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Appendix 27

SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILES
GENERAL
1. Attacks on aircraft engaged in civil air transport by surface-to-air missiles, or man-portable air defence
systems (MANPADS), have been rare but are not unknown. Successful defence against such an attack is difficult but
not impossible and depends on close cooperation and coordination between ground forces, operators, flight crew and
ATS.
2. Successful defence depends, in the first instance, on an appreciation of a weapon and its capabilities and
limitations. Most such weapons are infra-red guided missiles, and operators have several functions to perform for the
successful launch of this type of missile, including:
a) identification of the target;
b) aiming of the missile, and often energizing an operating battery at the same time;
c) allowing sufficient time for the missile guidance system to lock on to the target; and
d) launching of the missile.
3. Such missiles are generally simple to operate, requiring only that the operator be able to see the target and
operate the power system and launching mechanism. However, training is required if an operator wishes to make
optimum use of the system, and it is not unusual for an untrained or poorly trained operator to wrongly estimate target
range and fire the missile at a target which is outside the launch success zone. In addition, there are a number of
limitations which are imposed on the operation, including:
a) time taken by the operator to prepare, aim, energize and launch the weapon;
b) life of the operating battery, which is often comparatively short;
c) the fact that the weapon may have no gravity bias and therefore must be launched at an angle of more
than 20 degrees elevation;
d) a sufficient level of radiated energy, often required to activate the guidance system;
e) strong solar reflection, often required to activate the guidance system if a suitable heat source is not
available as the target;
f) favourable weather conditions required for a successful launch;
g) limited slant range of about 4 500 m (15 000 ft);
APP 27-2 Aviation Security Manual
Sensitive Security Information
Dissemination, reproduction or onward distribution of this document is expressly prohibited without the consent of the originators.
h) weapon’s self-destruct mechanism, which frequently operates within 12 to 16 seconds after launch;
i) requirement for a favourable aspect from the missile to the target for both acquisition and
engagement; and
j) visibility of the target.
DEFENSIVE MEASURES AND PROCEDURES
Aircraft equipment
4. Operators providing service on a continuing basis in areas of high risk should consult with the appropriate
authority on the use of:
a) exhaust shrouding on aircraft;
b) non-reflective paint on the exterior of aircraft; and
c) electronic countermeasures equipment.
In-flight procedures
5. Aircraft, when over areas known to be at risk from attacks with surface-to-air missiles, should:
a) maintain an altitude of not less than 7 500 m (25 000 ft) AGL for the maximum time possible;
b) make spiralling ascents or descents over designated safe areas for landing or take-off;
c) use the minimal power required for a safe landing or take-off;
d) operate without lights at night in order to obscure the target at which the missile operator must aim;
and
e) operate electronic countermeasures equipment.
ATS procedures
6. ATS staff should be provided with current operational security information so that:
a) safe ascent and descent areas can be pre-planned; and
b) flight crew may be briefed on the safest approach and take-off areas and operating procedures to use.
Appendix 27. Surface-to-air missiles APP 27-3
Sensitive Security Information
Dissemination, reproduction or onward distribution of this document is expressly prohibited without the consent of the originators.
Ground procedures
7. Missiles are easily transportable and can be operated from any open area, including the flat roof of a
building. Consequently, landing, and to a greater extent, take-off paths, which are frequently over open terrain, are the
areas from which attacks are likely to be launched. Contingency plans should therefore include:
a) a requirement for detailed surveys of probable launch sites to be conducted from time to time and for
similar inspections to be carried out immediately prior to landing or take-off;
b) surveillance of probable launch sites by irregularly scheduled security patrols;
c) recruitment of local residents who can assist by immediately reporting any unusual or suspicious
activity;
d) prior identification of high-risk flights for which special procedures will be required on take-off and
landing; and
e) clearance of areas from which attacks may be launched so as to eliminate places of concealment for
launch sites.
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