Professional Documents
Culture Documents
PROBLEM SET 3
1. Millennials
Well, from my point of view they are, despite their high expectations and high self-
esteem. Millennials, thanks to the way they were raised, respond very well to
tangible incentives (like a salary rise or a new position), but, moreover, they have
significant strengths in teamwork, technological skills, social networking and
multitasking.
3. How do millennials interact with the performance control and reward systems
used by firms? Should firms expect a different behavior between millennials and
other employees when evaluating performance and providing feedback? Use
your knowledge from Business Economics 2 on subjective and objective
performance evaluation and the provision of feedback to employees. Does any
feature of UPF’s organization of teaching and evaluation fit this analysis?
For millennials it is important a good reward system, a system in which they have
incentives to strive (esforzarse) and good opportunities, since they were raised
with these reward systems. For this reason, they tend to respond very good to this
type of systems.
On the other hand, millennials tend to prefer weekly or daily evaluations of
themselves, because they usually raised with const positive reinforcements, and
they search more affirmation in their workplace.
Provide feedback to a millennial could be a difficult task Because often their
parents protected them when they fail so as not to damage their self-esteem, so
too hard feedback could discourage them instead of motivating them.
2. Farsighted contracting
Well, farsighted contracting can reduce opportunism ex-post on certain occasions, but
if work circumstances are strongly changing, the cost of constantly creating and
changing this contract may be greater than that of avoided opportunism.
On the other hand, in those situations where work circumstance are quite fixed, this
farsighted contracts may be worth it.
Cooperation based on repetitive actions has its source in the rational ability of people to
calculate the option that greater output will give them considering that in the long term
others will know your way of acting. On the other hand, cooperation based on reciprocity
has its source in the emotional characteristics of people that causes the behavior and
output of others to alter our behavior.
3. How would you apply the experimental results obtained by Fehr and Gächter (2000) and
Carpenter (2001) on public goods, discussed in class and referred by Fehr and Falk (2002:
706-707), to manage quality control in a firm or service activity, as, for instance, the ones of a
hotel or a taxi company?
In the case of the taxi company, you could implement a system of qualifications and reviews for
both, taxi drivers and customers, so that when hiring a service both taxi driver and customer
could see the profile of the other person, and if the service by the taxi driver or the customer’s
behavior was bad, they could punish him with a bad review.
4. Ferhr and Falk (2002) explain that multiple equilibria can arise in the relationship between
individual compliance and the compliance of others in the social group. (a) What are the
consequences of the existence of multiple equilibria? (b) Provide two real life examples
similar to the initial and final equilibrium in the Kindergarten experiment.
5. Illustrate with an example each one of the four “rules” mentioned in the Cowen reading
I. Offer monetary rewards when performance at a task is highly responsive to extra effort.
Example: The owner of a supermarket could incentivize cashiers so that cashiers who do not
arrive late even once during the month have an extra bonus.
III. Pay monetary rewards when receiving money for a task produces social approval.
Example: As the accounting teacher did, offer an economic reward to the best project in the
class.
Example: The new super signing of Futbol Club Barcelona that cost 100 million dollars which
then ends up scoring two goals throughout all the season.