WEEK 3-LAW VS.

MORALITY,JUSTICE

1.ON THE CONNECTION BETWEEN LAW AND JUSTICE ANTHONY

D’AMATO

What does it mean to assert that judges should decide cases according to
justice and not according to the law? Is there something incoherent in the
question itself? That question will serve as our springboard in examining what
is—or should be—the connection between justice and law. Legal and political
theorists since the time of Plato have wrestled with the problem of whether
justice is part of law or is simply a moral judgment about law. Nearly every
writer on the subject has either concluded that justice is only a judgment about
law or has offered no reason to support a conclusion that justice is somehow
part of law. This Essay attempts to reason toward such a conclusion, arguing
that justice is an inherent component of the law and not separate or distinct
from it. Given the history of the topic, I start with a disclaimer. The issues
involved in these questions are as vast as they are fundamental. I do not
pretend to have a definitive solution. I do attempt a suggestive solution based
on an extended hypothetical case.

Facts:

petitioner) was hired by St. Scholastica's College Westgrove (SSCW), a

Catholic educational institution, as a non-teaching personnel, engaged in
pre-marital sexual relations, got pregnant out of wedlock... married the
father of her child,... and was dismissed by SSCW, in that order.

petitioner and her boyfriend conceived a child out of wedlock. When

SSCW learned of the petitioner's pregnancy, Sr. Edna Quiambao... advised
her to file a resignation letter effective June 1, 2003. In response, the
petitioner... informed Sr. Quiambao that she would not resign from her
employment just because she got pregnant... without the benefit of
marriage.[

. Quiambao formally directed the petitioner to explain in writing why she

should not be dismissed for engaging in pre-marital sexual relations and
getting pregnant as a result thereof, which amounts to serious
misconduct and conduct unbecoming of an employee... of a Catholic
school.

In a letter[11] dated June 6, 2003, SSCW, through counsel, maintained

that pre-marital sexual relations, even if between two consenting adults
without legal impediment to marry, is considered a disgraceful and
immoral conduct or a serious misconduct, which... are grounds for the
termination of employmen... petitioner filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal
Issues:

The validity of the petitioner's dismissal hinges on the determination of

whether pregnancy out of wedlock by an employee of a catholic
educational institution is a cause for the termination of her employment.

The

Ruling:

The fact of the petitioner's pregnancy out of wedlock, without more, is

not enough to characterize the petitioner's conduct as disgraceful or
immoral.

There must be substantial evidence to establish that pre-marital sexual

relations and, consequently,... pregnancy out of wedlock, are indeed
considered disgraceful or immoral

The totality of the circumstances... surrounding the conduct alleged to

be... disgraceful or immoral must be assessed... against the prevailing
norms of conduct.

consideration of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the

conduct; and second, an assessment of the said circumstances vis-à-vis
the... prevailing norms of conduct, i.e., what the society generally
considers moral and respectable.

the right of an employee to security of tenure is protected by the

Constitution.

when the law refers to morality, it necessarily pertains to public and

secular morality and not religious morality. Thus, the proscription against
"disgraceful or immoral conduct" under Section 94(e) of the 1992 MRPS,
which is made as a cause for dismissal, must necessarily... refer to public
and secular morality.

Principles:
CASE DIGEST: CHERYLL SANTOS LEUS, Petitioner, vs. ST.
SCHOLASTICA'S COLLEGE WESTGROVE and/or SR. EDNA
QUIAMBAO, OSB, Respondents.

In this very recent cast of Leus vs. St. Scholastica's College, the Supreme Court
held that a female teacher working as a non-teaching staff in a sectarian school
cannot be dismissed on grounds of premarital sexual relations even if it resulted
in her getting pregnant.

The dispositive portion of the decision is reproduced below:

WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the petition is
GRANTED. The Decision dated September 24, 2008 and Resolution dated March
2, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 100188 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

The respondent, St. Scholastica’s College Westgrove, is hereby declared guilty of

illegal dismissal and is hereby ORDERED to pay the petitioner, Cheryll Santos
Leus, the following: (a) separation pay in lieu of actual reinstatement equivalent
to one (1) month pay for every year of service, with a fraction of at least six (6)
months considered as one (1) whole year from the time of her dismissal up to the
finality of this Decision; (b) full backwages from the time of her illegal dismissal
up to the finality of this Decision; and (c) attorney’s fees equivalent to ten percent
(10%) of the total monetary award. The monetary awards herein granted shall
earn legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of the
finality of this Decision until fully paid. The case is REMANDED to the Labor
Arbiter for the computation of petitioner’s monetary awards.

The Highest Court, in this case, laid down two (2) important doctrines:

(1) Public and secular morality should determine the prevailing

norms of conduct, not religious morality.

The morality referred to in the law is public and necessarily secular, not religious
x x x. “Religious teachings as expressed in public debate may influence the civil
public order but public moral disputes may be resolved only on grounds
articulable in secular terms.” Otherwise, if government relies upon religious
beliefs in formulating public policies and morals, the resulting policies and
morals would require conformity to what some might regard as religious
programs or agenda. The non-believers would therefore be compelled to conform
to a standard of conduct buttressed by a religious belief, i.e., to a “compelled
religion,” anathema to religious freedom. Likewise, if government based its
actions upon religious beliefs, it would tacitly approve or endorse that belief and
thereby also tacitly disapprove contrary religious or non-religious views that
would not support the policy. As a result, government will not provide full
religious freedom for all its citizens, or even make it appear that those whose
beliefs are disapproved are second-class citizens. Expansive religious freedom
therefore requires that government be neutral in matters of religion;
governmental reliance upon religious justification is inconsistent with this policy
of neutrality.
In other words, government action, including its proscription of immorality as
expressed in criminal law like concubinage, must have a secular purpose. That is,
the government proscribes this conduct because it is “detrimental (or dangerous)
to those conditions upon which depend the existence and progress of human
society” and not because the conduct is proscribed by the beliefs of one religion
or the other. Although admittedly, moral judgments based on religion might have
a compelling influence on those engaged in public deliberations over what actions
would be considered a moral disapprobation punishable by law. After all, they
might also be adherents of a religion and thus have religious opinions and moral
codes with a compelling influence on them; the human mind endeavors to
regulate the temporal and spiritual institutions of society in a uniform manner,
harmonizing earth with heaven. Succinctly put, a law could be religious or
Kantian or Aquinian or utilitarian in its deepest roots, but it must have an
articulable and discernible secular purpose and justification to pass scrutiny of
the religion clauses. xxx.

(2) The petitioner’s pregnancy out of wedlock is not a disgraceful or

immoral conduct since she and the father of her child have no
impediment to marry each other.

In stark contrast to Santos, the Court does not find any circumstance in this case
which would lead the Court to conclude that the petitioner committed a
disgraceful or immoral conduct. It bears stressing that the petitioner and her
boyfriend, at the time they conceived a child, had no legal impediment to marry.
Indeed, even prior to her dismissal, the petitioner married her boyfriend, the
father of her child. As the Court held in Radam, there is no law which penalizes
an unmarried mother by reason of her sexual conduct or proscribes the
consensual sexual activity between two unmarried persons; that neither does
such situation contravene any fundamental state policy enshrined in the
Constitution.

Admittedly, the petitioner is employed in an educational institution where the

teachings and doctrines of the Catholic Church, including that on pre-marital
sexual relations, is strictly upheld and taught to the students. That her
indiscretion, which resulted in her pregnancy out of wedlock, is anathema to the
doctrines of the Catholic Church. However, viewed against the prevailing norms
of conduct, the petitioner’s conduct cannot be considered as disgraceful or
immoral; such conduct is not denounced by public and secular morality. It may
be an unusual arrangement, but it certainly is not disgraceful or immoral within
the contemplation of the law.

To stress, pre-marital sexual relations between two consenting adults who have
no impediment to marry each other, and, consequently, conceiving a child out of
wedlock, gauged from a purely public and secular view of morality, does not
amount to a disgraceful or immoral conduct under Section 94(e) of the 1992
MRPS.

Accordingly, the labor tribunals erred in upholding the validity of the petitioner’s
dismissal. The labor tribunals arbitrarily relied solely on the circumstances
surrounding the petitioner’s pregnancy and its supposed effect on SSCW and its
students without evaluating whether the petitioner’s conduct is indeed
considered disgraceful or immoral in view of the prevailing norms of conduct. In
this regard, the labor tribunals’ respective haphazard evaluation of the evidence
amounts to grave abuse of discretion, which the Court will rectify.

The labor tribunals’ finding that the petitioner’s pregnancy out of wedlock despite
the absence of substantial evidence is not only arbitrary, but a grave abuse of
discretion, which should have been set right by the CA.

[G.R. No. 47800. December 2, 1940.]

MAXIMO CALALANG, Petitioner, v. A. D. WILLIAMS, ET AL., Respondents.

Maximo Calalang in his own behalf.

Solicitor General Ozaeta and Assistant Solicitor General Amparo for

respondents Williams, Fragante and Bayan

City Fiscal Mabanag for the other respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONALITY OF COMMONWEALTH ACT No. 648;

DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER; AUTHORITY OF DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC WORKS
AND SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS AND COMMUNICATIONS TO PROMULGATE RULES
AND REGULATIONS. — The provisions of section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 648 do
not confer legislative power upon the Director of Public Works and the Secretary of
Public Works and Communications. The authority therein conferred upon them and
under which they promulgated the rules and regulations now complained of is not to
determine what public policy demands but merely to carry out the legislative policy laid
down by the National Assembly in said Act, to wit, "to promote safe transit upon, and
avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national roads by acts of the
National Assembly or by executive orders of the President of the Philippines" and to
close them temporarily to any or all classes of traffic "whenever the condition of the
road or the traffic thereon makes such action necessary or advisable in the public
convenience and interest." The delegated power, if at all, therefore, is not the
 determination of what the law shall be, but merely the ascertainment of the facts and
circumstances upon which the application of said law is to be predicated. To promulgate
rules and regulations on the use of national roads and to determine when and how long
a national road should be closed to traffic, in view of the condition of the road or the
traffic thereon and the requirements of public convenience and interest, is an
administrative function which cannot be directly discharged by the National Assembly.
It must depend on the discretion of some other government official to whom is confided
the duty of determining whether the proper occasion exists for executing the law. But it
cannot be said that the exercise of such discretion is the making of the law.

2. ID.; ID.; POLICE POWER; PERSONAL LIBERTY; GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY. —

Commonwealth Act No. 548 was passed by the National Assembly in the exercise of the
paramount police power of the state. Said Act, by virtue of which the rules and
regulations complained of were promulgated, aims to promote safe transit upon and
avoid obstructions on national roads, in the interest and convenience of the public. In
enacting said law, therefore, the National Assembly was prompted by considerations of
public convenience and welfare. It was inspired by a desire to relieve congestion of
traffic, which is, to say the least, a menace to public safety. Public welfare, then, lies at
the bottom of the enactment of said law, and the state in order to promote the general
welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and
occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and
burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state
(U.S. v. Gomer Jesus, 31 Phil., 218). To this fundamental aim of our Government the
rights of the individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a
misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over authority because then society
will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail over liberty because
then the individual will fall into slavery. The citizen should achieve the required balance
of liberty and authority in his mind through education and, personal discipline, so that
there may be established the resultant equilibrium, which means peace and order and
happiness for all. The moment greater authority is conferred upon the government,
logically so much is withdrawn from the residuum of liberty which resides in the people.
The paradox lies in the fact that the apparent curtailment of liberty is precisely the very
means of insuring its preservation.

3. ID.; ID.; SOCIAL JUSTICE. — Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism,
nor atomism, nor anarchy," but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social
and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular
conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the
welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to
insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through the
maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the
members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally
justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the
existence of all governments on the time-honored principle of salus populi est suprema
lex. Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of
interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that
should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social
and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the
state of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about
"the greatest good to the greatest number."
 DECISION

LAUREL, J.:

Maximo Calalang, in his capacity as a private citizen and as a taxpayer of Manila,

brought before this court this petition for a writ of prohibition against the respondents,
A. D. Williams, as Chairman of the National Traffic Commission; Vicente Fragante, as
Director of Public Works; Sergio Bayan, as Acting Secretary of Public Works and
Communications; Eulogio Rodriguez, as Mayor of the City of Manila; and Juan
Dominguez, as Acting Chief of Police of Manila.

It is alleged in the petition that the National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July
17, 1940, resolved to recommend to the Director of Public Works and to the Secretary
of Public Works and Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from
passing along Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmariñas
Street, from 7:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. and from 1:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m.; and along Rizal
Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Echague Street, from
7 a.m. to 11 p.m., from a period of one year from the date of the opening of the
Colgante Bridge to traffic; that the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission, on
July 18, 1940 recommended to the Director of Public Works the adoption of the
measure proposed in the resolution aforementioned, in pursuance of the provisions of
Commonwealth Act No. 548 which authorizes said Director of Public Works, with the
approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, to promulgate rules
and regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on national roads; that on
August 2, 1940, the Director of Public Works, in his first indorsement to the Secretary
of Public Works and Communications, recommended to the latter the approval of the
recommendation made by the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission as
aforesaid, with the modification that the closing of Rizal Avenue to traffic to animal-
drawn vehicles be limited to the portion thereof extending from the railroad crossing at
Antipolo Street to Azcarraga Street; that on August 10, 1940, the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications, in his second indorsement addressed to the Director of
Public Works, approved the recommendation of the latter that Rosario Street and Rizal
Avenue be closed to traffic of animal-drawn vehicles, between the points and during the
hours as above indicated, for a period of one year from the date of the opening of the
Colgante Bridge to traffic; that the Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of
Manila have enforced and caused to be enforced the rules and regulations thus
adopted; that as a consequence of such enforcement, all animal-drawn vehicles are not
allowed to pass and pick up passengers in the places above-mentioned to the detriment
not only of their owners but of the riding public as well.

It is contended by the petitioner that Commonwealth Act No. 548 by which the Director
of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, is authorized to promulgate rules and regulations for the regulation
and control of the use of and traffic on national roads and streets is unconstitutional
because it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. This contention is
untenable. As was observed by this court in Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro (39
Phil, 660, 700), "The rule has nowhere been better stated than in the early Ohio case
decided by Judge Ranney, and since followed in a multitude of cases, namely: ’The true
distinction therefore is between the delegation of power to make the law, which
necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or
discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The
first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made.’ (Cincinnati, W. & Z.
R. Co. v. Comm’rs. Clinton County, 1 Ohio St., 88.) Discretion, as held by Chief Justice
Marshall in Wayman v. Southard (10 Wheat., 1) may be committed by the Legislature
to an executive department or official. The Legislature may make decisions of executive
departments or subordinate officials thereof, to whom it has committed the execution of
certain acts, final on questions of fact. (U.S. v. Kinkead, 248 Fed., 141.) The growing
tendency in the decisions is to give prominence to the ’necessity’ of the case." cralaw virtua1aw library

Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 548 reads as follows: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SECTION 1. To promote safe transit upon, and avoid obstructions on, roads and
streets designated as national roads by acts of the National Assembly or by executive
orders of the President of the Philippines, the Director of Public Works, with the
approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, shall promulgate the
necessary rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on such
roads and streets. Such rules and regulations, with the approval of the President, may
contain provisions controlling or regulating the construction of buildings or other
structures within a reasonable distance from along the national roads. Such roads may
be temporarily closed to any or all classes of traffic by the Director of Public Works and
his duly authorized representatives whenever the condition of the road or the traffic
thereon makes such action necessary or advisable in the public convenience and
interest, or for a specified period, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works
and Communications." cralaw virtua1aw library

The above provisions of law do not confer legislative power upon the Director of Public
Works and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications. The authority therein
conferred upon them and under which they promulgated the rules and regulations now
complained of is not to determine what public policy demands but merely to carry out
the legislative policy laid down by the National Assembly in said Act, to wit, "to promote
safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national
roads by acts of the National Assembly or by executive orders of the President of the
Philippines" and to close them temporarily to any or all classes of traffic "whenever the
condition of the road or the traffic makes such action necessary or advisable in the
public convenience and interest." The delegated power, if at all, therefore, is not the
determination of what the law shall be, but merely the ascertainment of the facts and
circumstances upon which the application of said law is to be predicated. To promulgate
rules and regulations on the use of national roads and to determine when and how long
a national road should be closed to traffic, in view of the condition of the road or the
traffic thereon and the requirements of public convenience and interest, is an
administrative function which cannot be directly discharged by the National Assembly.
It must depend on the discretion of some other government official to whom is confided
the duty of determining whether the proper occasion exists for executing the law. But it
cannot be said that the exercise of such discretion is the making of the law. As was said
in Locke’s Appeal (72 Pa. 491): "To assert that a law is less than a law, because it is
made to depend on a future event or act, is to rob the Legislature of the power to act
wisely for the public welfare whenever a law is passed relating to a state of affairs not
yet developed, or to things future and impossible to fully know." The proper distinction
the court said was this: "The Legislature cannot delegate its power to make the law;
but it can make a law to delegate a power to determine some fact or state of things
upon which the law makes, or intends to make, its own action depend. To deny this
would be to stop the wheels of government. There are many things upon which wise
and useful legislation must depend which cannot be known to the law-making power,
and, must, therefore, be a subject of inquiry and determination outside of the halls of
legislation." (Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649, 694; 36 L. Ed. 294.)

In the case of People v. Rosenthal and Osmeña, G.R. Nos. 46076 and 46077,
promulgated June 12, 1939, and in Pangasinan Transportation v. The Public Service
Commission, G.R. No. 47065, promulgated June 26, 1940, this Court had occasion to
observe that the principle of separation of powers has been made to adapt itself to the
complexities of modern governments, giving rise to the adoption, within certain limits,
of the principle of "subordinate legislation," not only in the United States and England
but in practically all modern governments. Accordingly, with the growing complexity of
modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulations, and the
increased difficulty of administering the laws, the rigidity of the theory of separation of
governmental powers has, to a large extent, been relaxed by permitting the delegation
of greater powers by the legislative and vesting a larger amount of discretion in
administrative and executive officials, not only in the execution of the laws, but also in
the promulgation of certain rules and regulations calculated to promote public interest.

The petitioner further contends that the rules and regulations promulgated by the
respondents pursuant to the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 548 constitute an
unlawful interference with legitimate business or trade and abridge the right to personal
liberty and freedom of locomotion. Commonwealth Act No. 548 was passed by the
National Assembly in the exercise of the paramount police power of the state.

Said Act, by virtue of which the rules and regulations complained of were promulgated,
aims to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on national roads, in the
interest and convenience of the public. In enacting said law, therefore, the National
Assembly was prompted by considerations of public convenience and welfare. It was
inspired by a desire to relieve congestion of traffic. which is, to say the least, a menace
to public safety. Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the enactment of said law,
and the state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal
liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons and property may be
subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort,
health, and prosperity of the state (U.S. v. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil., 218). To this
fundamental aim of our Government the rights of the individual are subordinated.
Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to
prevail over authority because then society will fall into anarchy. Neither should
authority be made to prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into
slavery. The citizen should achieve the required balance of liberty and authority in his
mind through education and personal discipline, so that there may be established the
resultant equilibrium, which means peace and order and happiness for all. The moment
greater authority is conferred upon the government, logically so much is withdrawn
from the residuum of liberty which resides in the people. The paradox lies in the fact
that the apparent curtailment of liberty is precisely the very means of insuring its
preservation.

The scope of police power keeps expanding as civilization advances. As was said in the
case of Dobbins v. Los Angeles (195 U.S. 223, 238; 49 L. ed. 169), "the right to
exercise the police power is a continuing one, and a business lawful today may in the
future, because of the changed situation, the growth of population or other causes,
become a menace to the public health and welfare, and be required to yield to the
public good." And in People v. Pomar (46 Phil., 440), it was observed that "advancing
civilization is bringing within the police power of the state today things which were not
thought of as being within such power yesterday. The development of civilization, the
rapidly increasing population, the growth of public opinion, with an increasing desire on
the part of the masses and of the government to look after and care for the interests of
the individuals of the state, have brought within the police power many questions for
regulation which formerly were not so considered." cralaw virtua1aw library

The petitioner finally avers that the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon
the constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the well-
being and economic security of all the people. The promotion of social justice, however,
is to be achieved not through a mistaken sympathy towards any given group. Social
justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but the
humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so
that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be
approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the
adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all
the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and
social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community,
constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-
constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all
governments on the time-honored principle of salus populi est suprema lex.

Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of

interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that
should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social
and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the
state of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about
"the greatest good to the greatest number." cralaw virtua1aw library

In view of the foregoing, the writ of prohibition prayed for is hereby denied, with costs
against the petitioner. So ordered.

Avanceña, C.J., Imperial, Diaz. and Horrilleno. JJ. concur.

Summary:

Calalang filed a petition for writ of prohibition against certain officials in enforcing the
prohibition of animal-drawn vehicles in certain areas and during certain periods of the
day. The Court ruled that Commonwealth Act No 548, the law in question, is
constitutional.

Doctrine:

Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but the
humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so
that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be
approximated.

Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the
Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent
elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social
equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally,
through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the
exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored
principle of salus populi est suprema lex.

Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of

interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that
should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social
and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state
of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about "the
greatest good to the greatest number."

Facts:

 Maximo Calalang brought a petition for a writ of prohibition against the following
respondents: Chairman of the National Traffic Commission (A.D. Williams),
Director of Public Works (Vicente Fragante), Acting Secretary of Public Works
and Communications (Sergio Bayan), Mayor of the City of Manila (Eulogio
Rodriguez), and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila (Juan Dominguez).
 It is alleged in the petition that the respondents have caused and enforced
the prohibition of animal-drawn vehicles from passing along Rosario St.
extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmarinas Street (from 7:30am-
12:30pm and from 1:30-5:30p.m.); and Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad
crossing at Antipolo Street to Echague Street (from 7-11a.m.) for a period of one
year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge, to the detriment not
only of their owners but of the riding public as well.
 The petitioner avers that the rules and regulations to regulate and control the use
of and traffic on national roads, pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 548, infringe
upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice to insure
the well-being and economic security of all the people
Issues Ratio:

 WON CA No 548 is unconstitutional for being an undue delegation of legislative

power – NO
o The provisions of CA No 548 do not confer legislative power upon the
Director of Public Works and the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications.
o The authority therein conferred upon them and under which they
promulgated the rules and regulations now complained of is not to
determine what public policy demands but merely to carry out the
legislative policy laid down by the National Assembly.
o The delegated power is not the determination of what the law shall be,
but merely the ascertainment of the facts and circumstances upon
which the application of said law is to be predicated.
o To promulgate rules and regulations on the use of national roads and to
determine when and how long a national road should be closed to traffic,
in view of the condition of the road or the traffic thereon and the
requirements of public convenience and interest, is an administrative
function which cannot be directly discharged by the National
Assembly. It must depend on the discretion of some other government
official to whom is confided the duty of determining whether the proper
occasion exists for executing the law. But it cannot be said that the
exercise of such discretion is the making of the law.

 WON CA No 548 constitutes as an unlawful interference with legitimate business

or trade and abridge the right to personal liberty and freedom of locomotion – NO
o Commonwealth Act No. 548 was passed by the National Assembly in the
exercise of the paramount police power of the state.
o In enacting said law, therefore, the National Assembly was prompted by
considerations of public convenience and welfare. It was inspired by a
desire to relieve congestion of traffic, a menace to public safety. Public
welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the enactment of said law, and the
state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with
personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations.
o Persons and property may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and
burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health, and
prosperity of the state.

 WON CA No 548 infringes upon the constitutional precept regarding the

promotion of social justice – NO
 o The promotion of social justice is to be achieved not through a mistaken
sympathy towards any given group. Social justice is "neither communism,
nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but the humanization of laws
and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so
that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at
least be approximated.
o Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the
adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic
stability of all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance
of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the
members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of
measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise
of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-
honored principle of salus populi est suprema lex.
o Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the
necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse units of a
society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly
extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic
life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state
of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and of bringing
about "the greatest good to the greatest number."

Dispositive:

In view of the foregoing, the writ of prohibition prayed for is hereby denied, with costs
against the petitioner. So ordered.

SALVACION VS. CENTRAL BANK

MARCH 28, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ

KAREN E. SALVACION, minor, thru Federico N. Salvacion, Jr., father and

Natural Guardian, and Spouses FEDERICO N. SALVACION, JR., and
EVELINA E. SALVACION vs. CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES,
CHINA BANKING CORPORATION and GREG BARTELLI y NORTHCOTT
G.R. No. 94723 August 21, 1997
FACTS: Greg Bartelli, an American tourist, was arrested for committing four counts
of rape and serious illegal detention against Karen Salvacion. Police recovered from
him several dollar checks and a dollar account in the China Banking Corp. He was,
however, able to escape from prison. In a civil case filed against him, the trial court
awarded Salvacion moral, exemplary and attorney’s fees amounting to almost
P1,000,000.00.
Salvacion tried to execute the judgment on the dollar deposit of Bartelli with the
China Banking Corp. but the latter refused arguing that Section 11 of Central Bank
Circular No. 960 exempts foreign currency deposits from attachment, garnishment, or
any other order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any
administrative body whatsoever. Salvacion therefore filed this action for declaratory
relief in the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Should Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and Section 8 of
Republic Act No. 6426, as amended by PD 1246, otherwise known as the Foreign
Currency Deposit Act be made applicable to a foreign transient?
HELD: NO.
The provisions of Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246,
insofar as it amends Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6426, are hereby held to be
INAPPLICABLE to this case because of its peculiar circumstances. Respondents are
hereby required to comply with the writ of execution issued in the civil case and to
release to petitioners the dollar deposit of Bartelli in such amount as would satisfy the
judgment.

Supreme Court ruled that the questioned law makes futile the favorable judgment and
award of damages that Salvacion and her parents fully deserve. It then proceeded to
show that the economic basis for the enactment of RA No. 6426 is not anymore
present; and even if it still exists, the questioned law still denies those entitled to due
process of law for being unreasonable and oppressive. The intention of the law may
be good when enacted. The law failed to anticipate the iniquitous effects producing
outright injustice and inequality such as the case before us.

The SC adopted the comment of the Solicitor General who argued that the Offshore
Banking System and the Foreign Currency Deposit System were designed to draw
deposits from foreign lenders and investors and, subsequently, to give the latter
protection. However, the foreign currency deposit made by a transient or a tourist is
not the kind of deposit encouraged by PD Nos. 1034 and 1035 and given incentives
and protection by said laws because such depositor stays only for a few days in the
country and, therefore, will maintain his deposit in the bank only for a short time.
Considering that Bartelli is just a tourist or a transient, he is not entitled to the
protection of Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246 against
attachment, garnishment or other court processes.
Further, the SC said: “In fine, the application of the law depends on the extent of its
justice. Eventually, if we rule that the questioned Section 113 of Central Bank
Circular No. 960 which exempts from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or
process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body
whatsoever, is applicable to a foreign transient, injustice would result especially to a
citizen aggrieved by a foreign guest like accused Greg Bartelli. This would negate
Article 10 of the New Civil Code which provides that “in case of doubt in the
interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended
right and justice to prevail.”
___________

NOTES:
– On February 4, 1989, Greg Bartelli y Northcott, an American tourist, coaxed and
lured petitioner Karen Salvacion, then 12 years old to go with him to his apartment.
Therein, Greg Bartelli detained Karen Salvacion for four days, or up to February 7,
1989 and was able to rape the child once on February 4, and three times each day on
February 5, 6, and 7, 1989. On February 7, 1989, after policemen and people living
nearby, rescued Karen, Greg Bartelli was arrested and detained at the Makati
Municipal Jail. The policemen recovered from Bartelli the following items: 1.) Dollar
Check No. 368, Control No. 021000678-1166111303, US 3,903.20; 2.) COCOBANK
Bank Book No. 104-108758-8 (Peso Acct.); 3.) Dollar Account — China Banking
Corp., US$/A#54105028-2; 4.) ID-122-30-8877; 5.) Philippine Money (P234.00)
cash; 6.) Door Keys 6 pieces; 7.) Stuffed Doll (Teddy Bear) used in seducing the
complainant.

ELENA BUENAVENTURA MULLER, Petitioner,

vs.
HELMUT MULLER, Respondent.

G.R. No. 149615, August 29, 2006

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

Facts:

Petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller and respondent Helmut Muller got married and
lived in Germany owned by the respondent parents but then they decided to reside in
the Philippines permanently. The respondent had inherit the house in Germany from
his parents which he sold and used to proceeds for purchase of a parcel of land in
Antipolo, Rizal and he registered it in the name of petitioner, Elena Buenaventura
Muller.
Due to incompatibilities and maltreatment of respondent to the petitioner, the spouses
eventually separated.
The respondent filed a petition for separation of properties before RTC Quezon City. The
court granted said petition and ordered equal partition of personal properties located
within the country, excluding those acquired by gratuitous title during the marriage.
With regard to the Antipolo property the court ruled that he cannot recover his funds
because the property was purchased in violation of Section 7, Article XII of the
Constitution.

Issue:

Whether or not, respondent Helmut Muller is entitled to reimbursement.

Held:

No, Helmut Muller is not entitled to reimbursement.

There is an express prohibition against foreigners owning land in the Philippines.
Art. XII, Sec. 7 of the 1987 Constitution provides: “Save in cases of hereditary
succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals,
corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.”
In the case at bar, the respondent willingly and knowingly bought the property despite a
constitutional prohibition. And to get away with that constitutional prohibition, he put
the property under the name of his Filipina wife. He tried to do indirectly what the
fundamental law bars him to do directly.
With this, the Supreme Court ruled that respondent cannot seek reimbursement on the
ground of equity. It has been held that equity as a rule will follow the law and will not
permit that to be done indirectly which, because of public policy, cannot be done
directly.

G.R. No. 203947, February 26, 2014

RUFA A. RUBIO, BARTOLOME BANTOTO, LEON ALAGADMO, RODRIGO DELICTA,

AND ADRIANO ALABATA, Petitioners, v. LOURDES ALABATA, Respondent.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 seeks to annul and set aside the
November 16, 2011 Decision1 and the September 26, 2012 Resolution2 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA–G.R. CV No. 02497, which affirmed the February 28, 2008
Resolution of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 42, Dumaguete City (RTC–42), in an
action for revival of judgment.

The Facts:

Petitioners Rufa A. Rubio, Bartolome Bantoto, Leon Alagadmo, Rodrigo Delicta, and
Adriano Alabata (petitioners) and respondent Lourdes Alabata (respondent) were
protagonists in an earlier case for annulment of declaration of heirship and sale,
reconveyance and damages before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 43, Dumaguete City
(RTC–43). Docketed as Civil Case No. 10153, the case was decided in favor of
petitioner. In its October 31, 1995 Decision, the RTC–43 (1) voided the “Declaration of
Heirship and Sale;” (2) ordered respondent to reconvey the entire subject property to
petitioners; (3) dismissed respondent’s counterclaim; and (4) ordered her to pay moral
and exemplary damages plus the cost of suit.3

Not in conformity, respondent elevated the RTC–43 case to the CA. She, however, later
withdrew her appeal which paved the way for the RTC–43 Decision to lapse into finality.
The CA resolution granting respondent’s motion to withdraw became final and
executory on June 20, 1997. On August 20, 1997, the Entry of Judgment 4 was issued
and recorded in the CA Book of Entries of Judgments.
Unfortunately, the judgment was not executed. Petitioners claim that their counsel at
the Public Attorney’s Office, Dumaguete City (PAO–Dumaguete), was never informed
that the entry of judgment had already been issued.5 They pointed out that, initially,
their case was handled by the PAO–Dumaguete, but when the RTC–43 decision was
appealed to the CA by respondent, their case was handed over to the Special Appealed
Cases Division (SAC–PAO) at the PAO Central Office in Manila. They explained that
although a copy of the Entry of Judgment was sent to Atty. Ma. Lourdes Naz, the SAC–
PAO lawyer in charge of their case, she failed to inform petitioners of the issued entry
of judgment before she resigned from PAO sometime in November 1997. She also failed
to inform PAO–Dumaguete of the said development. When petitioners followed up with
PAO–Dumaguete, it was of the belief that the appeal of respondent was still pending. 6

In November 2007, or more than ten (10) years from the date when the RTC–43
decision was entered in the CA Book of Entries of Judgments, petitioners found out that
the said decision had become final and executory when their nephew secured a copy of
the Entry of Judgment.

On December 5, 2007, petitioners, through PAO–Dumaguete, filed an action for revival

of judgment which was raffled to RTC–42. On February 28, 2008, after respondent filed
her Answer with Affirmative Defenses, RTC–42 granted her Motion to Dismiss and
ordered petitioners’ case for revival of judgment dismissed on the ground of
prescription. Petitioners sought reconsideration, but RTC–42 denied the motion on April
4, 2008.7

Petitioners then interposed an appeal before the CA. The latter, on November 16, 2011,
rendered its assailed decision denying petitioners’ appeal and affirming the dismissal by
the RTC–42 of their case for revival of judgment. On September 26, 2012, the CA
denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.

Hence, this petition.

LONE ISSUE

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN STRICTLY APPLYING THE PROCEDURAL RULES

ON PRESCRIPTION AND DISMISSING THE CASE BASED ON THE SAID GROUND,
INSPITE [OF] THE FACT THAT PETITIONERS WILL SUFFER MANIFEST
INJUSTICE AND DEPRIVATION OF THEIR PROPERTY, DUE TO A FAULT NOT
ATTRIBUTABLE TO THEM.8

The Court resolves to grant the petition.

This case falls under Section 6, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which
states:

SEC.6. Execution by motion or by independent action. – A final and executory

judgment or order may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its
entry. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations,
a judgment may be enforced by action. The revived judgment may also be enforced by
motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry and thereafter by action before it
is barred by the statute of limitations.

The prior case before the RTC–43 involved a reconveyance of a parcel of land in favor
of the rightful owners, the heirs of one Agapito Alagadmo. Petitioners, in instituting the
case against respondent, showed their desire and resolve to pursue and take back what
was rightfully theirs. Eventually, they succeeded in obtaining justice and won back what
was theirs. For their sufferings, the trial court saw it fit to also assess moral damages
and exemplary damages against respondent.9

When the case was elevated by respondent to the CA, the PAO continued to represent
petitioners’ cause. As it was an appealed case, the matter was referred to, and handled
by, SAC–PAO in Manila.

For reasons known only to her, the respondent withdrew her appeal, which resulted in
the RTC–43 Decision becoming final and executory. The petitioners, however, never
knew of this because when they followed up the case with PAO–Dumaguete, they were
informed that the appeal was still pending.10

It appears from the records that a copy of the Entry of Judgment was sent to Atty. Ma.
Lourdes Naz, the SAC–PAO lawyer in charge of their case, who had resigned.
Unfortunately, she failed to inform petitioners of the said entry of judgment before her
resignation in November 1997. She also failed to inform PAO–Dumaguete of such
development.

It was only in November 2007, when petitioners actually discovered that their victory
was already final after their nephew secured a copy of the entry of judgment from RTC–
43.

Indeed, both the RTC–42 and the CA were acting in accordance with the rules and
jurisprudence when they dismissed the action for revival of judgment. Section 6 is
clear. Once a judgment becomes final and executory, the prevailing party can have it
executed as a matter of right by mere motion within five (5) years from the date of
entry of judgment. If the prevailing party fails to have the decision enforced by a
motion after the lapse of five (5) years, the said judgment is reduced to a right of
action which must be enforced by the institution of a complaint in a regular court within
ten (10) years from the time the judgment becomes final. 11

An action for revival of judgment is governed by Article 1144 (3), Article 1152 of the
Civil Code and Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. Thus,

Art. 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time the
right of action accrues:

xxxx

(3) Upon a judgment

Article 1152 of the Civil Code states:

Art. 1152. The period for prescription of actions to demand the fulfillment of obligations
declared by a judgment commences from the time the judgment became final.

To allow a strict application of the rules, however, would result in an injustice to

petitioners considering (1) that respondent decided not to contest the RTC–43 decision
and withdrew her appeal and (2) that no fault could be attributed to petitioners.

Petitioners could not afford to engage the services of a private counsel and so were
represented by the PAO. As has been repeatedly stated all over the records, PAO, SAC–
PAO in particular, failed them. SAC–PAO never informed them of the abandonment by
respondent of her appeal or of the entry of judgment. Under the circumstances, they
could not be faulted for their subsequent actions. They went to PAO–Dumaguete and
they were told that the case was still pending on appeal. Due to their penury and
unfamiliarity or downright ignorance of the rules, they could not be expected to bypass
PAO–Dumaguete and directly verify the status of the case with the SAC–PAO. They had
to trust their lawyer and wait.

No prejudice is caused to respondent because she withdrew her appeal. Withdrawing

her appeal means that she respected the RTC–43 Decision, which voided the
“Declaration of Heirship and Sale,” dismissed respondent’s counterclaim, and ordered
her to reconvey the entire subject property to petitioners and to pay moral and
exemplary damages plus the cost of suit. Since the decision became final and
executory, she has been in possession of the property which rightfully belongs to
petitioners. She will continue to hold on to the property just because of a technicality.

Due to the peculiarities of this case, the Court, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction,
relaxes the rules and decides to allow the action for the revival of judgment filed by
petitioners. The Court believes that it is its bounden duty to exact justice in every way
possible and exercise its soundest discretion to prevent a wrong. Although strict
compliance with the rules of procedure is desired, liberal interpretation is warranted in
cases where a strict enforcement of the rules will not serve the ends of justice; and that
it is a better rule that courts, under the principle of equity, will not be guided or bound
strictly by the statute of limitations or the doctrine of laches when to do so, manifest
wrong or injustice would result.12 Thus:

“x x x procedural rules may, nonetheless, be relaxed for the most persuasive of reasons
in order to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his
thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed. Corollarily, the rule,
which states that the mistakes of counsel bind the client, may not be strictly followed
where observance of it would result in the outright deprivation of the client’s liberty or
property, or where the interest of justice so requires. 13

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The November 16, 2011 Decision and the
September 26, 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA–G.R. CV No. 02497
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court
for appropriate action.

SO ORDERED.
The rule, which states that the mistakes of
counsel bind the client, may not be strictly
followed where observance of it would result in
the outright deprivation of the client’s liberty
or property, or where the interest of justice so
requires.
RUFA A. RUBIO, BARTOLOME BANTOTO, LEON ALAGADMO, RODRIGO DELICTA, AND
ADRIANO ALABATA, PETITIONERS, VS. LOURDES ALABATA, RESPONDENT. G.R. No. 203947,
February 26, 2014. - The Lawyer's Post

Due to the peculiarities of this case, the Court, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, relaxes the rules
and decides to allow the action for the revival of judgment filed by petitioners. The Court believes that it is
its bounden duty to exact justice in every way possible and exercise its soundest discretion to prevent a
wrong. Although strict compliance with the rules of procedure is desired, liberal interpretation is warranted
in cases where a strict enforcement of the rules will not serve the ends of justice; and that it is a better
rule that courts, under the principle of equity, will not be guided or bound strictly by the statute of
limitations or the doctrine of laches when to do so, manifest wrong or injustice would result. Thus:

“x x x procedural rules may, nonetheless, be relaxed for the most persuasive of reasons in order to relieve
a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with
the procedure prescribed. Corollarily, the rule, which states that the mistakes of counsel bind the client,
may not be strictly followed where observance of it would result in the outright deprivation of the client’s
liberty or property, or where the interest of justice so requires.”

2.SUBSTANTIVE VS. ADJECTIVE LAW

A. TAMAYO VS GSELL
 G.R. No. 10765 December 22, 1916
 PACIENTE TAMAYO, father of the minor, Brualio Tamayo, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CARLOS GSELL, defendant-appellant.
 William A. Kincaid and Thomas L. Hartigan for appellant.
Modesto Joaquin for appellee.


 TRENT, J.:
 This is an action for damages against the defendant Gsell for personal injuries suffered by
Braulio Tamayo, minor son of the plaintiff. From a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in his
capacity as guardian ad litem of Braulio Tamayo for the sum of P400, without costs, except
P25 fees for the attorney of the Bureau of Labor, the defendant appealed and now urges that
the trial court erred:
 1. In permitting the attorney of the Bureau of Labor to conduct the case and awarding him
P25 fees.
 2. In finding that Garlos Gsell is the owner of the factory wherein Braulio was injured.
 3. In finding that the accident occurred because Braulio Tamayo was assigned to work to
which he was not accustomed and did not understand, without any previous warning as to
the dangers thereof or instructions as to the manner of doing the work, in order to avoid
being injured.
 4. In finding that the negligence of the defendant or the persons for whom he is responsible
was the cause of the accident.
 5. In declining to sustain the defendant's defenses of contributory negligence and
assumption of risks.
 6. In awarding damages against the defendant in the absence of a showing that the injuries
in any way diminished Braulio Tamayo' earning capacity.
 Act No. 1868, approved June 18, 1908, creating the Bureau of Labor, provides in section 2
that the purpose of the Bureau shall be to see to the proper enforcement of all existing laws
and those which shall be enacted hereafter with reference to labor and capital in the
Philippine Islands and to promote the enactment of all other legislation which shall tend to
establish the material, social, intellectual, and moral improvement of workers; to acquire,
collect, compile, systematize, and submit from time to time reports to the Secretary of
Commerce and Police, statistical data relating to the hours and wages of labor, the number
of workers in each trade or occupation, etc., and to inspect all shops, factories, industrial and
commercial establishments and "to take the proper legal steps to prevent the exposure of the
health or lives of laborers and to aid and assist by all proper legal means laborers and
workers in securing just compensation for their labor, and the indemnity prescribed by law for
injuries resulting from accidents when engaged in the performance of their duties." Sections
2 and 3 of Act No. 1868 were amended by Act No. 2258, but such amendments do not affect
the issues involved in the instant case. Act No. 2385 amends subsection (d) of section 2 and
section 3 of Act No. 1868 and adds several paragraphs to the end of section 4 of that Act
and repeals Act No. 2258. Subsection (d) of section 2, as thus amended, reads:
 To secure the settlement of difference between employer and laborer and between master
and servant and to avert strikes and lockouts, acting as arbitrator between the parties
interested, summoning them to appear before it, and advising and bringing about, after
hearing their respective allegations and evidence, such arrangement as these may, in his
judgment, show to be just and fair.
 The pertinent provision added to section 4 and provide that the Bureau of Labor shall also
have an attorney who shall be paid a fixed salary per annum.
 Said attorney shall assist the Director or Assistant Director of Labor in all legal questions by
them submitted to him, and shall bring suit gratuitously, in the proper courts, for laborers or
servants when he shall deem this proper after the failure of the endeavors to bring about a
friendly settlement made by the Director or Assistant Director of Labor in the performance of
the duties imposed had the exercise of the powers conferred upon them by subsection (d). . .
. Provided, however, That the attorney of the Bureau of Labor shall not bring suit under this
Act unless the plaintiff shall have previously secured a certificate of indigency from the
proper court.
 The sentences of the courts trying cases under this Act shall provide, in case of judgment in
favor of the plaintiff, for the payment by the defendant of the sum of twenty-five pesos as
costs of the attorney of the Bureau of Labor, which sum shall be collected in the same
 manner as other costs and turned into the Insular Treasury and credited to the general
funds.
 It is argued that in conferring the power and duty upon the Director of the Bureau of Labor "to
secure the settlement of difference between employer and laborer and between master and
servant and to avert strikes and lockouts" the legislature never intended to bring negligence
cases resulting in personal injuries under the jurisdiction of the Director. If the attorney of the
Bureau of Labor is authorized to represent the plaintiff in actions such as the one under
consideration he could, it is said, appear on behalf of a laborer charged by his employer with
larceny of materials or on behalf of an employee under prosecution for assaulting his master.
We think this result does not necessarily follow. The Director is given the power and it is
made his duty to aid and assist by all legal means laborers and workers in securing the
indemnity prescribed by law for injuries resulting from accidents. If this cannot be done by "a
friendly settlement," then the attorney "shall bring suit gratuitously" for the employee if such
employee is too por to employ private counsel. No additional right of action is given laborers
and workers by this legislation.
 It was only the intention of the Legislature, as expressed in the acts, to provide the services
of an attorney for pauper employees in certain cased and to tax a portion of the costs of such
services against the defendant if the suit be successful. This, it is true, is advanced
legislation when compared with similar Acts in the United States. In Missouri the Bureau of
Labor is in most cases chiefly an instrument for gathering statistics. The arbitration of
disputes between employers and employees is given to a board distinct form the Bureau of
Labor (Ann. Sta., 1906). Minnesota (Statutes of 1894) provides for a Bureau of Labor to
gather statistics and inspect factories, with the power to enforce the laws pertaining to the
welfare of the workingmen, but gives it no power to prosecute civil actions for individuals. In
Nebraska the Bureau of Labor is a statistic gatherer, a factory inspector, and protector of the
laborer to the extent that the commissioner may file a complaint for a violation of the Act
creating the Bureau and defining its powers, which the county attorney must prosecute.
(Statutes of Nebraska, 1911.) Other States have similar statues. Some State provide for
public defenders in criminal cases. In this jurisdiction provisions are made for the defense of
pauper criminals and section 35 of the Code of Civil Procedure authorizes the Supreme
Court and the Courts of First Instance to assign any lawyer to render professional aid to a
p[arty in any pending action, free of charge, if such court, upon full investigation, shall find
that the party is destitute and unable to employ a lawyer. The statute under consideration
requires a certificate of indigency from the court before an attorney of the Bureau of Labor
can institute the action. The only essential difference between the two systems is a small
amount for the services of the attorney of the Bureau of Labor, which is taxed against
defendants when the plaintiffs are successful, but it cannot be done except in cases where
"a friendly settlement" has failed. Considering the scope and purposes of the Acts, in
connection with the fact that the plaintiffs are paupers, we see no reason for holding that the
provisions attacked are in violation of public policy or transcends the power of the
Legislature. Therefore, the first assignment of error is without merit.
 The second assignment of error has no merit. The plaintiff testified positively that the
defendant is the owner of the factory and when another witness was asked who the owner
was, counsel for the defendant stated," We do not dispute the ownership." No other
testimony was offered on this point and all proceeded thereafter upon the theory that there
was no question about the fact that the defendant is the owner of the match factory, yet
counsel, in their printed brief, say that "there is not one syllable of evidence in the testimony
or anywhere else in the record as to the ownership of this factory."
 The other assignments of error raise both questions of fact and law. The trial court's findings
of fact are these:
 The facts proven in the case are as follows:
 1. That the boy Braulio Tamayo, whose age neither he nor his father, Paciente Tamayo,
knows, nor does it appear of record, but which, in the opinion of the court, is about eleven or
 twelve years, was one of the workmen employed in the match factory, situated in Santa Ana,
Manila, and owned by the defendant, Carlos Gsell. On the 13th of March, 1914, the boy met
with an accident which consisted of an injury caused by the knife of one of the machines of
the factory which cut the little ring fingers on the right hand, the latter of which was severed.
 2. That the accident arose by reason of his being assigned by Eugenio Murcia, one of the
foremen employed in the factory, to perform work to which he was not accustomed. He was
put at the machine of Arcadio Reyes only the day of the accident, in spite of his persistent
and manifest opposition to assist the machinist; his work was to recover strips, used in the
manufacture of match boxes, from the machine, Exhibit 1, which were extracted from the
said machine from the wood placed therein. At the same time he had to clean out the pieces
of wood form said strips, which stuck in the machine and obstructed its proper working. Prior
to the date in question the only work entrusted to the boy, Braulio Tamayo, was to pick over
the piles of wood from which the strips used in the manufacture of match boxes were made
and select the best pieces for the purpose.
 3. Due to his inexperience in the work to which, for the first item and without any preparation
or instruction, he had been assigned in essaying to clean that part of the machine where the
pieces of wood from the strips were stuck, he was caught by the knife of the machine and
the right finger of his right hand was served. He was thereupon taken to the General
Hospital, where he received medical treatment until he was released.
 4. The plaintiff complied with the provision contained in section 4 of Act No. 1874, advising
the employer, who is the defendant herein, of the accident which had occurred to his son.
 In view of the facts as they were shown in the record, in spite of the conflicting testimony of
the witnesses of both sides, the court is obliged to give credit to the testimony of the
witnesses for the plaintiff, and since it was not contradicted by Eugenio Murcia, to whom is
attributed the determination to assign Braulio Tamayo, on the date and hour in question, to
another machine and to give him, inspite of his tender years, work of a class to which he was
not accustomed, the responsibility contracted by the employer to indemnify the injured
workman, represented by his father, for the damage and injury which he has suffered,
according to the Act cited, is very clear.
 Eugenio Murcia was one of the foremen employed in the factory; he knew the kind of work
which was assigned to each of the employees in relation to their respective ages and he
must have known that it is not the same thing to select wood lying on the ground, work in
which Braulio Tamayo had been employed ever since he entered the employ of the factory,
as to receive the strips delivered from the machine, Exhibit 1, and to clean the said machine,
even while it was running, of those parts of the strips which might interfere with its working,
and he should not have suddenly ordered Braulio Tamayo, taking into account his youth, to
temporarily take the place of a workman who ordinarily performed the work we have spoken
of on Arcadio Reyes' machine, especially without first preparing him and giving him the
necessary instruction in order to avoid an accident such as that which occurred and one to
which a boy of the age of Braulio Tamayo would be exposed.
 After a careful examination of the record we are convinced that the foregoing findings of fact
are supported by a fair preponderance of the evidence. This being true and the findings
being the result found by the trial court from conflicting testimony, we certainly are not
justified in reversing the judgment upon this branch of the case. In United States vs. Benitez
and Lipia (18 Phil. Rep., 513, 517), Justice Moreland, speaking for the court said:
 In a conflict of testimony such as is presented in this case, this court must reopened to a
considerable extent upon the discernment of the judge who sits at the trial. A careful and
discriminating trial judge has unequaled advantages in determining the relative credibility of
opposing witnesses. If he exercises his facilities with shrewdness and sagacity, he performs
a most valuable work for the appellate court. We have considered this case in a very
painstaking manner. We have searched the record for any evidence indicating that the
learned trial court was mistaken in his judgment as to the relative credibility of the witnesses
or that he had overlooked some fact or circumstances of weight or influence in passing upon
 the evidence, or that he had misinterpreted the significance of the facts as proved. We have
been unable to find from the record that the learned trial court has fallen into such error; and,
in accordance with the rule which we have so often laid down, namely, that this court will not
interfere with the judgment of the trial court in passing upon the relative credibility of
opposing witnesses unless there appears in the record some fact or circumstance of weight
and influence which has been overlooked or its significance misinterpreted by him, we
decline to interfere with the judgment of the trial court upon the facts in this case.
 The foregoing well considered rule is perfectly applicable to the case under consideration. lawphi1.net

 Dr. Vasquez of the General Hospital, who attended Braulio Tamayo at the time he was
injured, testified in reference to the nature and character of the injuries as follows:
 Q. Do you know in what condition the child's finger was? — A. The finger was mashed.
 Q. Are you sure that it was mashed? — A. Mashed and severed.
 During the trial of the case counsel for the defendant made this statement:
 I wish to appear of record that the right hand of the child shows that the severed finger was
cut at the first joint. It also bears a diagonal scar inside (interior?) and near the tip of the next
finger, the little finger.
 With reference to whether there was a dimunition in the earning capacity of Braulio Tamayo
due to the injuries received and as to the payment of expenses and salary while he was
being treated for the injuries, Geiser, superintendent of the defendant's factory, testified that
the defendant paid the hospital bill and Braulio's regular salary of fifty cents a day during the
time he was absent; that after Braulio left the hospital he (the witness) tried to get him to
return to work at the same salary, but he refused to do so; and that Braulio could occupy any
place in the factory which his age would permit, as his hand had been cured. While this
witness did not definitely state that Braulio's injuries did not diminish his earning capacity for
the work he was doing in the factory, yet it may be inferred, and we so decide, that the boy
can perform his former works in the factory just as well as now as he could before the
accident, or in other words, the injuries caused no dimunition of his ability to perform such
work. As to the character of the injuries, we have the finding of the trial court to the effect that
the little and ring fingers on the right hand were cut, the latter of which was severed, and the
statement of counsel that the ring finger was cut off at the first joint and the little finger
showed a diagonal scar on the inside of the end.
 The result is that we have a case where a foreman of a match factory, owned and operated
by the defendant, put a young ignorant employee to work at dangerous machinery without
any previous preparation or instruction. The boy was only 11 or 12 years old and so ignorant
that he did not know before the accident, which resulted in the severing of his ring finger on
his right hand at the first joint, doing only the very simplest work, in the performance of which
he had nothing to do with the machinery. He was ordered against his persistent and manifest
opposition to assist in cleaning out the pieces of wood "which stuck in the machinery and
obstructed its proper working," without any previous warning of the dangers incident to such
work or previous instruction as to how he should do the work in order to avoid accidents. He
was entirely unfamiliar with that kind of work, which required at least some knowledge of the
working of the machine. The machine was not defective and the danger resulting from
putting one's finger under the knife was obvious. To this extent the established facts are
against the contentions of the defendant.
 The questions of law require an investigation touching the scope and purposes of Act No.
1874, known as the Employer's Liability Act. We will first inquire into the origin and history of
this Act.
 By a joint resolution of the two Houses, dated February 1, 1908, there were appointed on
April 30, 1908, a committee of twenty-one for the purpose of "preparing and submitting to the
president of the Commission and the Speaker of the Assembly its recommendations on the
Labor Accident Bill presented by the Representative for the Second District of Manila,
Honorable Fernando Ma. Guerrero, and to study, prepare, and submit also any other
 recommendations deemed pertinent in the premises." (Vol. 2, p. 289 of the Commission
Journal of 1908.)
 Before this committee met for the purpose, as indicated two other bills were drafted, one by
another member of the Assembly and the other by the Secretary of Commerce and Police,
who was then a member of the Legislature. During the sessions of the committee the three
bills were discussed and by a majority vote a fourth bill was prepared and its passage
recommended. The Assembly then passed a bill substantially the same as that
recommended by the committee. The committee of the Commission, to whom the Assembly
bill was referred, recommended in its report of June 13, 1908, various amendments. These
amendments were adopted by the Commission and the bill, as thus amended, was passed
by that body. The bill in its amended form was returned to the Assembly and passed by it,
and became law (Act No. 1874) on June 19, 1908. The chairman of the joint committee, in
his report to the President of the Commission and the speaker of the Assembly, in referring
to the bill prepared by the Secretary of Commerce and Police, said:
 One of these (bills) was prepared in the Department of Commerce and Police for submission
to the committee, which was drawn substantially along the lines which have prevailed in the
State of Massachusetts some years and upon which interpretations have been made by the
Masachusetts courts defining the exact meaning of the provisions of the law. (Vol. 2, p. 298,
Commission Journal of 1908.)
 A comparison of Act No. 1874 with that of the State of Massachusetts of 1902 shows that the
former is essentially a copy of the latter. The first section of each is exactly the same and, in
so far as the question under consideration are concerned, there are no differences in the
other sections of the two acts.
 It appears from the official proceedings of the joint committee that the Guerrero bill, which
was rejected by the committee and the Legislature, was based on the Spanish law. This is
shown from the following extract from these proceedings:
 The clause contained in the Guerrero bill was based on a similar clause found in the Spanish
law, which was put in the same order to make provision for the damage and detriment
caused by work in the mercury mines, and as the Guerrero bill was based on the Spanish
law this clause was put in. . . . For this reason I move that the amendment proposed by Mr.
Javier be rejected but the section as it is drawn up be adopted.
 Act No. 1874 does not attempt to define generally the rights of master and servants, and is
not a codification of the law. Reference must be made to some other law to define who are
masters, who are servants, what is the scope of the employment, and whether the injury was
the approximate result of the negligence; and negligence itself must be determined by that
other law and not by the Act. The Act does not impose any obligation on the master to
employ competent servants nor to instruct or warn his servants about their work or the
dangers of it. These obligations, if they exist, must be found elsewhere. Neither does the Act
define the word "damages" by setting forth the element thereof, nor does it fix any general
rules for determining the measure of damages in personal injury case brought under it. It
does provide, however, that in those case where damages are awarded for the death of an
employee the same shall be assessed with reference to the degree of culpability of the
employer or of the person for whose negligence the employer is liable. The Act also fixes the
minimum and maximum amounts which may be awarded if deaths results from the injuries,
and the maximum amount of damages for personal injuries not resulting in the death of the
employee. In determining the important question here involved for the purpose of
ascertaining the intention of the Legislature, must we look to the Civil Code and the decision
of this court in construing its provisions for our guidance or was the statute adopted with the
construction given to it by the court in the country from which it was copied?
 The Massachusetts statute was "copied verbatim, with some variations of detail, from the
English statute (43 and 44 Vict. ch. 42). Therefore, it is proper, if not necessary, to begin by
considering how the English act had been constructed before our statute was enacted."
(Ryalls vs. Mechanics' Mills, 150 Mass., 190; 5 L. R. A., 667.)
 The Employers' Liability Act of Alabama, first enacted in 1855 (Civil Code 1907, Ch. 80, sec.
3910), is a substantial, if not an exact copy, of the English Act of 1880.
 This court is not finally concluded by the decision of any other State court or the British court,
in their construction of a similar statute, but the opinion of learned courts upon similar
questions are entitled to great weight, and this is specially true when the statute, from which
ours was copied had been construed prior to its enactment by our legislature. (Brimingham
Ry & Electric Co. vs. Allen, 99 Ala., 359, 371; 20 L. R. A., 457.)
 The Employers' Liability Act of Colorado (Laws 1893, chap. 77; Mill's Annotated Statutes,
Supp. 1891-1896, sec. 1511a) was copied from the Massachusetts Act of 1887 and the
Colorado Legislature "presumably adopted the Act with the construction that had been given
it by the courts of that state." (Colorado Milling & Elevator Co. vs. Mitchell [1899], 26 Colo.,
284.)
 Generally speaking, when a statute has been adopted from another State or country and
such statute has previously been construed by the courts of such State or country, the
statute is deemed to have been adopted with the construction so given it.
(Cerezo vs. Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific Co., 33 Phil. Rep., 425, citing 2 Lewis Sutherland on Stat.
Const., sec. 783.)
 The law being so clearly traced to its source and the intention of the Legislature being so
apparent, it is necessary to ascertain and be guided by the decisions of the courts in the
United States construing essentially the same law. Further reference will be made to the
same question in considering the sixth assignment of error.
 Dresser on Employers' Liability (vol. 1, sec. 2), says:
 It is apparent that the act has not attempted to define generally the rights and duties of
master and servants, and is not a codification of the law. . . . Constant reference must be
made to the common law to define who are master and who servants, what is the scope of
the employment, and whether the injury was the proximate result of the negligence; and
negligence itself is determined by the common law, and not by the act. The act, moreover, is
silent concerning certain terms of the contract of service. It does not impose any obligations
on the master to employ competent servants, nor to instruct or warn his servants about their
work or the dangers of it. These obligations were too well settled and important to be taken
away by implication merely, and the courts have held that the act was remedial, and a
concurrent, instead of an exclusive remedy. (Citing cases from Massachusetts, Alabama,
Colorado, and England.)
 The courts in the United States, in order to ascertain what changes have been made by the
Employers' Liability Acts in the "fellow servant rule," held that at common law the master
impliedly agreed to provide competent workmen, and in so doing he was bound to exercise
that measure of care which reasonably prudent men do so under similar circumstances, that
the master is not an insurer, and that it was only necessary that the danger in the work be
not enhanced through his fault. The servant on his part, by entering the employment, was
held to impliedly agree to take upon himself the perils arising from the carelessness and
recklessness of those were in the same employment, without regard to their grade, rank or
authority in the service, provided that the act causing the injury was not in the performance of
any personal duty of the master intrusted to the negligent servant. The whole doctrine in brief
was a denial as to the employee of the principle of respondent superior. Under the latter, a
stranger invited upon the master's premises could recover for the injuries received through
the negligence of the employees. It was this right which was denied to the employees. The
effect of section 1 of the Employers' Liability Act, the same courts held, is to exempt from the
class of fellow servants, the result of whose negligence the servant was held to have
assumed, such persons as are intrusted by the master with duties of superintendence while
in the exercise of them. The persons must be superintendents within the meaning of the Act
and the negligent acts must have been done in the exercise of the controlling functions of
superintendent. Applying these principles to the instant case, there can be no doubt that
Eugenio Murcia, one of the foremen employed in the defendant's factory, was exercising the
 controlling functions of superintendent when he ordered Braulio Tamayo to assist in keeping
the machine clean. Consequently, if such act constitutes negligence, the defendant is liable
in damages for the injures caused thereby, if it were, under the circumstances, the duty of
the defendant or the foreman to warn Braulio Tamayo as to the dangers incident to such
work and instruct him how the work should be done in order to avoid accidents.
 As to whether it was the duty of the defendant or the superintendent to thus warn and
instruct Braulio Tamayo, it is urged that no such duty was imposed on either of them
because, as the danger of putting one's fingers under the knife was obvious, Braulio
assumed all the risks of the work which he was ordered to do. It is further urged that the
defendant is not liable because Braulio Tamayo was not in the exercise of due care at the
time he received the injuries. In other words, the defendant here interposes the common law
defense of assumption of risks and contributory negligence. Some confusion has arisen with
reference to these two defenses. The Supreme Court of the United States explained the
distinction between the two in the following language in the recent case of Seaboard Air Line
Railway vs. Horton (233 U. S., 492, 503):
 The distinction, although simple, is sometimes overlooked. Contributory negligence involves
the notion of some fault or breach of duty on the part of the employees, and since it is
ordinarily his duty to take some precaution for his own safety when engaged in a hazardous
occupation, contributory negligence is sometimes defined as a failure to use such care for
his safety as ordinarily prudent employees in similar circumstances would use. On the other
hand, the assumption of risk, even though the risk be obvious, may be free from any
suggestion of fault or negligence on the part of the employees. The risks may be present,
notwithstanding the exercise of all reasonable care on is part. Some employments — danger
that must be and is confronted in the line of his duty. such danger as are normally and
necessarily incident to the occupation are presumably taken into account in fixing the rate of
wages. And a workman of mature years is taken to assume risks of this sort, whether he is
actually aware of them or not. But risks of another sort, not naturally incident to the
occupation, may arise put of the failure to providing a safe place of work and a suitable and
safe appliances for the work. These the employee is not treated as assuming until he
becomes aware of the defect and risk alike are so obvious that an ordinarily prudent person
under the circumstance would have observed and appreciated them. These distinctions have
been recognized and applied in numerous decisions of this court. (Choctaw, Oklahoma &
Gulf R. Co. vs. McDade, 191 U. S., 64, 68; Schlemmer vs. Buffalo, Rochester & Pittsburg
Ry. Co., 220 U. S., 590, 596; Tex & Pac. Ry. Co. vs. Harvey, 228 U. S., 319, 321; Gila Valley
Ry. Co. vs. Hall, 232 U. S., 94, 102, and cases cited.)
 In Southern Ry. Co. vs. Crockett (234 U. S., 725), the Supreme Court of the United States, in
passing upon the question as to what effect the Federal Employers' Liability Act of April 22,
1908, has had upon the common law defense of assumption of risks, said:
 Upon the merits we of course sustain the contention that by the employers' Liability Act the
defense of assumption of risk remains as at common law, saving in the cases mentioned in
section 4, that is to say: "Any case where the violation by such common carrier of any statute
enacted for the safety of employees contributed to the injury or death of such employee."
 In England it was said in the case of Thomas vs. Quartermaine (18 Q. B. D., 685) that the act
had not variated the effect of the maxim volenti non fit injuria, so far as it involves the
ordinary risks inherent in the particular employment. To the same effect is O'Malley vs. South
Boston Gas Light Co. (158 Mass., 135); Birmingham Ry. & Electric Co. vs. Allen (99 Ala.,
359); Whitcomb vs. Standard Oil Co. (153 Ins., 513.) There has been, however, a noticeable
difference in the application of the doctrine in favor of the workman since the enactment of
the Employers' Liability Act, but this change does not affect the issues involved in the instant
case. So it is quite clear that the Legislature in enacting Act No. 1874 intended to establish in
this jurisdiction, if it did not already exist, the defense of assumption of risks; that is, the
servant assumes such dangers as are normally and necessarily incident to the occupation.
 At common law the defense of contributory negligence is always available in actions for
compensation for negligence and if proved, defeats the action. The Act has not deprived the
employer of this defense. (Halsbury's Laws of England, vol. 20, p. 138.) In Massachusetts it
was said that assuming the negligence of the superintendent, the servant could not recover if
he were guilty of contributory negligence. (Regan vs. Lombard, 192 Mass., 319.) This
doctrine, however, has been more recently partially abrogated by statutes. Under the
Federal Employers' Liability Act of April 22, 1908 (35 Stat. 65; U. S. Comp. Stat., Supp.,
1911, p. 1322), the defense of contributory negligence "is abrogated in all instances where
the employer's violation of a statute enacted for the safety of his employees contributes to
the injury." And in several states the doctrine of comparative negligence, as to some
industries, has been established by statute. (Cerezo vs. Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific Co., supra,
and cases cited.) But such is not the case in this jurisdiction in so far as the application of Act
No. 1874 is concerned.
 That the defense of contributory negligence, as it is understood in the United States, is
recognized in the Act (Act No. 1874) with all its force and effect, is clear because the first
section requires as an essential requisite that the employee be "in the exercise of due care"
at the time of the injury in order to hold the employer liable for damages. (Cerezo vs. Atlantic,
Gulf & Pacific Co., supra.)
 The Civil Code does not recognized such a complete defense. (Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf &
Pacific Co., 7 Phil. Rep., 359, 366; Eades vs. Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific Co., 19 Phil. Rep., 561.)
 While the defenses of assumption of risks and contributory negligence are available to
masters in actions for personal injuries brought under Act No. 1874, these defenses have
their limitations when interposed in actions for personal injuries of minor or infant employees.
These limitations rest upon the well-established principle that it is the duty of masters or their
superintendents to warn such employees as to the dangers of the work and instruct them as
to the manner of doing the work in order to avoid accidents.
 The master is bound to warn and instruct his servant as to all dangers which he knows, or in
the exercise of reasonable care ought to know, and which he has reason to believe the
servant does not know and would not by the exercise of reasonable care discover.
 The duty continues during the employment, and cannot be delegated by the master.
(Dresser on Employers' Liability, sec. 99.)
 In cases where the servant assumes the risks, there is no duty on the part of the master to
warn or instruct him in regard to the work. The obligation of warning "is imposed mainly for
the sake of the young who have not the experience or power to look out for themselves,
which are to be expected in adults, o, in the case of adults, where there are concealed
defects." (Robinska vs. Lyman Mills, 174 Mass., 432, 433; O'Neal vs. Chicago & I. C. Ry.
Co., 132 Ind., 110.)
 And "it is clear that, in respect to all matters wherein a young and inexperienced employee is
competent to understand and avoid the dangers, such employee stands upon the same
footing with an experienced adult." (Levey vs. Bigelow, 6 Ind. App., 677.)
 The distinction between the adult and the child becomes important when it is necessary to
presume knowledge from the character of the danger, and determine whether it was obvious
to a person of the plaintiff's apparent capacity. (Dresser on Employers' Liability, sec. 99.)
 The dangers of a particular position or mode of doing work are often apparent to a person of
capacity of knowledge of the subject, while other, from youth, inexperience, or want of
capacity, may fail to appreciates them; and a servant, even with his own consent, is not to be
exposed to such dangers, unless with instructions and cautions sufficient to enable him to
comprehend them and to do his work safely, with proper care on his part. This is particularly
so when the master employs for a hazardous work, a child, young person, or other person
without experience, and of immature judgment. In such a case, the master is bound to point
out the dangers of which he has, or ought to have, knowledge, and give to the employee
such instructions as will enable him to avoid injury by the exercise of reasonable care, unless
both the danger and the means of avoiding it are apparent, and within the comprehension of
 the servant. But a master is not culpable simply because he hires a minor servant for the
performance of dangerous duties. Shearman and Redfield on Negligence (vol. 1, sec. 218)
state the rule as follows:
 Where a servant is set at dangerous work, the mere fact of his minority does not render the
master liable for the risk, if the servant has sufficient capacity to take care of himself, and
knows and can properly appreciate the risk.
 The following statement of the law relating to the employment of young children occurs in 4
Thompson on Negligence, sec. 3826, and is quoted with approval in Fitzgerald vs. Furniture
Co. (131 N. C. 636):
 The law, says Thompson on Neg., 978 "puts upon a master, when he takes an infant into his
service, the duty of explaining to him fully the hazards and dangers connected with the
business, and of instructing him how to avoid them. Nor is this all; the master will not have
discharged his duty in the regard unless the instructions and precautions given are so
graduated to the youth, ignorance and inexperience of the servant as to make him fully
aware of the danger to him, and to place him, with reference to it, in substantially the same
state as if he were an adult."
 In Taylor vs. Wootan (50 Am. St. Rep., 200) it was held that:
 It is an actionable wrong for a person to place or employ a child of such immature judgment
as to be unable to comprehend the danger to work with or about a machine of a dangerous
character likely to produce injury, . . .
 With reference to the nature and character of the risks assumed by infant employees, the
court, in Saller vs. Friedman Brothers Shoe Co. (130 Mo. App., 712) said:
 Generally, an employee assumes such risks as are open and obvious or which he would
have observed he had used ordinary caution; but children are not expected to observe
closely the construction of machines at which they are put to work or to appreciate the
ordinary risks incident to their operation, and for this reason are not held to assume the
ordinary risks of their operation, or such risks as they do not perceive and apprehend, and of
which they are not informed and warned against. (Vansler vs. Boc Co., 108 Mo. App., l. c.
628-9, 84 S. W., 201, and cases cited.)
 The law with reference to contributory negligence on the part of infant employees is fairly
well settled in the United States.
 In Wynne vs. Conklin (86 Ga., 40) the court held that whether the plaintiff [a boy of 13 years
of age] knew of the hazard or peril; whether he was of sufficient age and capacity to
appreciate the same and to provide against danger, are questions of fact which ". . . must be
left to the consideration of a jury."
 In Bare vs. Crane Creek Coal Co. (61 W. Va., 28) the court said:
 It is actionable negligence for an employer to engage and place at a dangerous employment
a minor who, although instructed, lacks sufficient age and capacity to comprehend and avoid
the dangers of the employment if the employer has, or should have, notice of the minor's age
and lack of capacity. (Thomp. on Neg. sec. 4689; 20 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, supra;
Golf vs. Norfolk & W. R. Co. supra; 1 Shear. & Redf. Neg., supra.)
 In Saller vs. Friedman Brothers Shoe Co., supra, the court said:
 Plaintiff, on cross-examination, testified he knew if his fingers were caught between the
upper and lower halves of the molder when they came together, they would be crushed. Of
course he knew this; the simplest child would know as much if it observed the operation of
the machine, but it might not, and probably would not make the observation. Plaintiff's
evidence tends to prove that though he knew his fingers would be mashed if caught between
the two halves of the molder when they came together, yet he swore he never thought of
getting hurt. His evidence shows that the idea that he might be hurt never entered his mind
until he was hurt; while his evidence shows he knew he might be hurt in the manner he was
hurt, yet he never thought of or appreciated the danger of getting hurt in that manner. It is
because of this very thoughtlessness and on account of the inexperience of minors that the
law does not hold them to the exercise of the same degree of care as it requires of adults.
 In the Brand Case (64 Fla., 184) cited in the recent case of Coons vs. Pritchard (L. R. A.,
1915 F, 558) the court held:
 As a matter of fact an employees who is an inexperienced youth may not be free from fault
when he is injured, yet in law his youth and inexperience may excuse his fault, and when the
employer has placed him at work the dangers and risks of which the youth does not
appreciate, and the youth is injured because of the dangers of the work, the employer is
liable.
 The court in Coons vs. Prichard, supra, lays down this rule:
 In employing a minor, the duty devolves upon the employer to fully instruct such employee,
and in such cases the master is bound to consider the age, mentality, and lack of capacity
and experience of his infant employee, and make such instructions so full and explicit as to
bring the dangers incident to the employment to the complete comprehension of the minor.
The theory seems to be that a minor presumably ignorant of the use of machinery or
dangers incident to his occupation, or to risks incident to the use of defective machinery,
would, without such instructions, be exposed to those dangers which he could have avoided
had his master fully discharged this duty.
 The infant employee's capacity is the criterion of his responsibility. As he grows older, he
becomes more and more amenable to the rules of law in respect to assumption of risk and
contributory negligence applicable to adults, and whether such infant employee has
assumed the risks or been negligent are questions to be answered by the jury in the United
States and by the courts in this jurisdiction.
 There is another point ion the case at bar which should be taken into consideration and
which bears upon the defendant's defenses of assumption of risks and contributory
negligence, and that is, the injuries did not occur while Braulio Tamayo was engaged in the
particular work and class of work for which he was employed. On the contrary, he was at the
time engaged in a work outside the ordinary contract of employment and wholly
disconnected with it. "To pick from piles of wood from which the strips used in the
manufacture of match boxes were made and select the best pieces" is a very different thing
from assisting in keeping the machine clean in order that it would not be obstructed in its
proper working. While the record is silent as to who made the contract of employment, yet,
taking into consideration the age of the boy and the interest which the father was taking in
his welfare, we may at least presume that the father consented to the boy's entering the
factory and doing the ordinary work which he had been engaged in before he was ordered to
work at the machine, and the father, in so doing, had the right to presume that neither the
defendant nor those who represented him would expose his son to such perils. If the order
had been given to a person of mature years, who was not engaged to do such work,
although enjoined to obey the directions of the foremen, it might, with some possibility, be
argued that he should have disobeyed it, as he must have known that its execution was
attendant with danger, or, if he chose to obey that order, he took upon himself the risks
incident to such work. Bur Braulio Tamayo occupied a very different position. He was a mere
child without, as we have said, any experience in that kind of work, and not familiar with the
machinery.
 In Union Pacific Railroad Co. vs. Fort (84 U. S., 553), Fort brought suit to recover damages
for injury to his son, age 16 years, resulting in the loss of an arm while in the employment of
the railroad company. The boy was employed in the machine shop as a workman or a helper
under the superintendence and control of one Collett and had been chiefly engaged in
receiving and putting away mouldings as they came from a molding machine. After the
service had been continued for a few months, the boy, by order of Collett, ascended a
ladder, resting on a shaft, for the purpose of adjusting a belt by which a portion of the
machinery was propelled and which had gotten out of place. While engaged in an endeavor
to execute the order, his arm was caught in the rapidly revolving machinery and torn from his
body. The injury found that he had been engaged to serve under Collett as a workman or
helper and was required to obey his orders; that the order by Collett to the boy (in carrying
 out which he lost his arm) was not within the scope of his duty and employment, but was
within that of Collett's; that the order was not a reasonable one; that its execution was
attended with hazard to life and limb; and that a prudent man would not have ordered the
boy to execute it. A verdict and judgement in favor of Fort was sustained.
 Applying the foregoing principles, which are founded upon reason and justice, to the case
under consideration, we conclude that the trial court did not err in rejecting the defenses of
assumption of risks and contributory negligence interpose by the defendant.
 We now come to the consideration of damages. As above stated, the record fails to disclose
to what extent, if any, the earning capacity of Braulio Tamayo has been diminished by
reason of the injuries. He could not, therefore, recover any amount if this action had been
brought under the Civil Code, as the services for medical attendance and salary during the
confinement have been paid by the defendant. (Marcelo vs. Velasco, 11 Phil. Rep., 287;
Algarra vs. Sandejas, 27 Phil. Rep., 284). But this court has never held that slight lameness
or permanent injuries and pain and suffering are not elements of damages, but simply that
damages cannot be allowed for the former, unless the extent of the diminution of the earning
power or capacity is how, and that the Civil Code does not include damages for the latter.
 The English rule as to the measure of damages which may be awarded for personal injuries
is stated in Halsbury's Laws of England (vol. 10, p. 323), as follows:
 In actions for personal injuries, whether such actions are founded on breach of contract to
carry safely, or upon negligence, the jury are to award damages not only for the actual
pecuniary loss occasioned by the injury, but also for the pain and suffering of the plaintiff and
the diminution of his capacity for the enjoyment of life, as well as in respect of the probable
inability of the plaintiff to earn an income equal to that which he has earned in the past; and
the probability that but for the injury the plaintiff might have earned an increasing income is
to be taken into account.
 Shearman and Redfield on the Law of Negligence (vol. 3, p. 1994 [6th ed.]) in discussing the
measure of damages for personal injuries, say:
 In an action for negligent injury to the person of the plaintiff, he may recover the expense of
his cure, the value of the time lost by him during his disabilities, and a fair compensation for
the bodily and mental suffering caused by the injury, as well as for any permanent reduction
of his power to earn money, provided, of course, that such damage is a proximate result of
the injury. As already stated, allowance should be made for all such damages, future as well
as past, if reasonably certain to occur. (Citing numerous authorities, including various
decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States.)
 As these rules, if not exclusively, upon the Anglo-American common law, it becomes
necessary to inquire just what changes, if any, have been brought about by the enactment of
the Employers' Liability Acts.
 Dresser on Employers' Liability, section 18, says:
 Subject to the limitation upon the amount, damages are to be measured in accordance with
the common-law rules.
 Reno's Employers' Liability Acts (2nd ed.), section 186, says:
 The Massachusetts statute limits the amount of damages recoverable by an employee when
his injury does not result in death to a sum not exceeding four thousand dollars. It does not
prescribe any criterion for estimating the amount, but leaves the question to be settled upon
general principles of law.
 And further on (sec. 198) the same author states:
 In Alabama it has been decided, in an action under its Employers' Liability Act, that such
(Exemplary or punitive) damages are not receivable where the injury results in death. The
statute does not limit the amount of damages recoverable, and the measure of damages is
determined upon common-law principles.
 Labatt's Master and Servant ([2d ed.], vol. 5, sec. 1730) lays down this rule:
 The provisions specifying the amount recoverable by an injured servant do not give a
measure of damages, but merely fix a limit beyond which the jury cannot award
 compensation. Within that limit the measure of damages is left to be determined upon the
ordinary principles which regulate the assessment of the indemnity in actions for personal
injuries.
 Section 1 of the Federal Employers' Liability Act (Act of Congress of April 22, 1908) provides
"That every common carrier by railroad, while engaging in commerce between any of the
several States or Territories, . . . shall be liable in damages to any person suffering injury
while he is employed by such carrier in such commerce, . . . ." The Supreme Court of the
United States in Michigan Central R. R. Co. vs. Vreeland (227 U. S., 59, 65), in referring to
the measure of damages recoverable under the Act, said:
 It (the Act) plainly declares the liability of the carrier to its injured servant. If he had survived
he might have recovered such damages as would have compensated him for his expense,
loss of time, suffering, and diminished earning power.
 And in St. Louis & Irom Mtn. Ry. vs. Craft (237 U. S., 648) the Supreme Court of the United
States sustained a judgment, in an action brought under the Federal Employers' Liability Act,
of the State court in favor of the father of the deceased employee for $6,000, being $1,000
for the pecuniary loss to the father and $5,000 for the pain and suffering of the deceased.
 What is the scope of the word damages as used in Act No. 1874? Did the Legislature intend
that the measure of damages should be the same as that in the United States, from the
country the Act was copied, or did it intend that the recovery should be limited to those
elements of damages provide for by the Civil Code in personal injury cases?
 In determining these questions it must be borne in mind that the intent of the Legislature is
the law; that the legislative meaning is to be extracted from the statute as a whole. Its
clauses are not to be segregated, but every part of a statute is to be construed with
reference to every other part and every word and phrase in connection with its context, and
that construction sought which gives effect to the whole of the statute — its every word; that
the history of the statute from the time it was introduced until it was finally passed may afford
aid to its construction; that where one legislature adopts, without change of phraseology, or
with only a merely immaterial change a legislative act of another jurisdiction, if antecedent to
its adoption, the statute has received a settled construction in the jurisdiction from which
adopted, the Legislature is presumed to have adopted the construction along with the
statute; and that a remedial statute is to be liberally construed to accomplish the purpose of
its enactment. (Vol. 11, Encyclopedia of United States Supreme Court Reports under
"Construction," and cases cited.)
 In Cerezo vs. Atlantic Gulf & Pacific Co. (supra), the court said:
 We do not doubt that it was, prior to the passage of Act No. 1874 and still is, the duty of the
employer in this jurisdiction to perform those duties, in reference to providing reasonably safe
places, and safe and suitable ways, works, and machinery, etc., in and about which his
employees are required to work, which, under the common law of England and America, are
termed personal duties, and which in the United States are held to be such that the employer
cannot delegate his responsibility and liability to his subordinates. (Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf &
Pacific Co., 7 Phil. Rep., 359.)
 The employer or master also impliedly agrees to furnish competent workmen (article 1903 of
the Civil Code; Chaves and Garcia vs. Manila Electric R. R. & Light Co., 31 Phil. Rep., 47).
Therefore, the master, under the Civil Code, can defend against an action by his servant by
proving his own freedom from negligence; that the negligence of the servant was
the immediate cause of the injury or that the accident happened through one of the ordinary
risks of employment. On the other hand the servant can recover a portion of the damages
resulting from the injuries, although he may be guilty of contributory negligence.
(Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf & Pac. Co., supra.) And the Civil Code does not fit the maximum
amount of the recovery.
 Act No. 1874 should be liberally construed in favor of employees. The main purpose of the
Act, as its title indicates, was to extend the liability of employers and to render them liable in
damages for certain classes of personal injuries for which they are not liable under the Civil
 Code. And one of these classes of cases is that where injuries are cause to employees
through the negligence of the master's "superintendent," although the master may have used
due care in the selection of his superintendent. To this extent the master's liability or
responsibility has, in fact, been extended. But the defense of contributory negligence, as it is
understood in the United States, is recognized in the Act with all its force and effect, as the
first section requires as an essential requisite to recovery that the employee be "in the
exercise of due care" at the time of the injury. The Act does not recognize the rule of
comparative negligence. It fixes the maximum amount which the injured servant may
recover. As to these matters, the Act restricts the master's liability. And if the measure of
damages is limited to conform with the Civil Code, the master's liability would be further
restricted.
 If reference must be made to the Anglo-American common law to define the rights and duties
of master and servants, as above indicated, what reasons exist for saying that the
Legislature intended that the courts must look to the Civil code for the meaning and scope of
the word "damages," a word, according to the origin and history of the Act, of purely English
origin, different in its scope from the Spanish word "daño"? It is said that the Act is an
Employers' Liability Act and not a law of damages. This contention is without foundation in
law because "to extend and regulate the responsibility of employers' means to enlarge their
pecuniary liability, otherwise the phrase would be meaningless. One's responsibility is his
liability or obligation. The Act is remedial. By remedial is not meant that it pertains to a
remedy in the sense of procedure such as the character and form of the action, the
admissibility of evidence, etc. The Act defines certain rights which it will aid, and specifies the
way in which it will aid them. So far as it defines, thereby creating, it is "substantive law." So
far as it provides a method of aiding and protecting, it is "adjective law," or procedure. The
right to damages is the essence of the cause of action. It is a substantive right granted by the
Act. Take this away and the injured employee has nothing of value left. No one in this
country has a vested interest in any rule of the Civil Code and the great office of the Act is to
remedy defects in the Civil Code rules as they are developed.
 The Congress of the United States, in conferring upon the personal representative of a
deceased person, whose death was the result of a wrongful act, neglect or fault of any
person or corporation in the District of Columbia, a right of action for damages, provided "that
in no case shall the recovery under this Act, exceed the sum of $10,000." (31 Stat. at Large,
1394, chap. 854.) The Federal Employers' liability Act, referred to above, does not limit the
amount of damages which may be recovered in actions brought thereunder. In
Hyde vs. Southern Railway Co. (31 App. D. C., 466) the court held that the recovery under
the last named Act was not limited to $10,000 as provided in the former Act. To the same
effect is the case of Devine vs. C. R. I. & R. R. Co. (266 Ill., 248).
 The inevitable conclusion is, therefore, that the Legislature intended that the measure of
damages in personal injury cases brought under Act No. 1874 shall be the same as that in
the country from which the Act was taken. The result is that Braulio Tamayo is entitled to
recover, through his guardian ad litem, damages for pain and suffering and permanent injury,
such damages being as they are the approximate result of the injuries. Bodily disfigurement
is included in his permanent injury. It needs no proof to show that the severing of the ring
finger at the first joint caused pain and suffering and a permanent injury and bodily
disfigurement, although slight. The fact that damages for such injuries cannot be ascertained
with mathematical exactness does not and should not defeat recovery for a reasonable
amount.
 In Gagnon vs. Klauder-Weldon Dyeing Mach. Co. (174 Fed. Rep., 477), the plaintiff was
awarded $4,000. This was reduced to $3,000, the court saying:
 As to the damages, there was no evidence that Gagnon has received less wages since his
injury than he did before. He was out nothing. His wages were continued while laid up, and
then he was given employment by defendant and later by others at no less wages than he
had been receiving. But he suffered pain and permanent disfigurement of one hand. He lost
 two fingers and that part of the hand immediately below or behind them. His power to lift and
handle things is interfered with and lessened. In some stations or businesses his earning
power or ability to perform his duties would not be interfered with at all; in others it would be
materially. What his future will demand of him cannot be foretold. As a mechanical
blacksmith his ability to do work, handle things, is impaired. I do not think the jury was
affected by passion or prejudice against corporations. They were carefully cautioned against
this. While damages in such cases are largely discretionary with a jury, still that discretion is
always within the control of the court. The pain and suffering in this case was not of long
continuance, the disfigurement is confined to the one hand, the arm is not injured, the
plaintiff can pick up and handle articles and handle all ordinary tools. I am of the opinion that
the damages were excessive, all things considered, and that they should be reduced to
$3,000.
 In "City of Panama" vs. Phelps (101 U. S., 453) the court said:
 Damages, in such a case, must depend very much upon the facts and circumstances proved
at the trial. When the suit is brought by the party for personal injuries, there cannot be any
fixed measure of compensation for the pain and anguish of body and mind, nor for the
permanent injury to health and constitution, but the result must be left to turn mainly upon the
good sense and deliberate judgment of the tribunal assigned by law to ascertain what is a
just compensation for the injuries inflicted.
 In Gahagan vs. Aeromotor Co. (67 Minn., 252) the plaintiff was awarded $1,800. this was
reduced to $1,200, the court saying:
 The only remaining question is whether the damages awarded are excessive. The boy, one
of eight children, was between 8 and 9 years of age. Aside from doing such chores about the
house as he was bidden by his parents, the only work he had ever engaged in was selling
newspapers on the village streets. His father was a buthcer, whose occupation was to
peddle through the country the flesh of animals which he bought and slaughtered. The injury
to the boy consisted of the mangling of the ends of the ring and middle fingers of the left
hand so as to require their amputation, — the one at the first joint, and the other just below
the first joint. This was successfully done at one operation, and the fingers healed
satisfactorily. Of course, this was necessarily accompanied by considerable pain; and there
is some evidence to the effect that the ends of the finger may always be somewhat more
sensitive to heat and cold than if not amputated. There was, also, the opinion of a physician
that the muscles supplying those fingers will not develop as fully as they would if the whole
fingers were there. It is also true that the amputation of the ends of these fingers constitutes
something of a disfigurement of the person. We have no desire to belittle the right which
every one, even in the humblest walks of life, has to the possession of all his faculties, both
mental and physical, unimpaired. but we are compelled to the conclusion that, in any view of
the case, the damages awarded to the boy are excessive. There are certain profession, such
as that of instrumental music, where the loss of the ends of two fingers, even on the left
hand, would be quite serious; but it is self-evident, without the aid of evidence, that in all the
ordinary occupations of life the injury to the boy will be almost inappreciable. We have often
had occasion to say that the question is not for what sum of money will compensate for it as
far as money can compensate at all; and, where a person asks for pecuniary compensation,
he cannot complain if the loss is estimated on a strictly pecuniary basis.
 In Rittel vs. Souther Iron Co. (127 Mo. App., 463) in reducing the award from $4,500 to
$3,000 and in disposing of the contention of the appellant that there was no evidence that
the plaintiff's earning capacity had been diminished by reason of the injuries, the court said:
 Plaintiff, as stated, was a young man twenty-one years old at that time of the accident, and
as far as appears he made his living by work similar to that he was doing when hurt; he was
not a mechanic, but a common laborer. He testified that he had done no work from the date
of the injury to the time of the trial; that prior to said time he had been earning nine dollars a
week, and in his opinion he was unable to do the same kind of work he had been doing
 theretofore. We think it is a matter of general knowledge that a laboring man who has the
thumb and forefinger of his right hand mashed has suffered a diminution of earning power.
 Similar holdings appear in Olsen vs. Tacoma Smelting Co. (50 Wash., 128);
Rommen vs. Empire Furniture Mfg. Co. ([1911] 118 Pac., 924); Duskey vs. Green Lake
Shingle Co. (51 Wash., 145); Barclay vs. Puget Sound Lumber Co. (48 Wash., 241);
Adams vs. Peterman Mfg. Co. (47 Wash., 484); Ball vs. Peterman Mfg. Co. (47 Wash., 653);
Johnson vs. City of Bay City (164 Mich., 251).
 This opinion is quite long, necessarily made so by the importance of the questions raised.
The judgment being strictly in accordance with law and the merits of the case, the same is
hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellant. So ordered.
 Torres, Carson and Araullo, JJ., concur.



 Separate Opinions

 MORELAND, J., dissenting:
 The proposition stated in the decision of the court in this case to which I propose to direct my
attention is that the Employers' Liability Act was intended by the Legislature of the Philippine
Islands to be not only a law enunciating the principles of legal liability resulting from negligent
acts and omissions in certain cases, but a law governing the measure of damages in such
cases also. The process of reasoning by which the court reached this conclusion is, in the
main, this: the Employers' Liability Act of the Philippine Islands is a copy of the Employers'
Liability Act of the State of Massachusetts; and, says the court, that being so, it necessarily
follows that the Legislature of the Philippine Islands, when it copied and passed the
Employers' Liability Act of the State of Massachusetts, intended, by virtue of the mere act of
copying, to bring to the Islands not only the Employers' Liability Act of the state of
Massachusetts but the law of that State governing the measure of damages also.
 I cannot bring myself to agree either with the position or with the arguments adduced to
support it. nothing far short of an express declaration of the Philippine Legislature to that
effect ought to be held to abrogate the settled principles of law governing the measure of
damages in personal injury cases laid down in the Civil Code and to substitute in place
thereof the law of a foreign country. There is no such declaration in the Employers' Liability
Act. I can find nothing in the Act which, in the remotest way, would suggest in my opinion, an
intention to that effect.
 The question under consideration arises in this way: A young boy working with dangerous
machinery had the ends of some of his fingers of one hand cut off. On the trial he proved no
pecuniary or actual damages. No one disputes this. The sole question is whether he can
recover damages other than pecuniary or actual damages. The Supreme Court in its opinion
states expressly that, under the law of the Philippine Islands as found in the Civil Code, he
would not be entitled to recover damages for pain, suffering or mental anguish; and that,
therefore, under the Civil Code, he could not maintain this action as he could prove no
damages apart from those arising from pain and suffering. The court has, however, met this
difficulty by asserting, as I have before indicated, that the law of damages of the Philippine
Islands does not govern the case at bar for the reason that, the Employers' Liability Act
having been taken bodily for the state of Massachusetts and brought to the Philippine
Islands, it necessarily follows that the law of the State of Massachusetts governing the
measure of damages was brought along to the Islands with it; and that it is the law of the
state of Massachusetts and not the Civil Code which governs the measure of damages in the
Philippine Islands.
 As I have already stated the Supreme Court holds in this very case that, under the law of the
Philippine Islands, the plaintiff is not entitled to damages, as he proved no damages except
those arising from pain and suffering. It says:
 We now come to the consideration of damages. As above stated, the record fails to disclose
to what extent, if any, the earning capacity of Braulio Tamayo has been diminished by
reason of the injuries. He could not, therefore, recover any amount if this action had been
brought under the Civil Code, as the services for medical attendance and salary during the
confinement have been paid by the defendant. (Marcelo vs. Velasco, 11 Phil. Rep., 287;
Algarra vs. Sandejas, 27 Phil. Rep., 284). But this court has never held that slight lameness
or permanent injuries and pain and suffering are not elements of damages, but simply that
damages cannot be allowed for the former, unless the extent of the diminution of the earning
power or capacity is shown, and that the Civil Code does not include damages for the latter.
 Before going forward with the discussion, I regard it necessary to examine the statement
contained in the last sentence of the quotation. I confess that I cannot grasp its meaning
except in part. The portion of the statement which I can not understand is this: "But this court
has never held that. . . . pain and suffering are not element of damages, but
simply . . . that the Civil Code does not include damages for the latter," that is, pain and
suffering. If the court has held that the Civil Code does not authorize, and, therefore, does
not permit, damages for pain and suffering, and, if the Civil Code contains all the law of the
Philippine Islands on the subject of damages, which no one denies, how can it be said that
"this court has never held that . . . pain and suffering are not elements of damages?" This
court has held again and again that pain and suffering are not an element of damage under
the law of the Philippine Islands; and has again and again refused to allow damages
therefor. (Marcelo vs. Velasco, 11 Phil. Rep., 287; Algarra vs. Sandejas, 27 Phil. Rep., 284)
The refusal was based on the finding that there was no law in the Philippine Islands
authorizing damages to be given upon that ground. The court admits in the statement quoted
that it has heretofore held "that the Civil Code does not include damages for the latter," that
is, for pain and suffering. How, then, is it possible for the court now to hold that pain and
suffering are elements of damage? And how can it say that the court has not held that pain
and suffering are not element of damage? The mere holding that there was no law in the
Philippine Islands authorizing damages on such ground is of itself a declaration that pain and
suffering are not an element of damage. If the court has declared that there is no law
authorizing relief of a certain kind, it is equivalent to a declaration that the courts are not
authorized to grant such relief.
 I proceed with the discussion of the position taken by the court on the main question.
 It must be said at the outset that the court rests its decision mainly on the statement that the
law of damages of Massachusetts came here by virtue of the mechanical act of the
draftsman of the Legislature of copying a statute of that State — a statute, by the way,
entirely different from the one which this court holds was brought over. So far as I can see,
there is no discussion of the grounds of this statement; no examination of the Act copied; no
quotation of or even reference to any provision of law or statute to support the allegations;
nothing except a naked statement of the court that it was brought over. The contention that
the mere mechanical act of the copying of the Employers' Liability Act of the State of
Massachusetts by the Philippine Legislature produced necessarily the momentous result of
repealing the law of this country regulating an important subject and of introducing in place
thereof the law of Massachusetts, appears on its face, it seems to me, so unsound, that the
most agent and powerful reason should be assigned to support it. The court has neglected to
refer to any Act of the Philippine Legislature, to any statue, or to any other law to sustain its
assertion. It simply says that the mere act of copying the Massachusetts Employers' Liability
Act is all that was necessary to enact into law not the Massachusetts Employers' Liability Act
by the Massachusetts law of damages.
 There is possibly one exception to the statement that the court has neither cited nor referred
to any statute, law, decision, principle or custom to support so strange a theory. It has
referred to the word "damages" which it found in the Employers' Liability Act. But that is all. It
does not even quote or cite the sentence in which the word appears. It is wrenched from its
setting and torn form the context and examined as a thing separate and apart, a species with
 no family or genus, something for a philologist, but not for a court. This reference by the
court to the word "damages" and the argument based upon that isolated word, may be called
an exception to or a qualification of my statement. I hesitate to admit it; for the reference is of
such a nature that it serves only to prove the correctness of the statement. If the court could
find nothing more in the Act of the Philippine Legislature to support its contention than a lone
word taken from the statute, then is my statement, I believe, more than justified.
 The quotation made from the opinion of the court is the opening statement in its argument to
support the proposition that the Philippine Legislature brought from the State of
Massachusetts with the Employers' Liability Act the Massachusetts law of damages in
negligence cases. As I regard this conclusion as erroneous I propose to follow the steps of
the court in its argument for the purpose of determining where the difficulty lies. Immediately
after the statement quoted comes a discussion of the rule of damages in negligence cases in
England and in the various States of the Union and as set down by the Federal courts.
Cases are cited to show that pain and suffering are element of damage under the common
law. The court quotes from the Federal Employers' Liability Act of the United States in cases
arising under it to show that the rule of damages as laid down by the Federal courts includes
compensation for pain and suffering. It is to be noted, however, that, when the Supreme
Court was discussing and applying the law of damages in those cases it was not discussing,
interpreting or applying the Federal Employers; Liability Act. It was construing and applying
the law governing the measure of damage; and the law of damage has no more relation to
the law governing the principles of legal liability than the law of bailments has to the law
property. It must be said, therefore, that the whole discussion of the court concerning the
measure of damages at common law, and its citations of and quotations from decisions of
courts on that subject, are immaterial to the discussion of the very first proposition necessary
to be established in this case to sustain the decision of this court; and that is that the
Massachusetts law governing the measure of damages in personal injury cases was brought
to the Philippine Islands by and along with the Employers' Liability Act and is now force
here. Until it is established that the Massachusetts law is here, it is idle to discuss what that
law is. Now, what is the proof offered to demonstrate the correctness of the contention that
the Massachusetts law of damages is a part of the Philippine law? Until that contention is
shown to be correct beyond question, what good, I repeat, can result from a disquisition on
the measure of damage at common law? Again, I ask, what has been offered on that
subject?
 Proceeding with its argument, the court says:
 What is the scope of the word damages as used in Act No. 1874 (the Employers' Liability
Act)? Did the Legislature intend that the measure of damages should be the same as that in
the United States, from which country the Act was copied, or did it intend that the recovery
should be limited to those elements of damages provided for by the Civil Code in personal
injury cases?
 With this inquiry before me I see no reason for the existence of the previous steps in the
discussion taken by the court. What may have been the law of damages as laid down by the
Federal courts, the State courts, or the English courts has nothing to do with the discussion
as to whether the Legislature of the Philippine Islands introduced into this country the law of
damages of the State of Massachusetts. The discussion as to what is the measure of
damages in England and in the various States of the Union would be material, as I have
already said, only after the proposition had been established that the law of damages of
England and of the United States had been imported into the Philippine Islands. But the
question whether that law was actually imported into the Philippine Islands has nothing to do
with the question as to what that law really is.
 I note what I have before intimidated, that the court does not cite the provision or provisions
of the Employers' Liability Act of the Philippine Islands which shows that the law of damages
of the State of Massachusetts or of England or of the United States was brought over to the
Islands along with the Act itself. I should be interested to have the court point out the
 particular provision on which it relies to accomplish the striking result which its decision
produces. I confess I can find no provision which I can even remotely construe into
producing such an effect. In order that the whole Act be before us I have reproduced it in a
footnote, including the title; 1 and an examination of it discloses instantly that there is not a
provision in it which, so far as I can judge, can be held to introduce into the Philippine Islands
the law of damages of the State of Massachusetts or of any other state or country. Nor can I
obtain such a result by viewing the Act as a whole. The title says that it is "An Act to extend
and regulate the responsibility of employers for personal injuries and deaths suffered by their
employees while at work." In the marginal note of the official Act it is called "Employers'
Liability Act." All the Act does or purports to do is to alter in some particular the principles of
legal liability governing negligent acts or omissions then operative in the Philippine Islands. It
does not touch and does not profess to touch the legal principles upon which damages are
assessed in such cases, that is, the law governing the measure of damage. The law
governing legal liability is quite distinct and separate from the law governing damages. The
former tells us whether an action will lie or not; the latter tells us how much plaintiff's
judgment will be. The former tells us what must be proved to establish liability; the latter how
to prove the amount to recovered. While the former lays down the foundation for the latter,
they are, nevertheless, separate branches of the law, wholly unlike, wholly apart from each
other, and governed by principles which have nothing in common. They are treated
separately by courts, text books and encyclopedias. They have no more relation to each
other than the law of wills and the law of waters.
 This being so, how do the following remarks of the court, which immediately follow the last
quotation, assist it to the conclusion that the law of damages of the State of Massachusetts
came to the Philippine Islands with the Employers' Liability Act?.
 In determining these questions it must be borne in mind that the intent of the Legislature is
the law; that the legislative meaning is to be extracted from the statute as a whole. Its
clauses are not to be segregated, but every part of a statute is to be construed with
reference to every other part and every word and phrase in connection with its context, and
that construction sought gives effect to the whole of the statute — its every word.
 Speaking generally, I have no objection to the principles enunciated in this quotation. But, it
seems to me, the court has not applied them. It would seem, rather, that the court has
disregarded them. Let us examine Act and admit that "the intent of the Legislature is the
law," that "the legislative meaning is to be extracted from the statute as a whole," that "its
clauses are not to be segregated," and that we must give effect to "its every word," and what
is the result? Are we, in the light of these principles, to say that the Legislature intended to
enact a law governing the measure of damages in the Philippine Islands when the title which
the Legislature itself gave to the Act for the express purpose of telling us in a summary way
what it proposed to do, shows that it tended to deal solely with the principles of legal liability
and not with a distinct and separate branch of the law known as the measure of damage?
Are we to say this when, so far as my judgment goes, the provisions of the Act are in
absolute conformity with its title and both which seem to refute the contention that the
Legislature intended that the Act, in addition to being a liability Act, should also be an Act
dealing with the measure of damage which should change in a marked degree the present
law on that subject? Can the Legislature be said to have intended such a sweeping change?
Is there anything in the Act which justifies the repeal of numerous and important articles of
the Civil Code, and the reversal of the decisions of the Supreme Court interpreting and
supplying them? Where is the provision in the Act which declares that this country, a country
of the Roman law, of the civil law, of the Spanish law, shall be agitated and confounded by a
fundamental change in its century old system of damages in personal injury cases? Read
the law, "its every word," and then say whether the Legislature intended that one law of
damages should apply to personal injuries sustained by one class of persons and a different
law to injuries sustained by another class of persons; or that a person who had both legs cut
off through the negligence of his employer should be able to obtain damages for pain and
 suffering, while his brother, who had both legs cut off through the negligence of a railroad
company not his employer, should not be able to recover such damages?
 It seems to me that such results should not be held to have been produced except upon the
clear and explicit provisions of the statute. Where are these provision? Is not the invasion of
an established and settled system, by a foreign law, of sufficient importance to require at
least a reference to the specific authority under which the invasion occurs? And if there is
any doubt about the authority should the invasion be permitted to succeed?
 But the court seems to think that it has found a sufficient reason for the invasion. It says, as I
have already intimated, that it finds somewhere in the statute the word damages." The
discovery of this word is that which provoked the question put by the court, already quoted,
in which it asks "What is the scope of the word damages as used in Act No. 1874? Did the
Legislature intend that the measure of damages should be the same as that in the United
States, from which country the Act was copied, or did it intend that the recovery should be
limited to those elements of damages provided for by the Civil Code in personal injury
cases?"
 These questions are immediately followed by the statement, also quoted, of the principles
governing the conduct of one who desires to ascertain the intent of the Legislature; but I am
afraid that the court did not follow those principles when it seized upon the lone word
"damages," discovered in the Act as the talisman which would disclose the intent which
governed the Philippine Legislature when it passed the Employers' Liability Act; for, while the
court has just declared that the intent of the Legislature "is to be extracted from the
statute as a whole," that its words and clauses "are not to be segregated," that "every
part . . . is to be construed with reference to every other part and every word and phrase in
common with its neighbors," nevertheless, it seizes upon the single word "damages," and,
upon this word segregated from its "context," and, without even a reference to any other line
or word in the statute, bases a doctrine which changes in large part the nature of the Act.
The result thus obtained violates, it seems to me, the enacting clause, destroys the
distinction between legal liability and measure of damage which the Act respects, introduces
into the Philippine Islands a new system of law, repeals important provisions of the Civil
Code, and makes unjust distinctions between employees and other classes of persons
equally deserving.
 I cannot agree to this reasoning which is, in my judgment, the only item of argument or
discussion in the opinion which is directed to the point to which my dissent and discussion
refer:
 If references must be made to the Anglo-American common law to define the rights and
duties of master and servants as above indicated, what reasons exist for saying that the
Legislature intended that the courts must look to the Civil Code for the meaning and scope of
the word "damages," a word, according to the origin and history of the Act, of purely English
origin, different in its scope from the Spanish word "daño?" It is said that the Act is an
Employers' Liability Act and not a law of damages. This contention is without foundation in
law because "to extend and regulate the responsibility of employers" means to enlarge their
pecuniary liability, otherwise the phrase would be meaningless. One's responsibility is his
liability or obligation. The Act is remedial. By remedial is not meant that it pertains to a
remedy in the sense of procedure such as the character and form of the action, the
admissibility of evidence, etc. The act defines certain rights which it will aid, and specified the
way in which it will aid them. So far as it define, thereby creating, it is "substantive law." So
far as it provides a method of aiding and protecting, it is "adjective law," or procedure. The
right to damage is the essence of the cause of action. It is a substantive right granted by the
Act. Take this away and the injured employee has nothing of value left. No one in this
country has a vested interest in any rule of the Civil Code and the great office of the Act is to
remedy defects in the Civil Code rules as they are developed.
 Let us examine the argument in detail. We may start out by doubting the correctness of the
inferential statement found in the very first sentence of the quotation. I did not know that it
 was necessary to refer "to the Anglo-American common law to define the rights and duties of
master and servant, as indicated above," I had supposed that the very purpose of the
Employers' Liability Act was to define those rights and duties, so far as they relate to injuries
occuring to employees while at work. I had believed that the precise object of employers'
liability acts in the States was the abrogation of the so-called Anglo-American common law,
and of the Employers' Liability Act of the Philippine Islands to abrogate the civil law as
contained in the Civil Code by substituting in its place a statute which specifically and in
detail defines those rights and duties. While the statute may be held to have given an
additional remedy, certainly, when the remedy conferred by the statute is selected by the
employee the common law in the States, the civil law here, ceases to operate. I had
supposed, also, that where there is a statute dealing with a given subject, and which
completely covers it, the statute is exclusively that to which we must look to ascertain the law
on that subject. It is true that, if any word or provision of the statute is ambiguous and needs
interpretation or construction before it can be applied, then we might, under certain
circumstances, go to the decisions of the courts of a foreign state to ascertain what ideas
they have expressed under similar conditions. But no such reference is permitted unless the
provisions of the statute to be applied in the particular case are so ambiguous and uncertain
as to require interpretation of construction before application is possible. The statute is the
law and the only law concerning the matter of which it treats.
 I must, therefore, doubt the correctness of the first sentence of the court's only argument.
There is no ambiguity in those provisions of the statute applicable to the case at bar. No one
claims there is. The court asserts none. Until we know what provisions the court has held
applicable we cannot know whether they are ambiguous or not. The case before us is a
simple one, only three questions being involved — (First.) Was the defendant's
superintendent negligent in placing a child at work with dangerous machinery? (Second.)
Was the child guilty of contributory negligence? (Third.) Was there damage proved and how
much? The statute specifically covers every question of law in this case. It does not, of
course, cover the questions of fact. Neither does the common law nor the civil law. But it
covers every legal aspect of he case and clearly and definitely and without ambiguity lays
down the rules which govern it; and I believe it to be erroneous to say that "reference must
be made to the Anglo-American common law to define the rights and duties of master and
servants." The Employers' Liability Act is the sole source of authority on that subject in the
Philippine Islands in cases where it is invoked and is applicable. Reference to the common
law is unnecessary. Aside from the fact that, in the absence of the Act, we would refer to the
Civil Code and not to the common law, it may be said that the Act is itself sufficient for every
purpose and the courts have no right to go outside of it on the assumption that interpretation
is necessary. As we said in the case of Lizarraga Hermanos vs. Yap Tico (24 Phil. Rep., 504,
513):
 The first and fundamental duty of courts, in our judgment, is to apply the law. Construction
and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or
inadequate without them. They are the very last functions which a court should exercise. The
majority of the laws need no interpretation or construction. They require only application, and
if there were more application and less construction, there would be more stability in the law,
and more people would know what the law is.
 Let us proceed to the next sentence. "It is said," continues the court, "that the act is an
Employers' Liability Act and not a law of damages. This contention is without foundation in
law because 'to extend and regulate the responsibility of employers' means to enlarge their
pecuniary liability, otherwise the phrase would be meaningless."
 It seems to me that there is here a failure to grasp the difference between extending one's
liability and increasing the amount one must pay after liability is established. All that the Act
does is to increase the number of occasions on which the employer will have to respond in
damages. In other words, it makes it easier for his injured employee to establish his liability.
It removes from his path certain hindrances and obstructions. Where the employer would not
 have been liable before the act was passed, he is liable now. Where, before the act was
passed, a certain amount of proof was required, now less is required. The act changes the
source from which the injured employee draws his rights; and, in changing the source, it at
the same time increases the number of rights and the ease with which they may be
exercised. But the change in the source of rights and the increase in the ease with which
they may be exercised is very far from an increase in the amount of the judgment the
employee will get as the ultimate result of an exercise of those rights. A right of action has
nothing whatever to do with the amount of recovery; yet these are precisely the two things
the court has confused to such an extent as to call them the same. To increase the number
of occasions in which an employer will be liable is an entirely different thing from increasing
the amount of damages which he will have to pay on each of the increased
occasions. 2 Moreover, looked at from a standpoint other than principle, it would be mulcting
the employer from both pockets at the same time. The occasions of his liability would be
increased and the amount he would have to pay on each of those increased occasions
would also be augmented by the amount of damages allowed for pain and suffering. That the
Legislature did not intend such a result is evident from the fact that, while the Act increased
the occasions on which employers would be liable and the ease with which the employee
might take advantage of those occasions, at the same time and as a partial compensation,
the act limited the amount of the latter's recovery in certain cases.
 I pass over the intervening sentence of the quotation and come at once to these: "The right
to damages is the essence of the cause of action. It is a substantive right and granted by the
Act. Take this away and the injured employee has nothing of value left." "One's responsibility
is his liability or obligation." Let all this be admitted, and still we may properly put the
question, what has it to do with the matter in hand? Here again, it seems to me, is the
confusion between a right of action and the amount of the recovery. No one is denying the
employee his right of action. Indeed, as for myself, I am contending that the Act increases
the number of occasions on which he will have a right of action. All I am doing is combating
the proposition that an increase in the number of occasions on which the employer is liable
means an increase in the amount of the recovery in any given occasion. I desire to maintain
the distinction between a right of action and the amount of the recovery; the liability and the
amount to be paid; the principles governing legal liability and those governing the measure of
damages.
 Having arrived at the conclusion that no damages was proved, I do not pass on the other
questions discussed by the court.
 1 No. 1874. — AN ACT TO EXTEND AND REGULATE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF
EMPLOYERS FOR PERSONAL INJURIES AND DEATHS SUFFERED BY THEIR
EMPLOYEES WHILE AT WORK.
 By authority of the United States, be it enacted by the Philippine Legislature, that:
 SECTION 1. If personal injury is caused to an employee, who, at the time of the injury, is in
the exercise of due care, by reason of —
 First, a defect in the condition of the ways, works, or machinery connected with or used in
the business of the employer, which arose from, or had not been discovered or remedied in
consequence of, the negligence of the employer or of a person in his service who had been
intrusted by him with the duty of seeing that the ways, works, or machinery were in proper
condition; or
 Second, the negligence of a person in the service of the employer who was intrusted with
and was exercising superintendence and whose sole or principal duty was that of
superintendence, or, in the absence of such superintendent, of a person acting as
superintendent with the authority or consent of such employer; or
 Third, the negligence of a person in the service of the employer who was incharge or control
of a signal, switch, locomotive engine, or train upon a railroad; the employee, or his legal
representatives, shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, have the same rights to
 compensation and of action against the employer as if he had not been an employee, nor in
the service, nor engaged in the work, of the employer.
 A car which is in use by, or which is in possession of, a railroad corporation shall be
considered as part of the ways, works, or machinery of the corporation which uses or has it
in possession, within the meaning of clause on of this section, whether it is owned by such
corporation or by some other company or person. One or more cars which are in motion,
whether attached to an engine or not, shall constitute a train within their meaning of clause
three of this section, and whoever, as part of his duty for the time being, physically controls
or directs the movements of a signal, switch, locomotive engine, or train shall be deemed to
be a person in charge or control of a signal, switch, locomotive engine, or train within the
meaning of said clause.
 SEC. 2. If, as the result of the negligence of the employer or that of a person for whose
negligence the employer is liable under the provisions of section one, an employee is killed
or dies by reason of injuries received, his widow, or legal heirs, or next of kin who at the time
of his death were dependent upon his wages for support, shall have a right of action for
damages against the employer.
 SEC. 3. If, under the provisions of this Act, damages are awarded for the death, they shall be
assessed with reference to the degree of culpability of the employer or of the person for
whose negligence the employer is liable.
 The amount of damages which may be awarded in an action under the provisions of section
one for a personal injury to an employee, in which no damages for his death are awarded
under the provisions of section two, shall not exceed two thousand pesos.
 The amount damages which may be awarded in such action, if damages for his death are
awarded under the provisions of section two, shall not be less than five thousand pesos nor
more than two thousand five hundred pesos for both the injury and the death.
 SEC. 4. No action for damages for injuries or death under this Act shall be maintained if a
report thereof is not furnished to the employer within ninety days of the date, place, and
cause of the injury or in the action is not brought within one year from the time of the
accident causing the injury or death. The report required by this section shall be made in
writing and signed by the person injured or by another in his name, or if, on account of
physical or mental disability, it is impossible for the person injured to give the notice within
the time provided by this section, the same may be given within ten days after such disability
shall have been removed, and in case of death without said report having been given and
without the person having for ten days at any time after the period above mentioned been
able to give such notice, the widow, legal heirs, or next of kin dependent upon his wages for
support, may give such notice within thirty days following the death of the laborer. No report
given under the provisions of this Act shall be considered void or insufficient by reason only
of some inaccuracy sa regards the date, place, or cause of the injury, if there was no
intention to mislead or the employer has not been misled by reason of such inaccuracy.
 SEC. 5. All actions for damages which may be brought under this Act shall have preference
over all other matters save and except criminal cases and habeas corpus matters on the
dockets of the courts of first instance, and shall be promptly tried by the court and decided
within fifteen days after final submission of the case to the court for decision.
 On application to the court by the party injured or by his duly authorized representatives, the
court may make a proper allowance for food and medical attendance during the pendency of
the action and while medical attendance is till necessary by reason of the injury: Provided,
however, That the defendant in the action shall be given an opportunity to be heard before
any such allowance is made.
 SEC. 6. If an employer enters into a contract, written or verbal, with an independent
contractor to do part of such employer's work, or if such contractor enters into a contract with
a subcontractor to do all or any part of the work comprised in such contractor's contract with
the employer, such contract or subcontract shall not bar the liability of the employer for
injuries to the employees of such contractor or subcontractor caused by any defect in the
 condition of the ways, works, machinery, or plant, if they are the property of the employer or
are furnished by him and if such defect arose or had not been discovered or remedied
through the negligence of the employer or of some person intrusted by him with the duty of
seeing that they were in proper condition.
 SEC. 7. An employer who shall have contributed to an insurance fund created and
maintained for the mutual purpose of indemnifying an employee for personal injuries for
which compensation may be recovered under the provisions of this Act or who shall have
contributed to any relief society for the same purpose may prove in mitigation of the
damages recoverable by an employee under the provisions of this Act such proportion of the
pecuniary benefit which has been received by such employee from any fund or society on
account of such contribution of said employer as the contribution of such employer to such
fund or society bears to the whole contribution thereto.
 SEC. 8. An employee or his legal representatives shall not be entitled under the provisions of
this Act to any right of action for damages against his employer if such employee knew of the
defect or negligence which caused the injury and failed within a reasonable time to give or
cause to be given information thereof to the employer or to some person superior to himself
in the service of the employer who was intrusted with general superintendence.
 SEC. 9. This Act shall not be applicable to domestic servants or agricultural laborers.
 SEC. 10. Any agreement to renounce the benefits of this Act made by the laborer prior to the
occurrence of any accident resulting in his injury or death shall be null and void.
 SEC. 11. This Act shall take effect on its passage.
 Enacted, June 19, 1908.

 2 This principle was expressly applied in the recent case of Dharamdas vs. Haroomall (35
Phil. Rep., 183), where the headnote reads:
 "Where a statute deals exclusively with the principles touching the liability of persons in a
specified class of cases it will not be held to affect the law of the land governing damages
applicable in such cases when liability has been established."
 In the body of the opinion the court said:
 "This, as will be seen at a glance, simply confers the right to bring a civil action to obtain the
relief which, formerly, could be secured only in a criminal action. No rule or measure of
damages is laid down by the Act; and the statute having for its only purpose the giving of an
`additional remedy' and not revoking, repealing or modifying `any other civil remedy which
the existing law may afford,' affects in no way the law of the land relating to the rule or
measure of damages in such cases. The statute really affects method only. It does not
interfere with the substantive law. The right always existed in all cases. The statute simply
offers another method of making that right effective. The nature of the right and the results
flowing therefrom, both criminally and civilly, are unaffected by the Act

[G.R. No. L-6120. June 30, 1953.]

CIPRIANO P. PRIMICIAS, Petitioner, v. FELICISIMO OCAMPO, as Judge-at-

large presiding over Branch C of the Court of First Instance of Manila and
EUGENIO ANGELES, as City Fiscal of Manila, representing the PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
 Claro M. Recto for Petitioner.

City Fiscal Eugenio Angeles for Respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; ASSESSORS; TRIAL WITH AID OF ASSESSORS, A

SUBSTANTIVE RIGHT. — The right to a trial by assessors is substantive in the sense
that it must be created and defined by express enactment as opposed to a mere
remedy devised to enforce such right or obtain redress therefor. The trial with the aid
of assessors as granted by section 154 of the Code of Civil Procedure and section 2477
of the old Charter of Manila are parts of substantive law and as such are not embraced
by the rule-making power of the Supreme Court. This is so because in said section 154
this matter is referred to as a right given by law to a party litigant. Section 1477 of the
Administrative Code of 1917 is couched in such a manner that a similar right is implied
when invoked by a party litigant. It says that the aid may be invoked in the manner
provided in the Code of Civil Procedure. And this right has been declared absolute and
substantial by the Supreme Court in several cases where the aid of assessors had been
invoked (Berbari v. Concepcion Et. Al., 40 Phil., 320; Colegio de San Jose v. Sison, 56
Phil., 344).

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; SUBSTANTIVE MATTER, DISTINGUISHED FROM PROCEDURAL. — A

substantive law creates, defines or regulates rights concerning life, liberty or property,
or the powers of agencies or instrumentalities for the administration of public affairs,
whereas rules of procedure are provisions prescribing the method by which substantive
rights may be enforced in courts of justice. (1 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court,
1952 ed., p. 4; Bustos v. Lucero, 46 Off. Gaz., Jan. supp., pp. 445, 448.)

3. PLEADING AND PRACTICE; ASSESSORS; TRIAL; RIGHT TO ASSESSORS STILL

EXISTS IN MANILA AND IN PROVINCES. — The promulgation of the Rules of Court did
not have the effect of repealing the provisions on assessors embodied in the Code of
Civil Procedure. These provisions have not been incorporated by the Supreme Court in
the present Rules of Court because they are substantive in nature. This remedy may be
invoked not only in Manila but in all other places where it existed prior to the
promulgation of the Rules of Court. The provisions on assessors embodied in the Code
of Civil Procedure are still in force and the same may still be invoked in the light of the
provisions of section 49 of Republic Act No. 409.

DECISION

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

This is a petition which seeks to prohibit respondent Judge from proceeding with the
trial of two criminal cases which were then pending against petitioner without the
assistance of assessors in accordance with the provisions of section 49 of Republic Act
No. 409 in relation to section 154 of Act No. 190, and as an auxiliary remedy, to have a
writ of preliminary injunction issued so that the trial may be held pending until further
orders of this court.

This petition was originally filed with the Court of Appeals, but was later certified to this
court on the ground that the main basis of the petition is section 49 of Republic Act No.
409, otherwise known as Revised Charter of the City of Manila, approved on June 18,
1949, and respondents assail the constitutionality of said section in that it contravenes
the constitutional provision that the rules of court "shall be uniform for all courts of the
same grade . . ." (Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution.)

Petitioner was charged before the Court of First Instance of Manila with two statutory
offenses, namely, (1) with a violation of Commonwealth Act No. 606, which was
docketed as criminal case No. 18374, in that he knowingly chartered a vessel of
Philippine registry to an alien without the approval of the President of the Philippines
and (2) with a violation of section 129 in relation to section 2713 of the Revised
Administrative Code, which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 18375, in that he failed
to submit to the Collector of Customs the manifests and certain authenticated
documents for the vessel "Antarctic" and failed to obtain the necessary clearance from
the Bureau of Customs prior to the departure of said vessel for a foreign port.

On April 23, 1952, before the trial of said criminal cases, petitioner filed a motion
praying that assessors be appointed to assist the court in considering the questions of
fact involved in said cases as authorized by section 49 of Republic Act No. 409,
otherwise known as Revised Charter of the City of Manila, which provides that "the aid
of assessors in the trial of any civil or criminal action in the Municipal Court, or the
Court of First Instance, within the City, may be invoked in the manner provided in the
Code of Civil Procedure." This motion was opposed by the City Fiscal who appeared for
the People of the Philippines.

On April 28, 1952, the court issued an order denying the motion holding in effect that
with the promulgation of the Rules of Court by the Supreme Court, which became
effective on July 1, 1940, all rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all
courts of the Philippines previously existing were not only superseded but expressly
repealed, that the Supreme Court, having been vested with the rule- making power,
expressly omitted the portions of the Code of Civil Procedure regarding assessors in
said Rules of Court, and that the reference to said statute by section 49 of Republic Act
No. 409 on the provisions regarding assessors should be deemed as a mere surplusage.
Believing that this order is erroneous, petitioner now comes to this court imputing
abuse of discretion to the respondent Judge.

The issues now posed by petitioner are: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"I. The right of the petitioner to a trial with the aid of assessors is an absolute
substantive right, and the duty of the court to provide assessors is mandatory.

"II. The right to trial with the aid of assessors, being substantive right, cannot be
impaired by this court in the exercise of its rule-making power.

"III. Section 154 of the Code of Civil Procedure and Section 2477 of the Old Charter of
Manila, creating the right to trial with the aid of assessors, are substantive law and
were not repealed by Rules of Court.

"IV. Granting without admitting that the provisions on assessors of the Code of Civil
Procedure and the old Charter of Manila were impliedly repealed, nevertheless, the
same provisions were later reenacted by reference in section 49 of the Revised Charter
of Manila, which is now the source of the right to trial with the aid of assessors and
which refers to the Code of Civil Procedure merely to indicate the procedure for
appointing assessors.

"V. Section 49 of the Revised Charter of Manila is not invalid class legislation and does
not violate the constitutional provision that the rules of pleading, practice and
procedure ’shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade.’"

A brief summary of the historical background of the legislation regarding trial with the
aid of assessors in the Philippines may be of help in the determination of the issues
posed by petitioner. The first provision which allowed trial with the aid of assessors in
civil cases in inferior courts and Courts of First Instance is contained in Act No. 190 of
the Philippine Commission, otherwise known as the Code of Civil Procedure, which took
effect on October 1, 1901 (Sections 58-62; 154-161). Almost simultaneously, or on
October 17, 1901, the trial with the aid of assessors both in civil and criminal cases was
allowed in the Manila courts upon the enactment of Act No. 267, amending Act No. 183,
the original Charter of Manila. In 1914, the trial by assessors was allowed in criminal
cases in the courts of first instance in the provinces with the enactment of Act No.
2369. And in 1915, Act No. 2520 was passed extending the same trial by assessors to
the courts of first instance and justice of the peace courts in the Department of
Mindanao and Sulu.

In connection with the use of assessors in Manila, section 44 of Act No. 183, the
original Charter of Manila, as amended by section 13 of Act No. 267, was reenacted as
section 2449 of the Administrative Code 1916, Act No. 2657. Section 2449 of the
Administrative Code of 1916 became section 2477 of Act No. 2711, otherwise known as
the Revised Administrative Code of 1917. And section 2477 in turn became section 49
of the Republic Act No. 409, which is the present Charter of the City of Manila. This
section 49 is the law now invoked by petitioner in support of his claim to a trial With the
aid of assessors in the two criminal cases now pending against him. Its pertinent
provisions are quoted hereunder for ready reference: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SEC. 49. Assessors in the courts in the city. — The aid of assessors in the trial of any
civil or criminal action in the municipal court, or the Court of First Instance, within the
city, may be invoked in the manner provided in the Code of Civil Procedure. It shall be
the duty of the Municipal Board to prepare one list of the names of twenty-five
residents of the City best fitted by education, natural ability and reputation for probity
to sit as assessors in the trial of actions in the municipal court and a like list of persons
to sit as assessors in the trial of the action in the Court of First Instance. The Board
may at any time strike any name from the list so prepared, by reason of the death,
permanent disability, or unfitness of the person named; and in case names are so
stricken out, other names shall be added in their place, to be selected as in this section
provided. Parties desiring to avail themselves of the use of assessors in the municipal or
Court of First Instance shall proceed as provided for by law or rules of court; and the
method of summoning assessors, enforcing their attendance, excusing them from
attendance, their compensation, oath duties and effect of dissent from the opinion of
the judges shall be as provided in those laws or rules." cralaw virtua1aw library

A careful analysis of the above provisions is interesting. Their most salient features are:
The aid of assessors in the trial of any civil or criminal action in the Municipal Court for
the Court of First Instance may be invoked in the manner provided in the Code of Civil
Procedure. The parties desiring to avail themselves of the use of assessors "shall
proceed as provided for by law or rules of court", and "the method of summoning
assessors, enforcing their attendance, excusing them from attendance, their
compensation, oath, duties, and effect of the dissent from the opinion of the judge shall
be as provided in those laws or rules." If we are to be guided merely by these
provisions, the right to trial with the aid of assessor would seem to be beyond dispute.
These provisions are simple and clear and appear to be mandatory. But where the
difficulty arises is in their relation or bearing on the directive of the Constitution which
provides that "the existing laws on pleading, practice, and procedure are hereby
repealed as statutes, and are declared rules of courts subject to the power of the
Supreme Court to alter and modify the same." Pursuant to this rule-making power, the
Supreme Court promulgated the present Rules of Court, which became effective on July
1, 1940, but because it failed to incorporate therein the provisions of the Code of Civil
Procedure on assessors, respondents now contend that the right to trial with the aid of
assessors, with all its concomitant provisions, cannot now be invoked because, being
procedural in nature, the same must be deemed to have been impliedly eliminated.

This claim would be correct if we were to hold that the right to trial with the aid of
assessors is not substantive but procedural or adjective in nature. If it were merely
procedural, not having been incorporated in the Rules of Court, the logical conclusion is
that the rule-making power has deemed wise to eliminate it. But no such presumption,
nor conclusion, can be drawn for the reason that the right to a trial by assessors is
substantive in the sense that it must be created and defined by express enactment as
opposed to a mere remedy devised to enforce such right or obtain redress therefor.
"Rules of procedure should be distinguished from substantive law. A substantive law
creates, defines or regulates rights concerning life, liberty or property, or the powers of
agencies or instrumentalities for the administration of public affairs, whereas rules of
procedure are provisions prescribing the method by which substantive rights may be
enforced in courts of justice." (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. I, 1952
ed., p. 4.)

In Bustos v. Lucero, * (46 Off. Gaz., January Supp., pp. 445, 448), this Court cited with
approval the following definitions of substantive law: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Substantive law creates substantive rights and the two terms in this respect may be
said to be synonymous. Substantive rights in a term which includes those rights which
one enjoys under the legal system prior to the disturbance of normal relations. (60 C. J.
980.)

"Substantive law is that part of the law which creates, defines and regulates rights, or
which regulates the right and duties which give rise to a cause of action; that part of
the law which courts are established to administer; as opposed to adjective or remedial
law, which prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtain redress for their
invasions (36 C. J. 27; 52 C. J. S. 1026)." cralaw virtua1aw library

The trial with the aid of assessors as granted by section 154 of the Code of Civil
Procedure and section 2477 of the old Charter of Manila are parts of substantive law
and as such are not embraced by the rule making power of the Supreme Court. This is
so because in said section 154 this matter is referred to as a right given by law to a
party litigant. Section 2477 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is couched in such a
manner that a similar right is implied when invoked by a party litigant. It says that the
aid may be invoked in the manner provided in the Code of Civil Procedure. And this
right has been declared absolute and substantial by this Court in several cases where
the aid of assessors had been invoked (Berbari v. Concepcion, Et Al., 40 Phil., 320;
Colegio de San Jose v. Sison, 54 Phil., 344). Thus, it was there said that these
provisions "necessarily lead to the conclusion that the intervention of the assessors is
not an empty formality which may be disregarded without violating either the letter or
the spirit of the law. It is another security given by the law to the litigants, and as such,
it is a substantial right of which they cannot be deprived without vitiating all the
proceedings. Were we to agree that for one reason or another the trial by assessors
may be done away with, the same line of reasoning would force us to admit that the
parties litigant may be deprived of their right to be represented by counsel, to appear
and be present at the hearings, and so on, to the extent of omitting the trial in a civil
case, and thus set at naught the essential rights granted by the law to the parties, with
consequent nullity of the proceedings." (Colegio de San Jose v. Sison, 54 Phil., 344,
349.)

Being substantive in nature, it is not difficult to see why the provisions concerning trial
by assessors embodied in the Code of Civil Procedure have not been incorporated by
the Supreme Court in the present Rules of Court. To have done so, it would have been
a travesty of its rule-making power which, by direct mandate of the Constitution, is
limited to matters referring to pleading, practice and procedure. The application that
the respondents draw from the failure to incorporate these provisions in the present
Rules of Court to the effect that the intention was to eliminate them or repeal them all
together cannot, therefore, stand in the light of the observations and authorities we
have above adverted to.

There is a point in the claim that the provisions concerning trial by assessors embodied
in the Code of Civil Procedure are not wholly substantive but portions thereof are
remedial such as those which refer to the method of summoning assessors, enforcing
their attendance, excusing them from attendance, their compensation, oath, duties and
effect of dissent from the opinion of the judge, as to which no cogent reason is seen for
their non-incorporation if the intent is not to eliminate them from the Rules of Court.
This is true; but it is likewise true that because said remedial provisions are inextricably
interwoven with the substantive part, it must have been deemed wise and proper to
leave them as they were for reasons of coordination and expediency, it being a truism
that the one cannot be detached from the other. Ubi jus ibi remedium. Remedial
measures are but implementary in character and they must be appended to the portion
of the law to which they belong. Mention should be made here that not all of the
provisions appearing in the Code of Civil Procedure are remedial in nature, such as
those pertaining to prescription, the requisites for making a will, and the succession of
the estate of an adopted child, which are admittedly substantive in character and for
that reason were not incorporated in the Rules of Court. To this group belong the
provisions under consideration.

Granting arguendo that the provisions on assessors of the Code of Civil Procedure and
even in the old Charter of Manila are purely remedial in nature and because of the
failure to incorporate them in the Rules of Court they are deemed to have been
impliedly repealed as claimed by respondents, we are of the opinion that they can still
he invoked by a litigant upon the theory that they had been reaffirmed and reenacted
by Republic Act No. 409, which was approved in 1949, or nine years after the Rules of
Court became effective. As already stated, section 49 of said Act states that the aid of
assessors may be invoked in the manner provided in the Code of Civil Procedure. It
likewise states that the parties desiring to avail themselves of the use of assessors shall
proceed as provided for by law. The mention made of the Code of Civil Procedure in
said section indicates in itself a re-enactment or incorporation by reference of the
provisions concerning assessors contained in said law. Congress, whose members were
mostly lawyers, must be presumed to know that at the time said Act was approved the
Rules of Court had already been promulgated without incorporating therein the
provisions concerning the aid to assessors, and fully cognizant of this situation, and not
desiring to omit this right granted to a litigant, they must have deemed it wise and
proper to re-enact them by reference in said section 49. This Congress can do, for,
while our Constitution has given the power to adopt rules of procedure to the Supreme
Court, such grant did not preclude Congress from enacting any procedural law or
altering, amending, or supplementing any of the rules that may be promulgated by the
Supreme Court (Section 13, Article VIII, Philippine Constitution).

The practice of making such reference has long been sanctioned. Our Congress did this
not only in connection with courts in the City of Manila. It also did it in connection with
courts in Quezon City (Republic Act No. 537). Statutes which refer to other statutes and
make them applicable to the subject for legislation are called "reference statutes."
These statutes are frequently used "to avoid encumbering the statute books by
unnecessary repetition, and they have frequently been recognized as an approved
method of legislation, in the absence of constitutional restrictions." [50 Am. Jur. 57;
Gruen v. Tax Commission, 211 P. (2d) (1949) 651, 666.]

Again, it has been held that "The adoption of an earlier statute by reference makes it as
much as a part of the latter act as though it had been incorporated at full length. This is
true of a legislative act which refers to another act for the procedure to be taken." (50
Am. Jur. 58.) The reference in Republic Act No. 409 to the provisions on assessors must
be deemed, therefore, to have incorporated therein the pertinent provisions on the
matter contained in the Code of Civil Procedure in much the same manner as if the
whole provisions had been reproduced. Consistent with this theory, we cannot but hold
that the observations made by respondents to the effect that the reference made to
said provisions in section 49 is a mere surplusage, or was due to a mere oversight, has
no legal basis, as such innuendo would be tantamount to imputing lack of foresight, if
not brazen negligence, to our legislative body.

It is finally contended that section 49 of Republic Act No. 409 is unconstitutional

because it violates the constitutional provisions that procedural rules "shall be uniform
for all courts of the same grade" and, therefore, it is a class legislation. This contention
cannot be entertained: firstly, because it is raised for the first time in this instance, a
procedural defect which would bar any further discussion on the matter following well-
known precedents 1 and, secondly, because it is not correct that at present only in
Manila trial with the aid of assessors may be invoked if we will sustain the theory that
the promulgation of the Rules of Court did not have the effect of repealing the
provisions on assessors embodied in the Code of Civil Procedure.

The contention of respondents — we reckon — is predicated on the assumption that the

provisions on assessors of the Code of Civil Procedure had been impliedly repealed.
Such is not the case. We have already pointed out that the basic provisions on the
matter partake of the nature of substantive law and as such they were left intact by the
Supreme Court. The corollary to this conclusion is that this remedy may be invoked out
only in Manila but in all other places where it existed prior to the promulgation of the
Rules of Court. This is true in civil cases. With regard to criminal cases, we have seen
that they are allowed by Act No. 2369; and we have already said that the same remedy
may be invoked in the cities of Cebu, Iloilo and Quezon, with the particularity that their
charters make express reference, either directly or indirectly, to the provisions of the
code of Civil Procedure. With this historical background, the claim that under the theory
we have entertained the trial with the aid of assessors can only be invoked in the City
of Manila is certainly without merit.

In view of the foregoing, we hold that the provisions on assessors embodied in the
Code of Civil Procedure are still in force and that the same may still be invoked in the
light of the provisions of section 49 of Republic Act No. 409. It is therefore our opinion
that the respondent Judge acted with abuse of discretion in denying petitioner his right
to the aid of assessors in the trial of the two criminal cases now pending in the Court of
First Instance of Manila.

Wherefore, petition is hereby granted, without pronouncement as to costs.

Paras, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, Jugo and Labrador, JJ.,
concur.

Separate Opinions

REYES, J., concurring: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

In view of section 49 of Republic Act No. 409, approved June 18, 1949, authorizing the
use of assessors in the trial of civil and criminal cases in the city of Manila, I concur in
the result.

TAN JR VS.CA

FACTS:
On January 22, 1981, Tan, for a consideration of P59,200 executed a deed of
absolute sale over the property in question in favor of spouses Jose Magdangal
and Estrella Magdangal. Simultaneous with the execution of this deed, the same
contracting parties entered into another agreement whereunder Tan was given
one (1) year within which to redeem or repurchase the property. Tan failed to
redeem the property until his death on January 4, 1988.

On May 2, 1988, Tan's heirs filed before the RTC at Davao City a suit against the
Magdangals for reformation of instrument alleging that while Tan and the
Magdangals denominated their agreement as deed of absolute sale, their real
intention was to conclude an equitable mortgage.

RTC rendered judgment finding for Tan, portion of which reads:

1) The Deed of Absolute Sale is, in accordance with the true intention of the
parties, hereby declared and reformed an equitable mortgage;

2) The plaintiff is ordered to pay the defendants within 120 days after the finality
of this decision P59,200 plus interest at the rate of 12% per annum from May 2,
1988, the date the complaint was filed, until paid;

3)xxx.

On Sept. 28, 1995, CA affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto. Both parties
received the decision of the appellate court on Oct. 5, 1995. On March 13, 1996,
the clerk of court of the appellate court entered in the Book of Entries of
Judgement the decision xxx and issued the corresponding Entry of Judgment
which, on its face, stated that the said decision has on Oct. 21, 1995 become final
and executory.

Magdangals filed in the RTC a Motion for Consolidation and Writ of Possession
alleging that the 120-day period of redemption of the petitioner has expired.

On June 10, 1996, the RTC allowed the petitioner to redeem the lot in question. It
ruled that the 120-day redemption period should be reckoned from the date of
Entry of Judgment in the CA or from March 13, 1996. The redemption price was
deposited on April 17, 1996.

ISSUE:
What rule should govern the finality of judgment favorably obtained in the trial
court by the petitioner?

HELD:

From 1991-1996, the years relevant to the case at bar, the rule that governs
finality of judgment is Rule 51 of the Revised Rules of Court. Its sections 10 and
11 provide:

SEC. 10. Entry of judgments and final resolutions. If no appeal or motion for new
trial or reconsideration is filed within the time provided in these Rules, the
judgment or final resolution shall forthwith be entered by the clerk in the book of
entries of judgments. The date when the judgments or final resolution becomes
executory shall be deemed as the date of its entry. The record shall contain the
dispositive part of the judgment or final resolution and shall be signed by the
clerk, with a certificate that such judgment or final resolution has become final
and executory.

SEC.11. Execution of judgment. Except where the judgment or final order or

resolution, or a portion thereof, is ordered to be immediately executory, the
motion for its execution may only be filed in the proper court after its entry.

The 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, however, amended the rule on finality
of judgment by providing in section 1, Rule 39 as follows:

Section 1. Execution upon judgments or final orders. Execution shall issue as a

matter of right, on motion, upon a judgment or order that disposes of the action
or proceeding upon the expiration of the period to appeal therefrom if no appeal
has been duly perfected.

If the appeal has been duly perfected and finally resolved, the execution may
forthwith be applied for in the court of origin, on motion of the judgment obligee,
submitting therewith certified true copies of the judgment or judgments or final
order or orders sought to be enforced and of the entry thereof, with notice to the
adverse party.

The appellate court may, on motion in the same case, when the interest of justice
so requires, direct the court of origin to issue the writ of execution.

SC hold that section 1, Rule 39 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure should not
be given retroactive effect in this case as it would result in great injustice to the
petitioner. Undoubtedly, petitioner has the right to redeem the subject lot and
this right is a substantive right. Petitioner followed the procedural rule then
existing as well as the decisions of this Court governing the reckoning date of the
period of redemption when he redeemed the subject lot. Unfortunately for
petitioner, the rule was changed by the 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure which if
applied retroactively would result in his losing the right to redeem the subject lot.
It is difficult to reconcile the retroactive application of this procedural rule with
the rule of fairness. Petitioner cannot be penalized with the loss of the subject lot
when he faithfully followed the laws and the rule on the period of redemption
when he made the redemption.

Case Dig: Dominador Bustos vs. Lucero

G.R. No. L-2068, October 20,1948
Posted By: Vincent Albien V. Arnado on 20 July 2018

FACTS:

The petitioner in the case appeared at the preliminary investigation before the
Justice of Peace of Masantol, Pampanga, and after being informed of the criminal
charges against him and asked if he pleaded guilty or not guilty, upon which he
entered the plea of not guilty. "Then his counsel moved that the complainant
present her evidence so that she and her witnesses could be examined and cross-
examined in the manner and form provided by law." The fiscal and the private
prosecutor objected, invoking section 11 of rule 108, and the objection was
sustained. "In view thereof, the accused's counsel announced his intention to
renounce his right to present evidence," and the justice of the peace forwarded
the case to the court of first instance.

The counsel for the accused petitioner filed a motion with the CFI praying that
the record of the case be remanded to the justice of peace of Masantol, on order
that the petitioner might cross-examine the complainant and her witnesses in
connection with their testimony. The motion was denied and for that reason the
present special civil action of mandamus was instituted. Petitioner squarely
attacks the validity of the provision of section 11 or Rule 108, on the ground that
it deprives him of the right to be confronted with and cross-examine the
witnesses for the prosecution, contrary to the provision of section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Section 11, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is an infringement to
the provision of section 13, Article VIII, of the Constitution hence the decision of
the majority is judicial legislation that diminishes the right of the accused.

HELD:

No. The Supreme Court ruled that section 11 of Rule 108, like its predecessors is
an adjective law and not a substantive law or substantive right. Substantive law
creates substantive rights and the two terms in this respect may be said to be
synonymous. Substantive rights are a term which includes those rights which one
enjoys under the legal system prior to the disturbance of normal relations.
Substantive law is that part of the law which creates, defines and regulates rights,
or which regulates the rights and duties which give rise to a cause of action; that
part of the law which courts are established to administer; as opposed to
adjective or remedial law, which prescribes the method of enforcing rights or
obtains redress for their invasion. As applied to criminal law, substantive law is
that which declares what acts are crimes and prescribes the punishment for
committing them, as distinguished from the procedural law which provides or
regulates the steps by which one who commits a crime is to be punished
Preliminary investigation is eminently and essentially remedial; it is the first step
taken in a criminal prosecution.

As a rule of evidence, section 11 of Rule 108 is also procedural. Evidence — which

is the "the mode and manner of proving the competent facts and circumstances
on which a party relies to establish the fact in dispute in judicial proceedings" —
is identified with and forms part of the method by which, in private law, rights
are enforced and redress obtained, and, in criminal law, a law transgressor is
punished. Criminal procedure refers to pleading, evidence and practice. The
entire rules of evidence have been incorporated into the Rules of Court. We
cannot tear down section 11 of Rule 108 on constitutional grounds without
throwing out the whole code of evidence embodied in these Rules. We do not
believe that the curtailment of the right of an accused in a preliminary
investigation to cross-examine the witnesses who had given evidence for his
arrest is of such importance as to offend against the constitutional inhibition. As
we have said in the beginning, preliminary investigation is not an essential part of
due process of law. It may be suppressed entirely, and if this may be done, mere
restriction of the privilege formerly enjoyed thereunder cannot be held to fall
within the constitutional prohibition.

While section 11 of Rule 108 denies to the defendant the right to cross-examine
witnesses in a preliminary investigation, his right to present his witnesses
remains unaffected, and his constitutional right to be informed of the charges
against him both at such investigation and at the trial is unchanged. In the latter
stage of the proceedings, the only stage where the guaranty of due process comes
into play, he still enjoys to the full extent the right to be confronted by and to
cross-examine the witnesses against him. The degree of importance of a
preliminary investigation to an accused may be gauged by the fact that this
formality is frequently waived. It is inevitable that the Supreme Court in making
rules should step on substantive rights, and the Constitution must be presumed
to tolerate if not to expect such incursion as does not affect the accused in a harsh
and arbitrary manner or deprive him of a defense, but operates only in a limited
and unsubstantial manner to his disadvantage. For the Court's power is not
merely to compile, revise or codify the rules of procedure existing at the time of
the Constitution's approval. This power is "to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts," which is a power to adopt a
general, complete and comprehensive system of procedure, adding new and
different rules without regard to their source.
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