorge) Dayaon and Daniel Torres, if it is shown by
their records (Form 137) that they have failed to
satisfy the school's prescribed academic standards.
Goldberg v. Kelly was a United States Supreme
Court case that treated welfare benefits as a form
of property. As such, the Court ruled that state and
federal government agencies could only remove
welfare benefits after a pre-termination hearing at
which recipients could confront witnesses before
an impartial adjudicator.[1]
The case was argued on October 13, 1969, and
decided on March 23, 1970. The case came on
appeal from the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York.[1]
The case was argued on October 13, 1969, and
decided on March 23, 1970. The case came on
appeal from the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York.[1
The case: Twenty residents of New York City
appealed the termination of their welfare benefits
after receiving a pre-termination review and a
post-termination hearing. The United States
District Court for the Southern District of New
York ruled that the procedures used by New York
were insufficient and a full pre-termination
hearing was required.
The issue: Whether the Due Process
Clause requires that recipients of welfare be given
an evidentiary hearing before the termination of
benefits.[1]
The outcome: The Supreme Court affirmed the
district court's ruling. The Court held 5-3 that
welfare benefits are statutory entitlements and
procedural due process is applicable to their
termination.[1]
Why it matters: The Supreme Court's ruling
in Goldberg v. Kelly was the foundation of
procedural due process, which is the idea that
the Constitution requires state and federal
governments to give notice and an opportunity to
be heard before they act in such a way as to deny
a citizen of an interest in life, liberty or
property.[1][2]
4|Poli – Atty. Butch Jamo n
Case background
New York City residents were receiving financial
aid under the federally assisted Aid to Families
with Dependent Children (AFDC) program. New
York State officials allegedly terminated or were
going to terminate the residents' benefits without
notifying them beforehand or giving them a
hearing. The beneficiaries sued claiming that
without notice and a hearing they were losing their
benefits contrary to due process of law.[1]
Question presented:
"[W]hether the Due Process Clause requires that
the recipient be afforded an evidentiary hearing
before the termination of benefits
The Supreme Court held 5-3 to affirm decision of
the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York. The majority opinion was
written by William Brennan and joined by
Justices William Douglas, John Harlan II, Byron
White and Thurgood Marshall. Chief
Justice Warren Burger, and Justices Hugo
Black and Potter Stewart filed separate dissenting
opinions.[6]
Panel opinion
The United States Supreme Court affirmed
the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York. The lower court held that
pre-termination hearings were required by the
Constitution before welfare recipients could lose
their benefits and that post-termination hearings
were insufficient:[3]
“ To sum up: We hold that a pre-
termination hearing for welfare
recipients is constitutionally required
and that the procedures set forth above
for such hearing are the constitutional
minimum. Accordingly, we deny
defendants' motion for summary
judgment; we grant plaintiffs' motion for
a preliminary injunction as to the
operation of option (b), and deny it as to
option (a), for the reasons and on the
conditions stated herein. In addition,
”
nothing herein is meant to affect the right
KAIRA MARIE CARLOS
to a post-termination hearing in
accordance with the procedures already
in existence.[3][4][5]
Question presented
Question presented:
"[W]hether the Due Process Clause requires that
the recipient be afforded an evidentiary hearing
before the termination of benefits."[1]
Audio
You can find audio of the oral argument here.
Decision
The Supreme Court held 5-3 to affirm decision of
the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York. The majority opinion was
written by William Brennan and joined by
Justices William Douglas, John Harlan II, Byron
White and Thurgood Marshall. Chief
Justice Warren Burger, and Justices Hugo
Black and Potter Stewart filed separate dissenting
opinions.[6]
Opinions
Opinion of the court
The majority held that only a pre-termination
evidentiary hearing provides welfare recipients
with procedural due process as required by the
Constitution. The Court said:[1]
“ For qualified recipients, welfare provides
the means to obtain essential food,
clothing, housing, and medical care.
Thus, the crucial factor in this context -- a
factor not present in the case of the
blacklisted government contractor, the
discharged government employee, the
taxpayer denied a tax exemption, or
virtually anyone else whose
governmental entitlements are ended --
is that termination of aid pending
resolution of a controversy over
”
eligibility may deprive an eligible
5|Poli – Atty. Butch Jamo n
recipient of the very means by which to
live while he waits. Since he lacks
independent resources, his situation
becomes immediately desperate. His
need to concentrate upon finding the
means for daily subsistence, in turn,
adversely affects his ability to seek
redress from the welfare bureaucracy.
Moreover, important governmental
interests are promoted by affording
recipients a pre-termination evidentiary
hearing. From its founding, the Nation's
basic commitment has been to foster the
dignity and wellbeing of all persons
within its borders. We have come to
recognize that forces not within the
control of the poor contribute to their
poverty. This perception, against the
background of our traditions, has
significantly influenced the development
of the contemporary public assistance
system. Welfare, by meeting the basic
demands of subsistence, can help bring
within the reach of the poor the same
opportunities that are available to others
to participate meaningfully in the life of
the community. At the same time,
welfare guards against the societal
malaise that may flow from a widespread
sense of unjustified frustration and
insecurity. Public assistance, then, is not
mere charity, but a means to "promote
the general Welfare, and secure the
Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our
Posterity." The same governmental
interests that counsel the provision of
welfare, counsel as well its uninterrupted
provision to those eligible to receive it;
pre-termination evidentiary hearings are
indispensable to that end.[1][7][5]
The Court also found the hearings implemented
by New York to be deficient because they did not
allow for welfare beneficiaries to present evidence,
to be heard by themselves or through a lawyer or
to cross-examine witnesses.[6]
You can find the full-text of the opinion here.
KAIRA MARIE CARLOS
Dissenting opinions
Justice Hugo Black filed an opinion dissenting
from the judgment. Black believed the Court was
going beyond what he saw as its role to interpret
the Constitution into usurping the legislative
powers of Congress and the people. He
reasoned:[1]
“ It somewhat strains credulity to say that the
government's promise of charity to an
individual is property belonging to that
individual when the government denies that
the individual is honestly entitled to receive
such a payment.
I would have little, if any, objection to the
majority's decision in this case if it were
written as the report of the House Committee
on Education and Labor, but as an opinion
ostensibly resting on the language of the
Constitution I find it woefully deficient. Once
the verbiage is pared away it is obvious that
this Court today adopts the views of the
District Court "that to cut off a welfare
recipient in the face of . . . 'brutal need'
without a prior hearing of some sort is
unconscionable," and therefore, says the
Court, unconstitutional. The majority
reaches this result by a process of weighing
"the recipient's interest in avoiding" the
termination of welfare benefits against "the
governmental interest in summary
adjudication." Today's balancing act requires
a "pre-termination evidentiary hearing," yet
there is nothing that indicates what
tomorrow's balance will be. Although the
majority attempts to bolster its decision with
limited quotations from prior cases, it is
obvious that today's result does not depend
on the language of the Constitution itself or
the principles of other decisions, but solely
on the collective judgment of the majority as
to what would be a fair and humane
procedure in this case.[1][8][5]
UP V. LIGOT-TAN G.R. No. 110280
October 12, 1993
6|Poli – Atty. Butch Jamo n
FACTS:
In an effort to make the University of the
Philippines (U.P.) truly the University of the
People, U.P. administration conceptualized
and implemented the socialized scheme of
tuition fee payments through
the Socialized Tuition Fee and Assistance
Program (STFAP), popularly known as the
"Iskolar ng Bayan" program. After broad
consultations with the various university
constituencies, U.P. President Jose V. Abu
eva, the U.P. Board of Regents issued
on April 28, 1988, a Resolution establishing
the STFAP. A year later, it was granted
official recognition when the Congress of the
Philippines allocated a portion of the
National Budget for the implementation of
the program.
In the interest of democratizing admission to
the State University, all students are entitled
to apply for STFAP benefits which include a
reduction in fees, living and book subsidies
and student assistantships which give
undergraduate students the opportunity to
earn P12.00 per hour by working for the
University.
Applicants are required to accomplish a
questionnaire where, among others, they
state the amount and source of the annual
income of the family, their real and personal
properties and special circumstances from
which the University may evaluate their
financial status and need on the basis of
which they are categorized into brackets.
To further ensure the integrity of the
program, a random sampling scheme of
verification of data indicated in a student's
application form is undertaken.
Among those who applied for STFAP
benefits for the School Year 1989-90 was
Ramon P. Nadal, a student enrolled in the
College of Law. A team
” composed of Arsenio L. Dona
and Jose Carlo Manalo conducted a home
KAIRA MARIE CARLOS
investigation at the residence of Nadal. Ms.
Cristeta Packing, Nadal's aunt, was
interviewed and the team submitted a home
visit report.
Consolacion Urbino, Scholarship Affairs
Officer II, found discrepancies between the
report and Nadal's application form.
Forthwith, she and Bella M. Villanueva,
head of the Office of Scholarships
and Student Services, presented the matter
to the Diliman Committee on Scholarships
and Financial Assistance.
In compliance with the said Committee's
directive, Bella Villanueva wrote Nadal
informing him that the investigation showed
that he had failed to declare, not only the fact
that he had been maintaining a 1977 Corolla
car which was owned by his brother but also
the income of his mother who was
supporting his brothers Antonio and
Federico. Nadal was likewise informed that
the Diliman Committee had reclassified him
to Bracket 9 (from Bracket 4), retroactive to
June 1989, unless he could submit "proofs to
the contrary."
Nadal was required "to pay back the
equivalent amount of full school fees" with
"interest based on current
commercial rates." Failure to settle his
account would mean the suspension of his
registration privileges and the
withholding of clearance and transcript of
records. He was also warned that his case
might be referred to the Student Discipli
nary Tribunal for further investigation of c
ommercial rates."
Failure to settle his account would mean the
suspension of his registration privileges and
the withholding of clearance and transcript
of records.
He was also warned that his case might be
referred to the Student Disciplinary Tribunal
for further investigation.
7|Poli – Atty. Butch Jamo n
Nadal issued a certification stating, among
other things, that his mother migrated to the
United States in 1981 but because her
residency status had not yet been legalized,
she had not been able to find a "stable,
regular, well-paying employment."
U.P. charged Nadal before the Student
Disciplinary Tribunal (SDT) that he
committed acts which find him guilty of
willfully and deliberately withholding
information about the income of his mother,
who is living abroad and that he was
maintaining a Toyota Corolla car. As such,
the SDT imposed upon Nadal the penalty of
expulsion from the University and required
him to reimburse all STFAP benefits he had
received but if he does not voluntarily make
reimbursement, it shall be "effected” by the
University thru outside legal action.
The SDT decision was
thereafter automatically elevated to the
Executive Committee of U.P. Diliman for
review pursuant to Sec. 20 of the U.P. Rules
on Student Conduct and Discipline. Board of
regents modified the penalty from Expulsion
to One Year- Suspension, effective
immediately, plus reimbursement of all
benefits received from the STFAP, with legal
interest.
However, the BOR also decided against
giving Nadal, a certification of good moral
character. Nadal forthwith filed a motion for
reconsideration of the BOR decision, in the
next BOR meeting Regent Antonio T. Carpio
raised the "material importance" of the truth
of Nadal's claim that earlier, he was a
beneficiary of a scholarship and financial aid
from the Ateneo de Manila University
(AdeMU).
Learning that the "certification issued by the
AdeMU that it had not given Nadal financial
aid while he was a student there was made
through a telephone call," Regent Carpio
declared that there was as yet "no direct
evidence in the records to substantiate the
KAIRA MARIE CARLOS
charge." According to Carpio, if it should be
disclosed that Nadal falsely stated that he
received such financial aid, it would be a
clear case of gross and material
misrepresentation that would even warrant
the penalty of expulsion.
Hence, he cast a conditional vote that would
depend on the verification of Nadal's claim
on the matter. U.P. President and
concurrently Regent Jose V. Abueva coun
tered by stating that "a decision should not
be anchored solely on one piece of
information which he considered irrelevant,
and which would ignore the whole pattern
of the respondent's dishonesty and deception
from 1989 which
had been established in the investigation
and the reviews."
In the morning of March 29, 1993, the
AdeMU issued a certification to the effect
that Nadal was indeed a recipient of a
scholarship grant from 1979 to 1983.
That evening, the BOR met again at a special
meeting,
according to Regent Carpio, in executive
session, the BOR found Nadal "guilty."
However, on April 22, 1993, Nadal filed with
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a
petition for mandamus with preliminary
injunction and prayer for a temporary
restraining order against President Abueva,
the BOR, Oscar M. Alfonso, Cesar A.
Buenaventura, Armand V. Fabella and Olivia
C. Caoili.
ISSUE:
WON the Board of Regent violated Nadal's
right to due process when it rendered a
decision finding Nadal guilty of the charges
against him" during the March 29, 1993,
meeting.
HELD:
NO. With respect to the March 29, 1993
meeting, respondent considers the same as
8|Poli – Atty. Butch Jamo n
"unquestionably void for lack of due process"
inasmuch as he was not sent a notice of said
meeting, that imposition
of sanctions on students requires "observ
ance of procedural due process," the phrase
obviously referring to the sending of notice
of the meeting.
However, BOR ruled that in any event, it is a
gross error to equate due process in the
instant case with the sending of notice of the
March 29, 1993, BOR meeting to the
respondent.
University rules do not require the
attendance in BOR meetings of individuals
whose cases are included as items on the
agenda of the Board. This is not exclusive of
students whose disciplinary cases have been
appealed to the Board of Regents as the final
review body. At no time did respondent
complain of lack of notice given to him to
attend any of the regular and special BOR
meetings where his case was up for
deliberation. Counsel for Nadal charged
before the lower court that Nadal was not
given due process in the March 29 meeting
because the ground upon which he was
again convicted was not the same as the
original charge. Obviously, he was referring
to the basis of the conditional votes on March
28. Whether or not Nadal was telling the
truth when he claimed that he received
a scholarship grant
from the AdeMU. However, Regent Carpio
himself testified that the charge considered
was "exactly the same charge" of withholding
information on the income of Nadal's
mother. It should be stressed that the reason
why Regent Carpio requested a verification
of Nadal's claim that he was a scholar at the
AdeMU was that Regent Carpio was not
"morally convinced" yet as to the guilt of
Nadal. In other words, he sought additional
insights into the character of Nadal
through the information that would be
obtained from the AdeMU. The Court in this
regard finds such information to be
KAIRA MARIE CARLOS
irrelevant and a mere superfluity. In his July
12, 1991 certification aforementioned, Nadal
admitted, although inconsistently, that his
mother was a "TNT" who could not find a
"stable, regular, well-paying employment"
but that she was supporting the education of
his brothers with the help of another son. The
court constitutes this as a sufficient
admission that Nadal withheld information
on the income, however measly and
irregular, of his mother. The court also
sighted that respondent aspires to join the
ranks of the professionals who would uphold
truth at all costs so that justice may prevail.
In those who exhibit duplicity in their
student days, one spots the shady character
who is bound to sow the seeds of chicanery
in the practice of his profession. With this the
court ruled that it sufficiently shown that
respondent has committed an act of
dishonesty in withholding vital informati
on in connection with his application for
STFAP benefits, all in blatant violation of the
Rules and Regulations on Student Conduct
and Discipline of petitioner University, the
latter's inherent power and authority to
impose disciplinary sanction may be invoked
and rightfully exercised. Therefore deciding
that the BOR did not violate Nadal’s right to
due process.
The lower court is hereby ordered
to DISMISS the petition for mandamus.
Chief Justice Warren Burger filed a dissenting
opinion joined by Justice Black. He argued that the
Court should not have intervened to engage "in
'legislating' via constitutional fiat when an
apparently reasonable result has been
accomplished administratively." He cited
regulations that would require even stricter
procedures than those outlined by the majority.[9]
Justice Potter Stewart filed a dissenting opinion
saying that the question was close, but that the
procedures used to terminate welfare payments
did not violate the Constitution.[9]
9|Poli – Atty. Butch Jamo n
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES,
petitioner, vs. THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION, ONG PENG, ET
AL., respondents.,
G.R. No. 100264-81; Jan 29, 1993
FACTS:
November 14, 1986, private respondents filed with
DOLE- Daet, Camarines Norte, 17 individual
complaints against Republic Hardwood Inc. (RHI)
for unpaid wages and separation pay. These
complaints were thereafter endorsed to Regional
Arbitration Branch of the NLRC since the
petitioners had already been terminated from
employment.
RHI alleged that it had ceased to operate in 1983
due to the government ban against tree-cutting
and that in May 24, 1981, its sawmill was totally
burned resulting in enormous losses and that due
to its financial setbacks, RHI failed to pay its loan
with the DBP. RHI contended that since DBP
foreclosed its mortgaged assets on September
24,1985, then any adjudication of monetary claims
in favor of its former employees must be satisfied
against DBP. Private respondent impleaded DBP.
Labor Arbiter favored private respondents and
held RHI and DBP jointly and severally liable to
private respondents. DBP appealed to the NLRC.
NLRC affirmed LA’s judgment. DBP filed M.R.
but it was dismissed. Thus, this petition for
certiorari.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether the private respondents are entitled to
separation pay.
(2) Whether the private respondents’ separation
pay should be preferred than the DBP’s lien over
the RHI’s mortgaged assets.
RULING:
Yes. Despite the enormous losses incurred by RHI
due to the fire that gutted the sawmill in 1981 and
despite the logging ban in 1953, the
uncontroverted claims for separation pay show
that most of the private respondents still worked
up to the end of 1985. RHI would still have
KAIRA MARIE CARLOS
continued its business had not the petitioner
foreclosed all of its assets and properties on
September 24, 1985. Thus, the closure of RHI’s
business was not primarily brought about by
serious business losses. Such closure was a
consequence of DBP’s foreclosure of RHI’s assets.
The Supreme Court applied Article 283 which
provides:
“. . . in cases of closures or cessation of operations
of establishment or undertaking not due to serious
business losses or financial reverses, the
separation pay shall be equivalent to 1 month pay
or at least 1/2 month pay for every year of service,
whichever is higher. . . .”
(2) No. Because of the petitioner’s assertion that
LA and NLRC incorrectly applied the provisions
of Article 110 of the Labor Code, the Supreme
Court was constrained to grant the petition for
certiorari.
Article 110 must be read in relation to the Civil
Code concerning the classification, concurrence
and preference of credits, which is application in
insolvency proceedings where the claims of all
creditors, preferred or non-preferred, may be
adjudicated in a binding manner. Before the
workers’ preference provided by Article 110 may
be invoked, there must first be a declaration of
bankruptcy or a judicial liquidation of the
employer’s business.
NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion when
it affirmed the LA’s ruling. DBP’s lien on RHI’s
mortgaged assets, being a mortgage credit, is
a special preferred credit under Article 2242 of the
Civil Code while the workers’ preference is
an ordinary preferred credit under Article 2244.
A distinction should be made between a
preference of credit and a lien. A preference
applies only to claims which do not attach to
specific properties. A lien creates a charge on a
particular property. The right of first preference as
regards unpaid wages recognized by Article 110
does not constitute a lien on the property of the
insolvent debtor in favor of workers. It is but a
preference of credit in their favor, a preference in
application. It is a method adopted to determine
and specify the order in which credits should be
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paid in the final distribution of the proceeds of the
insolvent’s assets. It is a right to a first preference
in the discharge of the funds of the judgment
debtor.
Article 110 of the Labor Code does not create
a lien in favor of workers or employees for unpaid
wages either upon all of the properties or upon
any particular property owned by their employer.
Claims for unpaid wages do not therefore fall at all
within the category of specially preferred claims
established under Articles 2241 and 2242 of the
Civil Code, except to the extent that such claims for
unpaid wages are already covered by Article 2241,
(6)- (claims for laborers’ wages, on the goods
manufactured or the work done); or by Article
2242,(3)- (claims of laborers and other workers
engaged in the construction, reconstruction or
repair of buildings, canals and other works, upon
said buildings, canals and other works.
Since claims for unpaid wages fall outside the
scope of Article 2241 (6) and 2242 (3), and not
attached to any specific property, they would
come within the category of ordinary preferred
credits under Article 2244.
(Note: SC favored DBP kasi yung mortgage nila
against RHI was executed prior to the amendment
of Article 110. The amendment can’t be given
retroactive effect daw. Pero sa present, 1st priority
na talaga ang laborer’s unpaid wages regardless
kung may mortgage or wala ang ibang creditors
ng employer)
Article 110 of the Labor Code has been amended
by R.A. No. 6715 and now reads:
“Article 110. Worker preference in case of
bankruptcy. – In the event of bankruptcy or
liquidation of an employers business, his workers
shall enjoy first preference as regards their unpaid
wages and other monetary claims, any provision
of law to the contrary notwithstanding. Such
unpaid wages, and monetary claims shall be paid
in full before the claims of the Government and
other creditors may be paid.”
The amendment “expands worker preference to
cover not only unpaid wages but also other
monetary claims to which even claims of the
KAIRA MARIE CARLOS
Government must be deemed subordinate.”
Hence, under the new law, even mortgage credits
are subordinate to workers’ claims.
R.A. No. 6715, however, took effect only on March
21, 1989. The amendment cannot therefore be
retroactively applied to, nor can it affect, the
mortgage credit which was secured by the
petitioner several years prior to its effectivity.
Even if Article 110 and its Implementing Rule, as
amended, should be interpreted to mean `absolute
preference,’ the same should be given only
prospective effect in line with the cardinal rule that
laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the
contrary is provided. To give Article 110
retroactive effect would be to wipe out the
mortgage in DBP’s favor and expose it to a risk
which it sought to protect itself against by
requiring a collateral in the form of real property.
The public respondent, therefore, committed
grave abuse of discretion when it retroactively
applied the amendment introduced by R.A. No.
6715 to the case at bar.
Petition GRANTED. Decision of NLRC SET
ASIDE
ESTRADA V. SANDIGANBAYAN G.R.
No. 148560. November 19, 2001
FACTS:
Former President Estrada and co-accused were
charged for Plunder under RA 7080 (An Act
Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder), as
amended by RA 7659.
On the information, it was alleged that Estrada
have received billions of pesos through any or a
combination or a series of overt or criminal acts, or
similar schemes or means thereby unjustly
enriching himself or themselves at the expense and
to the damage of the Filipino people and the
Republic of the Philippines.
Estrada questions the constitutionality of the
Plunder Law since for him:
1. it suffers from the vice of vagueness
2. it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt"
standard in criminal prosecutions
11 | P o l i – A t t y . B u t c h J a m o n
3. it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes
already punishable under The Revised Penal
Code.
Office of the Ombudsman filed before the
Sandiganbayan 8 separate Informations against
petitioner.
Estrada filed an Omnibus Motion on the grounds
of lack of preliminary investigation,
reconsideration/reinvestigation of offenses and
opportunity to prove lack of probable cause but
was denied.
Later on, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution
in Crim. Case No. 26558 finding that a probable
cause for the offense of plunder exists to justify the
issuance of warrants for the arrest of the accused.
Estrada moved to quash the Information in
Criminal Case No. 26558 on the ground that the
facts alleged therein did NOT constitute an
indictable offense since the law on which it was
based was unconstitutional for vagueness and that
the Amended Information for Plunder charged
more than one offense. Same was denied.
The questioned provisions of the petitioners are
Secs. 1, par. (d), 2 and 4 of the Plunder Law which
states that:
Section 1. x x x x (d) "Ill-gotten wealth" means any
asset, property, business, enterprise or material
possession of any person within the purview of
Section Two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or
indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents,
subordinates and/or business associates by any
combination or series of the following means or
similar schemes:
(1) Through misappropriation, conversion,
misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on
the public treasury;
(2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any
commission, gift, share, percentage, kickbacks or
any other form of pecuniary benefit from any
person and/or entity in connection with any
government contract or project or by reason of the
office or position of the public office concerned;
(3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or
disposition of assets belonging to the National
KAIRA MARIE CARLOS
Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or
instrumentalities, or government owned or
controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;
(4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or
indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other
form of interest or participation including the
promise of future employment in any business
enterprise or undertaking;
(5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or
commercial monopolies or other combinations
and/or implementation of decrees and orders
intended to benefit particular persons or special
interests; or
(6) By taking advantage of official position,
authority, relationship, connection or influence to
unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the
expense and to the damage and prejudice of the
Filipino people and the Republic of the
Philippines.
Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder,
Penalties. - Any public officer who, by himself or
in connivance with members of his family,
relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business
associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses,
accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through
a combination or series of overt or criminal acts as
described in Section 1 (d) hereof, in the aggregate
amount or total value of at least fifty million pesos
(P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of
plunder and shall be punished by reclusion
perpetua to death. Any person who participated
with the said public officer in the commission of
an offense contributing to the crime of plunder
shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the
imposition of penalties, the degree of participation
and the attendance of mitigating and extenuating
circumstances as provided by the Revised Penal
Code shall be considered by the court. The court
shall declare any and all ill-gotten wealth and their
interests and other incomes and assets including
the properties and shares of stocks derived from
the deposit or investment thereof forfeited in favor
of the State (underscoring supplied).
Section 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of
establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be
necessary to prove each and every criminal act
12 | P o l i – A t t y . B u t c h J a m o n
done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme
or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-
gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish
beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or
criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful
scheme or conspiracy (underscoring supplied).
ISSUE:
WON the crime of plunder is unconstitutional for
being vague?
HELD:
NO. As long as the law affords some
comprehensible guide or rule that would inform
those who are subject to it what conduct would
render them liable to its penalties, its validity will
be sustained. The amended information itself
closely tracks the language of the law, indicating
w/ reasonable certainty the various elements of
the offense w/c the petitioner is alleged to have
committed.
We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague
or ambiguous that will confuse petitioner in his
defense.
Petitioner, however, bewails the failure of the law
to provide for the statutory definition of the
terms “combination” and “series” in the key
phrase “a combination or series of overt or
criminal acts. These omissions, according to the
petitioner, render the Plunder Law
unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague
and overbroad and deny him the right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him, hence violative of his fundamental
right to due process.
A statute is not rendered uncertain and void
merely because general terms are used herein, or
because of the employment of terms without
defining them.
A statute or act may be said to be vague when it
lacks comprehensible standards that men of
common intelligence most necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ in its application. In such
instance, the statute is repugnant to the
Constitution in two (2) respects – it violates due
process for failure to accord persons, especially the
KAIRA MARIE CARLOS

parties targeted by it, fair notice of what invoked that the same was extinguished by PD
conduct to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers 1717.
unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions
Issue: Whether or not Philippine Veterans Bank as
and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the
creditor of Agrix is still entitled for payment
Government muscle.
without prejudice to PD 1717.
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to vague
Held: Yes. A mortgage lien is a property right
statute and to one which is overbroad because of
derived from contract and so comes under the
possible “chilling effect” upon protected
protection of Bill of rights so do interests on loans,
speech. The possible harm to society in permitting
as well s penalties and charges, which are also
some unprotected speech to go unpunished is
vested rights once they accrue. Private property
outweighed by the possibility that the protected
cannot simply be taken by law from one person
speech of others may be deterred and perceived
and given to another without just compensation
grievances left to fester because of possible
and any known public purpose. This is plain
inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes. But in
arbitrariness and is not permitted under the
criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the
constitution.
area of free speech.
The court also feels that the decree impairs the
obligation of the contract between Agrix and the
Old substantive Due Process private respondent without justification. While it
is true that the police power is superior to the
National Development Corporation vs Philippine
impairment clause, the principle will apply only
Veterans Bank
where the contract is so related to the public
192 SCRA 257 [GR No. 84132-33 December 10,
welfare that it will be considered congenitally
1990]
susceptible to change by the legislature in the
Facts: The particular enactment in question is interest of greater number.
Presidential Decree No. 1717, which ordered the
Our finding in sum, is that PD 1717 is an invalid
rehabilitation of the Agrix Group of Companies to
exercise of the police power, not being in
be administered mainly by the National
conformity with the traditional requirements of a
Development Company. The law outlined the
lawful subject and a lawful method. The extinction
procedure for filling claims against the Agrix
of the mortgage and other liens and of the interest
Companies and created a claims committee to
and other charges pertaining to the legitimate
process these claims. Especially relevant to this
creditors of Agrix constitutes taking without due
case, and noted at the outset, is section 4(1) thereof
process of law, and this is compounded by the
providing that “all mortgages and other liens
reduction of the secured creditors to the category
presently attaching to any of the assets of the
of unsecured creditors in violation of the equal
dissolved corporations are hereby extinguished.”
protection clause. Moreover, the new corporation
Earlier, the Agrix Marketing Inc. had executed in
being neither owned nor controlled by the
favor of private respondent Philippine Veterans
government, should have been created only by
Bank a real estate mortgage dated July 7, 1978 over
general and not special law. And in so far as the
three parcels of land situated in Los Baños,
decree also interferes with purely private
Laguna. During the existence of the mortgage,
agreements without any demonstrated connection
Agrix went bankrupt. It was the expressed
with the public interest, there is likewise an
purpose of salvaging this and the other Agrix
impairment of the obligation of the contract.
companies that the aforementioned decree was
issued by President Marcos. A claim for the Balacuit v. CFI Agusan del Norte
payment of its loan credit was filed by PNB against GR No. L-38429
herein petitioner, however the latter alleged and June 30, 1988
Facts:

13 | P o l i – A t t y . B u t c h J a m o n
KAIRA MARIE CARLOS

On April 21, 1969, the Municipal Board of the City

of Butuan passed Ordinance No. 640, which
penalizes persons and entities engaged in the
business of selling admission tickets for movies or
other public events who require children between
the ages of 7 and 12 to pay full price. Petitioners
are managers of theaters of the said city. They
contended that the ordinance was
unconstitutional and should not be enforced. The
Municipal Board, on the other hand, insisted that
it as a valid exercise of police power because as
provided in RA 523, the Charter of the City of
Butuan, the Board has the power to regulate and
fix the amount of the license fees for theaters,
cinematographs, etc.
Issue:
Is the act of the Municipal Board a valid exercise of
police power?
Ruling:
No. To invoke the exercise of police power, not
only must it appear that the interest of the public
generally requires an interference with private
rights, but the means adopted must be reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose
and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. The
ordinance was created to help parents who
complain that paying full price for their children is
too financially burdensome. This is not a public
necessity. A police power legislation must be
firmly grounded on public interest and welfare.
There is nothing pernicious in demanding equal
price for both children and adults. A lawful
business or calling may not, under the guise of
regulation, be unreasonably interfered with even
by the exercise of police power.

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