G.R. No.

189158 11 January 2017

JAMES IENT and MAHARLIKA SCHULZE, Petitioners,

vs.
TULLETT PREBON (PHILIPPINES), INC., Respondent.

TRADITION GROUP & TULLET are competitors in the inter-dealer broking business. TULLETT accused their former
officers who resigned and transferred to TRADITION, of sabotaging TULLETT.

CONTENTION OF THE STATE

The central point of dispute between IENT/SCHULZE (TRADITION) and TULLETT is the applicability of Section 144
(Violations of the Code) to Sections 31 (Liability of Directors, Trustees or Officers) and 34 (Disloyalty of a Director) of
the Corporation Code such that criminal liability attaches to violations of Sections 31 and 34.

DEFENSE OF THE ACCUSED

IENT/SCHULZE posits that Section 144 only applies to the provisions of the Corporation Code or its amendments
"not otherwise specifically penalized" by said statute and should not cover Sections 31 and 34 which both
prescribe the "penalties" for their violation; namely, damages, accounting and restitution of profits.

SUPREME COURT RULING

As Section 144 speaks, among others, of the imposition of criminal penalties, the Court is guided by the elementary
rules of statutory construction of penal provisions. First, in all criminal prosecutions, the existence of criminal
liability for which the accused is made answerable must be clear and certain. The Supreme Court has consistently
held that "penal statutes are construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the accused. When there
is doubt on the interpretation of criminal laws, all must be resolved in favor of the accused. Since penal laws
should not be applied mechanically, the Court must determine whether their application is consistent with the
purpose and reason of the law."

The Corporation Code was intended as a regulatory measure, not primarily as a penal statute. Sections 31 to 34 in
particular were intended to impose exacting standards of fidelity on corporate officers and directors but without
unduly impeding them in the discharge of their work with concerns of litigation. Considering the object and policy
of the Corporation Code to encourage the use of the corporate entity as a vehicle for economic growth, the Court
cannot espouse a strict construction of Sections 31 and 34 as penal offenses in relation to Section 144 in the
absence of unambiguous statutory language and legislative intent to that effect.

When Congress intends to criminalize certain acts it does so in plain, categorical language, otherwise such a statute
would be susceptible to constitutional attack. As earlier discussed, this can be readily seen from the text of Section
450) of Republic Act No. 8189 and Section 74 of the Corporation Code.

The consolidated petitions are GRANTED. The Decision dated August 12, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 109094 and the Resolutions dated April 23, 2009 and May 15, 2009 of the Secretary of Justice in I.S. No. 08-J-
8651 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
 G.R. No. 122846               January 20, 2009

WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION, TITANIUM CORPORATION and STA. MESA TOURIST & DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, Petitioners,
vs.
CITY OF MANILA, represented by DE CASTRO, MAYOR ALFREDO S. LIM, Respondent.

WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION et.al. assails the validity and constitutionality of the Manila City Ordinance No. 7774
entitled, "An Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time Admission, Short-Time Admission Rates, and Wash-Up Rate
Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, Pension Houses, and Similar Establishments in the City of Manila"
as it violates the sacred constitutional rights to liberty, due process and equal protection. 

CONTENTION OF THE STATE

The Ordinance did not violate the right to privacy or the freedom of movement, as it only penalizes the owners or
operators of establishments that admit individuals for short time stays. The virtually limitless reach of police power
is only constrained by having a lawful object obtained through a lawful method. The lawful objective of the
Ordinance is satisfied since it aims to curb immoral activities. There is a lawful method since the establishments are
still allowed to operate. The adverse effect on the establishments is justified by the well-being of its constituents in
general. Finally, as held in Ermita-Malate Motel Operators Association v. City Mayor of Manila, liberty is regulated
by law.

DEFENSE OF THE ACCUSED

WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION et.al. allege that as owners of establishments offering "wash-up" rates, their business
is being unlawfully interfered with by the Ordinance and that the equal protection rights of their clients are also
being interfered with. 

SUPREME COURT RULING

Individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate
demands of public interest or public welfare. The State is a leviathan that must be restrained from needlessly
intruding into the lives of its citizens. However well-intentioned the Ordinance may be, it is in effect an arbitrary
and whimsical intrusion into the rights of the establishments as well as their patrons. The Ordinance needlessly
restrains the operation of the businesses of the petitioners as well as restricting the rights of their patrons without
sufficient justification. The Ordinance rashly equates wash rates and renting out a room more than twice a day
with immorality without accommodating innocuous intentions.

The promotion of public welfare and a sense of morality among citizens deserves the full endorsement of the
judiciary provided that such measures do not trample rights the Court is sworn to protect.

Even as the implementation of moral norms remains an indispensable complement to governance, that
prerogative is hardly absolute, especially in the face of the norms of due process of liberty. And while the tension
may often be left to the courts to relieve, it is possible for the government to avoid the constitutional conflict by
employing more judicious, less drastic means to promote morality.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED, and the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9, is REINSTATED. Ordinance No. 7774 is hereby declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. No pronouncement as to costs.
 G.R. No. 179267               June 25, 2013

JESUS C. GARCIA, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE RAY ALAN T. DRILON, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court-Branch 41, Bacolod City, and
ROSALIE JAYPE-GARCIA, for herself and in behalf of minor children, namely: JO-ANN, JOSEPH EDUARD, JESSE
ANTHONE, all surnamed GARCIA, Respondents.

JESUS GARCIA assails the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 (landmark legislation that defines and criminalizes acts of
violence against women and their children (VAWC)) for being violative of the due process and the equal protection
clauses, and the validity of the modified TPO issued in the civil case for being “an unwanted product of an invalid
law.”

CONTENTION OF THE STATE

CA dismissed JESUS C. GARCIA’s petition for failure to raise the constitutional issue in his pleadings before the trial
court in the civil case, which is clothed with jurisdiction to resolve the same and the challenge to the validity of R.A.
9262 through a petition for prohibition seeking to annul the protection orders issued by the trial court constituted
a collateral attack on said law.

JESUS C. GARCIA chose not to file the required comment arguing that it would just be an "exercise in futility,"
conveniently forgetting that the renewal of the questioned TPO was only for a limited period (30 days) each time,
and that he could prevent the continued renewal of said order if he can show sufficient cause therefor. Having
failed to do so, petitioner may not now be heard to complain that he was denied due process of law.

DEFENSE OF THE ACCUSED

R.A. 9262 singles out the husband or father as the culprit.

JESUS C. GARCIA bewails the disregard of R.A. 9262, specifically in the issuance of POs, of all protections afforded
by the due process clause of the Constitution as on the basis of unsubstantiated allegations, and practically no
opportunity to respond, he was stripped of family, property, guns, money, children, job, future employment and
reputation, all in a matter of seconds, without an inkling of what happened.

SUPREME COURT RULING

Before a statute or its provisions duly challenged are voided, an unequivocal breach of, or a clear conflict with the
Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative one, must be demonstrated in such a manner as to leave no
doubt in the mind of the Court. In other words, the grounds for nullity must be beyond reasonable doubt. In the
instant case, however, no concrete evidence and convincing arguments were presented by JESUS C. GARCIA to
warrant a declaration of the unconstitutionality of R.A. 9262, which is an act of Congress and signed into law by the
highest officer of the co-equal executive department.

R.A. 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws. Equal protection simply requires that all
persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities
imposed. There is no merit to the contention that R.A. 9262 singles out the husband or father as the culprit as
VAWC may likewise be committed "against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating
relationship." Clearly, the use of the gender-neutral word "person" who has or had a sexual or dating relationship
with the woman encompasses even lesbian relationships. 

A respondent of a petition for protection order is apprised of the charges imputed to him and afforded an
opportunity to present his side. Thus, the fear of JESUS C. GARCIA of being "stripped of family, property, guns,
money, children, job, future employment and reputation, all in a matter of seconds, without an inkling of what
happened" is a mere product of an overactive imagination. The essence of due process is to be found in the
reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of one's defense. "To be
heard" does not only mean verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also through pleadings. Where
opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural
due process.

The scope of reliefs in protection orders is broadened to ensure that the victim or offended party is afforded all the
remedies necessary to curtail access by a perpetrator to the victim. This serves to safeguard the victim from
greater risk of violence; to accord the victim and any designated family or household member safety in the family
residence, and to prevent the perpetrator from committing acts that jeopardize the employment and support of
the victim. It also enables the court to award temporary custody of minor children to protect the children from
violence, to prevent their abduction by the perpetrator and to ensure their financial support.

RA 9262, by affording special and exclusive protection to women and children, who are vulnerable victims of
domestic violence, undoubtedly serves the important governmental objectives of protecting human rights, insuring
gender equality, and empowering women. The gender-based classification and the special remedies prescribed by
said law in favor of women and children are substantially related and necessary, to achieve such objectives. Hence,
said Act survives the intermediate review or middle-tier judicial scrutiny. The gender-based classification therein is
therefore not violative of the equal protection clause embodied in the 1987 Constitution.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
 501 U.S. 560

111 S.Ct. 2456

115 L.Ed.2d 504

Michael BARNES, Prosecuting Attorney of St. Joseph County, Indiana, et al.

v.
GLEN THEATRE, INC., et al.

No. 90-26.

Argued Jan. 8, 1991.

Decided June 21, 1991.

GLEN THEATRE, INC., et al. wish to provide totally nude dancing as entertainment and they enjoin enforcement of
the state public indecency law which requires dancers to wear pasties and a G-string asserting that the law's
prohibition against total nudity in public places violates the First Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of
expression.

CONTENTION OF THE STATE

The Court of Appeals ruled that non-obscene nude dancing performed for entertainment is protected expression,
and that the statute was an improper infringement of that activity because its purpose was to prevent the message
of eroticism and sexuality conveyed by the dancers.

DEFENSE OF THE ACCUSED

GLEN THEATRE pointed out that minors are excluded and there are no non-consenting viewers. They contend that
while the state may license establishments such as the ones GLEN THEATRE and KITTY KAT LOUNGE, and limit the
geographical area in which they do business, it may not in any way limit the performance of the dances within
them without violating the First Amendment.

GLEN THEATRE contend that even though prohibiting nudity in public generally may not be related to suppressing
expression, prohibiting the performance of nude dancing is related to expression because the state seeks to
prevent its erotic message. Therefore, they reason that the application of the Indiana statute to the nude dancing
in this case violates the First Amendment, because it fails the third part of the O'Brien test, viz: the governmental
interest must be unrelated to the suppression of free expression.

SUPREME COURT RULING

The enforcement of Indiana's public indecency law to prevent totally nude dancing does not violate the  First
Amendment 's guarantee of freedom of expression. 

(a) Nude dancing of the kind sought to be performed here is expressive conduct within the outer perimeters of
the  First Amendment , although only marginally so.

(b) Applying the four-part test of United States v. O'Brien, which rejected the contention that symbolic speech is
entitled to full  First Amendment  protection — the statute is justified despite its incidental limitations on some
expressive activity. The law is clearly within the State's constitutional power. And it furthers a substantial
governmental interest in protecting societal order and morality. Public indecency statutes reflect moral
disapproval of people appearing in the nude among strangers in public places, and this particular law follows a line
of state laws, dating back to 1831, banning public nudity. The States' traditional police power is defined as the
authority to provide for the public health, safety, and morals, and such a basis for legislation has been upheld. This
governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression, since public nudity is the evil the State
seeks to prevent, whether or not it is combined with expressive activity. The law does not proscribe nudity in these
establishments because the dancers are conveying an erotic message. To the contrary, an erotic performance may
be presented without any state interference, so long as the performers wear a scant amount of clothing. Finally,
the incidental restriction on  First Amendment  freedom is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of the
governmental interest. Since the statutory prohibition is not a means to some greater end, but an end itself, it is
without cavil that the statute is narrowly tailored.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals accordingly is REVERSED.

 G.R. No. 128959 September 30, 2005

CIRIACO ‘BOY’ GUINGGUING, Petitioners,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

The case originated from a criminal complaint for libel filed by Cirse "Choy" Torralba (broadcast journalist).  Lim
caused the publication of records of criminal cases filed against Torralba as well as photographs of the latter being
arrested. These were published by means of a one-page advertisement paid for by Lim in the Sunday Post, a
weekly publication edited and published by GUINGGUING.

GUINGGUING contends inter alia that as editor-publisher of the Sunday Post and as a member of the fourth estate,
the lower courts' finding of guilt against him constitutes an infringement of his constitutional right to freedom of
speech and of the press.

CONTENTION OF THE STATE

Malice is the most important element of libel, it held that the same was present in the case because every
defamatory publication prima facie implies malice on the part of the author and publisher towards the person
subject thereof. The CA likewise held that self-defense was unavailing as a justification since GUINGGUING should
not go beyond explaining what was previously said of him. The appellate court asserted that the purpose of self-
defense in libel is to repair, minimize or remove the effect of the damage caused to him but it does not license the
GUINGGUING to utter blow-for-blow scurrilous language in return for what he received. Once the defendant hits
back with equal or more scurrilous remarks unnecessary for his defense, the retaliation becomes an independent
act for which he may be liable.

DEFENSE OF THE ACCUSED

The publication was resorted to in self-defense.

SUPREME COURT RULING

There was nothing untruthful about what was published in the Sunday Post. The criminal cases listed in the
advertisement as pending against the Torralba had indeed been filed. It may have been inconvenient for Torralba
that these matters may have been divulged, yet such information hardly falls within any realm of privacy
complainant could invoke, since the pendency of these criminal charges are actually matters of public record.

Torralba hosts a public affairs program, one which he himself claimed was imbued with public character since it
deals with "corruptions in government, corruptions by public officials, irregularities in government in comrades."
By entering into this line of work, Torralba in effect gave the public a legitimate interest in his life. He likewise gave
them a stake in finding out if he himself had the integrity and character to have the right to criticize others for their
conduct.

The guarantee of free speech was enacted to protect not only polite speech, but even expression in its most
unsophisticated form. 

The publication of the subject advertisement by GUINGGUING and Lim cannot be deemed by this Court to have
been done with actual malice. Aside from the fact that the information contained in said publication was true, the
intention to let the public know the character of their radio commentator can at best be subsumed under the
mantle of having been done with good motives and for justifiable ends. The advertisement in question falls
squarely within the bounds of constitutionally protected expression under Section 4, Article III, and thus, acquittal
is mandated.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals dated 29 July 1996 and 3 October 1996, respectively, in CA-G.R. CR No. 16413 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE insofar as they affect petitioner. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, promulgated on 17
May 1994, as regards petitioner is likewise REVERSED and SET ASIDE and petitioner is ACQUITTED of the charge of
libel therein.
 Employment Division v. Smith

Decision

494 U.S. 872

Argued: Nov. 6, 1989

Decided: April 17, 1990

ALFRED SMITH and GALEN BLACK were fired from their jobs with a private drug rehabilitation organization because
they ingested peyote for sacramental purposes at a ceremony of the Native American Church, of which both are
members. SMITH AND BLACK applied to EMPLOYMENT DIVISION for unemployment compensation, they were
determined to be ineligible for benefits because they had been discharged for work-related "misconduct." 
*Peyote is a small, spineless cactus, whose principal active ingredient is the hallucinogen mescaline. From earliest recorded time, peyote has
been used by native peoples in northern Mexico and the southwestern United States as a part of traditional religious rites.

CONTENTION OF THE STATE

Oregon Supreme Court held that SMITH AND BLACK’s religiously inspired use of peyote fell within the prohibition
of the Oregon statute, which "makes no exception for the sacramental use" of the drug. It then considered
whether that prohibition was valid under the Free Exercise Clause, and concluded that it was not. The court
therefore reaffirmed its previous ruling that the State could not deny unemployment benefits to respondents for
having engaged in that practice.

DEFENSE OF THE ACCUSED

Denials violated SMITH AND BLACK’s  First Amendment  free exercise rights.

SUPREME COURT RULING

SMITH AND BLACK’s ingestion of peyote was prohibited under Oregon law, and because that prohibition is
constitutional, Oregon may, consistent with the Free Exercise Clause, deny respondents unemployment
compensation when their dismissal results from use of the drug. The decision of the oregon supreme court is
accordingly REVERSED.
 A.M. No. P-02-1651 June 22, 2006(Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 00-1021-P)

 
ALEJANDRO ESTRADA,
Complainant,
vs.
SOLEDAD S. ESCRITOR,
Respondent.

ESCRITOR is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City. She has been living with Quilapio, a man
who is not her husband, for more than 25 years and had a son with him as well. ESCRITOR’s husband died a year
before she entered into the judiciary while Quilapio is still legally married to another woman.
She was charged with committing “disgraceful and immoral conduct” under Book V, Title I, Chapter VI, Section 46(b)(5) of the Revised
Administrative Code.

*Religious Freedom as a Defense in Concubinage

CONTENTION OF THE STATE

The government argued for the stability and sanctity of the avowed social institutions of marriage and family,
arguing that the so-called “Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness” should not be recognized or given effect.

DEFENSE OF THE ACCUSED

As a member of the religious sect known as Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society,
SCRITOR asserted that her conjugal arrangement with Quilapio was in conformity with their religious beliefs and
had the approval of their congregation. In fact, after ten years of living with him, she executed a “Declaration of
Pledging Faithfulness” on July 28, 1991. The declaration allowed Jehovah’s Witnesses like her, who had been
abandoned by their spouses, to enter into marital relations with someone else. It thus made the resulting union
moral and binding within the congregation all over the world, except in countries where divorce was allowed. As
laid down by the tenets of their faith, the members required that at the time of the declaration, the couple could
not secure the civil authorities’ approval of the marital relationship because of legal impediments.

Only couples who had been baptized and in good standing could execute the declaration, which required the
approval of the elders of the congregation. As a matter of practice, the marital status of the declarants and their
respective spouses’ commission of adultery were investigated before the declarations were executed.

ESCRITOR and Quilapio made their declarations in the usual and approved form prescribed by Jehovah’s
Witnesses, approved by the elders of the congregation where the declarations were executed, and recorded in the
Watch Tower Central Office. Moreover, the congregation believed that once all legal impediments for the couple
were lifted, the validity of the declarations ceased, and the couple were obliged to legalize their union. In this case,
although Escritor was widowed in 1998 -- a fact that, on her part, lifted the legal impediment to marry -- her mate
was still not capacitated to remarry. Thus, their declarations remained valid. In sum, therefore, insofar as the
congregation was concerned, there was nothing immoral about the conjugal arrangement between the couple,
and they remained members in good standing in the congregation.

SUPREME COURT RULING

Our Constitution adheres to the benevolent neutrality approach that gives room for accommodation of religious
exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause.Thus, in arguing that ESCRITOR should be held administratively
liable as the arrangement she had was "illegal per se because, by universally recognized standards, it is inherently
or by its very nature bad, improper, immoral and contrary to good conscience," the Solicitor General failed to
appreciate that benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it
does not offend compelling state interests.

Even assuming that the OSG has proved a compelling state interest, it has to further demonstrate that the state
has used the least intrusive means possible so that the free exercise is not infringed any more than necessary to
achieve the legitimate goal of the state, i.e., it has chosen a way to achieve its legitimate state end that imposes as
little as possible on religious liberties. Again, the Solicitor General utterly failed to prove this element of the test.
Other than the two documents offered which established the sincerity of respondent’s religious belief and the fact
that the agreement was an internal arrangement within respondent’s congregation, no iota of evidence was
offered. In fact, the records are bereft of even a feeble attempt to procure any such evidence to show that the
means the state adopted in pursuing this compelling interest is the least restrictive to respondent’s religious
freedom.

Thus, we find that in this particular case and under these distinct circumstances, respondent Escritor’s conjugal
arrangement cannot be penalized as she has made out a case for exemption from the law based on her
fundamental right to freedom of religion. The Court recognizes that state interests must be upheld in order that
freedoms - including religious freedom - may be enjoyed. In the area of religious exercise as a preferred freedom,
however, man stands accountable to an authority higher than the state, and so the state interest sought to be
upheld must be so compelling that its violation will erode the very fabric of the state that will also protect the
freedom. In the absence of a showing that such state interest exists, man must be allowed to subscribe to the
Infinite.

In view whereof, the instant administrative complaint is DISMISSED.

 G.R. No. L-5790 April 17, 1953

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

PABLO DE LA CRUZ,Defendant-Appellant.

Having retailed a can of milk at ten centavos more than the ceiling price, PABLO DE LA CRUZ was sentenced, after
trial, to imprisonment for 5 years, and to pay a fine of 5,000 pesos plus costs. He was also barred from engaging in
wholesale and retail business for 5 years.

CONTENTION OF THE STATE

Executive Order No. 331 (issued by authority of Republic Act No. 509) fixed 20 centavos as the maximum price for
that kind of commodity.

His argument based on the principles of entrapment, may not be upheld, because he was selling to the public, i.e.,
to anybody who would come to his store to buy his commodities, and no special circumstances are shown to
support the claim that he was led or induced to commit the offense.

DEFENSE OF THE ACCUSED

The charge was fabricated; Punishment wholly disproportionate to the offense and therefore unconstitutional and
not invalidating Republic Act No. 509 in so far as it prescribed excessive penalties.

SUPREME COURT RULING

The Constitution directs that "Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted."
The prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments is generally aimed at the form or character of the punishment
rather than its severity in respect of duration or amount, and apply to punishment which never existed in America
of which public sentiment has regarded as cruel or obsolete, for instance those inflicted at the whipping post, or in
the pillory, burning at the stake, breaking on the wheel, disemboweling, and the like. Fine and imprisonment
would not thus be within the prohibition.

Too long a prison term might clash with the Philippine Constitution.

Fortunately there is an area of compromise, skirting the constitutional issue, yet executing substantial justice: SC
may decrease the penalty, exercising that discretion vested in the courts by the same statutory enactment.

The appealed decision is AFFIRMED in all respects but reducing the imprisonment to 6 months and the fine to
2,000 pesos.