CASES FOR CONFESSION

People v. Sace, G.R. No. 178063, April 5, 2010

Doctrine:
a declaration is deemed part of the res gestae and admissible in evidence as an exception to the
hearsay rule when the following requisites concur: (1) the principal act, the res gestae, is a
startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or
devise; and (3) the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately
attending circumstances.

Facts:
Appellant was charged with the crime of rape with homicide. At the arraignment, appellant
entered a plea of not guilty. Trial thereafter ensued. The prosecution presented the following as
witnesses: BBB, CCC, Rafael Motol, Bonifacio Vitto, Maribeth Mawac (Maribeth), Carmelita
Mawac, Dr. Erwin Labay, SPO2 Praxedo Seño and Domingo Motol. On the other hand, appellant
testified for his own behalf.Barangay Kagawad Carmelita Mawac (Carmelita) and other
barangay officials and tanods, including Rafael Motol and Bonifacio Vitto, arrived. Upon arrival,
they noticed the bloodstains on appellant's clothing. Carmelita asked appellant what he did, but
appellant denied any knowledge of what happened. Carmelita then went to the half naked body
of AAA and again asked appellant why he did such a thing to his cousin. At that point, appellant
admitted to the barangay officials and tanods that he was the one who committed the crime. He
admitted that he raped and killed AAA. Barangay Tanod Rafael Motol also obtained the same
confession from appellant when he interviewed him in front of other people. On the part of the
defense, appellant denied participation in the crime. Appellant claimed that he was on his way
home from a drinking spree when he passed by AAA's house. As he was walking, appellant saw
AAA who was bloodied and lying on the ground. He held his cousin to determine whether she
was still alive. He then saw in the vicinity of AAA's house, two (2) men whom he allegedly
chased. Appellant could not identify nor remember what the two (2) men were wearing because
it was dark at the time. Convinced that AAA was already dead, appellant did not any more call
for help. Instead, appellant went to the house of his aunt and slept. When CCC and her
companion arrived, he relayed to them how he had chased two (2) men who may have been
responsible for AAA's death. Appellant denied that he confessed to the crime. RTC found
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt. The trial court did not give credence to appellant's
alibi since he even categorically admitted that he was at the crime scene and saw AAA's lifeless
body. Because the crime occurred more or less around the time appellant left the drinking
session, the trial court held that it was not impossible for appellant to accomplish his bestial act
shortly after he left the drinking session as he had to pass by AAA's house on his way home.
Also, other than his bare denial, appellant did not offer any evidence
to support his alibi. RTC also took into consideration the confession of appellant that he was the
one who raped and killed AAA. The trial court noted that the confession was made voluntarily
and spontaneously in public, and witnessed by prosecution's witnesses, who were not shown to
have any ill motive against appellant. Thus, appellant's declaration was admissible as part of res
gestae, his statement concerning the crime having been made immediately subsequent to the
rape-slaying before he had time to contrive and devise. The Court of Appeals upheld the decision
of the RTC so the case was appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issue:
Whether appellants confession is admissible.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the RTC.

The Supreme Court held that the facts in this case clearly show that appellant admitted the
commission of the crime to the prosecution's witnesses. According to their testimonies, appellant
admitted having raped and killed AAA. Their testimonies were not rebutted by the defense.
Appellant's statements in front of the prosecution witnesses are admissible for being part of the
res gestae. Under the Revised Rules on Evidence, a declaration is deemed part of the res gestae
and admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule when the following requisites
concur: (1) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (2) the statements were
made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (3) the statements must concern the
occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances. All these requisites are
present in his case. Appellant had just been through a startling and gruesome occurrence, AAA's
death. His admission was made while he was still under the in􀁁uence of said startling
occurrence and before he had an opportunity to concoct or contrive a story. In addition, he was
still under the influence of alcohol at that time, having engaged in a drinking spree from 1:00
p.m. to 7:00 p.m. that day. His confession concerned the rape and killing of AAA. Appellant's
spontaneous statements made to private persons, not agents of the State or law enforcers, are not
covered by the constitutional safeguards on custodial investigation and, as res gestae, admissible
in evidence against him.

People v. Dacanay G.R. No. 216064, November7, 2016

Facts:
In an Information filed with the RTC, accused-appellant Antonio[4] T. Dacanay (Antonio) was
charged with the crime of Parricide under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC),... On
October 6, 2007, Norma E. Dacanay (Norma), the wife of Antonio, was found lifeless with several
puncture wounds on the bathroom floor of their home by their son, Quinn, who was then coming
home from school.[7] Quinn likewise observed that the rest of the house was in disarray, with the
clothes and things of Norma scattered on the floor, as if suggesting that a robbery had just taken
place.[8] At that time, Antonio had already left for work after having allegedly left the house at
around six in the morning.[9]
Quinn then rushed to the house of his aunt, one Beth Bautista, to tell her about the fate of Norma, and
then proceeded to the workplace of Antonio,[10] which was only ten (10) minutes away from their
house.[11]
On October 8, 2007, PO3 Santos went to Antonio's workplace at PHIMCO Industries, Inc.
(PHIMCO) in Punta, Sta. Ana, Manila, to once again invite Antonio to the precinct.[18] Antonio
acceded to such request and, after fetching Quinn from school, they all proceeded to the police
station.[19] When they arrived at the precinct, Barangay Kagawad Antonio I. Nastor, Jr. and some
members of the media were present.[20]
While at the precinct, Barangay Kagawad Antonio I. Nastor, Jr. informed PO3 Santos that Antonio
was already willing to confess to killing Norma.[21] Accordingly, PO3 Santos proceeded to contact a
lawyer from the Public Attorney's Office.[22] In the meantime, PO3 Santos apprised Antonio of his
constitutional rights, including the right to remain silent.[23] However, as determined by both the
RTC and the CA, despite having been apprised of his rights, Antonio nonetheless confessed to the
crime before the media representatives, who separately interviewed him without PO3 Santos, viz:
Per [Antonio]'s account, around 4:00 in the morning, he and his wife had a fight pertaining to the
unaccounted amount of P100,000.00. With extreme anger, he stabbed his wife several times.
Thereafter, he threw all the pieces of evidence to the river. [Antonio] further declared that he set up
the first floor of their house by placing a pitcher of juice, a half-empty glass of juice and cigarette on
top of the table, to make it appear that someone else went to their house and robbed the place. He
also confessed that he took the missing pieces of jewelry and placed them inside his locker at
PHIMCO. He allegedly admitted the killing of his wife as his conscience has been bothering him. x x
x[24]
Issues:
The sole issue for our resolution is whether the CA, in affirming the RTC, erred in finding Antonio
guilty of the crime of Parricide on the basis of his extrajudicial confession.
Ruling:
At this juncture, it bears stressing that during the separate occasions that Antonio was interviewed by
the news reporters, there was no indication of the presence of any police officers within the proximity
who could have possibly exerted undue pressure or influence. As recounted by both reporters during
their testimonies, Antonio voluntarily narrated how he perpetrated the crime in a candid and
straightforward manner, "with no trace of fear, intimidation or coercion in him".
Under Article 246 of the RPC, the crime of Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2)
the deceased is killed by the accused; (3) the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendants or other descendants, or the legitimate
spouse of the accused.[57] Undoubtedly, all elements are present in this case.
To begin with, the fact that Norma was the spouse of Antonio was sufficiently proven by the
prosecution through their Marriage Contract.[58]
Next, as a rule, an extrajudicial confession, where admissible, must be corroborated by evidence of
corpus delicti in order to sustain a finding of guilt.[59] In this connection, extrajudicial confessions
are presumed voluntary until the contrary is proved.[60] Hence, as extensively discussed above,
considering that Antonio failed to rebut such presumption of voluntariness regarding the authorship
of the crime, coupled with the fact of death of his wife, Norma, we find Antonio guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for the crime of Parricide.

People v. Camat, G.R. No. 112262, April 2,1996

FACTS OF THE CASE While Gonzalo Penalver and his companion, both members of the AFP,
were walking along the streets of Metro Manila, accused (herein petitioner) stole the bag of the
former which contained P150.00 worth of tools and other things. Met with the resistance of the
two officers, herein petitioner stabbed both Gonzalo and his companion which resulted to the
latter’s death. On the other hand, Gonzalo was able to survive from the attack and was
immediately brought to the hospital. A witness testified at the Paranaque police station that he
saw the incident that transpired that evening. During the said testimonial of the witness,
petitioner Camat was brought to the same police station for the reason that he was charged with
acts of lasciviousness. Subsequently, the witness at the police station to the petitioner as the one
who robbed and stabbed the victims. During trial, petitioner invoked his constitutional rights,
alleging that he was coerced to give an extrajudicial confession and that he was denied of his
right to counsel. He argues that the same cannot be admitted as evidence by the prosecution.

ISSUE/S Whether or not the extra-judicial confessions of petitioner Camat can be admitted as
evidence by the prosecution against him
HELD/RATIO No. The Supreme Court held that the extra-judicial confession of petitioner
Camat is in violation of his constitutional rights and, as a result, cannot be admitted in evidence
by the prosecution. In the case at bar, the prosecution failed to prove that the prior questioning
was performed in accordance with the constitutional rights of the accused. However, the Court
held that the same was not overcame by the prosecution. The records do not show that the
petitioner was advised of his constitutional rights and therefore cannot be held as admissible in
evidence.

People v. Lauga, G.R. No. 186228, March 15,2010

Principle: The extrajudicial confession of appellant, which was taken without a counsel,
inadmissible in evidence.
FACTS:
 Appellant Lauga was charged of qualified rape by his daughter. Testimonies revealed that
the victim was left alone at home while his father was having drinking spree at the neighbor’s
place. Her mother decided to leave because appellant has the habit of mauling her mother every
time he gets drunk. Her only brother also went out with some neighbors.
At around 10pm, appellant woke up the victim, removed his pants and slid inside the
blanket covering the victim and removed her pants and underwear. Appellant had warned the
victim not to shout for help. He proceeded to have carnal knowledge of her daughter by
threatening her with his fist and a knife. Soon after, the victim’s brother arrived and saw her
crying. Appellant claimed he scolded the victim for staying out late. The two decided to leave the
house.
While on their way to their maternal grandmother’s house, victim recounted to her
brother what happened to her. They later told the incident to their grandmother and uncle who
sought the assistance of Moises Boy Banting. Banting found appellant in his house wearing only
his underwear. He was invited to the police station to which he obliged. Appellant admitted to
Banting that he indeed raped her daughter because he was unable to control himself.
The trial court convicted the accused for qualified rape. Upon appeal, the CA affirmed
with modification the ruling of the trial court. Hence this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not appellant’s extrajudicial confession without counsel admissible in

evidence?
RULING: No.

The specific scope of duties and responsibilities delegated to a "bantay bayan," particularly on
the authority to conduct a custodial investigation, any inquiry he makes has the color of a state-
related function and objective insofar as the entitlement of a suspect to his constitutional rights
provided for under Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution, otherwise known as the Miranda
Rights, is concerned. Therefore, the extrajudicial confession of appellant, which was taken
without a counsel, inadmissible in evidence.

However, SC agreed with the Court of Appeals that the conviction of the appellant was not
deduced solely from the assailed extrajudicial confession but "from the confluence of evidence
showing his guilt beyond reasonable doubt."

Belonghilot v. RTC Zamboanga del Norte, G.R.No. 128512, April 30,

2003
ADMISSION BY SILENCE

Villanueva v. Balaguer, G.R. No. 180197

195 Villanueva v. Balaguer

G.R. No. 180197 (2009)
J. Ynares-Santiago / Tita K
Subject Matter: Rule 130 – testimonial evidence; admissions and confessions; admissions by silence
Summary: Petitioner, then assistant manager for operations of IBC, was dismissed from employment for
allegedly selling forged certificates of performance. News articles were published where Balaguer was quoted to
have said that anomalies in IBC-13 led to the dismissal of an ‘operations executive for selling forged certificates of
performance. Petitioner then wrote a letter to Balaguer and IBC-13 asking them if he was the person referred to in
the article as the ‘operations executive’. Balaguer and IBC-13 did not reply to the said letter. WON Balaguer and
IBC-13’s failure to respond to petitioner’s letter constitute an admission by silence. SC held that it does not
constitute an admission.
Doctrines:
The rule on admission by silence applies to adverse statements in writing if the party was carrying on a mutual
correspondence with the declarant. However, if there was no such mutual correspondence, the rule is relaxed on the
theory that while the party would have immediately reacted by a denial if the statements were orally made in his
presence, such prompt response can generally not be expected if the party still has to resort to a written reply.

As for the publications themselves, newspaper articles purporting to state what the defendant said are inadmissible
against him, since he cannot be held responsible for the writings of third persons.

Parties:
Petitioner FRANCISCO N. VILLANUEVA
VIRGILIO P. BALAGUER and INTERCONTINENTAL BROADCASTING
Respondent
CORPORATION CHANNEL-13 (IBC-13)
Facts:
 Petitioner Villanueva was then Assistant Manager for Operations of IBC-13.
 Respondent Balaguer was the President of IBC-13.
 Petitioner Villanueva was dismissed from employment on the ground of loss of confidence for allegedly
selling forged certificates of performance.
 News articles about irregularities in IBC-13 were published in The Manila Times and The Philippine Star,
and Manila Bulletin, wherein Balaguer was quoted to have said that he uncovered various anomalies in
IBC-13 during his tenure which led to the dismissal of an operations executive for selling forged
certificates of performance.
 In a letter, petitioner urged respondents to confirm or deny if he was the person referred to in the
news article as the ‘operations executive’ of IBC-13 who was dismissed for selling forged certificates of
performance.
  None of the respondents replied to the letter.
 Petitioner filed before RTC a complaint for damages against Balaguer and IBC-13. Petitioner claimed that
respondents caused the publication of the said news articles which defamed him by falsely and maliciously
referring to him as the ‘IBC-13 operations executive who sold forged certificates of performance’.
 RTC held that petitioner is entitled to an award of damages. However, RTC decision was reversed by the
CA.

Issue/s:
1. WON the failure of the addressee to respond to a letter containing statements attributing to him
commission of acts constituting actionable wrong constitute his admission of said statements. (NO)

In other words, WON the failure of Balaguer and IBC-13 to respond to Villanueva’s letter constitute an admission of the act 1
imputed to them in the letter. (NO)

2. WON the failure of an individual to disown the attribution to him by newspaper publications, as the source
of defamatory newspaper reports, constitute admission that he, indeed, was the source of the said defamatory
news reports. (NO)

In other words, WON the failure of Balaguer to deny the attribution to him by Manila Times and Philippines Star, as the source of
news of defamatory reports about Villanueva, constitute an admission. (NO)

3. WON the admission by a principal is admissible against its agent. (NO)

Ratio:

NO – Respondents failure to respond to Villanueva’s letter does not constitute an admission to the act
imputed in the letter.

Petitioner argues that by not responding to the letter which expressly urged them to reply if the statements therein
contained are untrue, respondents in effect admitted the matters stated therein, pursuant to the rule on admission by
silence in Sec. 32, Rule 130, and the disputable presumption that acquiescence resulted from a belief that the thing
acquiesced in was conformable to the law or fact.

SC held that:

 One cannot prove his claim by placing the burden of proof on the other party.
 Indeed, a man cannot make an evidence for himself by writing a letter containing the statements that
he wishes to prove. He cannot turn a letter into evidence by sending it to the party against whom he wishes
to prove the facts stated therein. He cannot impose a duty to answer a charge just like he cannot impose a
duty to pay by sending goods. Therefore, a failure to answer such adverse assertions in the absence of
further circumstances making an answer requisite or natural has no effect as an admission (Ravago
Equipment Rentals, Inc. v. CA, 1997).2”
 Moreover, the rule on admission by silence applies to adverse statements in writing if the party was
carrying on a mutual correspondence with the declarant. However, if there was no such mutual
correspondence, the rule is relaxed on the theory that while the party would have immediately reacted by
1
Act imputed to respondents: that respondents caused the publication of the subject news articles which defamed him by falsely
and maliciously referring to him as the IBC-13 operations executive who sold forged certificates of performance

2
VERBATIM: Indeed, “(a) man cannot make evidence for himself by writing a letter containing the statements that he wishes to
prove. He does not make the letter evidence by sending it to the party against whom he wishes to prove the facts [stated therein].
He no more can impose a duty to answer a charge than he can impose a duty to pay by sending goods. Therefore a failure to
answer such adverse assertions in the absence of further circumstances making an answer requisite or natural has no effect as an
admission.”
 a denial if the statements were orally made in his presence, such prompt response can generally not be
expected if the party still has to resort to a written reply.

2. NO – Balaguer’s failure to disown the attribution to him by newspaper publications, as the source of
defamatory newspaper reports, does not constitute admission that he, indeed, was the source of the said
defamatory news reports.

 The rule on admission by silence is relaxed when the statement is not made orally in one’s presence or
when one still has to resort to a written reply, or when there is no mutual correspondence between the
parties.
o In this case, newspaper articles purporting to state what the defendant said are inadmissible
against Balaguer since he cannot be held responsible for the writings of third persons.
o While the subject news items indicated that Balaguer was the source of the columnists, proving
that he truly made such statements is another matter.
o Thus, petitioner failed to prove that Balaguer did make such statements.

3. NO – admission by IBC is not admissible against Balaguer.

Petitioner also argues that IBC-13’s cross-claim against Balaguer wherein it was stated that:

“The acts complained of by the plaintiff were done solely by co-defendant Balaguer. Balaguer resorted to
these things in his attempt to stave off his impending removal from IBC.”

is an admission by IBC-13, which is admissible against Balaguer pursuant to Sec. 29, Rule 130 as an admission by a
co-partner or an agent.

SC held that:

 IBC-13’s cross-claim against Balaguer effectively created an adverse interest between them. Hence, the
admission of one defendant is not admissible against his co-defendant. Besides, the alleged acts imputed to
Balaguer were never proven to have been committed, much less maliciously, by Balaguer.

Wherefore, the petition is DENIED.

People v. Roa, G.R. Nos. 138195-96, July 2003

Ma. Nina de la Cruz (Nina) was sleeping in her room. Sleeping in the same room but on a
separate bed was Nina's 23-year old mentally deranged brother.
Nina was awakened when Roa suddenly entered her room. Roa then covered her mouth, held her
hand and removed her shorts and panty after which he removed his pants and brief, went on top
of her. After satisfying his carnal desire, appellant warned her not tell anyone about what
happened and left the room.

More than two months after, nangyari ulit. Same acts. -.-
Nina's mother, after confirming from Nina herself that she was pregnant, confronted appellant
about the incidents but he remained silent.
Two separate Information were filed against accused-appellant Nicanor Roa, charging him with two counts
of rape committed against Ma. Nina Dela Cruz, 14 years old, on two separate occasions. Upon
arraignment, Roa pleaded not guilty to both cases. After the joint trial, RTC Valenzuela found accused-
appellant guilty of two counts of rape, and sentenced him to suffer
reclusion perpetua for each count.

In his appeal before the Court, appellant assailed the testimony of the
complainant. According to appellant, a close scrutiny of her testimony readily
exhibited inconsistencies which go to the very core of her credibility. Appellant
argued that "the fact that complainant was already sleeping would make it
impossible for him to lay her down again because these circumstances did not
appear to be in consonance with the normal course of human nature; and that
while the complainant attributed her pregnancy to appellant, she nevertheless
admitted that she was already pregnant before May 25, 1997 when the alleged
rape subject of the first case occurred.

Issue: Whether Roa should be held guilty of 2 counts of rape

Ruling: Yes, The prosecution having by its evidence prima facie established
appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the burden of evidence shifted on him.
Appellant's evidence, however, is weak and fails to controvert the positive
declaration of Nina who was not shown to have any reason to falsely charge him.
His admitted silence when Nina's mother confronted and even cursed him by his
claim, betrays his guilt just as his passivity does when he was allegedly
maltreated and haled into jail by Nina's father on account of the incidents. For an
innocent man would certainly strongly protest and deny a false accusation and
do something positive to spare himself of punishment. But he did not.

He is, by his silence, deemed to have admitted the charges.|||

First Part of Res Inter Alios Acta; Exceptions

People v. Tena, G.R. No. 100909, October 21, 1992

G.R. No. 100909 October 21, 1992

PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. vs. SOLITO TENA
On June 19, 1988, 82-year-old Alfredo Altamarino, Sr. was found dead inside the
bedroom of his house located at corner Gardner and Regidor Streets, Barangay Sadsaran,
Mauban, Quezon. The deceased's bedroom was in a topsy-turvy state; his cabinet's drawers had
been opened and ransacked.
Suspicion fell on the deceased's caretakers, the spouses William Verzo and Ofelia Ritual,
but investigation by the Mauban Police Force yielded no evidence to warrant the filing of
charges against them. Emma Altamarino Ibana sought the help of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI). NBI Agents arrived at Mauban, Quezon to conduct their own investigation.
Mauban Police Station Commander Lt. Gironimo de Gala informed them that suspicion as to the
authorship of the crime had shifted to a syndicate operating in Lucena City and nearby
municipalities. This syndicate was reportedly involved in the robbery of a Petron Gas Station
owned by a certain Benjamin Lim and a member thereof, Adelberto Camota, was then in
detention. The NBI Agents interrogated Camota.
When confronted, Adelberto Camota executed an extrajudicial confession in the presence
of Atty. Albert Siquijor, admitting participation in the robbery-killing of Alfredo Altamirano, Sr.
and pointing to Virgilio Conde, Jose de Jesus, Solito Tena and an unidentified person as his
companions in the crime.
An information for the crime of Robbery with Homicide was subsequently filed by the
Assistant Provincial Fiscal against Virgilio Conde, Jose de Jesus Jr., Adelberto Camota, Solito
Tena and John Doe. Virgilio Conde and Solito Tena pleaded not guilty upon arraignment on
November 12, 1989 as did Adelberto Camota when arraigned on January 17, 1990.
On February 26, 1991, the Trial Court rendered a decision finding accused Virgilio Conde,
Adelberto Camota and Solito Tena are all found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex
crime of Robbery with Homicide. There was no eyewitness to the commission of the crime. The
judgment of conviction was based chiefly on the extrajudicial confession of accused Adelberto
Camota.

Issue:
Whether or not the extrajudicial confession made by Camota is admissible in evidence
against Tena.

Ruling:
NO. The court ruled that the use of Camota's extrajudicial confession is precluded by
Section 25 (now Section 28), of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, viz:
Section 28. Admission by third party. — The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an
act, declaration, or omission of another, except as hereinafter provided.

On a principle of good faith and mutual convenience, a man's own acts are binding upon
himself, and are evidence against him. So are his conduct and declarations. Yet it would not only
be rightly inconvenient, but also manifestly unjust, that a man should be bound by the acts of
mere unauthorized strangers; and if a party ought not to be bound by the acts of strangers, neither
ought their acts or conduct be used as evidence against him.
But there is an exception, it is admissible in evidence if it is proved that a co-consprirator
relationship exists between Camota and Tena. In order that the admission of a conspirator may be
received against his co-conspirator, it is necessary that (a) the conspiracy be first proved by
evidence other than the admission itself; (b) the admission relates to the common object; and (c)
it has been made while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the conspiracy.
 There exists no evidence of conspiracy between Camota and accused-appellant Tena. As
stressed by the trial court, there was no eyewitness to the commission of the crime and none of
the circumstantial proofs considered by the court a quo points to a conspiracy between Camota
and accused-appellant Tena. For another, the extrajudicial confession was executed only
February 1, 1989, long after the supposed conspiracy between Camota and accused-appellant had
come to an end. The extrajudicial confession of Camota thus being inadmissible against his co-
accused, and there being no evidence independently of said confession, linking accused-
appellant Solito Tena to the crime, this Court declares Tena not guilty of the complex crime of
robbery with homicide with which he is charged.

Naguiat v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118375, October 3, 2003

FACTS:
Aurora Queaño applied with Celestina Naguiat for a loan in the amount of P200,000, which Naguiat
granted. Naguiat indorsed to Quano various checks to cover the loan granted by her. To secure the loan, Queano
executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage in favor of Naguiat. Queano also issued a promissory note for the amount
of P200,000 with interest at 12% per annum and a Security Bank check payable to the order of Naguiat.
The Security Bank check was dishonored for insufficiency of funds. Subsequently, Queano receveid a letter
from Naguiat’s lawyer, demanding the settlement of the loan. Shortly thereafter, Queaño and one Ruby Ruebenfeldt
(Ruebenfeldt) met with Naguiat. At the meeting, Queaño told Naguiat that she did not receive the proceeds of the
loan, adding that the checks were retained by Ruebenfeldt, who purportedly was Naguiat’s agent.
Naguiat ordered for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage. Three days before the scheduled sale,
Queano filed the case before the RTC of Pasay City annulment of the mortgage deed. The lower court declared the
Deed of REM null and void. The CA affirmed in toto the ruling of the lower court.
ISSUE: Whether Queaño had actually received the loan proceeds which were supposed to be covered by the two
checks
(1) Naguiat vigorously insists that Queaño received the loan proceeds. Capitalizing on the status of the mortgage
deed as a public document, she cites the rule that a public document enjoys the presumption of validity and
truthfulness of its contents.

(2) Naguiat questions the admissibility of the various written representations made by Ruebenfeldt on the
ground that they could not bind her following the res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet rule (things
done between strangers ought not to affect a third person, who is a stranger to the transaction).

RULING:
(1) NO, Naguiat is not correct. The presumption of truthfulness of the recitals in a public document was defeated
by the clear and convincing evidence in this case that pointed to the absence of consideration. This Court has
held that the presumption of truthfulness engendered by notarized documents is rebuttable, yielding as it does to
clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, as in this case.

On the other hand, absolutely no evidence was submitted by Naguiat that the checks she issued or endorsed
were actually encashed or deposited. The mere issuance of the checks did not result in the perfection of the
contract of loan. For the Civil Code provides that the delivery of bills of exchange and mercantile documents
such as checks shall produce the effect of payment only when they have been cashed. It is only after the checks
have produced the effect of payment that the contract of loan may be deemed perfected. (Art. 1934 of the Civil
Code)
 A loan contract is a real contract, not consensual, and, as such, is perfected only upon the delivery of the
object of the contract.

(2) NO, Naguiat is not correct. The Court of Appeals rejected the argument, holding that since Ruebenfeldt was
an authorized representative or agent of Naguiat the situation falls under a recognized exception to the rule.
Still, Naguiat insists that Ruebenfeldt was not her agent.

The Court of Appeals recognized the existence of an “agency by estoppel” citing Article 1873 of the Civil
Code. Apparently, it considered that at the very least, as a consequence of the interaction between Naguiat and
Ruebenfeldt, Queaño got the impression that Ruebenfeldt was the agent of Naguiat, but Naguiat did nothing to
correct Queaño’s impression. In that situation, the rule is clear. One who clothes another with apparent authority
as his agent, and holds him out to the public as such, cannot be permitted to deny the authority of such person to
act as his agent, to the prejudice of innocent third parties dealing with such person in good faith, and in the
honest belief that he is what he appears to be. The Court of Appeals is correct in invoking the said rule on
agency by estoppel.
NOTE: Estoppel by laches, or the negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warrants a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. (Ochagabia vs. Court
of Appeals, 304 SCRA 587 [1999])

Bordalba v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.112443, January 25, 2002

FACTS:
In 1980, herein petitioner, Teresita Bordalba (Bordalba) was granted a Free Patent and
was issued an Original Certificate of Title over the herein subject lot located in Mandaue City.
She caused the subdivision and titling of the said lot into 6 parcels, as well as the conveyance of
the two parcels thereof. Private respondents, however, claimed ownership over the same lot by
virtue of an extrajudicial partition made as early as 1947, contending that the land was given to
them by their parents, Sps. Carmeno Jayme and margarita Espina de Jayme (Sps. Jayme).
Hence, they filed a complaint to declare void the Free Patent as well as the cancellation of the
titles issued.

Bordalba averred that a portion of the lot was in possession of the lot in the concept of an
owner since 1947 and that Nicanor Jayme merely occupied same lot through the tolerance of her
mother. During the cross-examination, Bordalba admitted that the properties of the Sps. Jayme
were partitioned by their children, however she was not aware the existence of said Deed of
Extra-judicial Parition. She, however, identified one of the signaturs of the deed to be her
mothers.

The trial court, finding that fraud was employed by petitioner in obtaining the Free
Patent, declared said free patent and title void and ordered its cancellation. However, the
purchaser and mortgagee of the two parcels conveyed were declared in good faith, hence, upheld
their rights over the property. Both petitioner and private respondents appealed to the Court of
Appeals, which affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court. It ruled that private
respondents are entitled only to 1/3 portion of the lot and petitioner should be ordered to
reconvey only 1/3 of the lot to the private respondents.

Petitioner contends that the testimonies given by the witnesses for private respondents
which touched on matters occurring prior to the death of her mother should not have been
admitted by the trial court, as the same violated the dead man's statute. Likewise, petitioner
questions the right of private respondents to inherit from the late Nicanor Jayme and Asuncion
Jayme-Baclay, as well as the identity between the disputed lot and the parcel of land adjudicated
in the Deed of Extra-judicial Partition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a violation of dead man’s statute?

HELD:
No. The dead man's statute does not operate to close the mouth of a witness as to any
matter of fact coming to his knowledge in any other way than through personal dealings with the
deceased person, or communication made by the deceased to the witness.

Since the claim of private respondents and the testimony of their witnesses in the present
case is based, inter alia, on the 1947 Deed of Extra-judicial Partition and other documents, and
not on dealings and communications with the deceased, the questioned testimonies were properly
admitted by the trial court.

Likewise untenable is the claim of petitioner that private respondents are not legal heirs
of Nicanor Jayme and Asuncion Jayme-Baclay. Other than their bare allegations to dispute their
heirship, no hard evidence was presented by them to substantiate their allegations. Besides, in
order that an heir may assert his right to the property of a deceased, no previous judicial
declaration of heirship is necessary.

Second part of Inter Alios Acta

People v. Pineda, G.R. No. 141644, May 27, 2004

Facts:
The Information[2] charged appellant, along with Celso Sison y Lloren[3] ("Sison"), Victor
Emmanuel Colet ("Colet"), Totie Jacob ("Jacob"), John Doe and Peter Doe, with the crime of
Highway Robbery resulting in Homicide, as... follows:
That on or about the 15th day of October 1997, in Caloocan City, Metro Manila, the above-named
accused, conspiring, confederating and helping each other, with intent to gain and posing as
passengers of an AIRCONDITIONED BUS "DREAMLINE AIRCON BUS" then cruising along
Quirino Highway, Malaria, Caloocan City with more or less sixty (60) passengers, said accused by
means of violence and intimidation upon all passengers as well as the bus driver and conductor, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously stage a HOLD-UP by pulling... out their
respective firearms and poke the same against everybody especially against the bus driver and
conductor and they started to take and rob cash and personal belongings of all and on the occasion of
said robbery in order to instill more fear among passengers, said accused... in pursuit of their
conspiracy, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to kill shot in
different parts of his body one SPO1 ARNEL FUENSALIDA Y INCINARES, PNP, who as a
consequence of the wounds died shortly thereafter to the damage and prejudice of... all passengers,
bus driver, conductor and the family of deceased SPO1 Arnel Fuensalida y Incinares.
Appellant pleaded not guilty on his arraignment on 24 May 1999. After appellant had rested his case,
the police arrested Colet. Colet pleaded not guilty during his arraignment on 27 September 1999.
When the trial court rendered its decision, the other accused remained at... large.
The trial court ruled that contrary to the offense designated in the information, the proper charge
against appellant is robbery with homicide under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code[9] and not
highway robbery resulting in homicide under P.D. No. 532.
The trial court declared that the situation covered by P.D. No. 532 contemplates acts of brigandage
against any prospective victim anywhere on the highway.
The trial court found the testimonies of Ferrer and Ramos "positive, spontaneous and forthright" and
observed that they "remained steadfast and convincing despite the rigid cross-examination by defense
counsel and the clarificatory questions of the trial court judge. After evaluating the evidence, the trial
court convicted appellant and acquitted Colet,... The police later arrested appellant based on an out-
of-court identification by Ferrer. Ferrer first identified appellant and Sison through mug shots the
police presented to them. Although he testified against Colet, SPO1 Carlito Alas ("SPO1 Alas"), the
investigating police... officer, admitted that there were only two photographs presented to Ferrer. The
police showed Ferrer only the photographs of appellant and his co-accused Sison.

Issue: W/N Pineda was correctly convicted of the crime charged? - NO.

Ruling: SC held that Pineda must be acquitted because the prosecution

was not able to sufficiently establish his identity as the perpetrator of
the crime charged.
In resolving the admissibility of out-of-court identification of suspects, courts have adopted the
totality of circumstances test where they consider the following factors: (1) the witness' opportunity
to view the perpetrator of the crime; (2) the witness' degree of attention at... the time; (3) the
accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty shown by the witness
of his identification; (5) the length of time between the crime and the identification; and, (6) the
suggestiveness of the identification procedure.
Although showing mug shots of suspects is one of the established methods of identifying criminals,
[23] the procedure used in this case is unacceptable. The first rule in proper photographic
identification procedure is that a series of photographs must be... shown, and not merely that of the
suspect.[24] The second rule directs that when a witness is shown a group of pictures, their
arrangement and display should in no way suggest which one of the pictures pertains to the suspect.
In the present case, there was impermissible suggestion because the photographs were only of
appellant and Sison, focusing attention on the two accused.[27] The police obviously suggested the
identity of the accused by showing only appellant and Sison's... photographs to Ferrer and Ramos.
The testimonies of Ferrer and Ramos show that their identification of appellant fails the totality of
circumstances test. The out-of-court identification of appellant casts doubt on the testimonies of
Ferrer and Ramos in court.
In its decision, the trial court relied on the testimonies of Ferrer and Ramos to prove that appellant is
one of the perpetrators. On closer examination, however, we see that Ferrer and Ramos failed to
establish that what they saw of the perpetrators is sufficient to produce an... accurate memory of the
incident.

◦ Sec. 34, Rule 130 provides that "Evidence that one did or did not
do a certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he did or
did not do the same or a similar thing at another time; but it may be
received to prove a specific intent or knowledge, identity, plan,
system, scheme, habit, custom or usage, and the like."
◦ Evidence is NOT admissible when it shows, or tends to show, that
the accused in a criminal case has not committed a crime independent
from the offense for which he is on trial.
A man may be a notorious criminal and may have committed many
crimes and still be innocent of the crime charged on trial.

People v. Magpayo, G.R. Nos. 92961-64, September 1, 1993

Facts: Magpayo here was accused in 4 cases (rape, robbery, robbery

with holdup, and forcible abduction with rape). It can be observed from
these cases that the victims are usually young girls under the age of
12. What Magpayo would do is that he would accuse these minor of a
crime then he would bring them to an isolated place them he would
rape or rob them. The trial court jointly tried these cases and found
Magpayo guilty of all of them.
Magpayo assails the trial court's application of the doctrine of res inter
alios acta (Sec. 35, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Evidence)
allegedly because the similarity of the acts involved (i.e., molestation)
was not sufficiently established.

Issue: Whether the Trial Court erred in the application of Section 35 of

rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence.

Held: No. Rule under Section 35, Rule 130:

Evidence which shows that the accused in a criminal case has
committed a crime wholly independent of the offense for which he is
on trial is not admissible.

Exception:
When such evidence tends directly to establish the particular crime,
and it is usually competent to prove the motive, the intent, the
absence of mistake or accident, a common scheme or plan embracing
the commission of two or more crimes so related to each other that
proof of one tends to establish the other, or the identity of the person
charged with the commission of the crime on
In this case, the evidence introduced in the Forcible Abduction with
Rape was not introduced as evidence of similar acts to prove that the
accused also committed a similar act in the other rape and robbery.

The evidence was not offered and admitted to prove the other but only
to show the plan, scheme or modus operandi of the offender.

As observed by the Trial Court, the modus operandi of the offender is

that of approaching young girls of not more than twelve years of age,
and taking advantage of their innocence, imputed to them the
commission of a crime and brought them to an isolated place where
the offenses charged were committed.

Thus, as provided under section 35 of rule 130, evidence that one did
or did not do a certain thing at one time may be received to prove a
specific intent or knowledge, identity, plan, system, scheme, habit,
custom or usage and the like.

People v. Acosta, G.R. No. 126351, February 18, 2000

FACTS: Complainant’s grandson, Elmer Montesclaros, in the belief that Acosta and his wife were the ones hiding
his live-in partner from him, stormed the house of appellant and burned their belonings.
In the afternoon of February 27, 1996, witness Aquino saw Acosta and approached him. When she asked
why he was carrying a stove and a knife, he replied that he would burn the house of complainant.
 In the morning of February 28, 1996, witness Videña, saw complainant's house burning. She noticed the
presence of appellant standing alone in front of the burning house. Appellant was just watching the blaze and not
doing anything to contain it. When the fire truck arrived, the house was already razed to the ground.
After the conduct of the investigation, the investigator did not find any incendiary device; hence, the cause
of fire remained undetermined. However, trial court found appellant guilty with the crime of arson.

ISSUE: Whether circumstantial evidences can justify appellant’s conviction for the crime of arson.

HELD: YES. Appellant's conviction for the crime of arson rests on circumstantial evidence. Pertinently, Section 4
of Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. — Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven;
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt.
In order to justify a conviction upon circumstantial evidence, the combination of circumstances must be
such as to leave no reasonable doubt in the mind as to the criminal responsibility of the accused.
Although there is no direct evidence linking appellant to the arson, SC agreed with the trial court holding
him guilty thereof in the light of the following circumstances duly proved and on record:
First, appellant had the motive to commit the arson. It is not absolutely necessary, nevertheless in a case of
arson like the present, the existence or non-existence of a sufficient motive is a fact affecting the credibility of the
witnesses. It was duly proved that at around 4:30 in the afternoon of February 27, 1996, complainant's grandson,
stormed the house of appellant and his wife and burned their belongings. When appellant was informed of the
incident, he got mad, and as his common-law wife testified, appellant threw a tantrum.
Second, appellant's intent to commit the arson was established by his previous attempt to set on fire a bed
inside the same house (private complainant's) which was burned later in the night. Witness Aquino testified that at
around 5:00 in the afternoon of the same day, she asked appellant what he was going to do with the stove he was
carrying that time, he answered that he was going to burn the house of private complainant. When she peeped in the
kitchen, she saw that appellant entered the house of private complainant and started pouring gas on a bed and then
lighted a fire with a disposable lighter. Appellant's wife rushed in and extinguished the fire with a broomstick. The
two later left the house.
Third, appellant was not only present at the locus criminis before the incident, he was seen inside the yard
of the burning house during the height of the fire. At around 1:00 in the morning of February 28, 1996, witness
Videña, through the holes of the GI sheets, saw appellant latter that day standing alone inside private complainant's
yard watching the house burning. Appellant even looked happy with a canine smile and crazy-looking expression.
Fourth, appellant's actions subsequent to the incident further point to his culpability. At around 12:00 noon
of February 28, 1996, private complainant went with witness Videña to the place of Kagawad Tecson. They were
about to leave when appellant arrived. Private complainant asked him why he burned her house and appellant
answered, "So what if I burned your house?"
Lastly, it would not be amiss here to point out that "in the crime of arson, the enormity of the offense is not
measured by the value of the property that may be destroyed but rather by the human lives exposed to destruction."