TRINIDAD VS PEOPLE

CRIME: HOMICIDE

FACTS:

1. Around 9pm in October 1998, Doming boarded the tricycle of Salvador.

2. Accused, along with 5 others were having a bon fire. They flagged the tricycle of Salvador which
angered Doming.

3. Doming brought out a fan knife and slapped Sonny prompting the companions of the latter, except
petitioner Romulo Trinidad, to scamper. Doming approached petitioner and said, "You are one of
them." Petitioner replied, "I am not x x x one [of them], uncle."

4. Thereafter, Doming slapped petitioner in the face and the latter said, "You are boastful, uncle."
Doming picked up a bamboo and hit petitioner on his left arm. Petitioner ran towards the east, while
Doming chased him.

5. Totoy Trinidad and Antonio Trinidad, went near the persons hiding behind the tricycle and asked
them if Doming was armed, to which Sonny answered, "Yes, he has a knife." Totoy went beside
Salvador and told him to put off the light of his tricycle, which the latter did not follow. Thus, Totoy
turned off the engine of Salvador's tricycle and headed towards the east shortly after Doming chased
petitioner to the same direction.

6. Salvador went to the house of the Barangay Captain, but the latter was asleep, prompting him to go
to the police station to report that Doming was in trouble.

7. SPO4 Charlie Abuan, together with policemen Coloma and Cariaga, with Barangay Kagawad Rudy
Sabado and Salvador, went to the scene of the crime and saw the bloodied body of the victim in a
kneeling position with his forehead touching the ground. Five (5) persons were brought to the police
station for investigation.

8. RTC acquitted Totoy Trinidad, Petitioner's father on reasonable doubt and convicted Antonio and
petitioner.

9. It was appealed to CA. CA acquitted Antonio Trinidad on reasonable doubt, but affirmed the
conviction of petitioner.

10. Petitioner insists that the prosecution was not able to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt
because the circumstantial evidence presented during the trial is insufficient. According to him, he
was not the only person who had a motive to kill the victim; thus, the presumption of innocence
should be in his favor.
ISSUE:

W/N Romulo be acquitted on the ground that he is not is only person with motive to kill the victim.

CONTENTION OF THE ACCUSED:

 petitioner insists that the prosecution was not able to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt
because the circumstantial evidence presented during the trial is insufficient.  According to him, he
was not the only person who had a motive to kill the victim; thus, the presumption of innocence
should be in his favor.

CONTENTION OF THE STATE:

This Court finds no merit to the petition.  Since petitioner was convicted on the basis of purely
circumstantial evidence, this Court has to review the facts and to deliberate on the case with extra
care, cognizant that the prosecution cannot rely on the weakness of the defense, and that any
conviction must rest on nothing less than moral certainty of the guilt of the accused

RULLING/HELD:  

the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, dated July 1,
2010, of petitioner Romulo Trinidad is hereby DENIED and the Decision and Resolution dated October
12, 2009 and May 4, 2010, respectively, of the Court of Appeals affirming the Decision dated
September 28, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court of Bauang, La Union, Branch 33, finding him guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide, is hereby YES.

LETICIA I. KUMMER, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent;

G.R. No. 174461
September 11, 2013

CRIME: HOMICIDE

FACTS OF THE CASE:

The prosecution’s evidence revealed that., Jesus Mallo, Jr., accompanied by Amiel Malana, went to
the house of the petitioner, Leticia Kummer and her Son Johan. The petitioner opened the door and
at this point, Johan shot Mallo twice using a gun. Malana, who was with Mallo and who witnessed the
shooting, immediately ran towards the west and when he turned his back, he saw the petitioner
leveling and firing her long gun at Mallo, hitting the latter’s back and causing him to fall flat on the
ground.
The petitioner denied the charge and claimed in her defense that she and her children were already
asleep in that evening. She claimed that they were awakened by the sound of stones being thrown at
their house, a gun report, and the banging at their door. Believing that the noise was caused by the
members of the New People’s Army prevalent in their area, Johan got and fired it twice outside to
scare the people causing the disturbance. The noise continued, however, with a stone hitting the
window and breaking the glass which prompted Johan to fire the gun again. The noise thereafter
stopped and they all went back to sleep. 
RTC found Leticia Kummer and her Son Johan guilty of homicide by the testimonies of prosecution
eyewitnesses. This was coupled by positive findings of gunpowder nitrates on the left hand of Johan
and on the petitioner’s right hand, as well as the corroborative testimony of the other prosecution
witnesses.
Johan, who shot Mallo, was still a minor at that time, was released on the recognizance of his father,
Moises Kummer. Johan subsequently left the country without notifying the court; hence, only the
petitioner appealed the judgment of conviction with the CA.
 
 
CONTENTION OF THE ACCUSED:
Petitioner appealed to CA that RTC committed the following errors:

-In giving credence to the testimonial evidence of Cuntapay and of Malana despite the
discrepancies between their sworn statements and direct testimonies.

-In not considering the failure of the prosecution to cite the petitioner’s motive in killing the victim

-In failing to consider that the writer of the decision, Judge Lyliha L. Abella-Aquino, was not
the judge who heard the testimonies; and

-In considering the paraffin test results finding the petitioner positive for gunpowder residue.

CONTENTION OF THE STATE:

CA – REJECTED petitioner’s arguments:

-Discrepancies between the sworn statement and the direct testimony of the witnesses do
not necessarily discredit them because the contradictions are minimal and reconcilable.

- Proof of motive is only necessary when a serious doubt arises on the identity of the accused.

-That the writer of the decision was not the judge who heard the testimonies of the
witnesses does not necessarily make the decision erroneous.

-Malana and Cuntapay’s positive identification and the corroborative evidence presented by the
prosecution more than sufficient to convict the petitioner of the crime charged.

ISSUE:
W/N lack of motive can acquit the accused from the crime of Homicide.
 
RULING:
NO. We agree with the CA’s ruling that motive gains importance only when the identity of the
assailant is in doubt. As held in a long line of cases, the prosecution does not need to prove the
motive of the accused when the latter has been identified as the author of the crime. The petitioner
was positively identified by Malana and Cuntapay. Thus, the prosecution did not have to identify and
prove the motive for the killing. It is a matter of judicial knowledge that persons have been killed for
no apparent reason at all, and that friendship or even relationship is no deterrent to the commission
of a crime. The petitioner attempts to offer the justification that the witnesses did not really witness
the shooting as their affidavits merely attested that they heard the shooting of Mallo (and did not
state that they actually witnessed it). We find this to be a lame argument whose merit we cannot
recognize. That Malana and Cuntapay have been eyewitnesses to the crime remains unrefuted. They
both confirmed in their direct testimony before the RTC that they saw the petitioner fire a gun at
Mallo. This was again reaffirmed by the witnesses during their cross examination. The fact that their
respective affidavits merely stated that they heard the gunshots does not automatically foreclose the
possibility that they also saw the actual shooting as this was in fact what the witnesses claimed truly
happened. Besides, it has been held that the claim that “whenever a witness discloses in his
testimony in court facts which he failed to state in his affidavit taken ante litem motam, then an
inconsistency exists between the testimony and the affidavit” is erroneous. If what were stated in
open court are but details or additional facts that serve to supplement the declarations made in the
affidavit, these statements cannot be ruled out as inconsistent and may be considered by the court.
Thus, in light of the direct and positive identification of the petitioner as one of the perpetrators of
the crime by not one but two prosecution eyewitnesses, the failure to cite the motive of the
petitioner is of no moment. At any rate, we find it noteworthy that the lack or absence of motive
for committing the crime does not preclude conviction where there are reliable witnesses who fully
and satisfactorily identified the petitioner as the perpetrator of the felony, such as in this case.
 
CA's decision convicting petitioner of the crime of homicide is AFFIRMED.

People vs obosa

Crime: MURDER

FACTS:

Appellant is the attorney-in-fact of the victim. He visited the victim before her
death, caliming at 3pm to give a land title paper then left right away.
The niece of the victim heard appellant saying, "Kung hindi ka magbibigay ng
pera, papatayin kita" before they went into the apartment, claiming at 4pm.
A neighbor saw Obosa leave the apartment at past 5.
Appellant was informed of the victim's death and he even helped in the funeral.
He was convicted to murder by the RTC with punishment of death with penalties.

Contention of the accused:

The evidence is insufficient to prove beyond reasonable doubt.

He is convicted to murder on the basis of PURE CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
His defense of alibi which was corroborated by others was not appreciated.

Contention of the state:

the Court finds the accused MAMERTO OBOSA GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT of the crime of MURDER and accordingly sentences him to suffer the
penalty of DEATH; to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the sum of P50,000.00;
to pay funeral expenses in the amount of P250,000.00, moral damages in the
amount of P250,000.00, attorney’s fees in the sum of P25,000.00 and the costs
of the suit

Issue:

WON there is credibility of witnesses and the sufficiency of circumstantial

evidence to warrant the conviction of appellant of murder.s
Rulling/Held:

The prosecution introduced evidence showing there was a MOTIVE on the part of
the appellant in committing the crime. Jenny Lora testified that previously,
appellant threatened to kill Leonarda if she would not meet his demand for
money. With proof of such motive and circumstantial evidence on hand,
appellant’s guilt is indeed beyond any doubt.

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 121,
Caloocan City, dated May 3, 1997 in Criminal Case No. C-49679(95); is hereby
AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that appellant Mamerto Obosa is sentenced
to reclusion perpetua, instead of death, and is ordered to pay the heirs of the
victim, Leonarda Lora y Lalic, the sums of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and
P50,000.00 as moral damages.

PEOPLE VS FERRERA – GR NO. L-66965

CRIME: Murder with qualified treachery

FACTS:

Arsenio Ferrera, Barangay Captain and CHDF head, together with some CHDF
men, stopped the “motorela” and ordered the driver, Pascual Patiag (victim), to
alight even as one of the CHDF men accused the said driver of being a member
and/or sympathizer of the New People’s Army (NPA). The men then hitting him
with their fists. Arsenio Ferrera, perhaps unsatisfied with merely using his bare
hands on the poor man, brought out his knife and stabbed the man once in the
stomach.
Holding desperately to dear life, the victim, by then profusely bleeding, staggered
to his house which was about 200 meters away. Arsenio Ferrera, evidently lusting
for more, and with his men tailing him, relentlessly pursued the fleeing victim and
in cold blood shot him twice with a carbine. Pascual Patiag finally lay lifeless on
the road. Yet his ordeal was far from over. The killers apparently wanted to
partake of the dead man’s body. They, thus sliced slabs of flesh from his thighs
as though it were edible meat, mutilated his ears and extracted his liver. Finally,
and in an effort to conceal the crime, the men attempted to burn what remained
of the victim, then left it by the sugarcane field where it was discovered.

CONTENTION OF THE STATE:

Arsenio Ferrera abused his position as Barangay Captain and CHDF head ordering
Pascual Patiag to go out of his “motorela” which was enough for him to submit
leading to his murder.

CONTENTION OF THE ACCUSED:

One of Arsenio Ferrera’s men accused Pascual Patiag of being a member and/or
sympathizer of the New People’s Army (NPA)

ISSUE:

Whether or not appellant Ferrera is guilty of murder qualified by treachery

beyond reasonable doubt

RULING:

The appellant is guilty of murder qualified by treachery. The offense being

attended by one aggravating circumstance (taking advantage of public office),
with no mitigating circumstance to offset it, the penalty provided in Article 248
(1) of the Revised Penal Code is hereby imposed in its maximum period (death).
In view, however, of the provisions of the 1987 Constitution abolishing the death
penalty, the appellant’s sentence is commuted to reclusion perpetua. The
indemnity to be paid is P30,000.00. The grant of P39,000.00 and P50,000.00 as
and for further actual damages and moral damages respectively, stands.

MADEJA VS CARO

CRIME: homicide through reckless imprudence

FACTS:

An information for homicide through reckless imprudence for the death of Cleto
Madeja after an appendectomy was filed by the widow of the deceased, Carmen
L. Madeja, against Dr. Eva A. Japson in the defunct Court of First Instance of
Eastern Samar. The information states that: "The offended party Carmen L.
Madeja reserving her right to file a separate civil action for damages." (Rollo, p.
36.) While the criminal case still pending, Carmen L. Madeja sued Dr. Eva A.
Japzon for damages in Civil Case in the same court alleging that her husband died
because of the gross negligence of Dr. Japzon. Japzon filed a motion to dismiss
which was granted by Judge Felix Caro invoking Section 3(a) of Rule 111 of the
Rules of Court: (a) Criminal and civil actions arising from the same offense may
be instituted separately, but after the criminal action has been commenced the
civil action can not be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the
criminal action.
According to the respondent judge, "under the foregoing Sec. 3 (a), Rule 111,
New Rules of Court, the instant civil action may be instituted only after final
judgment has been rendered in the criminal action." (Rollo, p. 33.) Madeja now
filed the instant petition which seekimg to set aside the order of the respondent
judge.

ISSUE:

-Case for homicide through reckless imprudence for the death of Cleto Madeja
after an appendectomy
-Whether they can file for a separate civil action for damage and negligence

CONTENTION OF THE ACCUSED:

Japzon filed a motion to dismiss which was granted by Judge Felix Caro invoking
Section 3(a) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court: (a) Criminal and civil actions
arising from the same offense may be instituted separately, but after the criminal
action has been commenced the civil action can not be instituted until final
judgment has been rendered in the criminal action.

CONTENTION OF THE STATE:

According to the respondent judge, "under the foregoing Sec. 3 (a), Rule 111,
New Rules of Court, the instant civil action may be instituted only after final
judgment has been rendered in the criminal action." (Rollo, p. 33.) Madeja now
filed the instant petition which seekimg to set aside the order of the respondent
judge.

RULLING/HELD:

Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court in relation to Article 33 of the Civil Code
is the applicable provision. The two enactments are quoted herein below: Sec. 2.
Independent civil action. — In the cases provided for in Articles 31,32, 33, 34 and
2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, an independent civil action entirely
separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured
party during the pendency of the criminal case, provided the right is reserved as
required in the preceding section. Such civil action shall proceed independently of
the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence."
(Rule 111, Rules of Court.) Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical
injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the
criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall
proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence. (Civil Code,) There are at least two things about Art.
33 of the Civil Code which are worth noting, namely: 1. The civil action for
damages which it allows to be instituted is ex-delicto -
 IVLER VS SAN PEDRO

CRIME:

Reckless Imprudence resulting in Slight Physical Injuries and Reckless

Imprudence resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property.

FACTS:
BECAUSE OF THE CAR INCIDENT
 Ivler was charged in the MeTC with Reckless Imprudence resulting in Slight Physical Injuries (against
Evangeline Ponce) and Reckless Imprudence resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property (against
Nestor Ponce) He pleaded guilty to the case of Reckless Imprudence resulting in Slight Physical
Injuries and was given the penalty of public censure. Because he plead guilty and was convicted for
the aforementioned case, he moved to quash the Information in the case resulting to Homicide for
placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence.

ISSUE:

is whether or not the remaining case should be dismissed because of Ivler’s

constitutional right against double jeopardy.

CONTENTION OF THE ACCUSED:

Ivler argues that his constitutional right not to be placed twice in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense bars his prosecution for Reckless Imprudence
with Homicide and Damage to Property, having been previously convicted for the
case with for the same offense of reckless imprudence with slight physical
injuriescharged. He submits that the multiple consequences of such crime are
material only to determine his penalty.

CONTENTION OF THE STATE:

the court cancelled his bail and ordered for his arrest. The case was elevated to
the RTC, where the lower court’s order was affirmed.

RULLING/HELD:

NO. Petitioner’s non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case

No.82366 did not divest him of personality to maintain the petition in S.C.A.
2803;

The RTC’s dismissal of petitioner’s special civil action for certiorari to review a
pre-
arraignment ancillary question on the applicability of the Due Process Clause to
bar

proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366 finds no basis under procedural rules and
jurisprudence.
The mischief in the RTC’s treatment of petitioner’s non-appearance at his
arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366 as proof of his loss of standing
becomes more evident when one considers the Rules of Court’s treatment of a
defendant who absents himself from post-arraignment hearings.
 JACINTO VS PEOPLE

CRIME:

A petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Gemma T. Jacinto seeking the
reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming petitioner's conviction of
the crime of Qualified Theft, and its Resolution denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration

FACTS:

Baby Aquino handed petitioner Gemma Jacinto a Banco De Oro (BDO) Check in
the amount of P10,000.00. The check was payment for Baby Aquino's purchases
from Mega Foam Int'l., Inc., and petitioner was then the collector of Mega Foam.
Somehow, the check was deposited in the Land Bank account of Generoso
Capitle, the husband of Jacqueline Capitle;

phone call from an employee of Land Bank, who was looking for Generoso
Capitle. The reason for the call was to inform Capitle that the subject BDO check
deposited in his account had been dishonored. Ricablanca then called and relayed
the message through accused Anita Valencia, a former employee/collector of
Mega Foam, because the Capitles did not have a phone; but they could be
reached through Valencia, a neighbor and former co-employee of Jacqueline
Capitle at Mega Foam. Valencia then told Ricablanca that the check came from
Baby Aquino, and instructed Ricablanca to ask Baby Aquino to replace the check
with cash

Valencia also told Ricablanca of a plan to take the cash and divide it equally into
four: for herself, Ricablanca, petitioner Jacinto and Jacqueline Capitle. Ricablanca,
upon the advise of Mega Foam's accountant, reported the matter to the owner of
Mega Foam, Joseph Dyhengco

PEOPLE filed a Complaint with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and
worked out an entrapment operation with its agents. Ten pieces of P1,000.00 bills
provided by PEOPLE were marked and dusted with fluorescent powder by the
NBI. Thereafter, the bills were given to Ricablanca, who was tasked to pretend
that she was going along with Valencia's plan.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a worthless check can be the object of theft.

CONTENTION OF THE ACCUSED:

appealed to the CA and the decision of the trial court was MODIFIED, in that:(a)
the sentence against accused Gemma Jacinto stands; (b) the sentence against
accused Anita Valencia is reduced to 4 months arresto mayor medium, and (c)
The accused Jacqueline Capitle is acquitted. Hence, the present Petition for
Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner alone,
CONTENTION OF THE STATE:

A case was filed against the three accused, Jacinto, Valencia and Capitle. RTC
rendered its Decision finding them GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of QUALIFIED THEFT and sentenced each imprisonment of FIVE (5) YEARS, FIVE
(5) MONTHS AND ELEVEN (11) DAYS, as minimum, to SIX (6) YEARS, EIGHT (8)
MONTHS AND TWENTY (20) DAYS, as maximum

RULLING/HELD:

The Decision of the Court of Appeals, are MODIFIED. Petitioner Gemma T. Jacinto
is found GUILTY of an IMPOSSIBLE CRIME as defined and penalized in Articles 4,
paragraph 2, and 59 of the Revised Penal Code, respectively. Petitioner is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of six (6) months of arrresto mayor, and to pay
the costs.

violate the due process clause of the Constitution. If at all, that fraudulent
scheme could have been another possible source of criminal liability. IN VIEW OF
THE FOREGOING

BATACLAN VS MEDINA

CRIME: Negligence in pursuant to Arts. 1733, 1759, and 1763 of the

NCC (responsibility of common carrier to its passengers and their goods)

1733- Safety of the passenger

1759- liable for death of or the injuries to the passenger

1763- Responsible on account of the willfull acts or negligence of other passenger

or stranger

FACTS:

Defendant Medina is the owner-operator of bus no. 30 of the Medina

Transportation. At about 2:00 AM on Sept. 13, 1952, while the said bus was
running very fast on a highway, one of the front tires burst and the vehicle
began to zig-zag until it fell into a canal or ditch on the right side of the road
and turned upside down. Some of the passengers managed to leave the bus
but four passengers could not get out of the overturned bus. It would appear
that as the bus overturned, gasoline began to leak and escape from the
gasoline tank on the side of the chassis, spreading over and permeating the
body of the bus and the ground under and around it. After half an hour, came
about ten men, one of them carrying a lighted torch, presumably approached
the overturned bus to help the people trapped therein but almost immediately,
a fierce fire started, burning and all but consuming the bus, including the four
passengers trapped inside it.
ISSUE:

the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan was not the overturning of the bus,
but rather, the fire that burned the bus.

WON the carrier is liable

CONTENTION OF THE ACCUSED:

PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS: Citing an American jurisprudence,

they argued that based on the given definition, a proximate cause:
“that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the
result would not have occurred.” And more comprehensively, 'the
proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either
immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural
and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection

CONTENTION OF THE STATE:

There is no question that the defendant carrier is

liable. However, as to the what degree, the trial court was of the opinion that
the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan was not the overturning of the
bus, but rather, the fire that burned the bus, including himself and his co-
passengers who were unable to leave it.

-negligence on the part of the agents of the carrier.the driver and the conductor
were on the
road walking back and forth. They, or at least, the driver should and must have
known that in the position in which the overturned bus was, gasoline could and
must have leaked from the gasoline tank and soaked the area in and around
the bus, this aside from the fact that gasoline when spilled, specially over a
large area, can be smelt and directed even from a distance, and yet neither
the driver nor the conductor would appear to have cautioned or taken steps to
warn the rescuers not to bring the lighted torch too near the bus. That is

RULING HELD:

the decision of the trial court is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION to

the damages awarded.