SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 174461. September 11, 2013.]

LETICIA I. KUMMER, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J : p

We decide the appeal filed by petitioner Leticia I. Kummer assailing the April 28,
2006 decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA — G.R. CR No. 27609. The CA
decision affirmed the July 27, 2000 judgment 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 4, Tuguegarao City, Cagayan, finding the petitioner and her co-accused
Freiderich Johan I. Kummer guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide in
Criminal Case No. 1130.

The Facts

The prosecution's evidence revealed that on June 19, 1988, between 9:00 and
10:00 p.m., Jesus Mallo, Jr., accompanied by Amiel Malana, went to the house of the
petitioner. Mallo knocked at the front door with a stone and identified himself by saying,
"Auntie, ako si Boy Mallo."

The petitioner opened the door and at this point, her son and co-accused, Johan,
using his left hand, shot Mallo twice using a gun about six (6) inches long. 3 Malana,
who was with Mallo and who witnessed the shooting, immediately ran towards the west,
followed by Mallo. When Malana turned his back, he saw the petitioner leveling and
firing her long gun at Mallo, hitting the latter's back and causing him to fall flat on the
ground. 4 DIETcH

Thereafter, the petitioner went inside the house and came out with a flashlight.
Together with her co-accused, she scoured the pathway up to the place where Mallo was
lying flat. 5 At that point, the petitioner uttered, "Johan, patay na," in a loud voice. 6 The
petitioner and her co-accused put down the guns and the flashlight they were holding,
held Mallo's feet and pulled him to about three (3) to four (4) meters away from the
house. gat, they returned to the house and turned off all the lights. 7
 The following morning, policeman Danilo Pelovello went to the petitioner's house
and informed her that Mallo had been found dead in front of her house. Pelovello
conducted an investigation through inquiries among the neighbors, including the
petitioner, who all denied having any knowledge of the incident.

The prosecution filed an information 8 for homicide on January 12, 1989 against
the petitioner and Johan, docketed as Criminal Case No. 1130. Both accused were
arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. They waived the pre-trial, and the
trial on the merits accordingly followed.

The petitioner denied the charge and claimed in her defense that she and her
children, Johan, Melanie and Erika, were already asleep in the evening of June 19, 1988.
She claimed that they were awakened by the sound of stones being thrown at their house,
a gun report, and the banging at their door.

Believing that the noise was caused by the members of the New People's Army
prevalent in their area, and sensing the possible harm that might be inflicted on them,
Johan got a .38 cal. gun from the drawer and fired it twice outside to scare the people
causing the disturbance. The noise continued, however, with a stone hitting the window
and breaking the glass; another stone hit Melanie who was then sick. This prompted
Johan to get the shotgun placed beside the door and to fire it. The noise thereafter stopped
and they all went back to sleep.AcSIDE

In its judgment dated July 27, 2000, the RTC found the prosecution's evidence
persuasive based on the testimonies of prosecution eyewitnesses Ramon Cuntapay and
Malana who both testified that the petitioner shot Mallo. The testimonial evidence,
coupled by the positive findings of gunpowder nitrates on the left hand of Johan and on
the petitioner's right hand, as well as the corroborative testimony of the other prosecution
witnesses, led the RTC to find both the petitioner and Johan guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged.

Johan, still a minor at the time of the commission of the crime, was released on the
recognizance of his father, Moises Kummer. Johan subsequently left the country without
notifying the court; hence, only the petitioner appealed the judgment of conviction with
the CA.

She contended before the CA that the RTC committed reversible errors in its
appreciation of the evidence, namely: (1) in giving credence to the testimonial evidence
of Cuntapay and of Malana despite the discrepancies between their sworn statements and
direct testimonies; (2) in not considering the failure of the prosecution to cite the
petitioner's motive in killing the victim; (3) in failing to consider that the writer of the
decision, Judge Lyliha L. Abella-Aquino, was not the judge who heard the testimonies;
and (4) in considering the paraffin test results finding the petitioner positive for
gunpowder residue.

The CA rejected the petitioner's arguments and affirmed the RTC judgment,
holding that the discrepancies between the sworn statement and the direct testimony of
the witnesses do not necessarily discredit them because the contradictions are minimal
and reconcilable. The CA also ruled that the inconsistencies are minor lapses and are
therefore not substantial. The petitioner's positive identification by the eyewitnesses as
one of the assailants remained unrefuted. The CA, moreover, held that proof of motive is
only necessary when a serious doubt arises on the identity of the accused. That the writer
of the decision was not the judge who heard the testimonies of the witnesses does not
necessarily make the decision erroneous. aHICDc

In sum, the CA found Malana and Cuntapay's positive identification and the
corroborative evidence presented by the prosecution more than sufficient to convict the
petitioner of the crime charged.

On further appeal to this Court, the petitioner submits the issue of whether the CA
committed a reversible error in affirming the RTC's decision convicting her of the crime
of homicide.

In essence, the case involves the credibility of the prosecution eyewitnesses and
the sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence.

Our Ruling

We find the petition devoid of merit.

The petitioner's conviction is anchored on the positive and direct testimonies of the
prosecution eyewitnesses, which testimonies the petitioner submits to be both
inconsistent and illogical. The petitioner essentially impugns the credibility of the
witnesses on these grounds. The petitioner moreover claims that her conviction was
based on doctrinal precepts that should not apply to her case.

Variance between the eyewitnesses'

testimonies in open court and their
affidavits does not affect their
credibility

In her attempt to impugn the credibility of prosecution eyewitnesses Malana and

Cuntapay, the petitioner pointed to the following inconsistencies: First, in paragraph 7 of
Malana's July 21, 1988 affidavit, he stated that after hearing two gunshots, he dived to the
ground for cover and heard another shot louder than the first two. This statement is
allegedly inconsistent with his declaration during the direct examination that he saw the
petitioner and Johan fire their guns at Mallo. Second, the July 22, 1988 affidavit of
Cuntapay likewise stated that he heard two burst of gunfire coming from the direction of
the petitioner's house and heard another burst from the same direction, which statement is
allegedly inconsistent with his direct testimony where he claimed that he saw the
petitioner shoot Mallo. Third, in his affidavit, Malana declared that he ran away as he felt
the door being opened and heard two shots, while in his testimony in court, he stated that
he ran away after Mallo was already hit. According to the petitioner, these and some
other trivial and minor inconsistencies in the testimony of the two witnesses effectively
destroyed their credibility.ASCTac

We find these claims far from convincing. The Court has consistently held that
inconsistencies between the testimony of a witness in open court, on one hand, and the
statements in his sworn affidavit, on the other hand, referring only to minor and collateral
matters, do not affect his credibility and the veracity and weight of his testimony as they
do not touch upon the commission of the crime itself. Slight contradictions, in fact, even
serve to strengthen the credibility of the witnesses, as these may be considered as badges
of truth rather than indicia of bad faith; they tend to prove that their testimonies have not
been rehearsed. Nor are such inconsistencies, and even improbabilities, unusual, for no
person has perfect faculties of senses or recall. 9

A close scrutiny of the records reveals that Malana and Cuntapay positively and
firmly declared in open court that they saw the petitioner and Johan shoot Mallo. The
inconsistencies in their affidavit, they reasoned, were due to the oversight of the
administering official in typing the exact details of their narration.

It is oft repeated that affidavits are usually abbreviated and inaccurate. Oftentimes,
an affidavit is incomplete, resulting in its seeming contradiction with the declarant's
testimony in court. Generally, the affiant is asked standard questions, coupled with ready
suggestions intended to elicit answers, that later turn out not to be wholly descriptive of
the series of events as the affiant knows them. 10 Worse, the process of affidavit-taking
may sometimes amount to putting words into the affiant's mouth, thus allowing the whole
statement to be taken out of context.

The court is not unmindful of these on-the-ground realities. In fact, we have ruled
that the discrepancies between the statements of the affiant in his affidavit and those
made by him on the witness stand do not necessarily discredit him since ex parte
affidavits are generally incomplete. 11 As between the joint affidavit and the testimony
given in open court, the latter prevails because affidavits taken ex parte are generally
considered to be inferior to the testimony given in court. 12 DTcASE

In the present case, we find it undeniable that Malana and Cuntapay positively
identified the petitioner as one of the assailants. This is the critical point, not the
inconsistencies that the petitioner repeatedly refers to, which carry no direct bearing on
the crucial issue of the identity of the perpetrator of the crime. Indeed, the inconsistencies
refer only to minor details that are not critical to the main outcome of the case. Moreover,
the basic rule is that the Supreme Court accords great respect and even finality to the
findings of credibility of the trial court, more so if the same were affirmed by the CA, as
in this case. 13 We find no reason to break this rule and thus find that both the RTC and
the CA were correct in giving credence to the testimonies of Malana and Cuntapay.

It is not necessary for the validity of

the judgment that it be rendered by
the judge who heard the case

The petitioner contends that the CA, in affirming the judgment of the RTC, failed
to recognize that the trial court that heard the testimonies of Malana and Cuntapay was
not the same court that rendered the decision. 14

We do not share this view.

The rule is settled that the validity of a judgment is not rendered erroneous solely
because the judge who heard the case was not the same judge who rendered the decision.
In fact, it is not necessary for the validity of a judgment that the judge who penned the
decision should actually hear the case in its entirety, for he can merely rely on the
transcribed stenographic notes taken during the trial as the basis for his decision. 15 aITDAE

Thus, the contention — that since Judge Lyliha L. Abella-Aquino was not the one
who heard the evidence and thereby did not have the opportunity to observe the
demeanor of the witnesses — must fail. It is sufficient that the judge, in deciding the
case, must base her ruling completely on the records before her, in the way that appellate
courts do when they review the evidence of the case raised on appeal. 16 Thus, a
judgment of conviction penned by a different trial judge is not erroneous if she relied on
the records available to her.

Motive is irrelevant when the

accused has been positively identified
by an eyewitness

We agree with the CA's ruling that motive gains importance only when the
identity of the assailant is in doubt. As held in a long line of cases, the prosecution does
not need to prove the motive of the accused when the latter has been identified as the
author of the crime. 17

Once again, we point out that the petitioner was positively identified by Malana
and Cuntapay. Thus, the prosecution did not have to identify and prove the motive for the
killing. It is a matter of judicial knowledge that persons have been killed for no apparent
reason at all, and that friendship or even relationship is no deterrent to the commission of
a crime. 18

The petitioner attempts to offer the justification that the witnesses did not really
witness the shooting as their affidavits merely attested that they heard the shooting of
Mallo (and did not state that they actually witnessed it). We find this to be a lame
argument whose merit we cannot recognize.

That Malana and Cuntapay have been eyewitnesses to the crime remains
unrefuted. They both confirmed in their direct testimony before the RTC that they saw
the petitioner fire a gun at Mallo. This was again re-affirmed by the witnesses during
their cross examination. The fact that their respective affidavits merely stated that they
heard the gunshots does not automatically foreclose the possibility that they also saw the
actual shooting as this was in fact what the witnesses claimed truly happened. Besides, it
has been held that the claim that "whenever a witness discloses in his testimony in court
facts which he failed to state in his affidavit taken ante litem motam, then an
inconsistency exists between the testimony and the affidavit" is erroneous. If what were
stated in open court are but details or additional facts that serve to supplement the
declarations made in the affidavit, these statements cannot be ruled out as inconsistent
and may be considered by the court. TSacID

Thus, in light of the direct and positive identification of the petitioner as one of the
perpetrators of the crime by not one but two prosecution eyewitnesses, the failure to cite
the motive of the petitioner is of no moment.

At any rate, we find it noteworthy that the lack or absence of motive for
committing the crime does not preclude conviction where there are reliable witnesses
who fully and satisfactorily identified the petitioner as the perpetrator of the felony, such
as in this case.

There is no absolute uniformity nor

a fixed standard form of human
behavior

The petitioner imputes error to the CA in giving credence to the testimonies of

Malana and Cuntapay on the claim that these are riddled not only by inconsistencies and
contradictions, but also by improbabilities and illogical claims. She laboriously pointed
out the numerous improbabilities that, taken as a whole, allegedly cast serious doubt on
their reliability and credibility.

She alleged, among others: (1) that it was abnormal and contrary to the ways of
the farmers in the rural areas for Cuntapay to go home from his corral at about 9:00 p.m.,
while everybody else goes home from his farm much earlier, as working late in the farm
(that is, before and after sunset) is taboo to farming; (2) that the act of the petitioner of
putting down her gun in order to pull the victim away does not make any sense because a
criminal would not simply part with his weapon in this manner; (3) that it is highly
incredible that Malana, who accompanied Mallo, was left unharmed and was allowed to
escape if indeed he was just beside the victim; (4) that it is unbelievable that when
Malana heard the cocking of guns and the opening of the door, he did not become scared
at all; (5) that Malana and Cuntapay did not immediately report the incident to the
authorities; (6) that it was highly improbable for Malana to turn his head while running;
and (7) that it was unusual that Cuntapay did not run away when he saw the shooting. SDEITC

We rule, without descending to particulars and going over each and every one of
these claims, that without more and stronger indicators, we cannot accord them credit.
Human nature suggests that people may react differently when confronted with a given
situation. Witnesses to a crime cannot be expected to demonstrate an absolute uniformity
and conformity in action and reaction. People may act contrary to the accepted norm,
react differently and act contrary to the expectation of mankind. There is no standard
human behavioral response when one is confronted with an unusual, strange, startling or
frightful experience. 19

We thus hold that the CA was correct in brushing aside the improbabilities alleged
by the petitioner who, in her present plight, can be overcritical in her attempt to seize
every detail that can favor her case. Unfortunately, if at all, her claims refer only to minor
and even inconsequential details that do not touch on the core of the crime itself.

Public documents are admissible in

court without further proof of their
due execution and authenticity

A public document is defined in Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court as
follows:

SEC. 19.  Classes of Documents. — For the purpose of their presentation

[in] evidence, documents are either public or private.

Public documents are:

(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign
authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether
of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;

(b) Documents acknowledge[d] before a notary public except last wills and

testaments; and aTEACS
 (c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, [or] private documents required by
law to [be] entered therein.

All other writings are private. [emphasis and underscore ours]

The chemistry report showing a positive result of the paraffin test is a public
document. As a public document, the rule on authentication does not apply. It is
admissible in evidence without further proof of its due execution and genuineness; the
person who made the report need not be presented in court to identify, describe and
testify how the report was conducted. Moreover, documents consisting of entries in
public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie
evidence of the facts stated therein. 20

In the present case, notwithstanding the fact that it was Captain Benjamin Rubio
who was presented in court to identify the chemistry report and not the forensic chemist
who actually conducted the paraffin test on the petitioner, the report may still be admitted
because the requirement for authentication does not apply to public documents. In other
words, the forensic chemist does not need to be presented as witness to identify and
authenticate the chemistry report. Furthermore, the entries in the chemistry report are
prima facie evidence of the facts they state, that is, of the presence of gunpowder residue
on the left hand of Johan and on the right hand of the petitioner. As a matter of fact, the
petitioner herself admitted the presence of gunpowder nitrates on her fingers, albeit
ascribing their presence from a match she allegedly lighted. 21 Accordingly, we hold that
the chemistry report is admissible as evidence.

On the issue of the normal process versus the actual process conducted during the
test raised by the petitioner, suffice it to say that in the absence of proof to the contrary, it
is presumed that the forensic chemist who conducted the report observed the regular
procedure. Stated otherwise, the courts will not presume irregularity or negligence in the
performance of one's duties unless facts are shown dictating a contrary conclusion. The
presumption of regularity in favor of the forensic chemist compels us to reject the
petitioner's contention that an explanation has to be given on how the actual process was
conducted. Since the petitioner presented no evidence of fabrication or irregularity, we
presume that the standard operating procedure has been observed.

We note at this point that while the positive finding of gunpowder residue does not
conclusively show that the petitioner indeed fired a gun, the finding nevertheless serves
to corroborate the prosecution eyewitnesses' testimony that the petitioner shot the victim.
Furthermore, while it is true that cigarettes, fertilizers, urine or even a match may leave
traces of nitrates, experts confirm that these traces are minimal and may be washed off
with tap water, unlike the evidence nitrates left behind by gunpowder. ASHaDT
 Change in the date of the
commission of the crime, where the
disparity is not great, is merely a
formal amendment, thus, no
arraignment is required

The petitioner claims that she was not arraigned on the amended information for
which she was convicted. The petitioner's argument is founded on the flawed
understanding of the rules on amendment and misconception on the necessity of
arraignment in every case. Thus, we do not see any merit in this claim.

Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court permits a formal amendment of a
complaint even after the plea but only if it is made with leave of court and provided that it
can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused. Section 14 provides:

Section 14. Amendment or substitution. — A complaint or information

may be amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time
before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a
formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can
be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.

However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of

the offense charged in or excludes any accused from the complaint or
information, can be made only upon motion by the prosecutor, with notice to the
offended party and with leave of court. The court shall state its reasons in
resolving the motion and copies of its order shall be furnished all parties,
especially the offended party.

If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made
in charging the proper offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or
information upon the filing of a new one charging the proper offense in
accordance with section 19, Rule 119, provided the accused [would] not be
placed in double jeopardy. The court may require the witnesses to give bail for
their appearance at the trial. [emphasis and underscore ours]HSDCTA

A mere change in the date of the commission of the crime, if the disparity of time
is not great, is more formal than substantial. Such an amendment would not prejudice the
rights of the accused since the proposed amendment would not alter the nature of the
offense.

The test as to when the rights of an accused are prejudiced by the amendment of a
complaint or information is when a defense under the complaint or information, as it
originally stood, would no longer be available after the amendment is made, when any
evidence the accused might have would no longer be available after the amendment is
made, and when any evidence the accused might have would be inapplicable to the
complaint or information, as amended. 22

In People, et al. v. Borromeo, et al., 23 we ruled that the change of the date of the
commission of the crime from June 24, 1981 to August 28, 1981 is a formal amendment
and would not prejudice the rights of the accused because the nature of the offense of
grave coercion would not be altered. In that case, the difference in the date was only
about two months and five days, which difference, we ruled, would neither cause
substantial prejudice nor cause surprise on the part of the accused.

It is not even necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise time at
which the offense was committed except when time is a material ingredient of the
offense. 24 The act may be alleged to have been committed at any time as near as to the
actual date at which date the offense was committed, as the information will permit.
Under the circumstances, the precise time is not an essential ingredient of the crime of
homicide.

Having established that a change of date of the commission of a crime is a formal

amendment, we proceed to the next question of whether an arraignment is necessary.

Arraignment is indispensable in bringing the accused to court and in notifying him

of the nature and cause of the accusations against him. The importance of arraignment is
based on the constitutional right of the accused to be informed. 25 Procedural due process
requires that the accused be arraigned so that he may be informed of the reason for his
indictment, the specific charges he is bound to face, and the corresponding penalty that
could be possibly meted against him. It is at this stage that the accused, for the first time,
is given the opportunity to know the precise charge that confronts him. It is only
imperative that he is thus made fully aware of the possible loss of freedom, even of his
life, depending on the nature of the imputed crime. 26 prcd

The need for arraignment is equally imperative in an amended information or

complaint. This however, we hastily clarify, pertains only to substantial amendments and
not to formal amendments that, by their very nature, do not charge an offense different
from that charged in the original complaint or information; do not alter the theory of the
prosecution; do not cause any surprise and affect the line of defense; and do not adversely
affect the substantial rights of the accused, such as an amendment in the date of the
commission of the offense.

We further stress that an amendment done after the plea and during trial, in
accordance with the rules, does not call for a second plea since the amendment is only as
to form. The purpose of an arraignment, that is, to inform the accused of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him, has already been attained when the accused was
arraigned the first time. The subsequent amendment could not have conceivably come as
a surprise to the accused simply because the amendment did not charge a new offense nor
alter the theory of the prosecution.

Applying these rules and principles to the prevailing case, the records of the case
evidently show that the amendment in the complaint was from July 19, 1988 to June 19,
1988, or a difference of only one month. It is clear that consistent with the rule on
amendments and the jurisprudence cited above, the change in the date of the commission
of the crime of homicide is a formal amendment — it does not change the nature of the
crime, does not affect the essence of the offense nor deprive the accused of an
opportunity to meet the new averment, and is not prejudicial to the accused. Further, the
defense under the complaint is still available after the amendment, as this was, in fact, the
same line of defenses used by the petitioner. This is also true with respect to the pieces of
evidence presented by the petitioner. The effected amendment was of this nature and did
not need a second plea.

To sum up, we are satisfied after a review of the records of the case that the
prosecution has proven the guilt of the petitioner beyond reasonable doubt. The
constitutional presumption of innocence has been successfully overcome. IECAaD

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision dated April 28, 2006,
convicting the petitioner of the crime of homicide, is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner Leticia I. Kummer.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, Perez, Perlas-Bernabe and Leonen, * JJ., concur.

 
||| (Kummer v. People, G.R. No. 174461, [September 11, 2013], 717 PHIL 670-688)

SECOND DIVISION

[A.M. No. RTJ-14-2399. November 19, 2014.]

[Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 13-4013-RTJ]

GASPAR BANDOY, complainant, vs. JUDGE JOSE S. JACINTO,

JR., PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 45, and ACTING PRESIDING
JUDGE, BRANCH 46, both at REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, SAN
JOSE, OCCIDENTAL MINDORO, respondent.
 DECISION

MENDOZA, J : p

For review before the Court is this administrative case against respondent Judge
Jose S. Jacinto, Jr. (Judge Jacinto, Jr.) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branches 45 1
and 46, 2 San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, filed by Gaspar Bandoy (Bandoy) for Grave
Abuse of Authority in relation to Criminal Case No. 2-1928, 3 entitled "People of the
Philippines v. Gaspar Bandoy, Peter Alfaro and Randolph Ignacio" and Criminal Case
No. Z-1910, entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Romulo De Jesus, Jr."

Complainant Bandoy alleged, in his verified complaint, 4 that he was one of the
accused in Criminal Case No. 2-1928, for Serious Illegal Detention filed by Romulo De
Jesus, Jr. (De Jesus, Jr.), which was raffled to Branch 44 of the RTC, Mamburao,
Occidental Mindoro (RTC-Br. 44), with Judge Jacinto, Jr. as the Assisting Presiding
Judge. Bandoy claimed that the case was initiated by De Jesus, Jr. to get back at him for
being instrumental in the filing of an earlier criminal complaint against him for Violation
of Article XXII, Section 261, paragraph 7, number 14 of the Omnibus Election Code
(Ballot Switching). The said case was likewise raffled to RTC-Br. 44.

Bandoy also averred that he was an election watcher of former Mayor Joel
Panaligan during the 2007 local elections, while De Jesus, Jr., a teacher of their
municipality's public elementary school, was one of the chairpersons of the Board of
Election Inspectors; that they were both assigned in Precinct 3-A of Mamburao,
Occidental Mindoro; that De Jesus, Jr. was rumored to be closely associated with the
rival mayoralty candidate, Voltaire Anthony C. Villarosa (Voltaire), son of House
representative Amelita C. Villarosa (Cong. Villarosa) and Mayor Jose Tapales Villarosa
(Mayor Villarosa) of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro; that in the said local elections, De
Jesus, Jr. was caught in the act of ballot switching, which was captured on video by a
member of the media, a certain Randy Bool; that by virtue of a search warrant from the
Commission of Elections (COMELEC), De Jesus, Jr. was caught in possession of some
ballots inside his backpack; and that as a result of this incident, De Jesus, Jr. was
criminally charged with the offense of ballot switching. Accordingly, on August 17,
2007, a warrant of arrest was issued against De Jesus, Jr. 5

According to Bandoy, on August 20, 2007, De Jesus, Jr. personally appeared

before Provincial Prosecutor Levitico Salcedo to file a criminal case for Serious Illegal
Detention against him, Peter Alfaro, Randolph Ignacio, and then Election Supervisor,
Atty. Judy Lorenzo (Atty. Lorenzo). Apparently, De Jesus, Jr. did this while there was a
standing warrant of arrest against him. Worse, De Jesus, Jr. remained at-large until he
was able to post bail on March 7, 2008 before then Las Piñas RTC Judge Raul B.
Villanueva. 6 Because complainant Bandoy was charged with Serious Illegal Detention,
the provincial prosecutor recommended "no bail" leaving them incarcerated for more than
two years. 7

Bandoy further claims that Judge Jacinto, Jr. committed grave abuse of his
authority by displaying manifest bias and partiality in favor of De Jesus, Jr. when he
granted several postponements of De Jesus, Jr.'s arraignment, originally scheduled on
April 23, 2008, 8 but was reset for seven times until De Jesus, Jr. entered a plea of not
guilty supposedly inside Judge Jacinto, Jr.'s chambers on July 6, 2011. 9

Bandoy emphasized that many of the said resettings were mostly due to De Jesus,
Jr.'s non-appearance for failure to locate him at his given address. Despite these supposed
obvious court defiance, Judge Jacinto, Jr. remained lenient and seemingly tolerated his
continuous non-appearance in the court's subsequent scheduled hearings. Another
example of Judge Jacinto, Jr.'s supposed unreasonable bias towards Bandoy was his lack
of interest to dispose of the case of serious illegal detention despite De Jesus, Jr.'s
obvious dilatory tactics and unjustified absences when his appearance was necessary. EScIAa

Bandoy, along with his co-accused, moved for reconsideration and filed a petition
for review before the Department of Justice (DOJ) to have the serious illegal detention
case against them dismissed. Meanwhile, co-accused Atty. Lorenzo filed a separate
petition with the Court of Appeals (CA) and won the case. The Court later affirmed the
dismissal of the case against her. At first, the DOJ denied their petition. Upon
reconsideration, however, the DOJ, under the helm of Justice Secretary Leila De Lima,
directed the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, Occidental Mindoro, to cause the
withdrawal of the case against Bandoy and his co-accused. 10 Accordingly, the Office of
the Provincial Prosecutor filed its Motion to Withdraw Information.

Judge Jacinto, Jr., in an order, 11 dated July 5, 2011, denied the motion to
withdraw information. In the end, Bandoy was only able to regain temporary freedom
when Judge Jacinto, Jr. finally resolved 12 to allow him to post a bail bond of
P100,000.00 each or a total of P300,000.00. 13 Bandoy added that Voltaire was a
principal sponsor in the wedding of Judge Jacinto, Jr.'s child.

Thereafter, Judge Jacinto, Jr. was assigned to another sala, while Judge Wilfredo
De Joya Mayor (Judge Mayor) became the assisting presiding judge of Branch 44. It was
during this time that the case for serious illegal detention was temporarily dismissed, but
upon reconsideration, Judge Mayor decided to reinstate and continue the case against
Bandoy. Meanwhile, the case of ballot switching against De Jesus, Jr. was dismissed on
October 25, 2012, 14 while their bail for the serious illegal detention case was cancelled.
15

According to complainant Bandoy, the compelling force that made him initiate
this present administrative case was because Judge Jacinto, Jr. would take over Judge
Mayor's assignments on account of the latter's compulsory retirement from service on
December 1, 2012, which would include their pending serious illegal detention case. He
claimed that Judge Jacinto, Jr. ordered the police and the CIDG to re-arrest him and his
co-accused even though there was no warrant of arrest against them. 16 He begged the
Court not to let Judge Jacinto, Jr. handle their case of serious illegal detention for fear
that they would have to endure another bout of extreme bias and partiality from him.

In his Comment, 17 Judge Jacinto, Jr. denied being an ally of the Villarosa clan.
18 He also denied having a hand in the order to arrest Bandoy and his co-accused as the
Chief of PNP and the CIDG Chief, both of Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, merely
consulted him on how to go about the order of cancellation of bail that Judge Mayor
issued. He explained "wala po akong alam sa Kautusan kaya binasa po sa akin ang
nilalaman nito sa cellphone at pagkatapos ay nagwika po akong parang may kulang sa
Kautusan at kapag nakansela ang piyansa ay babalik sila sa selda dahil wala na po
silang piyansa (as a consequence thereof)." 19 Judge Jacinto, Jr. even refused to issue a
warrant of arrest when he was asked because he was not handling the case anymore. 20

Bandoy, in his Reply, 21 brought to the attention of the Court that Judge Jacinto,
Jr., in order to thwart the enemies of his supposed master, Mayor Villarosa, issued
warrants of arrest against ten individuals. 22 He also divulged that the audit team from
the Court was personally assisted by Judge Jacinto, Jr. and given accommodations in
"Aroma Center," one of the properties of Mayor Villarosa. 23 Bandoy was thankful that
Judge Jacinto, Jr. did not deny the fact that the police officials wanted to arrest them even
without a warrant of arrest. 24 Bandoy showed a timeline of events supposedly depicting
how De Jesus, Jr., through the tolerance and partiality of Judge Jacinto, Jr., evaded
arraignment on numerous occasions effectively delaying the progress of the case for
ballot switching and even actually conducting the arraignment in his chambers. 25 He
further reiterated his plea not to let Judge Jacinto, Jr. preside over the affairs of Branch
44.

In his Rejoinder, 26 Judge Jacinto, Jr. stated that he was again assigned as
Assisting Presiding Judge of Branch 44. 27 He clarified that he indeed issued warrants of
arrest against ten individuals in connection with a serious illegal detention case against
them, but only after a finding of probable cause by the public prosecutor handling it.
Judge Jacinto, Jr. reiterated that he merely affirmed the finding of probable cause, which
justified the issuance of the warrants of arrest as the charge was a non-bailable offense.
28 He likewise denied seeking any favor from Mayor Villarosa to accommodate the audit
team in their property, the Aroma Family Hotel. He explained that the audit team paid
him a "courtesy call" where he assured the team of his cooperation. 29 He again restated
that the police officials merely coordinated with him as was customary because he was
the Executive Judge of the municipality. 30 Judge Jacinto, Jr. believes that Bandoy's
accusations against him were designed to oust him as Presiding Judge of Branches 45 and
46 of San Jose and even as Assisting Presiding Judge of Branch 44, Mamburao, both in
the province of Occidental Mindoro. 31

In its Report, 32 dated June 03, 2014, the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) did not give credence to Bandoy's allegation that Judge Jacinto, Jr. issued an order
for his arrest without a warrant and to the insinuation that the Court's audit team was
conveniently housed in Aroma Family Hotel of the Villarosas for failure to present proof.
33 The OCA observed, however, that Judge Jacinto, Jr. never refuted the allegations of
leniency over the several resettings of the arraignment of De Jesus, Jr. and that the
arraignment was held in his chambers. As such, the OCA equated his silence to
admission. 34 Thus, the OCA recommended that:

1. The administrative complaint against Presiding Judge Jose S. Jacinto,

Jr., Branch 45, Regional Trial Court, San Jose, Occidental
Mindoro, be RE-DOCKETED as regular administrative matter;
and

2.. Respondent Judge Jose Jacinto, Jr. be found GUILTY of Bias and

Partiality and Gross Ignorance of the Law and Procedure and,
accordingly, be FINED in the amount of Forty Thousand Pesos
(P40,000.00) with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the
same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely. 35

The Court's Ruling

The Court agrees with the recommendation of the OCA.

Rule 3.01, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a judge shall be
faithful to the law and maintain professional competence. Indeed, competence and
diligence are prerequisites to the due performance of judicial office. 36

Everyone, especially a judge, is presumed to know the law. One who accepts the
exalted position of a judge owes the public and the Court the duty to maintain
professional competence at all times. 37

In this case, Judge Jacinto, Jr. was directly confronted with an allegation that he
arraigned De Jesus, Jr. inside his chambers. He was given the opportunity to answer, but
he chose not to delve into it. Ultimately, Judge Jacinto, Jr. did not squarely face the issues
being imputed against him, which was quite irregular since it was his name and his
capacity as a member of the bench, that was being challenged. As aptly observed by the
OCA, "the natural instinct of man impels him to resist an unfounded claim or imputation
and defend himself. It is against human nature to just remain reticent and say nothing in
the face of false accusations." 38 His silence introduces doubt in the minds of the public,
which is not acceptable.
 Given the exacting standards required of magistrates in the application of the law
and procedure, the Court finds Judge Jacinto, Jr. administratively guilty of gross
ignorance of Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Court, specifically Section 1 (a) thereof
requiring arraignment of an accused to be made in open court, to wit:

Section 1. Arraignment and plea, how made. — (a) The accused must be
arraigned before the court where the complaint or information was filed or
assigned for trial. The arraignment shall be made in open court by the judge or
clerk by furnishing the accused with a copy of the complaint or information,
reading the same in the language or dialect known to him, and asking him
whether he pleads guilty or not guilty. The prosecution may call at the trial
witnesses other than those named in the complaint or information.HDTSCc

(Emphasis supplied)

The procedural steps laid down in Section 1 (a) of Rule 116 are not empty rituals
that a judge can take nonchalantly. Each step constitutes an integral part of that crucial
stage in criminal litigation "where the issues are joined . . . and without which the
proceedings cannot advance further." 39

Thus, anything less than is required by Section 1 (a) of Rule 116 constitutes gross
ignorance of the law. 40 There is gross ignorance of the law when the error committed by
the judge was "gross or patent, deliberate or malicious." 41 It may also be committed
when a judge ignores, contradicts or fails to apply settled law and jurisprudence because
of bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption. 42 Gross ignorance of the law or
incompetence cannot be excused by a claim of good faith. 43

The Court has impressed upon judges that they owe it to the public and the legal
profession to know the very law that they are supposed to apply in a given controversy.
44 They are called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes
and procedural rules, to be conversant with the basic law, and to maintain the desired
professional competence. 45 When a judge displays an utter lack of familiarity with the
rules, he erodes the confidence of the public in the courts. A judge owes the public and
the Court the duty to be proficient in the law and is expected to keep abreast of laws and
prevailing jurisprudence. Ignorance of the law by a judge can easily be the mainspring of
injustice. 46

Canon 2, 47 Rule 2.01 48 and Canon 3 49 of the Code of Judicial Conduct

likewise emphasize that judges, as officers of the court, have the duty to see to it that
justice is dispensed with evenly and fairly. Not only must they be honest and impartial,
but they must also appear to be honest and impartial in the dispensation of justice. Judges
should make sure that their acts are circumspect and do not arouse suspicion in the minds
of the public. When they fail to do so, such acts may cast doubt upon their integrity and
ultimately the judiciary in general. 50 As held in Joselito Rallos, et al. vs. Judge Ireneo
Lee Gako Jr., Branch 5 RTC, Cebu City: 51

Well-known is the judicial norm that "judges should not only be

impartial but should also appear impartial." Jurisprudence repeatedly teaches
that litigants are entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial
judge. The other elements of due process, like notice and hearing, would
become meaningless if the ultimate decision is rendered by a partial or biased
judge. Judges must not only render just, correct and impartial decisions, but
must do so in a manner free of any suspicion as to their fairness, impartiality
and integrity.

This reminder applies all the more sternly to municipal, metropolitan

and regional trial court judges like herein respondent, because they are judicial
front-liners who have direct contact with the litigating parties. They are the
intermediaries between conflicting interests and the embodiments of the
people's sense of justice. Thus, their official conduct should be beyond
reproach.

Here, the Court cannot fathom why the arraignment of De Jesus, Jr. was postponed
from 2007 to 2011 without appropriate action coming from the court. Judge Jacinto, Jr.
should have availed of known legal remedies to compel De Jesus, Jr. to personally appear
for his arraignment, but he did not. The appearance of leniency seemingly exhibited in
favor of De Jesus, Jr. gives an impression of bias and partiality that should be addressed
and corrected.

Consequently, under Section 8 (9), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court,as amended by
A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, gross ignorance of the law or procedure is classified as a serious
charge. Section 11 (A) of the same Rule provides that the penalty to be imposed if a
respondent Judge is found guilty of a serious charge is either a fine of more than
P20,000.00 but not more than P40,000.00, suspension from office without salary and
other benefits for more than three but not exceeding six months, or dismissal from the
service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and
disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including
government-owned or controlled corporations.

The Court is aware of the other pending administrative cases against Judge
Jacinto, Jr., but they cannot be fully considered in the imposition of the penalty in this
case as they are still under review and evaluation. Thus, a fine of P40,000.00 52 is
deemed appropriate under the circumstances.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Judge Jose S. Jacinto, Jr. GUILTY of
Gross Ignorance of the Law and Procedure and of Bias and Partiality. Accordingly, he is
FINED in the amount of Forty Thousand (P40,000.00) Pesos with a STERN
WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, Brion, Del Castillo, and Leonen, JJ., concur.

(Bandoy v. Jacinto, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-14-2399, [November 19, 2014], 747 PHIL 156-
|||

169)

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 226679. August 15, 2017.]

SALVADOR ESTIPONA, JR. y ASUELA, petitioner, vs. HON.

FRANK E. LOBRIGO, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 3, Legazpi City, Albay, and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J : p

Challenged in this petition for certiorari and prohibition 1 is the

constitutionality of Section 23 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165, or the
"Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002," 2 which provides:
SEC. 23. Plea-Bargaining Provision. — Any person charged under
any provision of this Act regardless of the imposable penalty shall not be
allowed to avail of the provision on plea-bargaining. 3
The facts are not in dispute.
Petitioner Salvador A. Estipona, Jr. (Estipona) is the accused in Criminal Case
No. 13586 for violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 (Possession of
Dangerous Drugs). The Information alleged:
That on or about the 21st day of March, 2016, in the City of Legazpi,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, not being lawfully authorized to possess or otherwise use any
regulated drug and without the corresponding license or prescription, did then
and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have, in his possession and
under his control and custody, one (1) piece heat-sealed transparent plastic
 sachet marked as VOP 03/21/16-1G containing 0.084 [gram] of white
crystalline substance, which when examined were found to be positive for
Methamphetamine Hydrocloride (Shabu), a dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 4
On June 15, 2016, Estipona filed a Motion to Allow the Accused to Enter into a
Plea Bargaining Agreement, 5 praying to withdraw his not guilty plea and, instead, to
enter a plea of guilty for violation of Section 12, Article II of R.A. No. 9165
(Possession of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia for
Dangerous Drugs) with a penalty of rehabilitation in view of his being a first-time
offender and the minimal quantity of the dangerous drug seized in his possession. He
argued that Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 violates: (1) the intent of the law expressed
in paragraph 3, Section 2 thereof; (2) the rule-making authority of the Supreme Court
under Section 5 (5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution; and (3) the principle of
separation of powers among the three equal branches of the government.
In its Comment or Opposition 6 dated June 27, 2016, the prosecution moved
for the denial of the motion for being contrary to Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165, which
is said to be justified by the Congress' prerogative to choose which offense it would
allow plea bargaining. Later, in a Comment or Opposition 7 dated June 29, 2016, it
manifested that it "is open to the Motion of the accused to enter into plea bargaining
to give life to the intent of the law as provided in paragraph 3, Section 2 of [R.A. No.]
9165, however, with the express mandate of Section 23 of [R.A. No.] 9165
prohibiting plea bargaining, [it] is left without any choice but to reject the proposal of
the accused."
On July 12, 2016, respondent Judge Frank E. Lobrigo of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 3, Legazpi City, Albay, issued an Order denying Estipona's
motion. It was opined:
The accused posited in his motion that Sec. 23 of RA No. 9165, which
prohibits plea bargaining, encroaches on the exclusive constitutional power of
the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of procedure because plea bargaining
is a "rule of procedure." Indeed, plea bargaining forms part of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure, particularly under Rule 118, the rule on pre-trial
conference. It is only the Rules of Court promulgated by the Supreme Court
pursuant to its constitutional rule-making power that breathes life to plea
bargaining. It cannot be found in any statute.
Without saying so, the accused implies that Sec. 23 of Republic Act
No. 9165 is unconstitutional because it, in effect, suspends the operation of
Rule 118 of the Rules of Court insofar as it allows plea bargaining as part of
the mandatory pre-trial conference in criminal cases.
The Court sees merit in the argument of the accused that it is also the
intendment of the law, R.A. No. 9165, to rehabilitate an accused of a drug
offense. Rehabilitation is thus only possible in cases of use of illegal drugs
because plea bargaining is disallowed. However, by case law, the Supreme
 Court allowed rehabilitation for accused charged with possession of
paraphernalia with traces of dangerous drugs, as held in People v. Martinez,
G.R. No. 191366, 13 December 2010. The ruling of the Supreme Court in this
case manifested the relaxation of an otherwise stringent application of
Republic Act No. 9165 in order to serve an intent for the enactment of the
law, that is, to rehabilitate the offender.
Within the spirit of the disquisition in People v. Martinez, there might
be plausible basis for the declaration of Sec. 23 of R.A. No. 9165, which bars
plea bargaining as unconstitutional because indeed the inclusion of the
provision in the law encroaches on the exclusive constitutional power of the
Supreme Court.
While basic is the precept that lower courts are not precluded from
resolving, whenever warranted, constitutional questions, the Court is not
unaware of the admonition of the Supreme Court that lower courts must
observe a becoming modesty in examining constitutional questions. Upon
which admonition, it is thus not for this lower court to declare Sec. 23 of R.A.
No. 9165 unconstitutional given the potential ramifications that such
declaration might have on the prosecution of illegal drug cases pending before
this judicial station. 8
Estipona filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied in an Order 9
dated July 26, 2016; hence, this petition raising the issues as follows: CAIHTE

I.
WHETHER SECTION 23 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165, WHICH
PROHIBITS PLEA BARGAINING IN ALL VIOLATIONS OF THE SAID
LAW, IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR BEING VIOLATIVE OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW.
II.
WHETHER SECTION 23 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165 IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS IT ENCROACHED UPON THE POWER OF
THE SUPREME COURT TO PROMULGATE RULES OF PROCEDURE.
III.
WHETHER THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, AS PRESIDED BY HON.
FRANK E. LOBRIGO, COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT
REFUSED TO DECLARE SECTION 23 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165 AS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 10
We grant the petition.
PROCEDURAL MATTERS
The People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), contends that the petition should be dismissed outright for being procedurally
defective on the grounds that: (1) the Congress should have been impleaded as an
indispensable party; (2) the constitutionality of Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 cannot be
attacked collaterally; and (3) the proper recourse should have been a petition for
declaratory relief before this Court or a petition for certiorari before the RTC.
Moreover, the OSG argues that the petition fails to satisfy the requisites of judicial
review because: (1) Estipona lacks legal standing to sue for failure to show direct
injury; (2) there is no actual case or controversy; and (3) the constitutionality of
Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 is not the lis mota of the case.
On matters of technicality, some points raised by the OSG may be correct.
Nonetheless, without much further ado, it must be underscored that it is within this
Court's power to make exceptions to the rules of court. Under proper conditions, We
may permit the full and exhaustive ventilation of the parties' arguments and positions
despite the supposed technical infirmities of a petition or its alleged procedural flaws.
In discharging its solemn duty as the final arbiter of constitutional issues, the Court
shall not shirk from its obligation to determine novel issues, or issues of first
impression, with far-reaching implications. 11
Likewise, matters of procedure and technicalities normally take a backseat
when issues of substantial and transcendental importance are present. 12 We have
acknowledged that the Philippines' problem on illegal drugs has reached "epidemic,"
"monstrous," and "harrowing" proportions, 13 and that its disastrously harmful social,
economic, and spiritual effects have broken the lives, shattered the hopes, and
destroyed the future of thousands especially our young citizens. 14 At the same time,
We have equally noted that "as urgent as the campaign against the drug problem must
be, so must we as urgently, if not more so, be vigilant in the protection of the rights of
the accused as mandated by the Constitution x x x who, because of excessive zeal on
the part of the law enforcers, may be unjustly accused and convicted." 15 Fully aware
of the gravity of the drug menace that has beset our country and its direct link to
certain crimes, the Court, within its sphere, must do its part to assist in the all-out
effort to lessen, if not totally eradicate, the continued presence of drug lords, pushers
and users. 16
Bearing in mind the very important and pivotal issues raised in this petition,
technical matters should not deter Us from having to make the final and definitive
pronouncement that everyone else depends for enlightenment and guidance. 17 When
public interest requires, the Court may brush aside procedural rules in order to resolve
a constitutional issue. 18
x x x [T]he Court is invested with the power to suspend the application
of the rules of procedure as a necessary complement of its power to
promulgate the same. Barnes v. Hon. Quijano Padilla discussed the rationale
for this tenet, viz.:
Let it be emphasized that the rules of procedure should be viewed as
mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid
application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather
 than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed. Even the Rules of
Court reflect this principle. The power to suspend or even disregard rules can
be so pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which this Court itself has
already declared to be final, x x x.
The emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to afford every party
litigant the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his
cause, free from the constraints of technicalities. Time and again, this Court
has consistently held that rules must not be applied rigidly so as not to
override substantial justice. 19
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES

Rule-making power of the Supreme

Court under the 1987 Constitution

Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:

Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the
admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the
underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive
procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of
the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights.
Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain
effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
The power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is now Our
exclusive domain and no longer shared with the Executive and Legislative
departments. 20 In Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, 21 then Associate Justice (later
Chief Justice) Reynato S. Puno traced the history of the Court's rule-making power
and highlighted its evolution and development.
x x x It should be stressed that the power to promulgate rules of
pleading, practice and procedure was granted by our Constitutions to this
Court to enhance its independence, for in the words of Justice Isagani Cruz
"without independence and integrity, courts will lose that popular trust so
essential to the maintenance of their vigor as champions of justice." Hence,
our Constitutions continuously vested this power to this Court for it enhances
its independence. Under the 1935 Constitution, the power of this Court to
promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure was granted but
it appeared to be co-existent with legislative power for it was subject to the
power of Congress to repeal, alter or supplement. Thus, its Section 13, Article
VIII provides:
 "Sec. 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to
promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure
in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said
rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall
not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. The
existing laws on pleading, practice and procedure are hereby
repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of Court, subject to
the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the same.
The Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter or
supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the
Philippines."
The said power of Congress, however, is not as absolute as it may appear on
its surface. In In re: Cunanan Congress in the exercise of its power to amend
rules of the Supreme Court regarding admission to the practice of law, enacted
the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953 which considered as a passing grade, the
average of 70% in the bar examinations after July 4, 1946 up to August 1951
and 71% in the 1952 bar examinations. This Court struck down the law as
unconstitutional. In his ponencia, Mr. Justice Diokno held that "x x x the
disputed law is not a legislation; it is a judgment — a judgment promulgated
by this Court during the aforecited years affecting the bar candidates
concerned; and although this Court certainly can revoke these judgments even
now, for justifiable reasons, it is no less certain that only this Court, and not
the legislative nor executive department, that may do so. Any attempt on the
part of these departments would be a clear usurpation of its function, as is the
case with the law in question." The venerable jurist further ruled: "It is
obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of
law belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the
matter is of permissive character, or as other authorities say, merely to fix the
minimum conditions for the license." By its ruling, this Court qualified the
absolutist tone of the power of Congress to "repeal, alter or supplement the
rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure, and the admission to the
practice of law in the Philippines.
The ruling of this Court in In re Cunanan was not changed by the
1973 Constitution. For the 1973 Constitution reiterated the power of this
Court "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all
courts, x x x which, however, may be repealed, altered or supplemented by the
Batasang Pambansa x x x." More completely, Section 5(2)5 of its Article X
provided:
xxx xxx xxx
"Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers.
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law,
 and the integration of the Bar, which, however, may be
repealed, altered, or supplemented by the Batasang Pambansa.
Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive
procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform
for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish,
increase, or modify substantive rights."
Well worth noting is that the 1973 Constitution further strengthened the
independence of the judiciary by giving to it the additional power to
promulgate rules governing the integration of the Bar.
The 1987 Constitution molded an even stronger and more
independent judiciary. Among others, it enhanced the rule making power of
this Court. Its Section 5(5), Article VIII provides:
xxx xxx xxx
"Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following
powers:
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice and
procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the
Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged.
Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive
procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform
for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish,
increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of
special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective
unless disapproved by the Supreme Court."
The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the first
time was given the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights. The Court was also granted for the first
time the power to disapprove rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-
judicial bodies. But most importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away the
power of Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading,
practice and procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate rules of pleading,
practice and procedure is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, more
so with the Executive. x x x. 22
Just recently, Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division) 23 further
elucidated:
While the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of
the various courts is, by constitutional design, vested unto Congress, the
power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts
 belongs exclusively to this Court. Section 5 (5), Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution reads:
xxx xxx xxx
In Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice (Echegaray), the Court traced the
evolution of its rule-making authority, which, under the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions, had been priorly subjected to a power-sharing scheme with
Congress. As it now stands, the 1987 Constitution textually altered the old
provisions by deleting the concurrent power of Congress to amend the
rules, thus solidifying in one body the Court's rule-making powers, in line
with the Framers' vision of institutionalizing a "[s]tronger and more
independent judiciary." DETACa

The records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission

would show that the Framers debated on whether or not the Court's rule-
making powers should be shared with Congress. There was an initial
suggestion to insert the sentence "The National Assembly may repeal, alter, or
supplement the said rules with the advice and concurrence of the Supreme
Court," right after the phrase "Promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all
courts, the admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal
assistance to the underprivileged[,]" in the enumeration of powers of the
Supreme Court. Later, Commissioner Felicitas S. Aquino proposed to delete
the former sentence and, instead, after the word "[under]privileged," place a
comma (,) to be followed by "the phrase with the concurrence of the National
Assembly." Eventually, a compromise formulation was reached wherein (a)
the Committee members agreed to Commissioner Aquino's proposal to delete
the phrase "the National Assembly may repeal, alter, or supplement the said
rules with the advice and concurrence of the Supreme Court" and (b) in turn,
Commissioner Aquino agreed to withdraw his proposal to add "the phrase
with the concurrence of the National Assembly." The changes were
approved, thereby leading to the present lack of textual reference to any
form of Congressional participation in Section 5 (5), Article VIII, supra.
The prevailing consideration was that "both bodies, the Supreme Court
and the Legislature, have their inherent powers."
Thus, as it now stands, Congress has no authority to repeal, alter, or
supplement rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure. x x x. 24
The separation of powers among the three co-equal branches of our
government has erected an impregnable wall that keeps the power to promulgate rules
of pleading, practice and procedure within the sole province of this Court. 25 The
other branches trespass upon this prerogative if they enact laws or issue orders that
effectively repeal, alter or modify any of the procedural rules promulgated by the
Court. 26 Viewed from this perspective, We have rejected previous attempts on the
part of the Congress, in the exercise of its legislative power, to amend the Rules of
Court (Rules), to wit:
 1. Fabian v. Desierto 27 — Appeal from the decision of the Office of the
Ombudsman in an administrative disciplinary case should be taken to the
Court of Appeals under the provisions of Rule 43 of the Rules instead of
appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 as provided in Section 27 of R.A. No.
6770.
2. Cathay Metal Corporation v. Laguna West Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc.
28 — The Cooperative Code provisions on notices cannot replace the rules on
summons under Rule 14 of the Rules.
3. RE: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the GSIS from Payment of
Legal Fees; 29 Baguio Market Vendors Multi-Purpose Cooperative
(BAMARVEMPCO) v. Hon. Judge Cabato-Cortes; 30 In Re: Exemption of the
National Power Corporation from Payment of Filing/Docket Fees; 31 and
Rep. of the Phils. v. Hon. Mangotara, et al. 32 — Despite statutory provisions,
the GSIS, BAMARVEMPCO, and NPC are not exempt from the payment of
legal fees imposed by Rule 141 of the Rules.
4. Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division) 33 — The first
paragraph of Section 14 of R.A. No. 6770, which prohibits courts except the
Supreme Court from issuing temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction to enjoin an investigation conducted by the
Ombudsman, is unconstitutional as it contravenes Rule 58 of the Rules.
Considering that the aforesaid laws effectively modified the Rules, this Court
asserted its discretion to amend, repeal or even establish new rules of procedure, to
the exclusion of the legislative and executive branches of government. To reiterate,
the Court's authority to promulgate rules on pleading, practice, and procedure is
exclusive and one of the safeguards of Our institutional independence. 34

Plea bargaining in criminal cases

Plea bargaining, as a rule and a practice, has been existing in our jurisdiction
since July 1, 1940, when the 1940 Rules took effect. Section 4, Rule 114 (Pleas) of
which stated:
SEC. 4. Plea of guilty of lesser offense. — The defendant, with the consent of
the court and of the fiscal, may plead guilty of any lesser offense than that
charged which is necessarily included in the offense charged in the complaint
or information.
When the 1964 Rules became effective on January 1, 1964, the same provision
was retained under Rule 118 (Pleas). Subsequently, with the effectivity of the 1985
Rules on January 1, 1985, the provision on plea of guilty to a lesser offense was
amended. Section 2, Rule 116 provided:
SEC. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. — The accused with the consent of
the offended party and the fiscal, may be allowed by the trial court to plead
guilty to a lesser offense, regardless of whether or not it is necessarily
 included in the crime charged, or is cognizable by a court of lesser jurisdiction
than the trial court. No amendment of the complaint or information is
necessary. (4a, R-118)
As well, the term "plea bargaining" was first mentioned and expressly required
during pre-trial. Section 2, Rule 118 mandated:
SEC. 2. Pre-trial conference; subjects. — The pre-trial conference shall
consider the following:
(a) Plea bargaining;
(b) Stipulation of facts;
(c) Marking for identification of evidence of the parties;
(d) Waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence; and
(e) Such other matters as will promote a fair and expeditious
trial. (n)
The 1985 Rules was later amended. While the wordings of Section 2, Rule 118
was retained, Section 2, Rule 116 was modified in 1987. A second paragraph was
added, stating that "[a] conviction under this plea shall be equivalent to a conviction
of the offense charged for purposes of double jeopardy."
When R.A. No. 8493 ("Speedy Trial Act of 1998") was enacted, 35 Section 2,
Rule 118 of the Rules was substantially adopted. Section 2 of the law required that
plea bargaining and other matters 36 that will promote a fair and expeditious trial are
to be considered during pre-trial conference in all criminal cases cognizable by the
Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court,
Regional Trial Court, and the Sandiganbayan.
Currently, the pertinent rules on plea bargaining under the 2000 Rules 37 are
quoted below:
RULE 116 (Arraignment and Plea):
SEC. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. — At arraignment, the accused, with
the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor, may be allowed by the
trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in
the offense charged. After arraignment but before trial, the accused may still
be allowed to plead guilty to said lesser offense after withdrawing his plea of
not guilty. No amendment of the complaint or information is necessary. (Sec.
4, Cir. 38-98)
RULE 118 (Pre-trial):
SEC. 1. Pre-trial; mandatory in criminal cases. — In all criminal cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial
Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal
Circuit Trial Court, the court shall, after arraignment and within thirty (30)
days from the date the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the
 accused, unless a shorter period is provided for in special laws or circulars of
the Supreme Court, order a pre-trial conference to consider the following:
(a) plea bargaining;
(b) stipulation of facts;
(c) marking for identification of evidence of the parties;
(d) waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence;
(e) modification of the order of trial if the accused admits the
charge but interposes a lawful defense; and
(f) such matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial of
the criminal and civil aspects of the case. (Sec. 2 & 3, Cir. 38-
98)

Plea bargaining is a rule of procedure

The Supreme Court's sole prerogative to issue, amend, or repeal procedural

rules is limited to the preservation of substantive rights, i.e., the former should not
diminish, increase or modify the latter. 38 "Substantive law is that part of the law
which creates, defines and regulates rights, or which regulates the right and duties
which give rise to a cause of action; that part of the law which courts are established
to administer; as opposed to adjective or remedial law, which prescribes the method
of enforcing rights or obtain redress for their invasions." 39 Fabian v. Hon. Desierto
40 laid down the test for determining whether a rule is substantive or procedural in
nature.
It will be noted that no definitive line can be drawn between those
rules or statutes which are procedural, hence within the scope of this Court's
rule-making power, and those which are substantive. In fact, a particular rule
may be procedural in one context and substantive in another. It is admitted
that what is procedural and what is substantive is frequently a question of
great difficulty. It is not, however, an insurmountable problem if a rational
and pragmatic approach is taken within the context of our own procedural and
jurisdictional system.
In determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the
practice and procedure of the lower courts, abridges, enlarges, or modifies any
substantive right, the test is whether the rule really regulates procedure, that is,
the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive
law and for justly administering remedy and redress for a disregard or
infraction of them. If the rule takes away a vested right, it is not procedural. If
the rule creates a right such as the right to appeal, it may be classified as a
substantive matter; but if it operates as a means of implementing an existing
right then the rule deals merely with procedure. 41
In several occasions, We dismissed the argument that a procedural rule violates
substantive rights. For example, in People v. Lacson, 42 Section 8, Rule 117 of the
Rules on provisional dismissal was held as a special procedural limitation qualifying
the right of the State to prosecute, making the time-bar an essence of the given right
or as an inherent part thereof, so that its expiration operates to extinguish the right of
the State to prosecute the accused. 43 Speaking through then Associate Justice Romeo
J. Callejo, Sr., the Court opined:
In the new rule in question, as now construed by the Court, it has fixed
a time-bar of one year or two years for the revival of criminal cases
provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused and with a
priori notice to the offended party. The time-bar may appear, on first
impression, unreasonable compared to the periods under Article 90 of the
Revised Penal Code. However, in fixing the time-bar, the Court balanced the
societal interests and those of the accused for the orderly and speedy
disposition of criminal cases with minimum prejudice to the State and the
accused. It took into account the substantial rights of both the State and of the
accused to due process. The Court believed that the time limit is a reasonable
period for the State to revive provisionally dismissed cases with the consent of
the accused and notice to the offended parties. The time-bar fixed by the Court
must be respected unless it is shown that the period is manifestly short or
insufficient that the rule becomes a denial of justice. The petitioners failed to
show a manifest shortness or insufficiency of the time-bar. aDSIHc

The new rule was conceptualized by the Committee on the Revision of

the Rules and approved by the Court en banc primarily to enhance the
administration of the criminal justice system and the rights to due process of
the State and the accused by eliminating the deleterious practice of trial courts
of provisionally dismissing criminal cases on motion of either the prosecution
or the accused or jointly, either with no time-bar for the revival thereof or with
a specific or definite period for such revival by the public prosecutor. There
were times when such criminal cases were no longer revived or refiled due to
causes beyond the control of the public prosecutor or because of the
indolence, apathy or the lackadaisical attitude of public prosecutors to the
prejudice of the State and the accused despite the mandate to public
prosecutors and trial judges to expedite criminal proceedings.
It is almost a universal experience that the accused welcomes delay as
it usually operates in his favor, especially if he greatly fears the consequences
of his trial and conviction. He is hesitant to disturb the hushed inaction by
which dominant cases have been known to expire.
The inordinate delay in the revival or refiling of criminal cases may
impair or reduce the capacity of the State to prove its case with the
disappearance or nonavailability of its witnesses. Physical evidence may have
been lost. Memories of witnesses may have grown dim or have faded. Passage
of time makes proof of any fact more difficult. The accused may become a
fugitive from justice or commit another crime. The longer the lapse of time
from the dismissal of the case to the revival thereof, the more difficult it is to
prove the crime.
 On the other side of the fulcrum, a mere provisional dismissal of a
criminal case does not terminate a criminal case. The possibility that the case
may be revived at any time may disrupt or reduce, if not derail, the chances of
the accused for employment, curtail his association, subject him to public
obloquy and create anxiety in him and his family. He is unable to lead a
normal life because of community suspicion and his own anxiety. He
continues to suffer those penalties and disabilities incompatible with the
presumption of innocence. He may also lose his witnesses or their memories
may fade with the passage of time. In the long run, it may diminish his
capacity to defend himself and thus eschew the fairness of the entire criminal
justice system.
The time-bar under the new rule was fixed by the Court to excise the
malaise that plagued the administration of the criminal justice system for the
benefit of the State and the accused; not for the accused only. 44
Also, We said in Jaylo, et al. v. Sandiganbayan, et al. 45 that Section 6, Rule
120 of the Rules, which provides that an accused who failed to appear at the
promulgation of the judgment of conviction shall lose the remedies available against
the judgment, does not take away substantive rights but merely provides the manner
through which an existing right may be implemented.
Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court, does not take away per se
the right of the convicted accused to avail of the remedies under the Rules. It
is the failure of the accused to appear without justifiable cause on the
scheduled date of promulgation of the judgment of conviction that forfeits
their right to avail themselves of the remedies against the judgment.
It is not correct to say that Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court
diminishes or modifies the substantive rights of petitioners. It only works in
pursuance of the power of the Supreme Court to "provide a simplified and
inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases." This provision
protects the courts from delay in the speedy disposition of criminal cases —
delay arising from the simple expediency of nonappearance of the accused on
the scheduled promulgation of the judgment of conviction. 46
By the same token, it is towards the provision of a simplified and inexpensive
procedure for the speedy disposition of cases in all courts 47 that the rules on plea
bargaining was introduced. As a way of disposing criminal charges by agreement of
the parties, plea bargaining is considered to be an "important," "essential," "highly
desirable," and "legitimate" component of the administration of justice. 48 Some of its
salutary effects include:
x x x For a defendant who sees slight possibility of acquittal, the advantages
of pleading guilty and limiting the probable penalty are obvious — his
exposure is reduced, the correctional processes can begin immediately, and
the practical burdens of a trial are eliminated. For the State there are also
advantages — the more promptly imposed punishment after an admission of
guilt may more effectively attain the objectives of punishment; and with the
 avoidance of trial, scarce judicial and prosecutorial resources are conserved
for those cases in which there is a substantial issue of the defendant's guilt or
in which there is substantial doubt that the State can sustain its burden of
proof. (Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 [1970])
Disposition of charges after plea discussions x x x leads to prompt and
largely final disposition of most criminal cases; it avoids much of the
corrosive impact of enforced idleness during pretrial confinement for those
who are denied release pending trial; it protects the public from those accused
persons who are prone to continue criminal conduct even while on pretrial
release; and, by shortening the time between charge and disposition, it
enhances whatever may be the rehabilitative prospects of the guilty when they
are ultimately imprisoned. (Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261
[1971])
The defendant avoids extended pretrial incarceration and the anxieties and
uncertainties of a trial; he gains a speedy disposition of his case, the chance to
acknowledge his guilt, and a prompt start in realizing whatever potential there
may be for rehabilitation. Judges and prosecutors conserve vital and scarce
resources. The public is protected from the risks posed by those charged with
criminal offenses who are at large on bail while awaiting completion of
criminal proceedings. (Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 [1977])
In this jurisdiction, plea bargaining has been defined as "a process whereby the
accused and the prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case
subject to court approval." 49 There is give-and-take negotiation common in plea
bargaining. 50 The essence of the agreement is that both the prosecution and the
defense make concessions to avoid potential losses. 51 Properly administered, plea
bargaining is to be encouraged because the chief virtues of the system — speed,
economy, and finality — can benefit the accused, the offended party, the prosecution,
and the court. 52
Considering the presence of mutuality of advantage, 53 the rules on plea
bargaining neither create a right nor take away a vested right. Instead, it operates as a
means to implement an existing right by regulating the judicial process for enforcing
rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy
and redress for a disregard or infraction of them.
The decision to plead guilty is often heavily influenced by the defendant's
appraisal of the prosecution's case against him and by the apparent likelihood of
securing leniency should a guilty plea be offered and accepted. 54 In any case,
whether it be to the offense charged or to a lesser crime, a guilty plea is a "serious and
sobering occasion" inasmuch as it constitutes a waiver of the fundamental rights to be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, to be heard by himself and counsel, to
meet the witnesses face to face, to bail (except those charged with offenses punishable
by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong), to be convicted by proof
beyond reasonable doubt, and not to be compelled to be a witness against himself. 55
 Yet a defendant has no constitutional right to plea bargain. No basic rights are
infringed by trying him rather than accepting a plea of guilty; the prosecutor need not
do so if he prefers to go to trial. 56 Under the present Rules, the acceptance of an offer
to plead guilty is not a demandable right but depends on the consent of the offended
party 57 and the prosecutor, which is a condition precedent to a valid plea of guilty to
a lesser offense that is necessarily included in the offense charged. 58 The reason for
this is that the prosecutor has full control of the prosecution of criminal actions; his
duty is to always prosecute the proper offense, not any lesser or graver one, based on
what the evidence on hand can sustain. 59
[Courts] normally must defer to prosecutorial decisions as to whom to
prosecute. The reasons for judicial deference are well known. Prosecutorial
charging decisions are rarely simple. In addition to assessing the strength and
importance of a case, prosecutors also must consider other tangible and
intangible factors, such as government enforcement priorities. Finally, they
also must decide how best to allocate the scarce resources of a criminal justice
system that simply cannot accommodate the litigation of every serious
criminal charge. Because these decisions "are not readily susceptible to the
kind of analysis the courts are competent to undertake," we have been
"properly hesitant to examine the decision whether to prosecute." 60
The plea is further addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, which
may allow the accused to plead guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily included
in the offense charged. The word may denotes an exercise of discretion upon the trial
court on whether to allow the accused to make such plea. 61 Trial courts are exhorted
to keep in mind that a plea of guilty for a lighter offense than that actually charged is
not supposed to be allowed as a matter of bargaining or compromise for the
convenience of the accused. 62
Plea bargaining is allowed during the arraignment, the pre-trial, or even up to
the point when the prosecution already rested its case. 63 As regards plea bargaining
during the pre-trial stage, the trial court's exercise of discretion should not amount to a
grave abuse thereof. 64 "Grave abuse of discretion" is a capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty
or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, as where the power is exercised
in an arbitrary and despotic manner because of passion or hostility; it arises when a
court or tribunal violates the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence. 65
If the accused moved to plead guilty to a lesser offense subsequent to a bail
hearing or after the prosecution rested its case, the rules allow such a plea only when
the prosecution does not have sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of the crime
charged. 66 The only basis on which the prosecutor and the court could rightfully act
in allowing change in the former plea of not guilty could be nothing more and nothing
less than the evidence on record. As soon as the prosecutor has submitted a comment
whether for or against said motion, it behooves the trial court to assiduously study the
prosecution's evidence as well as all the circumstances upon which the accused made
 his change of plea to the end that the interests of justice and of the public will be
served. 67 The ruling on the motion must disclose the strength or weakness of the
prosecution's evidence. 68 Absent any finding on the weight of the evidence on hand,
the judge's acceptance of the defendant's change of plea is improper and irregular. 69

On whether Section 23 of R.A. No.

9165 violates the equal protection
clause

At this point, We shall not resolve the issue of whether Section 23 of R.A. No.
9165 is contrary to the constitutional right to equal protection of the law in order not
to preempt any future discussion by the Court on the policy considerations behind
Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165. Pending deliberation on whether or not to adopt the
statutory provision in toto or a qualified version thereof, We deem it proper to declare
as invalid the prohibition against plea bargaining on drug cases until and unless it is
made part of the rules of procedure through an administrative circular duly issued for
the purpose. ETHIDa

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED.

Section 23 of Republic Act No. 9165 is declared unconstitutional for being contrary to
the rule-making authority of the Supreme Court under Section 5 (5), Article VIII of
the 1987 Constitution.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-de Castro, Bersamin, Del
Castillo, Perlas-Bernabe, Jardeleza, Martires, Tijam, Reyes, Jr. and Gesmundo, JJ.,
concur.
Leonen, J., see separate concurring opinion.
Caguioa, * J., is on wellness leave.
(Estipona, Jr. y Asuela v. Lobrigo, G.R. No. 226679, [August 15, 2017], 816 PHIL 789-
|||

820)

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. Nos. 163972-77. March 28, 2008.]

JOSELITO RANIERO J. DAAN, petitioner, vs. THE HON.

SANDIGANBAYAN (Fourth Division), respondent.

DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J : p

Joselito Raniero J. Daan (petitioner), one of the accused in Criminal Cases

Nos. 24167-24170, 24195-24196, 1 questions the denial by the Sandiganbayan of his
plea bargaining proposal. HaDEIc

The antecedents facts are laid down by Sandiganbayan in its Resolution dated
March 25, 2004, as follows:
Said accused, 2 together with accused Benedicto E. Kuizon, were
charged before this Court for three counts of malversation of public funds
involving the sums of P3,293.00, P1,869.00, and P13,528.00, respectively,
which they purportedly tried to conceal by falsifying the time book and
payrolls for given period making it appear that some laborers worked on the
construction of the new municipal hall building of Bato, Leyte and collected
their respective salaries thereon when, in truth and in fact, they did not. Thus,
in addition to the charge for malversation, the accused were also indicted
before this Court for three counts of falsification of public document by a
public officer or employee.
In the falsification cases, the accused offered to withdraw their plea of
"not guilty" and substitute the same with a plea of "guilty", provided, the
mitigating circumstances of confession or plea of guilt and voluntary
surrender will be appreciated in their favor. In the alternative, if such proposal
is not acceptable, said accused proposed instead to substitute their plea of "not
guilty" to the crime of falsification of public document by a public officer or
employee with a plea of "guilty", but to the lesser crime of falsification of a
public document by a private individual. On the other hand, in the
malversation cases, the accused offered to substitute their plea of "not guilty"
thereto with a plea of "guilty", but to the lesser crime of failure of an
accountable officer to render accounts.
Insofar as the falsification cases are concerned, the prosecution found
as acceptable the proposal of the accused to plead "guilty" to the lesser crime
of falsification of public document by a private individual. The prosecution
explained:

"With respect to the falsification cases earlier mentioned, it

appears that the act of the accused in pleading guilty for a lesser offense
of falsification by a private individual defined and penalized under
Article 172 of the Revised Penal code will strengthen our cases against
the principal accused, Municipal Mayor Benedicto Kuizon, who appears
to be the master mind of these criminal acts."

Insofar as the malversation cases are concerned, the prosecution was

likewise amenable to the offer of said accused to plead "guilty" to the lesser
crime of failure of an accountable officer to render accounts because: DaESIC
 ". . . JOSELITO RANIERO J. DAAN has already restituted the
total amount of P18,860.00 as per official receipt issued by the
provincial government of Leyte dated February 26, 2002. In short, the
damage caused to the government has already been restituted . . . . 3

The Sandiganbayan, in the herein assailed Resolution, 4 dated March 25, 2004,
denied petitioner's Motion to Plea Bargain, despite favorable recommendation by the
prosecution, on the main ground that no cogent reason was presented to justify its
approval. 5
The Sandiganbayan likewise denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration in
a Resolution dated May 31, 2004.
This compelled petitioner to file the present case for certiorari and prohibition
with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioner argues that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion
in denying his plea bargaining offer on the following grounds: first, petitioner is not
an accountable officer and he merely affixed his signature on the payrolls on a
"routinary basis," negating any criminal intent; and that the amount involved is only
P18,860.00, which he already restituted. 6
The petition is meritorious.
Plea bargaining in criminal cases is a process whereby the accused and the
prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court
approval. It usually involves the defendant's pleading guilty to a lesser offense or to
only one or some of the counts of a multi-count indictment in return for a lighter
sentence than that for the graver charge. 7
Plea bargaining is authorized under Section 2, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure, to wit: EaISTD

SEC. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. — At arraignment, the

accused, with the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor, may be
allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense which is
necessarily included in the offense charged. After arraignment but before trial,
the accused may still be allowed to plead guilty to said lesser offense after
withdrawing his plea of not guilty. No amendment of the complaint or
information is necessary. (sec. 4, cir. 38-98)
Ordinarily, plea bargaining is made during the pre-trial stage of the
proceedings. Sections 1 and 2, Rule 118 of the Rules of Court, require plea bargaining
to be considered by the trial court at the pre-trial conference, 8 viz.:
SEC. 1. Pre-trial; mandatory in criminal cases. — In all criminal
cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan
Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Municipal Trial Court and
 Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the court shall, after arraignment and within
thirty (30) days from the date the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of
the accused, unless a shorter period is provided for in special laws or circulars
of the Supreme Court, order a pre-trial conference to consider the following:

(a) plea bargaining;

(b) stipulation of facts;

(c) marking for identification of evidence of the parties;

(d) waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence;

(e) modification of the order of trial if the accused admits the

charge but interposes a lawful defense; and

(f) such matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial of the

criminal and civil aspects of the case.

SEC. 2. Pre-trial agreement. — All agreements or admissions made or

entered during the pre-trial conference shall be reduced in writing and signed
by the accused and counsel, otherwise, they cannot be used against the
accused. The agreements covering the matters referred to in section 1 of this
Rule shall be approved by the court. (Emphasis supplied)
But it may also be made during the trial proper and even after the prosecution
has finished presenting its evidence and rested its case. Thus, the Court has held that it
is immaterial that plea bargaining was not made during the pre-trial stage or that it
was made only after the prosecution already presented several witnesses. 9 ASaTCE

Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court presents the basic requisites upon
which plea bargaining may be made, i.e., that it should be with the consent of the
offended party and the prosecutor, 10 and that the plea of guilt should be to a lesser
offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged. The rules however use
word may in the second sentence of Section 2, denoting an exercise of discretion upon
the trial court on whether to allow the accused to make such plea. 11 Trial courts are
exhorted to keep in mind that a plea of guilty for a lighter offense than that actually
charged is not supposed to be allowed as a matter of bargaining or compromise for the
convenience of the accused. 12
In People of the Philippines v. Villarama, 13 the Court ruled that the
acceptance of an offer to plead guilty to a lesser offense is not demandable by the
accused as a matter of right but is a matter that is addressed entirely to the sound
discretion of the trial court, 14 viz.:
. . . In such situation, jurisprudence has provided the trial court and the
Office of the Prosecutor with a yardstick within which their discretion may be
 properly exercised. Thus, in People v. Kayanan (L-39355, May 31, 1978, 83
SCRA 437, 450), We held that the rules allow such a plea only when the
prosecution does not have sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of the
crime charged. In his concurring opinion in People v. Parohinog (G.R. No. L-
47462, February 28, 1980, 96 SCRA 373, 377), then Justice Antonio Barredo
explained clearly and tersely the rationale or the law:
. . . (A)fter the prosecution had already rested, the only basis on
which the fiscal and the court could rightfully act in allowing the appellant to
change his former plea of not guilty to murder to guilty to the lesser crime of
homicide could be nothing more nothing less than the evidence already in the
record. The reason for this being that Section 4 of Rule 118 (now Section 2,
Rule 116) under which a plea for a lesser offense is allowed was not and could
not have been intended as a procedure for compromise, much less bargaining.
15 (Emphasis supplied)
However, Villarama involved plea bargaining after the prosecution had already
rested its case.HcISTE

As regards plea bargaining during the pre-trial stage, as in the present case, the
trial court's exercise of its discretion should neither be arbitrary nor should it amount
to a capricious and whimsical exercise of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion implies
such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction or, in other words, where the power is exercised in an arbitrary manner by
reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility; and it must be so patent or gross as
to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law. 16
In the present case, the Sandiganbayan rejected petitioner's plea offer on the
ground that petitioner and the prosecution failed to demonstrate that the proposal
would redound to the benefit of the public. The Sandiganbayan believes that
approving the proposal would "only serve to trivialize the seriousness of the charges
against them and send the wrong signal to potential grafters in public office that the
penalties they are likely to face would be lighter than what their criminal acts would
have merited or that the economic benefits they are likely to derive from their
criminal activities far outweigh the risks they face in committing them; thus, setting to
naught the deterrent value of the laws intended to curb graft and corruption in
government." 17
Apparently, the Sandiganbayan has proffered valid reasons in rejecting
petitioner's plea offer. However, subsequent events and higher interests of justice and
fair play dictate that petitioner's plea offer should be accepted. The present case calls
for the judicious exercise of this Court's equity jurisdiction —
Equity as the complement of legal jurisdiction seeks to reach and do
complete justice where courts of law, through the inflexibility of their rules
and want of power to adapt their judgments to the special circumstances of
cases, are incompetent so to do. Equity regards the spirit of and not the letter,
 the intent and not the form, the substance rather than the circumstance, as it is
variously expressed by different courts. 18
and of its power of control and supervision over the proceedings of lower courts, 19 in
order to afford equal justice to petitioner.
In People of the Philippines v. Estrada, 20 the Sandiganbayan, in its
Resolution dated March 14, 2007, approved the Plea Bargaining Agreement entered
into by the prosecution and one of the accused, Charlie "Atong" Ang. The agreement
provided that the accused undertakes to assist in the prosecution of the case and
promises to return the amount of P25,000,000.00. In approving the Plea Bargaining
Agreement, the Sandiganbayan took into consideration the timeliness of the plea
bargaining and whether the agreement complied with the requirements of Section 2,
Rule 116 of the Rules of Court. The Sandiganbayan noted that the accused had
already withdrawn his earlier plea of "not guilty"; and that the prosecution consented
to the plea of guilt to a lesser offense; and the lesser offense, which is Corruption of
Public Officials in relation to Indirect Bribery, is necessarily included in the offense
charged, which is Plunder. 21 HATEDC

The Court sees no reason why the standards applied by the Sandiganbayan to
Estrada should not be applied to the present case. Records show that there was a
favorable recommendation by the Office of the Special Prosecutor to approve
petitioner's motion to plea bargain. Thus, in its Memorandum dated August 16, 2002,
the Office of the Special Prosecutor rationalized:
In the cases at bar, there is no dispute that JOSELITO RANIERO J.
DAAN has already restituted the total amount of P18,860.00 as per official
receipt issued by the provincial government of Leyte dated February 26, 2002.
In short, the damage caused to the government has already been restituted by
the accused.
There is also no dispute that accused DAAN voluntarily surrendered in
the instant cases. Moreover, the accused is also willing to plead guilty to a
lesser offense which to our mind, merits consideration.
With respect to the falsification cases earlier mentioned, it appears that
the act of the accused in pleading guilty for a lesser offense of falsification by
private individual defined and penalized under Article 172 of the Revised
Penal Code will strengthen our cases against the principal accused, the
Municipal Mayor Benedicto Kuizon, who appears to be the master mind of
these criminal acts. After all, the movants herein JOSELITO RANIERO J.
DAAN was merely designated as draftsman detailed as foreman/timekeeper of
the Municipality of Bato, Leyte. 22
Moreover, the lesser offenses of Falsification by Private Individuals and
Failure to Render Account by an Accountable Officer are necessarily included in the
crimes of Falsification of Public Documents and Malversation of Public Funds,
respectively, with which petitioner was originally charged.
 Under Article 171, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, for the crime of
Falsification of Public Documents through an untruthful narration of facts to be
established, the following elements must concur: (a) the offender makes in a
document untruthful statements in a narration of facts; (b) the offender has a legal
obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated; (c) the facts narrated by the
offender are absolutely false; and (d) the perversion of truth in the narration of facts
was made with the wrongful intent of injuring a third person. 23
On the other hand, Falsification by Private Individuals penalized under Article
172, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code has the following elements: (a) the
offender is a private individual or a public officer or employee who did not take
advantage of his official position; (b) the offender committed any of the acts of
falsification enumerated under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code; and (c) the
falsification was committed in a public or official or commercial document. 24 AEIHaS

As regards the crime of Malversation of Public Funds defined and penalized

under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, with which petitioner was also charged,
the elements are as follows: (a) the offender is a public officer; (b) he has custody or
control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office; (c) the funds or
property involved are public funds or property for which he is accountable; and (d) he
has appropriated, taken or misappropriated, or has consented to, or through
abandonment or negligence permitted, the taking by another person of such funds or
property. 25 Article 217 also provides that the failure of the public officer to have
duly forthcoming such public funds or property, upon demand by a duly authorized
officer, "shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property
to personal use." In this regard, it has been ruled that once such presumption is
rebutted, then it is completely destroyed; in fact, the presumption is never deemed to
have existed at all. 26
Meanwhile, under Article 218 of the Revised Penal Code, Failure to Render
Account by an Accountable Officer, the lesser offense which petitioner seeks to plead
guilty of, the following elements must concur: (a) the offender is a public officer; (b)
the offender must be an accountable officer for public funds or property; (c) the
offender is required by law or regulation to render accounts to the COA or to a
provincial auditor; and (d) the offender fails to render an account for a period of two
months after such accounts should be rendered. 27
Section 5, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court state when an offense includes or is
included in the other, to wit:
SEC. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. — An
offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the
essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or
information, constitute the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily
included in the offense proved, when the essential ingredients of the former
constitute or form part of those constituting the latter.
 An offense may be said to necessarily include another when some of the
essential elements or ingredients of the former as alleged in the complaint or
information constitute the latter. And vice versa, an offense may be said to be
necessarily included in another when the essential ingredients of the former constitute
or form part of those constituting the latter. 28
ICDcEA

In this case, the allegations in the Informations filed against petitioner are
sufficient to hold petitioner liable for the lesser offenses. Thus, in the charge for
Falsification of Public Documents, petitioner may plead guilty to the lesser offense of
Falsification by Private Individuals inasmuch as it does not appear that petitioner took
advantage of his official position in allegedly falsifying the timebook and payroll of
the Municipality of Bato, Leyte. In the same vein, with regard to the crime of
Malversation of Public Funds, while the Informations contain allegations which make
out a case for Malversation against petitioner, nevertheless, absent the element of
conversion, theoretically, petitioner may still be held liable for Failure to Render
Account by an Accountable Officer if it is shown that the failure to render account
was in violation of a law or regulation that requires him to render such an accounting
within the prescribed period.
Given, therefore, that some of the essential elements of offenses charged in this
case likewise constitute the lesser offenses, then petitioner may plead guilty to such
lesser offenses.
Finally, as propounded by petitioner, indeed, he is not an accountable officer in
that the nature of his duty as foreman/timekeeper does not permit or require
possession or custody of local government funds, 29 not to mention that petitioner has
already restituted the amount of P18,860.00 involved in this case. Unlike Estrada
which involves a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, 30 and a whopping
P25,000,000.00 taken from the public coffers, this case tremendously pales in
comparison.
Under the peculiar circumstances of the present case, where gross inequity will
result in a discriminatory dispensation of justice, the Court will not hesitate to
intervene in order to equalize the imbalance.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated March 25,
2004 and May 31, 2004 are SET ASIDE. The Sandiganbayan is hereby ORDERED
to grant petitioner's Motion to Plea Bargain. Let records of this case be REMANDED
to the Sandiganbayan for further proceedings in accordance with this Decision. aTHCSE

SO ORDERED.
Tinga, * Chico-Nazario, Nachura and Reyes, JJ., concur.
||| (Daan v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 163972-77, [March 28, 2008], 573 PHIL 368-383)

SECOND DIVISION
 [G.R. No. 122619. August 18, 2006.]

HEIRS OF MARIO GEVERO, REPRESENTED BY IRISH

GEVERO, petitioners, vs. GUIHING AGRICULTURAL &
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondent.

DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J : p

For our resolution is the herein petition for review on certiorari assailing the
Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals dated October 13, 1995 in CA-G.R. SP No. 37408.

Juanito M. Nava is an employee of Guihing Agricultural & Development

Corporation (GADECO). At around 5:30 p.m. of April 1, 1990, a Sunday, he was driving
a motorcycle, issued to him by GADECO, along Quezon Avenue, Digos, Davao del Sur.
Riding with him was his wife, Avelina Canseco-Nava. Along the way, Nava's motorcycle
bumped the bicycle Mario Gevero was riding on. As a result of the collision, the latter
died.

Subsequently, Nava was charged with Reckless Imprudence Resulting in

Homicide in an Information filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Digos, Davao
del Sur, docketed as Criminal Case No. 235 (90). Before his arraignment, he manifested
his intent to enter a plea of guilty to a lesser offense of reckless imprudence resulting in
damage to property, defined and penalized under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.
Irish Gevero, wife of the late Mario Gevero, and their children consented to the plea of
guilty to a lesser offense by Nava.

On December 28, 1990, the trial court issued an Order 2 finding accused Nava
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the lesser offense of reckless imprudence resulting in
damage to property and ordering him to pay a fine of P200.00.

During the separate hearing of the civil aspect of Criminal Case No. 235 (90), Irish
Gevero testified that at the time of the death of her husband, he was thirty (30) years old,
earning P6,000.00 a month as a T-shirt designer and P2,000.00 as a "freelance" worker.
She incurred P153,222.15 for medical, hospitalization, and burial expenses. 3
Significantly, the accused did not object to the prosecution's formal offer of these
evidence.

On November 12, 1991, the trial court rendered its Decision, 4 the dispositive
portion of which reads:
 In view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
complainant and against the accused, ordering the latter to indemnify the
offended party the amount of P153,222.15 for medical, hospitalization, and
burial expenses; and to pay P8,000.00 for loss of earnings in the concept of
actual or compensatory damages; P200,000.00 as moral damages and
P25,000.00 as attorney's fees; P500.00 per court appearance as may be shown
on record; and costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

Eventually, the writ of execution was issued by the trial court. However, it was
returned by the sheriff unsatisfied since accused Nava was insolvent. Upon motion of
Irish Gevero and her children, the trial court issued a writ of execution against GADECO,
employer of Nava. Hence, its bank deposit of P157,044.75 was garnished and turned over
by the sheriff to Irish Gevero.

GADECO filed a motion to quash the writ of execution and for the return of its
money. However, the trial court issued an Order 5 dated December 26, 1994 denying
GADECO's motion.

As the full amount of the award was not satisfied, the heirs of Mario Gevero filed
a motion for the issuance of an alias writ of execution against GADECO. This was
granted by the trial court.

Meanwhile, GADECO filed an urgent omnibus motion to hold in abeyance further

execution of the Decision and to reconsider the Order dated December 26, 1994. Again in
its Order dated January 16, 1995, the trial court denied this motion, prompting GADECO
to file with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, 6 docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
37408. GADECO alleged therein that the appellate court, in issuing the Order dated
December 26, 1994 denying GADECO's motion to quash the writ of execution and Order
dated January 16, 1995 denying its omnibus motion, acted with grave abuse of discretion.
cTEICD

On October 13, 1995, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision setting aside the
challenged Orders of the trial court and ordering the heirs of Mario Gevero to return to
GADECO the amount of P157,044.75.

Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari by the heirs (wife and children)
of Mario Gevero.

Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the civil liability
of respondent GADECO is only P200.00, the damage caused to the bicycle of the late
Mario Gevero, thus obliterating the fact of his death.

Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code reads:

 ART. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of felony. — Every person
criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.

The Court of Appeals, in applying the above provision, ruled that the civil liability
of accused Nava should be for the offense for which he was convicted and sentenced, i.e.,
reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property. Pursuant to Article 365 of the
Revised Penal Code on criminal negligence, 7 the appellate court imposed upon the
accused only a fine of P200.00, the damage caused to the victim's bicycle.

Section 2, Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended,

provides:

SEC. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. — The accused, with the

consent of the offended party and the fiscal, maybe allowed by the trial court to
plead guilty to a lesser offense, regardless of whether or not it is necessarily
included in the crime charged, or is cognizable by a court of lesser jurisdiction
than the trial court. No amendment of the complaint of information is necessary.

A conviction under this plea shall be equivalent to a conviction of the

offense charged for purposes of double jeopardy.

It is clear from the Rule that an accused in a criminal case may be allowed to plead
guilty to a lesser offense, regardless of whether it is included or not in the crime charged.
Thus, pursuant to this Rule, Nava, who was charged with reckless imprudence resulting
in homicide, was allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to the lesser offense of reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to property.

The Court of Appeals, however, in limiting Nava's civil liability to the cost of the
damage to the bicycle, clearly ignored the fact of death of the victim. The offense of
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide necessarily produces death; the offense of
reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property does not. Obviously, the fact of
death of the victim cannot be reconciled with the accused's plea of guilty to the lesser
offense of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property.

Significantly, Section 2, Rule 116 is silent on the effect of the plea to a lesser
offense on the civil liability of the accused. On this point, this Court's ruling in Amaton v.
Aujero 8 is relevant, thus:

However, the law is not entirely bereft of solutions in such cases. In

instances where a literal application of a provision of law would lead to injustice
or to a result so directly in opposition which the dictates of logic and everyday
common sense as to be unconscionable, the Civil Code admonishes judges to
take principles of right and justice at heart. In case of doubt, the intent is to
promote right and justice. Fiat justicia ruat coelum. Stated differently, when a
 provision of law is silent or ambiguous, judges ought to invoke a solution
responsive to the vehement urge of conscience.

These are fundamental tenets of law. In the case at bench, the fact of the
victim's death, a clear negation of frustrated or attempted homicide, ought to
have alerted the judge not only to a possibly inconsistent result but to an
injustice. The failure to recognize such principles so cardinal to our body of
laws amounts to ignorance of the law and reflects respondent judge's lack of
prudence, if not competence, in the performance of his duties. While it is true,
as respondent judge contends, that he merely applied the rule to the letter, the
palpably incongruous result ought to have been a "red flag" alerting him of the
possibility of injustice. The death of an identified individual, the gravamen of
the charge against the defendant in the criminal case, cannot and should not be
ignored in favor of a mere expedient plea of either attempted or frustrated
homicide. We have held before that if the law is so elementary, not to know it or
to act as if one does not know it, constitutes gross ignorance of law.

Indeed, the Court of Appeals should have realized outright that a grave injustice
will be committed against the heirs of the victim if the accused will only be fined
P200.00 corresponding to the cost of damage to the victim's bicycle, without awarding
his heirs civil liabilities corresponding to the fact of his death. Common sense dictates
that the civil liability arising from the death of a person cannot be pegged to the cost of
damage to a bicycle.

Moreover, to hold otherwise would lead to the possibility that offended parties
will hesitate to give their consent to a plea of guilty to a lesser offense by the accused for
fear that it would foreclose their chance to recover the appropriate civil liability.

In fine, we hold that the civil liability of the accused for the death of Mario Gevero
awarded by the trial court to his heirs is in order.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The challenged Decision of the Court of

Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 37408 is REVERSED. The Orders of the trial court dated
December 26, 1994 and January 16, 1995 in Criminal Case No. 235 (90) are
REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, Corona and Garcia, JJ., concur.

Azcuna, J., is on official leave.

(Heirs of Gevero v. Guihing Agricultural & Development Corp., G.R. No. 122619,
|||

[August 18, 2006], 530 PHIL 698-705)

 EN BANC

[G.R. Nos. 131799-801. February 23, 2004.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. FELICIANO

ULIT y TAMPOY, appellant.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J : p

Before the Court on automatic review is the Decision 1 dated December 17, 1997
of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 62, in Criminal Cases Nos. 97-385 to
97-388 finding appellant Feliciano Ulit y Tampoy guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two
counts of qualified rape. 2 In the same decision, the appellant was convicted of two
counts of acts of lasciviousness. For each count of rape, the trial court sentenced him to
suffer the supreme penalty of death, while for each count of acts of lasciviousness, the
appellant was sentenced to suffer imprisonment "from eight (8) years, eight (8) months
and one (1) day of prision mayor in its medium period, as minimum, to fifteen (15) years,
six (6) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as
maximum." The appellant was, likewise, ordered to indemnify the victim Lucelle
Serrano, the amount of P50,000 for each count of rape and P20,000 for each count of acts
of lasciviousness.

The Indictments

Upon the sworn complaint of the victim Lucelle Serrano, four Informations were
filed against her uncle, the appellant. The docket number and the accusatory portion of
each Information reads:

Criminal Case No. 97-385

That sometime in the month of November 1996, in the City of Makati,

Metro Manila, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, who is the uncle of the complainant
LUCELLE SERRANO y ULIT, hence, her relative by consanguinity within the
third civil degree, while armed with a knife, by means of force, violence and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
carnal knowledge of the complainant LUCELLE SERRANO y ULIT, an eleven
(11) year old girl, without her consent and against her will, to her damage and
prejudice.
 CONTRARY TO LAW. 3

Criminal Case No. 97-386

That sometime in the month of February 1997, in the City of Makati,

Metro Manila, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, who is the uncle of complainant LUCELLE
SERRANO y ULIT, hence her relative by consanguinity within the third civil
degree, while armed with a knife, by means of force, violence and intimidation,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge
of the complainant LUCELLE SERRANO y ULIT, an eleven (11) year old girl,
without her consent and against her will, to her damage and prejudice.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 4

Criminal Case No. 97-387

That sometime in the month of December 1996, in the City of Makati,

Metro Manila, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, with lewd design by means of force, violence
and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
commit acts of lasciviousness upon complainant LUCELLE SERRANO y
ULIT, an eleven (11) year old girl, by then and there kissing her and touching
her sexual organ, without her consent and against her will, to her damage and
prejudice.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 5

Criminal Case No. 97-388

That on or about the 2nd day of March 1997, in the City of Makati,
Metro Manila, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, with lewd design by means of force, violence
and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
commit acts of lasciviousness upon complainant LUCELLE SERRANO y
ULIT, an eleven (11) year old girl, by then and there dragging her inside a
bathroom and repeatedly kissing her on her checks [sic], without her consent
and against her will, to her damage and prejudice.
ACEIac

CONTRARY TO LAW. 6

The appellant, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty during the arraignment. Joint
trial of all the cases ensued.

In the meantime, Lucelle was undergoing psychiatric treatment at the Philippine

General Hospital. On May 5, 1997, the prosecution presented her as its first witness.
 On direct examination, Lucelle testified that she was born on February 19, 1986. 7
In November 1996, her uncle, the appellant, did something to her. When the prosecution
asked her what happened, Lucelle did not answer. When asked if she wanted to continue
with her testimony, again, she did not respond. The trial was reset to June 2 and 9, 1997.
When trial resumed on June 9, 1997, Lucelle was questioned by the prosecution on direct
examination, but still, she gave no answer. She cried profusely in open court. When asked
by the court if she wanted to proceed with the trial she remained silent. The trial was reset
anew to July 9 and 14, 1997.

In the meantime, the trial court ordered that Lucelle be subjected to physical and
psychological examinations at the National Center for Mental Health (NCMH). Dr.
Rochelflume Samson examined Lucelle and submitted her Report dated August 29, 1997
with the following remarks and recommendation:

Based on clinical history, mental status examination and psychological

evaluation, this patient is suffering from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. This
illness is characterized by intense fear and feeling of helplessness whenever she
recalls her traumatic experience of being raped. It causes her intense
psychological distress whenever asked to talk about the rape scene or incident.
Thus, she avoids recollections of the trauma.

At present, she is still manifesting symptoms described above. She

would be having difficulties testifying in court because of this. She requires
psychiatric treatment at the Out-Patient Section. 8

During the trial on July 14, 1997, Lucelle refused to take the witness stand. The
trial was reset to July 21, 1997.

During the hearing on October 20, 1997, the prosecution presented Lucelle anew
to continue with her testimony on direct examination. She declared that the appellant
raped her in November 1996 and many other times thereafter in her residence at No. 7104
San Maximo Street, Makati City. Instead of asking questions to elicit the facts and
circumstances before and during the commission of the crimes, the prosecutor asked
Lucelle to identify her signature in her sworn statement 9 and to affirm the truth of its
contents. She did so. The public prosecutor then marked the sworn statement in evidence
as Exhibit "H," and then manifested to the court that he had no more questions for the
witness on direct examination.

On clarificatory questions by the court, Lucelle testified that she was born on
February 19, 1986. The appellant mounted her, removed her pants, poked a knife at her
and threatened her. 10

On cross-examination, Lucelle testified that the appellant was her mother's older
brother. In November 1996, she was not enrolled in any school. Her father was working
at a construction firm, the appellant was employed at the Department of Environment and
Sanitation in Makati City, while her grandmother, who lived with her, worked as a maid
in Bel Air Subdivision. Her mother worked for one of her father's cousins. On re-direct
examination, the prosecution elicited from Lucelle that the appellant raped her in
November 1996 at 11:00 p.m. inside the room of her aunt Marina in her grandmother's
house at No. 7104 San Maximo Street, Olympia, Makati City, and that her aunt, Marina,
and her Ate Sharon were inside the room. When asked where her aunt and Ate Sharon
were when she was being raped in her aunt's room, Lucelle did not respond. When asked
why she did not respond to the questions propounded to her during the previous hearings
and why she had been crying in open court, Lucelle replied that she was afraid of her
uncle, the appellant.

In her sworn statement, 11 Lucelle alleged that sometime in November 1996, she
was sleeping in a room in the house. It was about 6 o'clock in the evening. She was
awakened when she felt someone kissing her on the cheek. When she opened her eyes,
she saw her uncle, the appellant, armed with a bladed weapon (balisong). He poked the
weapon on the left side of her neck. He warned her that if she told her parents, he would
kill her. He removed her panties, undressed himself and mounted her. He then inserted
his penis into her vagina. She felt pain in her private part and cried. The appellant,
thereafter, left the room. Also during the month of November 1996, the appellant
continued kissing her whenever her parents were out of the house.

In December 1996, Lucelle was in the room when the appellant entered and kissed
her and mashed her private parts. Sometime in February 1997, the appellant again abused
her (sinalbahe) while she was in the same room. It was about 11 o'clock in the evening.
He again warned her not to divulge to her parents what he did to her. At 9:00 p.m. on
March 2, 1997, Lucelle urinated in the bathroom and when she was about to go out, the
appellant entered, pushed her inside and kissed her on her cheeks several times.

Celso Serrano, Lucelle's father, testified that sometime in November 1996, at

dawn, he was in bed and noticed that the appellant was in the bedroom of his cousin-in-
law. Sometime later, he went to the bathroom. He then heard his wife ask the appellant
where he had come from and the latter replied that he just came from the roof of the
house. On another occasion, one early Sunday morning, he noticed blood stains on
Lucelle's short pants. When she declared that she had her monthly period, he gave her
P5.00 with which to buy sanitary napkins. Lucelle refused to accept the money. He
suggested that she wash herself but she just nodded her head. When he asked her why she
refused to accept the money, Lucelle replied that she was afraid to tell him because she
might be killed.

Lourdes Serrano testified that she was Lucelle's mother. Lucelle was born on
February 19, 1986. 12 She and her husband Celso Serrano and their daughter Lucelle
resided with her mother, Guadalupe Ulit, at No. 7104 San Maximo Street, Olympia,
Makati City. Her sister Marina and the appellant, her brother, also resided in the same
house. The family slept together in the evenings in the sala of the house while Marina
slept in her bedroom. At times, Marina allowed her niece Lucelle to sleep in her
bedroom. At 11:00 p.m. on February 19, 1997, Lourdes noticed that Lucelle was not at
her side. The appellant, who usually also slept in the sala, was not there either. Lourdes
went to Marina's bedroom and saw Lucelle in bed (papag), covered with a blanket.
Beside her was the appellant who was wearing a pair of short pants and undershirt. When
the appellant saw Lourdes, he slid down from the bed, went under the papag, and
furtively left the room. When Lourdes removed the blanket, she saw Lucelle lying
sideways with her knees up to her chin (nakabaluktot). Lucelle was trembling with fear.
When Lourdes asked Lucelle what happened, she did not respond. Lourdes left the room
and went back to the sala. She wanted to talk to the appellant but decided against it when
she saw him seated in the sala, playing with his balisong.

Lourdes further testified that at 9:00 p.m. on March 2, 1997, she and her husband
were having dinner when she noticed that Lucelle was nowhere to be found. She looked
for her daughter in the house, but failed to find her. She then asked her cousin Nita if she
had seen Lucelle. Nita replied in the negative. When Lourdes asked Nita if Lucelle was
inside the bathroom, Nita responded that the appellant was using it. Momentarily,
Lourdes saw the appellant emerge from the bathroom. He was in his short pants and his
shirt was on his shoulder. He was perspiring profusely. Lourdes was flabbergasted when
she saw Lucelle come out of the bathroom after the appellant. Lucelle was crying and
looked pale. When Lourdes asked Lucelle why she was crying, she told her mother that
she had just urinated. The appellant later told her sister Lourdes that he did not do
anything to Lucelle.

Believing that the appellant had been abusing their daughter, Celso and Lourdes
brought Lucelle on March 5, 1997, to Barangay Chairman Romeo Medina. On their way,
Lucelle adamantly refused to tell her parents what the appellant did to her. However,
when they reached the barangay headquarters, Lucelle told the barangay chairman that
the appellant sexually abused her. Thereafter, Lourdes filed a complaint with the
barangay chairman against the appellant for sexually molesting Lucelle.

Barangay Tanod Fernando David testified that on March 6, 1997, the barangay
chairman ordered him and Barangay Tanod Antonio Echavez to invite and bring the
appellant to the barangay hall. The barangay chairman asked the appellant if he raped
Lucelle and the latter replied that he did. A Sinumpaang Salaysay was prepared in the
Office of the Barangay Chairman in which the appellant admitted that he raped Lucelle in
February 1997, and on March 2, 1997, despite her resistance, and that he threatened to
kill her and her family if she divulged the incidents to her parents. 13 The appellant signed
his statement in the presence of the barangay chairman and the barangay tanods.
 From the barangay headquarters, the appellant was brought to the Makati City
Police Headquarters where Celso, Lourdes and Lucelle filed a complaint against him for
rape and acts of lasciviousness. SPO4 Lilia Hogar of the Women's Desk Unit took the
sworn statements of Lourdes and Lucelle. 14 She conducted a custodial investigation of
the appellant who was without counsel during which the latter admitted having raped the
victim. SPO4 Hogar also prepared a report on her investigation of the victim's complaint.
15

On July 28, 1997, Dr. Armie M. Soreta-Umil, NBI Medico-Legal Officer, testified
that on March 12, 1997, she conducted genital and vaginal examinations on Lucelle and
submitted Living Case Report No. MG-97-355 which contained the following findings:

GENERAL PHYSICAL EXAMINATION:

Height: 141 cm. Weight: 78 lbs.

Normally developed, fairly nourished, conscious, coherent, cooperative,

ambulatory subject.

Breasts, developing, conical, firm. Areolae, light-brown, 2.6 cms. in

diameter. Nipples, light-brown, protruding, 0.8 cm. in diameter.

No extra-genital physical injuries noted.

GENERAL EXAMINATION:

Pubic hair, fully grown, moderate. Labia majora, gaping. Labia minora,
coaptated. Fourchette, lax. Vestibular mucosa, pinkish. Hymen, tall, thick,
intact, distensible. Hymenal orifice, admits a tube 2.5 cms. in diameter. Vaginal
walls, lax. Rugosities, shallow.

CONCLUSIONS

1.) No evident sign of extra-genital physical injuries noted on the body

of the subject at the time of examination.

2.) Hymen, intact but distensible, and its orifice wide (2.5 cms. in
diameter) as to allow complete penetration by an average-sized adult Filipino
male organ in full erection without producing any genital injury. 16

When the prosecution offered in evidence the appellant's Sinumpaang Salaysay

before the barangay chairman 17 as part of the testimony of Barangay Tanod Fernando
David, the appellant objected to its admission on the ground that the appellant was not
assisted by counsel and that, he was forced and coerced into signing the same.
Nevertheless, the trial court admitted the statement as part of David's testimony. The
appellant's counsel, likewise, objected to the admissibility of Lucelle's sworn statement
on the ground that she was incompetent to give the same because of her mental illness.
The trial court admitted the sworn statement of Lucelle in evidence as part of her
testimony.

After the prosecution had rested its case, the trial court reset the hearing to
November 5, 1997 for the appellant to adduce his evidence. When the case was called for
trial on that date, his counsel manifested to the court that the appellant was changing his
plea in Criminal Cases Nos. 97-385 and 97-387 from "not guilty" to "guilty." He also
manifested that he would no longer adduce any evidence in his defense in Criminal Cases
Nos. 97-386 and 97-388 because the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt for the crimes charged therein. The trial court suspended the
proceedings and gave the appellant forty-five minutes to confer with him counsel. When
trial resumed, the appellant reiterated his earlier manifestation. When told by the court
that he could be sentenced to death for the rape charges, the appellant stood pat on his
decision to plead guilty in Criminal Cases Nos. 97-385 and 97-387, and to no longer
present any evidence in his defense in the other two cases. The appellant was re-arraigned
in Criminal Cases Nos. 97-385 and 97-387 with the assistance of the same counsel and
entered his plea of guilty to the charges.

On December 15, 1997, the trial court rendered judgment convicting the appellant
of all the crimes charged. The decretal portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as

follows:

1. In Criminal Case Nos. 97-385 and 97-386, for rape, the prosecution
has proven beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused, FELICIANO
ULIT Y TAMPOY, as principal in the two counts of statutory rape defined and
penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. He is
hereby declare[d] CONVICTED in each of the cases. Accordingly he is
sentenced to suffer the supreme penalty [of] DEATH in each of the two cases;
and indemnify the victim LUCELLE SERRANO, in the amount of P50,000 as
moral damages for each of the cases;

2. In Criminal Case Nos. 97-387 and 97-388, for acts of lasciviousness,
the prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused,
FELICIANO ULIT Y TAMPOY, as principal in two counts of acts of
lasciviousness defined under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code and
penalized under Section 5(b) of R.A. 7610. He is hereby declared CONVICTED
in each of the two cases; and, accordingly, he is sentenced to suffer in each of
the cases an indeterminate prison term from eight (8) years, eight (8) months
and one (1) day of prision mayor in its medium period, as minimum, to fifteen
(15) years, six (6) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal in its
 medium period, as maximum; and, indemnify the victim, LUCELLE
SERRANO, in the amount of P20,000 as moral damages for each of the cases.

SO ORDERED. 18

The trial court declared that even prescinding from the appellant's plea of guilty,
the prosecutor adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the appellant for
qualified rape in Criminal Cases Nos. 97-385 and 97-386. The trial court ruled that
although Lucelle did not testify on the contents of her sworn statement 19 the same were
admissible in evidence as part of the res gestae.

The appellant did not appeal from the decision in Criminal Cases Nos. 97-387 and
97-388. In view of the trial court's imposition of the death penalty on the appellant in
Criminal Cases Nos. 97-385 and 97-386, the said cases were brought to this Court on
automatic appeal.

The appellant assails the decision of the trial court with the lone assignment of
error, to wit:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SENTENCING THE ACCUSED

FELICIANO ULIT WITH A DEATH PENALTY DESPITE HIS ADMISSION
OF GUILT. 20

The appellant does not contest his conviction for rape in Criminal Cases Nos. 97-
385 and 97-386, and the validity of the proceedings in the said cases in the trial court. He
pleads, however, that he be spared the death penalty. He asserts that he was so remorseful
for the crimes he committed and that he pleaded guilty in Criminal Cases Nos. 97-385
and 97-387; he no longer presented any evidence in Criminal Case No. 97-388 so that the
proceedings before the court would be shortened and simplified. Nevertheless, the appeal
in a criminal case is a review de novo and the court is not limited to the assigned errors.
21 An appeal thus opens the whole case for review, and the appellate tribunal may
consider and correct errors though unassigned and even reverse the decision of the trial
court on the grounds other than those the parties raised as errors. 22

Appellant's Plea of Guilty

in Criminal Case No. 97-385
was Imprudently Made.

In Criminal Case No. 97-385, the appellant was charged with qualified rape, i.e.,
the rape of his niece, who was a minor, punishable by death under Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659. Undoubtedly, the appellant
was charged with a capital offense. When the appellant informed the trial court of his
decision to change his plea of "not guilty" to "guilty," it behooved the trial court to
conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the
consequences of his plea as mandated by Section 6, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure. In People vs. Camay, 23 this Court enumerated the following duties
of the trial court under the rule:

1. The court must conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and
full comprehension [by the accused] of the consequences of his plea;

2. The court must require the prosecution to present evidence to prove

the guilt of the accused and precise degree of his culpability; and

3. The court must require the prosecution to present evidence in his

behalf and allow him to do so if he desires. 24

The raison d'etre for the rule is that the courts must proceed with extreme care
where the imposable penalty is death, considering that the execution of such sentence is
irrevocable. Experience has shown that even innocent persons have at times pleaded
guilty. Improvident pleas of guilty to a capital offense on the part of the accused must be
averted since by admitting his guilt before the trial court, the accused would forfeit his
life and liberty without having fully understood the meaning, significance and the dire
consequences of his plea. 25

There is no hard and fast rule as to how the trial judge may conduct a searching
inquiry. It has been held, however, that the focus of the inquiry must be on the
voluntariness of the plea and the full or complete comprehension by the accused of his
plea of guilty so that it can truly be said that it is based on a free and informed judgment.
In People vs. Aranzado, 26 we formulated the following guidelines as to how the trial
court may conduct its searching inquiry:

(1) Ascertain from the accused himself (a) how he was brought into the custody
of the law; (b) whether he had the assistance of a competent counsel
during the custodial and preliminary investigations; and (c) under what
conditions he was detained and interrogated during the investigations.
These the court shall do in order to rule out the possibility that the
accused has been coerced or placed under a state of duress either by
actual threats of physical harm coming from malevolent or avenging
quarters.

(2) Ask the defense counsel a series of questions as to whether he had conferred

with, and completely explained to, the accused the meaning and
consequences of a plea of guilty.

(3) Elicit information about the personality profile of the accused, such as his
age, socio-economic status, and educational background, which may
 serve as a trustworthy index of his capacity to give a free and informed
plea of guilty.

(4) Inform the accused the exact length of imprisonment or nature of the penalty
under the law and the certainty that he will serve such sentence. Not
infrequently indeed an accused pleads guilty in the hope of a lenient
treatment or upon bad advice or because of promises of the authorities or
parties of a lighter penalty should he admit guilt or express remorse. It is
the duty of the judge to see to it that the accused does not labor under
these mistaken impressions.

(5) Require the accused to fully narrate the incident that spawned the charges
against him or make him reenact the manner in which he perpetrated the
crime, or cause him to supply missing details or significance. 27

In People vs. Ostia, 28 we held that the trial court is also required to probe
thoroughly into the reasons or motivations, as well as the facts and circumstances for a
change of plea of the accused and his comprehension of his plea; explain to him the
elements of the crime for which he is charged as well as the nature and effect of any
modifying circumstances attendant to the commission of the offense, inclusive of
mitigating and aggravating circumstances, as well as the qualifying and special qualifying
circumstances, and inform him of the imposable penalty and his civil liabilities for the
crime for which he would plead guilty to. 29

In this case, the trial court failed to make a searching inquiry into the appellant's
voluntariness and full comprehension of his plea of guilty. This is evident by the
transcript of stenographic notes taken on November 5, 1998:

ATTY. MANALO

 Your Honor, at today's reception of defense' evidence, accused informed this

representation that he will no longer present evidence and instead
willing to change his plea from not guilty to that of guilty. This
accused's representation is therefore praying that he be allowed to
change his plea from that of not guilty to guilty.

COURT

 You better confer with your client and explain to him the consequences of his
intended change of plea from not guilty to that of guilty.

ATTY. MANALO

 Yes, Your Honor.

COURT (to the accused)

 Is your counsel's manifestation true, that you would like to change your plea
from not guilty to that of guilty and that you are no longer presenting
evidence in Criminal Cases Nos. 97-386 and 97-388?

ACCUSED

 Yes, Your Honor.

COURT

(to the accused)

 You talk with your lawyer and think twice before asking the court to change
your plea of not guilty to that of guilty. The Court will call your case
again.

xxx xxx xxx

COURT

(to the accused)

 Mr. Ulit, earlier your counsel informed the court that you would like to change
your plea from not guilty to that of guilty, in Criminal Case No. 97-385,
for rape and Criminal Case No. 97-387, for Acts of Lasciviousness, do
you affirm the manifestation of your counsel?

ACCUSED

 Yes, Your Honor.

COURT

(to accused)

 Do you know that you are accused here for the crime of rape, a capital offense
which carries with it a capital punishment?

ACCUSED

 Yes, Your Honor.

COURT
(to accused)

 Despite your knowledge that you are charged with a capital offense which
carries with it a capital penalty you still insists that you are pleading
guilty?

ACCUSED

 Yes, Your Honor.

COURT (to accused)

 Was there anyone who forced you to change your plea of not guilty to that of
guilty?

ACCUSED

 None, Your Honor.

COURT

(to accused)

 Do you know that by pleading guilty you will be sentenced in accordance with
[what] the law provides?

ACCUSED

 Yes, Your Honor.

COURT

(to accused)

 Do you know that the penalty provided for by law is death penalty because the
Information states that the victim is eleven years old and your niece and
that you used a deadly weapon in the commission of the rape?

ACCUSED

 Yes, Your Honor. I am willing to plead guilty.

COURT

 Alright, arraign the accused. 30

 First. The trial court did not ask the appellant his reasons for changing his plea,
from not guilty to that of guilty, and the cogent circumstances that led him to decide to do
so.

Second. It appears in the Informations filed by the Public Prosecutor that the
appellant opted not to avail himself of his right to a regular preliminary investigation and
refused to execute a waiver under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. The records
also show that the appellant executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay while detained at the
barangay hall where he confessed to having raped the victim in February 1997 and March
2, 1997. However, the trial court did not ask the appellant whether he was assisted by
counsel when he was brought to the Office of the Public Prosecutor for inquest
investigation. Neither did the court a quo inquire about the circumstances and the
appellant's reasons for refusing to execute the said waiver.

The records show that when the prosecution offered the appellant's Sinumpaang
Salaysay in evidence to prove that he confessed to having raped the victim in February
1997 and March 2, 1997, the appellant objected thereto on the ground that he was not
assisted by counsel and that he was coerced into signing the same.

Third. The trial court also failed to ascertain from the appellant whether he was
assisted by counsel when he executed his Sinumpaang Salaysay while detained at the
barangay hall; and, if he was not so assisted by counsel, whether he had waived his right
thereto, before and when he signed his Sinumpaang Salaysay.

Fourth. The trial court failed to ask the appellant why he was pleading guilty to a
rape committed in November 1996, when in his Sinumpaang Salaysay, 31 he confessed to
having raped the victim only in February 1997 and March 2, 1997. The appellant did not
admit having raped her in November 1996 as alleged in the Information in Criminal Case
No. 97-385. The trial court did not even inquire from the appellant who prepared and
typed his Sinumpaang Salaysay and if the contents of his statement were explained to
him before he signed the same.

Fifth. The trial court did not explain the following to the appellant, in plain and
simple terms so as to be understood by him: (a) the elements of the crime of qualified
rape; (b) the circumstances of relationship and the minority of the victim; and (c) that his
plea of guilty to qualified rape would not mitigate the penalty for the crime in light of
Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code.

Sixth. It was not explained to the appellant that if convicted of qualified rape, he
would be civilly liable to the victim in the amount of P50,000 as moral damages and
P75,000 as civil indemnity ex delicto.
 Seventh. Neither did the trial court inquire from the appellant's counsel whether
the meaning and the consequences of a guilty plea were explained to the appellant in a
language or dialect known to and understood by him.

Eight. The trial court failed to delve into and ascertain from the appellant his age,
educational attainment and socio-economic status.

Ninth. The trial court failed to ask the appellant to narrate the facts and
circumstances surrounding the incident of qualified rape as charged in Criminal Case No.
97-385.

Tenth. The appellant was not asked if he desired to adduce evidence in Criminal
Case No. 97-385 in spite of his plea of guilty.

As a rule, this Court has set aside convictions based on pleas of guilty in capital
offenses because of the improvidence thereof, and when such plea is the sole basis of the
condemnatory judgment. 32 However, where the trial court receives, independently of his
plea of guilty, evidence to determine whether the accused committed the crimes charged
and the precise degree of his criminal culpability therefor, he may still be convicted if
there is ample proof on record, not contingent on the plea of guilty, on which to predicate
conviction. 33

In this case, the prosecution had already rested its case when the appellant decided
to change his plea. In fact, the trial court granted the prosecution's motion that the
evidence it had presented be considered proof of the degree of culpability of the
appellant. It is, thus, incumbent upon this Court to determine whether the evidence
adduced by the prosecution in Criminal Case No. 97-385 is sufficient to establish beyond
reasonable doubt the appellant's guilt for qualified rape.

In determining the guilt of the accused in rape cases, the Court is guided by the
following considerations: (a) that an accusation of rape can be made with facility; it is
difficult to prove, but more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove;
(b) that in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime which usually involves two persons,
the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (c) that
the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be
allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence of the defense. 34 It,
likewise, bears stressing that in all criminal prosecutions, without regard to the nature of
the defense which the accused may raise, the burden of proof remains at all times upon
the prosecution to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 35
 The Prosecution Adduced Proof
of the Appellant's Guilt Beyond
Reasonable Doubt of the Crime
of Rape in Criminal Case No. 97-385

We have reviewed the evidence on record and we are convinced that the
prosecution adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant raped the victim in
November 1996. The victim declared in her sworn statement, on direct examination and
her testimony on clarificatory questions made by the trial court, that indeed, the appellant
raped her in November 1996. Quoted hereunder is the testimony of Lucelle on direct and
on re-direct examination:

Fiscal

Q So, matapos mong ituro ang tiyuhin mo, ano ang ginawa niya sa iyo?

A Ginahasa niya ako.

Q Ilang ulit kang ginahasa?

A Marami po.

Q Kailan ka ginahasa ng tiyuhin mo?

A November po.

Q 19?

A 1996, po.

Q Saan ka ginahasa?

A 7104 San Maximo St., Makati City, po. 36

xxx xxx xxx

Fiscal

Q Humigit-kumulang, anong oras ng gabi nang gahasain ka ng Tito Ely mo

noong Nobyembre 1996?

A Alas onse po ng gabi.

Q Samakatuwid, hindi na siya nagtratrabaho, wala na siya sa trabaho?

 A Wala na po.

Q Saang lugar ka ginahasa?

A Sa 7104 San Maximo St.

Q Sa loob ba ng bahay?

A Opo.

Q Saang parte ng bahay ka ginahasa ng Tito mo?

A Sa kuwarto po. 37

xxx xxx xxx

COURT

Q Noong Nobyembre 1996, ayon sa iyo ay ginahasa ka ng iyong Tito. Saan ka

ginahasa ng Tito mo?

A Sa 7104 San Maximo St., po.

Q Doon din sa bahay na iyong tinitirhan?

A Opo. 38

In her Sworn Statement, 39 Lucelle narrated in detail how the appellant ravished
her:

06. T: Kailan ka unang senalbahe ng iyong TITO ELY?

S. Noon pong Nobyembre 1996 hindi ko na po matandaan ang petsa, mga

bandang 6:00 ng gabi po nang ako ay natutulog sa loob po ng kuwarto
ay nagising na lang po ako nang maramdaman ko na may humahalik sa
aking pisngi, at nang ako po ay magising ay nakita ko po si TITO ELY
na may hawak na balisong na humigit kumulang po sa 10 pulgada ang
haba na nakatutok sa aking kaliwang leeg habang humahalik po sa
aking pisngi at ang sabi ay kung ako daw po ay magsusumbong sa aking
magulang ay papatayin po niya (TITO ELY) ako. Pagkatapos po ay
hinubaran po ako ng panty at naghubad na rin po si TITO ELY ng
kanyang short pants at pumatong na po sa akin. Ipinasok po ni TITO
ELY and kanyang (TITO ELY) ari sa aking "PEPE" at ako po ay
nasaktan at umiyak na lang po ako at nang makaraos po si TITO ELY
ay umalis na lang. . . . 40
 We do not agree with the ruling of the trial court that the contents of the sworn
statement of Lucelle are hearsay, simply because she did not testify thereon and merely
identified her signatures therein. By hearsay evidence is meant that kind of evidence
which does not derive its value solely from the credence to be attributed to the witness
herself but rests solely in part on the veracity and competence of some persons from
whom the witness has received the information. 41 It signifies all evidence which is not
founded upon the personal knowledge of the witness from whom it is elicited, and which,
consequently, is not subject to cross-examination. 42 The basis for the exclusion appears
to lie in the fact that such testimony is not subject to the test which can ordinarily be
applied for the ascertainment of truth of testimony, since the declarant is not present and
available for cross-examination. In criminal cases, the admission of hearsay evidence
would be a violation of the constitutional provision while the accused shall enjoy the
right to confront and cross-examine the witness testifying against him. 43 Generally, the
affidavits of persons who are not presented to testify on the truth of the contents thereof
are hearsay evidence. 44 Such affidavit must be formally offered in evidence and
accepted by the court; otherwise, it shall not be considered by the court for the simple
reason that the court shall consider such evidence formally offered and accepted. 45

In this case, Lucelle testified on and affirmed the truth of the contents of her sworn
statement which she herself had given. As gleaned from the said statement, she narrated
how and when the appellant raped and subjected her to lascivious acts. She was cross-
examined by the appellant's counsel and answered the trial court's clarificatory questions.
The prosecution offered her sworn statement as part of her testimony and the court
admitted the same for the said purpose without objection on the part of the appellant. aIcDCT

The Prosecution Proved Beyond

Reasonable Doubt that the
Appellant Raped the Victim
in February 1997

The trial court convicted the appellant of rape in Criminal Case No. 97-386 on the
basis of Lucelle's sworn statement, 46 the testimony of her mother, Lourdes Serrano, the
appellant's statement 47 executed in the Barangay Chairman's Office, and the testimony of
Dr. Armie Soreta-Umil. We agree with the trial court's findings and conclusion.

First. In Lucelle's sworn statement, 48 she declared that the appellant subjected her
to sexual abuse.

Second. Lourdes saw Lucelle in bed (papag) in Marina's room, covered with a
blanket beside the appellant who was wearing a pair of short pants and undershirt. He slid
down from the papag, went under the bed and slipped outside. When Lourdes removed
the blanket, she saw Lucelle trembling with fear, lying sidewise, her knees near her chin
(nakabaluktot).
 Third. The appellant admitted to the barangay chairman on March 5, 1997, that he
raped Lucelle in February 1997:

Na, noong isang araw ng PEBRERO 1997, sa loob ng kuwarto ng aking

kapatid na babae, pumasok, ako na nadatnang nakahiga si LUCILLE ULIT sa
isang papag na anyong natutulog. Lumapit ako sa kanya at pinaghihipuan sa
maseselang parte ng kanyang katawan at nang siya'y magising tinakot ko
siyang huwag sisigaw, habang siya ay aking hinuhubaran ng "Short" na
kasama pati ang kanyang "panty." Nagpupumiglas siya habang ako ay
nakadagan sa kanya na noon din ay hinuhubad ko ang aking "brief."
Pinaghahalikan ko po siya habang siya ay nagpupumiglas at umiiyak at noon
din ay aking pinasok ang aking ari sa kanyang ari. Umiiyak siya habang ang
aking ari ay labas masok sa kanyang ari. Nang ako ay makaraos ay tinakot ko
siyang huwag magsusumbong sa kanyang mga magulang. 49

Although the appellant was not assisted by counsel at the time he gave his
statement to the barangay chairman and when he signed the same, it is still admissible in
evidence against him because he was not under arrest nor under custodial investigation
when he gave his statement. 50

The exclusionary rule is premised on the presumption that the defendant is thrust
into an unfamiliar atmosphere and runs through menacing police interrogation procedures
where the potentiality for compulsion, physical and psychological, is forcefully apparent.
As intended by the 1971 Constitutional Convention, this covers "investigation conducted
by police authorities which will include investigations conducted by the municipal police,
the PC and the NBI and such other police agencies in our government." 51 The barangay
chairman 52 is not deemed a law enforcement officer for purposes of applying Section
12(1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. Under these circumstances, it cannot be
successfully claimed that the appellant's statement before the barangay chairman is
inadmissible.

The Sufficiency of Evidence on Lucelle's

Relationship with the Appellant, her
Minority, and the Propriety of the
Imposition of the Death Penalty

The appellant's conviction for two counts of rape having been duly established by
the prosecution, we now come to the question of the penalty to be meted upon him.

Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of Republic Act
No. 7659, which was the law in effect at the time of the commission of the subject rapes,
provides in part:
 ART. 335. When and how rape is committed. — Rape is committed by
having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances.

1. By using force or intimidation;

2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and

3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.

The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.

Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly

weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to
death.

xxx xxx xxx

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is

committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:

1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender
is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the
common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.

xxx xxx xxx

The qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship must concur. More

importantly, they must be both alleged and proved, in order to qualify the crime of rape
and warrant the imposition of the death penalty. 53 In addition to the requirement that the
qualifying and aggravating circumstance must be specifically alleged in the information,
it must be established with certainty that the victim was below eighteen (18) years of age
or that she was a minor at the time of the commission of the crime. It must be stressed
that the severity of the death penalty, especially its irreversible and final nature once
carried out, makes the decision-making process in capital offenses aptly subject to the
most exacting rules of procedure and evidence. 54

The relationship between the appellant and the victim has been adequately
established. The allegations in both Informations that the appellant is the victim's "uncle,"
"a relative by consanguinity within the third civil degree" is specific enough to satisfy the
special qualifying circumstance of relationship.

In People v. Ferolino, 55 we said —

 In this case the allegation that FERLYN is ANTONIO's niece is not
specific enough to satisfy the special qualifying circumstances of relationship. If
the offender is merely a relation — not a parent, ascendant, step-parent, or
guardian or common law spouse of the mother of the victim — it must be
alleged in the information that he is "a relative by consanguinity or affinity [as
the case may be] within the third civil degree." That relationship by
consanguinity or affinity was not alleged in the informations in these cases.
Even if it was, it was still necessary to further allege that such relationship was
within the third civil degree. 56

The prosecution's evidence has also shown that the appellant is the victim's uncle,
being the older brother of the victim's mother, a fact that the appellant himself admitted.

The same cannot, however, be said with respect to the age of the victim. In People
v. Pruna, 57 the Court, after noting the divergent rulings on proof of age of the victim in
rape cases, set out certain guidelines in appreciating age, either as an element of the crime
or as qualifying circumstance:

1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or
certified true copy of the certificate of live birth of such party.

2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such
as baptismal certificate and school records which show the date of birth
of the victim would suffice to prove age.

3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been
lost or destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and
credible, of the victim's mother or a member of the family either by
affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters respecting
pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the offended party
pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be
sufficient under the following circumstances:

a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought
to be proved is that she is less than 7 years old;

b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought
to be proved is that she is less than 12 years old;

c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought
to be proved is that she is less than 18 years old.

4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the

testimony of the victim's mother or relatives concerning the victim's age,
the complainant's testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and
clearly admitted by the accused.
 5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended
party. The failure of the accused to object to the testimonial evidence
regarding age shall not be taken against him.

6. The trial court should always make a categorical finding as to the age of the
victim. 58

In the present case, no birth certificate or any similar authentic document was
presented and offered in evidence to prove Lucelle's age. While the victim testified that
she was born on February 19, 1986, therefore 11 years old when the appellant twice
raped her, the same will not suffice as the appellant did not expressly and clearly admit
the same as required by Pruna. The corroboration of Lucelle's mother as to her age is not
sufficient either, as there is no evidence that the said certificate of birth was lost or
destroyed or was unavailable without the fault of the prosecution. The fact that there was
no objection from the defense regarding the victim's age cannot be taken against the
appellant since it is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the same. Moreover,
the trial court did not make a categorical finding of the victim's minority, another
requirement mandated by Pruna.

Another issue that needs to be settled is the third paragraph of Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, which provides that, "[w]henever rape is committed
with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the imposable penalty shall
be reclusion perpetua to death.

The evidence on record shows that the appellant raped Lucelle with the use of a
deadly weapon in both rape incidents as alleged in both informations, and under Article
335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, by Republic Act No. 7659, the imposable
penalty for the crime is reclusion perpetua to death.

In the determination of whether the death penalty should be imposed on the

appellant, the presence of an aggravating circumstance in the commission of the crime is
crucial. In the cases at bar, although the relationship of uncle and niece between the
appellant and the victim has been duly proven, the alternative circumstance of
relationship under Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code cannot be appreciated as an
aggravating circumstance against the appellant. While it is true that the alternative
circumstance of relationship is always aggravating in crimes against chastity, regardless
of whether the offender is a relative of a higher or lower degree of the offended party, it is
only taken into consideration under Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code "when the
offended party is the spouse, ascendant, descendant, legitimate, natural or adopted
brother or sister, or relative by affinity in the same degree of the offender." The
relationship of uncle and niece is not covered by any of the relationships mentioned. 59

Hence, for the prosecution's failure to prove the age of the victim by any means set
forth in Pruna, and considering that the relationship of uncle and niece is not covered by
any of the relationships mentioned in Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
the appellant can only be convicted of rape in its aggravated form, the imposable penalty
for which is reclusion perpetua to death.

There being no modifying circumstances attendant to the commission of the

crimes, the appellant should be sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua for each count of
rape, conformably to Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code.

The victim is entitled to moral damages without need of proof other than the fact
of the rape itself because it is assumed that the victim has suffered moral injuries entitling
her to such an award. 60 We find the trial court's award of P50,000 as moral damages to
the victim in each rape to be in order.

However, the trial court erred in not awarding civil indemnity to the victim in each
case, the same being mandatory upon the finding of the fact of rape. 61 Thus, this Court
awards the victim the sum of P50,000 as civil indemnity for each count of rape.

In addition to this, appellant is ordered to pay the victim P25,000 as exemplary

damages, the qualifying aggravating circumstance of use of a deadly weapon having
attended the commission of the crime. 62

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court; of Makati City, Branch
62, in Criminal Cases Nos. 97-385 to 97-388 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The
appellant Feliciano Ulit y Tampoy is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of two
counts of rape in Criminal Cases Nos. 97-385 and 97-386, and in each case, is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay the victim,
Lucelle Serrano, P50,000 as moral damages; P50,000 as civil indemnity; and P25,000 as
exemplary damages. Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago,

Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Azcuna and
Tinga, JJ., concur.

(People v. Ulit y Tampoy, G.R. Nos. 131799-801, [February 23, 2004], 467 PHIL 852-
|||

888)

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 130026. May 31, 2000.]

 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ANTONIO
MAGAT y LONDONIO, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.

SYNOPSIS

Accused-appellant was charged with two (2) counts of rape committed against his
own daughter. Upon arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded guilty but bargained for a
lesser penalty for each case. Accordingly, he was sentenced to suffer a jail term of ten
(10) years imprisonment for each case. After three months, the cases were revived at the
instance of the complainant on the ground that the penalty imposed was "too light." As a
consequence, accused-appellant was re-arraigned on both Informations where he entered
a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. After trial, accused-appellant
was found guilty by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City of raping his daughter on
two occasions and was sentenced to suffer the extreme penalty of death for each case.
Hence, the present automatic review.

Accused-appellant contended that the trial court erred in re-arraigning him and
proceeding into trial despite the fact that he was already convicted per Order of the trial
court dated January 10, 1997 based on his plea of guilt. He also argued that when the
court rendered judgment convicting him, the prosecution did not appeal nor move for
reconsideration or took steps to set aside the order. Consequently, the conviction having
attained finality can no longer be set aside or modified even if the prosecution later
realized that the penalty imposed was too light. Accused-appellant likewise posited that
the re-arraignment and trial on the same information violated his right against double
jeopardy.

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial court in Criminal Case No.
Q-96-68-119 convicting appellant of rape and sentencing him to the supreme penalty of
death. The Court, however, in Criminal Case No. Q-96-68120 reduced the penalty of
death to reclusion perpetua because at the time the alleged rape was committed, the
complainant was already nineteen (19) years of age and therefore did not fall under the
last paragraph of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA No. 7659,
authorizing the imposition of the death penalty. The Court found appellant's contention
untenable. Appellant did not plead to a lesser offense, but pleaded guilty to the rape
charges and only bargained for a lesser penalty. He did not plea bargain, but made
conditions on the penalty to be imposed, and by pleading guilty to the offense charged,
appellant should be sentenced to the penalty to which he pleaded. Accordingly, the
judgment rendered by the trial court which was based on a void plea bargaining was also
void ab initio and can not be considered to have attained finality, for the simple reason
that a void judgment has no legality from its inception. Thus, since the judgment of
conviction rendered against accused-appellant was void, double jeopardy will not lie. HIaAED

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; PLEA OF GUILTY; PLEA

OF GUILTY TO THE CRIME CHARGED JUSTIFIES IMPOSITION OF PENALTY
TO WHICH ACCUSED PLEADED AND NOT TO LESSER PENALTY. — It must be
emphasized that accused-appellant did not plead to a lesser offense but pleaded guilty to
the rape charges and only bargained for a lesser penalty. In short, as aptly observed by the
Solicitor General, he did not plea bargain but made conditions on the penalty to be
imposed. This is erroneous because by pleading guilty to the offense charged, accused-
appellant should be sentenced to the penalty to which he pleaded. It is the essence of a
plea of guilty that the accused admits absolutely and unconditionally his guilt and
responsibility for the offense imputed to him. Hence, an accused may not foist a
conditional plea of guilty on the court by admitting his guilt provided that a certain
penalty will be meted unto him.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; CONDITIONAL PLEA EQUIVALENT TO PLEA OF NOT

GUILTY: NO DOUBLE JEOPARDY; SINCE CONVICTION WAS BASED ON A
VOID PLEA BARGAINING. — Accused-appellant's plea of guilty is undoubtedly a
conditional plea. Hence, the trial court should have vacated such a plea and entered a plea
of not guilty for a conditional plea of guilty, or one subject to the proviso that a certain
penalty be imposed upon him, is equivalent to a plea of not guilty and would, therefore,
require a full-blown trial before judgment may be rendered. In effect, the judgment
rendered by the trial court which was based on a void plea bargaining is also void ab
initio and can not be considered to have attained finality for the simple reason that a void
judgment has no legality from its inception. Thus, since the judgment of conviction
rendered against accused-appellant is void, double jeopardy will not lie.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; APPELLANT'S FAILURE TO QUESTION THE

PROCEDURAL ERRORS IN THE FIRST ARRAIGNMENT IS DEEMED A WAIVER
OF HIS RIGHT TO QUESTION THE SAME. — Nonetheless, whatever procedural
infirmity in the arraignment of the accused-appellant was rectified when he was re-
arraigned and entered a new plea. Accused-appellant did not question the procedural
errors in the first arraignment and having failed to do so, he is deemed to have abandoned
his right to question the same and waived the errors in procedure.

4. ID.; ID.; PLEA OF GUILTY TO CAPITAL OFFENSE; LEGAL

REQUIREMENTS OF SUCH PLEA. — Under the present rule, if the accused pleads
guilty to capital offense, trial courts are now enjoined: (a) to conduct searching inquiry
into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea; (b) to
require the prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and the
precise degree of his culpability; and (c) to ask the accused if he so desires to present
evidence in his behalf and allow him to do so if he desires. This Court, in a long line of
decisions imposed upon trial judges to comply with the procedure laid down in the rules
of arraignment, particularly the rules governing a plea of guilty to a capital offense in
order to preclude any room for reasonable doubt in the mind of either the trial court or of
this Court, on review, as to the possibility that there might have been some
misunderstanding on the part of the accused as to the nature of the charges to which he
pleaded guilty and to ascertain the circumstances attendant to the commission of the
crime which justify or require the exercise of a greater or lesser degree of severity in the
imposition of the prescribed penalties. Apart from the circumstances that such procedure
may remove any doubt that the accused fully understood the consequences of his plea is
the fact that the evidence taken thereon is essential to the fulfillment by this Court of its
duty of review of automatic appeals from death sentences.

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — We have carefully reviewed the record of this
case and are convinced that the trial judge has faithfully discharged his bounden duty as
minister of the law to determine the voluntariness and full understanding of accused-
appellants' plea of guilty. The absence of the transcript of stenographic notes of the
proceedings during the arraignment do not make the procedure flawed. The minutes of
the proceedings indubitably show that the judge read the Informations to the accused-
appellant both in English and Tagalog, asked him questions as to his understanding of the
consequences of his plea, his educational attainment and occupation. Accused-appellant
could have known of the consequence of his plea having pleaded twice to the charges
against him. In fact, in the two (2) letters sent to the trial court judge, accused-appellant
not only admitted his "sins" but also asked for forgiveness and prayed for a chance to
reform.

6. ID.; ID.; IMPROVIDENT PLEA OF GUILTY; IMPROVIDENT PLEA OF

GUILTY LOSES SIGNIFICANCE WHEN THE CONVICTION IS PREDICATED ON
EVIDENCE PROVING THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME. — While we have in a
catena of cases set aside convictions based on pleas of guilty in capital offenses because
of the improvidence of the plea, we did so only when such plea is the sole basis of the
judgment of the condemnatory judgment. Thus, when the trial court in obedience to this
Court's injunction, receives evidence to determine precisely whether or not the accused
has erred in admitting guilt, the manner in which the plea of guilty is made loses legal
significance, for the simple reason that the conviction is predicated not on the plea but on
the evidence proving the commission by the accused of the offense charged. In such case,
it cannot be claimed that defendant was sentenced to death without having been
previously informed of the nature of the charges against him and of the qualifying and
aggravating circumstances recited in the information, as he is fully apprised not only of
the allegations in the information but of the entire evidence of the prosecution.
 7. CRIMINAL LAW; RAPE; PENALTY. — Complainant was born on August
14, 1977. On September 1, 1996, when the rape was committed (Criminal Case No. Q-
96-68120), complainant was already nineteen (19) years of age. Therefore, the same does
not fall under the last paragraph of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
RA No. 7659. The proper penalty should be reclusion perpetua pursuant to Article 335 of
Revised Penal Code.

8. ID.; ID.; SPECIAL QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES; MINORITY AND

RELATIONSHIP; PENALTY. — However, the extreme penalty of death should be
imposed in Criminal Case No. Q-96-68119, complainant being only 17 years of age when
accused-appellant, her father, raped her.

9. ID.; ID.; CIVIL INDEMNITY. — With regard to the award of compensatory

damages, we have ruled in People vs. Victor, which was later reaffirmed in People vs.
Prades, that "if the crime of rape is committed or effectively qualified by any of the
circumstances under which the death penalty is authorized by the present amended law,
the indemnity of the victim shall be in the increased amount of not less than P75,000.00."
Accordingly, in Criminal Case No. Q-96-68119, the award of compensatory damages
should be increased from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00. In Criminal Case No. Q-96-68120
however, while appellant was sentenced to reclusion perpetua, the compensatory damage
should be the same (P75,000.00). As rightly argued by the Solicitor General, the trauma,
ignominy, pain and shame suffered by the complainant can not be treated or regarded any
lesser. The award of civil indemnity "is not only a reaction to the apathetic societal
perception of the penal law and the financial fluctuations over time, but also an
expression of the displeasure of the Court over the incidence of heinous crimes against
chastity." More so, if the crime is committed by the father against his own flesh and
blood.

10. ID.; ID.; MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES. — With respect to the

award of moral damages, we have in People vs. Prades, held: ". . . The Court has also
resolved that in crimes of rape, such as that under consideration, moral damages may
additionally be awarded to the victim in the criminal proceeding, in such amount as the
Court deems just, without the need for pleading or proof of the basis thereof as has
heretofore been the practice. Indeed, the conventional requirement of allegata et probata
in civil procedure and for essentially civil cases should be dispensed with in criminal
prosecution for rape with the civil aspect included therein, since no appropriate pleadings
are filed wherein such allegations can be made. Corollarily, the fact that complainant has
suffered the trauma of mental, physical and psychological sufferings which constitute the
bases for moral damages are too obvious to still require the recital thereof at the trial by
the victim, since the Court itself even assumes and acknowledges such agony on her part
as a gauge of her credibility. What exists by necessary implication as being ineludibly
present in the case need not go through the superfluity of still being proved through a
testimonial charade." Nevertheless, we find the award of P200,000.00 moral damages
excessive. An award of P50,000.00 for each count of rape is to our mind more
reasonable. However, we are deleting the award of exemplary or corrective damages, in
the absence of any legal basis therefor.

DECISION

PER CURIAM : p

Before this court for automatic review is the joint decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 103, in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-96-68119 and Q-96-68120,
finding accused-appellant Antonio Magat y Londonio guilty of raping his daughter, Ann
Fideli L. Magat, on two occasions and sentencing him to suffer the extreme penalty of
death for each case, and to pay the sum of P750,000.00 as compensatory, moral and
exemplary damages.

The two (2) Informations, charging accused-appellant with rape reads:

CRIMINAL CASE NO. Q-96-68119

The undersigned, upon sworn complaint of the offended party, nineteen

year old (19) ANN FIDELI LIMPOCO MAGAT, accuses ANTONIO MAGAT
y LONDONIO, her father, of the crime of rape defined and penalized under
Article 335, Revised Penal code, as amended by RA 7659, committed as
follows:dctai

"That on or about the 14th day of August 1994, during the 17th birthday
of Ann Fideli L Magat in Kasunduan, Quezon City and within the jurisdiction
of the Honorable Court, accused ANTONIO MAGAT Y LONDONIO, with
lewd designs, and by means of threat and violence, did then and there,
unlawfully and feloniously, lie and succeeded in having sexual intercourse with
Ann Fideli Limpoco Magat." 1

CRIMINAL CASE NO. 96-68120

"The undersigned, upon sworn complaint of the offended party, nineteen

year old (19) ANN FIDELI LIMPOCO MAGAT, accuses ANTONIO MAGAT
y LONDONIO, her father, of the crime of rape defined and penalized under
Article 335, Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659, committed as
follows:

That on or about the 1st day of September 1996, in Barangay Holy

Spirit, Quezon City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
accused ANTONIO MAGAT Y LONDONIO, with lewd designs and by means
 of threat and violence, did then and there, unlawfully and feloniously, lie and
succeeded in having sexual intercourse with Ann Fideli Limpoco Magat." 2

Upon arraignment on January 10, 1997, accused-appellant pleaded guilty but

bargained for a lesser penalty for each case. Complainant's mother, Ofelia Limpoco
Magat, and the public prosecutor, Rio Espiritu agreed with the plea bargain.
Consequently, the trial court issued, on that same day, an Order, the fallo of which reads:

"On arraignment, accused with the assistance of his counsel Atty.

Diosdado Savellano and upon the request of the accused, the information was
read and explained to him in tagalog, a dialect known to him and after which
accused entered a plea of "GUILTY" to the crime charged against him, and
further pleads for a lower penalty to which the Hon. Public Prosecutor interpose
no objection.

ACCORDINGLY, the court hereby finds the accused ANTONIO

LONDONIO MAGAT, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Violation of Article 335, RPC in relation to RA 7659 and he is hereby sentenced
to suffer a jail term of ten (10) years imprisonment for each case." 3

After three months, the cases were revived at the instance of the complainant on
the ground that the penalty imposed was "too light." 4 As a consequence, accused-
appellant was re-arraigned on both Informations on April 15, 1997 where he entered a
plea of not guilty. 5

Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued with the prosecution presenting Dr. Ida
Daniel, medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation and complainant's
mother.

On July 3, 1997 accused-appellant entered anew a plea of guilty. 6 The court read
to him the Informations in English and Tagalog and repeatedly asked whether he
understood his change of plea and propounded questions as to his understanding of the
consequences of his plea. 7

Convinced of accused-appellant's voluntariness of his plea of guilty, the court

required the taking of complainant's testimony. The accused-appellant did not present any
evidence.

On July 15, 1997, the trial court rendered judgment, the decretal portion of which
reads:

"CONSEQUENTLY, the court renders judgment finding the accused

ANTONIO MAGAT y LONDONIO, GUILTY of the crime of Rape in
violation of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, beyond
reasonable doubt and accordingly, sentences him as follows:
 1. In Crim. Case No. Q-96-68119, the accused Antonio Magat y
Londonio is sentenced to DEATH by lethal injection; and

2. In Crim. Case No. Q-96-68120, the accused Antonio Magat y

Londonio is sentenced to DEATH by lethal injection.

On the civil aspect, the accused Antonio Magat y Londonio is hereby

ordered to pay Ann Fideli Limpoco Magat the sum of P50,000.00 as
compensatory damages; further sum of P200,000.00 as moral damages and
another sum of P500,000 00 as exemplary and corrective damages.

SO ORDERED." 8

Hence, this automatic review.

Accused-appellant contends that the trial court erred in re-arraigning and

proceeding into trial despite the fact that he was already convicted per Order of the trial
court dated January 10, 1997 based on his plea of guilt. He also argues that when the
court rendered judgment convicting him, the prosecution did not appeal nor move for
reconsideration or took steps to set aside the order. Consequently, the conviction having
attained finality can no longer be set aside or modified even if the prosecution later
realizes that the penalty imposed was too light. Accused-appellant likewise posit that the
re-arraignment and trial on the same information violated his right against double
jeopardy.

The January 10, 1997 order of the trial court convicting the accused-appellant on
his own plea of quilt is void ab initio on the ground that accused-appellant's plea is not
the plea bargaining contemplated and allowed by law and the rules of procedure. The
only instance where a plea bargaining is allowed under the Rules is when an accused
pleads guilty to a lesser offense. Thus, Section 2, Rule 116 of Revised Rules of Court
provides:

"SECTION 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. — The accused, with the

consent of the offended party and the fiscal, may be allowed by the trial court to
plead guilty to a lesser offense, regardless of whether or not it is necessarily
included in the crime charged, or is cognizable by a court of lesser jurisdiction
than the trial court. No amendment of the complaint or information is necessary.

"A conviction under this plea shall be equivalent to a conviction of the

offense charged for purposes of double jeopardy."

Here, the reduction of the penalty is only a consequence of the plea of guilt to a
lesser penalty.
 It must be emphasized that accused-appellant did not plead to a lesser offense but
pleaded guilty to the rape charges and only bargained for a lesser penalty. In short, as
aptly observed by the Solicitor General, he did not plea bargain but made conditions on
the penalty to be imposed. This is erroneous because by pleading guilty to the offense
charged, accused-appellant should be sentenced to the penalty to which he pleaded.

It is the essence of a plea of guilty that the accused admits absolutely and
unconditionally his guilt and responsibility for the offense imputed to him. 9 Hence, an
accused may not foist a conditional plea of guilty on the court by admitting his guilt
provided that a certain penalty will be meted unto him. 10

Accused-appellant's plea of guilty is undoubtedly a conditional plea. Hence, the

trial court should have vacated such a plea and entered a plea of not guilty for a
conditional plea of guilty, or one subject to the proviso that a certain penalty be imposed
upon him, is equivalent to a plea of not guilty and would, therefore, require a full-blown
trial before judgment may be rendered. 11

In effect, the judgment rendered by the trial court which was based on a void plea
bargaining is also void ab initio and can not be considered to have attained finality for the
simple reason that a void judgment has no legality from its inception. 12 Thus, since the
judgment of conviction rendered against accused-appellant is void, double jeopardy will
not lie.
prcd

Nonetheless, whatever procedural infirmity in the arraignment of the accused-

appellant was rectified when he was re-arraigned and entered a new plea. Accused-
appellant did not question the procedural errors in the first arraignment and having failed
to do so, he is deemed to have abandoned his right to question the same 13 and waived
the errors in procedure. 14

Accused-appellant also maintains that assuming that there was proper basis for
setting aside the Order of January 10, 1997, the trial court erred in not finding that he
made an improvident plea of guilty. He faults the trial court in not complying with the
procedure laid down in the Section 3, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Court. 15 He
claims that the record of the case fails to support the trial court's assertion that it
conducted a searching inquiry to determine that the accused-appellant voluntarily entered
his plea of guilty with full understanding of the consequences of his plea. He claims that
there is no evidence that the trial court conducted searching inquiry in accordance with
the rules.

Under the present rule, if the accused pleads guilty to capital offense, trial courts
are now enjoined: (a) to conduct searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full
comprehension of the consequences of his plea; (b) to require the prosecution to present
evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his culpability; and
(c) to ask the accused if he so desires to present evidence in his behalf and allow him to
do so if he desires. 16

This Court, in a long line of decisions imposed upon trial judges to comply with
the procedure laid down in the rules of arraignment, particularly the rules governing a
plea of guilty to a capital offense in order to preclude any room for reasonable doubt in
the mind of either the trial court or of this Court, on review, as to the possibility that there
might have been some misunderstanding on the part of the accused as to the nature of the
charges to which he pleaded guilty and to ascertain the circumstances attendant to the
commission of the crime which justify or require the exercise of a greater or lesser degree
of severity in the imposition of the prescribed penalties. 17 Apart from the circumstances
that such procedure may remove any doubt that the accused fully understood the
consequences of his plea is the fact that the evidence taken thereon is essential to the
fulfillment by this Court of its duty of review of automatic appeals from death sentences.
18

We have carefully reviewed the record of this case and are convinced that the trial
judge has faithfully discharged his bounden duty as minister of the law to determine the
voluntariness and full understanding of accused-appellants' plea of guilty. The absence of
the transcript of stenographic notes of the proceedings during the arraignment do not
make the procedure flawed. The minutes of the proceedings 19 indubitably show that the
judge read the Informations to the accused-appellant both in English and Tagalog, asked
him questions as to his understanding of the consequences of his plea, his educational
attainment and occupation. Accused-appellant could have known of the consequence of
his plea having pleaded twice to the charges against him. In fact, in the two (2) letters
sent to the trial court judge, accused-appellant not only admitted his "sins" but also asked
for forgiveness and prayed for a chance to reform. 20

Moreover, the prosecution has already presented its evidence. Thus, even
assuming that there was an improvident plea of guilt, the evidence on record can sustain
the conviction of the accused appellant.

The testimony of the complainant, as summarized by the Solicitor General, reveal:

"Complainant's . . . parents separated when she was only seven (7) years
old and she and her younger brother David were left with her father, accused-
appellant, while another brother, Jonathan, and sister, Abigail, stayed with their
mother (TSN, July 15, 1997, p. 46; May 22, 1997, pp. 38-41; 49-51).

"On her 9th birthday, her father first raped her and she was beaten when
she resisted, thus, she found it futile to resist every time her father touched her
after that (TSN, supra, pp. 24-25).
 "August 14, 1994, was complainant's 17th birthday. That evening, while
sleeping together with accused-appellant and her brother in their rented house at
Kasunduan, Quezon City, she was awakened by the kisses of her father. He then
removed her clothes and, after removing his own clothes, went on top of her and
inserted his penis inside her vagina as he had done to her many times before this
incident. After he had finished, he told her to wash her vagina which she did
(TSN, supra, pp. 12-17).

"On September 1, 1996, complainant who was already 19 years old, was
at home with accused-appellant and her brother after 'selling' when her father
ordered her and her brother to go to sleep. Her brother fell asleep but
complainant could not sleep and was restless that night. Again, accused-
appellant raped her on the same bed where her brother was also sleeping. She
did not resist him anymore because nothing would happen anyway and he
would just beat her if she did (TSN, supra, 21-25).

". . . complainant further revealed that she was not only sexually abused
but also physically abused by accused-appellant who even beat her with a whip
while being tied and struck her with a bag containing tin cans causing head
injuries necessitating her hospitalization. She also confirmed that her father
started raping her on her 9th birthday which was repeated several times after
that. She likewise revealed that she felt some fluid ('katas') coming out of her
father's penis every time he raped her but she did not become pregnant because
her father made her drink the water from boiled guava leaves and a medicine
she identified as 'Gextex' (should be Gestex) if her menstruation was delayed. In
fact, when her menstrual period was delayed for three (3) months, her father
even boxed her stomach after making her drink the water boiled from guava
leaves and Gextex thereby causing her to bleed profusely. She was not able to
report or reveal what her father did to her because she was warned by him that
he would kill her, her brother, her mother and her relatives if ever she would
escape and reveal the rape. Besides, she had nowhere else to go and was further
made to believe by her father that there was nothing wrong with what he was
doing to her because it was not forbidden by the Bible."

The medical examination confirmed complainant's testimony. Dr. Ida P. Daniel of

the NBI testified that complainant had "lax fourchette" and "distensible hymen" which
may be caused by sexual intercourse or penetration of a hard blunt object such as a penis.
She also concluded that the "shallow rugosities" inside her vagina lead to the conclusion
that there was more than one or even more than ten (10) times of sexual intercourse or
penetration of a hard blunt object that passed through her vaginal canal. Moreover, her
hymen orifice can allow complete penetration of an average-sized Filipino adult penis in
its erect stage which is from 2.5 to 3.0 cms. in diameter. 21
 Surprisingly, accused-appellant did not present any evidence to rebut the
prosecution's evidence nor testified in his behalf to deny the inculpatory testimony of the
complainant, giving us the impression that he acknowledges the charges against him.

While we have in a catena of cases set aside convictions based on pleas of guilty
in capital offenses because of the improvidence of the plea, we did so only when such
plea is the sole basis of the judgment of the condemnatory judgment. Thus, when the trial
court in obedience to this Court's injunction, receives evidence to determine precisely
whether or not the accused has erred in admitting guilt, the manner in which the plea of
guilty is made loses legal significance, for the simple reason that the conviction is
predicated not on the plea but on the evidence proving the commission by the accused of
the offense charged. 22 In such case, it cannot be claimed that defendant was sentenced to
death without having been previously informed of the nature of the charges against him
and of the qualifying and aggravating circumstances recited in the information, as he is
fully apprised not only of the allegations in the information but of the entire evidence of
the prosecution. 23

Additionally, accused-appellant's second plea of guilty validated his first plea of

guilt. It removed any reasonable doubt as to his guilt. 24

Accused-appellant further impugns the trial court's imposition of the death penalty
in Criminal Case No. Q-96-68120 contending that the complainant was already nineteen
(19) years old when the alleged rape occurred.

Republic Act No. 7659 which amended Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code
provides:

"The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is

committed with any of the following attendant circumstances: cdll

1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender
is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or
affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of
the victim." (Emphasis supplied)

Complainant was born on August 14, 1977. 25 On September 1, 1996, when the rape was
committed (Criminal Case No. Q-96-68120), complainant was already nineteen (19)
years of age. Therefore, the same does not fall under the last paragraph of Article 335 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA No. 7659. The proper penalty should be
reclusion perpetua pursuant to Article 335 of Revised Penal Code.

However, the extreme penalty of death should be imposed in Criminal Case No.
Q-96-68119, complainant being only 17 years of age when accused-appellant, his father,
raped her.
 Finally, accused-appellant likewise assails the award of P750,000.00 damages
claiming that the same is excessive.

With regard to the award of compensatory damages, we have ruled in People vs.
Victor, 26 which was later reaffirmed in People vs. Prades, 27 that "if the crime of rape is
committed or effectively qualified by any of the circumstances under which the death
penalty is authorized by the present amended law, the indemnity of the victim shall be in
the increased amount of not less than P75,000.00." 28 Accordingly, in Criminal Case No.
Q-96-68119, the award of compensatory damages should be increased from P50,000.00
to P75,000.00. In Criminal Case No. Q-96-68120 however, while appellant was
sentenced to reclusion perpetua, the compensatory damage should be the same
(P75,000.00). As rightly argued by the Solicitor General, the trauma, ignominy, pain and
shame suffered by the complainant can not be treated or regarded any lesser.

The award of civil indemnity "is not only a reaction to the apathetic societal
perception of the penal law and the financial fluctuations over time, but also an
expression of the displeasure of the Court over the incidence of heinous crimes against
chastity." 29 More so, if the crime is committed by the father against his own flesh and
blood.

With respect to the award of moral damages, we have in People vs. Prades, 30
held:

". . . The Court has also resolved that in crimes of rape, such as that
under consideration, moral damages may additionally be awarded to the victim
in the criminal proceeding, in such amount as the Court deems just, without the
need for pleading or proof of the basis thereof as has heretofore been the
practice. Indeed, the conventional requirement of allegata et probata in civil
procedure and for essentially civil cases should be dispensed with in criminal
prosecution for rape with the civil aspect included therein, since no appropriate
pleadings are filed wherein such allegations can be made.

"Corollarily, the fact that complainant has suffered the trauma of mental,
physical and psychological sufferings which constitute the bases for moral
damages are too obvious to still require the recital thereof at the trial by the
victim, since the Court itself even assumes and acknowledges such agony on her
part as a gauge of her credibility. What exists by necessary implication as being
ineludibly present in the case need not go through the superfluity of still being
proved through a testimonial charade."

Nevertheless, we find the award of P200,000.00 moral damages excessive. An

award of P50,000.00 for each count of rape is to our mind more reasonable. However, we
are deleting the award of exemplary or corrective damages, in the absence of any legal
basis therefor.
 Four members of the Court maintain their position that Republic Act No. 7659,
insofar as it prescribes the death penalty, is unconstitutional; nevertheless they submit to
the ruling of the Court, by majority vote, that the law is constitutional and the death
penalty should be imposed accordingly.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. In Criminal Case No. Q-96-68119, the decision of the Regional Trial
Court convicting accused-appellant Antonio Magat y Londonio of
rape and sentencing him to the Supreme Penalty of DEATH is
hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that the award of
compensatory damages be increased to Seventy-Five Thousand
Pesos (P75,000.00), moral damages is reduced to Fifty Thousand
Pesos (P50,000.00) and exemplary damages deleted.

2. In Criminal Case No. Q-96-68120, the decision of the Regional Trial
Court convicting accused-appellant of rape and sentencing him to
the Supreme Penalty of DEATH is hereby reduced to
RECLUSION PERPETUA. The award of compensatory damages is
increased to Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75.000.00), moral
damages is reduced to Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) and
exemplary damages is deleted.

In accordance with Section 25 of the RA 7659, amending Article 83 of the

Revised Penal Code, upon the finality of this Decision, let the records of this case be
forthwith forwarded to the Office of the President for the possible exercise of executive
clemency or pardoning power. cdasia

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo (Acting C.J.), Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Purisima, Pardo,
Buena and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.

Davide, Jr., C.J., is on official business.

Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago and De Leon, Jr., JJ., are on leave.

 
||| (People v. Magat, G.R. No. 130026, [May 31, 2000], 388 PHIL 311-328)

THIRD DIVISION
 [G.R. No. 188314. January 10, 2011.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. KHADDAFY

JANJALANI, GAMAL B. BAHARAN a.k.a. Tapay, ANGELO
TRINIDAD a.k.a. Abu Khalil, GAPPAL BANNAH ASALI a.k.a.
Maidan or Negro, JAINAL SALI a.k.a. Abu Solaiman, ROHMAT
ABDURROHIM a.k.a. Jackie or Zaky, and other JOHN and JANE
DOES, accused,

GAMAL B. BAHARAN a.k.a. Tapay, ANGELO TRINIDAD a.k.a.

Abu Khalil, and ROHMAT ABDURROHIM a.k.a. Abu Jackie or
Zaky, accused-appellants.

DECISION

SERENO, J : p

Before the Court is an appeal from the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA)
dated 30 June 2008, which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City in Criminal Case Nos. 05-476 and 05-4777 dated 18 October 2005. The
latter Decision convicted the three accused-appellants — namely, Gamal B. Baharan
a.k.a. Tapay, Angelo Trinidad a.k.a. Abu Khalil, and Rohmat Abdurrohim a.k.a. Abu
Jackie or Zaky — of the complex crime of multiple murder and multiple frustrated
murder, and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of death by lethal injection. The CA
modified the sentence to reclusion perpetua as required by Republic Act No. 9346
(Act Abolishing the Imposition of Death Penalty).
Statement of Facts

The pertinent facts, as determined by the trial court, are as follows:

On 14 February 2005, an RRCG bus was plying its usual southbound route,
from its Navotas bus terminal towards its Alabang bus terminal via Epifanio de los
Santos Avenue (EDSA). Around 6:30 to 7:30 in the evening, while they were about to
move out of the Guadalupe-EDSA southbound bus stop, the bus conductor noticed
two men running after the bus. The two insisted on getting on the bus, so the
conductor obliged and let them in.
According to Elmer Andales, the bus conductor, he immediately became wary
of the two men, because, even if they got on the bus together, the two sat away from
each other — one sat two seats behind the driver, while the other sat at the back of the
bus. At the time, there were only 15 passengers inside the bus. He also noticed that
the eyes of one of the men were reddish. When he approached the person near the
driver and asked him whether he was paying for two passengers, the latter looked
dumb struck by the question. He then stuttered and said he was paying for two and
gave PhP20. Andales grew more concerned when the other man seated at the back
also paid for both passengers. At this point, Andales said he became more certain that
the two were up to no good, and that there might be a holdup.
Afterwards, Andales said he became more suspicious because both men kept
on asking him if the bus was going to stop at Ayala Avenue. The witness also noticed
that the man at the back appeared to be slouching, with his legs stretched out in front
of him and his arms hanging out and hidden from view as if he was tinkering with
something. When Andales would get near the man, the latter would glare at him.
Andales admitted, however, that he did not report the suspicious characters to the
police.
As soon as the bus reached the stoplight at the corner of Ayala Avenue and
EDSA, the two men insisted on getting off the bus. According to Andales, the bus
driver initially did not want to let them off the bus, because a Makati ordinance
prohibited unloading anywhere except at designated bus stops. Eventually, the bus
driver gave in and allowed the two passengers to alight. The two immediately got off
the bus and ran towards Ayala Avenue. Moments after, Andales felt an explosion. He
then saw fire quickly engulfing the bus. He ran out of the bus towards a nearby mall.
After a while, he went back to where the bus was. He saw their bus passengers either
lying on the ground or looking traumatized. A few hours after, he made a statement
before the Makati Police Station narrating the whole incident.
The prosecution presented documents furnished by the Department of Justice,
confirming that shortly before the explosion, the spokesperson of the Abu Sayyaf
Group — Abu Solaiman — announced over radio station DZBB that the group had a
Valentine's Day "gift" for former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. After the
bombing, he again went on radio and warned of more bomb attacks. HETDAC

As stipulated during pretrial, accused Trinidad gave ABS-CBN News Network

an exclusive interview some time after the incident, confessing his participation in the
Valentine's Day bombing incident. In another exclusive interview on the network,
accused Baharan likewise admitted his role in the bombing incident. Finally, accused
Asali gave a television interview, confessing that he had supplied the explosive
devices for the 14 February 2005 bombing. The bus conductor identified the accused
Baharan and Trinidad, and confirmed that they were the two men who had entered the
RRCG bus on the evening of 14 February.
Members of the Abu Sayyaf Group — namely Khaddafy Janjalani, Gamal B.
Baharan, Angelo Trinidad, Gappal Bannah Asali, Jainal Asali, Rohmat Abdurrohim
a.k.a. Abu Jackie or Zaky, and other "John" and "Jane Does" — were then charged
with multiple murder and multiple frustrated murder. Only Baharan, Trinidad, Asali,
and Rohmat were arrested, while the other accused remain at-large.
On their arraignment for the multiple murder charge (Crim. Case No. 05-
476), Baharan, Trinidad, and Asali all entered a plea of guilty. On the other hand,
upon arraignment for the multiple frustrated murder charge (Crim. Case No. 05-
477), accused Asali pled guilty. Accused Trinidad and Baharan pled not guilty.
Rohmat pled not guilty to both charges. During the pretrial hearing, the parties
stipulated the following:

1.) The jurisdiction of this court over the offenses charged.

2.) That all three accused namely alias Baharan, Trinidad, and Asali admitted
knowing one another before February 14, 2005.

3.) All the same three accused likewise admitted that a bomb exploded in the
RRCG bus while the bus was plying the EDSA route fronting the MRT
terminal which is in front of the Makati Commercial Center.

4.) Accused Asali admitted knowing the other accused alias Rohmat whom he
claims taught him how to make explosive devices.

5.) The accused Trinidad also admitted knowing Rohmat before the February 14
bombing incident.

6.) The accused Baharan, Trinidad, and Asali all admitted to causing the bomb
explosion inside the RRCG bus which left four people dead and more or
less forty persons injured.

7.) Both Baharan and Trinidad agreed to stipulate that within the period March
20-24 each gave separate interviews to the ABS-CBN news network
admitting their participation in the commission of the said crimes,
subject of these cases.

8.) Accused Trinidad and Baharan also admitted to pleading guilty to these

crimes, because they were guilt-stricken after seeing a man carrying a
child in the first bus that they had entered.

9.) Accused Asali likewise admitted that in the middle of March 2005 he gave a
television news interview in which he admitted that he supplied the
explosive devices which resulted in this explosion inside the RRCG bus
and which resulted in the filing of these charges.

10.) Finally, accused Baharan, Trinidad, and Asali admitted that they are
members of the Abu Sayyaf. 1
 In the light of the pretrial stipulations, the trial court asked whether accused
Baharan and Trinidad were amenable to changing their "not guilty" pleas to the
charge of multiple frustrated murder, considering that they pled "guilty" to the
heavier charge of multiple murder, creating an apparent inconsistency in their pleas.
Defense counsel conferred with accused Baharan and Trinidad and explained to them
the consequences of the pleas. The two accused acknowledged the inconsistencies and
manifested their readiness for re-arraignment. After the Information was read to them,
Baharan and Trinidad pled guilty to the charge of multiple frustrated murder. 2
After being discharged as state witness, accused Asali testified that while under
training with the Abu Sayyaf in 2004, Rohmat, a.k.a. Abu Jackie or Zaky, and two
other persons taught him how to make bombs and explosives. The trainees were told
that they were to wage battles against the government in the city, and that their first
mission was to plant bombs in malls, the Light Railway Transit (LRT), and other parts
of Metro Manila. HTIEaS

As found by the trial court, Asali, after his training, was required by the Abu
Sayyaf leadership, specifically Abu Solaiman and Rohmat, to secure eight kilos of
TNT, a soldering gun, aluminum powder, a tester, and Christmas lights, all of which
he knew would be used to make a bomb. He then recalled that sometime in November
to December 2004, Trinidad asked him for a total of 4 kilos of TNT — that is, 2 kilos
on two separate occasions. Rohmat allegedly called Asali to confirm that Trinidad
would get TNT from Asali and use it for their first mission. The TNT was allegedly
placed in two buses sometime in December 2004, but neither one of them exploded.
Asali then testified that the night before the Valentine's Day bombing, Trinidad
and Baharan got another two kilos of TNT from him. Late in the evening of 14
February, he received a call from Abu Solaiman. The latter told Asali not to leave
home or go to crowded areas, since the TNT taken by Baharan and Trinidad had
already been exploded in Makati. Thirty minutes later, Trinidad called Asali,
repeating the warning of Abu Solaiman. The next day, Asali allegedly received a call
from accused Rohmat, congratulating the former on the success of the mission. 3
According to Asali, Abu Zaky specifically said, "Sa wakas nag success din yung
tinuro ko sayo."
Assignment of Errors

Accused-appellants raise the following assignment of errors:

I. The trial court gravely erred in accepting accused-appellants' plea of guilt

despite insufficiency of searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full
comprehension of the consequences of the said plea.

II. The trial court gravely erred in finding that the guilt of accused-appellants for
the crimes charged had been proven beyond reasonable doubt. 4  
First Assignment of Error
Accused-appellants Baharan and Trinidad argue that the trial court did not
conduct a searching inquiry after they had changed their plea from "not guilty" to
"guilty." The transcript of stenographic notes during the 18 April 2005 re-arraignment
before the Makati Regional Trial Court is reproduced below:

Court:

    Anyway, I think what we should have to do, considering the stipulations that
were agreed upon during the last hearing, is to address this matter of
pleas of not guilty entered for the frustrated murder charges by the two
accused, Mr. Trinidad and Mr. Baharan, because if you will recall they
entered pleas of guilty to the multiple murder charges, but then earlier
pleas of not guilty for the frustrated multiple murder charges remain . . .
[I]s that not inconsistent considering the stipulations that were entered
into during the initial pretrial of this case? [If] you will recall, they
admitted to have caused the bomb explosion that led to the death of at
least four people and injury of about forty other persons and so under the
circumstances, Atty Peña, have you discussed this matter with your
clients?

xxx xxx xxx

Atty. Peña:

Then we should be given enough time to talk with them. I haven't

conferred with them about this with regard to the multiple murder case.

xxx xxx xxx

Court:

Okay. So let us proceed now. Atty. Peña, can you assist the two accused
because if they are interested in withdrawing their [pleas], I want to hear
it from your lips.

Atty. Peña:

Yes, your Honor.

(At this juncture, Atty. Peña confers with the two accused, namely
Trinidad and Baharan) EIAScH

I have talked to them, your Honor, and I have explained to them the
consequence of their pleas, your Honor, and that the plea of guilt to the
 murder case and plea of not guilty to the frustrated multiple murder
actually are inconsistent with their pleas.

Court:

With matters that they stipulated upon?

Atty. Peña:

Yes, your Honor. So, they are now, since they already plead guilt to the
murder case, then they are now changing their pleas, your Honor, from
not guilty to the one of guilt. They are now ready, your Honor, for re-
arraignment.

xxx xxx xxx

INTERPRETER:

    (Read again that portion [of the information] and translated it in Filipino in a
clearer way and asked both accused what their pleas are).

    Your Honor, both accused are entering separate pleas of guilt to the crime
charged.

COURT:

    All right. So after the information was re-read to the accused, they have
withdrawn their pleas of not guilty and changed it to the pleas of guilty
to the charge of frustrated murder. Thank you. Are there any matters
you need to address at pretrial now? If there are none, then I will
terminate pretrial and accommodate . . . 5

As early as in People v. Apduhan, the Supreme Court has ruled that "all trial
judges . . . must refrain from accepting with alacrity an accused's plea of guilty, for
while justice demands a speedy administration, judges are duty bound to be extra
solicitous in seeing to it that when an accused pleads guilty, he understands fully the
meaning of his plea and the import of an inevitable conviction." 6 Thus, trial court
judges are required to observe the following procedure under Section 3, Rule 116 of
the Rules of Court:

SEC. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence. — When

the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a
searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the
consequences of his plea and shall require the prosecution to prove his guilt
and the precise degree of culpability. The accused may also present evidence in
his behalf. (Emphasis supplied)
 The requirement to conduct a searching inquiry applies more so in cases of re-
arraignment. In People v. Galvez, the Court noted that since accused-appellant's
original plea was "not guilty," the trial court should have exerted careful effort in
inquiring into why he changed his plea to "guilty." 7 According to the Court:

The stringent procedure governing the reception of a plea of guilt,

especially in a case involving the death penalty, is imposed upon the trial judge
in order to leave no room for doubt on the possibility that the accused might
have misunderstood the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea. 8

Likewise, the requirement to conduct a searching inquiry should not be deemed

satisfied in cases in which it was the defense counsel who explained the consequences
of a "guilty" plea to the accused, as it appears in this case. In People v. Alborida, this
Court found that there was still an improvident plea of guilty, even if the accused had
already signified in open court that his counsel had explained the consequences of the
guilty plea; that he understood the explanation of his counsel; that the accused
understood that the penalty of death would still be meted out to him; and that he had
not been intimidated, bribed, or threatened. 9
We have reiterated in a long line of cases that the conduct of a searching
inquiry remains the duty of judges, as they are mandated by the rules to satisfy
themselves that the accused had not been under coercion or duress; mistaken
impressions; or a misunderstanding of the significance, effects, and consequences of
their guilty plea. 10 This requirement is stringent and mandatory. 11
Nevertheless, we are not unmindful of the context under which the re-
arraignment was conducted or of the factual milieu surrounding the finding of guilt
against the accused. The Court observes that accused Baharan and Trinidad
previously pled guilty to another charge — multiple murder — based on the same act
relied upon in the multiple frustrated murder charge. The Court further notes that prior
to the change of plea to one of guilt, accused Baharan and Trinidad made two other
confessions of guilt — one through an extrajudicial confession (exclusive television
interviews, as stipulated by both accused during pretrial), and the other via judicial
admission (pretrial stipulation). Considering the foregoing circumstances, we deem it
unnecessary to rule on the sufficiency of the "searching inquiry" in this instance.
Remanding the case for re-arraignment is not warranted, as the accused's plea of guilt
was not the sole basis of the condemnatory judgment under consideration. 12 EacHSA

Second Assignment of Error

In People v. Oden, the Court declared that even if the requirement of
conducting a searching inquiry was not complied with, "[t]he manner by which the
plea of guilt is made . . . loses much of great significance where the conviction can be
based on independent evidence proving the commission by the person accused of the
offense charged." 13 Thus, in People v. Nadera, the Court stated:
 Convictions based on an improvident plea of guilt are set aside only
if such plea is the sole basis of the judgment. If the trial court relied on
sufficient and credible evidence to convict the accused, the conviction must
be sustained, because then it is predicated not merely on the guilty plea of the
accused but on evidence proving his commission of the offense charged. 14
(Emphasis supplied.)

In their second assignment of error, accused-appellants assert that guilt was not
proven beyond reasonable doubt. They pointed out that the testimony of the conductor
was merely circumstantial, while that of Asali as to the conspiracy was insufficient.
Insofar as accused-appellants Baharan and Trinidad are concerned, the
evidence for the prosecution, in addition to that which can be drawn from the
stipulation of facts, primarily consisted of the testimonies of the bus conductor, Elmer
Andales, and of the accused-turned-state-witness, Asali. Andales positively identified
accused Baharan and Trinidad as the two men who had acted suspiciously while
inside the bus; who had insisted on getting off the bus in violation of a Makati
ordinance; and who had scampered away from the bus moments before the bomb
exploded. On the other hand, Asali testified that he had given accused Baharan and
Trinidad the TNT used in the bombing incident in Makati City. The guilt of the
accused Baharan and Trinidad was sufficiently established by these corroborating
testimonies, coupled with their respective judicial admissions (pretrial stipulations)
and extrajudicial confessions (exclusive television interviews, as they both stipulated
during pretrial) that they were indeed the perpetrators of the Valentine's Day
bombing. 15 Accordingly, the Court upholds the findings of guilt made by the trial
court as affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Anent accused Rohmat, the evidence for the prosecution consisted of the
testimony of accused-turned-state-witness Asali. Below is a reproduction of the
transcript of stenographic notes on the state prosecutor's direct examination of state-
witness Asali during the 26 May 2005 trial:

Q: You stated that Zaky trained you and Trinidad. Under what circumstances
did he train you, Mr. Witness, to assemble those explosives, you and
Trinidad?

A: Abu Zaky, Abu Solaiman, Khadaffy Janjalani, the three of them, that Angelo
Trinidad and myself be the one to be trained to make an explosive, sir.

Q: Mr. witness, how long that training, or how long did it take that training?

A: If I am not mistaken, we were thought to make bomb about one month and
two weeks.

xxx xxx xxx

 Q: Now, speaking of that mission, Mr. witness, while you were still in training
at Mr. Cararao, is there any mission that you undertook, if any, with
respect to that mission?

xxx xxx xxx

A: Our first mission was to plant a bomb in the malls, LRT, and other parts of
Metro Manila, sir. 16

The witness then testified that he kept eight kilos of TNT for accused Baharan and
Trinidad. 

Q: Now, going back to the bomb. Mr. witness, did you know what happened to
the 2 kilos of bomb that Trinidad and Tapay took from you sometime in
November 2004?

A: That was the explosive that he planted in the G-liner, which did not explode.

Q: How did you know, Mr. witness?

A: He was the one who told me, Mr. Angelo Trinidad, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: What happened next, Mr. witness, when the bomb did not explode, as told to
you by Trinidad? cIECTH

A: On December 29, Angelo Trinidad got 2 more kilos of TNT bombs.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: Did Trinidad tell you why he needed another amount of explosive on that
date, December 29, 2004? Will you kindly tell us the reason why?

xxx xxx xxx

A: He told me that Abu Solaiman instructed me to get the TNT so that he could
detonate a bomb

xxx xxx xxx

Q: Were there any other person, besides Abu Solaiman, who called you up, with
respect to the taking of the explosives from you?

A: There is, sir . . . Abu Zaky, sir, called up also.

Q: What did Abu Zaky tell you when he called you up?

A: He told me that "this is your first mission."

Q: Please enlighten the Honorable Court. What is that mission you are referring
to?

A: That is the first mission where we can show our anger towards the
Christians.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: The second time that he got a bomb from you, Mr. witness, do you know if
the bomb explode?

A: I did not know what happened to the next 2 kilos taken by Angelo Trinidad
from me until after I was caught, because I was told by the policeman
that interviewed me after I was arrested that the 2 kilos were planted in a
bus, which also did not explode.

Q: So besides these two incidents, were there any other incidents that Angelo
Trinidad and Tapay get an explosive for you, Mr. witness?

xxx xxx xxx

A: If I am not mistaken, sir, on February 13, 2005 at 6:30 p.m.

Q: Who got from you the explosive Mr. witness?

A: It's Angelo Trinidad and Tapay, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: How many explosives did they get from you, Mr. witness, at that time?

A: They got 2 kilos TNT bomb, sir.

Q: Did they tell you, Mr. witness, where are they going to use that explosive?

A: No, sir.

Q: Do you know, Mr. witness, what happened to the third batch of explosives,
which were taken from you by Trinidad and Tapay? ETDHaC

xxx xxx xxx

A: That is the bomb that exploded in Makati, sir.

Q: Why did you know, Mr. witness?

A: Because I was called in the evening of February 14 by Abu Solaiman. He

told me not to leave the house because the explosive that were taken by
Tapay and Angelo Trinidad exploded.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: Was there any other call during that time, Mr. Witness?

xxx xxx xxx

A: I was told by Angelo Trinidad not to leave the house because the explosive
that he took exploded already, sir.

Q: How sure were you, Mr. witness, at that time, that indeed, the bomb
exploded at Makati, beside the call of Abu Solaiman and Trinidad?

A: It was told by Abu Solaiman that the bombing in Makati should coincide
with the bombing in General Santos.

xxx xxx xxx

A: He told it to me, sir . . . I cannot remember the date anymore, but I know it
was sometime in February 2005.

Q: Any other call, Mr. witness, from Abu Solaiman and Trinidad after the
bombing exploded in Makati, any other call?

xxx xxx xxx

A: There is, sir . . . The call came from Abu Zaky.

Q: What did Abu Zaky tell you, Mr. witness?

A: He just greeted us congratulations, because we have a successful mission.

xxx xxx xxx

A: He told me that "sa wakas, nag success din yung tinuro ko sayo."

xxx xxx xxx

 Q: By the way, Mr. witness, I would just like to clarify this. You stated that Abu
Zaky called you up the following day, that was February 15, and
congratulating you for the success of the mission. My question to you,
Mr. witness, if you know what is the relation of that mission, wherein
you were congratulated by Abu Zaky, to the mission, which have been
indoctrinated to you, while you were in Mt. Cararao, Mr. witness?

A: They are connected, sir.

Q: Connected in what sense, Mr. witness?

A: Because when we were undergoing training, we were told that the Abu
Sayyaf should not wage war to the forest, but also wage our battles in
the city.

Q: Wage the battle against who, Mr. witness?

A: The government, sir. 17

What can be culled from the testimony of Asali is that the Abu Sayyaf Group
was determined to sow terror in Metro Manila, so that they could show their "anger
towards the Christians." 18 It can also be seen that Rohmat, together with Janjalani
and Abu Solaiman, had carefully planned the Valentine's Day bombing incident,
months before it happened. Rohmat had trained Asali and Trinidad to make bombs
and explosives. While in training, Asali and others were told that their mission was to
plant bombs in malls, the LRT, and other parts of Metro Manila. According to Asali,
Rohmat called him on 29 December 2004 to confirm that Trinidad would get two
kilos of TNT from Asali, as they were "about to commence" their "first mission." 19
They made two separate attempts to bomb a bus in Metro Manila, but to no avail. The
day before the Valentine's Day bombing, Trinidad got another two kilos of TNT from
Asali. On Valentine's Day, the Abu Sayyaf Group announced that they had a gift for
the former President, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. On their third try, their plan finally
succeeded. Right after the bomb exploded, the Abu Sayyaf Group declared that there
would be more bombings in the future. Asali then received a call from Rohmat,
praising the former: "Sa wakas nag success din yung tinuro ko sayo." 20 CaDATc

In the light of the foregoing evidence, the Court upholds the finding of guilt
against Rohmat. Article 17 of the Revised Penal Code reads:

Art. 17. Principals. — The following are considered principals:

1. Those who take a direct part in the execution of the act

2. Those who directly force or induce others to commit it

 3. Those who cooperate in the commission of the offense by another act without
which it would not have been accomplished

Accused Rohmat is criminally responsible under the second paragraph, or the

provision on "principal by inducement." The instructions and training he had given
Asali on how to make bombs — coupled with their careful planning and persistent
attempts to bomb different areas in Metro Manila and Rohmat's confirmation that
Trinidad would be getting TNT from Asali as part of their mission — prove the
finding that Rohmat's co-inducement was the determining cause of the commission of
the crime. 21 Such "command or advice [was] of such nature that, without it, the
crime would not have materialized." 22
Further, the inducement was "so influential in producing the criminal act that
without it, the act would not have been performed." 23 In People v. Sanchez, et al.,
the Court ruled that, notwithstanding the fact that Mayor Sanchez was not at the crime
scene, evidence proved that he was the mastermind of the criminal act or the principal
by inducement. Thus, because Mayor Sanchez was a co-principal and co-conspirator,
and because the act of one conspirator is the act of all, the mayor was rendered liable
for all the resulting crimes. 24 The same finding must be applied to the case at bar.
The Court also affirms the finding of the existence of conspiracy involving
accused Baharan, Trinidad, and Rohmat. Conspiracy was clearly established from the
"collective acts of the accused-appellants before, during and after the commission of
the crime." As correctly declared by the trial court in its Omnibus Decision:

Asali's clear and categorical testimony, which remains unrebutted on its

major points, coupled with the judicial admissions freely and voluntarily given
by the two other accused, are sufficient to prove the existence of a conspiracy
hatched between and among the four accused, all members of the terrorist group
Abu Sayyaf, to wreak chaos and mayhem in the metropolis by indiscriminately
killing and injuring civilian victims by utilizing bombs and other similar
destructive explosive devices.

While said conspiracy involving the four malefactors has not been
expressly admitted by accused Baharan, Angelo Trinidad, and Rohmat, more
specifically with respect to the latter's participation in the commission of the
crimes, nonetheless it has been established by virtue of the aforementioned
evidence, which established the existence of the conspiracy itself and the
indispensable participation of accused Rohmat in seeing to it that the
conspirators' criminal design would be realized.

It is well-established that conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the

accused, which clearly manifests a concurrence of wills, a common intent or
design to commit a crime (People v. Lenantud, 352 SCRA 544). Hence, where
acts of the accused collectively and individually demonstrate the existence of a
common design towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful purpose,
 conspiracy is evident and all the perpetrators will be held liable as principals
(People v. Ellado, 353 SCRA 643). 25

In People v. Geronimo, the Court pronounced that it would be justified in

concluding that the defendants therein were engaged in a conspiracy "when the
defendants by their acts aimed at the same object, one performing one part and the
other performing another part so as to complete it, with a view to the attainment of the
same object; and their acts, though apparently independent, were in fact concerted and
cooperative, indicating closeness of personal association, concerted action and
concurrence of sentiments." 26  
Accused contend that the testimony of Asali is inadmissible pursuant to Sec.
30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. It is true that under the rule, statements made by a
conspirator against a co-conspirator are admissible only when made during the
existence of the conspiracy. However, as the Court ruled in People v. Buntag, if the
declarant repeats the statement in court, his extrajudicial confession becomes a
judicial admission, making the testimony admissible as to both conspirators. 27 Thus,
in People v. Palijon, the Court held the following: cTCADI

. . . [W]e must make a distinction between extrajudicial and judicial

confessions. An extrajudicial confession may be given in evidence against the
confessant but not against his co-accused as they are deprived of the opportunity
to cross-examine him. A judicial confession is admissible against the declarant's
co-accused since the latter are afforded opportunity to cross-examine the
former. Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court applies only to
extrajudicial acts or admissions and not to testimony at trial where the
party adversely affected has the opportunity to cross-examine the
declarant. Mercene's admission implicating his co-accused was given on the
witness stand. It is admissible in evidence against appellant Palijon. Moreover,
where several accused are tried together for the same offense, the testimony of a
co-accused implicating his co-accused is competent evidence against the latter.
28

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Regional Trial

Court of Makati, as affirmed with modification by the Court of Appeals, is hereby
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio Morales, Brion, Bersamin and Villarama, Jr., JJ., concur.

||| (People v. Baharan, G.R. No. 188314, [January 10, 2011], 654 PHIL 148-169)

EN BANC
 [G.R. Nos. 141129-33. December 14, 2001.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROLAND

MOLINA y JOVERE, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.

SYNOPSIS

Accused-appellant Roland J. Molina was charged with attempted rape and four (4)
counts of incestuous rape penalized under RA 8353 amending Art. 266 of The Revised
Penal Code committed against his very own 16-year old daughter Brenda Molina. He
was found guilty by the court a quo in these five (5) crimes for which he was meted a
prison term for the attempted rape and four (4) death sentences for the four (4) counts of
incestuous rape. In his appeal before the Court, appellant, through the Public Attorney's
Office asserted that his plea of guilty was improvidently made.

The Supreme Court remanded the case to the court of origin for rearraignment and
for further proceedings. The Court found merit in the Public Attorney's Office's
observation and ruled that the improvident plea of guilt of appellant and the critical
omissions in the procedure adopted by the trial court in the re-arraignment has affected
the manner by which the prosecution and the defense conducted its presentation of the
evidence, and the trial court in evaluating the evidence on record. The record of the re-
arraignment merely noted that the accused was re-arraigned and entered a plea of guilty
separately in the five cases after the consequences of the change of plea had been duly
explained to him, but it did not state that copies of the five (5) Informations and the list of
witnesses were given to him and that the Informations were read in a language that he
knows. Even the certificate of re-arraignment contradicted the statement therein that
appellant was separately re-arraigned in the five (5) criminal cases. The certificate stated
"complaint" (singular) rather than "complaints" (plural) since there were five (5) criminal
cases to which he was allegedly pleading guilty and thus irregularly attested to his guilty
plea to only one (1) of the five (5) Informations. The trial court did not also conduct a
searching inquiry to establish that the plea of guilty was done voluntarily with full
awareness of its consequences. The fact that the consequences of the plea were explained
to appellant did not mean that there was compliance with the strict parameters of a
searching inquiry since a mere warning that the accused faces the supreme penalty of
death is insufficient. The trial court should have explained to appellant the essential
elements of the five (5) crimes he was charged with and their respective penalties and
civil liabilities, and also should have directed a series of questions to defense counsel to
determine whether he has conferred with his client and has completely explained to him
the meaning of a plea of guilty. The said formula is mandatory and absent any showing
that it was followed, a searching inquiry cannot be said to have been undertaken. CHDaAE

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; ARRAIGNMENT AND

PLEA; TRIAL COURT COMMITTED CRITICAL PROCEDURAL OMISSIONS. —
We find critical omissions in the procedure adopted by the trial court in the re-
arraignment of accused-appellant. For one, Sec. 1, par. (a), of Rule 116 of the Rules of
Court, which requires that the accused-appellant must be furnished a copy of the
complaint or information with the list of witnesses to be read to him in the language or
dialect known to him, was not followed by the trial court. Record of the re-arraignment
merely noted that "the accused was re-arraigned and [he] entered a plea of guilty
separately in the five-entitled cases after the consequences of the change of plea have
been duly explained to him . . ." but it did not state that copies of the five (5) Informations
and the list of witnesses were given to him and the Informations read in a language that
he knew. We ruled in People v. Bello that when the death penalty is at stake, the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions does not apply. "The
original record of this case is completely bereft of any document concerning accused-
appellant's supposed re-arraignment. We cannot presume that the re-arraignment of
accused-appellant was regularly conducted. We cannot lean on this rebuttable
presumption especially when a man's life is at stake. We cannot anchor our judgment
based on mere speculations and conjectures. Rather, we must be positively convinced."
Clearly, it cannot be said that the trial court complied with this rule.

2. ID.; D.; ID.; CERTIFICATE OF RE-ARRAIGNMENT ITSELF

CONTRADICTS STATEMENT THEREIN THAT APPELLANT WAS SEPARATELY
RE-ARRAIGNED IN THE FIVE (5) CRIMINAL CASES. — Even the certificate of re-
arraignment contradicts the statement therein that accused-appellant was separately re-
arraigned in the five (5) criminal cases. This certificate states "complaint" (singular)
rather than "complaints" (plural) since there were five (5) criminal cases to which he was
allegedly pleading guilty and thus irregularly attests to his guilty plea to only one (1) of
the five (5) Informations. SHIcDT

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; NO SEARCHING INQUIRY TO ESTABLISH

VOLUNTARINESS OF PLEA OF GUILT AND WITH FULL AWARENESS OF
CONSEQUENCES. — The trial court did not conduct a searching inquiry to establish
that the plea of guilty was done voluntarily with full awareness of its consequencies.
Under established principles, a searching inquiry must not only comply with the
requirements of Sec. 1, par. (a), of Rule 116 but must also expound on the events that
actually took place during the arraignment, the words spoken and the warnings given,
with special attention to the age of the accused, his educational attainment and socio-
economic status as well as the manner of his arrest and detention, the provision of
counsel in his behalf during the custodial and preliminary investigations, and the
opportunity of his defense counsel to confer with him. These matters are relevant since
they serve as trustworthy indices of his capacity to give a free and informed plea of guilt.
Lastly, the trial court must explain the essential elements of the five (5) crimes he was
charged with and their respective penalties and civil liabilities, and also direct a series of
questions to defense counsel to determine whether he has conferred with the accused and
has completely explained to him the meaning of a plea of guilty. This formula is
mandatory and absent any showing that it was followed, a searching inquiry cannot be
said to have been undertaken.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; NO VERIFIABLE FACTS SHOWING APPELLANT

COMPLETELY COMPREHENDED LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE OF GUILTY PLEA
AND THE NATURE OF CRIME OR CRIMES CONFESSED TO. — Nothing on record
shows that the foregoing inquiry was complied with, or in any manner or event answered.
Not even the assurance conveyed to us by the Order of the trial court of 2 September
1999 sketchily alleging compliance with the requirements satisfies a searching inquiry —
"In today's hearing, the private offended party was supposed to continue with her
testimony. Atty. Elmer Surot, counsel for the accused, however, manifested that the
accused was being bothered by his conscience and by way of contrition would like to
make amends by withdrawing his pleas of not guilty in the above-entitled cases and
change same to pleas of guilty. Thus, the accused was re-arraigned and entered a plea of
guilty separately in the five-entitled cases after the consequences of the change of plea
have been duly explained to him by his counsel and by 1st Asst. Provincial Prosecutor
Eugenio Manaois, the Public Prosecutor handling the case for the prosecution. With this
Order alone, we have nothing to go by to state for sure that the trial court followed the
steps or asked the questions outlined above or that accused-appellant's own counsel
advised him adequately. As stated above, we do not presume compliance with the
requirements from a silent record. The fact that the consequences of the plea were
explained to accused-appellant does not comply with the strict parameters of a searching
inquiry since "a mere warning that the accused faces the supreme penalty of death is
insufficient." There are therefore clearly no verifiable facts for us to assume that he
completely comprehended the legal significance of a guilty plea and the nature of the
crime or crimes he confessed to. ADcEST

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; APPELLANT'S IMPROVIDENT PLEA OF GUILT

WARRANTED REMAND OF CRIMINAL CASES FOR RE-ARRAIGNMENT AND
FURTHER RELEVANT PROCEEDINGS. — Where facts are however adequately
represented in the criminal case and no procedural unfairness or irregularity has
prejudiced either the prosecution or the defense as a result of the improvident plea of
guilty, the settled rule is that a decision based on an irregular plea may nevertheless be
upheld where the judgment is supported beyond reasonable doubt by other evidence on
record since it would be a useless ritual to return the case to the trial court for another
arraignment and further proceedings. After a careful examination of the records, we find
that the improvident plea of guilt of accused-appellant has affected the manner by which
the prosecution and the defense conducted its presentation of the evidence, and the trial
court in carefully evaluating the evidence on record. Remand of Crim. Cases Nos. 99-
02817-D, 99-02818-D, 99-02819-D, 99-02820-D and 99-02821-D for re-arraignment and
further relevant proceedings is therefore proper.

6. ID.; ID.; ID.; FLAWED RE-ARRAIGNMENT CAUSED BY OMISSION OF

MINIMAL STANDARDS FOR SEARCHING INQUIRY. — The flawed re-arraignment
of accused-appellant and the invalid admission of his supposed letter-admission were
caused by the omission of minimal standards for a searching inquiry in the former and the
admissibility of private documents in the latter. We cannot conceive any reasonable legal
basis to explain the oversight to contest these errors. Under the same set of facts, it was
held in Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Bruno: In ruling upon appellant's claim that he
was denied effective assistance of counsel, we are guided by the standard established by
our Supreme Court in Commonwealth ex rel. Washington v. Maroney . . . [O]ur inquiry
ceases and counsel's assistance is deemed constitutionally effective once we are able to
conclude that the particular course chosen by counsel had some reasonable basis designed
to effectuate his client's interests. The test is not whether other alternatives were more
reasonable, employing a hindsight evaluation of the records. Although weigh the
alternatives we must, the balance tips in favor of a finding of effective assistance as soon
as it is determined that trial counsel's decisions had any reasonable basis. Counsel's
failure to insure that the plea colloquy conducted met at least the minimal standards as set
forth in Rule 319 and cases of this Commonwealth [have] no reasonable legal basis that
we can discern. As such, we hold that appellant was denied effective assistance of
counsel. HESAIT

7. ID.; ID.; ID.; JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION CANNOT STAND UPON

INVALID ARRAIGNMENT. — We are not unmindful that the charges against accused-
appellant carry the punishment that is most severe. The death penalty is irrevocable, and
deplorably, experience has shown that innocent persons have at times pleaded guilty. The
dispossessed of fortune should not be disinherited in law. But neither are we oblivious of
Brenda's claim that she was molested and abused successfully by her father four (4)
times. When truth stands, to no person will we sell, or deny, or delay, right or justice, and
rightly then would the consequent public condemnation and punishment of the
perpetrator reassure the victim that she has public recognition and support. Verily, a
judgment of conviction cannot stand upon an invalid arraignment. Since the vice of
nullity affects not only the criminal cases for incestuous rape under automatic review but
also the criminal case for attempted rape, notwithstanding the absence of a notice of
appeal in the latter, we rule to set aside the Joint Decision dated 3 November 1999 in
toto. We therefore remand Crim. Cases Nos. 99-02817-D, 99-02818-D, 99-02819-D, 99-
02820-D and 99-02821-D to the court a quo for rearraignment and reception of evidence
for the prosecution and accused-appellant if both so desire. If the accused-appellant
pleads guilty, the trial court is instructed to conduct the searching inquiry and to inform
him of his right to adduce evidence, in accordance with the discussion herein made,
complete with transcripts of stenographic notes.

DECISION

BELLOSILLO, J : p

This case pierces the enduring belief in the family as a peaceful retreat. Here, we
are faced with a father who, it is claimed, attempted to rape his own daughter once and
succeeded in consummating it four (4) times before then, as a result of which he was
sentenced to a prison term and imposed four (4) death penalties. The children, as many
others in the past, are unfortunately the victims of this indecency in an atrophied family,
something that we stress is never about losing virtue or honor but an assault upon their
persons akin to torture or murder. 1 Quite understandably, most crimes of this nature
remain unreported, while the perpetrators in those cases prosecuted and tried, naturally
engender enmity and rage. With sensitivity to this call for justice and healing, we proceed
to review this criminal case.

Roland J. Molina, accused-appellant, was charged with attempted rape and four
(4) counts of incestuous rape penalized under RA 8353 amending Art. 266 of The
Revised Penal Code committed against his very own 16-year old 2 daughter Brenda
Molina. He was found guilty by the court a quo in these five (5) crimes for which he was
meted an indeterminate sentence of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal
as maximum for the attempted rape, and four (4) death sentences for the four (4) counts
of incestuous rape. He was also ordered to pay his victim indemnity and moral damages
each worth P75,000.00. His conviction is now the subject of this automatic review, 3 and
tests our fealty to procedural fairness and the rule of law.

The four (4) cases of incestuous rape were allegedly committed by accused-
appellant Roland Molina sometime in August 1998, 22 September, 29 September and 24
December 1998, while the attempted rape, on 1 March 1999. Upon the verbal complaint
of his daughter Brenda, accused-appellant was arrested on 3 March 1999 and detained at
the municipal jail of Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan. There is however nothing on record from
then on to account for his version of the facts.

Despite his immediate arrest and the absence of a waiver under the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure, accused-appellant was subjected to a regular preliminary
investigation by the municipal trial judge whose findings 4 were affirmed by the
Provincial Prosecutor. Accused-appellant did not file a counter-affidavit to refute the
charges. The preliminary investigation took about one (1) month to complete, after
which, accused-appellant was transferred from the Sta. Barbara Municipal Jail to the
Pangasinan Provincial Jail. Thereafter, four (4) Informations were filed against accused-
appellant for raping his own daughter who was below eighteen (18) years old 5 and one
(1) Information for attempted rape. 6 The cases were raffled to RTC-Br. 42 in Dagupan
City, Pangasinan.

Roland Molina was arraigned on the four (4) indictments for incestuous rape on 18
May 1999. He pleaded not guilty to each of the four (4) charges. On 20 May 1999 these
cases were consolidated with the attempted rape to which he also pleaded not guilty on 3
June 1999, after which, the pre-trial was conducted for all the five (5) cases. The trial
commenced on 22 July 1999 with the mother of complaining witness Brenda Molina
testifying. Parenthetically, two (2) of the Informations (Crim. Cases Nos. 99-02818-D
and 99-02819-D), both for incestuous rape, were amended to specify the dates of
commission of the crimes

On 30 August 1999 the hearing was cut short when the prosecution "asked for a
deferment to determine whether the proposal of the accused to withdraw his plea of not
guilty and change same (sic) to guilty could have the effect of lowering the penalty
attached to the offense charged to reclusion perpetua." 7 Trial was thus reset to 2
September 1999 on which date the defense counsel manifested the desire of accused-
appellant to change his plea to guilty as regards all the five (5) crimes since he "was
being bothered by his conscience and by way of contrition would like to make amends." 8
Thus he was immediately re-arraigned and entered a plea of guilty "after," as the trial
court noted, "the consequences of the change of plea had been duly explained to him by
his counsel and by 1st Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Eugenio Manaois, the public
prosecutor handling the case for the prosecution." 9 Despite this observation of the trial
court, there is nothing on record to determine what this explanation consisted of. By way
of concession, after accused-appellant was arraigned, the defense counsel prayed for
liberality from the trial court "even only by recommending the accused for executive
clemency.'' 10

The prosecution then proceeded to present its evidence on 16 September 1999 to

ascertain with precision the real culpability of accused-appellant. All in all, the
prosecution evidence consisted of (a) the testimonies of Brenda, her mother, the police
investigators, a barangay councilor, and the medico-legal officer, and (b) certain
documents, e.g., the birth certificate of Brenda, the medico-legal certificate, and the letter
of accused-appellant to his daughter Brenda begging the latter's forgiveness. While the
defense counsel cross-examined the prosecution witnesses, he did not introduce any
evidence in behalf of accused-appellant.
 On 10 November 1999 the trial court rendered judgment finding accused-appellant
guilty of the five (5) crimes charged on the basis of "the change of plea by the accused
from not guilty to guilty, and the testimony of the offended party Brenda Molina and the
corroborating evidence presented by the prosecution, both oral and written.'' 11 The trial
court however strongly recommended executive clemency in light of his plea of guilt and
his alleged letter that ambiguously expressed his remorse for some unidentified acts. No
notice of appeal was filed from the conviction in the criminal case for attempted rape.
Accused-appellant was thereafter transferred from the Pangasinan Provincial Jail to the
National Penitentiary at Muntinlupa City.

The Public Attorneys Office, in its Brief for the Appellant, asserts that accused-
appellant's plea of guilty was improvidently made.

We find merit in this observation. Verily it was incumbent upon the trial court to
observe the provisions of Secs. 1, par. (a), and 3, of Rule 116, 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, when accused appellant manifested his intention to withdraw his earlier plea
of not guilty to re-enter a plea of guilty to the four (4) crimes of incestuous rape and one
(1) attempted rape. In this regard, we find critical omissions in the procedure adopted by
the trial court in the re-arraignment of accused-appellant. For one, Sec. 1, par. (a), of Rule
116 of the Rules of Court, 12 which requires that the accused-appellant must be furnished
a copy of the complaint or information with the list of witnesses to be read to him in the
language or dialect known to him, was not followed by the trial court. Record of the re-
arraignment merely noted that "the accused was re-arraigned and [he] entered a plea of
guilty separately in the five-entitled cases after the consequences of the change of plea
have been duly explained to him . . ." 13 but it does not state that copies of the five (5)
Informations and the list of witnesses were given to him and the Informations read in a
language that he knows. We ruled in People v. Bello 14 that when the death penalty is at
stake, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions does not
apply —

The original record of this case is completely bereft of any document

concerning accused-appellant's supposed re-arraignment. We cannot presume
that the re-arraignment of accused-appellant was regularly conducted. We
cannot lean on this rebuttable presumption especially when a man's life is at
stake. We cannot anchor our judgment based on mere speculations and
conjectures. Rather, we must be positively convinced.CIDcHA

Clearly, it cannot be said that the trial court complied with this rule.

Even the certificate of re-arraignment 15 contradicts the statement therein that

accused-appellant was separately re-arraigned in the five (5) criminal cases. This
certificate states "complaint" (singular) rather than "complaints" (plural) since there were
five (5) criminal cases to which he was allegedly pleading guilty 16 and thus irregularly
attests to his guilty plea to only one (1) of the five (5) Informations. 17 In People v.
Estomaca 18 we held —

At threshold, what strikes this Court as peculiar is that the arraignment

appears to have consisted merely of the bare reading of the five complaints,
synthetically and cryptically reported in the transcript, thus: "(Reading the
information/complaint to the accused in Ilonggo/local dialect)." Since what was
supposed to have been read was stated in the singular, but there were five
criminal complaints against appellant, this Court is then left to speculate on
whether all five criminal complaints were actually read, translated or explained
to appellant on a level within his comprehension, considering his limited
education.

Moreover, the trial court did not conduct a searching inquiry to establish that the
plea of guilty was done voluntarily with full awareness of its consequences. 19 This
procedure is anchored on Sec. 3, of Rule 116, 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure —

When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall
conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full consequences of his
plea and require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of
culpability. The accused may also present evidence on his behalf.

Under established principles, a searching inquiry must not only comply with the
requirements of Sec. 1, par. (a), of Rule 116 but must also expound on the events that
actually took place during the arraignment, the words spoken and the warnings given, 20
with special attention to the age of the accused, his educational attainment and socio-
economic status 21 as well as the manner of his arrest and detention, the provision of
counsel in his behalf during the custodial and preliminary investigations, and the
opportunity of his defense counsel to confer with him. 22 These matters are relevant since
they serve as trustworthy indices of his capacity to give a free and informed plea of guilt.
23 Lastly, the trial court must explain the essential elements of the five (5) crimes he was
charged with and their respective penalties and civil liabilities, 24 and also direct a series
of questions to defense counsel to determine whether he has conferred with the accused
and has completely explained to him the meaning of a plea of guilty. 25 This formula is
mandatory and absent any showing that it was followed, a searching inquiry cannot be
said to have been undertaken. 26

Nothing on record shows that the foregoing inquiry was complied with, or in any
manner or event answered. Not even the assurance conveyed to us by the Order of the
trial court of 2 September 1999 sketchily alleging compliance with the requirements
satisfies a searching inquiry —

In today's hearing, the private offended party was supposed to continue

with her testimony. Atty. Elmer Surot, counsel for the accused, however,
 manifested that the accused was being bothered by his conscience and by way
of contrition would like to make amends by withdrawing his pleas of not guilty
in the above-entitled cases and change same to pleas of guilty. Thus, the
accused was re-arraigned and entered a plea of guilty separately in the five-
entitled cases after the consequences of the change of plea have been duly
explained to him by his counsel and by 1st Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Eugenio
Manaois, the Public Prosecutor handling the case for the prosecution.

With this Order alone, we have nothing to go by to state for sure that the trial court
followed the steps or asked the questions outlined above or that accused-appellant's own
counsel advised him adequately. As stated above, we do not presume compliance with
the requirements from a silent record. The fact that the consequences of the plea were
explained to accused-appellant does not comply with the strict parameters of a searching
inquiry since "a mere warning that the accused faces the supreme penalty of death is
insufficient." 27 There are therefore clearly no verifiable facts for us to assume that he
completely comprehended the legal significance of a guilty plea and the nature of the
crime or crimes he confessed to.

Equally distressing is the correlated omission of the transcripts of stenographic

notes of the supposed re-arraignment or plea colloquy of accused-appellant. We have
emphasized the need for and importance of such transcripts, 28 and even more in the
instant case where accused-appellant manifested his desire to change his plea on the
condition that the death penalty would not be imposed. Thus the trial court deferred the
hearing on 29 August 1999 precisely to give the prosecution time to ". . . determine
whether the proposal of the accused to withdraw his plea of not guilty and change the
same to guilty could have the effect of lowering the penalty attached to the offense
charged to reclusion perpetua." 29 If the searching inquiry were reduced into writing, this
Court would have been duly informed of accused-appellant's sincere intention to change
his plea despite the imposition of the capital penalty and the legal impossibility of any
promise of reward.

In view of the foregoing we have no alternative but to set aside the plea of guilty.
30

It is also urged in the Brief for the Appellant that an improvident plea of guilty per
se results in the remand of the criminal case(s) to the trial court for the re-arraignment of
accused-appellant and for further proceedings. We hold that this argument does not
accurately reflect the standing principle. Our jurisdiction does not subscribe to a per se
rule that once a plea of guilty is deemed improvidently made that the accused-appellant is
at once entitled to a remand. To warrant a remand of the criminal case, it must also be
proved that as a result of such irregularity there was inadequate representation of facts by
either the prosecution or the defense during the trial. In People v. Abapo 31 we found that
undue reliance upon an invalid plea of guilty prevented the prosecution from fully
presenting its evidence, and thus remanded the criminal case for further proceedings.
Similarly in People v. Durango 32 where an improvident plea of guilty was followed by
an abbreviated proceeding with practically no role at all being played by the defense, we
ruled that this procedure was "just too meager to accept as being the standard
constitutional due process at work enough to forfeit a human life" and so threw back the
criminal case to the trial court for appropriate action. Verily the relevant matter that
justifies the remand of the criminal case to the trial court is the procedural unfairness or
complete miscarriage of justice in the handling of the proceedings a quo as occasioned by
the improvident plea of guilty, 33 or what People v. Tizon 34 encapsulizes as the
"attendant circumstances."

Where facts are however adequately represented in the criminal case and no
procedural unfairness or irregularity has prejudiced either the prosecution or the defense
as a result of the improvident plea of guilty, the settled rule is that a decision based on an
irregular plea may nevertheless be upheld where the judgment is supported beyond
reasonable doubt by other evidence on record 35 since it would be a useless ritual to
return the case to the trial court for another arraignment and further proceedings. 36

After a careful examination of the records, we find that the improvident plea of
guilt of accused-appellant has affected the manner by which the prosecution and the
defense conducted its presentation of the evidence, and the trial court in carefully
evaluating the evidence on record. Remand of Crim. Cases Nos. 99-02817-D, 99-02818-
D, 99-02819-D, 99-02820-D and 99-02821-D for re-arraignment and further relevant
proceedings is therefore proper. First, the prosecution failed to lay the proper foundation
for the introduction of the alleged handwritten letter of accused-appellant acknowledging
his guilt for the rape of his daughter. This could very well be attributed to the fact that
this letter was introduced only after accused-appellant pleaded guilty to the accusations
for which reason the prosecution no longer endeavored to elicit the proper foundation for
this evidence.

Under Sec. 20 of Rule 132, Rules of Court, proof of the authenticity and due
execution of this letter is done by "anyone who saw the document executed or written" or
"evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker." Brenda's
testimony that the letter was given to her by her father's nephew and grandfather and that
it was signed by accused-appellant does not prove the authorship of the letter. 37 In the
first place, no foundation was laid to ascertain that she knew the signature of her father,
and her reliance upon statements of her father's nephew and grandfather (even if truly
said) would be hearsay and speculative. Furthermore, the contents of the letter are, as it
is, far from damaging. Its relevant parts are ambiguous from which we cannot infer
anything about the alleged cases of rape of Brenda. It states, ". . . please forgive me for
what happened to us . . . so please forgive and I'll promise I will not repeat anymore what
I have done to you." Verily, several conclusions could be deciphered from these
statements that may have nothing to do at all with rape.
 It is certainly within the power of the prosecution to compel accused-appellant's
nephew and grandfather to prove the authenticity and due execution of the alleged
damning letter since they were the sources thereof. Or perhaps if accused-appellant was
indeed pleading guilty then, he could very well accommodate the prosecution by owning
authorship of the letter and clarifying its meaning. This the prosecution may undertake in
the course of the proceedings upon remand of the criminal cases.

Second, the presentation of the prosecution's case was lacking in assiduity and was
not characterized with the meticulous attention to details that is necessarily expected in a
prosecution for a capital offense. In his examination of Brenda after accused-appellant
pleaded guilty, the public prosecutor was evidently concerned with abbreviating the
proceedings as shown by his failure to clarify such ambiguous statements as "he repeated
to me what he had done to me" when previously he pursued such ambiguities to their
clear intended meanings. It is clear to our mind that the prosecution did not discharge its
obligation as seriously as it should have had, had there been no plea of guilt on the part of
the accused. The prosecutor's questions and Brenda's answers are as follows — cCEAHT

[in August 1998]

Q: And after kissing your neck as well as your breast, what else did your father
do?

A: He tried to insert his penis inside my private part, sir.

Q: Was he successful?

A: No sir.

Q: Why do you know that he was inserting his penis into your vagina?

A: Because I felt pain, sir.

Q: When you felt pain, what did you do?

A: I pushed his arms, sir . . . .

Q: What happened when you cannot (sic) do anything anymore?

A: (Witness crying.) He succeeded, sir. He used me . . . .

Q: When you said your father was successful in doing what he wanted to do and
that he used you, what do you mean by he used you?

A: He had sexual intercourse with me, sir. (TSN, 16 August 1999, pp. 23-25).
 [on 22 September 1998]

Q: After removing your shirt and panty, what did he do next?

A: That he did what he wanted to do, sir.

Q: What is that, tell us frankly?

A: The fact what he does to my mother, sir.

Q: What is that which your father does to your mother and which he did to you
on that night of September 22, 1998, tell us in plain language?

A: (Witness is crying.) He is already making sex with me, sir. (TSN, 16

September 1999, p. 6).

[about one week after 22 September 1998]

Q: While you were sleeping in your house on that same date which is (sic)
approximately one week after September 22, was there anything unusual
that took place?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What is (sic) it?

A: He repeated to me what he did to me for the first time and second time, sir.
(TSN, 16 September 1999, pp. 7-8).

[on 24 December 1998]

Q: While you were sleeping on that night of December 24, was there anything
unusual that took place?

A: Yes, sir.

Q:  What was that?

A: He repeated to me (again) what he had done to me, sir. (TSN, 16 September
1999, p. 10).

Third, the prosecution could very well clarify why on 1 March 1999 after accused-
appellant's wife saw him and Brenda sleeping side by side and after she confronted his
husband about it 38 and was told by her daughter that "if I will tell it to you, my father
will kill us," 39 accused-appellant was still allegedly able to attempt a rape on his
daughter on the same date. 40 It is our understanding of the behavior of gutter criminals
that with the confrontation between him and his wife, he would have laid low a while
even for just that day. 41 The prosecution may want to elucidate on this seemingly
unnatural behavior.

Fourth, neither the defense nor the prosecution elicited from the private
complainant whether the accusations for incestuous rape and attempted rape were in a
manner colored by the seething allegations in the transcript of stenographic notes that
accused-appellant was a violent person towards his family, most especially his wife who
is Brenda's mother. 42 This Court would want to know for sure that these criminal cases
under review are not merciless equivalents of the alleged violence done by accused-
appellant. Our endeavor is to try the case on the facts and not upon the supposedly
despicable character of the man.

Fifth, the improvident plea appears to have sent the wrong signal to the defense
that proceedings thereafter would be abbreviated. There was thus a perfunctory
representation of accused-appellant as shown by (a) his counsel's failure to object to and
correct the irregularities during his client's re-arraignment; (b) his failure to question the
offer of the alleged letter wherein accused-appellant acknowledged his authorship of the
dastardly crimes; (c) his failure to present evidence in behalf of accused-appellant or to so
inform the latter of his right to adduce evidence whether in support of the guilty plea or in
deviation therefrom; (d) his failure to object to his client's warrantless arrest and the
designation of the crime in Crim. Case No. 99-02821-D as attempted rape when the
evidence may appear not to warrant the same; and, (e) his failure to file a notice of appeal
as regards Crim. Case No. 99-02821-D to the Court of Appeals for appropriate review.
This Court perceives no reasonable basis for excusing these omissions as counsel's
strategic decision in his handling of the case. Rather, they constitute inadequate
representation that renders the result of the trial suspect or unreliable, and as we
explained in People v. Durango, 43 in violation of the right to counsel of accused-
appellant —

The improvident plea, followed by an abbreviated proceeding, with

practically no role at all played by the defense, is just too meager to accept as
being the standard constitutional due process at work enough to forfeit a human
life. It may be opportune to invite attention to the disquisition of the Court in
People v. Bermas, thus —

. . . The right to counsel proceeds from the fundamental principle

of due process which basically means that a person must be heard before
being condemned. The due process requirement is a part of a person's
basic rights; it is not a mere formality that may be dispensed with or
performed perfunctorily.

The right to counsel must be more than just the presence of a

lawyer in the courtroom or the mere propounding of standard questions
 and objections. The right to counsel means that the accused is amply
accorded legal assistance extended by a counsel who commits himself to
the cause for the defense and acts accordingly. The right assumes an
active involvement by the lawyer in the proceedings, particularly at the
trial of the case, his bearing constantly in mind of the basic rights of the
accused, his being well-versed on the case, and his knowing the
fundamental procedures, essential laws and existing jurisprudence. The
right of an accused to counsel finds substance in the performance by the
lawyer of his sworn duty of fidelity to his client. Tersely put, it means an
efficient and truly decisive legal assistance and not a simple perfunctory
representation.

The flawed re-arraignment of accused-appellant and the invalid admission of his

supposed letter-admission were caused by the omission of minimal standards for a
searching inquiry in the former and the admissibility of private documents in the latter.
We cannot conceive any reasonable legal basis to explain the oversight to contest these
errors. Under the same set of facts, it was held in Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v.
Bruno: 44

In ruling upon appellant's claim that he was denied effective assistance

of counsel, we are guided by the standard established by our Supreme Court in
Commonwealth ex rel. Washington v. Maroney . . .

[O]ur inquiry ceases and counsel's assistance is deemed

constitutionally effective once we are able to conclude that the particular
course chosen by counsel had some reasonable basis designed to
effectuate his client's interests. The test is not whether other alternatives
were more reasonable, employing a hindsight evaluation of the record.
Although weigh the alternatives we must, the balance tips in favor of a
finding of effective assistance as soon as it is determined that trial
counsel's decisions had any reasonable basis.

Counsel's failure to insure that the plea colloquy conducted met at least
the minimal standards as set forth in Rule 319 and cases of this Commonwealth
[have] no reasonable legal basis that we can discern. As such, we hold that
appellant was denied effective assistance of counsel.

Considering the other attendant circumstances, with more reason should we so rule
in the instant case.

While no longer material to the merits of the criminal cases now under review, it
appears to us that accused-appellant's warrantless arrest on 3 March 1999 was contrary to
law. We observe with due attention how he was arrested without a warrant and thereafter
subjected to the regular process of preliminary investigation without the benefit of a
waiver as called for in Art. 125, The Revised Penal Code, and Sec. 7 of Rule 112, 1985
Rules of Criminal Procedure. Without belaboring this matter, it is worth stressing that his
warrantless arrest was under no emergency circumstance of flight or risk to law enforcers
and more obviously under none of the circumstances stated in Sec. 5, of Rule 113, 1985
Rules of Criminal Procedure. Unfortunately, the public defender did not bring these facts
to the attention of the trial court for remedial measures.TcDIaA

The accusation and conviction of accused-appellant for attempted rape in Crim.

Case No. 99-02821-D were based on the testimony of Brenda that she was watching
television when her father unexpectedly sat beside her, pushed her to the floor, went on
top of her, and with their clothes on, wiggled his hips while drubbing his penis on her
unexposed vagina. 45 As she further testified, her friends suddenly called out her name
from the house's frontage since they were supposed to attend a wake at a relative's house,
and the unexpected visitors forced accused-appellant to stop his prurient motions. 46
Considering these allegations, the defense could have plausibly argued accused-
appellant's absence of intent to lie with the victim, or given accused-appellant's alleged
willingness to plead guilty, at least conferred with the latter to inquire from him if he did
have the intention then to have carnal knowledge of his daughter since the crime may
constitute acts of lasciviousness and not the crime charged. 47

Still, as regards the conviction for attempted rape, this Court notes the conspicuous
absence of a Notice of Appeal to the Court of Appeals for proper review. It was
necessary to file such notice since the conviction does not fall under Sec. 17, par. (1), RA
296 (The Judiciary Act of 1948) as amended which outlines our jurisdiction over "[a]ll
criminal cases involving offenses for which the penalty imposed is death or life
imprisonment; and those involving other offenses which, although not so punished, arose
out of the same occurrence or which may have been committed by the accused on the
same occasion, as that giving rise to the more serious offense . . . ." 48 In the instant case,
it cannot be said that the attempted rape "arose out of the same occurrence or committed
by the accused on the same occasion" as the more severe crimes of incestuous rape. The
two (2) sets of cases involved distinct offenses committed allegedly at an interval of three
(3) months. The prosecution evidence reveals that the last incident of incestuous rape was
committed on Christmas eve of 1998 while the attempted rape was perpetrated on 1
March 1999. As can be deduced further from the same evidence, the circumstances in
both cases are diverse that clearly accused-appellant was animated by separate
circumstances and criminal intent although both crimes were directed against the same
victim. The prosecution evidence for the attempted rape shows that he merely
commenced the foreplay by mimicking the sexual act while he and his daughter had their
clothes on; while in contrast, the four (4) criminal cases of rape involved consummated
lust.

This omission is fatal since ordinarily the conviction for attempted rape would by
now be already final and executory. No doubt this omission was caused by accused-
appellant's improvident plea of guilty that led the public defender to simply shorten the
proceedings. Given that the plea of guilty has been set aside, effective counseling would
have nonetheless dictated the institution of at least a precautionary appeal to the appellate
court if only to assure protection of his client's rights.

Sixth, for whatever reason, accused-appellant had not found a voice in the
proceedings a quo. Oddly from the preliminary investigation to the promulgation of
judgment his version was never heard of even if prior to his re-arraignment he appeared
adamant at denying the crimes charged against him. This situation is lamentable since at
the preliminary investigation of a criminal case the Constitution requires that an accused
be informed of his right to counsel and provided with a lawyer if he cannot afford to hire
one, and that a waiver of these rights requires the assistance of counsel.

While it is true that unrebutted evidence provides itself an effective corroboration,

49 we cannot give credence to this rule given the circumstances under which such
deficiency came about. For one, had the trial court correctly implemented the
corresponding rules on plea of guilty, we may not be having this situation where only the
private complainant was heard. The absence of the transcripts of stenographic notes of
the arraignment proceedings already denies us "full opportunity to review the cases fairly
and intelligently." 50 After having set aside the plea of guilty, we could never be sure that
accused-appellant would waive telling his version of the story, or that the facts would still
be the same after we hear him say his side. Moreover, the sad fact of this omission is that
obviously we could have learned more about the crimes alleged by the prosecution if
accused-appellant had also participated meaningfully in all the proceedings below. His
voice could better assure the fairness of any action for or against him. As in similar
situations, we should achieve such comforting posture if the court a quo is required to
establish with moral certainty the guilt of accused-appellant who allegedly wanted to
confess his guilt by requiring him to narrate the incident or making him reenact it, or by
causing him to furnish the missing details. 51

Lastly, the idea that in our midst runs a paucity of facts is substantiated by the
assailed Decision of the trial court itself. It bewailed the sloppy pacing of the trial proper,
but in coming up with the judgment of conviction barely summed up the testimony of the
private complainant and other prosecution evidence. No reason is given why the trial
court found the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses credible except for the bare
statement that Brenda wept while on the witness stand and the inadmissible letter
allegedly from accused-appellant admitting the charges against him. The assailed
Judgment fails to state, in short, the factual and legal reasons on which the trial court
based the conviction, contrary to Sec. 2 of Rule 120, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure.
52 Thus even the Decision lacks the "assurance to the parties that, in reaching judgment,
the judge did so through the processes of legal reasoning . . . a safeguard against the
impetuosity of the judge, preventing him from deciding by ipse dixit." 53
 Given the attendant circumstances in the instant case, we are not therefore about to
order the execution of accused-appellant because of default by both the public defender
and, to a certain degree, the trial court. This Court cannot send him to the death chamber
for no matter how outrageous the crime might be or how depraved the offender would
appear to be, the uncompromising rule of law must still prevail. Truly, there is in the
ethics of judgeship the caution expected of every judge, all the more in this case where
the accused stands to be executed four (4) times. The advocate Hugh P. MacMillan drives
this point poignantly: "There is almost always something to be said either way. And it is
of the greatest importance that something should be said, not only in order that each party
may leave the judgment seat satisfied that, whatever has been the decision, the case has
had a fair hearing, but in order that the Court may not reach its judgment without having
had in view all that could be urged to the contrary effect. In order that the decisions of the
Courts may give satisfaction to the parties and at the same time command respect and
acceptance, they must proceed upon full arguments on both sides." 54

Clearly we are not unmindful that the charges against accused-appellant carry the
punishment that is most severe. The death penalty is irrevocable, and deplorably,
experience has shown that innocent persons have at times pleaded guilty. 55 The
dispossessed of fortune should not be disinherited in law. But neither are we oblivious of
Brenda's claim that she was molested and abused successfully by her father four (4)
times. When truth stands, to no person will we sell, or deny, or delay, right or justice, and
rightly then would the consequent public condemnation and punishment of the
perpetrator reassure the victim that she has public recognition and support. 56

Verily, a judgment of conviction cannot stand upon an invalid arraignment. 57

Since the vice of nullity affects not only the criminal cases for incestuous rape under
automatic review but also the criminal case for attempted rape, notwithstanding the
absence of a notice of appeal in the latter, we rule to set aside the Joint Decision dated 3
November 1999 in toto. We therefore remand Crim. Cases Nos. 99-02817-D, 99-02818-
D, 99-02819-D, 99-02820-D and 99-02821-D to the court a quo for rearraignment and
reception of evidence for the prosecution and accused-appellant if both so desire. If the
accused-appellant pleads guilty, the trial court is instructed to conduct the searching
inquiry and to inform him of his right to adduce evidence, in accordance with the
discussion herein made, complete with transcripts of stenographic notes.

WHEREFORE, the Joint Decision dated 3 November 1999 is SET ASIDE. Crim.
Cases Nos. 99-02817-D, 99-02818-D, 99-02819-D, 99-02820-D and 99-02821-D are
REMANDED to the court of origin for rearraignment of accused-appellant ROLANDO
MOLINA Y JOVERE and for further proceedings in accordance with this Decision. For
this purpose, the appropriate law enforcement officers are directed to TRANSFER
accused-appellant from the National Penitentiary in Muntinlupa City where he is
presently detained to the Pangasinan Provincial Jail in Lingayen, Pangasinan, where he
shall be DETAINED for the duration of the proceedings in the trial court.
 SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Melo, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing,

Pardo, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, Jr., Sandoval-Gutierrez and Carpio, JJ., concur.

Puno, J., on official leave.

Buena, J., on official business.

(People v. Molina y Jovere, G.R. Nos. 141129-33, [December 14, 2001], 423 PHIL 637-
|||

664)

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 192898. January 31, 2011.]

SPOUSES ALEXANDER TRINIDAD and CECILIA TRINIDAD,

petitioners, vs. VICTOR ANG, respondent.

RESOLUTION

BRION, J : p

We resolve the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner spouses

Alexander Trinidad and Cecilia Trinidad (petitioners) to challenge our Resolution of
September 29, 2010. Our Resolution denied the petition for review on certiorari for
its failure to state the material dates of receipt of the order 1 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 44, Masbate City, and of filing the motion for reconsideration,
in violation of Sections 4 (b) 2 and 5, 3 Rule 45, in relation to Section 5 (d), 4 Rule 56
of the Rules of Court.
Antecedent Facts
On September 3, 2007, the Office of the City Prosecutor, Masbate City, issued
a Resolution recommending the filing of an Information for Violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 against the petitioners. On October 10, 2007, the petitioners
filed with the Department of Justice (DOJ) a petition for review challenging this
Resolution.
On March 3, 2009, the Office of the City Prosecutor filed before the Municipal
Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Fifth Judicial Region, Masbate City, an Information for
Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 against the petitioners. As the case was
 covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure, the MTCC ordered the petitioners to
submit their counter affidavits and to appear in court within 10 days from receipt of
the said order.
The petitioners filed a Manifestation and Motion to Defer Arraignment and
Proceedings and Hold in Abeyance the Issuance of Warrants of Arrest 5 praying,
among others, for the deferment of their arraignment in view of the pendency of their
petition for review before the DOJ.
The MTCC, in its Order 6 dated May 28, 2009, granted the motion,
"subject . . . to paragraph c[,] Section 11, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure." On August 10, 2009, the MTCC reconsidered this order, and set the
petitioners' arraignment on September 10, 2009. 7
The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the RTC, docketed as SCA
No. 05-2009. The RTC, in its decision 8 of January 6, 2010, denied this petition. The
petitioners moved to reconsider this decision, but the RTC denied their motion in its
order 9 dated July 5, 2010. CSIDEc

The RTC held that the MTCC judge did not err in setting the arraignment of
the petitioners after the lapse of one (1) year and ten (10) months from the filing of the
petition for review with the DOJ. It explained that the cases cited by the petitioners
were decided before the amendment of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
After the amendment of the Rules on December 1, 2000, the Supreme Court applied
the 60-day limit on suspension of arraignment in case of a pendency of a petition for
review with the DOJ.
The petitioners filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari
essentially claiming that the 60-day limit on suspension of arraignment is only a
general rule. They cited several cases to show that the arraignment of an accused
should be deferred until the petition for review with the DOJ is resolved.
As earlier stated, we denied the petition for its failure to state the material dates
of receipt of the assailed RTC order and of filing the motion for reconsideration.
The Motion for Reconsideration
In the present motion for reconsideration, the petitioners claim that the date of
receipt of the assailed RTC order was stated in the petition. The petitioners further
state that they filed the motion for reconsideration on January 2, 2010.
The Court's Ruling

We grant the motion for reconsideration and reinstate the petition for review on
certiorari.

A careful examination of the petition reveals that it stated the date when the
petitioners received a copy of the RTC's assailed order. In addition, the petitioners'
failure to state the material date of filing the motion for reconsideration is only a
formal requirement that warrants the relaxation of the rules in accordance with the
liberal spirit pervading the Rules of Court and in the interest of justice.
Nevertheless, we resolve to deny the petition for its failure to show any
reversible error in the challenged RTC order.
The grounds for suspension of arraignment are provided under Section 11,
Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, which provides:

SEC. 11. Suspension of Arraignment. — Upon motion by the proper

party, the arraignment shall be suspended in the following cases:

(a) The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition

which effectively renders him unable to fully understand the charge
against him and to plead intelligently thereto. In such case, the court
shall order his mental examination and, if necessary, his confinement for
such purpose;

(b) There exists a prejudicial question; and

(c) A petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor is pending at

either the Department of Justice, or the Office of the President;
Provided, that the period of suspension shall not exceed sixty (60)
days counted from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office.

In Samson v. Daway, 10 the Court explained that while the pendency of a

petition for review is a ground for suspension of the arraignment, the aforecited
provision limits the deferment of the arraignment to a period of 60 days reckoned
from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office. It follows, therefore, that
after the expiration of said period, the trial court is bound to arraign the accused
or to deny the motion to defer arraignment. cdrep

In the present case, the petitioners filed their petition for review with the DOJ
on October 10, 2007. When the RTC set the arraignment of the petitioners on August
10, 2009, 1 year and 10 months had already lapsed. This period was way beyond the
60-day limit provided for by the Rules.
In addition, the cases cited by the petitioners — Solar Team Entertainment,
Inc. v. How, 11 Roberts, Jr. v. CA, 12 and Dimatulac v. Villon 13 — were all decided
prior to the amendment to Section 11 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure which took effect on December 1, 2000. At the time these cases were
decided, there was no 60-day limit on the suspension of arraignment.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to:
 (1) GRANT the present motion for reconsideration, and REINSTATE
the petition for review on certiorari; and

(2) DENY the said petition for petitioners' failure to show any reversible
error in the challenged RTC order.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio Morales, Bersamin, Villarama, Jr. and Sereno, JJ., concur.

(Spouses Trinidad v. Ang, G.R. No. 192898 (Resolution), [January 31, 2011], 656 PHIL
|||

216-222)

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 176033. March 11, 2015.]

FELILIBETH AGUINALDO and BENJAMIN PEREZ, petitioners,

vs. REYNALDO P. VENTUS and JOJO B. JOSON, respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J : p

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, seeking to nullify and set aside the Decision 1 dated August 11, 2006 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) and its December 4, 2006 Resolution 2 in CA-G.R. SP No. 92094.
The CA dismissed for lack of merit the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 filed by
petitioners Felilibeth Aguinaldo and Benjamin Perez, praying for the following reliefs:
(1) the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order
to enjoin the public respondent Judge Felixberto T. Olalia from implementing the Orders
dated May 16, 2005 and August 23, 2005; (2) the issuance of a Writ of Certiorari to
annul the said Orders, and (3) the dismissal of the estafa case against them for having
been prematurely filed and for lack of cause of action.

The procedural antecedents are as follows:

On December 2, 2002, private respondents Reynaldo P. Ventus and Jojo B. Joson

filed a Complaint-Affidavit 3 for estafa against petitioners Aguinaldo and Perez before
the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Manila. Claiming to be business partners in
financing casino players, private respondents alleged that sometime in March and April
2002, petitioners connived in convincing them to part with their Two Hundred Sixty
Thousand (P260,000.00) Pesos in consideration of a pledge of two motor vehicles which
the latter had misrepresented to be owned by Aguinaldo, but turned out to be owned by
one Levita De Castro, manager/operator of LEDC Rent-A-Car.

On January 15, 2003, Perez filed his Counter-Affidavit, 4 denying the accusation
against him, and claiming that his only participation in the transaction between private
respondents and Aguinaldo was limited to having initially introduced them to each other.

On January 22, 2003, private respondents filed their Reply-Affidavit, 5 asserting

that Perez was the one who showed them photocopies of the registration paper of the
motor vehicles in the name of Aguinaldo, as well as the one who personally took them
out from the rent-a-car company.

On January 29, 2003, Perez filed his Rejoinder-Affidavit, 6 stating that neither
original nor photocopies of the registration was required by private respondents to be
submitted to them because from the very start, they were informed by Aguinaldo that she
merely leased the vehicles from LEDC Rent-a-Car.

On February 25, 2003, Assistant City Prosecutor (ACP) Renato F. Gonzaga issued
a Resolution 7 recommending both petitioners to be indicted in court for estafa under
Article 315, paragraph (2) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). He also noted that
Aguinaldo failed to appear and to submit any controverting evidence despite the
subpoena.

On July 16, 2003, an Information 8 (I.S. No. 02L-51569) charging petitioners with
the crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2 (a) of the RPC was filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Manila. Docketed as Criminal Case No. 03-216182, entitled
"People of the Philippines v. Felilibeth Aguinaldo and Benjamin Perez," the case was
raffled to the public respondent.

On July 31, 2003, Perez was arrested, so he filed an Urgent Motion for Reduction
of Bail to be Posted in Cash, which the public respondent granted in an Order of even
date. 9TIHCcA

On the same day, petitioners filed through counsel a Very Urgent Motion to Recall
or Quash Warrants of Arrest, 10 alleging that the Resolution dated February 25, 2003 has
not yet attained finality, and that they intended to file a motion for reconsideration.

On August 4, 2003, petitioners jointly filed with the OCP of Manila their "Motion
for Reconsideration and Motion for the Withdrawal of the Information Prematurely Filed
with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, City of Manila." 11 Citing the Counter-Affidavit
and Rejoinder-Affidavit of Perez, Aguinaldo asserted, among others, that no deceit or
false pretenses was committed because private respondents were fully aware that she
does not own the pledged motor vehicles.

On August 6, 2003, the public respondent issued an Order 12 granting the motion
for withdrawal of information, and directing the recall of the arrest warrant only insofar
as Aguinaldo was concerned, pending resolution of her motion for reconsideration with
the OCP.

On August 9, 2003, petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Cancellation of

Arraignment, pending resolution of their motion for reconsideration filed with the OCP
of Manila. Upon the prosecution's motion, 13 the public respondent ordered the
proceedings to be deferred until the resolution of petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
14

On December 23, 2003, the public respondent ordered the case archived pending
resolution of petitioners' motion for reconsideration with the OCP of Manila. 15

On January 16, 2004, the OCP of Manila, through ACP Antonio M. Israel, filed a
Motion to Set Case for Trial, 16 considering that petitioners' motions for reconsideration
and for withdrawal of the information have already been denied for lack of merit.

On February 27, 2004, petitioners filed with the Department of Justice (DOJ) a
petition for review 17 in I.S. No. 02L-51569 for estafa, entitled "Benjamin Perez and
Felilibeth Aguinaldo v. Reynaldo P. Ventus and Jojo B. Joson."

Acting on the prosecution's recommendation for the denial of petitioners' motions

for reconsideration and withdrawal of the information, and its motion to set the case for
trial, the public respondent issued an Order 18 dated March 15, 2004 directing the
issuance of a warrant of arrest against Aguinaldo and the setting of the case for
arraignment.

On March 26, 2004, petitioners filed an Urgent Motion to Cancel Arraignment and
Suspend Further Proceedings, 19 until their petition for review before the DOJ is
resolved with finality. Petitioners reiterated the same prayer in their Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration 20 of the Order dated March 15, 2004.

On April 16, 2004, the public respondent granted petitioners' urgent motion to
cancel arraignment and suspend proceedings, and motion for reconsideration. 21

On June 23, 2004, Levita De Castro, through the Law Firm of Lapeña and
Associates, filed a Motion to Reinstate Case and to Issue Warrant of Arrest. 22 De Castro
alleged that she was the private complainant in the estafa case that had been ordered
archived. Petitioners filed an Opposition with Motion to Expunge, 23 alleging that De
Castro is not a party to the said case, which is in active file, awaiting the resolution of
their petition for review before the DOJ.

On October 15, 2004, De Castro filed a Manifestation 24 informing the public

respondent that the DOJ had already promulgated a Resolution dated September 6, 2004
denying petitioners' petition for review in I.S. Nos. 02G-29349 & 02G-28820 for estafa,
entitled "Levita De Castro v. Felilibeth Aguinaldo." 25

On May 16, 2005, the public respondent issued an Order granting the Motion to
Reinstate Case and to Issue Warrant of Arrest, thus:

Pending with this Court are (1) Motion to Reinstate Case and to Issue
Warrant of Arrest against accused Aguinaldo filed by private prosecutor with
conformity of the public prosecutor. . . .

It appears from the records that:

(1) the warrant of arrest issued against accused Aguinaldo was

recalled pending resolution of the Petition for Review filed with the
DOJ; . . .

(2) the Petition for Review was subsequently dismissed . . .

(3) accused Aguinaldo has not yet posted bail bond. aSIHcT

In view of the foregoing, (the) Motion to Reinstate Case and to Issue

Warrant of Arrest is GRANTED. Let this case be REINSTATED and let
warrant of arrest be issued against accused Aguinaldo.

xxx xxx xxx

SO ORDERED. 26

On May 30, 2005, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to
Quash Warrant of Arrest. 27

On August 23, 2005, the public respondent issued an Order denying petitioners'
Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Quash Warrant of Arrest, and setting
petitioners' arraignment, as the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure (or Rules of Court)
allows only a 60-day period of suspension of arraignment. Citing Crespo v. Mogul, 28 he
also ruled that the issuance of the warrant of arrest is best left to the discretion of the trial
court. He also noted that records do not show that the DOJ has resolved the petition for
review, although photocopies were presented by De Castro.
 Aggrieved, petitioners filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court, attributing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the public respondent in issuing the Orders dated May 16, 2005
and August 23, 2005. On August 11, 2006, the CA dismissed the petition for lack of
merit. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA denied it in a Resolution
29 dated December 4, 2006. Hence, this instant petition for review on certiorari.

Petitioners raise the following issues:

I.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO APPRECIATE

THAT THE MOTION TO REINSTATE THE CASE AND ISSUE A
WARRANT OF ARREST WAS FILED BY ONE LEVITA DE CASTRO
WHO IS NOT A PARTY TO CRIMINAL CASE NO. 03-21[6]182.

II.

A PROCEDURAL TECHNICALITY THAT THE SUSPENSION ALLOWED

FOR ARRAIGNMENT IS ALREADY BEYOND THE 60-DAY PERIOD
MAY BE RELAXED IN THE INTEREST OF AN ORDERLY AND SPEEDY
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.

III.

THE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION ON THE I.S. NO. 02L-51569

(CRIMINAL CASE NO. 03-21[6]182) BY THE OFFICE OF THE CITY
PROSECUTOR OF MANILA HAS NOT YET BEEN COMPLETED. 30

On the first issue, petitioners argue that the public respondent erred in issuing the
Order dated May 16, 2005 reinstating the case and issuing an arrest warrant against
Aguinaldo. They point out that the Motion to Reinstate the Case and to Issue a Warrant
of Arrest against Aguinaldo was filed by De Castro who is not a party in Criminal Case
No. 03-216182, entitled "People of the Philippines v. Felilibeth Aguinaldo and Benjamin
Perez," instead of private complainants Reynaldo P. Ventus and Jojo B. Joson. They also
assert that said motion was erroneously granted based on the purported denial of their
petition for review by the DOJ, despite a Certification showing that their actual petition
in I.S. Number 02L-51569, entitled "Reynaldo Ventus, et al. v. Felilibeth Aguinaldo," has
not yet been resolved and is still pending with the DOJ.

On the second issue, petitioners argue that the provision of Section 11, Rule 116 of
the Rules of Court limiting the suspension for arraignment to only sixty (60) days is
merely directory; thus, it cannot deprive petitioners of their procedural right to due
process, as their petition for review has not yet been resolved by the DOJ.
 On the third issue, petitioners take exception that even before they could receive a
copy of the DOJ resolution denying their petition for review, and thus move for its
reconsideration, the Information in Criminal Case No. 03-216182 had already been filed
with the RTC on July 16, 2003. They contend that such precipitate filing of the
Information and issuance of a warrant of arrest put petitioners at the risk of incarceration
without the preliminary investigation having been completed because they were not
afforded their right to file a motion for reconsideration of the DOJ resolution. In support
of their contention, they raise the following arguments: that the right to preliminary
investigation is a substantive, not merely a procedural right; that an Information filed
without affording the respondent his right to file a motion for reconsideration of an
adverse resolution, is fatally premature; and, that a denial of a complete preliminary
investigation deprives the accused of the full measure of his right to due process and
infringes on his constitutional right to liberty.

The petition is denied for lack of merit. EAISDH

On the first issue, petitioners are correct in pointing out that the Motion to
Reinstate the Case and Issue a Warrant of Arrest 31 was filed by one Levita De Castro
who is not a party to Criminal Case No. 03-216182. Records show that De Castro is not
even a private complainant, but a mere witness for being the owner of the vehicles
allegedly used by petitioners in defrauding and convincing private respondents to part
with their P260,000.00. Thus, the public respondent should have granted petitioners'
motion to expunge, and treated De Castro's motion as a mere scrap of paper with no legal
effect, as it was filed by one who is not a party to that case.

Petitioners are also correct in noting that De Castro's motion was granted based on
the purported dismissal of their petition for review with the DOJ. In reinstating the case
and issuing the arrest warrant against Aguinaldo, the public respondent erroneously relied
on the DOJ Resolution dated September 6, 2004 dismissing the petition for review in a
different case, i.e., I.S. Nos. 02G-29349 & 02G-28820, entitled "Levita De Castro v.
Felilibeth Aguinaldo, for two (2) counts of estafa." As correctly noted by petitioners,
however, their petition for review with the DOJ is still pending resolution. In particular,
Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Miguel F. Guido, Jr. certified that based on available
records of the Office of the Chief State Prosecutor, their petition for review filed in I.S.
Number 02L-51569, entitled "Reynaldo Ventus, et al. v. Felilibeth Aguinaldo" for estafa,
is still pending resolution as of May 27, 2005. 32 It bears stressing that their petition
stemmed from Criminal Case No. 03-216812, entitled "People of the Philippines v.
Felilibeth Aguinaldo and Benjamin Perez" wherein the public respondent issued the
interlocutory orders assailed before the CA, and now before the Court.

On the second issue, the Court disagrees with petitioners' contention that the
provision of Section 11 (c), 33 Rule 116 of the Rules of Court limiting the suspension for
arraignment to only sixty (60) days is merely directory; thus, the estafa case against them
cannot proceed until the DOJ resolves their petition for review with finality.

In Samson v. Judge Daway, 34 the Court explained that while the pendency of a
petition for review is a ground for suspension of the arraignment, the aforecited provision
limits the deferment of the arraignment to a period of 60 days reckoned from the filing of
the petition with the reviewing office. It follows, therefore, that after the expiration of
said period, the trial court is bound to arraign the accused or to deny the motion to defer
arraignment. 35

In Diño v. Olivarez, 36 the Court held that it did not sanction an indefinite
suspension of the proceedings in the trial court. Its reliance on the reviewing authority,
the Justice Secretary, to decide the appeal at the soonest possible time was anchored on
the rule provided under Department Memorandum Order No. 12, dated 3 July 2000,
which mandates that the period for the disposition of appeals or petitions for review shall
be seventy-five (75) days. 37

In Heirs of Feraren v. Court of Appeals, 38 the Court ruled that in a long line of
decisions, it has repeatedly held that while rules of procedure are liberally construed, the
provisions on reglementary periods are strictly applied, indispensable as they are to the
prevention of needless delays, and are necessary to the orderly and speedy discharge of
judicial business. After all, rules of procedure do not exist for the convenience of the
litigants, and they are not to be trifled with lightly or overlooked by the mere expedience
of invoking "substantial justice." Relaxation or suspension of procedural rules, or the
exemption of a case from their operation, is warranted only by compelling reasons or
when the purpose of justice requires it. 39

Consistent with the foregoing jurisprudence, and there being no such reasons
shown to warrant relaxation of procedural rules in this case, the CA correctly ruled, thus:

In the case at bar, the petitioners' petition for review was filed with the
Secretary of Justice on February 27, 2004. As early as April 16, 2004, upon the
petitioners' motion, the arraignment of the petitioners herein was ordered
deferred by the public respondent. We believe that the period of one year and
one month from April 16, 2004 to May 16, 2005 when the public respondent
ordered the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of petitioner Aguinaldo, was
more than ample time to give the petitioners the opportunity to obtain a
resolution of their petition for review from the DOJ. The petitioners though
submitted a Certification from the DOJ dated May 30, 2005 stating that their
petition for review is pending resolution by the Department as of May 27, 2005.
However, such delay in the resolution does not extend the period of 60 days
prescribed under the afore-quoted Section 11(c), Rule 116 of the Revised Rules
on Criminal Procedure. Besides, the petitioners may be faulted for the delay in
the resolution of their petition. According to their counsel, she received the
 letter dated April 15, 2004 from the DOJ requiring her to submit the pertinent
pleadings relative to petitioners' petition for review; admittedly, however, the
same was complied with only on October 15, 2004. We therefore find that the
trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed
orders. 40

On the third issue, the Court is likewise unconvinced by petitioners' argument that
the precipitate filing of the Information and the issuance of a warrant of arrest put
petitioners at the risk of incarceration without the preliminary investigation having been
completed because they were not afforded their right to file a motion for reconsideration
of the DOJ resolution.

While they are correct in stating that the right to preliminary investigation is a
substantive, not merely a procedural right, petitioners are wrong in arguing that the
Information filed, without affording the respondent his right to file a motion for
reconsideration of an adverse DOJ resolution, is fatally premature. In support of their
argument, petitioners cite Sales v. Sandiganbayan 41 wherein it was held that since filing
of a motion for reconsideration is an integral part of the preliminary investigation proper,
an Information filed without first affording the accused his right to a motion for
reconsideration, is tantamount to a denial of the right itself to a preliminary investigation.
cTCADI

The Court finds petitioners' reliance on Sales 42 as misplaced. A closer look into
said case would reveal that the accused therein was denied his right to move for a
reconsideration or a reinvestigation of an adverse resolution in a preliminary
investigation under the Rules of Procedure of the Ombudsman before the filing of an
Information. In contrast, petitioners in this case were afforded their right to move for
reconsideration of the adverse resolution in a preliminary investigation when they filed
their "Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for the Withdrawal of Information
Prematurely Filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, City of Manila," 43 pursuant
to Section 3 of the 2000 National Prosecution Service (NPS Rule on Appeal) 44 and
Section 56 of the Manual for Prosecutors. 45

With the Information for estafa against petitioners having been filed on July 16,
2003, the public respondent cannot be faulted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing
the August 23, 2005 Order denying their motion to quash warrant of arrest, and setting
their arraignment, pending the final resolution of their petition for review by the DOJ.
The Court believes that the period of almost one (1) year and seven (7) months from the
time petitioners filed their petition for review with the DOJ on February 27, 2004 to
September 14, 2005 46 when the trial court finally set their arraignment, was more than
ample time to give petitioners the opportunity to obtain a resolution of their petition. In
fact, the public respondent had been very liberal with petitioners in applying Section 11
(c), Rule 116 of the Rules of Court which limits the suspension of arraignment to a 60-
day period from the filing of such petition. Indeed, with more than eleven (11) years
having elapsed from the filing of the petition for review and petitioners have yet to be
arraigned, it is now high time for the continuation of the trial on the merits in the criminal
case below, as the 60-day period counted from the filing of the petition for review with
the DOJ had long lapsed.

On whether petitioners were accorded their right to a complete preliminary

investigation as part of their right to due process, the Court rules in the affirmative.
Having submitted his Counter-Affidavit and Rejoinder-Affidavit to the OCP of Manila
before the filing of Information for estafa, Perez cannot be heard to decry that his right to
preliminary investigation was not completed. For her part, while Aguinaldo was not
personally informed of any notice of preliminary investigation prior to the filing of the
Information, she was nonetheless given opportunity to be heard during such
investigation. In petitioners' motion for reconsideration 47 of the February 25, 2003
Resolution of ACP Gonzaga, Aguinaldo relied mostly on the Counter-Affidavit and
Rejoinder-Affidavit of Perez to assail the recommendation of the prosecutor to indict her
for estafa. Since the filing of such motion for reconsideration was held to be consistent
with the principle of due process and allowed under Section 56 of the Manual for
Prosecutors, 48 she cannot complain denial of her right to preliminary investigation.

Both petitioners cannot, therefore, claim denial of their right to a complete

preliminary investigation as part of their right to due process. After all, "[d]ue process
simply demands an opportunity to be heard. Due process is satisfied when the parties are
afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their respective sides of the
controversy. Where an opportunity to be heard either through oral arguments or through
pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process." 49

In fine, the Court holds that public respondent erred in issuing the May 16, 2005
Order granting the Motion to Reinstate Case and to Issue Warrant of Arrest, as it was
filed by one who is not a party to the case, and it was based on the DOJ's dismissal of a
petition for review in a different case. Nevertheless, the Court upholds the CA ruling that
the public respondent committed no grave abuse of discretion when he issued the August
23, 2005 Order denying petitioners' motion to quash warrant of arrest, and setting their
arraignment, despite the pendency of their petition for review with the DOJ. For one, the
public respondent had been very liberal in applying Section 11 (c), Rule 116 of the Rules
of Court which allows suspension of arraignment for a period of 60 days only. For
another, records show that petitioners were given opportunity to be heard during the
preliminary investigation of their estafa case.

Considering that this case had been held in abeyance long enough without
petitioners having been arraigned, the Court directs the remand of this case to the trial
court for trial on the merits with strict observance of Circular No. 38-98 dated August 11,
1998, or the "Implementing the Provisions of Republic Act No. 8493, entitled 'An Act to
Ensure a Speedy Trial of All Criminal Cases Before the Sandiganbayan, Regional Trial
Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Municipal Trial Court
and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for Other
Purposes.'" In this regard, suffice it to state that petitioners cannot invoke violation of
their right to speedy trial because Section 9 (3) of Circular No. 38-98 excludes in
computing the time within which trial must commence the delay resulting from
extraordinary remedies against interlocutory orders, such as their petitions before the CA
and the Court.

Finally, in order to avoid delay in the proceedings, judges are reminded that the
pendency of a motion for reconsideration, motion for reinvestigation, or petition for
review is not a cause for the quashal of a warrant of arrest previously issued because the
quashal of a warrant of arrest may only take place upon the finding that no probable
cause exists. Moreover, judges should take note of the following: HaIESC

1. If there is a pending motion for reconsideration or motion for

reinvestigation of the resolution of the public prosecutor, the court
may suspend the proceedings upon motion by the parties.
However, the court should set the arraignment of the accused and
direct the public prosecutor to submit the resolution disposing of
the motion on or before the period fixed by the court, which in no
instance could be more than the period fixed by the court counted
from the granting of the motion to suspend arraignment, otherwise
the court will proceed with the arraignment as scheduled and
without further delay.

2. If there is a pending petition for review before the DOJ, the court may
suspend the proceedings upon motion by the parties. However, the
court should set the arraignment of the accused and direct the DOJ
to submit the resolution disposing of the petition on or before the
period fixed by the Rules which, in no instance, could be more
than sixty (60) days from the filing of the Petition for Review
before the DOJ, otherwise, the court will proceed with the
arraignment as scheduled and without further delay.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision

dated August 11, 2006 of the Court of Appeals and its Resolution dated December 4,
2006 in CA-G.R. SP No. 92094, are AFFIRMED. Considering that the proceedings in
this criminal case had been held in abeyance long enough, let the records of this case be
remanded to the trial court which is hereby DIRECTED to try the case on the merits
with dispatch in accordance with the Court's Circular No. 38-98 dated August 11, 1998.

SO ORDERED.
 Velasco, Jr., Villarama, Jr., Reyes and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.

||| (Aguinaldo v. Ventus, G.R. No. 176033, [March 11, 2015], 755 PHIL 536-553)

IRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 191566. July 17, 2013.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. EDGARDO V.

ODTUHAN, respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J : p

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed
by petitioner People of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General,
against respondent Edgardo V. Odtuhan assailing the Court of Appeals Decision 1 dated
December 17, 2009 and Resolution 2 dated March 4, 2010 in CA-G.R. SP No. 108616.
The assailed decision granted the petition for certiorari filed by respondent, and ordered
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 27, to give due course to and receive
evidence on respondent's motion to quash and resolve the case with dispatch, while the
assailed resolution denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration. TaCIDS

The facts of the case follow:

On July 2, 1980, respondent married Jasmin Modina (Modina). 3 On October 28,

1993, respondent married Eleanor A. Alagon (Alagon). 4 Sometime in August 1994, he
filed a petition for annulment of his marriage with Modina. 5 On February 23, 1999, the
RTC of Pasig City, Branch 70 granted respondent's petition and declared his marriage
with Modina void ab initio for lack of a valid marriage license. 6 On November 10, 2003,
Alagon died. In the meantime, in June 2003, private complainant Evelyn Abesamis
Alagon learned of respondent's previous marriage with Modina. 7 She thus filed a
Complaint-Affidavit 8 charging respondent with Bigamy.

On April 15, 2005, respondent was indicted in an Information 9 for Bigamy

committed as follows:

That on or about October 28, 1993, in the City of Manila, Philippines,

the said accused being then legally married to JASMIN MODINA and without
 such marriage having been legally dissolved, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously contract a second or subsequent marriage with
ELEANOR A. ALAGON, which second/subsequent marriage has all the
essential requisites for validity.

Contrary to law. 10

On February 5, 2008, respondent filed an Omnibus Motion 11 praying that he be

allowed to present evidence to support his motion; that his motion to quash be granted;
and that the case be dismissed. Respondent moved for the quashal of the information on
two grounds, to wit: (1) that the facts do not charge the offense of bigamy; and (2) that
the criminal action or liability has been extinguished. 12

On September 4, 2008, the RTC 13 issued an Order 14 denying respondent's Omnibus

Motion. The RTC held that the facts alleged in the information — that there was a
valid marriage between respondent and Modina and without such marriage having
been dissolved, respondent contracted a second marriage with Alagon — constitute
the crime of bigamy. The trial court further held that neither can the information be
quashed on the ground that criminal liability has been extinguished, because the
declaration of nullity of the first marriage is not one of the modes of extinguishing
criminal liability. Respondent's motion for reconsideration was likewise denied in an
Order 15 dated February 20, 2009.

Aggrieved, respondent instituted a special civil action on certiorari under Rule 65

of the Rules of Court 16 before the CA, assailing the denial of his motion to quash the
information despite the fact that his first marriage with Modina was declared null and
void ab initio prior to the filing of the bigamy case. 17
TADIHE

On December 17, 2009, the CA rendered the assailed decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for certiorari

is hereby GRANTED. The RTC, Branch 27, Manila is hereby ordered to give
due course to and receive evidence on the petitioner's motion to quash and
resolve the case with dispatch.

SO ORDERED. 18

The CA applied the conclusion made by the Court in Morigo v. People, 19 and
held that there is cogent basis in looking into the motion to quash filed by respondent, for
if the evidence would establish that his first marriage was indeed void ab initio, one
essential element of the crime of bigamy would be lacking. 20 The appellate court further
held that respondent is even better off than Morigo which thus calls for the application of
such doctrine, considering that respondent contracted the second marriage after filing the
petition for the declaration of nullity of his first marriage and he obtained the favorable
declaration before the complaint for bigamy was filed against him. 21 The CA thus
concluded that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in denying respondent's motion to
quash the information, considering that the facts alleged in the information do not charge
an offense. 22

With the denial of the motion for reconsideration before the CA, petitioner filed a
petition before the Court in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court based on the following grounds:

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN

IT RENDERED ITS DECISION DATED DECEMBER 17, 2009
GRANTING RESPONDENT'S PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND THE
RESOLUTION DATED MARCH 4, 2010 DENYING PETITIONER'S
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, CONSIDERING THAT:

I.

THE INFORMATION CHARGING RESPONDENT OF

BIGAMY SUFFICIENTLY ALLEGES ALL THE
ELEMENTS CONSTITUTING SAID OFFENSE.

II.

THE SUBSEQUENT COURT JUDGMENT DECLARING

RESPONDENT'S FIRST MARRIAGE VOID AB INITIO DID
NOT EXTINGUISH RESPONDENT'S CRIMINAL
LIABILITY WHICH ALREADY ATTACHED PRIOR TO
SAID JUDGMENT. 23 aHATDI

The petition is meritorious.

The issues are not novel and have been squarely ruled upon by this Court in
Montañez v. Cipriano, 24 Teves v. People, 25 and Antone v. Beronilla. 26

In Montañez, respondent Cipriano married Socrates in April 1976, but during the
subsistence of their marriage on January 24, 1983, respondent married Silverio. In 2001,
respondent filed a petition for the annulment of her marriage with Socrates on the ground
of psychological incapacity which was granted on July 18, 2003. On May 14, 2004,
petitioner filed a complaint for bigamy against respondent. The latter, however, moved
for the quashal of the information and dismissal of the criminal complaint alleging that
her first marriage had already been declared void ab initio prior to the filing of the
bigamy case.
 In Teves, petitioner married Thelma on November 26, 1992. During the
subsistence of their marriage on December 10, 2001, he again married Edita. On May 4,
2006, petitioner obtained a declaration of her marriage with Thelma null and void on the
ground that the latter is physically incapacitated to comply with her marital obligations.
On June 8, 2006, an Information for Bigamy was filed against petitioner. The court
eventually convicted petitioner of the crime charged.

In Antone, petitioner married respondent in 1978, but during the subsistence of

their marriage, respondent contracted a second marriage in 1991. On April 26, 2007,
respondent obtained a declaration of nullity of her first marriage which decision became
final and executory on May 15, 2007. On June 21, 2007, the prosecution filed an
information for bigamy against respondent which the latter sought to be quashed on the
ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense.

The present case stemmed from similar procedural and factual antecedents as in
the above cases. As in Antone and Montañez, respondent moved to quash the information
on the grounds that the facts do not charge the offense of bigamy and that his criminal
liability has been extinguished both because of the declaration of nullity of the first
marriage. The RTC refused to quash the information. On petition for certiorari, the CA,
however, reached a different conclusion.

As defined in Antone, "a motion to quash information is the mode by which an

accused assails the validity of a criminal complaint or information filed against him for
insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defects which are apparent in the face of
the information." It is a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the information.
The fundamental test in determining the sufficiency of the material averments in an
Information is whether or not the facts alleged therein, which are hypothetically admitted,
would establish the essential elements of the crime defined by law. Evidence aliunde or
matters extrinsic of the information are not to be considered. 27 To be sure, a motion to
quash should be based on a defect in the information which is evident on its fact. 28
Thus, if the defect can be cured by amendment or if it is based on the ground that the
facts charged do not constitute an offense, the prosecution is given by the court the
opportunity to correct the defect by amendment. 29 If the motion to quash is sustained,
the court may order that another complaint or information be filed 30 except when the
information is quashed on the ground of extinction of criminal liability or double
jeopardy. 31 DcSACE

An examination of the information filed against respondent, however, shows the

sufficiency of the allegations therein to constitute the crime of bigamy as it contained all
the elements of the crime as provided for in Article 349 32 of the Revised Penal Code, to
wit:

(1)   That the offender has been legally married;

 (2)   That the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her
spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead
according to the Civil Code;

(3)   That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and

(4)   That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for
validity. 33

Here, the information contained the following allegations: (1) that respondent is
legally married to Modina; (2) that without such marriage having been legally dissolved;
(3) that respondent willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously contracted a second marriage
with Alagon; and (4) that the second marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.
Respondent's evidence showing the court's declaration that his marriage to Modina is null
and void from the beginning because of the absence of a marriage license is only an
evidence that seeks to establish a fact contrary to that alleged in the information that a
first valid marriage was subsisting at the time he contracted the second marriage. This
should not be considered at all, because matters of defense cannot be raised in a motion
to quash. 34 It is not proper, therefore, to resolve the charges at the very outset without
the benefit of a full blown trial. The issues require a fuller examination and it would be
unfair to shut off the prosecution at this stage of the proceedings and to quash the
information on the basis of the document presented by respondent. 35 With the
presentation of the court decree, no facts have been brought out which destroyed the
prima facie truth accorded to the allegations of the information on the hypothetical
admission thereof.

Respondent's motion to quash was founded on the trial court's declaration that his
marriage with Modina is null and void ab initio. He claims that with such declaration,
one of the elements of the crime is wanting. Thus, the allegations in the information do
not charge the offense of bigamy, or at the very least, such court decree extinguished his
criminal liability. Both respondent and the CA heavily relied on the Court's
pronouncement in Morigo v. People 36 where the accused therein was acquitted because
the elements of the crime of bigamy were incomplete. In said case, the first marriage was
declared null and void, because the parties only signed the marriage contract without the
presence of a solemnizing officer. Considering, therefore, that the declaration of nullity
retroacts to the date of the first marriage, the Court held that there was no marriage to
speak of when the accused contracted the second marriage. Logically, the accused was
acquitted.

The Family Code has settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the
matter. A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required
either as a cause of action or a ground for defense. 37 It has been held in a number of
cases that a judicial declaration of nullity is required before a valid subsequent marriage
can be contracted; or else, what transpires is a bigamous marriage, reprehensible and
immoral. 38 IDScTE

What makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts a second
or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage. 39 Parties to the
marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be
submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage
is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration, the
presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage
before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being
prosecuted for bigamy. 40 If we allow respondent's line of defense and the CA's
ratiocination, a person who commits bigamy can simply evade prosecution by
immediately filing a petition for the declaration of nullity of his earlier marriage and hope
that a favorable decision is rendered therein before anyone institutes a complaint against
him. 41

Respondent, likewise, claims that there are more reasons to quash the information
against him, because he obtained the declaration of nullity of marriage before the filing of
the complaint for bigamy against him. Again, we cannot sustain such contention. In
addition to the discussion above, settled is the rule that criminal culpability attaches to the
offender upon the commission of the offense and from that instant, liability appends to
him until extinguished as provided by law and that the time of filing of the criminal
complaint or information is material only for determining prescription. 42

Thus, as held in Antone:

To conclude, the issue on the declaration of nullity of the marriage

between petitioner and respondent only after the latter contracted the subsequent
marriage is, therefore, immaterial for the purpose of establishing that the facts
alleged in the information for Bigamy does not constitute an offense. Following
the same rationale, neither may such defense be interposed by the respondent in
his motion to quash by way of exception to the established rule that facts
contrary to the allegations in the information are matters of defense which may
be raised only during the presentation of evidence. 43

In view of the foregoing, the CA erred in granting the petition for certiorari filed
by respondent. The RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying his motion
to quash and to allow him to present evidence to support his omnibus motion.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Court of Appeals

Decision dated December 17, 2009 and Resolution dated March 4, 2010 in CA-G.R. SP
No. 108616 are SET ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 05-235814 is REMANDED to the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 27 for further proceedings.
 SO ORDERED. HcACST

Velasco, Jr., Abad, Mendoza and Leonen, JJ., concur.

||| (People v. Odtuhan, G.R. No. 191566, [July 17, 2013], 714 PHIL 349-360)

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 173588. April 22, 2009.]

ARIEL M. LOS BAÑOS, on behalf of P/Supt. Victor Arevalo, SPO2

Marcial Olympia, SPO1 Rocky Mercene and PO1 Raul Adlawan, and
in his personal capacity, petitioner, vs. JOEL R. PEDRO, respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J : p

We review in this petition for review on certiorari 1 the September 19, 2005
decision 2 and the July 6, 2006 resolution 3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
SP No. 80223. The petition seeks to revive the case against respondent Joel R. Pedro
(Pedro) for election gun ban violation after the CA declared the case permanently
dismissed pursuant to Section 8, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court. DCcIaE

THE ANTECEDENTS
Pedro was charged in court for carrying a loaded firearm without the required
written authorization from the Commission on Elections (Comelec) a day before the
May 14, 2001 national and local elections. The Information reads:

That on or about the 13th day of May 2001 at about 4:00 o'clock in the
afternoon, in [S]itio Bantauyan, [B]arangay Bantad, Municipality of Boac,
Province of Marinduque, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously carry a Revolver Cal. 357, Magnum Ruger 100
loaded with six (6) ammunitions, with Serial No. 173-56836 outside his
residence during the election period, without authorization in writing from the
Commission on Election[s].

CONTRARY TO LAW. 4
 The accusation was based on Batas Pambansa Bilang 881 or the Omnibus
Election Code (Code) after the Marinduque Philippine National Police (PNP) caught
Pedro illegally carrying his firearm at a checkpoint at Boac, Marinduque. The Boac
checkpoint team was composed of Police Senior Inspector Victor V. Arevalo, SPO2
Marshal Olympia, SPO1 Rocky Mercene, and PO1 Raul Adlawan. The team stopped
a silver-gray Toyota Hi-Ace with plate number WHT-371 on the national highway,
coming from the Boac town proper. When Pedro (who was seated at the rear portion)
opened the window, Arevalo saw a gun carry case beside him. Pedro could not show
any COMELEC authority to carry a firearm when the checkpoint team asked for one,
but he opened the case when asked to do so. The checkpoint team saw the following
when the case was opened: 1) one Revolver 357 Magnum Ruger GP100, serial
number 173-56836, loaded with six ammunitions; 2) one ammunition box containing
100 bullets; 3) two pieces speed loader with six ammunitions each; and 4) one set ear
protector. Pedro was with three other men. The checkpoint team brought all of them
to the Boac police station for investigation.
The Boac election officer filed a criminal complaint against Pedro for violating
the election gun ban, i.e., for carrying a firearm outside of his residence or place of
business without any authority from the Comelec. After an inquest, the Marinduque
provincial prosecutor filed the above Information against Pedro with the Marinduque
Regional Trial Court (RTC) for violation of the Code's Article XXII, Section 261 (q),
5 in relation to Section 264. 6
Pedro filed a Motion for Preliminary Investigation, which the RTC granted. 7
The preliminary investigation, however, did not materialize. Instead, Pedro filed with
the RTC a Motion to Quash, arguing that the Information "contains averments which,
if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification 8 and/or that the facts charged
do not constitute an offense." 9 Pedro attached to his motion a Comelec Certification
dated September 24, 2001 that he was "exempted" from the gun ban. The provincial
prosecutor opposed the motion.
The RTC quashed the Information and ordered the police and the prosecutors
to return the seized articles to Pedro. 10
IHCSET

The petitioner, private prosecutor Ariel Los Baños (Los Baños), representing
the checkpoint team, moved to reopen the case, as Pedro's Comelec Certification was
a "falsification", and the prosecution was "deprived of due process" when the judge
quashed the information without a hearing. Attached to Los Baños' motion were two
Comelec certifications stating that: (1) Pedro was not exempted from the firearm ban;
and (2) the signatures in the Comelec Certification of September 24, 2001 were
forged.
The RTC reopened the case for further proceedings, as Pedro did not object to
Los Baños' motion. 11 Pedro moved for the reconsideration of the RTC's order
primarily based on Section 8 of Rule 117, 12 arguing that the dismissal had become
permanent. He likewise cited the public prosecutor's lack of express approval of the
motion to reopen the case.
The public prosecutor, however, manifested his express conformity with the
motion to reopen the case. The trial court, for its part, rejected the position that
Section 8, Rule 117 applies, and explained that this provision refers to situations
where both the prosecution and the accused mutually consented to the dismissal of the
case, or where the prosecution or the offended party failed to object to the dismissal of
the case, and not to a situation where the information was quashed upon motion of the
accused and over the objection of the prosecution. The RTC, thus, set Pedro's
arraignment date.
Pedro filed with the CA a petition for certiorari and prohibition to nullify the
RTC's mandated reopening. 13 He argued that the RTC committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling that the dismissal
contemplated under Section 8, Rule 117 refers to situations where either the
prosecution and the accused mutually consented to, or where the prosecution alone
moved for, the provisional dismissal of the case; in rejecting his argument that the
prescriptive periods under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code 14 or Act No. 3326
15 find no application to his case as the filing of the Information against him stopped
the running of the prescriptive periods so that the prescription mandated by these laws
became irrelevant; and, in setting the case for arraignment and pre-trial conference,
despite being barred under Section 8 of Rule 117.
THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION
The CA initially denied Pedro's petition. For accuracy, we quote the material
portions of its ruling:

The petition lacks merit. ADcHES

The trial court erred in ruling that Section 8, Rule 117 does not apply to
provisional dismissals on motion of the accused. The Rule merely provides that
a case shall not be provisionally dismissed, except with the express consent of
the accused and with notice to the offended party. Nothing in the said rule
proscribes its application to dismissal on motion of the accused.

Nevertheless, we find no basis for issuing the extraordinary writs of

certiorari and prohibition, as there is no showing that the error was tainted with
grave abuse of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion implies capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The grave
abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion or
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law.

Before the petitioner may invoke the time-bar in Section 8, he must

establish the following:
 1. the prosecution, with the express conformity of the accused or the
accused moves for a provisional (sin perjuicio) dismissal of the
case; or both the prosecution and the accused move for a
provisional dismissal of the case;

2. the offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional dismissal

of the case;

3. the court issues an order granting the motion and dismissing the case
provisionally;

4. the public prosecutor is served, with a copy of the order of provisional

dismissal of the case.

Although the second paragraph of Section 8 states that the order of

dismissal shall become permanent one year after the issuance thereof, without
the case having been revived, such provision should be construed to mean that
the dismissal shall become permanent one year after service of the order of
dismissal on the public prosecutor, as the public prosecutor cannot be expected
to comply with the timeliness requirement unless he is served with a copy of the
order of dismissal.

In the instant, case, the records are bereft of proof as to when the public
prosecutor was served the order of dismissal dated 22 November 2001. Absent
such proof, we cannot declare that the State is barred from reviving the case.IaECcH

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

In his motion for reconsideration, Pedro manifested the exact date and time of
the Marinduque provincial prosecutor's receipt of the quashal order to be "2:35 p.m.,
December 10, 2001", and argued that based on this date, the provisional dismissal of
the case became "permanent" on December 10, 2002. Based on this information, the
CA reversed itself, ruling as follows:

On 9 September 2005, we ruled that Section 8, Rule 117 is applicable to

a dismissal on motion of the accused. However, we did not issue the writs of
certiorari and prohibition, because it was shown that the trial court committed
grave abuse of discretion in ordering the reopening of the case. Moreover, we
stated that we cannot rule on the issue of whether or not the State is barred from
reopening the case because it was not shown when the public prosecutor was
served the order of dismissal.

xxx xxx xxx

 The arguments raised in the respondents' motion for modification were
duly passed upon in arriving at the decision dated 9 September 2005, and no
new matters were raised which would warrant a reconsideration thereof.

On the other hand, the petitioner was able to prove that the motion to
reopen the case was filed after the lapse of more than one year from the time the
public prosecutor was served the notice of dismissal. Therefore, the state is
barred from reopening the case.

WHEREFORE, petitioner Joel Pedro's motion for partial

reconsideration is hereby GRANTED, and respondent Ariel Los Banos' motion
for modification of judgment is, accordingly, DENIED.

To summarize this ruling, the appellate court, while initially saying that there
was an error of law but no grave abuse of discretion that would call for the issuance of
a writ, reversed itself on motion for reconsideration; it then ruled that the RTC
committed grave abuse of discretion because it failed to apply Section 8, Rule 17 and
the time-bar under this provision.
THE PETITION
Los Baños prays in his petition that the case be remanded to the RTC for
arraignment and trial, or that a new charge sheet be filed against Pedro, or that the old
information be re-filed with the RTC. He contends that under Section 6 of Rule 117,
an order sustaining a motion to quash does not bar another prosecution for the same
offense, unless the motion was based on the grounds specified in Section 3 (g) 16 and
(i) 17 of Rule 117. Los Baños argues that the dismissal under Section 8 of Rule 117
covers only situations where both the prosecution and the accused either mutually
consented or agreed to, or where the prosecution alone moved for the provisional
dismissal of the case; it can also apply to instances of failure on the part of the
prosecution or the offended party to object, after having been forewarned or cautioned
that its case will be dismissed. It does not apply where the information was quashed.
He adds that although the trial court granted the motion to quash, it did not
categorically dismiss the case, either provisionally or permanently, as the judge
simply ordered the return of the confiscated arms and ammunition to Pedro. The order
was "open-ended", and did not have the effect of provisionally dismissing the case
under Section 8 of Rule 117. AHCcET

Los Baños also contends that the CA gravely erred when: (1) it ruled in effect
that the Order dated November 22, 2001 granting the motion to quash is considered a
provisional dismissal, which became permanent one year from the prosecutor's receipt
of the order; the order to quash the Information was based on Section 3 of Rule 117,
not on Section 8 of this Rule; (2) it granted Pedro's motion for reconsideration and
denied Los Baños' motion for modification of judgment, when Section 6 of Rule 117
clearly provides that an order granting a motion to quash is not a bar to another
prosecution for the same offense.
He notes that the grounds Pedro relied upon in his motion to quash are not
subsections (g) or (i) of Rule 117, but its subsections (a) — that the facts charged do
not constitute an offense, and (h) — that it contains averments which if true would
constitute a legal justification. Pedro's cited grounds are not the exceptions that would
bar another prosecution for the same offense. 18 The dismissal of a criminal case
upon the express application of the accused (under subsections [a] and [h]) is not a bar
to another prosecution for the same offense, because his application is a waiver of his
constitutional prerogative against double jeopardy.
In response to all these, respondent Pedro insists and fully relies on the
application of Section 8 of Rule 117 to support his position that the RTC should not
have granted Los Baños' motion to reopen the case.
THE ISSUES
The issue is ultimately reduced to whether Section 8, Rule 117 is applicable to
the case, as the CA found. If it applies, then the CA ruling effectively lays the matter
to rest. If it does not, then the revised RTC decision reopening the case should prevail.
OUR RULING
We find the petition meritorious and hold that the case should be
remanded to the trial court for arraignment and trial.
Quashal v. Provisional Dismissal
a. Motion to Quash
A motion to quash is the mode by which an accused assails, before entering his
plea, the validity of the criminal complaint or the criminal information filed against
him for insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defect apparent on the face of
the Information. 19 The motion, as a rule, hypothetically admits the truth of the facts
spelled out in the complaint or information. The rules governing a motion to quash are
found under Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court. Section 3 of this Rule
enumerates the grounds for the quashal of a complaint or information, as follows: HSAcaE

(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;

(b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged;

(c) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of the
accused;

(d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;

(e) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;

 (f) That more than one offense is charged except when a single punishment for
various offenses is prescribed by law;

(g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;

(h) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or

justification; and

(i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense
charged, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated
without his express consent.

b. Provisional Dismissal
On the other hand, Section 8, Rule 117 that is at the center of the dispute states
that:

SEC. 8. Provisional dismissal. — A case shall not be provisionally

dismissed except with the express consent of the accused and with notice to the
offended party.

The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment not

exceeding six (6) years or a fine of any amount, or both, shall become
permanent one (1) year after issuance of the order without the case having been
revived. With respect to offenses punishable by imprisonment of more than six
(6) years, their provisional dismissal shall become permanent two (2) years after
issuance of the order without the case having been revived.

A case is provisionally dismissed if the following requirements concur:

1) the prosecution with the express conformity of the accused, or the accused,
moves for a provisional dismissal (sin perjuicio) of his case; or both the
prosecution and the accused move for its provisional dismissal; TcHDIA

2) the offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional dismissal of the
case;

3) the court issues an order granting the motion and dismissing the case
provisionally; and

4) the public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of provisional

dismissal of the case. 20

In People v. Lacson, 21 we ruled that there are sine qua non requirements in
the application of the time-bar rule stated in the second paragraph of Section 8 of Rule
117. We also ruled that the time-bar under the foregoing provision is a special
procedural limitation qualifying the right of the State to prosecute, making the time-
bar an essence of the given right or as an inherent part thereof, so that the lapse of the
time-bar operates to extinguish the right of the State to prosecute the accused.
c. Their Comparison
An examination of the whole Rule tells us that a dismissal based on a motion
to quash and a provisional dismissal are far different from one another as concepts, in
their features, and legal consequences. While the provision on provisional dismissal is
found within Rule 117 (entitled Motion to Quash), it does not follow that a motion to
quash results in a provisional dismissal to which Section 8, Rule 117 applies.
A first notable feature of Section 8, Rule 117 is that it does not exactly state
what a provisional dismissal is. The modifier "provisional" directly suggests that the
dismissals which Section 8 essentially refers to are those that are temporary in
character (i.e., to dismissals that are without prejudice to the re-filing of the case), and
not the dismissals that are permanent (i.e., those that bar the re-filing of the case).
Based on the law, rules, and jurisprudence, permanent dismissals are those barred by
the principle of double jeopardy, 22 by the previous extinction of criminal liability, 23
by the rule on speedy trial, 24 and the dismissals after plea without the express
consent of the accused. 25 Section 8, by its own terms, cannot cover these dismissals
because they are not provisional.
A second feature is that Section 8 does not state the grounds that lead to a
provisional dismissal. This is in marked contrast with a motion to quash whose
grounds are specified under Section 3. The delimitation of the grounds available in a
motion to quash suggests that a motion to quash is a class in itself, with specific and
closely-defined characteristics under the Rules of Court. A necessary consequence is
that where the grounds cited are those listed under Section 3, then the appropriate
remedy is to file a motion to quash, not any other remedy. Conversely, where a
ground does not appear under Section 3, then a motion to quash is not a proper
remedy. A motion for provisional dismissal may then apply if the conditions required
by Section 8 obtain. AHCcET

A third feature, closely related to the second, focuses on the consequences of a

meritorious motion to quash. This feature also answers the question of whether the
quashal of an information can be treated as a provisional dismissal. Sections 4, 5, 6,
and 7 of Rule 117 unmistakably provide for the consequences of a meritorious motion
to quash. Section 4 speaks of an amendment of the complaint or information, if the
motion to quash relates to a defect curable by amendment. Section 5 dwells on the
effect of sustaining the motion to quash — the complaint or information may be re-
filed, except for the instances mentioned under Section 6. The latter section, on the
other hand, specifies the limit of the re-filing that Section 5 allows — it cannot be
done where the dismissal is based on extinction of criminal liability or double
jeopardy. Section 7 defines double jeopardy and complements the ground provided
under Section 3 (i) and the exception stated in Section 6.
 Rather than going into specifics, Section 8 simply states when a provisional
dismissal can be made, i.e., when the accused expressly consents and the offended
party is given notice. The consent of the accused to a dismissal relates directly to what
Section 3 (i) and Section 7 provide, i.e., the conditions for dismissals that lead to
double jeopardy. This immediately suggests that a dismissal under Section 8 — i.e.,
one with the express consent of the accused — is not intended to lead to double
jeopardy as provided under Section 7, but nevertheless creates a bar to further
prosecution under the special terms of Section 8.
This feature must be read with Section 6 which provides for the effects of
sustaining a motion to quash — the dismissal is not a bar to another prosecution for
the same offense — unless the basis for the dismissal is the extinction of criminal
liability and double jeopardy. These unique terms, read in relation with Sections 3 (i)
and 7 and compared with the consequences of Section 8, carry unavoidable
implications that cannot but lead to distinctions between a quashal and a provisional
dismissal under Section 8. They stress in no uncertain terms that, save only for what
has been provided under Sections 4 and 5, the governing rule when a motion to quash
is meritorious are the terms of Section 6. The failure of the Rules to state under
Section 6 that a Section 8 provisional dismissal is a bar to further prosecution shows
that the framers did not intend a dismissal based on a motion to quash and a
provisional dismissal to be confused with one another; Section 8 operates in a world
of its own separate from motion to quash, and merely provides a time-bar that
uniquely applies to dismissals other than those grounded on Section 3. Conversely,
when a dismissal is pursuant to a motion to quash under Section 3, Section 8 and its
time-bar does not apply.
Other than the above, we note also the following differences stressing that a
motion to quash and its resulting dismissal is a unique class that should not be
confused with other dismissals: AaITCS

First, a motion to quash is invariably filed by the accused to question the

efficacy of the complaint or information filed against him or her (Sections 1 and 2,
Rule 117); in contrast, a case may be provisionally dismissed at the instance of either
the prosecution or the accused, or both, subject to the conditions enumerated under
Section 8, Rule 117. 26
Second, the form and content of a motion to quash are as stated under Section
2 of Rule 117; these requirements do not apply to a provisional dismissal.
Third, a motion to quash assails the validity of the criminal complaint or the
criminal information for defects or defenses apparent on face of the information; a
provisional dismissal may be grounded on reasons other than the defects found in the
information.
 Fourth, a motion to quash is allowed before the arraignment (Section 1, Rule
117); there may be a provisional dismissal of the case even when the trial proper of
the case is already underway provided that the required consents are present. 27
Fifth, a provisional dismissal is, by its own terms, impermanent until the time-
bar applies, at which time it becomes a permanent dismissal. In contrast, an
information that is quashed stays quashed until revived; the grant of a motion to quash
does not per se carry any connotation of impermanence, and becomes so only as
provided by law or by the Rules. In re-filing the case, what is important is the
question of whether the action can still be brought, i.e., whether the prescription of
action or of the offense has set in. In a provisional dismissal, there can be no re-filing
after the time-bar, and prescription is not an immediate consideration.
To recapitulate, quashal and provisional dismissal are different concepts whose
respective rules refer to different situations that should not be confused with one
another. If the problem relates to an intrinsic or extrinsic deficiency of the complaint
or information, as shown on its face, the remedy is a motion to quash under the terms
of Section 3, Rule 117. All other reasons for seeking the dismissal of the complaint or
information, before arraignment and under the circumstances outlined in Section 8,
fall under provisional dismissal.
Thus, we conclude that Section 8, Rule 117 does not apply to the reopening of
the case that the RTC ordered and which the CA reversed; the reversal of the CA's
order is legally proper.
Pedro's Motion to Quash
The merits of the grant of the motion to quash that the RTC initially ordered is
not a matter that has been ruled upon in the subsequent proceedings in the courts
below, including the CA. We feel obliged to refer back to this ruling, however, to
determine the exact terms of the remand of the case to the RTC that we shall order. TaHIDS

The grounds Pedro cited in his motion to quash are that the Information
contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification
[Section 3 (h), Rule 117], and that the facts charged do not constitute an offense
[Section 3 (a), Rule 117]. We find from our examination of the records that the
Information duly charged a specific offense and provides the details on how the
offense was committed. 28 Thus, the cited Section 3 (a) ground has no merit. On the
other hand, we do not see on the face or from the averments of the Information any
legal excuse or justification. The cited basis, in fact, for Pedro's motion to quash was a
Comelec Certification (dated September 24, 2001, issued by Director Jose P.
Balbuena, Sr. of the Law Department, Committee on Firearms and Security Personnel
of the Comelec, granting him an exemption from the ban and a permit to carry
firearms during the election period) 29 that Pedro attached to his motion to quash.
This COMELEC Certification is a matter aliunde that is not an appropriate motion to
raise in, and cannot support, a motion to quash grounded on legal excuse or
 justification found on the face of the Information. Significantly, no hearing was ever
called to allow the prosecution to contest the genuineness of the COMELEC
certification. 30
Thus, the RTC grossly erred in its initial ruling that a quashal of the
Information was in order. Pedro, on the other hand, also misappreciated the true
nature, function, and utility of a motion to quash. As a consequence, a valid
Information still stands, on the basis of which Pedro should now be arraigned and
stand trial.
One final observation: the Information was not rendered defective by the fact
that Pedro was charged of violating Section 261 (q) of the Code, instead of Section 32
of R.A. No. 7166, which amended Section 261 (q); these two sections aim to penalize
among others, the carrying of firearms (or other deadly weapons) in public places
during the election period without the authority of the Comelec. The established rule
is that the character of the crime is not determined by the caption or preamble of the
information or from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been
violated; the crime committed is determined by the recital of the ultimate facts and
circumstances in the complaint or information 31 Further, in Abenes v. Court of
Appeals, 32 we specifically recognized that the amendment under Section 32 of R.A.
No. 7166 does not affect the prosecution of the accused who was charged under
Section 261 (q) of the Code.
WHEREFORE, we hereby GRANT the petition and accordingly declare the
assailed September 19, 2005 decision and the July 6, 2006 resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 80223 respectively MODIFIED and REVERSED. The
case is remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Boac, Marinduque for the
arraignment and trial of respondent Joel R. Pedro, after reflecting in the Information
the amendment introduced on Section 261 (q) of the Code by Section 32 of Republic
Act No. 7166. STaHIC

SO ORDERED.
Puno, C.J., Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona,
Carpio Morales, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Velasco, Jr., Nachura, Leonardo-de Castro,
Peralta and Bersamin, JJ., concur.
 
||| (Los Baños v. Pedro, G.R. No. 173588, [April 22, 2009], 604 PHIL 215-236)

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 220598. July 19, 2016.]

 GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES AND THE SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division),
respondents.

[G.R. No. 220953. July 19, 2016.]

BENIGNO B. AGUAS, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (First

Division), respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J : p

We resolve the consolidated petitions for certiorari separately brought to assail

and annul the resolutions issued on April 6, 2015 1 and September 10, 2015, 2
whereby the Sandiganbayan respectively denied their demurrer to evidence, and their
motions for reconsideration, asserting such denials to be tainted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Antecedents
On July 10, 2012, the Ombudsman charged in the Sandiganbayan former
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA); Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office
(PCSO) Budget and Accounts Officer Benigno Aguas; PCSO General Manager and
Vice Chairman Rosario C. Uriarte; PCSO Chairman of the Board of Directors Sergio
O. Valencia; Members of the PCSO Board of Directors, namely: Manuel L. Morato,
Jose R. Taruc V, Raymundo T. Roquero, and Ma. Fatima A.S. Valdes; Commission
on Audit (COA) Chairman Reynaldo A. Villar; and COA Head of
Intelligence/Confidential Fund Fraud Audit Unit Nilda B. Plaras with plunder. The
case was docketed as Criminal Case No. SB-12-CRM-0174 and assigned to the First
Division of the Sandiganbayan.
The information 3 reads:
The undersigned Assistant Ombudsman and Graft Investigation and
Prosecution Officer III, Office of the Ombudsman, hereby accuse GLORIA
MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, ROSARIO C. URIARTE, SERGIO O.
VALENCIA, MANUEL L. MORATO, JOSE R. TARUC V, RAYMUNDO
T. ROQUERO, MA. FATIMA A.S. VALDES, BENIGNO B. AGUAS,
REYNALDO A. VILLAR and NILDA B. PLARAS, of the crime of
PLUNDER, as defined by, and penalized under Section 2 of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 7080, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, committed, as follows:
 That during the period from January 2008 to June 2010 or sometime
prior or subsequent thereto, in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused GLORIA MACAPAGAL-
ARROYO, then the President of the Philippines, ROSARIO C. URIARTE,
then General Manager and Vice Chairman, SERGIO O. VALENCIA, then
Chairman of the Board of Directors, MANUEL L. MORATO, JOSE R.
TARUC V, RAYMUNDO T. ROQUERO, MA. FATIMA A.S. VALDES,
then members of the Board of Directors, BENIGNO B. AGUAS, then Budget
and Accounts Manager, all of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office
(PCSO), REYNALDO A. VILLAR, then Chairman, and NILDA B.
PLARAS, then Head of Intelligence/Confidential Fund Fraud Audit Unit, both
of the Commission on Audit, all public officers committing the offense in
relation to their respective offices and taking undue advantage of their
respective official positions, authority, relationships, connections or influence,
conniving, conspiring and confederating with one another, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate and/or acquire.
Directly or indirectly, ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount or total value
of THREE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE MILLION NINE HUNDRED NINETY
SEVEN THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED FIFTEEN PESOS
(PHP365,997,915.00), more or less, through any or a combination or a series
of overt or criminal acts, or similar schemes or means, described as follows:

(a) diverting in several instances, funds from the operating budget of

PCSO to its Confidential/Intelligence Fund that could be
accessed and withdrawn at any time with minimal restrictions,
and converting, misusing, and/or illegally conveying or
transferring the proceeds drawn from said fund in the
aforementioned sum, also in several instances, to themselves, in
the guise of fictitious expenditures, for their personal gain and
benefit;

(b) raiding the public treasury by withdrawing and receiving, in several

instances, the above-mentioned amount from the
Confidential/Intelligence Fund from PCSO's accounts, and or
unlawfully transferring or conveying the same into their
possession and control through irregularly issued disbursement
vouchers and fictitious expenditures; and CAIHTE

(c) taking advantage of their respective official positions, authority,

relationships, connections or influence, in several instances, to
unjustly enrich themselves in the aforementioned sum, at the
expense of, and the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people
and the Republic of the Philippines.

CONTRARY TO LAW.
 By the end of October 2012, the Sandiganbayan already acquired jurisdiction
over GMA, Valencia, Morato and Aguas. Plaras, on the other hand, was able to secure
a temporary restraining order (TRO) from this Court in Plaras v. Sandiganbayan
docketed as G.R. Nos. 203693-94. Insofar as Roquero is concerned, the
Sandiganbayan acquired jurisdiction as to him by the early part of 2013. Uriarte and
Valdes remained at large.
Thereafter, several of the accused separately filed their respective petitions for
bail. On June 6, 2013, the Sandiganbayan granted the petitions for bail of Valencia,
Morato and Roquero upon finding that the evidence of guilt against them was not
strong. 4 In the case of petitioners GMA and Aguas, the Sandiganbayan, through the
resolution dated November 5, 2013, denied their petitions for bail on the ground that
the evidence of guilt against them was strong. 5 The motions for reconsideration filed
by GMA and Aguas were denied by the Sandiganbayan on February 19, 2014. 6
Accordingly, GMA assailed the denial of her petition for bail in this Court, but her
challenge has remained pending and unresolved to date.
Personal jurisdiction over Taruc and Villar was acquired by the
Sandiganbayan in 2014. Thereafter, said accused sought to be granted bail, and their
motions were granted on different dates, specifically on March 31, 2014 7 and May 9,
2014, 8 respectively.
The case proceeded to trial, at which the State presented Atty. Aleta Tolentino
as its main witness against all the accused. The Sandiganbayan rendered the
following summary of her testimony and evidence in its resolution dated November 5,
2013 denying the petitions for bail of GMA and Aguas, to wit:
She is a certified public accountant and a lawyer. She is a member of
the Philippine Institute of Certified Public Accountants and the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines. She has been a CPA for 30 years and a lawyer for 20 years.
She has practiced accountancy and law. She became accounting manager of
several companies. She has also taught subjects in University of Santo Tomas,
Manuel L. Quezon University, Adamson University and the Ateneo de Manila
Graduate School. She currently teaches Economics, Taxation and Land
Reform.
Presently, she is a Member of the Board of Directors of the PCSO. The
Board appointed her as Chairman of an Audit Committee. The audit review
proceeded when she reviewed the COA Annual Reports of the PCSO for
2006, 2007, 2008 and 2009 (Exhibits "D", "E", "F" and "G", respectively),
and the annual financial statements contained therein for the years 2005 to
2009. The reports were given to them by the COA. These are transmitted to
the PCSO annually after the subject year of audit.
One of her major findings was that the former management of the
PCSO was commingling the charity fund, the prize fund and the operating
fund. By commingling she means that the funds were maintained in only one
main account. This violates Section 6 of Republic Act 1169 (PCSO Charter)
and generally accepted accounting principles. aScITE

The Audit Committee also found out that there was excessive
disbursement of the Confidential and Intelligence Fund (CIF). There were also
excessive disbursements for advertising expenses. The internal audit
department was also merged with the budget and accounting department,
which is a violation of internal audit rules.
There was excessive disbursement of the CIF because the PCSO was
given only P10 million in 2002, i.e., P5 million for the Office of the Chairman
and P5 million for the Office of the General Manager. Such allocation was
based on the letters of then Chairman Lopez (Exh. "I") and then General
Manager Golpeo (Exh. "J"), asking for P5 million intelligence fund each. Both
were dated February 21, 2000, and sent to then President Estrada, who
approved them. This allocation should have been the basis for the original
allocation of the CIF in the PCSO, but there were several subsequent requests
made by the General Manager during the time of, and which were approved
by, former President Arroyo.
The allocation in excess of P10 million was in violation of the PCSO
Charter. PCSO did not have a budget for this. They were working on a deficit
from 2004 to 2009. The charter allows only 15% of the revenue as operating
fund, which was already exceeded. The financial statements indicate that they
were operating on a deficit in the years 2006 to 2009.
It is within the power of the General Manager to ask for additional
funds from the President, but there should be a budget for it. The CIF should
come from the operating fund, such that, when there is no more operating
fund, the other funds cannot be used.
The funds were maintained in a commingled main account and PCSO
did not have a registry of budget utilization. The excess was not taken from
the operating fund, but from the prize fund and the charity fund.
In 2005, the deficit was P916 million; in 2006, P1,000,078,683.23.
One of the causes of the deficit for 2006 was the CIF expense of P215 million,
which was in excess of the approved allocation of P10 million. The net cash
provided by operating expenses in 2006 is negative, which means that there
were more expenses than what was received.
In the 2007 COA report, it was found that there was still no deposit to
the prize and charity funds. The COA made a recommendation regarding the
deposits in one main account. There were also excessive disbursements of CIF
amounting to P77,478,705.
She received a copy of the PCSO corporate operating budget (COB)
for the year 2008 in 2010 because she was already a member of its Board of
Directors. The 2008 approved COB has a comparative analysis of the actual
budget for 2007 (Exh. "K"). It is stated there that the budget for CIF in 2007 is
only P25,480,550. But the financial statements reflect P77 million. The budget
was prepared and signed by then PCSO General Manager Rosario Uriarte. It
had accompanying Board Resolution No. 305, Series of 2008, which was
approved by then Chairperson Valencia, and board members Valdes, Morato,
Domingo, and attested to by Board Secretary Atty. Ronald T. Reyes.
In the 2008 COA report, it was noted that there was still no deposit to
the prize and charity funds, adverted in the 2007 COA report. There was
already a recommendation by the COA to separate the deposits or funds in
2007. But the COA noted that this was not followed. The financial statements
show the Confidential and the Extra-Ordinary Miscellaneous Expenses
account is P38,293,137, which is more than the P10 million that was
approved.
In the Comparative Income Statement (Exh. "K"), the 2008
Confidential/Intelligence Expense budget was approved for P28 million. The
Confidential and Extra-Ordinary Miscellaneous Expenses is the account being
used for confidential and intelligence expenses. The amount in the financial
statements is over the budgeted amount of P28 million. Further, the real
disbursement is more than that, based on a summary of expenditures she had
asked the treasurer to prepare.
In the Comparative Income Statement for 2009 Budget against the
2008 Actual Budget (Exh. "L"), the budget for CIF and expenses was P60
million.
In the 2009 COA report, it was noted that there was still no deposit to
the prize and charity funds, despite the instruction or recommendation of
COA. The funds were still deposited in one account. The COA observation in
2007 states that there is juggling or commingling of funds.
After she had concluded the audit review, she reported her findings to
the Board of Directors in one of their executive meetings. The Board
instructed her to go in-depth in the investigation of the disbursements of CIF.
The Audit Committee also asked Aguas why there were disbursements
in excess of P10 million. He explained that there were board resolutions
confirming additional CIF which were approved by former President Arroyo.
Aguas mentioned this in one of their meetings with the directors and corporate
secretary. The board secretary, Atty. Ed Araullo, gave them the records of
those resolutions.
In the records that Araullo submitted to her, it appears that Uriarte
would ask for additional CIF, by letter and President Arroyo approves it by
affixing her signature on that same letter-request. There were seven letters or
memoranda to then President Arroyo, with the subject "Request for
Intelligence Fund."
She then asked their Treasurer, Mercy Hinayon, to give her a summary
of all the disbursements from CIF from 2007 to 2010. The total of all the
amounts in the summaries for three years is P365,997,915.
 After receiving the summaries of the disbursed checks, she asked
Hinayon to give her the checks or copies thereof. She also asked Dorothy
Robles, Budget and Accounting Manager, to give her the corresponding
vouchers. Only two original checks were given to her, as the rest were with
the bank. She asked her to request certified true copies of the checks.
They were then called to the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, which
was then investigating the operation of PCSO, including the CIF. She was
invited as a resource speaker in an invitation from Chairman Teofisto
Guingona III (Exh. "DD"). Before the hearing, the Committee Chairman went
to the PCSO and got some documents regarding the subject matter being
investigated. Araullo was tasked to prepare all the documents needed by the
Committee. These documents included the CIF summary of disbursements,
letters of Uriarte and the approval of the former president.
She attended whenever there were committee hearings. Among those
who also attended were the incoming members if the PCSO Board Directors
and the directors. Accused Valencia and Aguas were also present in some
hearings as resources speakers. They were invited in connection with the past
disbursements of PCSO related to advertising expenses, CIF, vehicles for the
bishops, and the commingling of funds. HEITAD

The proceedings in the Committee were recorded and she secured a

copy of the transcript of stenographic notes from the Office of the Blue
Ribbon Committee. In the proceeding on June 7, 2011 (Exh. "EE"), Uriarte
testified. The witness was about two to three meters away from Uriarte when
the latter testified, and using a microphone.
According to the witness, Uriarte testified that all the confidential
intelligence projects she had proposed were approved by President Arroyo; all
the requests she gave to the President were approved and signed by the latter
personally in her (Uriarte's) presence; and all the documents pertaining to the
CIF were submitted to President Arroyo. On the other hand, Valencia and
Taruc said they did not know about the projects. Statements before the
Committee are under oath.
After the Committee hearings, she then referred to the laws and
regulations involved to check whether the disbursements were in accordance
with law. One of the duties and responsibilities of the audit committee was to
verify compliance with the laws.
She considered the following laws: R.A. 1169, as amended (PCSO
Charter); P.D. 1445 (COA Code); LOI 1282; COA Circular 92-385, as
amended by Circular 2003-002, which provides the procedure for approval of
disbursements and liquidation of confidential intelligence funds. She made a
handwritten flowchart (Exh. "II") of the allocations/disbursements/liquidation
and audit of the CIF, based on LOI 1282 and the COA Circulars. A digital
presentation of this flowchart was made available.
 The first step is the provision or allotment of a budget because no CIF
fund can be disbursed without the allocation. This is provided in the second
whereas clause of Circular 92-385. For GOCCs, applying Circular 2003-002,
there must be allocation or budget for the CIF and it should be specifically in
the corporate operating budget or would be taken from savings authorized by
special provisions.
This was not followed in the PCSO CIF disbursement in 2008. The
disbursement for that year was P86,555,060. The CIF budget for that year was
only P28 million, and there were no savings because they were on deficit.
This was also not followed for the year 2009. The CIF disbursement for that
year was P139,420,875. But the CIF budget was only P60 million, and there
was also no savings, as they were in deficit. For the year 2010, the total
disbursement, as of June 2010, was P141,021,980. The budget was only P60
million.
The requirements in the disbursement of the CIF are the budget and
the approval of the President. If the budget is correct, the President will
approve the disbursement or release of the CIF. In this case, the President
approved the release of the fund without a budget and savings. Also, the
President approved the same in violation of LOI 1282, because there were no
detailed specific project proposals and specifications accompanying the
request for additional CIF. The requests for the year 2008, 2009 and 2010
were uniform and just enumerated the purposes, not projects. They did not
contain what was required in the LOI.
The purpose of this requirement is stated in the LOI itself. The request
for allocations must contain full details and specific purposes for which the
fund will be used. A detailed presentation is made to avoid duplication of
expenditures, as what had happened in the past, because of a lack of
centralized planning and organization or intelligence fund.
There was no reason for each additional intelligence fund that was
approved by then President Arroyo.
The third step is the designation of the disbursing officer. In this case,
the Board of Directors designated Uriarte as Special Disbursing Officer
(SDO) for the portion of the CIF that she withdrew. For the portion withdrawn
by Valencia, there was no special disbursing officer designated on record.
The designation of Uriarte was in violation of internal control which is
the responsibility of the department head, as required by Section 3 of Circular
2003-002. When she went through copies of the checks and disbursement
vouchers submitted to her, she found out that Uriarte was both the SDO and
the authorized officer to sign the vouchers and checks. She was also the payee
of the checks. All the checks withdrawn by Uriarte were paid to her and she
was also the signatory of the checks.
 Aside from Uriarte, Valencia also disbursed funds in the CIF. For the
funds withdrawn by Valencia, he was also the authorized officer to sign the
vouchers and checks. He was also the payee of the checks.
The confidential funds were withdrawn through cash advance. She
identified the vouchers and checks pertaining to the disbursements made by
Uriarte and Valencia in 2008, 2009 and 2010.
The checks of Uriarte and Valencia had the treasurer as co-signatory.
The treasurer who signed depends on when the checks were issued.
She knows the signatures of Uriarte, Valencia and Aguas because they
have their signatures on the records.
Uriarte and Valencia signed the vouchers to certify to the necessity
and legality of the vouchers; they also signed to approve the same, signify
they are "okay" for payment and claim the amount certified and approved as
payee. Gloria P. Araullo signed as releasing officer, giving the checks to the
claimants.
Accused Aguas signed the vouchers to certify that there are adequate
funds and budgetary allotment, that the expenditures were properly certified
and supported by documents, and that the previous cash advances were
liquidated and accounted for. This certification means that the cash advance
voucher can be released. This is because the COA rule on cash advance is that
before any subsequent cash advance is released, the previous cash advance
must be liquidated first. This certification allowed the requesting party and
payee to get the cash advance from the voucher. Without this certification,
Uriarte and Valencia could not have been able to get the cash advance.
Otherwise, it was a violation of P.D. 1445 (Government Auditing Code).
The third box in the flowchart is the designation of the SDO. Board
Resolutions No. 217, Series of 2009 (Exh. "M"), No. 2356, Series of 2009
(Exh. "N"), and No. 029, Series of 2010 (Exh. "O"), resolved to designate
Uriarte as SDO for the CIF. These resolutions were signed and approved by
Valencia, Taruc, Valdes, Uriarte, Roquero and Morato. The witness is familiar
with these persons' signature because their signatures appear on PCSO official
records.
Valencia designated himself as SDO upon the recommendation of
COA Auditor Plaras. There was no board resolution for this designation.
There was just a certification dated February 2, 2009 (Exh. "Z4"). This
certification was signed by Valencia himself and designates himself as the
SDO since he is personally taking care of the funds which are to be handled
with utmost confidentiality. The witness is familiar with Valencia's signature
because it appears on PCSO official documents. Under COA rules, the Board
of Directors has authority to designate the SDO. The chairman could not do
this by himself.
Plaras wrote a letter dated December 15, 2008 to Valencia. It appears
in the letter that to substantiate the liquidation report, Plaras told Valencia to
designate himself as SDO because there was no disbursing officer. It was the
suggestion of Plaras. Plaras is the head of the CIF Unit under then COA
Chairman Villar. Liquidation vouchers and supporting papers were submitted
to them, with corresponding fidelity bond.
COA Circulars 92-385 and 2003-002 indicate that to disburse CIF, one
must be a special disbursing officer or SDO. All disbursing officers of the
government must have fidelity bonds. The bond is to protect the government
from and answer for misappropriation that the disbursing officer may do. The
bond amount required is the same as the amount that may be disbursed by the
officer. It is based on total accountability and not determined by the head of
the agency as a matter of discretion. The head determines the accountability
which will be the basis of the bond amount.
The Charter states that the head of the agency is the Board of
Directors, headed by the Chairman. But now, under the Governance of
Government Corporation law, it is the general manager. ATICcS

Plaras should have disallowed or suspended the cash advances because

there was no fidelity bond and the disbursing officer was not authorized.
There was no bond put up for Valencia. The records show that the bond for
Uriarte was only for the amount of P1.5 million. This is shown in a letter
dated August 23, 2010, to COA Chairman Villar through Plaras from Aguas
(Exh. "B5"), with an attachment from the Bureau of Treasury, dated March 2,
2009. It appears there that the bond for Uriarte for the CIF covering the period
February 2009 to February 2010 was only P1.5 million.
Aguas submitted this fidelity bond certification, which was received
on August 24, 2010, late, because under the COA Circulars, it should have
been submitted when the disbursing officer was designated. It should have
been submitted to COA because a disbursing officer cannot get cash advances
if they do not have a fidelity bond.
Once an SDO is designated, the specimen signature must be submitted
to COA, together with the fidelity bond and the signatories for the cash
advances.
The approval of the President pertains to the release of the budget, not
its allocation. She thinks the action of the Board was done because there was
no budget. The Board's confirmation was needed because it was in excess of
the budget that was approved. They were trying to give a color of legality to
them approval of the CIF in excess of the approved corporate operating
budget. The Board approval was required for the amount to be released, which
amount was approved in excess of the allotted budget for the year. The
President cannot approve an additional amount, unless there is an
appropriation or a provision saying a particular savings will be used for the
CIF. The approvals here were all in excess of the approved budget.
Cash advances can be given on a per project basis for CIF. For one to
get a cash advance, one must state what the project is as to that cash advance.
No subsequent cash advance should be given, until previous cash advances
have been liquidated and accounted for. If it is a continuing project, monthly
liquidation reports must be given. The difference in liquidation process
between CIF and regular cash advances is that for CIF, the liquidation goes to
the Chair and not to the resident auditor of the agency or the GOCC. All of the
liquidation papers should go to the COA Chair, given on a monthly basis.
In this case, the vouchers themselves are couched generally and just
say cash advance from CIF of the Chairman or from the GM's office in
accordance with her duties. There is no particular project indicated for the
cash advance. Also, the requirement that prior advances be liquidated first for
subsequent advances to be given was not followed. The witness prepared a
summary of the cash advances withdrawn by the two disbursing officers
covering the years 2008, 2009 and 2010 (Exh. "D 5"). The basis for this
summary is the record submitted to them by Aguas, which were supposedly
submitted to COA. It shows that there were subsequent cash advances, even if
a prior advance has not yet been liquidated. Valencia submitted liquidation
reports to Villar, which consists of a letter, certification and schedule of cash
advances, and liquidation reports. One is dated July 24, 2008 (Exh. "G 5") and
another is dated February 13, 2009 (Exh. "H5").
When she secured Exhibit "G5", together with the attached documents,
she did not find any supporting documents despite the statement in Exhibit
"G5" that the supporting details of the expenses that were incurred from the
fund can be made available, if required. Aguas, the person who processed the
cash advances said he did not have the details or supporting details of
documents of the expenditures.
Normally, when liquidating CIF, the certification of the head of the
agency is necessary. If there were vouchers or receipts involved, then all these
should be attached to the liquidation report. There should also be an
accomplishment report which should be done on a monthly basis. All of these
should be enclosed in a sealed envelope and sent to the Chairman of the COA,
although the agency concerned must retain a photocopy of the documents. The
report should have a cover/transmittal letter itemizing the documents, as well
as liquidation vouchers and other supporting papers. If the liquidation voucher
and the supporting papers are in order, then the COA Chairman or his
representative shall issue a credit memorandum. Supporting papers consist of
receipts and sales invoices. The head of the agency would have to certify that
those were all actually incurred and are legal. In this case, there were no
supporting documents submitted with respect to Valencia's cash advances in
2008. Only the certifications by the SDO were submitted. These certifications
stated that he has the documents in his custody and they can be made
available, if and when necessary.
When she reviewed the CIF, she asked Aguas to produce the
supporting documents which were indicated in Valencia's certification and
Aguas's own certification in the cash advance vouchers, where he also
certified that the documents supporting the cash advance were in their
possession and that there was proper liquidation. Aguas replied that he did not
have them.
She identified the letter of Uriarte to Villar dated July 24, 2008 as well
as a transmittal letter by Uriarte for August 1, 2008, a certification and
schedule of cash advances and an undetailed liquidation report. Among the
attachments is Board Resolution 305, a copy of the COB for 2008, a
document for the second half of 2008, a document dated April 2, 2009, and a
document for liquidation of P2,295,000. She also identified another letter for
P50 million, dated February 13, 2009, attached to the transmittal letter. There
is a certification attached to those two letters amounting to P2,295,000. Also
attached is the schedule of cash advances by Aguas and a liquidation report
where Aguas certified that the supporting documents are complete and proper
although the supporting documents and papers are not attached to the
liquidation report, only the general statement. These documents were
submitted to them by Aguas. ETHIDa

She was shown the four liquidation reports (Exhibits "M 5", "N5", "O5"
and "P5") attached to the transmittal letter and was asked whether they were
properly and legally accomplished. She replied that they were couched in
general terms and the voucher for which the cash advance was liquidated is
not indicated and only the voucher number is specified. She adds that the form
of the liquidation is correct, but the details are not there and neither are the
supporting papers.
The liquidation report was dated July 24, 2008, but it was submitted
only on August 1, 2008 to COA, and it supposedly covered the cash advances
of Uriarte from January to May 2008. This is stated in her summary of
liquidation that was earlier marked. There were no supporting papers stated on
or attached to the liquidation report.
She identified a set of documents to liquidate the cash advances from
the CIF for the second semester of 2008 by Uriarte. The transmittal letter of
Uriarte was received by the COA on April 2, 2009. Upon inquiry with Aguas,
he said that he did not have any of the supporting papers that he supposedly
had according to the certification. According to him, they are with Uriarte.
Uriarte, on the other hand, said, during the Senate hearing, that she gave them
to President Arroyo.
When Plaras wrote Valencia on December 15, 2008, Aguas wrote back
on behalf of Valencia, who had designated himself as SDO. However, their
designations, or in what capacity they signed the voucher are not stated.
Among the attachments is also a memorandum dated April 2, 2008 (Exhibit
"P5"), containing the signature of Arroyo, indicating her approval to the
utilization of funds. Another memorandum, dated August 13, 2008, indicating
the approval of Arroyo was also attached to the transmittal letter of Aguas on
April 4, 2009. These two memoranda bear the reasons for the cash advances,
couched in general terms. The reasons were donated medicines that were sold
and authorized expenditures on endowment fund. The reasons stated in the
memoranda are practically the same. Uriarte did not submit any
accomplishment reports regarding the intelligence fund. Aguas submitted an
accomplishment report, but the accomplishments were not indicated in
definite fashion or with specificity.
The witness narrated, based on her Summary of Liquidation Reports in
2009, that the total cash advance made by Uriarte was P132,760,096. Arroyo
approved P90 million for release. P10 million in January 2009 and April 27,
2009, and then P50 million in May 6, 2009. In July 2, 2009, P10 million or a
total of P70 million. In October 2009, P20 million or a total of P90 million.
The amount that was cash advanced by Valencia was P5,660,779. Therefore,
the total cash advances by these two officials were P138,420,875, but all of
these were never liquidated in 2009. Uriarte and Valencia only submitted a
liquidation voucher and a report to COA on April 12, 2010. For the January
22, 2009 disbursements, the date of the liquidation voucher was June 30,
2009, but it was submitted to COA on April 12, 2010. Witness identified the
transmittal letter for P28 million by Uriarte, dated October 19, 2009, which
was received by the COA only on April 12, 2010, with an accompanying
certification from Uriarte as to some of the documents from which the
witness's Summary of Liquidation was based.
The cash advances made by Uriarte and Valencia violated par. 1, Sec.
4 and Sec. 84 of P.D. 1445 and par. 2, III, COA Circular No. 92-385.
Since these cash advances were in excess of the appropriation, in
effect, they were disbursed without any appropriation. These cash advances
were also made without any specific project, in violation of par. 2 of COA
Circular No. 92-385. In this case, the cash advances were not for a specific
project. The vouchers only indicate the source of the fund. The vouchers did
not specify specific projects.
The total cash advances for the years 2008, 2009 and 2010 to accused
Uriarte and Valencia is more than P366,000,000. Valencia cash advanced
P13.3 million. The rest was made by Uriarte. TIADCc

The memoranda to President Arroyo stated only the problems

encountered by the PCSO. These problems, as stated in each memorandum,
included donated medicines sometimes ending up in store for sale, unofficial
use of ambulances, rise of expenditures of endowment fund, lotto sweepstakes
scams, fixers for programs of the PCSO, and other fraudulent schemes. No
projects were mentioned.
As regards the sixth step — the credit notice, the same was not validly
issued by the COA. The credit notice is a settlement or an action made by the
COA Auditors and is given once the Chairman, in the case of CIF Fund, finds
that the liquidation report and all the supporting papers are in order. In this
case, the supporting papers and the liquidation report were not in order, hence,
the credit notice should not have been issued. Further, the credit notice has to
follow a specific form. The COA Chairman or his representative can: 1) settle
the cash advance when everything is in order; 2) suspend the settlement if
there are deficiencies and then ask for submission of the deficiencies; or 3) out
rightly disallow it in case said cash advances are illegal, irregular or
unconscionable, extravagant or excessive. Instead of following this form, the
COA issued a document dated January 10, 2011, which stated that there is an
irregular use of the price fund and the charity fund for CIF Fund. The
document bears an annotation which says, "wait for transmittal, draft" among
others. The document was not signed by Plaras, who was the Head of the
Confidential and Intelligence Fund Unit under COA Chairman Villar. Instead,
she instructed her staff to "please ask Aguas to submit the supplemental
budget." This document was not delivered to PCSO General Manager J.M.
Roxas. They instead received another letter dated January 13, 2011 which was
almost identical to the first document, except it was signed by Plaras, and the
finding of the irregular use of the prize fund and the charity fund was omitted.
Instead, the work "various" was substituted and then the amount of
P137,500,000. Therefore, instead of the earlier finding of irregularity,
suddenly, the COA issued a credit notice as regards the total of P140,000,000.
The credit notice also did not specify that the transaction had been audited,
indicating that no audit was made.
A letter dated May 11, 2009 from the COA and signed by Plaras,
states that the credit notice is hereby issued. Thus, it is equivalent to the credit
notice, although it did not come in the required form. It merely stated that the
credit notice is issued for P29,700,000, without specifying for which vouchers
and for which project the credit notice was being given. It merely says "First
Semester of 2008". In other words, it is a "global" credit notice that she issued
and it did not state that she made an audit.
Another letter, dated July 14, 2010 and signed by Plaras, supposedly
covers all the cash advances in 2009, but only up to the amount of
P116,386,800. It also did not state that an audit was made.
There were no supporting papers attached to the voucher, and the
certification issued is not in conformity with the required certification by
COA Circular 2003-002. The certification dated July 24, 2008 by Valencia
was not in conformity with the certification required by COA. The required
form should specify the project for which the certification was being issued,
and file code of the specific project. The certification dated July 24, 2008,
however, just specified that it was to certify that the P2 million from the 2008
CIF Fund was incurred by the undersigned, in the exercise of his functions as
PCSO Chairman for the various projects, projects and activities related to the
operation of the office, and there was no specific project or program or file
code of the intelligence fund, as required by COA. Furthermore, the
certification also did not contain the last paragraph as required by COA.
Instead, the following was stated in the certification: "He further certifies that
the details and supporting documents and papers on these highly confidential
missions and assignments are in our custody and kept in our confidential file
which can be made available if circumstances so demand." No details or
supporting documents were reviewed by the witness, and though she
personally asked Aguas, the latter said that he did not have the supporting
papers, and they were not in the official files of the PCSO. Two people should
have custody of the papers, namely, The Chairman of COA and the PCSO or
its Special Disbursing Officer. The witness asked Aguas because Valencia
was not there, and also because Aguas was the one who made the certification
and was in-charge of accounting. The vouchers, supposedly certified by
Aguas, as Budget and Accounting Department Manager, each time cash
advances were issued, stated that the supporting documents are complete, so
the witness went to him to procure the documents.
A certification dated February 13, 2009, stating that P2,857,000 was
incurred by Valencia in the exercise of his function as PCSO Chairman,
related to the operations of his office without the specific intelligence project.
In the same document, there is a certification similar to one in the earlier
voucher. No details of this certification were submitted by Aguas.
Another certification dated July 24, 2008 was presented, and it also did
not specify the intelligence and confidential project, and it did not contain any
certification that the amount was disbursed legally or that no benefits was
given to any person. Similarly, the fourth paragraph of the same document
states that Uriarte certified that details and supporting papers of the cash
advance that she made of P27,700,000 are "kept in their confidential" (sic).
The same were not in the PCSO official records. cSEDTC

The certification dated October 19, 2009 for the amount of

P2,498,300, was submitted to the witness by Aguas. It also did not conform to
the COA requirements, as it also did not specify the use of the cash advance,
did not contain any certification that the cash advance was incurred for legal
purposes, or that no benefits to other people were paid out of it. Again, no
supporting documents were found and none were given by Aguas. Similarly, a
certification dated February 8, 2010 for the amount of P2,394,654 was
presented, and it also does not conform with the COA circular, as it only
stated that the amount was spent or incurred by Valencia for projects covering
the period of July 1 to December 31, 2009 to exercise his function as PCSO
Chairman, thus no particular intelligence fund or project was stated. As in the
other certifications, though it was stated that the details were in the
confidential file, it appeared that these were not in the possession of PCSO.
Another certification dated October 19, 2009 submitted by Uriarte was
examined by the witness in the course of her audit, and found that it also did
not conform to the requirements, as it only stated that the P25 million and P10
million intelligence and confidential fund dated January 29, 2009 and April
27, 2009 were used in the exercise of her function as PCSO Vice Chairman
and General Manager.
All the documents were furnished by Aguas during the course of the
audit of the financial transactions of PCSO. Other documents given by Aguas
include a letter by Valencia to COA Chairman Villar, which was attached to
the letter dated July 24, 2008. For the Certification issued by Valencia for
P2,857,000, there was also a certification attached dated February 13, 2009.
As to Exhibit "J5", together with the certification, there was a letter but no
other documents were submitted. Similarly, as to Exhibit "M6", it was
attached to a letter dated October 19, 2009 and was submitted to the witness
by Aguas. Exhibit "N6" was attached to the letter of Valencia dated February
8, 2010, the October 19, 2009 certification was attached to the October 19,
2009 letter to Chairman Villar.
The certification dated June 29, 2010, signed by Valencia in the
amount of P2,075,000, also does not conform with the COA requirement as it
only specifies that the fund was disbursed by Valencia under his office for
various programs in the exercise of his function as Chairman. Though there
was a certification that the supporting papers were kept in the office, these
papers were not found in the records of the PCSO and Aguas did not have any
of the records. The certification was attached to the letter of Valencia to Villar
dated June 29, 2010.
In the certification dated June 29, 2010 signed by Uriarte in the
amount of P137,500,000, the witness also said that the certification did not
conform to the COA Circular because it only stated that the amount was
disbursed from a special intelligence fund, authorized and approved by the
President under the disposition of the Office of the Vice Chairman. Despite
the statement certifying that there were documents for the audit, no documents
were provided and the same were not in the official files of PCSO. The
certification was attached to a letter by Uriarte dated July 1, 2010 addressed to
Villar.
In the certification dated October 19, 2009 signed by Uriarte in the
amount of P2,500,000, the witness made the same finding that it also did not
conform to the COA Circular, as it did not specify the project for which the
cash advance was obtained and there were also no records in the PCSO. It was
attached to the letter dated October 19, 2009.
Finally, in the certification dated February 9, 2010 signed by Uriarte in
the amount of P73,993,846, the witness likewise found that it did not conform
with the requirements of the COA, as all it said was the amount was used for
the exercise of the functions of the PCSO Chairman and General Manager.
The documents related to this were also not in the PCSO records and Aguas
did not submit the same. It was attached to a letter dated February 8, 2010
from Uriarte to Villar.
There are two kinds of audit on disbursements of government funds:
pre-audit and post-audit. Both are defined in COA Circular 2009-002. Pre-
audit is the examination of documents supporting the transaction, before these
are paid for and recorded. The auditor determines whether: (1) the proposed
expenditure was in compliance with the appropriate law, specific statutory
authority or regulations; (2) sufficient funds are available to enable payment
of the claim; (3) the proposed expenditure is not illegal, irregular, extravagant,
unconscionable or unnecessary, and (4) the transaction is approved by the
proper authority and duly supported by authentic underlying evidence. On the
other hand, the post-audit requirement is the process where the COA or the
auditor will have to do exactly what was done in the pre-audit, and in addition,
the auditor must supplement what she did by tracing the transaction under
audit to the books of accounts, and that the transaction is all recorded in the
books of accounts. The auditor, in post-audit, also makes the final
determination of whether the transaction was not illegal, irregular,
extravagant, excessive, unconscionable or unnecessary.
In this case, no audit was conducted. In a letter dated May 11, 2009
signed by Plaras, it was stated that a credit advice was given. However, the
letter did not conform to the requirements or form of a credit notice. Such
form was in COA Circular 2003-002, and should specify the liquidation report
number, the amount, check numbers, and the action taken by the auditor. The
auditor should also include a certification that these have been audited. In this
instance, no certification that the transaction was audited was given by Plaras.
Other similar letters did not conform with the COA Circular. All transactions
of the government must be subject to audit in accordance with the provisions
of the Constitution. Nevertheless, the requirements for audit are the same.
The effect of the issuance of the credit notice by the COA was that the
agency will take it up in the books and credit the cash advance. This is the
seventh step in the flowchart. Once there is a cash advance, the liability of the
officers who obtained the cash advance would be recorded in the books. The
credit notice, when received, would indicate that the account was settled. The
agency will credit the receivable or the cash advance, and remove from the
books as a liability of the person liable for the cash advance. The effect of this
was that the financial liabilities of Uriarte and Valencia were removed from
the books, but they could still be subject to criminal liability based on Sec. 10
of COA Circular 91-368 (Government Accounting and Auditing Manuals,
Vol. 1, implementing P.D. 1445), which states: "The settlement of an account
whether or not on appeal has been made within the statutory period is no bar
to criminal prosecution against persons liable." From the 2008 COA Annual
Audited Financial Statements of PCSO, it was seen that the procedure was not
followed because the liability of the officers was already credited even before
the credit notice was received. In the financial statements, it was stated that
the amount due from officers and employees, which should include the cash
advances obtained by Uriarte and Valencia, were not included because the
amount stated therein was P35 million, while the total vouchers of Uriarte and
Valencia was P86 million.
The witness also related that she traced the records of the CIF fund
(since such was no longer stated as a receivable), and reviewed whether it was
recorded as an expense in 2008. She found out that the recorded CIF fund
expense, as recorded in the corporate operating budget as actually disbursed,
was only P21,102,000. As such, she confronted her accountants and asked
them "Saan tinago itong amount na to?" The personnel in the accounting
office said that the balance of the P86 million or the additional P21 million
was not recorded in the operating fund budget because they used the prize
fund and charity fund as instructed by Aguas. Journal Entry Voucher No.
8121443 dated December 31, 2008, signed by Elmer Camba, Aguas (Head of
the Accounting Department), and Hutch Balleras (one of the staff in the
Accounting Department), showed that this procedure was done.
The contents of the Journal Entry Voucher are as follows:

(a) Accounts and Explanation: Due to other funds. This means that the
amount of P63,750,000 was credited as confidential expense
from the operating fund. The amount was then removed from the
operating fund, and it was passed on to other funds.

(b) PF Miscellaneous, Account No. 424-1-L P41,250,000 and CF

Miscellaneous for 424-2-G for P22,500,000. PF Miscellaneous
means Prize Fund Miscellaneous and CF stands for Charity Fund
Miscellaneous. This means that funds used to release the cash
advances to Uriarte and Valencia were from the prize fund and
charity.

Attached to the Journal Entry Voucher was a document which reads

"Allocation of Confidential and Intelligence Fund Expenses", and was the
basis of Camba in doing the Journal Entry Voucher. In the same document,
there was a written annotation dated 12-31-2008 which reads that the
adjustment of CIF, CF and IF, beneficiary of the fund is CF and PF and signed
by Aguas.
The year 2009 was a similar case, as the witness traced the recording
of the credit notice at the end of 2009, and despite the absence of the credit
notice, the Accounting Department removed from the books of PCSO the
liability of Uriarte and Valencia, corresponding to the cash advances obtained
in 2009. She based this finding on the COA Annual Audit Report on the
PCSO for the year ended December 31, 2009. It was stated in the Audit
Report that the total liability due from officers and employees was only
P87,747,280 and it was less than the total cash advances of Uriarte and
Valencia, which was P138 million. As a result, the witness checked the
corresponding entry for the expenses in the corporate operating budget and
found out that the same was understated. The CIF expenses were only
P24,968,300, as against the actual amount per vouchers, which was
P138,420,875. Upon checking with the Accounting Department, the
department showed her another Journal Entry Voucher No. 9121157, dated
December 29, 2009, where the personnel removed immediately the expense
and recorded it as expense for the prize fund and charity fund by the end of
December 31. SDAaTC

The contents of the Journal Entry Voucher, especially the notation

"due from", means the accountability of those who had cash advance was
instead credited. It was removed, and the amount was P106 million. The entry
was confidential expense for P15,958,020 and then the due to other funds was
P90,428,780. The explanation for "424" was found in the middle part, stating:
"424-1-L" of miscellaneous prize fund was used in the amount of P58,502,740
and the charity fund was used in the amount of P31,916,040. The total amount
of the receivables from Uriarte and Valencia that was removed was
P106,386,800 and P90,428,780 respectively which came from the prize fund
and charity fund.
The witness reported the discrepancy because there were violations of
R.A. 1169, Sec. 6, which provides for the different funds of PCSO namely:
prize fund (55% of the net receipts), charity fund (30% of the net receipts),
and operating fund (15%). The proceeds of the lotto and sweepstakes ticket
sales provide the money for these different funds, removing first the printing
cost and the net proceeds (98%) is divided among the three funds mentioned.
The prize fund is the fund set aside to be used to pay the prizes for the
winnings in the lotto or sweepstakes draws, whether they are jackpot or
consolation prizes. Incentives to the lotto operators or horse owners are also
drawn from this fund, as all of the expenses connected to the winnings of the
draw. On the other hand, the charity fund is reserved for charity programs
approved by the board of PCSO, and constitutes hospital and medical
assistance to individuals, or to help facilities and other charities of national
character. Operating expenses are charged to the expenses to operate,
personnel services, and MOOE. One kind of fund cannot be used for another
kind, as they become a trust fund which should only be used for the purpose
for which it was authorized, not even with the approval of the board.
The amounts obtained from the charity fund and prize fund for 2008
was P63,750,000, and in 2009 P90,428,780. The Board of Directors was given
a copy of the COA Audit Reports for years 2008 and 2009. The Board of
Directors for both years was composed of: Chairman Valencia, and Board
Members Morato, Roquero, Taruc and Valdez. Uriarte was the Vice Chairman
of the Board of Directors. The witness did not know whether the Board
checked the COA reports, but there was no action on their part, and neither
did they question the correctness of the statements. They also had the Audit
Committee (which was composed of members of the board) at that time, and
one of the duties of the Audit Committee was to verify the balances.
The witness identified the documents referring to the confirmation by
the Board of Directors of PCSO of the CIF. Board Resolution No. 217,
approved on February 18, 2009, confirms the CIF approved by the President.
It did not state which CIF they were approving. They also assigned Uriarte as
the Special Disbursing Officer of the CIF, but it did say for what year. The
signatories to the same Board Resolution were Valencia, Taruc, Valdes,
Uriarte, Roquero and Morato. The same were the witness's findings for Board
Resolution No. 2356 S. 2009, approved on December 9, 2009. As for Board
Resolution No. 29, S. 2010, approved on January 6, 2010, the Board
confirmed the fund approved by the President for 2010, though the approval
of the President was only received on August 13, 2010 as shown in the
Memorandum dated January 4. In effect, the Board was aware of the requests,
 and because they ratified the cash advances, they agreed to the act of
obtaining the same.
Apart from the President violating LOI 1282, the witness also
observed that the President directly dealt with the PCSO, although the
President, by Executive Order No. 383 dated November 14, 2004, and
Executive Order No. 455 dated August 22, 2005, transferred the direct control
and supervision of the PCSO to the Department of Social Welfare and
Development (DSWD), and later to the Department of Health (DOH). A
project should first be approved by the Supervising and Controlling Secretary
of the Secretary of Health; that the President had transferred her direct control
and supervision, and lost the same. The witness said her basis was
administrative procedure. In this regard, President Aquino now has transferred
the control and supervision of the PCSO back to the Office of the President
through Executive Order No. 14, S. 2010, dated November 19, 2010.
Uriarte should not have gone directly to the President to ask for the
latter's approval for allocation. Nonetheless, the release of the CIF must still
be approved by the President. 9
The State also presented evidence consisting in the testimonies of officers
coming from different law enforcement agencies 10 to corroborate Tolentino's
testimony to the effect that the PCSO had not requested from their respective offices
any intelligence operations contrary to the liquidation report submitted by Uriarte and
Aguas.
To complete the evidence for the Prosecution, Atty. Anamarie Villaluz
Gonzales, Office-in-Charge and Department Manager of the Human Resources of
PCSO; Flerida Africa Jimenez, Head of the Intelligence and Confidential Fund Audit
Unit of the COA; and Noel Clemente, Director of COA were presented as additional
witnesses.
After the Prosecution rested its case, GMA, Aguas, Valencia, Morato, Taruc V,
Roquero and Villar separately filed their demurrers to evidence asserting that the
Prosecution did not establish a case for plunder against them.
On April 6, 2015, the Sandiganbayan granted the demurrers to evidence of
Morato, Roquero, Taruc and Villar, and dismissed the charge against them. It held
that said accused who were members of the PCSO Board of Directors were not shown
to have diverted any PCSO funds to themselves, or to have raided the public treasury
by conveying and transferring into their possession and control any money or funds
from PCSO account; that as to Villar, there had been no clear showing that his
designation of Plaras had been tainted with any criminal design; and that the fact that
Plaras had signed "by authority" of Villar as the COA Chairman could not criminally
bind him in the absence of any showing of conspiracy.
However, the Sandiganbayan denied the demurrers of GMA, Aguas and
Valencia, holding that there was sufficient evidence showing that they had conspired
to commit plunder; and that the Prosecution had sufficiently established a case of
malversation against Valencia, pertinently saying:
Demurrer to evidence is an objection by one of the parties in an action,
to the effect that the evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in
point of law, whether true or not, to make out a case or sustain the issue. The
party demurring challenges the sufficiency of the whole evidence to
sustain a verdict. The court then ascertains whether there is a competent
or sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment or to support a verdict of
guilt.
xxx xxx xxx
Sufficient evidence for purposes of frustrating a demurrer thereto is
such evidence in character, weight or amount as will legally justify the
judicial or official action demanded to accord to circumstances. To be
considered sufficient therefore, the evidence must prove (a) the commission of
the crime, and (b) the precise degree of participation therein by the accused
(Gutib v. CA, 110 SCAD 743, 312 SCRA 365 [1999]).
xxx xxx xxx
A. Demurrer filed by Arroyo and Aguas:
It must be remembered that in Our November 5, 2013 Resolution, We
found strong evidence of guilt against Arroyo and Aguas, only as to the
second predicate act charged in the Information, which reads:

(b) raiding the public treasury by withdrawing and receiving, in several

instances, the above-mentioned amount from the
Confidential/Intelligence Fund from PCSO's accounts, and/or
unlawfully transferring or conveying the same into their
possession and control through irregularly issued disbursement
vouchers and fictitious expenditures.

In the November 5, 2013 Resolution, We said:

It should be noted that in both R.A. No. 7080 and the
PCGG rules, the enumeration of the possible predicate acts in
the commission of plunder did not associate or require the
concept of personal gain/benefit or unjust enrichment with
respect to raids on the public treasury, as a means to commit
plunder. It would, therefore, appear that a "raid on the public
treasury" is consummated where all the acts necessary for its
execution and accomplishment are present. Thus a "raid on the
public treasury" can be said to have been achieved thru the
pillaging or looting of public coffers either through misuse,
misappropriation or conversion, without need of establishing
gain or profit to the raider. Otherwise stated, once a
"raider" gets material possession of a government asset
through improper means and has free disposal of the same,
the raid or pillage is completed. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Clearly, the improper acquisition and illegal use of CIF
funds, which is obviously a government asset, will amount to a
raid on the public treasury, and therefore fall into the category
of ill-gotten wealth.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . It is not disputed that Uriarte asked for and was
granted authority by Arroyo to use additional CIF funds during
the period 2008-2010. Uriarte was able [to] accumulate
during that period CIF funds in the total amount of
P352,681,646. This was through a series of withdrawals as
cash advances of the CIF funds from the PCSO coffers, as
evidenced by the disbursement vouchers and checks issued and
encashed by her, through her authorized representative.
These flagrant violations of the rules on the use of CIF
funds evidently characterize the series of withdrawals by and
releases to Uriarte as "raids" on the PCSO coffers, which is
part of the public treasury. These were, in every sense,
"pillage," as Uriarte looted government funds and appears
to have not been able to account for it. The monies came into
her possession and, admittedly, she disbursed it for purposes
other than what these were intended for, thus, amounting to
"misuse" of the same. Therefore, the additional CIF funds are
ill-gotten, as defined by R.A. 7080, the PCGG rules, and
Republic v. Sandiganbayan. The encashment of the checks,
which named her as the "payee," gave Uriarte material
possession of the CIF funds which she disposed of at will.
As to the determination whether the threshold amount
of P50 million was met by the prosecution's evidence, the
Court believes this to have been established. Even if the
computation is limited only to the cash advances/releases made
by accused Uriarte alone AFTER Arroyo had approved her
requests and the PCSO Board approved CIF budget and the
"regular" P5 million CIF budget accorded to the PCSO
Chairman and Vice Chairman are NOT taken into account, still
the total cash advances through accused Uriarte's series of
withdrawals will total P189,681,646. This amount surpasses
the P50 million threshold. EcTCAD

The evidence shows that for the year 2010 alone,

Uriarte asked for P150 million additional CIF funds, and
Arroyo granted such request and authorized its use. From
 January 8, 2010 up to June 18, 2010, Uriarte made a series of
eleven (11) cash advances in the total amount of P138,223,490.
According to Uriarte's testimony before the Senate, the
main purpose for these cash advances was for the "roll-out" of
the small town lottery program. However, the accomplishment
report submitted by Aguas shows that P137,500,000 was spent
on non-related PCSO activities, such as "bomb threat,
kidnapping, terrorism and bilateral and security relations." All
the cash advances made by Uriarte in 2010 were made in
violation of LOI 1282, and COA Circulars 2003-002 and 92-
385. These were thus improper use of the additional CIF funds
amounting to raids on the PCSO coffers and were ill-gotten
because Uriarte had encashed the checks and came into
possession of the monies, which she had complete freedom to
dispose of, but was not able to properly account for.
These findings of the Court clearly point out the commission by
Uriarte of the crime of Plunder under the second predicate act charged in
the Information. As to Arroyo's participation, the Court stated in its
November 5, 2013 Resolution that:
The evidence shows that Arroyo approved not only
Uriarte's request for additional CIF funds in 2008-2010, but
also authorized the latter to use such funds. Arroyo's "OK"
notation and signature on Uriarte's letter-requests signified
unqualified approval of Uriarte's request to use the
additional CIF funds because the last paragraph of
Uriarte's requests uniformly ended with this phrase: "With
the use of intelligence fund, PCSO can protect its image
and integrity of its operations.
The letter-request of Uriarte in 2010 was more explicit
because it categorically asked for: "The approval on the use of
the fifty percent of the PR Fund as PCSO Intelligence Fund
will greatly help PCSO in the disbursement of funds to
immediately address urgent issues."
Arroyo cannot, therefore, successfully argue that what
she approved were only the request for the grant or allocation
of additional CIF funds, because Arroyo's "OK" notation
was unqualified and, therefore, covered also the request to
use such funds, through releases of the same in favor of
Uriarte. 11
The Sandiganbayan later also denied the respective Motions for
Reconsideration of GMA and Aguas, observing that:
In this case, to require proof that monies went to a plunderer's
bank account or was used to acquire real or personal properties or used
for any other purpose to personally benefit the plunderer, is absurd.
 Suppose a plunderer had already illegally amassed, acquired or accumulated
P50 Million or more of government funds and just decided to keep it in his
vault and never used such funds for any purpose to benefit him, would that not
be plunder? Or, if immediately right after such amassing, the monies went up
in flames or recovered by the police, negating any opportunity for the person
to actually benefit, would that not still be plunder? Surely, in such cases, a
plunder charge could still prosper and the argument that the fact of personal
benefit should still be evidence-based must fail.
Also, accused Arroyo insists that there was no proof of the fact of
amassing the ill-gotten wealth, and that the "overt act" of approving the
disbursement is not the "overt act" contemplated by law. She further stresses
that there was no proof of conspiracy between accused Arroyo and her co-
accused and that the Prosecution was unable to prove their case against
accused Arroyo. What accused Arroyo forgets is that although she did not
actually commit any "overt act" of illegally amassing CIF funds, her act
of approving not only the additional CIF funds but also their releases,
aided and abetted accused Uriarte's successful raids on the public
treasury. Accused Arroyo is therefore rightly charged as a co-conspirator of
Uriarte who accumulated the CIF funds. Moreover, the performance of an
overt act is not indispensable when a conspirator is the mastermind. 12
Considering that the Sandiganbayan denied the demurrers to evidence of GMA
and Aguas, they have come to the Court on certiorari to assail and set aside said
denial, claiming that the denial was with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction.
Issues
GMA pleads that the denial of her demurrer to evidence was in patent and
flagrant violation of Republic Act No. 7080, the law on plunder, and was
consequently arbitrary and oppressive, not only in grave abuse of discretion but
rendered without jurisdiction because:
First Ground
On the basis of the above Resolutions, the Sandiganbayan has denied
petitioner Arroyo's Demurrer to Evidence and considering the reasons
for doing so, would find petitioner Arroyo guilty of the offense of plunder
under Republic Act No. 7080 as charged in the Information
notwithstanding the following:

a. While the gravamen, indeed corpus delicti of the offense of plunder under
R.A. No. 7080, and as charged in the Information, is that the public
officer . . . "amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth
through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts as
described in Section 1(d) hereof, in the aggregate amount or total
value of at least Fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00)", the
 Sandiganbayan Resolutions extirpate this vital element of the
offense of plunder;

b. In point of fact, not a single exhibit of the 637 exhibits offered by the
prosecution nor a single testimony of the 21 witnesses of the
prosecution was offered by the prosecution to prove that petitioner
amassed, accumulated or acquired even a single peso of the alleged
ill-gotten wealth amounting to P365,997,915.00 or any part of that
amount alleged in the Information;

c. Implicitly confirming the above, and aggravating its error, on the basis
solely of petitioner Arroyo's authorization of the release of the
Confidential/Intelligence Fund from PCSO's accounts, the
Sandiganbayan ruled that she has committed the offense of plunder
under R.A. No. 7080 for the reason that her release of CIF funds to
the PCSO amount to a violation of Sec. 1(d) [1] of R.A. No. 7080
which reads, as follows:

 1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation

of public funds or raids on the public treasury;

 which, "did not associate or require the concept of personal gain/benefit or

unjust enrichment with respect to raids on the public treasury",
thereby disregarding the gravamen or the corpus delicti of the
offense of plunder under R.A. No. 7080.

Second Ground
Worsening the above error of the Sandiganbayan, the Resolutions, with
absolutely no justification in law or in the evidence, purportedly as the
"mastermind" of a conspiracy, and without performing any overt act,
would impute to petitioner Arroyo the "series of withdrawals as cash
advances of the CIF funds from the PCSO coffers" by Uriarte as "raids
on the PCSO coffers, which is part of the public treasury" and "in every
sense, 'pillage' as Uriarte looted government funds and appears to have
not been able to account for it". Parenthetically, Uriarte has not been
arrested, was not arraigned and did not participate in the trial of the
case.
Third Ground
That as an obvious consequence of the above, denial of petitioner
Arroyo's Demurrer to Evidence for the reasons stated in the
Sandiganbayan Resolutions, amounting no less to convicting her on the
basis of a disjointed reading of the crime of plunder as defined in R.A.
No. 7080, aggravated by the extirpation in the process of its "corpus
delicti" — the amassing, accumulation or acquisition of ill-gotten wealth,
 hence, of a crime that does not exist in law and consequently a blatant
deprivation of liberty without due process of law.
Fourth Ground
The Information alleges that the ten (10) persons accused in Crim. Case
No. SB-12-CRM-0174, namely: Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Rosario C.
Uriarte, Sergio O. Valencia, Manuel L. Morato, Jose R. Taruc V,
Raymundo T. Roquero, [M]a. Fatima A.S. Valdes, Benigno B. Aguas,
Reynaldo A. Villar and Nilda B. Plaras" . . . all public officers committing
the offense in relation to their respective offices and taking undue
advantage of their respective official positions, authority, relationships,
connections or influence, conniving, conspiring and confederating with
one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally
amass, accumulate and/or acquire, directly or indirectly, ill-gotten wealth
in the aggregate amount or total value of THREE HUNDRED SIXTY
FIVE MILLION NINE HUNDRED NINETY SEVEN THOUSAND
NINE HUNDRED FIFTEEN PESOS (PHP365,997,915.00), more or less,
through any or a combination or a series of overt or criminal acts, or
similar schemes or means, described as follows . . ." or each of them,
P36,599,791.50 which would not qualify the offense charged as "plunder"
under R.A. No. 7080 against all ten (10) accused together, for which
reason the Information does not charge the offense of plunder and, as a
consequence, all proceedings thereafter held under the Information are
void. 13
On his part, Aguas contends that:

A. In light of the factual setting described above and the evidence offered
and admitted, does proof beyond reasonable doubt exist to warrant
a holding that Prosecution proved the guilt of the accused such that
there is legal reason to deny Petitioner's Demurrer?

B. Did the Prosecution's offered evidence squarely and properly support

the allegations in the Information?

 PETITIONER STRONGLY SUBMITS THAT PROSECUTION FAILED

TO ESTABLISH BY PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
THE EXISTENCE OF THE CORE ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME
OF PLUNDER. 14

On the other hand, the Prosecution insists that the petitions for certiorari
should be dismissed upon the following grounds, namely:

A. CERTIORARI IS NOT THE PROPER REMEDY FROM AN ORDER

OR RESOLUTION DENYING DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE.
 B. THERE IS NO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION BECAUSE THE
SANDIGANBAYAN MERELY INTERPRETED WHAT
CONSTITUTES PLUNDER UNDER LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE IN LIGHT OF FACTS OF THE CASE. IT DID
NOT JUDICIALLY LEGISLATE A "NEW" OFFENSE.

1. ACTUAL PERSONAL GAIN, BENEFIT OR ENRICHMENT IS

NOT AN ELEMENT OF PLUNDER UNDER R.A. NO.
7080.

2. EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT ARROYO, BY INDISPENSABLE

COOPERATION, CONSPIRED WITH HER CO-
ACCUSED AND PARTICIPATED IN THE COMPLEX,
ILLEGAL SCHEME WHICH DEFRAUDED PCSO IN
HUNDREDS OF MILLIONS OF PESOS, WHICH
CONSTITUTES PLUNDER.

3. ARROYO IS NOT SIMILARLY SITUATED WITH ACCUSED

PCSO BOARD MEMBERS AND CANNOT THUS
DEMAND THAT THE SANDIGANBAYAN DISMISS THE
PLUNDER CASE AGAINST HER.

C. ARROYO'S BELATED, COLLATERAL ATTACK ON THE

INFORMATION CHARGING HER AND CO-ACCUSED FOR
PLUNDER IS HIGHLY IMPROPER, ESPECIALLY AT THIS
LATE STAGE OF THE PROCEEDING.

1. THE FACTS CONSTITUTING THE OFFENSE ARE

CLEARLY ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION.

2. ARROYO'S ACTIVE PARTICIPATION IN THE

PROCEEDINGS ARISING FROM OR RELATING TO SB-
12-CRM-0174 PROVES THAT SHE HAS ALWAYS
KNOWN AND UNDERSTOOD THE NATURE AND
SCOPE OF THE ACCUSATIONS AGAINST HER.

D. ARROYO IS NOT ENTITLED TO A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING

ORDER BECAUSE THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION IN SB-12-
CRM-0174 CANNOT BE ENJOINED. 15

Based on the submissions of the parties, the Court synthesizes the decisive
issues to be considered and resolved, as follows:
Procedural Issue:
1. Whether or not the special civil action for certiorari is proper to assail the
denial of the demurrers to evidence.
 Substantive Issues:
1. Whether or not the State sufficiently established the existence of conspiracy
among GMA, Aguas, and Uriarte;
2. Whether or not the State sufficiently established all the elements of the
crime of plunder:
a. Was there evidence of amassing, accumulating or acquiring ill-gotten
wealth in the total amount of not less than P50,000,000.00?
b. Was the predicate act of raiding the public treasury alleged in the
information proved by the Prosecution?
Ruling of the Court
The consolidated petitions for certiorari are meritorious.
I.
The Court cannot be deprived of its jurisdiction
to correct grave abuse of discretion
The Prosecution insists that the petition for certiorari of GMA was improper to
challenge the denial of her demurrer to evidence; that she also thereby failed to show
that there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan in denying
her demurrer to evidence; and that, on the contrary, the Sandiganbayan only
interpreted what constituted plunder under the law and jurisprudence in light of the
established facts, and did not legislate a new offense, by extensively discussing how
she had connived with her co-accused to commit plunder. 16 AScHCD

The Court holds that it should take cognizance of the petitions for certiorari
because the Sandiganbayan, as shall shortly be demonstrated, gravely abused its
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The special civil action for certiorari is generally not proper to assail such an
interlocutory order issued by the trial court because of the availability of another
remedy in the ordinary course of law. 17 Moreover, Section 23, Rule 119 of the Rules
of Court expressly provides that "the order denying the motion for leave of court to
file demurrer to evidence or the demurrer itself shall not be reviewable by appeal or
by certiorari before judgment." It is not an insuperable obstacle to this action,
however, that the denial of the demurrers to evidence of the petitioners was an
interlocutory order that did not terminate the proceedings, and the proper recourse of
the demurring accused was to go to trial, and that in case of their conviction they may
then appeal the conviction, and assign the denial as among the errors to be reviewed.
18 Indeed, it is doctrinal that the situations in which the writ of certiorari may issue
should not be limited, 19 because to do so —
. . . would be to destroy its comprehensiveness and usefulness. So wide
is the discretion of the court that authority is not wanting to show that
certiorari is more discretionary than either prohibition or mandamus. In the
 exercise of our superintending control over other courts, we are to be
guided by all the circumstances of each particular case 'as the ends of
justice may require.' So it is that the writ will be granted where necessary
to prevent a substantial wrong or to do substantial justice. 20
The Constitution itself has imposed upon the Court and the other courts of
justice the duty to correct errors of jurisdiction as a result of capricious, arbitrary,
whimsical and despotic exercise of discretion by expressly incorporating in Section 1
of Article VIII the following provision:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court
and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
The exercise of this power to correct grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government cannot be thwarted by rules of procedure to the contrary or for the sake
of the convenience of one side. This is because the Court has the bounden
constitutional duty to strike down grave abuse of discretion whenever and wherever it
is committed. Thus, notwithstanding the interlocutory character and effect of the
denial of the demurrers to evidence, the petitioners as the accused could avail
themselves of the remedy of certiorari when the denial was tainted with grave abuse
of discretion. 21 As we shall soon show, the Sandiganbayan as the trial court was
guilty of grave abuse of discretion when it capriciously denied the demurrers to
evidence despite the absence of competent and sufficient evidence to sustain the
indictment for plunder, and despite the absence of the factual bases to expect a guilty
verdict. 22
II.
The Prosecution did not properly allege and prove
the existence of conspiracy among GMA, Aguas and Uriarte
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning
the commission of a felony, and decide to commit it. 23 In this jurisdiction, conspiracy
is either a crime in itself or a mere means to commit a crime.
As a rule, conspiracy is not a crime unless the law considers it a crime, and
prescribes a penalty for it. 24 The exception is exemplified in Article 115 (conspiracy
and proposal to commit treason), Article 136 (conspiracy and proposal to commit
coup d'etat, rebellion or insurrection) and Article 141 (conspiracy to commit
sedition) of the Revised Penal Code. When conspiracy is a means to commit a crime,
it is indispensable that the agreement to commit the crime among all the conspirators,
or their community of criminal design must be alleged and competently shown.
 We also stress that the community of design to commit an offense must be a
conscious one. 25 Conspiracy transcends mere companionship, and mere presence at
the scene of the crime does not in itself amount to conspiracy. Even knowledge of, or
acquiescence in, or agreement to cooperate is not enough to constitute one a party to a
conspiracy, absent any active participation in the commission of the crime with a view
to the furtherance of the common design and purpose. 26 Hence, conspiracy must be
established, not by conjecture, but by positive and conclusive evidence.
In terms of proving its existence, conspiracy takes two forms. The first is the
express form, which requires proof of an actual agreement among all the co-
conspirators to commit the crime. However, conspiracies are not always shown to
have been expressly agreed upon. Thus, we have the second form, the implied
conspiracy. An implied conspiracy exists when two or more persons are shown to
have aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object,
each doing a part so that their combined acts, though apparently independent, were in
fact connected and cooperative, indicating closeness of personal association and a
concurrence of sentiment. 27 Implied conspiracy is proved through the mode and
manner of the commission of the offense, or from the acts of the accused before,
during and after the commission of the crime indubitably pointing to a joint purpose, a
concert of action and a community of interest. 28
But to be considered a part of the conspiracy, each of the accused must be
shown to have performed at least an overt act in pursuance or in furtherance of the
conspiracy, for without being shown to do so none of them will be liable as a co-
conspirator, and each may only be held responsible for the results of his own acts. In
this connection, the character of the overt act has been explained in People v. Lizada:
29

An overt or external act is defined as some physical activity or deed,

indicating the intention to commit a particular crime, more than a mere
planning or preparation, which if carried out to its complete termination
following its natural course, without being frustrated by external obstacles nor
by the spontaneous desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily
ripen into a concrete offense. The raison d'etre for the law requiring a
direct overt act is that, in a majority of cases, the conduct of the accused
consisting merely of acts of preparation has never ceased to be equivocal;
and this is necessarily so, irrespective of his declared intent. It is that
quality of being equivocal that must be lacking before the act becomes
one which may be said to be a commencement of the commission of the
crime, or an overt act or before any fragment of the crime itself has been
committed, and this is so for the reason that so long as the equivocal
quality remains, no one can say with certainty what the intent of the
accused is. It is necessary that the overt act should have been the ultimate step
towards the consummation of the design. It is sufficient if it was the "first or
some subsequent step in a direct movement towards the commission of the
offense after the preparations are made." The act done need not constitute
 the last proximate one for completion. It is necessary, however, that the
attempt must have a causal relation to the intended crime. In the words of
Viada, the overt acts must have an immediate and necessary relation to
the offense. (Bold underscoring supplied for emphasis)
In her case, GMA points out that all that the State showed was her having
affixed her unqualified "OK" on the requests for the additional CIFs by Uriarte. She
argues that such act was not even an overt act of plunder because it had no immediate
and necessary relation to plunder by virtue of her approval not being per se illegal or
irregular. However, the Sandiganbayan, in denying the Motions for Reconsideration
of GMA and Aguas vis-à-vis the denial of the demurrers, observed that:
. . . accused Arroyo insists that there was no proof of the fact of
amassing the ill-gotten wealth, and that the "overt act" of approving the
disbursement is not the "overt act" contemplated by law. She further stresses
that there was no proof of conspiracy between accused Arroyo and her co-
accused and that the Prosecution was unable to prove their case against
accused Arroyo. What accused Arroyo forgets is that although she did not
actually commit any "overt act" of illegally amassing CIF funds, her act of
approving not only the additional CIF funds but also their releases, aided and
abetted accused Uriarte's successful raids on the public treasury. Accused
Arroyo is therefore rightly charged as a co-conspirator of Uriarte who
accumulated the CIF funds. Moreover, the performance of an overt act is not
indispensable when a conspirator is the mastermind. 30
It is in this regard that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion
amounting to lack or excess of its jurisdiction. To start with, its conclusion that GMA
had been the mastermind of plunder was plainly conjectural and outrightly unfounded
considering that the information did not aver at all that she had been the mastermind;
hence, the Sandiganbayan thereby acted capriciously and arbitrarily. In the second
place, the treatment by the Sandiganbayan of her handwritten unqualified "OK" as an
overt act of plunder was absolutely unwarranted considering that such act was a
common legal and valid practice of signifying approval of a fund release by the
President. Indeed, pursuant to People v. Lizada, supra, an act or conduct becomes an
overt act of a crime only when it evinces a causal relation to the intended crime
because the act or conduct will not be an overt act of the crime if it does not have an
immediate and necessary relation to the offense. AcICHD

In Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, 31 the Court recognized two nuances of

appreciating conspiracy as a means to commit a crime, the wheel conspiracy and the
chain conspiracy.
The wheel conspiracy occurs when there is a single person or group (the hub)
dealing individually with two or more other persons or groups (the spokes). The spoke
typically interacts with the hub rather than with another spoke. In the event that the
spoke shares a common purpose to succeed, there is a single conspiracy. However, in
the instances when each spoke is unconcerned with the success of the other spokes,
there are multiple conspiracies. 32
An illustration of wheel conspiracy wherein there is only one conspiracy
involved was the conspiracy alleged in the information for plunder filed against
former President Estrada and his co-conspirators. Former President Estrada was the
hub while the spokes were all the other accused individuals. The rim that enclosed the
spokes was the common goal in the overall conspiracy, i.e., the amassing,
accumulation and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth.
On the other hand, the American case of Kotteakos v. United States 33
illustrates a wheel conspiracy where multiple conspiracies were established instead of
one single conspiracy. There, Simon Brown, the hub, assisted 31 independent
individuals to obtain separate fraudulent loans from the US Government. Although all
the defendants were engaged in the same type of illegal activity, there was no
common purpose or overall plan among them, and they were not liable for
involvement in a single conspiracy. Each loan was an end in itself, separate from all
others, although all were alike in having similar illegal objects. Except for Brown, the
common figure, no conspirator was interested in whether any loan except his own
went through. Thus, the US Supreme Court concluded that there existed 32 separate
conspiracies involving Brown rather than one common conspiracy. 34
The chain conspiracy recognized in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan exists when
there is successive communication and cooperation in much the same way as with
legitimate business operations between manufacturer and wholesaler, then wholesaler
and retailer, and then retailer and consumer. 35 This involves individuals linked
together in a vertical chain to achieve a criminal objective. 36 Illustrative of chain
conspiracy was that involved in United States v. Bruno, 37 of the US Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit. There, 88 defendants were indicted for a conspiracy to import,
sell, and possess narcotics. This case involved several smugglers who had brought
narcotics to retailers who, in turn, had sold the narcotics to operatives in Texas and
Louisiana for distribution to addicts. The US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
ruled that what transpired was a single chain conspiracy in which the smugglers knew
that the middlemen must sell to retailers for distribution to addicts, and the retailers
knew that the middle men must purchase drugs from smugglers. As reasoned by the
court, "the conspirators at one end of the chain knew that the unlawful business would
not and could not, stop with their buyers; and those at the other end knew that it had
not begun with their sellers." Each conspirator knew that "the success of that part with
which he was immediately concerned was dependent upon success of the whole."
This means, therefore, that "every member of the conspiracy was liable for every
illegal transaction carried out by other members of the conspiracy in Texas and in
Louisiana." 38
Once the State proved the conspiracy as a means to commit a crime, each co-
conspirator is as criminally liable as the others, for the act of one is the act of all. A
co-conspirator does not have to participate in every detail of the execution; neither
does he have to know the exact part performed by the co-conspirator in the execution
of the criminal act. 39 Otherwise, the criminal liability of each accused is individual
and independent.
The Prosecution insisted that a conspiracy existed among GMA, Uriarte,
Valencia and the Members of the PCSO Board of Directors, Aguas, Villar and Plaras.
The Sandiganbayan agreed with the Prosecution as to the conspirators involved,
declaring that GMA, Aguas, and Uriarte had conspired and committed plunder.
A review of the records of the case compels us to reject the Sandiganbayan's
declaration in light of the information filed against the petitioners, and the foregoing
exposition on the nature, forms and extent of conspiracy. On the contrary, the
Prosecution did not sufficiently allege the existence of a conspiracy among GMA,
Aguas and Uriarte.
A perusal of the information suggests that what the Prosecution sought to show
was an implied conspiracy to commit plunder among all of the accused on the basis of
their collective actions prior to, during and after the implied agreement. It is notable
that the Prosecution did not allege that the conspiracy among all of the accused was
by express agreement, or was a wheel conspiracy or a chain conspiracy.
This was another fatal flaw of the Prosecution.
In its present version, under which the petitioners were charged, Section 2 of
Republic Act No. 7080 (Plunder Law) states:
Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder; Penalties. — Any
public officer who, by himself or in connivance with members of his family,
relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or
other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a
combination or series of overt criminal acts as described in Section 1 (d)
hereof in the aggregate amount or total value of at least Fifty million pesos
(P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished
by reclusion perpetua to death. Any person who participated with the said
public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of
plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of
penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and
extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code, shall be
considered by the court. The court shall declare any and all ill-gotten wealth
and their interests and other incomes and assets including the properties and
shares of stocks derived from the deposit or investment thereof forfeited in
favor of the State. [As Amended by Section 12, Republic Act No. 7659 (The
Death Penalty Law)]
Section 1 (d) of Republic Act No. 7080 provides:
Section 1. Definition of terms. — As used in this Act, the term:
xxx xxx xxx
 d. "Ill-gotten wealth" means any asset, property, business enterprise or
material possession of any person within the purview of Section two (2)
hereof, acquired by him directly or indirectly through dummies, nominees,
agents, subordinates and/or business associates by any combination or series
of the following means or similar schemes:
1. Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of
public funds or raids on the public treasury;
2. By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share,
percentage, kickbacks or any/or entity in connection with any government
contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the public officer
concerned;
3. By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets
belonging to the National Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or
instrumentalities or government-owned or controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries;TAIaHE

4. By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares

of stock, equity or any other form of interest or participation including the
promise of future employment in any business enterprise or undertaking;
5. By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or
other combinations and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to
benefit particular persons or special interests; or
6. By taking undue advantage of official position, authority,
relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves
at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the
Republic of the Philippines.
The law on plunder requires that a particular public officer must be identified
as the one who amassed, acquired or accumulated ill-gotten wealth because it plainly
states that plunder is committed by any public officer who, by himself or in
connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity,
business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires
ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount or total value of at least P50,000,000.00
through a combination or series of overt criminal acts as described in Section 1 (d)
hereof. Surely, the law requires in the criminal charge for plunder against several
individuals that there must be a main plunderer and her co-conspirators, who may be
members of her family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates,
subordinates or other persons. In other words, the allegation of the wheel conspiracy
or express conspiracy in the information was appropriate because the main plunderer
would then be identified in either manner. Of course, implied conspiracy could also
identify the main plunderer, but that fact must be properly alleged and duly proven by
the Prosecution.
This interpretation is supported by Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, 40 where the
Court explained the nature of the conspiracy charge and the necessity for the main
plunderer for whose benefit the amassment, accumulation and acquisition was made,
thus:
There is no denying the fact that the "plunder of an entire nation
resulting in material damage to the national economy" is made up of a
complex and manifold network of crimes. In the crime of plunder, therefore,
different parties may be united by a common purpose. In the case at bar, the
different accused and their different criminal acts have a commonality — to
help the former President amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. Sub-
paragraphs (a) to (d) in the Amended Information alleged the different
participation of each accused in the conspiracy. The gravamen of the
conspiracy charge, therefore, is not that each accused agreed to receive
protection money from illegal gambling, that each misappropriated a portion
of the tobacco excise tax, that each accused ordered the GSIS and SSS to
purchase shares of Belle Corporation and receive commissions from such sale,
nor that each unjustly enriched himself from commissions, gifts and
kickbacks; rather, it is that each of them, by their individual acts, agreed to
participate, directly or indirectly, in the amassing, accumulation and
acquisition of ill-gotten wealth of and/or for former President Estrada.
[bold underscoring supplied for emphasis]
Here, considering that 10 persons have been accused of amassing,
accumulating and/or acquiring ill-gotten wealth aggregating P365,997,915.00, it
would be improbable that the crime charged was plunder if none of them was alleged
to be the main plunderer. As such, each of the 10 accused would account for the
aliquot amount of only P36,599,791.50, or exactly 1/10 of the alleged aggregate ill-
gotten wealth, which is far below the threshold value of ill-gotten wealth required for
plunder.
We are not unmindful of the holding in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan 41 to the
effect that an information alleging conspiracy is sufficient if the information alleges
conspiracy either: (1) with the use of the word conspire, or its derivatives or
synonyms, such as confederate, connive, collude, etc.; or (2) by allegations of the
basic facts constituting the conspiracy in a manner that a person of common
understanding would know what is being conveyed, and with such precision as would
enable the accused to competently enter a plea to a subsequent indictment based on
the same facts. We are not talking about the sufficiency of the information as to the
allegation of conspiracy, however, but rather the identification of the main plunderer
sought to be prosecuted under R.A. No. 7080 as an element of the crime of plunder.
Such identification of the main plunderer was not only necessary because the law
required such identification, but also because it was essential in safeguarding the
rights of all of the accused to be properly informed of the charges they were being
made answerable for. The main purpose of requiring the various elements of the crime
charged to be set out in the information is to enable all the accused to suitably prepare
their defense because they are presumed to have no independent knowledge of the
facts that constituted the offense charged. 42
 For sure, even the Sandiganbayan was at a loss in this respect. Despite the
silence of the information on who the main plunderer or the mastermind was, the
Sandiganbayan readily condemned GMA in its resolution dated September 10, 2015
as the mastermind despite the absence of the specific allegation in the information to
that effect. Even worse, there was no evidence that substantiated such sweeping
generalization.
In fine, the Prosecution's failure to properly allege the main plunderer should
be fatal to the cause of the State against the petitioners for violating the rights of each
accused to be informed of the charges against each of them.
Nevertheless, the Prosecution insists that GMA, Uriarte and Aguas committed
acts showing the existence of an implied conspiracy among themselves, thereby
making all of them the main plunderers. On this score, the Prosecution points out that
the sole overt act of GMA to become a part of the conspiracy was her approval via the
marginal note of "OK" of all the requests made by Uriarte for the use of additional
intelligence fund. The Prosecution stresses that by approving Uriarte's requests in that
manner, GMA violated the following:
a. Letter of Instruction 1282, which required requests for additional
confidential and intelligence funds (CIFs) to be accompanied with
detailed, specific project proposals and specifications; and
b. COA Circular No. 92-385, which allowed the President to approve the
release of additional CIFs only if there was an existing budget to cover
the request.
The insistence of the Prosecution is unwarranted. GMA's approval of Uriarte's
requests for additional CIFs did not make her part of any design to raid the public
treasury as the means to amass, accumulate and acquire ill-gotten wealth. Absent the
specific allegation in the information to that effect, and competent proof thereon,
GMA's approval of Uriarte's requests, even if unqualified, could not make her part of
any criminal conspiracy to commit plunder or any other crime considering that her
approval was not by any means irregular or illegal.
The Prosecution takes GMA to task for approving Uriarte's request despite the
requests failing to provide "the full detail [of] the specific purposes for which said
funds shall be spent and shall explain the circumstances giving rise to the necessity
for the expenditure and the particular aims to be accomplished." It posits that the
requests were not specific enough, contrary to what is required by LOI 1282.
LOI 1282 reads:
LETTER OF INSTRUCTION NO. 1282
To: All Ministries and Offices Concerned
In recent years intelligence funds appropriated for the various ministries and
certain offices have been, as reports reaching me indicate, spent with less than
 full regard for secrecy and prudence. On the one hand, there have been far too
many leakages of information on expenditures of said funds; and on the other
hand, where secrecy has been observed, the President himself was often left
unaware of how these funds had been utilized.
Effective immediately, all requests for the allocation or release of intelligence
funds shall indicate in full detail the specific purposes for which said funds
shall be spent and shall explain the circumstances giving rise to the necessity
for the expenditure and the particular aims to be accomplished.
The requests and the detailed explanations shall be submitted to the President
personally. cDHAES

It is imperative that such detailed presentations be made to the President in

order to avoid such duplication of expenditures as has taken place in the past
because of the lack of centralized planning and organized disposition of
intelligence funds.
Full compliance herewith is desired.
Manila, January 12, 1983.
(Sgd.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS
President of the Philippines
However, an examination of Uriarte's several requests indicates their
compliance with LOI No. 1282. The requests, similarly worded, furnished: (a) the full
details of the specific purposes for which the funds would be spent; (b) the
explanations of the circumstances giving rise to the necessity of the expenditure; and
(c) the particular aims to be accomplished.
The specific purposes and circumstances for the necessity of the expenditures
were laid down as follows:
In dispensing its mandate, PCSO has been constantly encountering a
number of fraudulent schemes and nefarious activities on a continuing basis
which affect the integrity of our operations, to wit:

1. Donated medicines sometimes end up in drug stores for sale even if

they were labeled "Donated by PCSO — Not for Sale";

2. Unwarranted or unofficial use of ambulances by beneficiary-donees;

3. Unauthorized expenditures of endowment fund for charity patients

and organizations;

4. Lotto and sweepstakes scams victimizing innocent people of winning

the jackpot and selling tampered tickets as winning tickets;
 5. Fixers for the different programs of PCSO such as Ambulance
Donation Project, Endowment Fund Program and Individual
Medical Assistance Program;

6. Other fraudulent schemes and activities which put the PCSO in bad
light. 43

A reading of the requests also reveals that the additional CIFs requested were
to be used to protect PCSO's image and the integrity of its operations. The Court thus
cannot share the Prosecution's dismissiveness of the requests for not being compliant
with LOI No. 1282. According to its terms, LOI No. 1282 did not detail any
qualification as to how specific the requests should be made. Hence, we should not
make any other pronouncement than to rule that Uriarte's requests were compliant
with LOI No. 1282.
COA Circular No. 92-385 required that additional request for CIFs would be
approved only when there was available budget. In this regard, the Prosecution
suggests that there was no longer any budget when GMA approved Uriarte's requests
because the budget had earmarked intelligence funds that had already been maxed out
and used. The suggestion is not acceptable, however, considering that the funds of the
PCSO were co-mingled into one account as early as 2007. Consequently, although
only 15% of PCSO's revenues was appropriated to an operation fund from which the
CIF could be sourced, the remaining 85% of PCSO's revenues, already co-mingled
with the operating fund, could still sustain the additional requests. In short, there was
available budget from which to draw the additional requests for CIFs.
It is notable that the COA, although frowning upon PCSO's co-mingling of
funds, did not rule such co-mingling as illegal. As such, sourcing the requested
additional CIFs from one account was far from illegal. TCAScE

Lastly, the Prosecution's effort to show irregularities as badges of bad faith has
led it to claim that GMA had known that Uriarte would raid the public treasury, and
would misuse the amounts disbursed. This knowledge was imputed to GMA by virtue
of her power of control over PCSO.
The Prosecution seems to be relying on the doctrine of command responsibility
to impute the actions of subordinate officers to GMA as the superior officer. The
reliance is misplaced, for incriminating GMA under those terms was legally
unacceptable and incomprehensible. The application of the doctrine of command
responsibility is limited, and cannot be true for all litigations. The Court ruled in
Rodriguez v. Macapagal-Arroyo 44 that command responsibility pertains to the
responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members of the
armed forces or other persons subject to their control in international wars or domestic
conflict. The doctrine has also found application in civil actions for human rights
abuses. But this case involves neither a probe of GMA's actions as the Commander-
in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, nor of a human rights issue. As such,
it is legally improper to impute the actions of Uriarte to GMA in the absence of any
conspiracy between them.
On the part of Aguas, the Sandiganbayan pronounced him to be as much a
member of the implied conspiracy as GMA was, and detailed his participation in this
manner:
In all of the disbursement vouchers covering the cash
advances/releases to Uriarte of the CIF funds, Aguas certified that:
CERTIFIED: Adequate available funds/budgetary allotment in
the amount of P___________; expenditure properly certified;
supported by documents marked (X) per checklist and back
hereof; account codes proper; previous cash advance
liquidated/accounted for.
These certifications, after close scrutiny, were not true because: 1.)
there were no documents which lent support to the cash advances on a per
project basis. The particulars of payment simply read: "To draw cash advance
form the CIF Fund of the Office of the Vice-Chairman and General Manager".
No particular purpose or project was specified contrary to the requirement
under COA Circular 2003-002 that cash advances must be on a per project
basis. Without specifics on the project covered by each cash advance. Aguas
could not certify that supporting documents existed simply because he would
not know what project was being funded by the cash advances; and 2.) There
were no previous liquidations made of prior cash advances when Aguas made
the certifications. COA circular 2003-002 required that cash advances be
liquidated within one (1) month from the date the purpose of the cash advance
was accomplished. If the completion of the projects mentioned were for more
than one month, a monthly progress liquidation report was necessary. In the
case of Uriarte's cash advances certified to by Aguas, the liquidation made
was wholesale, i.e., these were done on a semi-annual basis without a monthly
liquidation or at least a monthly liquidation progress report. How then could
Aguas correctly certify that previous liquidations were accounted for? Aguas's
certification also violated Sec. 89 of P.D. 1445 which states:
Limitations on cash advance. No cash advance shall be
given unless for a legally authorized specific purpose. A cash
advance shall be reported on and liquidated as soon as the
purpose for which it was given has been served. No additional
cash advance shall be allowed to any official or employee
unless the previous cash advance given to him is first settled or
a proper accounting thereof is made.
There is a great presumption of guilt against Aguas, as his action aided
and abetted Uriarte's being able to draw these irregular CIF funds in
contravention of the rules on CIF funds. Without Aguas's certification, the
disbursement vouchers could not have been processed for payment.
Accordingly, the certification that there were supporting documents and prior
 liquidation paved the way for Uriarte to acquire ill-gotten wealth by raiding
the public coffers of the PCSO.
By just taking cognizance of the series and number of cash advances
and the staggering amounts involved, Aguas should have been alerted that
something was greatly amiss and that Uriarte was up to something. If Aguas
was not into the scheme, it would have been easy for him to refuse to sign the
certification, but he did not. The conspiracy "gravamen" is therefore present in
the case of Aguas. Moreover, Aguas's attempt to cover-up Uriarte's misuse of
these CIF funds in his accomplishment report only contributed to unmasking
the actual activities for which these funds were utilized. Aguas's
accomplishment report, which was conformed to by Uriarte, made it self-
evidence that the bulk of the CIF funds in 2009 and 2010 were allegedly
spend for non-PCSO related activities, e.g., bomb threats, kidnapping,
terrorism, and others. 45
Thus, the Sandiganbayan concluded that Aguas became a part of the implied
conspiracy when he signed the disbursement vouchers despite the absence of certain
legal requirements, and issued certain certifications to the effect that the budgetary
allotment/funds for cash advance to be withdrawn were available; that the
expenditures were supported by documents; and that the previous cash advances had
been liquidated or accounted for.
We opine and declare, however, that Aguas' certifications and signatures on the
disbursement vouchers were insufficient bases to conclude that he was into any
conspiracy to commit plunder or any other crime. Without GMA's participation, he
could not release any money because there was then no budget available for the
additional CIFs. Whatever irregularities he might have committed did not amount to
plunder, or to any implied conspiracy to commit plunder.
Under the circumstances, the Sandiganbayan's finding on the existence of the
conspiracy to commit plunder was unsustainable. It then becomes unavoidable for the
Court to rule that because the Prosecution failed to properly allege the elements of the
crime, as well as to prove that any implied conspiracy to commit plunder or any other
crime existed among GMA, Aguas and Uriarte there was no conspiracy to commit
plunder among them. As a result, GMA and Aguas could be criminally responsible
only for their own respective actions, if any.
III.
No proof of amassing, or accumulating, or acquiring
ill-gotten wealth of at least P50 Million
was adduced against GMA and Aguas
The Sandiganbayan sustained the sufficiency of the evidence to convict the
petitioners for plunder on the basis that the Prosecution established all the elements of
plunder.
 After a review of the records, we find and rule that the Prosecution had no case
for plunder against the petitioners.
cTDaEH

To successfully mount a criminal prosecution for plunder, the State must allege
and establish the following elements, namely:
1. That the offender is a public officer who acts by herself or in connivance
with members of her family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity,
business associates, subordinates or other persons;
2. That the offender amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through
a combination or series of the following overt or criminal acts: (a)
through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public
funds or raids on the public treasury; (b) by receiving, directly or
indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickback or any
other form of pecuniary benefits from any person and/or entity in
connection with any government contract or project or by reason of the
office or position of the public officer; (c) by the illegal or fraudulent
conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National
Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities of
Government owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries; (d)
by obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of
stock, equity or any other form of interest or participation including the
promise of future employment in any business enterprise or
undertaking; (e) by establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial
monopolies or other combinations and/or implementation of decrees and
orders intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; or (f)
by taking advantage of official position, authority, relationship,
connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the
expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the
Republic of the Philippines; and,
3. That the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth amassed,
accumulated or acquired is at least P50,000,000.00. 46
The corpus delicti of plunder is the amassment, accumulation or acquisition of
ill-gotten wealth valued at not less than P50,000,000.00. The failure to establish the
corpus delicti should lead to the dismissal of the criminal prosecution.
As regards the element that the public officer must have amassed, accumulated
or acquired ill-gotten wealth worth at least P50,000,000.00, the Prosecution adduced
no evidence showing that either GMA or Aguas or even Uriarte, for that matter, had
amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth of any amount. There was also no
evidence, testimonial or otherwise, presented by the Prosecution showing even the
remotest possibility that the CIFs of the PCSO had been diverted to either GMA or
Aguas, or Uriarte.
 The absolute lack of evidence on this material but defining and decisive aspect
of the criminal prosecution was explicitly noted in the concurring and partial
dissenting opinion of Justice Rodolfo A. Ponferrada of the Sandiganbayan, to wit:
Here the evidence of the prosecution failed to show the existence of
the crime of plunder as no evidence was presented that any of the accused,
accumulated and/or acquired ill-gotten wealth. In fact, the principal witness of
the prosecution when asked, said that she does not know the existence or
whereabouts of the alleged ill-gotten wealth, to wit:
Q: Of course, you don't know where is this ill-gotten wealth are (sic)
now?
A: Yes, Your Honors. We don't know whether they saved it,
squandered it or what? We don't know, Your Honor. 47 [bold
emphasis supplied]
After Atty. Tolentino, as the Prosecution's main witness, conceded lack of any
knowledge of the amassing, accumulating or acquiring of ill-gotten wealth of at least
P50,000,000.00, nothing more remained of the criminal prosecution for plunder.
Hence, the Sandiganbayan should have granted the demurrers of GMA and Aguas,
and dismissed the criminal action against them.
IV.
The Prosecution failed to prove the
predicate act of raiding the public treasury
The Sandiganbayan observed that the Prosecution established the predicate act
of raiding the public treasury, to wit:
Secondly, the terms "unjust enrichment," "benefit," and "pecuniary
benefit" are only mentioned in the predicate acts mentioned in par. 2, 5 and 6
of Section 1 (d) of the Plunder Law. Paragraph 1 of the same section where
"raids on the public treasury" is mentioned did not mention "unjust
enrichment" or "personal benefit". Lastly, the predicate act covering "raids on
the public treasury" is lumped up with the phrases misappropriation,
conversion, misuse and malversation of public funds. Thus, once public funds,
as in the case of CIF funds, are illegally accumulated, amassed or acquired. To
the tune of P50 Million or more, there will be no need to establish any motive
to gain, or much more establish where the money eventually ended up. As
stated in Our Resolution dated November 5, 2013:
It should be noted that in both R.A. No. 7080 and the PCGG rules, the
enumeration of the possible predicate acts in the commission of plunder did
not associate or require the concept of personal gain/benefit or unjust
enrichment with respect to raids on the public treasury, as a means to commit
plunder. It would, therefore, appear that a "raid on the public treasury" is
consummated where all the acts necessary for its execution and
accomplishment are present. Thus a "raid on the public treasury" can be said
to have been achieved thru the pillaging or looting of public coffers either
 through misuse, misappropriation or conversion, without need of establishing
gain or profit to the "raider" gets material possession of a government asset
through improper means and has free disposal of the same, the raid or pillage
is completed.
xxx xxx xxx
Clearly, the improper acquisition and illegal use of CIF funds, which is
obviously a government asset, will amount to a raid on the public treasury,
and therefore fall into the category of ill-gotten wealth.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . It is not disputed that Uriarte asked for and was granted authority
by Arroyo to use additional CIF funds during the period 2008-2010. Uriarte
was able to accumulate during that period CIF funds in the total amount of
P352,681,646. This was through a series of withdrawals as cash advances of
the CIF funds from the PCSO coffers, as evidenced by the disbursement
vouchers and checks issued and encashed by her, through her authorized
representatives.
These flagrant violations of the rules on the use of CIF funds evidently
characterize the series of withdrawals by and releases to Uriarte as "raids" on
the PCSO coffers, which is part of the public treasury. These were, in every
sense, "pillage," as Uriarte looted government funds and appears to have not
been able to account for it. The monies came into her possession and,
admittedly, she disbursed it for purposes other than what these were intended
for, thus amounting to "misuse" of the same. . . .
In this case, to require proof that monies went to a plunderer's bank
account or was used to acquire real or personal properties or used for any
other purpose to personally benefit the plunderer, is absurd. Suppose a
plunderer had already amassed, acquired or accumulated P50 Million or more
of government funds and just decide to keep it in his vault and never used
such funds for any purpose to benefit him, would that not be plunder? Or, if
immediately right after such amassing, the monies went up in flames or
recovered by the police, negating any opportunity for the purpose to actually
benefit, would that not still be plunder? Surely, in such cases, a plunder charge
could still prosper and the argument that the fact of personal benefit should
still be evidence-based must fail. 48
CHTAIc

The Sandiganbayan contended that in order to prove the predicate act of raids
of the public treasury, the Prosecution need not establish that the public officer had
benefited from such act; and that what was necessary was proving that the public
officer had raided the public coffers. In support of this, it referred to the records of the
deliberations of Congress to buttress its observation.
We do not share the Sandiganbayan's contention.
The phrase raids on the public treasury is found in Section 1 (d) of R.A. No.
7080, which provides:
 Section 1. Definition of Terms. — . . .
xxx xxx xxx
d) Ill-gotten wealth means any asset, property, business enterprise or
material possession of any person within the purview of Section Two (2)
hereof, acquired by him directly or indirectly through dummies, nominees,
agents, subordinates and/or business associates by any combination or series
of the following means or similar schemes:
1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or
malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury;
xxx xxx xxx
To discern the proper import of the phrase raids on the public treasury, the key
is to look at the accompanying words: misappropriation, conversion, misuse or
malversation of public funds. This process is conformable with the maxim of statutory
construction noscitur a sociis, by which the correct construction of a particular word
or phrase that is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings may
be made by considering the company of the words in which the word or phrase is
found or with which it is associated. Verily, a word or phrase in a statute is always
used in association with other words or phrases, and its meaning may, therefore, be
modified or restricted by the latter. 49
To convert connotes the act of using or disposing of another's property as if it
were one's own; to misappropriate means to own, to take something for one's own
benefit; 50 misuse means "a good, substance, privilege, or right used improperly,
unforeseeably, or not as intended;" 51 and malversation occurs when "any public
officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or
property, shall appropriate the same or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent,
through abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other person to take such public
funds, or property, wholly or partially." 52 The common thread that binds all the four
terms together is that the public officer used the property taken. Considering that
raids on the public treasury is in the company of the four other terms that require the
use of the property taken, the phrase raids on the public treasury similarly requires
such use of the property taken. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan gravely erred in
contending that the mere accumulation and gathering constituted the forbidden act of
raids on the public treasury. Pursuant to the maxim of noscitur a sociis, raids on the
public treasury requires the raider to use the property taken impliedly for his personal
benefit.
The Prosecution asserts that the Senate deliberations removed personal benefit
as a requirement for plunder. In not requiring personal benefit, the Sandiganbayan
quoted the following exchanges between Senator Enrile and Senator Tañada, viz.:
Senator Enrile. The word here, Mr. President, "such public officer or
person who conspired or knowingly benefited". One does not have to
conspire or rescheme. The only element needed is that he "knowingly
 benefited". A candidate for the Senate for instance, who received a political
contribution from a plunderer, knowing that the contributor is a plunderer and
therefore, he knowingly benefited from the plunder, would he also suffer the
penalty, Mr. President, for life imprisonment?
Senator Tañada. In the committee amendments, Mr. President, we
have deleted these lines 1 to 4 and part of line 5, on page 3. But, in a way, Mr.
President, it is good that the Gentleman is bringing out these questions, I
believe that under the examples he has given, the Court will have to. . .
Senator Enrile. How about the wife, Mr. President, he may not agree
with the plunderer to plunder the country but because she is a dutiful wife or a
faithful husband, she has to keep her or his vow of fidelity to the spouse. And,
of course, she enjoys the benefits out of the plunder. Would the Gentleman
now impute to her or him the crime of plunder simply because she or he
knowingly benefited out of the fruits of the plunder and, therefore, he must
suffer or he must suffer the penalty of life imprisonment?
The President. That was stricken out already in the Committee
amendment.
Senator Tañada. Yes, Mr. President. Lines 1 to 4 and part of line 5
were stricken out in the Committee amendment. But, as I said, the examples
of the Minority Floor Leader are still worth spreading the Record. And, I
believe that in those examples, the Court will have just to take into
consideration all the other circumstances prevailing in the case and the
evidence that will be submitted.
The President. In any event, 'knowingly benefited' has already been
stricken off." 53
The exchanges between Senator Enrile and Senator Tañada reveal, therefore,
that what was removed from the coverage of the bill and the final version that
eventually became the law was a person who was not the main plunderer or a co-
conspirator, but one who personally benefited from the plunderers' action. The
requirement of personal benefit on the part of the main plunderer or his co-
conspirators by virtue of their plunder was not removed. EATCcI

As a result, not only did the Prosecution fail to show where the money went
but, more importantly, that GMA and Aguas had personally benefited from the same.
Hence, the Prosecution did not prove the predicate act of raids on the public treasury
beyond reasonable doubt.
V.
Summation
In view of the foregoing, the Court inevitably concludes that the
Sandiganbayan completely ignored the failure of the information to sufficiently
charge conspiracy to commit plunder against the petitioners; and ignored the lack of
evidence establishing the corpus delicti of amassing, accumulation and acquisition of
 ill-gotten wealth in the total amount of at least P50,000,000.00 through any or all of
the predicate crimes. The Sandiganbayan thereby acted capriciously, thus gravely
abusing its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Grave abuse of discretion means such capricious or whimsical exercise of
judgment which is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. 54 To justify the issuance of the
writ of certiorari, the abuse of discretion must be grave, as when the power is
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility,
and the abuse must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all, in
contemplation of law, as to be equivalent to having acted without jurisdiction. 55
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petitions for certiorari; ANNULS
and SETS ASIDE the resolutions issued in Criminal Case No. SB-12-CRM-0174 by
the Sandiganbayan on April 6, 2015 and September 10, 2015; GRANTS the
petitioners' respective demurrers to evidence; DISMISSES Criminal Case No. SB-12-
CRM-0174 as to the petitioners GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO and
BENIGNO AGUAS for insufficiency of evidence; ORDERS the immediate release
from detention of said petitioners; and MAKES no pronouncements on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-de Castro, Brion, Peralta, Del Castillo, Perez,
Mendoza, Reyes and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.
Sereno, C.J., I join the Dissent of J. Leonen and attach my separate Dissent.
Carpio, J., I join the Dissenting Opinion of J. Leonen.
Perlas-Bernabe, J., Please see my separate concurring and dissenting opinion.
Leonen, J., I dissent. See separate opinion.
Caguioa, J., I join the dissent of J. Leonen.
(Macapagal-Arroyo v. People, G.R. Nos. 220598 & 220953, [July 19, 2016], 790 PHIL
|||

367-556)

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. Nos. 169823-24. September 11, 2013.]

HERMINIO T. DISINI, petitioner, vs. THE HON.

SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST DIVISION, AND THE PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

[G.R. Nos. 174764-65. September 11, 2013.]

 HERMINIO T. DISINI, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST
DIVISION, AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J : p

The Sandiganbayan has exclusive original jurisdiction over the criminal action
involving petitioner notwithstanding that he is a private individual considering that his
criminal prosecution is intimately related to the recovery of ill-gotten wealth of the
Marcoses, their immediate family, subordinates and close associates.

The Case

Petitioner Herminio T. Disini assails via petition for certiorari the resolutions
promulgated by the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal Case
No. 28002, both entitled People v. Herminio T. Disini, on January 17, 2005 (denying
his motion to quash the informations) 1 and August 10, 2005 (denying his motion for
reconsideration of the denial of his motion to quash), 2 alleging that the
Sandiganbayan (First Division) thereby committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Antecedents

The Office of the Ombudsman filed two informations dated June 30, 2004
charging Disini in the Sandiganbayan with corruption of public officials, penalized
under Article 212 in relation to Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code (Criminal Case
No. 28001), and with a violation of Section 4 (a) of Republic Act 3019 (R.A. No.
3019), also known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Criminal Case No.
28002).
The accusatory portions of the informations read as follows:

Criminal Case No. 28001

That during the period from 1974 to February 1986, in Manila,

Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused
HERMINIO T. DISINI, conspiring together and confederating with the then
President of the Philippines Ferdinand E. Marcos, did then and there, wil[l]fully,
unlawfully and feloniously offer, promise and give gifts and presents to said
Ferdinand E. Marcos, consisting of accused DISINI's ownership of two billion
and five hundred (2.5 billion) shares of stock in Vulcan Industrial and Mining
Corporation and four billion (4 billion) shares of stock in The Energy
Corporation, with both shares of stock having then a book value of P100.00 per
share of stock, and subcontracts, to Engineering and Construction Company of
Asia, owned and controlled by said Ferdinand E. Marcos, on the mechanical and
electrical construction work on the Philippine Nuclear Power Plant Project
("Project") of the National Power Corporation at Morong, Bataan, all for and in
consideration of accused Disini seeking and obtaining for Burns and Roe and
Westinghouse Electrical Corporation (Westinghouse), the contracts to do the
engineering and architectural design and to construct, respectively, the Project,
as in fact said Ferdinand E. Marcos, taking undue advantage of his position and
committing the offense in relation to his office and in consideration of the
aforesaid gifts and presents, did award or cause to be awarded to said Burns and
Roe and Westinghouse, the contracts to do the engineering and architectural
design and to construct the Project, respectively, which acts constitute the crime
of corruption of public officials.
CADSHI

CONTRARY TO LAW. 3

Criminal Case No. 28002

That during the period 1974 to February 1986, in Manila, Philippines,

and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, accused HERMINIO T.
DISINI, conspiring together and confederating with the then President of the
Philippines, Ferdinand E. Marcos, being then the close personal friend and
golfing partner of said Ferdinand E. Marcos, and being further the husband of
Paciencia Escolin-Disini who was the first cousin of then First Lady Imelda
Romualdez-Marcos and family physician of the Marcos family, taking
advantage of such close personal relation, intimacy and free access, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally, in connection with the Philippine
Nuclear Power Plant (PNPP) Project ("PROJECT") of the National Power
Corporation (NPC) at Morong, Bataan, request and receive from Burns and
Roe, a foreign consultant, the total amount of One Million U.S. Dollars
($1,000,000.00), more or less, and also from Westinghouse Electric Corporation
(WESTINGHOUSE), the total amount of Seventeen Million U.S. Dollars
($17,000,000.00), more or less, both of which entities were then having
business, transaction, and application with the Government of the Republic of
the Philippines, all for and in consideration of accused DISINI securing and
obtaining, as accused Disini did secure and obtain, the contract for the said
Burns and Roe and Westinghouse to do the engineering and architectural
design, and construct, respectively, the said PROJECT, and subsequently,
request and receive subcontracts for Power Contractors, Inc. owned by accused
DISINI, and Engineering and Construction Company of Asia (ECCO-Asia),
owned and controlled by said Ferdinand E. Marcos, which stated amounts and
subcontracts constituted kickbacks, commissions and gifts as material or
pecuniary advantages, for securing and obtaining, as accused DISINI did secure
and obtain, through the direct intervention of said Ferdinand E. Marcos, for
 Burns and Roe the engineering and architectural contract, and for Westinghouse
the construction contract, for the PROJECT.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 4

On August 2, 2004, Disini filed a motion to quash, 5 alleging that the criminal
actions had been extinguished by prescription, and that the informations did not
conform to the prescribed form. The Prosecution opposed the motion to quash. 6
On September 16, 2004, Disini voluntarily submitted himself for arraignment
to obtain the Sandiganbayan's favorable action on his motion for permission to travel
abroad. 7 He then entered a plea of not guilty to both informations.
As stated, on January 17, 2005, the Sandiganbayan (First Division)
promulgated its first assailed resolution denying the motion to quash. 8
Disini moved for the reconsideration of the resolution dated January 17, 2005,
9 but the Sandiganbayan (First Division) denied his motion on August 10, 2005
through the second assailed resolution. 10

Issues

Undaunted, Disini commenced this special civil action for certiorari, alleging
that:

A. THE RESPONDENT COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE

OFFENSES CHARGED.

1. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT

RULED THAT SECTION 4, PARAGRAPHS (A) AND (B) OF
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8249 DO NOT APPLY SINCE THE
INFORMATIONS WERE "FILED PURSUANT TO E.O. NOS.
1, 2, 14 AND 14-A".

2. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT

ASSUMED JURISDICTION WITHOUT HAVING MET THE
REQUISITE UNDER SECTION 4 OF R.A. 8249 THAT THE
ACCUSED MUST BE A PUBLIC OFFICER. DEHaAS

B. THE RESPONDENT COURT ACTED WITH SUCH GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION WHEN IT EFFECTIVELY IGNORED,
DISREGARDED, AND DENIED PETITIONER'S
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY RIGHT TO
PRESCRIPTION.
 1. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
DETERMINING THE APPLICABLE PRESCRIPTIVE
PERIOD.

2. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN

DETERMINING THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE
PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD.

3. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN

DETERMINING THE POINT OF INTERRUPTION OF THE
PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD.

C. BY MERELY ASSUMING THE PRESENCE OF GLARINGLY ABSENT

ELEMENTS IN THE OFFENSES CHARGED TO UPHOLD THE
'SUFFICIENCY' OF THE INFORMATIONS IN CRIMINAL CASE
NOS. 28001 AND 28002, THE RESPONDENT COURT
DEMONSTRATED ITS PREJUDGMENT OVER THE SUBJECT
CASES AND ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF ITS DISCRETION.

D. THE RESPONDENT COURT ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO QUASH THE INFORMATIONS
DESPITE THEIR UTTER FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE
PRESCRIBED FORM, THUS EFFECTIVELY DENYING THE
ACCUSED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY RIGHT TO
BE INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF THE
ACCUSATION AGAINST HIM. 11

Ruling

The petition for certiorari has no merit.

1.

Preliminary Considerations

To properly resolve this case, reference is made to the ruling of the Court in
G.R. No. 175730 entitled Herminio Disini v. Sandiganbayan, 12 which involved the
civil action for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution, and damages (Civil
Case No. 0013 entitled Republic v. Herminio T. Disini, et al.) filed by the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG) against Disini and others. 13 The amended
complaint in Civil Case No. 0013 alleged that Disini had acted in unlawful concert
with his co-defendants in acquiring and accumulating ill-gotten wealth through the
misappropriation of public funds, plunder of the nation's wealth, extortion,
embezzlement, and other acts of corruption, 14 as follows:
 4. Defendant HERMINIO T. DISINI is a close associate of defendant
Ferdinand E. Marcos and the husband of the first cousin of Defendant Imelda R.
Marcos. By reason of this relationship . . . defendant Herminio Disini obtained
staggering commissions from the Westinghouse in exchange for securing the
nuclear power plant contract from the Philippine government.

xxx xxx xxx

13. Defendants Herminio T. Disini and Rodolfo Jacob, by themselves

and/or in unlawful concert, active collaboration and willing participation of
defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, and taking undue
advantage of their association and influence with the latter defendant spouses in
order to prevent disclosure and recovery of ill-gotten assets, engaged in devices,
schemes, and stratagems such as:

xxx xxx xxx

(c) unlawfully utilizing the Herdis Group of Companies and Asia

Industries, Inc. as conduits through which defendants received, kept, and/or
invested improper payments such as unconscionably large commissions from
foreign corporations like the Westinghouse Corporation; CcSEIH

(d) secured special concessions, privileges and/or benefits from

defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, such as a contract
awarded to Westinghouse Corporation which built an inoperable nuclear facility
in the country for a scandalously exorbitant amount that included defendant's
staggering commissions — defendant Rodolfo Jacob executed for HGI the
contract for the aforesaid nuclear plant; 15

Through its letter dated April 8, 1991, 16 the PCGG transmitted the records of
Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002 to then Ombudsman Conrado
M. Vasquez for appropriate action, to wit:

In line with the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Eduardo
M. Cojuangco, Jr. versus the PCGG (G.R. Nos. 92319-92320) dated October 2,
1990, we are hereby transmitting to your Office for appropriate action the
records of the attached criminal case which we believe is similar to the said
Cojuangco case in certain aspects, such as: (i) some parts or elements are also
parts of the causes of action in the civil complaints[-] filed with the
Sandiganbayan; (ii) some properties or assets of the respondents have been
sequestered; (iii) some of the respondents are also party defendants in the civil
cases.

Although the authority of the PCGG has been upheld by the Supreme
Court, we are constrained to refer to you for proper action the herein-attached
 case in view of the suspicion that the PCGG cannot conduct an impartial
investigation in cases similar to that of the Cojuangco case. . . .

Ostensibly, the PCGG's letter of transmittal was adverting to the ruling in

Cojuangco, Jr. v. Presidential Commission on Good Government (Cojuangco, Jr.), 17
viz.:

. . . [T]he PCGG and the Solicitor General finding a pima facie basis
filed a civil complaint against petitioner and intervenors alleging substantially
the same illegal or criminal acts subject of the subsequent criminal complaints
the Solicitor General filed with the PCGG for preliminary investigation. . . . .

Moreover, when the PCGG issued the sequestration and freeze orders
against petitioner's properties, it was on the basis of a prima facie finding that
the same were ill-gotten and/or were acquired in relation to the illegal
disposition of coconut levy funds. Thus, the Court finds that the PCGG
cannot possibly conduct the preliminary investigation of said criminal
complaints with the "cold neutrality of an impartial judge," as it has
prejudged the matter. . . . 18

xxx xxx xxx

The Court finds that under the circumstances of the case, the PCGG
cannot inspire belief that it could be impartial in the conduct of the
preliminary investigation of the aforesaid complaints against petitioner and
intervenors. It cannot possibly preside in the said preliminary investigation
with an even hand.

The Court holds that a just and fair administration of justice can be
promoted if the PCGG would be prohibited from conducting the
preliminary investigation of the complaints subject of this petition and the
petition for intervention and that the records of the same should be
forwarded to the Ombudsman, who as an independent constitutional
officer has primary jurisdiction over cases of this nature, to conduct such
preliminary investigation and take appropriate action. 19 (Bold emphasis
supplied) SETAcC

It appears that the resolutions of the Office of the Ombudsman, following its
conduct of the preliminary investigation on the criminal complaints thus transmitted
by the PCGG, were reversed and set aside by the Court in Presidential Commission
on Good Government v. Desierto, 20 with the Court requiring the Office of the
Ombudsman to file the informations that became the subject of Disini's motion to
quash in Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002.

2.
 Sandiganbayan has exclusive and
original jurisdiction over the offenses charged

Disini challenges the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over the offenses

charged in Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002. He contends that:
(1) the informations did not allege that the charges were being filed pursuant to and in
connection with Executive Order (E.O.) Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A; (2) the offenses
charged were not of the nature contemplated by E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A because
the allegations in the informations neither pertained to the recovery of ill-gotten
wealth, nor involved sequestration cases; (3) the cases were filed by the Office of the
Ombudsman instead of by the PCGG; and (4) being a private individual not charged
as a co-principal, accomplice or accessory of a public officer, he should be prosecuted
in the regular courts instead of in the Sandiganbayan.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction over the offenses charged because Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal
Case No. 28002 were filed within the purview of Section 4 (c) of R.A. No. 8249; and
that both cases stemmed from the criminal complaints initially filed by the PCGG
pursuant to its mandate under E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A to investigate and file the
appropriate civil or criminal cases to recover ill-gotten wealth not only of the
Marcoses and their immediately family but also of their relatives, subordinates and
close associates.
We hold that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over Criminal Case No.
28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002.
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1606 was the law that established the
Sandiganbayan and defined its jurisdiction. The law was amended by R.A. No. 7975
and R.A. No. 8249. Under Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, the Sandiganbayan was vested
with original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases involving:

a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known

as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one
or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the
government whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of
the commission of the offense:

xxx xxx xxx

b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other

crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in
subsection (a) of this section in relation to their office.
 c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with
Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986. (Bold emphasis
supplied)

In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions

corresponding to salary grade '27' or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic
Act No. 6758, or military or PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original
jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court,
metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court and municipal circuit trial court, as
the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdiction as provided in Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended. DaScCH

xxx xxx xxx

In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or

accessories with the public officers or employees, including those employed in
government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with
said public officers and employees in the proper courts which shall exercise
exclusive jurisdiction over them.

xxx xxx xxx

It is underscored that it was the PCGG that had initially filed the criminal
complaints in the Sandiganbayan, with the Office of the Ombudsman taking over the
investigation of Disini only after the Court issued in Cojuangco, Jr. the directive to
the PCGG to refer the criminal cases to the Office of the Ombudsman on the ground
that the PCGG would not be an impartial office following its finding of a prima facie
case being established against Disini to sustain the institution of Civil Case No. 0013.
Also underscored is that the complaint in Civil Case No. 0013 and the
informations in Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002 involved the
same transaction, specifically the contracts awarded through the intervention of Disini
and President Marcos in favor of Burns & Roe to do the engineering and architectural
design, and Westinghouse to do the construction of the Philippine Nuclear Power
Plant Project (PNPPP). Given their sameness in subject matter, to still expressly aver
in Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002 that the charges involved
the recovery of ill-gotten wealth was no longer necessary. 21 With Criminal Case No.
28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002 being intertwined with Civil Case No. 0013, the
PCGG had the authority to institute the criminal prosecutions against Disini pursuant
to E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.
That Disini was a private individual did not remove the offenses charged from
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Section 2 of E.O. No. 1, which tasked the
PCGG with assisting the President in "[t]he recovery of all ill-gotten wealth
accumulated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family,
relatives, subordinates and close associates, whether located in the Philippines or
abroad, including the takeover or sequestration of all business enterprises and entities
owned or controlled by them, during his administration, directly or through nominees,
by taking undue advantage of their public office and/or using their powers, authority,
influence, connections or relationship," expressly granted the authority of the PCGG
to recover ill-gotten wealth covered President Marcos' immediate family, relatives,
subordinates and close associates, without distinction as to their private or public
status.
Contrary to Disini's argument, too, the qualifying clause found in Section 4 of
R.A. No. 8249 22 applied only to the cases listed in Subsection 4a and Subsection 4b
of R.A. No. 8249, the full text of which follows:

xxx xxx xxx

a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise

known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one
or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the
government whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of
the commission of the offense:

(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of

regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade '27' and higher,
of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No.
6758), specifically including:ITSacC

(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang

panlalawigan and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers and other
provincial department heads;

(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod,

city treasurers, assessors, engineers and other city department heads;

(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul

and higher;

(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all
officers of higher rank;

(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the

position of provincial director and those holding the rank of senior
superintendent or higher;

(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and
prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
 (g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned
or -controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or
foundations;

(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade

'27' and up under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;

(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the

Constitution;

(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without

prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; and

(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade '27' and
higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.

b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other

crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in
subsection a of this section in relation to their office. (bold emphasis supplied)

xxx xxx xxx

Unquestionably, public officials occupying positions classified as Grade 27 or

higher are mentioned only in Subsection 4a and Subsection 4b, signifying the plain
legislative intent of limiting the qualifying clause to such public officials. To include
within the ambit of the qualifying clause the persons covered by Subsection 4c would
contravene the exclusive mandate of the PCGG to bring the civil and criminal cases
pursuant to and in connection with E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A. In view of this, the
Sandiganbayan properly took cognizance of Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal
Case No. 28002 despite Disini's being a private individual, and despite the lack of any
allegation of his being the co-principal, accomplice or accessory of a public official in
the commission of the offenses charged.

3.

The offenses charged in the

informations have not yet prescribed

In resolving the issue of prescription, the following must be considered,

namely: (1) the period of prescription for the offense charged; (2) the time when the
period of prescription starts to run; and (3) the time when the prescriptive period is
interrupted. 23
The information in Criminal Case No. 28001 alleged that Disini had offered,
promised and given gifts and presents to Ferdinand E. Marcos; that said gifts were in
consideration of Disini obtaining for Burns & Roe and Westinghouse Electrical
Corporation (Westinghouse) the contracts, respectively, to do the engineering and
architectural design of and to construct the PNPPP; and that President Marcos did
award or cause to be awarded the respective contracts to Burns & Roe and
Westinghouse, which acts constituted the crime of corruption of public officials. 24
The crime of corruption of public officials charged in Criminal Case No. 28001
is punished by Article 212 of the Revised Penal Code with the "same penalties
imposed upon the officer corrupted." 25 Under the second paragraph of Article 210 of
the Revised Penal Code (direct bribery), 26 if the gift was accepted by the officer in
consideration of the execution of an act that does not constitute a crime, and the
officer executes the act, he shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its medium and
minimum periods and a fine of not less than three times the value of the gift.
Conformably with Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, 27 the period of prescription
for this specie of corruption of public officials charged against Disini is 15 years. CIAHDT

As for Criminal Case No. 28002, Disini was charged with a violation of
Section 4 (a) of R.A. No. 3019. By express provision of Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019,
as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 195, the offenses committed under R.A. No.
3019 shall prescribe in 15 years. Prior to the amendment, the prescriptive period was
only 10 years. It became settled in People v. Pacificador, 28 however, that the longer
prescriptive period of 15 years would not apply to crimes committed prior to the
effectivity of Batas Pambansa Blg. 195, which was approved on March 16, 1982,
because the longer period could not be given retroactive effect for not being favorable
to the accused. With the information alleging the period from 1974 to February 1986
as the time of the commission of the crime charged, the applicable prescriptive period
is 10 years in order to accord with People v. Pacificador.
For crimes punishable by the Revised Penal Code, Article 91 thereof provides
that prescription starts to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the
offended party, the authorities, or their agents. As to offenses punishable by R.A. No.
3019, Section 2 of Act No. 3326 n 29 states:

Section 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the

commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the
time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for
its investigation and punishment.

The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted

against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are
dismissed for reasons not constituting double jeopardy.

The ruling on the issue of prescription in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding

Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto 30 is also enlightening, viz.:
 Generally, the prescriptive period shall commence to run on the day the
crime is committed. That an aggrieved person "entitled to an action has no
knowledge of his right to sue or of the facts out of which his right arises," does
not prevent the running of the prescriptive period. An exception to this rule is
the "blameless ignorance" doctrine, incorporated in Section 2 of Act No. 3326.
Under this doctrine, "the statute of limitations runs only upon discovery of the
fact of the invasion of a right which will support a cause of action. In other
words, the courts would decline to apply the statute of limitations where the
plaintiff does not know or has no reasonable means of knowing the existence of
a cause of action." It was in this accord that the Court confronted the question
on the running of the prescriptive period in People v. Duque which became the
cornerstone of our 1999 Decision in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding
Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto (G.R. No. 130149), and the subsequent
cases which Ombudsman Desierto dismissed, emphatically, on the ground of
prescription too. Thus, we held in a catena of cases, that if the violation of the
special law was not known at the time of its commission, the prescription begins
to run only from the discovery thereof, i.e., discovery of the unlawful nature of
the constitutive act or acts.

Corollary, it is safe to conclude that the prescriptive period for the crime
which is the subject herein, commenced from the date of its discovery in 1992
after the Committee made an exhaustive investigation. When the complaint was
filed in 1997, only five years have elapsed, and, hence, prescription has not yet
set in. The rationale for this was succinctly discussed in the 1999 Presidential
Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans, that "it was well-high
impossible for the State, the aggrieved party, to have known these crimes
committed prior to the 1986 EDSA Revolution, because of the alleged
connivance and conspiracy among involved public officials and the
beneficiaries of the loans." In yet another pronouncement, in the 2001
Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto
(G.R. No. 130817), the Court held that during the Marcos regime, no person
would have dared to question the legality of these transactions. (Citations
omitted) 31

Accordingly, we are not persuaded to hold here that the prescriptive period
began to run from 1974, the time when the contracts for the PNPP Project were
awarded to Burns & Roe and Westinghouse. Although the criminal cases were the
offshoot of the sequestration case to recover ill-gotten wealth instead of behest loans
like in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto, the
connivance and conspiracy among the public officials involved and the beneficiaries
of the favors illegally extended rendered it similarly well-nigh impossible for the
State, as the aggrieved party, to have known of the commission of the crimes charged
prior to the EDSA Revolution in 1986. Notwithstanding the highly publicized and
widely-known nature of the PNPPP, the unlawful acts or transactions in relation to it
were discovered only through the PCGG's exhaustive investigation, resulting in the
establishment of a prima facie case sufficient for the PCGG to institute Civil Case No.
0013 against Disini. Before the discovery, the PNPPP contracts, which partook of a
public character, enjoyed the presumption of their execution having been regularly
done in the course of official functions. 32 Considering further that during the Marcos
regime, no person would have dared to assail the legality of the transactions, it would
be unreasonable to expect that the discovery of the unlawful transactions was possible
prior to 1986.ECISAD

We note, too, that the criminal complaints were filed and their records
transmitted by the PCGG to the Office of the Ombudsman on April 8, 1991 for the
conduct n the preliminary investigation. 33 In accordance with Article 91 of the
Revised Penal Code 34 and the ruling in Panaguiton, Jr. v. Department of Justice, 35
the filing of the criminal complaints in the Office of the Ombudsman effectively
interrupted the running of the period of prescription. According to Panaguiton: 36

In Ingco v. Sandiganbayan and Sanrio Company Limited v. Lim, which

involved violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019)
and the Intellectual Property Code (R.A. No. 8293), which are both special
laws, the Court ruled that the prescriptive period is interrupted by the institution
of proceedings for preliminary investigation against the accused. In the more
recent case of Securities and Exchange Commission v. Interport Resources
Corporation, the Court ruled that the nature and purpose of the investigation
conducted by the Securities and Exchange Commission on violations of the
Revised Securities Act, another special law, is equivalent to the preliminary
investigation conducted by the DOJ in criminal cases, and thus effectively
interrupts the prescriptive period.

The following disquisition in the Interport Resources case is instructive,

thus:

While it may be observed that the term "judicial proceedings" in

Sec. 2 of Act No. 3326 appears before "investigation and punishment" in
the old law, with the subsequent change in set-up whereby the
investigation of the charge for purposes of prosecution has become the
exclusive function of the executive branch, the term "proceedings"
should now be understood either executive or judicial in character:
executive when it involves the investigation phase and judicial when it
refers to the trial and judgment stage. With this clarification, any kind of
investigative proceeding instituted against the guilty person which may
ultimately lead to his prosecution should be sufficient to toll
prescription.

Indeed, to rule otherwise would deprive the injured party the right to
obtain vindication on account of delays that are not under his control.
 The prevailing rule is, therefore, that irrespective of whether the offense
charged is punishable by the Revised Penal Code or by a special law, it is the filing of
the complaint or information in the office of the public prosecutor for purposes of the
preliminary investigation that interrupts the period of prescription. Consequently,
prescription did not yet set in because only five years elapsed from 1986, the time of
the discovery of the offenses charged, up to April 1991, the time of the filing of the
criminal complaints in the Office of the Ombudsman.

4.

The informations were sufficient in form and substance

It is axiomatic that a complaint or information must state every single fact

necessary to constitute the offense charged; otherwise, a motion to dismiss or to quash
on the ground that the complaint or information charges no offense may be properly
sustained. The fundamental test in determining whether a motion to quash may be
sustained based on this ground is whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted,
will establish the essential elements of the offense as defined in the law. 37 Extrinsic
matters or evidence aliunde are not considered. 38 The test does not require absolute
certainty as to the presence of the elements of the offense; otherwise, there would no
longer be any need for the Prosecution to proceed to trial.
The informations in Criminal Case No. 28001 (corruption of public officials)
and Criminal Case No. 28002 (violation of Section 4 (a) of RA No. 3019) have
sufficiently complied with the requirements of Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of
Court, viz.:EIaDHS

Section 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. — A complaint or

information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of
the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of
the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed.

When the offense is committed by more than one person, all of them
shall be included in the complaint or information.

The information in Criminal Case No. 28001 alleging corruption of public

officers specifically put forth that Disini, in the period from 1974 to February 1986 in
Manila, Philippines, conspiring and confederating with then President Marcos,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously offered, promised and gave gifts and presents to
President Marcos, who, by taking undue advantage of his position as President,
committed the offense in relation to his office, and in consideration of the gifts and
presents offered, promised and given by Disini, President Marcos caused to be
awarded to Burns & Roe and Westinghouse the respective contracts to do the
engineering and architectural design of and to construct the PNPPP. The felonious act
consisted of causing the contracts for the PNPPP to be awarded to Burns & Roe and
Westinghouse by reason of the gifts and promises offered by Disini to President
Marcos.
The elements of corruption of public officials under Article 212 of the Revised
Penal Code are:

1. That the offender makes offers or promises, or gives gifts or presents to

a public officer; and

2. That the offers or promises are made or the gifts or presents are given
to a public officer under circumstances that will make the public
officer liable for direct bribery or indirect bribery.

The allegations in the information for corruption of public officials, if

hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential elements of the crime. The
information stated that: (1) Disini made an offer and promise, and gave gifts to
President Marcos, a public officer; and (2) in consideration of the offers, promises and
gifts, President Marcos, in causing the award of the contracts to Burns & Roe and
Westinghouse by taking advantage of his position and in committing said act in
relation to his office, was placed under circumstances that would make him liable for
direct bribery. 39 The second element of corruption of public officers simply required
the public officer to be placed under circumstances, not absolute certainty, that would
make him liable for direct or indirect bribery. Thus, even without alleging that
President Marcos received or accepted Disini's offers, promises and gifts — an
essential element in direct bribery — the allegation that President Marcos caused the
award of the contracts to Burns & Roe and Westinghouse sufficed to place him under
circumstances of being liable for direct bribery.
The sufficiency of the allegations in the information charging the violation of
Section 4 (a) of R.A. No. 3019 is similarly upheld. The elements of the offense under
Section 4 (a) of R.A. No. 3019 are:

1. That the offender has family or close personal relation with a public
official;

2. That he capitalizes or exploits or takes advantage of such family or

close personal relation by directly or indirectly requesting or
receiving any present, gift, material or pecuniary advantage from
any person having some business, transaction, application, request,
or contract with the government;
 3. That the public official with whom the offender has family or close
personal relation has to intervene in the business transaction,
application, request, or contract with the government. CTaSEI

The allegations in the information charging the violation of Section 4 (a) of

R.A. No. 3019, if hypothetically admitted, would establish the elements of the
offense, considering that: (1) Disini, being the husband of Paciencia Escolin-Disini,
the first cousin of First Lady Imelda Romualdez-Marcos, and at the same time the
family physician of the Marcoses, had close personal relations and intimacy with and
free access to President Marcos, a public official; (2) Disini, taking advantage of such
family and close personal relations, requested and received $1,000,000.00 from Burns
& Roe and $17,000,000.00 from Westinghouse, the entities then having business,
transaction, and application with the Government in connection with the PNPPP; (3)
President Marcos, the public officer with whom Disini had family or close personal
relations, intervened to secure and obtain for Burns & Roe the engineering and
architectural contract, and for Westinghouse the construction of the PNPPP.
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition for certiorari;
AFFIRMS the resolutions promulgated on January 17, 2005 and August 10, 2005 by
the Sandiganbayan (First Division) in Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal Case
No. 28002; and DIRECTS petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., Villarama, Jr., Perez * and Reyes, JJ., concur.
 
(Disini v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 169823-24 & 174764-65, [September 11, 2013],
|||

717 PHIL 638-669)

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. Nos. 211933 & 211960. April 15, 2015.]

ROBERTA S. SALDARIEGA, petitioner, vs. HON. ELVIRA D.C.

PANGANIBAN, Presiding Judge, Branch 227, Regional Trial Court,
National Capital Region, Quezon City and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

DECISION
PERALTA, J : p

Before us is a special civil action for certiorari 1 under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, dated April 21, 2014 filed by Roberta S. Saldariega (petitioner), through
counsel, assailing the Order dated June 14, 2013 issued by respondent Presiding Judge
Elvira D.C. Panganiban, which granted the motion to reopen Criminal Case Nos. Q-
11-173055 and Q-11-173056, for allegedly having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The facts of the case, as culled from the records, are as follows:
On November 8, 2011, the Office of the City Prosecutor, Quezon City filed
two (2) Informations against petitioner Roberta S. Saldariega for violation of Sections
5 and 11, Article 2, Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. Q-11-173055 and Q-
11-173056, respectively. 2 Said cases were raffled to Branch 227, Regional Trial
Court, Quezon City, presided by herein respondent Judge Elvira D.C. Panganiban.
Court hearings were set for the subject cases, however, the prosecution's
principal witness PO2 Nelson Villas (PO2 Villas), one of the arresting officers, failed
to attend said scheduled hearings, specifically on October 22, 2012 and October 25,
2012. 3 Thus, during the May 16, 2013 hearing, respondent judge issued an Order
provisionally dismissing the cases with the express consent of the accused-petitioner,
4 the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

Today is supposedly set for the continuation of the direct testimony of
PO2 Nelson Villas. However, although notified, said witness failed to appear
simply on the ground that there is a deceased relative, the body of whom, he
will accompany to the province.
The records show that on December 10, 2012, he testified partially on
direct examination and he was notified of the March 26, 2013 continuation of
his testimony, but despite Notice in open Court, he failed to appear. Likewise,
the Court noticed that the other prosecution witness, PO3 Rionaldo Sabulaan
never appeared despite Notice received. It appears from the records that only
the Forensic Chemist testified on September 13, 2012, but the Forensic
Chemist does not have any personal knowledge of the source of the evidence
she examined, and also on the facts and circumstances affecting the arrest of
the accused. Thus, the defense counsel invoked the right of the accused to
speedy trial. The Public Prosecutor did not object to the dismissal, provided
the dismissal is only provisional. Hence, let these cases be ordered
PROVISIONALLY DISMISSED WITH THE EXPRESS CONSENT OF
THE ACCUSED AND HER COUNSEL.
xxx xxx xxx
SO ORDERED. 5
 On June 5, 2013, PO2 Villas filed a Motion to Re-open the Case against
petitioner. PO2 Villas explained that his failure to appear during the hearings of the
cases was due to the untimely death of his father-in-law. 6 He further averred that PO3
Rionaldo Sabulaan, one of the arresting officers, is no longer assigned at the Cubao
Police Station and had been transferred at the Batasan Police Station since November
2012, thus, could not have received his subpoena which is directed at his former place
of assignment.
In the disputed Order 7 dated June 14, 2013, respondent Judge granted the
motion and ordered the re-opening of the cases against petitioner and set the cases for
continuation of hearing.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration. She argued that the provisional dismissal
of the criminal cases is considered an acquittal and PO2 Villas had no personality to
file the motion to re-open the case. 8
In an Order 9 dated February 18, 2014, respondent denied petitioner's motion
for reconsideration.
On April 29, 2014, the Court resolved to require respondents to comment on
the instant petition. 10
In their Comment 11 dated June 11, 2014, the Office of the Solicitor General,
through then Solicitor General Francis H. Jardeleza, 12 maintained that respondent
judge committed no grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed Orders dated
June 14, 2013 and February 18, 2014. It argued that petitioner did not expressly object
to the motion to revive the criminal cases.
Thus, the instant petition raising the following issues:
I
WHETHER OR NOT WITNESS PO2 NELSON VILLAS CAN FILE A
MOTION TO REOPEN A PROVISIONALLY DISMISSED CASE
WITHOUT THE PARTICIPATION OF A PUBLIC PROSECUTOR.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE BRANCH CLERK OF COURT HAS THE
RIGHT TO RECEIVE A MOTION TO RE-OPEN THAT DOES NOT
CONTAIN A NOTICE OF HEARING AND A SHOWING THAT THE
OTHER PARTY WAS GIVEN A COPY THEREOF.
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS THE
AUTHORITY TO ACT FAVORABLY UPON SAID MOTION.
IV
WHETHER OR NOT THE PROVISIONAL DISMISSAL OF CRIMINAL
CASES NOS. Q-11-173055-56 WITH THE CONSENT OF THE ACCUSED
 BUT PREDICATED ON FAILURE TO PROSECUTE WHICH VIOLATES
THE RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED TO SPEEDY TRIAL IS NOT
EQUIVALENT TO AN ACQUITTAL, SUCH THAT ITS REVIVAL
WOULD CONSTITUTE DOUBLE JEOPARDY. HEITAD

V
WHETHER OR NOT THE ABSENCE OF PROSECUTION'S PRINCIPAL
WITNESS PO2 NELSON VILLAS FOR FOUR (4) CONSECUTIVE
HEARINGS HAD BEEN CONSIDERED WAIVER PURSUANT TO A.M.
NO. 11-6-10-SC.
RULING
We deny the petition.
The Court notes that the instant case suffers from procedural infirmities which
this Court cannot ignore. While this petition is to be treated as one for certiorari under
Rule 65, it is still dismissible for violation of the hierarchy of courts. Although the
Supreme Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the RTC and the CA to issue writs of
certiorari, this should not be taken as granting parties the absolute and unrestrained
freedom of choice of the court to which an application will be directed. Direct resort
to this Court is allowed only if there are special, important and compelling reasons
clearly and specifically spelled out in the petition, which are not present in this case.
13

Moreover, this being a petition on certiorari under Rule 65, the issues raised
herein should be confined solely to questions of jurisdiction. Thus, while in the course
of the discussion, it may be necessary to thresh out pertinent factual issues, the same
is limited for the purpose of resolving the issue on jurisdiction, that is, whether the
trial court committed grave abuse of discretion resulting to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction.
When a criminal case is provisionally
dismissed with the express consent of
the accused, the case may be revived by
the State within the periods provided
under the 2nd paragraph of Section 8,
Rule 117 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with the express consent of
the accused and with notice to the offended party. Here, a perusal of the Order, dated
May 16, 2013, stresses in no uncertain terms that the dismissal of the case was
provisional, i.e., the case could be revived at some future time. If petitioner believed
that the case against her should be dismissed with prejudice, she should not have
agreed to a provisional dismissal. She should have moved for a dismissal with
prejudice so that the court would have no alternative but to require the prosecution to
present its evidence. There was nothing in the records showing the accused's
opposition to the provisional dismissal nor was there any after the Order of
provisional dismissal was issued. She cannot claim now that the dismissal was with
prejudice. Thus, if a criminal case is provisionally dismissed with the express consent
of the accused, as in this case, the case may be revived by the State within the periods
provided under the 2nd paragraph of Section 8, Rule 117 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure. There is no violation of due process as long as the revival of a
provisionally dismissed complaint was made within the time-bar provided under the
law.
Generally, the prosecutor should have been the one who filed the motion to
revive because it is the prosecutor who controls the trial. But in this particular case,
the defect, if there was any, was cured when the public prosecutor later actively
participated in the denial of the accused's motion for reconsideration when she filed
her Comment/Objection thereto. In the Order denying the motion, the trial court stated
that "in her Comment/Objection, the Public Prosecutor begged to disagree primarily
on the ground that double jeopardy has not set in, because the provisional dismissal
of the case was with the express consent of the accused." 14 The court even went
further when it stated that "although the Motion to Re-open the case was filed by the
witness without securing the conformity of the Public Prosecutor, in effect, the
prosecutor has conformed to the re-opening of the case because she (the prosecutor)
finds that the failure of the witness to appear on two (2) hearings was due to the death
of the father in law on March 23, 2013 and the death of his aunt on May 12, 2013, as
substantiated by the respective Certificates of Death of the said relatives." 15
Moreover, in the case at bar, it must be noted that the accused is charged with a
public crime, hence, it is a victim-less crime. Unlike in private crimes where the
participation of the private offended party is generally required for the recovery of
civil liability, in the instant case, there is no particular private offended party who can
actually file the motion to revive. Hence, in some instances, as in this case, it is the
arresting officer, PO2 Villas, who filed the motion to revive the case out of his sense
of duty as a police officer and compelled by his sense of obligation considering that
he knew his absence was the cause why the complaint was provisionally dismissed.
We could not entirely blame PO2 Villas in filing the motion to revive since we
are aware that in drug-related cases, the arresting officers are usually required to
explain by their superiors when a case is provisionally dismissed due to their failure to
appear during trial. Thus, in order to exonerate themselves from a possible
administrative and criminal liability, the arresting officers would then opt instead to
file the motion to revive on their own.
The provisional dismissal of the case does
not operate as an acquittal since its
dismissal was made with the express consent
of the accused, thus, there is no double
jeopardy.
 Further, the proscription against double jeopardy presupposes that an accused
has been previously charged with an offense, and the case against him is terminated
either by his acquittal or conviction, or dismissed in any other manner without his
consent. As a general rule, the following requisites must be present for double
jeopardy to attach: (1) a valid indictment, (2) before a court of competent jurisdiction,
(3) the arraignment of the accused, (4) a valid plea entered by him, and (5) the
acquittal or conviction of the accused, or the dismissal or termination of the case
against him without his express consent. However, there are two (2) exceptions to the
foregoing rule, and double jeopardy may attach even if the dismissal of the case was
with the consent of the accused: first, when there is insufficiency of evidence to
support the charge against him; and second, where there has been an unreasonable
delay in the proceedings, in violation of the accused's right to speedy trial. 16
In the instant case, while the first four requisites are present, the last requisite is
lacking, considering that here the dismissal was merely provisional and it was done
with the express consent of the accused-petitioner. Petitioner is not in danger of being
twice put in jeopardy with the reopening of the case against her as it is clear that the
case was only provisionally dismissed by the trial court. The requirement that the
dismissal of the case must be without the consent of the accused is not present in this
case. Neither does the case fall under any of the aforementioned exceptions because,
in fact, the prosecution had failed to continue the presentation of evidence due to the
absence of the witnesses, thus, the fact of insufficiency of evidence cannot be
established. Likewise, we find no unreasonable delay in the proceedings that would be
tantamount to violation of the accused's right to speedy trial.
This Court has emphasized that "'speedy trial' is a relative term and necessarily
a flexible concept." In determining whether the accused's right to speedy trial was
violated, the delay should be considered in view of the entirety of the proceedings.
The factors to balance are the following: (a) duration of the delay; (b) reason therefor;
(c) assertion of the right or failure to assert it; and (d) prejudice caused by such delay.
In the instant case, petitioner failed to show any evidence that the alleged delay in the
trial was attended with malice or that the same was made without good cause or
justifiable motive on the part of the prosecution. Mere mathematical reckoning of the
time involved would not suffice as the realities of everyday life must be regarded in
judicial proceedings. 17
Here, the delay in the proceedings, which ran from October 25, 2012 until the
provisional dismissal of the case on May 13, 2013, is not the kind of delay
contemplated under the law as to violate the accused's right to speedy trial. More so,
when the cause of the delay is valid, as in the instant case. Likewise, a perusal of the
Order dated May 16, 2013 would show that the order was categorical in stating that
the dismissal of the complaint was provisional with the express consent of the accused
and her counsel. The court merely stated in the Order as to what transpired during the
proceedings of the case and not that the dismissal was based on the accused's right to
speedy trial.
 While the Court recognizes the accused's right to speedy trial and adheres to a
policy of speedy administration of justice, we cannot, however, deprive the State of a
reasonable opportunity to fairly prosecute criminals. We reiterate that unjustified
postponements which prolong the trial for an unreasonable length of time are what
offend the right of the accused to speedy trial. 18
In a petition for certiorari under Rule 65,
petitioner should establish that the court or
tribunal acted in a capricious, whimsical,
arbitrary or despotic manner in the exercise
of its jurisdiction as to be equivalent to lack
of jurisdiction.
In view of the foregoing, we, thus, find no basis for issuing the extraordinary
writs of certiorari with injunction, as there was no showing that the alleged error in
judgment was tainted with grave abuse of discretion. Nowhere in the petition did
petitioner show that the issuance of the assailed orders was patent and gross that
would warrant striking it down through a petition for certiorari. No argument was
shown that the trial court exercised its judgment capriciously, whimsically, arbitrarily
or despotically by reason of passion and hostility.
It is well settled that a petition for certiorari against a court which has
jurisdiction over a case will prosper only if grave abuse of discretion is manifested.
The burden is on the part of the petitioner to prove not merely reversible error, but
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the
public respondent issuing the impugned order. Mere abuse of discretion is not
enough; it must be grave. The term grave abuse of discretion is defined as a capricious
and whimsical exercise of judgment as patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of
a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, as where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner because of passion or hostility.
19 Certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction, and not errors or mistakes
in the findings and conclusions of the trial court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Orders dated
June 14, 2013 and February 18, 2014 in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-11-173055 and Q-11-
173056 entitled People of the Philippines v. Roberta Saldariega are AFFIRMED.
Let the case be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr., Mendoza, * Reyes and Leonen, ** JJ., concur.
||| (Saldariega v. Panganiban, G.R. Nos. 211933 & 211960, [April 15, 2015])

SECOND DIVISION
 [G.R. No. 196508. September 24, 2014.]

LEONARDO A. VILLALON and ERLINDA TALDE-VILLALON,

petitioners, vs. AMELIA CHAN, respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J : p

We review in this petition for review on certiorari 1 the July 30, 2010 decision 2
and April 8, 2011 resolution 3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 93807.
The CA annulled and set aside the March 3, 2006 resolution 4 and September 5, 2006
order 5 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 74, Antipolo City, which disallowed
the private offended party's counsel from participating in the prosecution of the
petitioners for bigamy and dismissed the bigamy case filed against the petitioners,
respectively.

Factual Antecedents

On May 6, 1954, the respondent Amelia Chan married Leon Basilio Chua in a
civil ceremony solemnized by then Judge Cancio C. Garcia of the City Court of
Caloocan. The respondent claimed that her husband Leon Basilio Chua and the present
petitioner, Leonardo A. Villalon, are one and the same person.

During the subsistence of his marriage to Amelia, Leon Basilio Chua, this time
under the name of Leonardo A. Villalon, allegedly contracted a second marriage with
Erlinda Talde that took place on June 2, 1993. This marriage was solemnized by Judge
Ruth C. Santos of the Municipal Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal.

Amelia, who was then living in the United States and could not personally file a
case for bigamy in the Philippines, requested Benito Yao Chua and Wilson Go to
commence the criminal proceedings against the petitioners. On September 13, 2003, a
verified complaint-affidavit 6 alleging the commission of the crime of bigamy was filed
with the Office of the City Prosecutor in Antipolo. Consequently, an Information 7 was
filed with the RTC, docketed as Criminal Case No. 05-30485. On arraignment, the
petitioners pleaded not guilty.

During the pre-trial (or on February 6, 2006), Atty. Apollo V. Atencia appeared in
behalf of Amelia, the private offended party. On February 20, 2006, Atty. Atencia
formally filed his entry of appearance 8 as private prosecutor, with the conformity and
under the control and supervision of Assistant City Prosecutor Gerardo P. Barot.
 Leonardo filed an omnibus motion 9 with the RTC seeking to disqualify Atty.
Atencia. He argued that Amelia could not be represented in the bigamy case because she
was not a party to the case, as she did not file the complaint-affidavit. He also argued that
Amelia had already waived her right to file a civil and criminal case against him and his
co-defendant Erlinda. Amelia opposed the omnibus motion, 10 while the public
prosecutor joined the petitioners in disqualifying Atty. Atencia from appearing in the
case. 11 DHECac

In a resolution 12 dated March 3, 2006, the RTC granted Leonardo's omnibus

motion. Trial of the case ensued thereafter.

On March 27, 2006, Amelia filed a petition 13 for certiorari and prohibition, with
prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction, with the CA. In a resolution 14 dated April 19, 2006, the CA
issued a TRO enjoining further proceedings on the case.

Despite the TRO issued by the CA, trial of the bigamy case proceeded with the
presentation of the prosecution's evidence, to which Leonardo filed a demurrer to
evidence. In an order 15 dated September 5, 2006, the RTC dismissed the bigamy case
for failure of the prosecution to prove the petitioners' guilt.

Petition for certiorari and prohibition with the CA

In her petition for certiorari and prohibition before the CA, Amelia alleged grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC when it issued its March 3, 2006 resolution
and proceeded with the bigamy case without permitting the participation of Atty. Atencia
as private prosecutor.

In a decision 16 dated July 30, 2010, the CA granted Amelia's petition and
annulled the RTC's March 3, 2006 resolution disqualifying Atty. Atencia from
participation in the case, and its September 5, 2006 order that dismissed the bigamy case
against the petitioners. The CA ruled that the crime of bigamy, being public in nature, can
be denounced by anyone, not only by the offended party, before the prosecuting
authorities without the offended party losing her right to recover damages. Thus, the CA
concluded that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when it did not allow
Atty. Atencia to intervene and represent Amelia in the bigamy case and that the trial court
denied Amelia her right to due process.

Also, the CA ruled that the offended party could be deprived of the right to
intervene in the criminal case only when he or she expressly waives the civil action or
reserves the right to institute one. The CA found no such waiver from Amelia and held
that Atty. Atencia's appearance as private prosecutor was proof enough of Amelia's
determination to enforce her claim for damages in the bigamy case.
 The CA disposed of the certiorari petition under these terms: HCaIDS

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolution dated 3

March 2006 disqualifying Petitioner's counsel to intervene and the Order dated
5 September 2006 dismissing Criminal Case No. 05-30485 is ANNULLED and
SET ASIDE. Public respondent is hereby inhibited from further hearing the
case. This case is therefore REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of
Antipolo City for RE-RAFFLE to another branch and for further proceedings.
The trial court and public prosecutor are ORDERED to allow the private
prosecutor subject to the latter's control and supervision to intervene in the
proceedings in order to protect the interests of Petitioner as a complaining
witness.

SO ORDERED. 17

Petition for review on certiorari with this Court

With the denial of their motion for reconsideration 18 before the CA, the
petitioners filed the present petition for review on certiorari before this Court and raised
the following arguments:

A. The Decision of the Court of Appeals gravely transgresses the petitioners'

constitutional right to due process of law, apart from being violative of
the legal proscription against double jeopardy.

B. The Court of Appeals grossly erred in granting the petition for certiorari
insofar as the Resolution, dated 3 March 2006, of therein respondent
Judge was concerned.

C. The petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 93907 is fatally defective in that, among

other things, it failed to implead the People of the Philippines as a party-
respondent in that case, hence, the same should have been dismissed
outright. 19

Our Ruling

We find no merit in the petitioners' arguments.

First, the petitioners argue that the RTC's September 5, 2006 order dismissing the
bigamy case against them had already become final because it was not assailed by the
respondent in her petition for certiorari before the CA. The petitioners point out that the
respondent only particularly assailed the RTC's March 3, 2006 resolution and failed to
file a separate or amended petition for certiorari to include the September 5, 2006 order
as one of the assailed orders of the RTC. Based on this assertion, the petitioners contend
that the CA, in ordering the remand and re-raffle of the bigamy case to another RTC
branch, violates their right against double jeopardy.aSACED

The petitioners are mistaken. The review by the CA on whether the RTC
committed grave abuse of discretion encompassed, not only the issuance of the March 3,
2006 resolution, but all proceedings in the bigamy case thereafter. This is apparent from
the words used by the respondent in her certiorari petition before the CA where she
raised the following supporting grounds:

1. THE RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE QUESTIONED RESOLUTION
DATED 03 MARCH 2006 IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 05-30485
WHICH HELD THAT NO CLAIM FOR CIVIL LIABILITY WAS
DEEMED INSTITUTED IN THE CRIMINAL CASE, AND
CONSEQUENTLY DISQUALIFYING THE OFFENDED PARTY'S
COUNSEL FROM PARTICIPATING IN THE TRIAL OF THE CASE;

2. THE HEARINGS OF THE BIGAMY CASE WHEREIN THE

PARTICIPATION OF THE PRIVATE PROSECUTOR IS
EXPRESSLY PROHIBITED ARE WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION. 20 (Emphasis ours)

Evidently, the CA's review is not limited to the RTC's March 3, 2006 resolution
but also included the September 5, 2006 order that was issued by the RTC in the course
of the proceedings on the bigamy case. Thus, the RTC's September 5, 2006 order, which
is still the subject of review by this Court, has not attained finality and the CA's assailed
order of remanding and re-raffling the bigamy case to another trial court would not
violate the petitioners' right against double jeopardy.

Also, we emphasize that the RTC issued its September 5, 2006 order in defiance
of the TRO issued by the CA. The records show that the CA had issued a TRO on April
19, 2006, which should have prohibited the RTC from further proceeding on the case.
But the RTC, instead, continued with the presentation of the prosecution's evidence and
issued the assailed September 5, 2006 order.

Under this circumstance, the RTC's September 5, 2006 order was actually without
force and effect and would not serve as basis for the petitioners to claim that their right
against double jeopardy had been violated. The RTC, clearly, acted with grave abuse of
discretion in issuing its September 5, 2006 order in view of the earlier TRO issued by the
CA.
 Second, the petitioners argue that the CA gravely erred when it ruled that: the RTC
committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing its March 3, 2006 resolution disqualifying
Atty. Atencia as private prosecutor, and that Atty. Atencia's disqualification violated the
respondent's rights to intervene and be heard in the bigamy case. They contend that, even
with Atty. Atencia's disqualification, the respondent was never denied her right to
participate in the proceedings and was even called to stand as a witness but the
respondent never appeared before the court because she was out of the country during the
whole proceedings on the bigamy case.

Section 16 21 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure 22 expressly

allows an offended party to intervene by counsel in the prosecution of the offense for the
recovery of civil liability where the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising
from the offense charged is instituted with the criminal action. The civil action shall be
deemed instituted with the criminal action, except when the offended party waives the
civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to
the criminal action. 23 caIETS

In this case, the CA found no such waiver from or reservation made by the
respondent. The fact that the respondent, who was already based abroad, had secured the
services of an attorney in the Philippines reveals her willingness and interest to
participate in the prosecution of the bigamy case and to recover civil liability from the
petitioners. Thus, the RTC should have allowed, and should not have disqualified, Atty.
Atencia from intervening in the bigamy case as the respondent, being the offended party,
is afforded by law the right to participate through counsel in the prosecution of the
offense with respect to the civil aspect of the case.

Lastly, the petitioners argue that the respondent's certiorari petition before the CA
should have been dismissed outright because it failed to implead the "People of the
Philippines" as a party-respondent.

The respondent's failure to implead the "People of the Philippines" as a party-

respondent is not a fatal defect warranting the outright dismissal of her petition for
certiorari and prohibition before the CA because: (1) a petition for certiorari and
prohibition under Rule 65 is directed against any tribunal, board or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions alleged to have acted without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction;
24 and (2) the petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by the respondent is a special
civil action separate and independent from the bigamy case filed against the petitioners.
For these reasons, the "People of the Philippines" need not be impleaded as a party in a
petition for certiorari and prohibition. CSAaDE

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we DENY the present petition for

review on certiorari due to lack of merit, and hereby AFFIRM the decision dated July
30, 2010 and resolution dated April 8, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
93807.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, Del Castillo, Mendoza and Leonen, JJ., concur.

||| (Villalon v. Chan, G.R. No. 196508, [September 24, 2014], 744 PHIL 147-156)

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 189850. September 22, 2014.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. REYNALDO

TORRES, JAY TORRES, BOBBY TORRES @ ROBERTO TORRES y
NAVA, and RONNIE TORRES, accused,

BOBBY TORRES @ ROBERTO TORRES y NAVA, accused-

appellant.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J : p

This is an appeal from the July 23, 2009 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02925, which modified the December 5, 2006 Decision 2 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Manila, Branch 27 in Criminal Case No. 02-200171. The
RTC found appellant Bobby Torres @ Roberto Torres y Nava (appellant) guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder but on appeal, the CA found appellant guilty of
the special complex crime of robbery with homicide.

Factual Antecedents

On January 28, 2004, an Amended Information 3 was filed before the RTC,
charging siblings Reynaldo Torres (Reynaldo), Jay Torres (Jay), Ronnie Torres (Ronnie)
and appellant with the special complex crime of robbery with homicide committed
against Jaime M. Espino (Espino). The Amended Information contained the following
accusatory allegations:

That on or about September 21, 2001, in the City of Manila, Philippines,

the said accused, armed with bladed weapons, conspiring and confederating
together with one malefactor whose true name, real identity and present
whereabouts [is] still unknown and helping one another, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent of gain and by means of force,
violence, and intimidation, to wit: while one JAIME M. ESPINO was on board
his car and travelling along C.M. Recto Avenue corner Ylaya St., Tondo, this
City, by blocking his path and forcibly grabbing from the latter his belt-bag; that
on the occasion of the said robbery and by reason thereof, the herein accused, in
pursuance of their conspiracy, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with intent to kill, attack, assault, use personal violence and abuse
of superior strength upon the said JAIME M. ESPINO and that when the latter
resisted, by then and there stabbing the latter with bladed weapons on . . .
different parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon the latter multiple stab
wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his death thereafter, and
afterwhich, divest, take, rob and carry away a belt-bag, wallet, necklace, watch
and ring of undetermined amount, belonging to said JAIME M. ESPINO.

Contrary to law. 4

Only appellant was arrested. Reynaldo, Jay and Ronnie remain at-large to date.
During arraignment, appellant entered a plea of "not guilty". 5 After the termination of
the pre-trial conference, trial ensued. 6

Version of the Prosecution

The prosecution presented as eyewitnesses Eduardo Umali (Umali), a butcher, and

Merlito Macapar (Macapar), a cigarette vendor. Also presented were Dr. Romeo T. Salen
(Dr. Salen), who testified on the cause of death of Espino. From their testimonies, 7 the
following facts emerged:

At around 10:00 p.m. of September 21, 2001, Espino was driving his car along
C.M. Recto Avenue in Divisoria, Manila when Ronnie suddenly blocked his path. Espino
alighted from his vehicle and approached Ronnie, who tried to grab his belt-bag. Espino
resisted and struggled with Ronnie for the possession of his belt-bag but the latter's
brothers, Jay, Rey, appellant, and an unidentified companion suddenly appeared. With all
of them brandishing bladed weapons, appellant and his brothers took turns in stabbing
Espino in different parts of his body while the unidentified companion held him by the
neck. When Espino was already sprawled on the ground, they took his belt-bag, wallet
and jewelries and immediately fled. ICDcEA
 Espino was rushed to the hospital but was pronounced dead on arrival. In his
Medico-Legal Report No. W-658-2001, 8 Dr. Salen concluded that Espino died of
multiple stab wounds caused by sharp bladed instruments. The back portion of his head
bore two stab wounds while his body suffered four stab wounds which proved fatal.
Considering the number and varying measurements of the wounds, Dr. Salen opined that
there were more than one assailant.

To prove the civil aspect of the case, Espino's daughter, Winnie Espino-Fajardo
(Winnie) testified that the pieces of jewelry stolen from her father consisted of a necklace
worth P35,000.00, bracelet worth P15,000.00, wristwatch worth P10,000.00 and two
rings worth P10,000.00 each. As for their expenses, Winnie said that P25,000.00 was
spent for the burial lot and P37,000.00 for the funeral services. She stated further that
Espino was 51 years old at the time of his death and was earning P3,000.00 a day as a
meat vendor. 9

Version of the Defense

Appellant denied any participation in the crime. He testified that at around 10:00
p.m. of September 21, 2001, he was with his girlfriend, Merlita Hilario (Merlita). They
proceeded to the house of their friend, Marilou Garcia (Marilou), in Villaruel, Tayuman,
Manila where they had a drinking session which lasted until they fell asleep. They did not
leave their friend's house until the following morning when they went home. Thereupon,
he was told that policemen were looking for him because his brothers got involved in an
altercation that resulted in the death of someone. 10 Merlita and Marilou corroborated
appellant's alibi in their respective testimonies. 11

From the testimony of another defense witness, Jorna Yabut-Torres (Jorna), wife
of Ronnie, the defense's version of the incident emerged as follows:

In the evening of September 21, 2001, Jorna and Ronnie were sharing jokes with
other vendors in Divisoria when a car stopped a few meters from their stall. The driver
alighted and asked why they were laughing. Ronnie replied that it had nothing to do with
him. The driver seemed drunk since he walked back to his vehicle in an unsteady manner.
Moments later, the driver returned and stabbed Ronnie on the wrist with a knife. Jay saw
the assault on his brother, Ronnie, and got a bolo which he used to hack the driver
repeatedly. Thereafter, Ronnie and Jay fled. 12

Ditas Biescas-Mangilya, a vegetable vendor in Divisoria, corroborated Jorna's

version of the incident in her testimony. 13

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

 In its December 5, 2006 Decision, 14 the RTC held that appellant could not have
committed robbery. It ratiocinated, viz.:

Prosecution witness Merlito D. Macapar testified that Ronnie took the

belt bag of the deceased while Bobby and the rest took his wristwatch, ring and
necklace. However, on cross-examination, witness admitted that he did not see
who took the ring, wristwatch and necklace because as soon as the deceased fell
on the ground, accused and companions surrounded him. Merlito's testimony
was contradicted by Eduardo Umali on a vital point. Thus, Merlito testified that
there was an exchange of heated words. There was no intimation whatsoever
what the altercation was about. He was ten meters away. No such altercation,
however, took place according to Eduardo who was barely five meters away.
This tainted the testimony of Merlito and Eduardo with suspicion. When
material witnesses contradict themselves on vital points, the element of doubt is
injected and cannot be lightly disregarded. That was not all though. Merlito
testified [that] several people witnessed the incident. The stall of the victim's
daughter was about ten meters from the crime scene, which was a few meters
from the stall of Ronnie. They both had been in their respective stalls for quite
sometime. The principal prosecution witnesses are familiar with the deceased
and the accused except for the unidentified companion as they often see them at
the vicinity. Thus, in all likelihood, accused and the victim are familiar if not
know each other very well. The perpetration of robbery at the place was thus
unlikely.

Even granting that the element of taking is present, still, accused cannot
be held liable for the complex crime of robbery with homicide for the reason
that it was not indubitably shown that the main purpose of the accused was to
rob the victim. To the mind of the Court, this is precisely the reason why the
prosecution skipped the utterances made by the protagonist[s] during the attack.
To sustain a [conviction] for the special complex crime of robbery with
homicide, the original criminal design of the culprit must be robbery and the
homicide is perpetrated with a view to the consummation of the robbery, or by
reason or on the occasion of the robbery (People vs. Ponciano, 204 SCRA 627).

xxx xxx xxx

The crime of robbery not having been indubitably established, the

accused cannot be convicted of the special complex crime of robbery with
homicide. 15

The RTC thus concluded that appellant can only be liable for the killing of Espino.
It held him guilty of murder after it found the qualifying circumstance of abuse of
superior strength, which was alleged in the Information and duly established by the
prosecution. Moreover, the RTC ruled that conspiracy among the accused attended the
crime.SEACTH
 Anent the civil aspect of the case, the RTC granted civil indemnity, actual and
moral damages to the heirs of Espino, but denied the claim for loss of earning capacity
for lack of documentary evidence.

The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court finds

accused Bobby Torres y Nava, "Guilty" beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Murder as the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength attended
the commission of the crime and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua, to indemnify the heirs of the victim the sum of P50,000.00,
the additional sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages, actual damages in the
amount of P62,000.00 and to pay the costs.

Let alias warrant of arrest issue against accused Reynaldo Torres, Jay
Torres and Ronnie Torres.

SO ORDERED. 16

Appellant filed a Motion for Reconsideration 17 which was denied in an Order 18

dated April 10, 2007.

Hence, appellant appealed to the CA. 19

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In modifying the ruling of the RTC, i.e., finding appellant guilty of robbery with
homicide instead of murder, the CA found that the primary intention of appellant and his
co-accused was to rob Espino and his killing was only incidental to the robbery. The
blocking of Espino's car and the struggle for possession of his belt-bag after he alighted
are clear manifestations of the intent to commit robbery. The dispositive portion of the
July 23, 2009 Decision 20 of the CA reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of foregoing, the appealed decision of the RTC Manila,

Branch 27 dated December 5, 2006 is hereby MODIFIED in that appellant is
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of ROBBERY with
HOMICIDE and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. The trial court's award to the heirs of the victim, Jaime Espino, of
civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00, moral damages in the amount of
P50,000.00, and actual damages in the amount of P62,000.00 as well as its order
to appellant to pay the costs of suit, are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED. 21

Hence, this present appeal.

 Assignment of Errors

Appellant imputes upon the CA the following errors in his Supplemental Brief. 22

The acquittal of the accused-appellant in the robbery charge should be

left undisturbed as being final and executory which cannot be overturned
without violating the proscription against double jeopardy. 23

The appellate court exceeded its jurisdiction when it reviewed the entire
case despite the fact that the accused-appellant only appealed his conviction for
murder. 24

It was an error to convict the accused-appellant of the crimes charged

considering that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. 25

Our Ruling

The appeal is unmeritorious.

In an appeal by an accused, he waives

his right not to be subject to double
jeopardy.

Appellant maintains that the CA erred in finding him liable for robbery with
homicide as charged in the Amended Information. He argues that his appeal to the CA
was limited to his conviction for murder and excluded his acquittal for robbery. And by
appealing his conviction for murder, he does not waive his constitutional right not to be
subject to double jeopardy for the crime of robbery. He claims that even assuming that
the RTC erred in acquitting him of the robbery charge, such error can no longer be
questioned on appeal.

We cannot give credence to appellant's contentions. "An appeal in [a] criminal

case opens the entire case for review on any question including one not raised by the
parties." 26 "[W]hen an accused appeals from the sentence of the trial court, he waives
the constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and throws the whole case open to
the review of the appellate court, which is then called upon to render such judgment as
law and justice dictate, whether favorable or unfavorable to the appellant." 27 In other
words, when appellant appealed the RTC's judgment of conviction for murder, he is
deemed to have abandoned his right to invoke the prohibition on double jeopardy since it
became the duty of the appellate court to correct errors as may be found in the appealed
judgment. Thus, appellant could not have been placed twice in jeopardy when the CA
modified the ruling of the RTC by finding him guilty of robbery with homicide as
charged in the Information instead of murder. ETIDaH
 Appellant is guilty of the crime of
robbery with homicide.

"Robbery with homicide exists 'when a homicide is committed either by reason, or

on occasion, of the robbery. To sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide, the
prosecution must prove the following elements: (1) the taking of personal property
belonging to another; (2) with intent to gain; (3) with the use of violence or intimidation
against a person; and (4) on the occasion or by reason of the robbery, the crime of
homicide, as used in its generic sense, was committed. A conviction requires certitude
that the robbery is the main purpose and objective of the malefactor and the killing is
merely incidental to the robbery. The intent to rob must precede the taking of human life
but the killing may occur before, during or after the robbery'." 28

In this case, the prosecution adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt that the
primary intention of appellant and his companions was to rob Espino. Umali and
Macapar, the eyewitnesses presented by the prosecution, testified that at around 10:00
p.m. of September 21, 2001, appellant's brother and co-accused, Ronnie, blocked
Espino's car at the corner of C.M. Recto Avenue and Ylaya Street. When Espino alighted
from his vehicle, Ronnie attempted to grab his belt-bag. A struggle for possession of the
belt-bag ensued. It was at this juncture that appellant and the other co-accused joined the
fray and stabbed Espino several times in the head and body. When Espino fell to the
pavement from his stab wounds, appellant, Ronnie and their cohorts got hold of the
victim's wallet, belt-bag, wristwatch and jewelry then fled together. 29

From the foregoing, it is clear that the primordial intention of appellant and his
companions was to rob Espino. Had they primarily intended to kill Espino, they would
have immediately stabbed him to death. However, the fact that Ronnie initially wrestled
with appellant for possession of the belt-bag clearly shows that the central aim was to
commit robbery against Espino. This intention was confirmed by the accused's taking of
Espino's belt-bag, wallet, wrist-watch and jewelries after he was stabbed to death. The
killing was therefore merely incidental, resulting by reason or on occasion of the robbery.

The testimonies of the prosecution

eyewitnesses are worthy of credence. DcaCSE

Appellant attempts to discredit Umali and Macapar by asserting that there are
glaring contradictions in their testimonies. He calls attention to the RTC's observation
that Macapar gave conflicting testimonies on whether he actually witnessed who among
appellant and his cohorts took Espino's valuables after he fell to the ground. Appellant
asserts further that Umali's testimony that an altercation did not precede the commission
of the crime contradicts the testimony of Macapar that a heated exchange of words
occurred prior to the incident. He also claims that it is contrary to human nature for
Espino to alight from his car at 10:00 p.m. while in possession of a large amount of
money without fear of an impending hold-up.

We are not persuaded. The inconsistencies attributed to the prosecution's

eyewitnesses involve minor details, too trivial to adversely affect their credibility. Said
inconsistencies do not depart from the fact that these eyewitnesses saw the robbery and
the fatal stabbing of Espino by appellant and his cohorts. "[T]o the extent that
inconsistencies were in fact shown, they appear to the Court to relate to details of
peripheral significance which do not negate or dissolve the positive identification by
[Umali and Macapar of appellant] as the perpetrator of the crime." 30 "Inaccuracies may
in fact suggest that the witnesses are telling the truth and have not been rehearsed.
Witnesses are not expected to remember every single detail of an incident with perfect or
total recall." 31

Moreover, it is unlikely that Espino feared alighting from his vehicle at a late hour
while in possession of a huge amount of money since he was a vendor doing business in
the vicinity where the incident occurred. He was familiar with the people and their
activities in the premises.

In view of the above, the Court finds that the CA properly lent full credence to the
testimonies of Umali and Macapar.

The weapons are not the corpus delicti.

Appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient for his conviction since the
weapons used in the stabbing of Espino were not presented. In other words, he asserts
that it was improper to convict him because the corpus delicti had not been established.

We disagree. "'[C]orpus delicti refers to the fact of the commission of the crime
charged or to the body or substance of the crime. In its legal sense, it does not refer to the
ransom money in the crime of kidnapping for ransom or to the body of the person
murdered' or, in this case, [the weapons used in the commission of robbery with
homicide]. 'Since the corpus delicti is the fact of the commission of the crime, this Court
has ruled that even a single witness' uncorroborated testimony, if credible may suffice to
prove it and warrant a conviction therefor. Corpus delicti may even be established by
circumstantial evidence.'" 32 HTcDEa

In this case, the corpus delicti was established by the evidence on record. The
prosecution eyewitnesses testified that appellant and his cohorts used knives to perpetrate
the crime. Their testimonies on the existence and use of weapons in committing the
offense was supported by the medical findings of Dr. Salen who conducted the post-
mortem examination. Dr. Salen found that Espino sustained several stab wounds with
varying measurements which were caused by sharp bladed instruments. Appellant is
therefore mistaken in arguing that the failure to present the weapons used in killing
Espino was fatal to the cause of the prosecution.

The defenses of denial and alibi cannot

prosper.

We are in complete agreement with the RTC and the CA in finding lack of merit
in appellant's defenses of denial and alibi.

Appellant claims that he was in a drinking session in his friend's house in

Villaruel, Tayuman, Manila, from 10:00 p.m. of September 21, 2001 until 1:00 a.m. of
the following day. He alleges to have slept at the place and went home at around 7:00
a.m. of September 22, 2001. According to appellant, he did not depart from his friend's
house from the time they started drinking until he went home the following morning.

Appellant's alibi is unworthy of credence. Appellant himself testified that Villaruel

is less than two kilometers away from Divisoria and that it would only take a few minutes
to go to Divisoria from Villaruel. 33 Clearly, it was not impossible for appellant to be
physically present at the crime scene during its commission. "For alibi to prosper, it must
strictly meet the requirements of time and place. It is not enough to prove that the
accused was somewhere else when the crime was committed, but it must also be
demonstrated that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the crime scene at
the time the crime was committed." 34

The fact that appellant presented witnesses to corroborate his alibi deserves scant
consideration. Their testimonies are viewed with skepticism due to the very nature of
alibi the witnesses affirm. 35 Appellant can easily fabricate an alibi and ask relatives and
friends to corroborate it. 36

We have always ruled that alibi and denial are inherently weak defenses and must
be brushed aside when the prosecution has sufficiently and positively ascertained the
identity of the accused. Moreover, it is only axiomatic that positive testimony prevails
over negative testimony. 37 aECTcA

The evidence was sufficient to establish

the presence of abuse of superior
strength.

Appellant argues that mere superiority in numbers does not indicate the presence
of abuse of superior strength. In the same manner, appellant claims that the number of
wounds inflicted on the victim is not the criterion for the appreciation of this
circumstance.
 "There is abuse of superior strength when the offenders took advantage of their
combined strength in order to consummate the offense." 38 Here, appellant and his four
companions not only took advantage of their numerical superiority, they were also armed
with knives. Espino, on the other hand, was unarmed and defenseless. While Ronnie was
wrestling with Espino, appellant and his co-accused simultaneously assaulted the latter.
The unidentified companion locked his arm around the neck of Espino while appellant
and his co-accused stabbed and hacked him several times. While Espino was lying
defenseless on the ground, they divested him of all his valuables. Thereafter, they
immediately fled the scene of the crime. 39 It is clear that they executed the criminal act
by employing physical superiority over Espino.

The Proper Penalty

Nonetheless, the presence of abuse of superior strength should not result in

qualifying the offense to murder. When abuse of superior strength obtains in the special
complex crime of robbery with homicide, it is to be regarded as a generic circumstance,
robbery with homicide being a composite crime with its own definition and special
penalty in the Revised Penal Code. With the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death
imposed for committing robbery with homicide, 40 "[t]he generic aggravating
circumstance of [abuse of superior strength] attending the killing of the victim qualifies
the imposition of the death penalty on [appellant]." 41 In view, however, of Republic Act
No. 9346, entitled "An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of the Death Penalty in the
Philippines," the penalty that must be imposed on appellant is reclusion perpetua without
eligibility for parole. 42

The Civil Liabilities

In robbery with homicide, civil indemnity and moral damages are awarded
automatically without need of allegation and evidence other than the death of the victim
owing to the commission of the crime. 43 Here, the RTC and CA granted civil indemnity
and moral damages to Espino's heirs in the amount of P50,000.00 each. These courts
were correct in granting the awards, but the awards should have been P100,000.00 each.
Recent jurisprudence 44 declares that when the imposable penalty is death, the awards of
civil indemnity and moral damages shall be P100,000.00 each.

In granting compensatory damages, the prosecution must "prove the actual amount
of loss with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof and the best
evidence obtainable to the injured party." 45 "'Receipts should support claims of actual
damages.' Thus, as correctly held by the [RTC] and affirmed by the CA, the amount of
[P62,000.00] incurred as funeral expenses can be sustained since these are expenditures
supported by receipts." 46
 The existence of one aggravating circumstance also merits the grant of exemplary
damages under Article 2230 of the New Civil Code. Pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence,
we likewise award P100,000.00 as exemplary damages to the victim's heirs. 47 An
interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum on all awards of damages from the finality of
this judgment until fully paid should likewise be granted to the heirs of Espino. 48

Lastly, the RTC did not err in refusing to award indemnity for loss of earning
capacity of Espino despite the testimony of his daughter that he earned P3,000.00 a day
as a meat dealer. "Such indemnity is not awarded in the absence of documentary evidence
except where the victim was either self-employed or was a daily wage worker earning
less than the minimum wage under current labor laws. Since it was neither alleged nor
proved that the victim was either self-employed or was a daily wage earner, indemnity
for loss of earning capacity cannot be awarded to the heirs of the victim." 49

WHEREFORE, the July 23, 2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR-H.C. No. 02925 that affirmed with modifications the December 5, 2006 Decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 27, in Criminal Case No. 02-200171 is
AFFIRMED with further MODIFICATIONS. Appellant Bobby Torres @ Roberto
Torres y Nava is ordered to pay the heirs of the victim, Jaime M. Espino, P100,000.00 as
civil indemnity; P100,000.00 as moral damages, and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages.
The interest rate of 6% per annum is imposed on all damages awarded from the finality
of this Decision until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, * Acting C.J., Velasco, Jr., ** Brion and Leonen, JJ., concur.

||| (People v. Torres y Nava, G.R. No. 189850, [September 22, 2014], 743 PHIL 553-570)

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 189850. September 22, 2014.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. REYNALDO

TORRES, JAY TORRES, BOBBY TORRES @ ROBERTO TORRES y
NAVA, and RONNIE TORRES, accused,

BOBBY TORRES @ ROBERTO TORRES y NAVA, accused-

appellant.
 DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J : p

This is an appeal from the July 23, 2009 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02925, which modified the December 5, 2006 Decision 2 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Manila, Branch 27 in Criminal Case No. 02-200171. The
RTC found appellant Bobby Torres @ Roberto Torres y Nava (appellant) guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder but on appeal, the CA found appellant guilty of
the special complex crime of robbery with homicide.

Factual Antecedents

On January 28, 2004, an Amended Information 3 was filed before the RTC,
charging siblings Reynaldo Torres (Reynaldo), Jay Torres (Jay), Ronnie Torres (Ronnie)
and appellant with the special complex crime of robbery with homicide committed
against Jaime M. Espino (Espino). The Amended Information contained the following
accusatory allegations:

That on or about September 21, 2001, in the City of Manila, Philippines,

the said accused, armed with bladed weapons, conspiring and confederating
together with one malefactor whose true name, real identity and present
whereabouts [is] still unknown and helping one another, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent of gain and by means of force,
violence, and intimidation, to wit: while one JAIME M. ESPINO was on board
his car and travelling along C.M. Recto Avenue corner Ylaya St., Tondo, this
City, by blocking his path and forcibly grabbing from the latter his belt-bag; that
on the occasion of the said robbery and by reason thereof, the herein accused, in
pursuance of their conspiracy, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with intent to kill, attack, assault, use personal violence and abuse
of superior strength upon the said JAIME M. ESPINO and that when the latter
resisted, by then and there stabbing the latter with bladed weapons on . . .
different parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon the latter multiple stab
wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his death thereafter, and
afterwhich, divest, take, rob and carry away a belt-bag, wallet, necklace, watch
and ring of undetermined amount, belonging to said JAIME M. ESPINO.

Contrary to law. 4

Only appellant was arrested. Reynaldo, Jay and Ronnie remain at-large to date.
During arraignment, appellant entered a plea of "not guilty". 5 After the termination of
the pre-trial conference, trial ensued. 6

Version of the Prosecution

 The prosecution presented as eyewitnesses Eduardo Umali (Umali), a butcher, and
Merlito Macapar (Macapar), a cigarette vendor. Also presented were Dr. Romeo T. Salen
(Dr. Salen), who testified on the cause of death of Espino. From their testimonies, 7 the
following facts emerged:

At around 10:00 p.m. of September 21, 2001, Espino was driving his car along
C.M. Recto Avenue in Divisoria, Manila when Ronnie suddenly blocked his path. Espino
alighted from his vehicle and approached Ronnie, who tried to grab his belt-bag. Espino
resisted and struggled with Ronnie for the possession of his belt-bag but the latter's
brothers, Jay, Rey, appellant, and an unidentified companion suddenly appeared. With all
of them brandishing bladed weapons, appellant and his brothers took turns in stabbing
Espino in different parts of his body while the unidentified companion held him by the
neck. When Espino was already sprawled on the ground, they took his belt-bag, wallet
and jewelries and immediately fled. ICDcEA

Espino was rushed to the hospital but was pronounced dead on arrival. In his
Medico-Legal Report No. W-658-2001, 8 Dr. Salen concluded that Espino died of
multiple stab wounds caused by sharp bladed instruments. The back portion of his head
bore two stab wounds while his body suffered four stab wounds which proved fatal.
Considering the number and varying measurements of the wounds, Dr. Salen opined that
there were more than one assailant.

To prove the civil aspect of the case, Espino's daughter, Winnie Espino-Fajardo
(Winnie) testified that the pieces of jewelry stolen from her father consisted of a necklace
worth P35,000.00, bracelet worth P15,000.00, wristwatch worth P10,000.00 and two
rings worth P10,000.00 each. As for their expenses, Winnie said that P25,000.00 was
spent for the burial lot and P37,000.00 for the funeral services. She stated further that
Espino was 51 years old at the time of his death and was earning P3,000.00 a day as a
meat vendor. 9

Version of the Defense

Appellant denied any participation in the crime. He testified that at around 10:00
p.m. of September 21, 2001, he was with his girlfriend, Merlita Hilario (Merlita). They
proceeded to the house of their friend, Marilou Garcia (Marilou), in Villaruel, Tayuman,
Manila where they had a drinking session which lasted until they fell asleep. They did not
leave their friend's house until the following morning when they went home. Thereupon,
he was told that policemen were looking for him because his brothers got involved in an
altercation that resulted in the death of someone. 10 Merlita and Marilou corroborated
appellant's alibi in their respective testimonies. 11

From the testimony of another defense witness, Jorna Yabut-Torres (Jorna), wife
of Ronnie, the defense's version of the incident emerged as follows:
 In the evening of September 21, 2001, Jorna and Ronnie were sharing jokes with
other vendors in Divisoria when a car stopped a few meters from their stall. The driver
alighted and asked why they were laughing. Ronnie replied that it had nothing to do with
him. The driver seemed drunk since he walked back to his vehicle in an unsteady manner.
Moments later, the driver returned and stabbed Ronnie on the wrist with a knife. Jay saw
the assault on his brother, Ronnie, and got a bolo which he used to hack the driver
repeatedly. Thereafter, Ronnie and Jay fled. 12

Ditas Biescas-Mangilya, a vegetable vendor in Divisoria, corroborated Jorna's

version of the incident in her testimony. 13

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

In its December 5, 2006 Decision, 14 the RTC held that appellant could not have
committed robbery. It ratiocinated, viz.:

Prosecution witness Merlito D. Macapar testified that Ronnie took the

belt bag of the deceased while Bobby and the rest took his wristwatch, ring and
necklace. However, on cross-examination, witness admitted that he did not see
who took the ring, wristwatch and necklace because as soon as the deceased fell
on the ground, accused and companions surrounded him. Merlito's testimony
was contradicted by Eduardo Umali on a vital point. Thus, Merlito testified that
there was an exchange of heated words. There was no intimation whatsoever
what the altercation was about. He was ten meters away. No such altercation,
however, took place according to Eduardo who was barely five meters away.
This tainted the testimony of Merlito and Eduardo with suspicion. When
material witnesses contradict themselves on vital points, the element of doubt is
injected and cannot be lightly disregarded. That was not all though. Merlito
testified [that] several people witnessed the incident. The stall of the victim's
daughter was about ten meters from the crime scene, which was a few meters
from the stall of Ronnie. They both had been in their respective stalls for quite
sometime. The principal prosecution witnesses are familiar with the deceased
and the accused except for the unidentified companion as they often see them at
the vicinity. Thus, in all likelihood, accused and the victim are familiar if not
know each other very well. The perpetration of robbery at the place was thus
unlikely.

Even granting that the element of taking is present, still, accused cannot
be held liable for the complex crime of robbery with homicide for the reason
that it was not indubitably shown that the main purpose of the accused was to
rob the victim. To the mind of the Court, this is precisely the reason why the
prosecution skipped the utterances made by the protagonist[s] during the attack.
To sustain a [conviction] for the special complex crime of robbery with
homicide, the original criminal design of the culprit must be robbery and the
 homicide is perpetrated with a view to the consummation of the robbery, or by
reason or on the occasion of the robbery (People vs. Ponciano, 204 SCRA 627).

xxx xxx xxx

The crime of robbery not having been indubitably established, the

accused cannot be convicted of the special complex crime of robbery with
homicide. 15

The RTC thus concluded that appellant can only be liable for the killing of Espino.
It held him guilty of murder after it found the qualifying circumstance of abuse of
superior strength, which was alleged in the Information and duly established by the
prosecution. Moreover, the RTC ruled that conspiracy among the accused attended the
crime.SEACTH

Anent the civil aspect of the case, the RTC granted civil indemnity, actual and
moral damages to the heirs of Espino, but denied the claim for loss of earning capacity
for lack of documentary evidence.

The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court finds

accused Bobby Torres y Nava, "Guilty" beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Murder as the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength attended
the commission of the crime and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua, to indemnify the heirs of the victim the sum of P50,000.00,
the additional sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages, actual damages in the
amount of P62,000.00 and to pay the costs.

Let alias warrant of arrest issue against accused Reynaldo Torres, Jay
Torres and Ronnie Torres.

SO ORDERED. 16

Appellant filed a Motion for Reconsideration 17 which was denied in an Order 18

dated April 10, 2007.

Hence, appellant appealed to the CA. 19

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In modifying the ruling of the RTC, i.e., finding appellant guilty of robbery with
homicide instead of murder, the CA found that the primary intention of appellant and his
co-accused was to rob Espino and his killing was only incidental to the robbery. The
blocking of Espino's car and the struggle for possession of his belt-bag after he alighted
are clear manifestations of the intent to commit robbery. The dispositive portion of the
July 23, 2009 Decision 20 of the CA reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of foregoing, the appealed decision of the RTC Manila,

Branch 27 dated December 5, 2006 is hereby MODIFIED in that appellant is
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of ROBBERY with
HOMICIDE and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. The trial court's award to the heirs of the victim, Jaime Espino, of
civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00, moral damages in the amount of
P50,000.00, and actual damages in the amount of P62,000.00 as well as its order
to appellant to pay the costs of suit, are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED. 21

Hence, this present appeal.

Assignment of Errors

Appellant imputes upon the CA the following errors in his Supplemental Brief. 22

The acquittal of the accused-appellant in the robbery charge should be

left undisturbed as being final and executory which cannot be overturned
without violating the proscription against double jeopardy. 23

The appellate court exceeded its jurisdiction when it reviewed the entire
case despite the fact that the accused-appellant only appealed his conviction for
murder. 24

It was an error to convict the accused-appellant of the crimes charged

considering that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. 25

Our Ruling

The appeal is unmeritorious.

In an appeal by an accused, he waives

his right not to be subject to double
jeopardy.

Appellant maintains that the CA erred in finding him liable for robbery with
homicide as charged in the Amended Information. He argues that his appeal to the CA
was limited to his conviction for murder and excluded his acquittal for robbery. And by
appealing his conviction for murder, he does not waive his constitutional right not to be
subject to double jeopardy for the crime of robbery. He claims that even assuming that
the RTC erred in acquitting him of the robbery charge, such error can no longer be
questioned on appeal.

We cannot give credence to appellant's contentions. "An appeal in [a] criminal

case opens the entire case for review on any question including one not raised by the
parties." 26 "[W]hen an accused appeals from the sentence of the trial court, he waives
the constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and throws the whole case open to
the review of the appellate court, which is then called upon to render such judgment as
law and justice dictate, whether favorable or unfavorable to the appellant." 27 In other
words, when appellant appealed the RTC's judgment of conviction for murder, he is
deemed to have abandoned his right to invoke the prohibition on double jeopardy since it
became the duty of the appellate court to correct errors as may be found in the appealed
judgment. Thus, appellant could not have been placed twice in jeopardy when the CA
modified the ruling of the RTC by finding him guilty of robbery with homicide as
charged in the Information instead of murder. ETIDaH

Appellant is guilty of the crime of

robbery with homicide.

"Robbery with homicide exists 'when a homicide is committed either by reason, or

on occasion, of the robbery. To sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide, the
prosecution must prove the following elements: (1) the taking of personal property
belonging to another; (2) with intent to gain; (3) with the use of violence or intimidation
against a person; and (4) on the occasion or by reason of the robbery, the crime of
homicide, as used in its generic sense, was committed. A conviction requires certitude
that the robbery is the main purpose and objective of the malefactor and the killing is
merely incidental to the robbery. The intent to rob must precede the taking of human life
but the killing may occur before, during or after the robbery'." 28

In this case, the prosecution adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt that the
primary intention of appellant and his companions was to rob Espino. Umali and
Macapar, the eyewitnesses presented by the prosecution, testified that at around 10:00
p.m. of September 21, 2001, appellant's brother and co-accused, Ronnie, blocked
Espino's car at the corner of C.M. Recto Avenue and Ylaya Street. When Espino alighted
from his vehicle, Ronnie attempted to grab his belt-bag. A struggle for possession of the
belt-bag ensued. It was at this juncture that appellant and the other co-accused joined the
fray and stabbed Espino several times in the head and body. When Espino fell to the
pavement from his stab wounds, appellant, Ronnie and their cohorts got hold of the
victim's wallet, belt-bag, wristwatch and jewelry then fled together. 29

From the foregoing, it is clear that the primordial intention of appellant and his
companions was to rob Espino. Had they primarily intended to kill Espino, they would
have immediately stabbed him to death. However, the fact that Ronnie initially wrestled
with appellant for possession of the belt-bag clearly shows that the central aim was to
commit robbery against Espino. This intention was confirmed by the accused's taking of
Espino's belt-bag, wallet, wrist-watch and jewelries after he was stabbed to death. The
killing was therefore merely incidental, resulting by reason or on occasion of the robbery.

The testimonies of the prosecution

eyewitnesses are worthy of credence. DcaCSE

Appellant attempts to discredit Umali and Macapar by asserting that there are
glaring contradictions in their testimonies. He calls attention to the RTC's observation
that Macapar gave conflicting testimonies on whether he actually witnessed who among
appellant and his cohorts took Espino's valuables after he fell to the ground. Appellant
asserts further that Umali's testimony that an altercation did not precede the commission
of the crime contradicts the testimony of Macapar that a heated exchange of words
occurred prior to the incident. He also claims that it is contrary to human nature for
Espino to alight from his car at 10:00 p.m. while in possession of a large amount of
money without fear of an impending hold-up.

We are not persuaded. The inconsistencies attributed to the prosecution's

eyewitnesses involve minor details, too trivial to adversely affect their credibility. Said
inconsistencies do not depart from the fact that these eyewitnesses saw the robbery and
the fatal stabbing of Espino by appellant and his cohorts. "[T]o the extent that
inconsistencies were in fact shown, they appear to the Court to relate to details of
peripheral significance which do not negate or dissolve the positive identification by
[Umali and Macapar of appellant] as the perpetrator of the crime." 30 "Inaccuracies may
in fact suggest that the witnesses are telling the truth and have not been rehearsed.
Witnesses are not expected to remember every single detail of an incident with perfect or
total recall." 31

Moreover, it is unlikely that Espino feared alighting from his vehicle at a late hour
while in possession of a huge amount of money since he was a vendor doing business in
the vicinity where the incident occurred. He was familiar with the people and their
activities in the premises.

In view of the above, the Court finds that the CA properly lent full credence to the
testimonies of Umali and Macapar.

The weapons are not the corpus delicti.

Appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient for his conviction since the
weapons used in the stabbing of Espino were not presented. In other words, he asserts
that it was improper to convict him because the corpus delicti had not been established.
 We disagree. "'[C]orpus delicti refers to the fact of the commission of the crime
charged or to the body or substance of the crime. In its legal sense, it does not refer to the
ransom money in the crime of kidnapping for ransom or to the body of the person
murdered' or, in this case, [the weapons used in the commission of robbery with
homicide]. 'Since the corpus delicti is the fact of the commission of the crime, this Court
has ruled that even a single witness' uncorroborated testimony, if credible may suffice to
prove it and warrant a conviction therefor. Corpus delicti may even be established by
circumstantial evidence.'" 32 HTcDEa

In this case, the corpus delicti was established by the evidence on record. The
prosecution eyewitnesses testified that appellant and his cohorts used knives to perpetrate
the crime. Their testimonies on the existence and use of weapons in committing the
offense was supported by the medical findings of Dr. Salen who conducted the post-
mortem examination. Dr. Salen found that Espino sustained several stab wounds with
varying measurements which were caused by sharp bladed instruments. Appellant is
therefore mistaken in arguing that the failure to present the weapons used in killing
Espino was fatal to the cause of the prosecution.

The defenses of denial and alibi cannot

prosper.

We are in complete agreement with the RTC and the CA in finding lack of merit
in appellant's defenses of denial and alibi.

Appellant claims that he was in a drinking session in his friend's house in

Villaruel, Tayuman, Manila, from 10:00 p.m. of September 21, 2001 until 1:00 a.m. of
the following day. He alleges to have slept at the place and went home at around 7:00
a.m. of September 22, 2001. According to appellant, he did not depart from his friend's
house from the time they started drinking until he went home the following morning.

Appellant's alibi is unworthy of credence. Appellant himself testified that Villaruel

is less than two kilometers away from Divisoria and that it would only take a few minutes
to go to Divisoria from Villaruel. 33 Clearly, it was not impossible for appellant to be
physically present at the crime scene during its commission. "For alibi to prosper, it must
strictly meet the requirements of time and place. It is not enough to prove that the
accused was somewhere else when the crime was committed, but it must also be
demonstrated that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the crime scene at
the time the crime was committed." 34

The fact that appellant presented witnesses to corroborate his alibi deserves scant
consideration. Their testimonies are viewed with skepticism due to the very nature of
alibi the witnesses affirm. 35 Appellant can easily fabricate an alibi and ask relatives and
friends to corroborate it. 36
 We have always ruled that alibi and denial are inherently weak defenses and must
be brushed aside when the prosecution has sufficiently and positively ascertained the
identity of the accused. Moreover, it is only axiomatic that positive testimony prevails
over negative testimony. 37 aECTcA

The evidence was sufficient to establish

the presence of abuse of superior
strength.

Appellant argues that mere superiority in numbers does not indicate the presence
of abuse of superior strength. In the same manner, appellant claims that the number of
wounds inflicted on the victim is not the criterion for the appreciation of this
circumstance.

"There is abuse of superior strength when the offenders took advantage of their
combined strength in order to consummate the offense." 38 Here, appellant and his four
companions not only took advantage of their numerical superiority, they were also armed
with knives. Espino, on the other hand, was unarmed and defenseless. While Ronnie was
wrestling with Espino, appellant and his co-accused simultaneously assaulted the latter.
The unidentified companion locked his arm around the neck of Espino while appellant
and his co-accused stabbed and hacked him several times. While Espino was lying
defenseless on the ground, they divested him of all his valuables. Thereafter, they
immediately fled the scene of the crime. 39 It is clear that they executed the criminal act
by employing physical superiority over Espino.

The Proper Penalty

Nonetheless, the presence of abuse of superior strength should not result in

qualifying the offense to murder. When abuse of superior strength obtains in the special
complex crime of robbery with homicide, it is to be regarded as a generic circumstance,
robbery with homicide being a composite crime with its own definition and special
penalty in the Revised Penal Code. With the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death
imposed for committing robbery with homicide, 40 "[t]he generic aggravating
circumstance of [abuse of superior strength] attending the killing of the victim qualifies
the imposition of the death penalty on [appellant]." 41 In view, however, of Republic Act
No. 9346, entitled "An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of the Death Penalty in the
Philippines," the penalty that must be imposed on appellant is reclusion perpetua without
eligibility for parole. 42

The Civil Liabilities

In robbery with homicide, civil indemnity and moral damages are awarded
automatically without need of allegation and evidence other than the death of the victim
owing to the commission of the crime. 43 Here, the RTC and CA granted civil indemnity
and moral damages to Espino's heirs in the amount of P50,000.00 each. These courts
were correct in granting the awards, but the awards should have been P100,000.00 each.
Recent jurisprudence 44 declares that when the imposable penalty is death, the awards of
civil indemnity and moral damages shall be P100,000.00 each.

In granting compensatory damages, the prosecution must "prove the actual amount
of loss with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof and the best
evidence obtainable to the injured party." 45 "'Receipts should support claims of actual
damages.' Thus, as correctly held by the [RTC] and affirmed by the CA, the amount of
[P62,000.00] incurred as funeral expenses can be sustained since these are expenditures
supported by receipts." 46

The existence of one aggravating circumstance also merits the grant of exemplary
damages under Article 2230 of the New Civil Code. Pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence,
we likewise award P100,000.00 as exemplary damages to the victim's heirs. 47 An
interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum on all awards of damages from the finality of
this judgment until fully paid should likewise be granted to the heirs of Espino. 48

Lastly, the RTC did not err in refusing to award indemnity for loss of earning
capacity of Espino despite the testimony of his daughter that he earned P3,000.00 a day
as a meat dealer. "Such indemnity is not awarded in the absence of documentary evidence
except where the victim was either self-employed or was a daily wage worker earning
less than the minimum wage under current labor laws. Since it was neither alleged nor
proved that the victim was either self-employed or was a daily wage earner, indemnity
for loss of earning capacity cannot be awarded to the heirs of the victim." 49

WHEREFORE, the July 23, 2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR-H.C. No. 02925 that affirmed with modifications the December 5, 2006 Decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 27, in Criminal Case No. 02-200171 is
AFFIRMED with further MODIFICATIONS. Appellant Bobby Torres @ Roberto
Torres y Nava is ordered to pay the heirs of the victim, Jaime M. Espino, P100,000.00 as
civil indemnity; P100,000.00 as moral damages, and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages.
The interest rate of 6% per annum is imposed on all damages awarded from the finality
of this Decision until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, * Acting C.J., Velasco, Jr., ** Brion and Leonen, JJ., concur.

||| (People v. Torres y Nava, G.R. No. 189850, [September 22, 2014], 743 PHIL 553-570)

THIRD DIVISION
 [G.R. No. 183994. June 30, 2014.]

WILLIAM CO a.k.a. XU QUING HE, petitioner, vs. NEW

PROSPERITY PLASTIC PRODUCTS, represented by ELIZABETH
UY, 1 respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, * J : p

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997
Revised Rules on Civil Procedure (Rules) are the April 30, 2008 2 and August 1, 2008 3
Resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 102975, which dismissed
the petition and denied the motion for reconsideration, respectively. In effect, the CA
affirmed the January 28, 2008 Decision 4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 121
of Caloocan City, which annulled and set aside the Orders dated September 4, 2006 5 and
November 16, 2006 6 of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 50 of Caloocan
City, permanently dismissing Criminal Case Nos. 206655-59, 206661-77 and 209634.

The facts are simple and undisputed:

Respondent New Prosperity Plastic Products, represented by Elizabeth Uy (Uy), is

the private complainant in Criminal Case Nos. 206655-59, 206661-77 and 209634 for
Violation of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Bilang 22 filed against petitioner William Co (Co),
which were raffled to the MeTC Branch 49 of Caloocan City. In the absence of Uy and
the private counsel, the cases were provisionally dismissed on June 9, 2003 in open court
pursuant to Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (Rules). 7 Uy
received a copy of the June 9, 2003 Order on July 2, 2003, while her counsel-of-record
received a copy a day after. 8 On July 2, 2004, Uy, through counsel, filed a Motion to
Revive the Criminal Cases. 9 Hon. Belen B. Ortiz, then Presiding Judge of the MeTC
Branch 49, granted the motion on October 14, 2004 and denied Co's motion for
reconsideration. 10 When Co moved for recusation, Judge Ortiz inhibited herself from
handling the criminal cases per Order dated January 10, 2005. 11 The cases were,
thereafter, raffled to the MeTC Branch 50 of Caloocan City. On March 17, 2005, Co filed
a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order (TRO)/writ of preliminary injunction (WPI) before the RTC of Caloocan
City challenging the revival of the criminal cases. 12 It was, however, dismissed for lack
of merit on May 23, 2005. 13 Co's motion for reconsideration was, subsequently, denied
on December 16, 2005. 14 Co then filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
before the Supreme Court, which was docketed as G.R. No. 171096. 15 We dismissed the
petition per Resolution dated February 13, 2006. 16 There being no motion for
reconsideration filed, the dismissal became final and executory on March 20, 2006. 17

Before the MeTC Branch 50 where Criminal Case Nos. 206655-59, 206661-77
and 209634 were re-raffled after the inhibition of Judge Ortiz, Co filed a "Motion for
Permanent Dismissal" on July 13, 2006. 18 Uy opposed the motion, contending that the
motion raised the same issues already resolved with finality by this Court in G.R. No.
171096. 19 In spite of this, Judge Esteban V. Gonzaga issued an Order dated September
4, 2006 granting Co's motion. 20 When the court subsequently denied Uy's motion for
reconsideration on November 16, 2006, 21 Uy filed a petition for certiorari before the
RTC of Caloocan City. On January 28, 2008, Hon. Judge Adoracion G. Angeles of the
RTC Branch 121 acted favorably on the petition, annulling and setting aside the Orders
dated September 4, 2006 and November 16, 2006 and directing the MeTC Branch 50 to
proceed with the trial of the criminal cases. 22 Co then filed a petition for certiorari
before the CA, which, as aforesaid, dismissed the petition and denied his motion for
reconsideration. Hence, this present petition with prayer for TRO/WPI.

According to Co, the following issues need to be resolved in this petition:

1. WHETHER OR NOT THE DISMISSAL OF THE CRIMINAL CASES

AGAINST PETITIONER ON THE GROUND OF DENIAL OF HIS
RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL CONSTITUTES FINAL DISMISSAL OF
THESE CASES; CITDES

2. WHETHER OR NOT THE METC ACTED WITH JURISDICTION IN

REVIVING THE CRIMINAL CASES AGAINST PETITIONER
WHICH WERE DISMISSED ON THE GROUND OF DENIAL OF
HIS RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL; and

3. ASSUMING POR GRATIA ARGUMENTI THE CASES WERE ONLY

PROVISIONALLY DISMISSED:

a. WHETHER THE ONE-YEAR TIME BAR OF THEIR REVIVAL IS

COMPUTED FROM ISSUANCE OF THE ORDER OF
PROVISIONAL DISMISSAL;

b. WHETHER THE ACTUAL NUMBER OF DAYS IN A YEAR IS

THE BASIS FOR COMPUTING THE ONE-YEAR TIME
BAR;

c. WHETHER THE PROVISIONALLY DISMISSED CASES

AGAINST PETITIONER ARE REVIVED IPSO FACTO BY
THE FILING OF MOTION TO REVIVE THESE CASES. 23
 Co argues that the June 9, 2003 Order provisionally dismissing Criminal Case
Nos. 206655-59, 206661-77 and 209634 should be considered as a final dismissal on the
ground that his right to speedy trial was denied. He reasons out that from his arraignment
on March 4, 2002 until the initial trial on June 9, 2003, there was already a "vexatious,
capricious and oppressive" delay, which is in violation of Section 6 of Republic Act 8493
(Speedy Trial Act of 1998) 24 and Section 2, Paragraph 2, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure 25 mandating that the entire trial period should not exceed 180
days from the first day of trial. As the dismissal is deemed final, Co contends that the
MeTC lost its jurisdiction over the cases and cannot reacquire jurisdiction over the same
based on a mere motion because its revival would already put him in double jeopardy.

Assuming that the criminal cases were only provisionally dismissed, Co further
posits that such dismissal became permanent one year after the issuance of the June 9,
2003 Order, not after notice to the offended party. He also insists that both the filing of
the motion to revive and the trial court's issuance of the order granting the revival must be
within the one-year period. Lastly, even assuming that the one-year period to revive the
criminal cases started on July 2, 2003 when Uy received the June 9, 2003 Order, Co
asserts that the motion was filed one day late since year 2004 was a leap year.

The petition is unmeritorious.

At the outset, it must be noted that the issues raised in this petition were also the
meat of the controversy in Co's previous petition in G.R. No. 171096, which We
dismissed per Resolution dated February 13, 2006. Such dismissal became final and
executory on March 20, 2006. While the first petition was dismissed mainly due to
procedural infirmities, this Court nonetheless stated therein that "[i]n any event, the
petition lacks sufficient showing that respondent court had committed any reversible
error in the questioned judgment to warrant the exercise by this Court of its
discretionary appellate jurisdiction in this case." Hence, upon the finality of Our
February 13, 2006 Resolution in G.R. No. 171096, the same already constitutes as res
judicata between the parties. On this ground alone, this petition should have been
dismissed outright.

Even if We are to squarely resolve the issues repeatedly raised in the present
petition, Co's arguments are nonetheless untenable on the grounds as follows:

First, Co's charge that his right to a speedy trial was violated is baseless.
Obviously, he failed to show any evidence that the alleged "vexatious, capricious and
oppressive" delay in the trial was attended with malice or that the same was made without
good cause or justifiable motive on the part of the prosecution. This Court has
emphasized that "'speedy trial' is a relative term and necessarily a flexible concept." 26 In
determining whether the accused's right to speedy trial was violated, the delay should be
considered in view of the entirety of the proceedings. 27 The factors to balance are the
following: (a) duration of the delay; (b) reason therefor; (c) assertion of the right or
failure to assert it; and (d) prejudice caused by such delay. 28 Surely, mere mathematical
reckoning of the time involved would not suffice as the realities of everyday life must be
regarded in judicial proceedings which, after all, do not exist in a vacuum, and that
particular regard must be given to the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. 29
"While the Court recognizes the accused's right to speedy trial and adheres to a policy of
speedy administration of justice, we cannot deprive the State of a reasonable opportunity
to fairly prosecute criminals. Unjustified postponements which prolong the trial for an
unreasonable length of time are what offend the right of the accused to speedy trial." 30
AEIDTc

Second, Co is burdened to establish the essential requisites of the first paragraph of

Section 8, Rule 117 of the Rules, which are conditions sine qua non to the application of
the time-bar in the second paragraph thereof, to wit: (1) the prosecution with the express
conformity of the accused or the accused moves for a provisional (sin perjuicio)
dismissal of the case; or both the prosecution and the accused move for a provisional
dismissal of the case; (2) the offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional
dismissal of the case; (3) the court issues an order granting the motion and dismissing the
case provisionally; and (4) the public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of
provisional dismissal of the case. 31 In this case, it is apparent from the records that there
is no notice of any motion for the provisional dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. 206655-
59, 206661-77 and 209634 or of the hearing thereon which was served on the private
complainant at least three days before said hearing as mandated by Section 4, Rule 15 of
the Rules. 32 The fact is that it was only in open court that Co moved for provisional
dismissal "considering that, as per records, complainant had not shown any interest to
pursue her complaint." 33 The importance of a prior notice to the offended party of a
motion for provisional dismissal is aptly explained in People v. Lacson: 34

. . . It must be borne in mind that in crimes involving private interests,

the new rule requires that the offended party or parties or the heirs of the victims
must be given adequate a priori notice of any motion for the provisional
dismissal of the criminal case. Such notice may be served on the offended party
or the heirs of the victim through the private prosecutor, if there is one, or
through the public prosecutor who in turn must relay the notice to the offended
party or the heirs of the victim to enable them to confer with him before the
hearing or appear in court during the hearing. The proof of such service must be
shown during the hearing on the motion, otherwise, the requirement of the new
rule will become illusory. Such notice will enable the offended party or the heirs
of the victim the opportunity to seasonably and effectively comment on or
object to the motion on valid grounds, including: (a) the collusion between the
prosecution and the accused for the provisional dismissal of a criminal case
thereby depriving the State of its right to due process; (b) attempts to make
witnesses unavailable; or (c) the provisional dismissal of the case with the
consequent release of the accused from detention would enable him to threaten
and kill the offended party or the other prosecution witnesses or flee from
 Philippine jurisdiction, provide opportunity for the destruction or loss of the
prosecution's physical and other evidence and prejudice the rights of the
offended party to recover on the civil liability of the accused by his concealment
or furtive disposition of his property or the consequent lifting of the writ of
preliminary attachment against his property. 35

Third, there is evident want of jurisprudential support on Co's supposition that the
dismissal of the cases became permanent one year after the issuance of the June 9, 2003
Order and not after notice to the offended party. When the Rules states that the
provisional dismissal shall become permanent one year after the issuance of the order
temporarily dismissing the case, it should not be literally interpreted as such. Of course,
there is a vital need to satisfy the basic requirements of due process; thus, said in one
case:

Although the second paragraph of the new rule states that the order of
dismissal shall become permanent one year after the issuance thereof without
the case having been revived, the provision should be construed to mean that the
order of dismissal shall become permanent one year after service of the order of
dismissal on the public prosecutor who has control of the prosecution without
the criminal case having been revived. The public prosecutor cannot be
expected to comply with the timeline unless he is served with a copy of the
order of dismissal. 36

We hasten to add though that if the offended party is represented by a private

counsel the better rule is that the reckoning period should commence to run from the time
such private counsel was actually notified of the order of provisional dismissal. When a
party is represented by a counsel, notices of all kinds emanating from the court should be
sent to the latter at his/her given address. 37 Section 2, Rule 13 of the Rules analogously
provides that if any party has appeared by counsel, service upon the former shall be made
upon the latter. 38

Fourth, the contention that both the filing of the motion to revive the case and the
court order reviving it must be made prior to the expiration of the one-year period is
unsustainable. Such interpretation is not found in the Rules. Moreover, to permit
otherwise would definitely put the offended party at the mercy of the trial court, which
may wittingly or unwittingly not comply. Judicial notice must be taken of the fact that
most, if not all, of our trial court judges have to deal with clogged dockets in addition to
their administrative duties and functions. Hence, they could not be expected to act at all
times on all pending decisions, incidents, and related matters within the prescribed period
of time. It is likewise possible that some of them, motivated by ill-will or malice, may
simply exercise their whims and caprices in not issuing the order of revival on time.

Fifth, the fact that year 2004 was a leap year is inconsequential to determine the
timeliness of Uy's motion to revive the criminal cases. What is material instead is Co's
categorical admission that Uy is represented by a private counsel who only received a
copy of the June 9, 2003 Order on July 3, 2003. Therefore, the motion was not belatedly
filed on July 2, 2004. Since the period for filing a motion to revive is reckoned from the
private counsel's receipt of the order of provisional dismissal, it necessarily follows that
the reckoning period for the permanent dismissal is likewise the private counsel's date of
receipt of the order of provisional dismissal. HEcTAI

And Sixth, granting for the sake of argument that this Court should take into
account 2004 as a leap year and that the one-year period to revive the case should be
reckoned from the date of receipt of the order of provisional dismissal by Uy, We still
hold that the motion to revive the criminal cases against Co was timely filed. A year is
equivalent to 365 days regardless of whether it is a regular year or a leap year. 39 Equally
so, under the Administrative Code of 1987, a year is composed of 12 calendar months.
The number of days is irrelevant. This was our ruling in Commissioner of Internal
Revenue v. Primetown Property Group, Inc., 40 which was subsequently reiterated in
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Aichi Forging Company of Asia, Inc., 41 thus:

. . . [In] 1987, EO 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987 was enacted. Section
31, Chapter VIII, Book I thereof provides:

Sec. 31. Legal Periods. — "Year" shall be understood to be

twelve calendar months; "month" of thirty days, unless it refers to a
specific calendar month in which case it shall be computed according to
the number of days the specific month contains; "day", to a day of
twenty-four hours and; "night" from sunrise to sunset. (emphasis
supplied)

A calendar month is "a month designated in the calendar without regard to the
number of days it may contain." It is the "period of time running from the
beginning of a certain numbered day up to, but not including, the
corresponding numbered day of the next month, and if there is not a sufficient
number of days in the next month, then up to and including the last day of that
month." To illustrate, one calendar month from December 31, 2007 will be
from January 1, 2008 to January 31, 2008; one calendar month from January
31, 2008 will be from February 1, 2008 until February 29, 2008. 42

Applying Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987 to
this case, the one-year period reckoned from the time Uy received the order of dismissal
on July 2, 2003 consisted of 24 calendar months, computed as follows:

1st calendar month July 3, 2003 to August 2, 2003

2nd calendar month August 3, 2003 to September 2, 2003
3rd calendar month September 3, 2003 to October 2, 2003
4th calendar month
5th calendar month
6th calendar month
7th calendar month
8th calendar month
9th calendar month
10th calendar month
11th calendar month
12th calendar month
October 3, 2003 to November 2, 2003
November 3, 2003 to December 2, 2003
December 3, 2003 to January 2, 2004
January 3, 2004 to February 2, 2004
February 3, 2004 to March 2, 2004
March 3, 2004 to April 2, 2004
April 3, 2004 to May 2, 2004
May 3, 2004 to June 2, 2004
June 3, 2004 to July 2, 2004

In the end, We find it hard to disregard the thought that the instant petition was
filed as a dilatory tactic to prosecute Criminal Case Nos. 206655-59, 206661-77 and
209634. As correctly pointed out by Uy since the time when the "Motion for Permanent
Dismissal" was filed, the issues raised herein were already resolved with finality by this
Court in G.R. No. 171096. Verily, Co, acting through the guidance and advice of his
counsel, Atty. Oscar C. Maglaque, adopted a worthless and vexatious legal maneuver for
no purpose other than to delay the trial court proceedings. It appears that Atty.
Maglaque's conduct contravened the Code of Professional Responsibility which enjoins
lawyers to observe the rules of procedure and not to misuse them to defeat the ends of
justice (Rule 10.03, Canon 10) as well as not to unduly delay a case or misuse court
processes (Rule 12.04, Canon 12). The Lawyer's Oath also upholds in particular:

. . . I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or

unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for
money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of
my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to
my clients . . . .

This Court has repeatedly impressed upon counsels that the need for the prompt
termination of litigation is essential to an effective and efficient administration of justice.
In Spouses Aguilar v. Manila Banking Corporation, 43 We said:

The Court reminds petitioners' counsel of the duty of lawyers who, as

officers of the court, must see to it that the orderly administration of justice must
not be unduly impeded. It is the duty of a counsel to advise his client, ordinarily
a layman on the intricacies and vagaries of the law, on the merit or lack of merit
of his case. If he finds that his client's cause is defenseless, then it is his
bounden duty to advise the latter to acquiesce and submit, rather than traverse
the incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist the whims and caprices of his client,
 and temper his client's propensity to litigate. A lawyer's oath to uphold the cause
of justice is superior to his duty to his client; its primacy is indisputable. 44
HaECDI

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED. The April 30,

2008 and August 1, 2008 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals, respectively, in CA-G.R.
SP No. 102975, which affirmed the January 28, 2008 Decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 121 of Caloocan City, annulling and setting aside the Orders dated
September 4, 2006 and November 16, 2006 of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 50 of
Caloocan City that permanently dismissed Criminal Case Nos. 206655-59, 206661-77
and 209634, are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs of suit to be paid by the petitioner.

The Commission on Bar Discipline-Integrated Bar of the Philippines is

DIRECTED to investigate Atty. Oscar C. Maglaque for his acts that appear to have
violated the Lawyer's Oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Rule on
Forum Shopping.

SO ORDERED.

Villarama, Jr., ** Mendoza, Reyes *** and Leonen, JJ., concur.

(Co v. New Prosperity Plastic Products, G.R. No. 183994, [June 30, 2014], 737 PHIL 334-
|||

349)

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 181368. February 22, 2012.]

GEORGE S. TOLENTINO, MONICA S. TOLENTINO, GUSTAVO

S. TOLENTINO, JR., MA. MARJORIE S. TOLENTINO,
MARILYN S. TOLENTINO, MICHAEL GLEN S. TOLENTINO,
MYLENE S. TOLENTINO, MILAGROS M. GUEVARRA, MA.
VICTORIA T. RAMIREZ, LORENZA T. ANDES, MICHAEL T.
MEDRANO and JACINTO T. MEDRANO, petitioners, vs.
PACIFICO S. LAUREL, HEIRS OF ILUMINADA LAUREL-
ASCALON, CONSUELO T. LAUREL, BIENVENIDO LAUREL,
HEIRS OF ARCHIMEDES LAUREL, TEODORO LAUREL, FE
LAUREL-LIMJUCO and CLARO LAUREL, respondents.

DECISION
PERALTA, J : p

Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision 1 and Resolution 2 of the Court of
Appeals (CA), dated October 18, 2007 and January 22, 2008, respectively, in CA-G.R.
CV No. 78676. TaCDcE

The factual milieu follows.

Respondents, in their complaint before the Regional Trial Court, alleged that they
are the registered owners of a parcel of land situated in Barangay Balugo, Tagkawayan,
Quezon, with an area of 1,056,275 square meters, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. T-43927. For several years, petitioners have been in actual possession of the
western portion of the said property with a total area of 620,000 square meters which they
tried to develop into fishponds. In the years 1993 and 1994, respondents informed
petitioners, through Gustavo C. Tolentino, Sr. (Gustavo) who was then representing
them, that the area they are occupying was inside the respondents' property and,
therefore, they should vacate and leave the same. Gustavo, however, asked for time to
verify respondents' claim. If found to be true, then the petitioners were willing to discuss
with respondents the improvements that they have introduced on the subject area.
Respondents have waited for almost a year for the outcome of the intended verification,
but they waited in vain until Gustavo died. Petitioners continued to develop the area they
were occupying into fishponds, thereby manifesting their unwillingness to vacate the
premises and restore the possession thereof in favor of respondents. Hence, respondents
filed a suit against petitioners to recover the property and demand payment of unearned
income, attorney's fees and costs of suit.

Petitioners, as defendants in the trial court, averred in their Answer that the subject
property is owned by the Republic and they are occupying the same by virtue of a
Fishpond Lease Agreement entered with the Department of Agriculture. Thus, their stay
over the property is lawful.

On August 27, 1996, petitioners were declared in default, for failure to appear at
the pre-trial conference. However, the trial court set aside the default order and reset the
pre-trial conference. Despite several resetting of the pre-trial conference of which
petitioners were notified, petitioners failed to appear. Hence, on March 21, 2000, the trial
court issued an Order allowing respondents to present their evidence ex parte, instead of
declaring petitioners in default. 3

After the ex parte hearing for the reception of evidence, the RTC ruled in favor of
respondents, thus:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered to wit:

 (a) Ordering the defendants [petitioners herein] George S. Tolentino,
Monica S. Tolentino, Gustavo S. Tolentino, Jr., Ma. Marjorie S. Tolentino,
Marilyn S. Tolentino, Michael Glenn St. Tolentino and Mylene S. Tolentino,
their assigns, heirs and representatives to leave and vacate the portions of land
they are occupying which are part of and inside Lot 647-E of the Subdivision
Plan Csd-5627-D, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-43927 of the
Office of the Register of Deeds of Quezon immediately upon this decision
becoming final and executory; DcaCSE

(b) Commanding the aforementioned defendants [petitioners herein]

jointly and severally, to pay the plaintiffs [respondents herein] the reasonable
rental value of the areas occupied by the aforesaid defendants [petitioners
herein] at the rate of P20,000.00 per annum from October 13, 1995 until
possession thereof is returned to the plaintiff. [respondents herein]; and

(c) Enjoining the aforementioned defendants [petitioners herein] jointly

and severally, to pay plaintiff [respondents herein] attorney's fees in the amount
of P20,000.00, plus litigation expenses in the sum of P10,000.00.

SO ORDERED. 4

Aggrieved, petitioners challenged the trial court's decision before the CA. The CA
dismissed petitioners' appeal and affirmed the decision of the RTC. A motion for
reconsideration was filed by the petitioners, but was denied by the CA for lack of merit.

Petitioners then filed this present Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45,
raising the following issues:

1. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONERS WERE DENIED THEIR DAY

IN COURT.

2. WHETHER OR NOT IT WAS PROPER TO INCLUDE THE

GOVERNMENT THRU THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE IN THIS
CASE FOR A COMPLETE DETERMINATION OF THE CASE.

3. WHETHER OR NOT THE DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION OF

ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES FINDS APPLICATION IN THIS CASE.

4. WHETHER OR NOT ACCION PUBLICIANA WAS THE PROPER

ACTION TO BE INSTITUTED IN THIS CASE.

Petitioners maintain that they were denied their day in court, because they were
not allowed to present their evidence before the trial court which resulted in the denial of
their right to due process.
 We perused the records of the case and failed to see the lack of due process
claimed by petitioners. On the contrary, petitioners were given more than ample
opportunity to be heard through counsel. Lest it be forgotten, petitioners were first
declared in default on August 27, 1996, for their failure to appear at the pre-trial
conference. However, the trial court set aside the default order and the pre-trial
conference was set and reset for several times. Nonetheless, petitioners failed to appear
on January 9, 1998, 5 March 2, 1998, 6 May 18, 1999, 7 and March 21, 2000, 8
prompting the trial court to allow the respondents to present their evidence ex parte.
Thereafter, judgment was rendered. DISHEA

Sections 4 and 5, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 4. Appearance of parties. — It shall be the duty of the parties

and their counsel to appear at the pre-trial. The non-appearance of a party may
be excused only if a valid cause is shown therefor, or if a representative shall
appear in his behalf fully authorized in writing to enter into an amicable
settlement, to submit to alternative modes of dispute resolution, and to enter into
stipulations or admissions of facts and of documents.

Section 5. Effect of failure to appear. — The failure of the plaintiff to

appear when so required pursuant to the next preceding section shall be cause
for dismissal of the action. The dismissal shall be with prejudice, unless
otherwise ordered by the court. A similar failure on the part of the defendant
shall be cause to allow the plaintiff to present his evidence ex parte and the
court to render judgment on the basis thereof.

From the foregoing, the failure of a party to appear at the pre-trial has adverse
consequences. If the absent party is the plaintiff, then his case shall be dismissed. If it is
the defendant who fails to appear, then the plaintiff is allowed to present his evidence ex
parte and the court shall render judgment on the basis thereof. Thus, the plaintiff is given
the privilege to present his evidence without objection from the defendant, the likelihood
being that the court will decide in favor of the plaintiff, the defendant having forfeited the
opportunity to rebut or present its own evidence. 9

In the case at bar, the trial court gave petitioners every chance to air their side and
even reconsidered its first order declaring petitioners in default. Notwithstanding,
petitioners and their counsel failed to take advantage of such opportunity and disregarded
the legal processes, by continuously failing to appear during the pre-trial of the case
without any valid cause. Clearly, when the trial court allowed the respondents to present
evidence ex parte due to the continued failure of the petitioners to attend the pre-trial
conference, it did so in accordance with Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and
with due regard to the constitutional guarantee of due process. Plainly, petitioners cannot
complain that they were denied due process. What the fundamental law prohibits is total
absence of opportunity to be heard. When a party has been afforded opportunity to
present his side, he cannot feign denial of due process. 10

In The Philippine American Life & General Insurance Company v. Enario, 11 the
Court held that pre-trial cannot be taken for granted. It is not a mere technicality in court
proceedings for it serves a vital objective: the simplification, abbreviation and expedition
of the trial, if not indeed its dispensation. The Court said that:

The importance of pre-trial in civil actions cannot be overemphasized. In

Balatico v. Rodriguez, the Court, citing Tiu v. Middleton, delved on the
significance of pre-trial, thus:
DCSTAH

Pre-trial is an answer to the clarion call for the speedy disposition

of cases. Although it was discretionary under the 1940 Rules of Court, it
was made mandatory under the 1964 Rules and the subsequent
amendments in 1997. Hailed as "the most important procedural
innovation in Anglo-Saxon justice in the nineteenth century," pre-trial
seeks to achieve the following:

(a) The possibility of an amicable settlement or of a submission

to alternative modes of dispute resolution;

(b) The simplification of the issues;

(c) The necessity or desirability of amendments to the pleadings;

(d) The possibility of obtaining stipulations or admissions of

facts and of documents to avoid unnecessary proof;

(e) The limitation of the number of witnesses;

(f) The advisability of a preliminary reference of issues to a

commissioner;

(g) The propriety of rendering judgment on the pleadings, or

summary judgment, or of dismissing the action should a valid ground
therefor be found to exist;

(h) The advisability or necessity of suspending the proceedings;

and

(i) Such other matters as may aid in the prompt disposition of the

action. 12
 Petitioners' repeated failure to appear at the pre-trial amounted to a failure to
comply with the Rules and their non-presentation of evidence before the trial court was
essentially due to their fault.

Petitioners' assertion that it was necessary to include the government, through the
Department of Agriculture, as a party to the case, in order to have a complete
determination of the case, is specious, as the same was never raised before the RTC and
the CA. It is settled that points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the
attention of the lower court need not be, and ordinarily will not be, considered by a
reviewing court, as they cannot be raised for the first time at that late stage. Basic
considerations of due process impel this rule. 13 IcHTCS

In the same manner, the Court cannot consider petitioners' allegation that
respondents' failure to exhaust administrative remedies is fatal to the cause of the
respondents, as this was not raised before the trial court.

In substance, the appeal of petitioners hinges on their possession over the subject
lot by virtue of an alleged Fishpond Lease Agreement with the Department of
Agriculture. They questioned the validity of the respondents' title by claiming that since
the property is owned by the government, it is part of the public domain and, therefore,
cannot be privately owned by the respondents. The petitioners' submission is not
meritorious.

It is a rule that a certificate of title cannot be the subject of collateral attack.

Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 provides that:

Section 48. Certificate not Subject to Collateral Attack. — A certificate

of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or
canceled, except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.

Petitioners' attack on the legality of TCT No. T-43927, issued in the name of
respondents, is incidental to their quest to defend their possession of the property in an
accion publiciana, not in a direct action whose main objective is to impugn the validity of
the judgment granting the title. 14 To permit a collateral attack on the title, such as what
petitioners attempt, would reduce the vaunted legal indefeasibility of a Torrens title to
meaningless verbiage. 15

It must be pointed out that notwithstanding petitioners' submission that the subject
property is owned by the Republic, there is no showing that the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) or its representatives initiated an action for reversion of the subject
property to become part of the public domain. All actions for the reversion to the
Government of lands of the public domain or improvements thereon shall be instituted by
the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead, in the proper courts, in the name of
the Republic of the Philippines. 16 Unless and until the land is reverted to the State by
virtue of a judgment of a court of law in a direct proceeding for reversion, the Torrens
certificate of title thereto remains valid and binding against the whole world. 17

Besides, it must be emphasized that the action filed before the trial court is an
accion publiciana, which is a plenary action for recovery of possession in an ordinary
civil proceeding in order to determine the better and legal right to possess, independently
of title. 18 The objective of the plaintiffs in an accion publiciana is to recover possession
only, not ownership. However, where the parties raise the issue of ownership, the courts
may pass upon the issue to determine who between the parties has the right to possess the
property. This adjudication, however, is not a final and binding determination of the issue
of ownership; it is only for the purpose of resolving the issue of possession, where the
issue of ownership is inseparably linked to the issue of possession. The adjudication of
the issue of ownership, being provisional, is not a bar to an action between the same
parties involving title to the property. 19cdasia2005

It is undisputed that the subject property is covered by TCT No. T-43927,

registered in the name of the respondents. On the other hand, petitioners do not claim
ownership, but allege that they are leasing the portion they are occupying from the
government.

Respondents' title over the subject property is evidence of their ownership thereof.
It is a fundamental principle in land registration that the certificate of title serves as
evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the
person whose name appears therein. 20 It is conclusive evidence with respect to the
ownership of the land described therein. 21 It is also settled that the titleholder is entitled
to all the attributes of ownership of the property, including possession. 22 Thus, the Court
held that the age-old rule is that the person who has a Torrens title over a land is entitled
to possession thereof. 23

Petitioners' argument that an accion publiciana is not the proper remedy available
for the respondents, because more than ten (10) years had already elapsed since the
dispossession of the respondents' property, does not hold water. As the registered owners,
respondents' right to evict any person illegally occupying their property is
imprescriptible. In the case of Labrador v. Perlas, 24 the Court held that:

. . . As a registered owner, petitioner has a right to eject any person

illegally occupying his property. This right is imprescriptible and can never be
barred by laches. In Bishop v. Court of Appeals, we held, thus:

As registered owners of the lots in question, the private

respondents have a right to eject any person illegally occupying their
property. This right is imprescriptible. Even if it be supposed that they
were aware of the petitioners' occupation of the property, and regardless
of the length of that possession, the lawful owners have a right to
 demand the return of their property at any time as long as the possession
was unauthorized or merely tolerated, if at all. This right is never barred
by laches. 25

As a final note, the Court finds no factual and legal basis for the award of
attorney's fees and litigation expenses. The settled rule is that the matter of attorney's fees
cannot be mentioned only in the dispositive portion of the decision. The same goes for the
award of litigation expenses. 26 The reasons or grounds for the award thereof must be set
forth in the decision of the court. 27 The discretion of the court to award attorney's fees
under Article 2208 of the Civil Code demands factual, legal, and equitable justification,
without which the award is a conclusion without a premise, its basis being improperly left
to speculation and conjecture. 28

In the present case, the award of attorney's fees and litigation expenses was
mentioned only in the dispositive portion of the RTC decision without any prior
explanation and justification in its body, hence, the same is baseless and must be deleted.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the

Court of Appeals, dated October 18, 2007 and January 22, 2008, respectively, in CA-
G.R. CV No. 78676, are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the award of
attorney's fees and litigation expenses is DELETED. ECaITc

SO ORDERED.

Velasco, Jr., Abad, Mendoza and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.

||| (Tolentino v. Laurel, G.R. No. 181368, [February 22, 2012], 682 PHIL 527-542)

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 174471. January 12, 2016.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. JERRY PEPINO y

RUERAS and PRECIOSA GOMEZ y CAMPOS, respondents.

DECISION

BRION, J : p
 This is an appeal filed by Jerry Pepino (Pepino) and Preciosa Gomez (Gomez)
assailing the June 16, 2006 decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-
HC No. 02026. HEITAD

ANTECEDENTS
The prosecution evidence showed that at 1:00 p.m., on June 28, 1997, two men
and a woman entered the office of Edward Tan at Kilton Motors Corporation in Sucat,
Parañaque City, and pretended to be customers. When Edward was about to receive
them, one of the men, eventually identified as Pepino pulled out a gun. Thinking that
it was a holdup, Edward told Pepino that the money was inside the cashier's box.
Pepino and the other man looted the cashier's box, handcuffed Edward, and forced
him to go with them. 2 From the hallway, Jocelyn Tan (mentioned as "Joselyn" in
some parts of the record), Edward's wife, saw Pepino take her husband. She went to
the adjoining room upon Edward's instructions. 3
Pepino brought Edward to a metallic green Toyota Corolla where three other
men were waiting inside. The woman (later identified as Gomez) sat on the front
passenger seat. 4 The abductors then placed surgical tape over Edward's eyes and
made him wear sunglasses. After travelling for two and a half hours, they arrived at
an apartment in Quezon City. The abductors removed the tape from Edward's eyes,
placed him in a room, and then chained his legs. Pepino approached Edward and
asked for the phone number of his father so that he could ask for ransom for his
(Edward's) liberty. Edward told Pepino to negotiate with his wife, but the latter
insisted on talking to his father. 5
At around 5:00 p.m. of the same day, the kidnappers called Edward's father and
demanded a P40 million ransom for his release. Edward's father told the kidnappers
that he did not have that amount. The abductors negotiated with Jocelyn who
eventually agreed to a P700,000.00 ransom. The kidnappers told Jocelyn to pack the
money into two packages and to drop these at a convenience store in front of
McDonald's at Mindanao Avenue. They further demanded that Edward's vehicle be
used to bring the money. 6
After four days, or on July 1, 1997, Antonio Gepiga (the family driver) brought
the agreed amount to the 7-Eleven convenience store at Mindanao Avenue as
instructed. 7 That evening, three men and Gomez blindfolded Edward, made him
board a car, and drove around for 30 minutes. Upon stopping, they told Edward that
he could remove his blindfold after five minutes. When Edward removed his
blindfold, he found himself inside his own car parked at the UP Diliman Campus. He
drove home and reported his kidnapping to Teresita Ang See, a known anti-crime
crusader. 8
After five months, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) informed
Edward that they had apprehended some suspects, and invited him to identify them
from a lineup consisting of seven persons: five males and two females. Edward
positively identified Pepino, Gomez, and one Mario Galgo. 9 Jocelyn likewise
identified Pepino. 10
Pepino and Gomez did not testify for their defense. The defense instead
presented Zeny Pepino, Reynaldo Pepino, NBI Special Investigator Marcelo Jadloc
and P/Sr. Insp. Narciso Quano (mentioned as "Qano" in some parts of the record). aDSIHc

Zeny testified that she and her husband, Jerry Pepino, were inside their house
in Cebu City on December 7, 1997, when about 20 heavily armed men entered their
house looking for Jerry. When Jerry asked them if they had a warrant of arrest, one of
the men pointed a gun at him and handcuffed him; the armed men then hit him with
the butt of an armalite and punched him. The men also took Pepino's wristwatch and
wallet, as well as Zeny's bag and watch. Some of the armed men searched the second
floor of the house, and found a .45 caliber gun. The armed men brought Zeny and
Pepino outside their house where Zeny saw Renato Pepino and Larex Pepino already
handcuffed. The armed men brought them to the Cebu City Police Headquarters
before bringing them to the NBI Headquarters in Manila. The following day, Jerry,
Renato, and Larex were brought to the Department of Justice (DOJ). Zeny, on the
other hand, was released after being detained at the NBI for three (3) days. 11
Reynaldo's testimony was summarized by the CA as follows:
. . . On December 6, 1997, he accompanied accused-appellant Gomez
to his brother's sister-in-law who happens to work in a recruitment agency.
While they were inside the latter's house at Lot 2, Block 15, Marikina Heights,
Marikina City, they heard a noise at the gate. When he peeped through the
window, he saw two (2) motorcycles and two (2) Vannette vans. Shortly
thereafter, someone kicked the back door and several armed men emerged
therefrom and announced their arrest. When he asked them if they had any
warrant, they replied: "Walang warrant, warrant. Walang search, search."
They were then hogtied and made to lie face down. Five (5) of them then went
upstairs and seized his personal belongings together with his briefcase which
contained P45,000.00, documents of accused-appellant Gomez, and his .45
caliber pistol as well as his license and permit to carry the same. No receipts
were issued for their personal effects which were confiscated. They were
subsequently brought to Camp Crame and subjected to torture. The following
day, they were brought to the Department of Justice and a case for kidnapping
was filed against him. Upon reinvestigation, however, he was discharged from
the Information and the court dismissed the case against him. 12
SI Jadloc and Police Senior Inspector Quano, Jr. were presented as hostile
witnesses.
Jadloc declared on the witness stand that NBI Assistant Director Edmundo
Arugay dispatched a team to Cebu City to investigate a kidnap-for-ransom case. The
team immediately conducted surveillance operations when they arrived at Calle Rojo,
Lahug, Cebu City. One of the team members saw Renato and Larex Pepino with guns
tucked in their waists. When the team approached them, the two men ran inside their
house. The team went after them and on entering the house, they saw Jerry in
possession of a .45 caliber gun. The team arrested Jerry, Renato and Larex, and then
brought them to the NBI Headquarters in Manila. 13
Quano testified that he was designated as the leader of a team tasked to arrest
members of a kidnap-for-ransom group at their safe house in Lot 2, Block 50,
Marikina Heights, Marikina City. When they arrived there, they introduced
themselves as police officers. The police forcibly opened the door after the occupants
of the house refused to open the ground floor door. During their search at the second
floor, the operatives found an armalite and a .45 caliber gun. The members of the
team handcuffed Gomez and Reynaldo, and then brought them to Camp Crame. 14
The prosecution charged Preciosa Gomez, Jerry Pepino, Reynaldo Pepino,
Jessie Pepino, George Curvera, Boy Lanyujan, Luisito "Tata" Adulfo, Henriso Batijon
(a.k.a. Dodoy Batijon), Nerio Alameda, and an alias Wilan Tan with kidnapping for
ransom and serious illegal detention before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
259, Parañaque City. 15 Reynaldo was subsequently discharged after reinvestigation.
Only Pepino, Gomez, and Batijon were arraigned; their other co-accused remained at
large.
In its May 15, 2000 decision, the RTC convicted Pepino and Gomez of
kidnapping and serious illegal detention under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code
(as amended) and sentenced them to suffer the death penalty. The RTC also ordered
them to pay Edward P700,000.00 representing the amount extorted from him;
P50,000.00 as moral damages; and P50,000 as exemplary damages. The trial court
acquitted Batijon for insufficiency of evidence.
The RTC held that Edward positively identified Pepino and Gomez as two of
the persons who forcibly abducted him at gunpoint inside Kilton Motors, and who
consequently detained him somewhere in Quezon City for four (4) days until he was
released inside the UP Diliman Campus after the payment of ransom. The RTC added
that Jocelyn corroborated Edward's testimony on material points. It also pointed out
that Edward identified both Pepino and Gomez at the lineup conducted inside the NBI
compound, although Jocelyn only recognized Gomez.
The RTC further ruled that the accused were already estopped from
questioning the validity of their arrest after they entered their respective pleas.
The case was automatically elevated to this Court in view of the death penalty
that the RTC imposed. We referred the case to the CA for intermediate review
pursuant to our ruling in People v. Mateo. 16
In its decision dated June 16, 2006, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC
decision with the modification that the amounts of moral and exemplary damages
were increased from P300,000.00 and P100,000.00, respectively.
 The CA held that Pepino and Gomez were deemed to have waived any
objection to the illegality of their arrests when they did not move to quash the
information before entering their plea, and when they participated at the trial.
The CA further ruled that Pepino and Gomez conspired with each other to
attain a common objective, i.e., to kidnap Edward in exchange for ransom.
While the case was under review by the Supreme Court, Pepino filed an urgent
motion to withdraw his appeal, which the Court granted. 17 Only Gomez's appeal is
now pending before us.
In her brief 18 and supplemental brief, 19 Gomez maintained that it was
impossible for Edward to have seen her in the front seat of the getaway car because he
(Edward) was blindfolded. She also alleged that the prosecution failed to prove that
she had conspired with the other accused.
Gomez further claimed that Edward's identification of her during trial "may
have been preconditioned . . . by suggestive identification" 20 made at the police
lineup. She further argued that the death penalty imposed on her is no longer proper
due to the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346.
THE COURT'S RULING
We affirm Gomez's conviction, but we modify the penalty imposed and the
awarded indemnities.
Illegality of the Arrest
We point out at the outset that Gomez did not question before arraignment the
legality of her warrantless arrest or the acquisition of RTC's jurisdiction over her
person. Thus, Gomez is deemed to have waived any objection to her warrantless
arrest.
It is settled that [a]ny objection to the procedure followed in the matter of the
acquisition by a court of jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be
opportunely raised before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed
waived. 21 As we held in People v. Samson: 22
[A]ppellant is now estopped from questioning any defect in the
manner of his arrest as he failed to move for the quashing of the information
before the trial court. Consequently, any irregularity attendant to his arrest
was cured when he voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the trial
court by entering a plea of "not guilty" and by participating in the trial. 23
At any rate, the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting
aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free from
error. Simply put, the illegality of the warrantless arrest cannot deprive the State of its
right to prosecute the guilty when all other facts on record point to their culpability. It
is much too late in the day to complain about the warrantless arrest after a valid
information had been filed, the accused had been arraigned, the trial had commenced
and had been completed, and a judgment of conviction had been rendered against her.
24

Sufficiency of the Prosecution Evidence

a. Elements of kidnapping proved
The elements of kidnapping and serious illegal detention under Article 267 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended, are: (1) the offender is a private individual; (2)
he kidnaps or detains another or in any other manner deprives the latter of his liberty;
(3) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (4) in the commission of the
offense, any of the following circumstances is present: (a) the kidnapping or detention
lasts for more than three (3) days; or (b) it is committed by simulating public
authority; or (c) serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or
detained or threats to kill him are made; or (d) the person kidnapped or detained is a
minor, female, or a public officer. If the victim of kidnapping and serious illegal
detention is a minor, the duration of his detention is immaterial. Likewise, if the
victim is kidnapped and illegally detained for the purpose of extorting ransom, the
duration of his detention is also of no moment and the crime is qualified and becomes
punishable by death even if none of the circumstances mentioned in paragraphs 1 to 4
of Article 267 is present. 25
All these elements have been established by the prosecution. Edward positively
identified Gomez and Pepino — both private individuals — as among the three
persons who entered his office and pretended to be Kilton Motors' customers. He
further declared that Pepino pointed a gun at him, and forcibly took him against his
will. To directly quote from the records: ETHIDa

ATTY. WILLIAM CHUA:

Q: Can you tell us if anything unusual happened to you on June 28, 1997?
EDWARD TAN:
A: I was kidnapped.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Can you tell this Court how the kidnapping was initiated?
A: At around 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon, there were three persons who
entered the office of Kilton Motors and pretended to be customers.
Q: What was the gender of these three persons that you are referring to?
A: Two men and a woman.
Q: After they pretended to be customers, tell us what happened?
A: They told me they were going to pay but instead of pulling out money, they
pulled out a gun.
Q: How many people pulled out guns as you said?
A: Only one, sir.
Q: Will you look around this courtroom now and tell us if the person who pulled
out a gun is in court?
A: (WITNESS POINTED TO A PERSON AT THE RIGHT SECTION,
SECOND ROW WHO, WHEN ASKED HIS NAME, ANSWERED
JERRY PEPINO)
Q: Now, you said that there were two men and a woman who went up the Kilton
Motors Office and you pointed to one of the men as Jerry Pepino, can
you look around the courtroom and tell us if any of the two others are in
court?
A: (WITNESS POINTED TO A WOMAN INSIDE THE COURTROOM
WHO, WHEN ASKED HER NAME, ANSWERED AS PRECIOSA
GOMEZ)
xxx xxx xxx
Q: You said Mr. Pepino pulled out his gun, what happened after he pulled out
his gun?
A: He told me just to be quiet and go with him.
Q: What was your reaction when he pointed a gun to you and he stated those
words?
A: I thought it was only a holdup and so I told him there was money with the
cashier and told him to get it.
Q: What happened after you told him the money was in the cashier's box?
A: His companion took the money and told me to still go with them.
Q: When they told you to go with them, what happened next?
A: I told them why should I still go with them and then, I was handcuffed and
was forced to go down.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: As they were bringing you down, what happened next, Mr. Witness?
A: When we went down nearing his car, I was boarded on [in] his car.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: When they boarded you inside that car, what did they do to you, Mr.
Witness?
A: They put surgical tape on my eyes and also sunglasses.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Who was at the passenger's front seat of the car?
A: It was Preciosa Gomez. 26
 xxx xxx xxx
Edward further declared on the witness stand that Pepino, Gomez, and their
other co-accused brought him to a safe house in Quezon City; detained him there for
four (4) days; and demanded ransom from his (Edward's) family.
It is settled that the crime of serious illegal detention consists not only of
placing a person in an enclosure, but also in detaining him or depriving him of his
liberty in any manner. For there to be kidnapping, it is enough that the victim is
restrained from going home. Its essence is the actual deprivation of the victim's
liberty, coupled with indubitable proof of the intent of the accused to effect such
deprivation. 27
Notably, Jocelyn corroborated Edward's testimony on the following points:
Pepino poked a handgun at Edward while they were on the second floor of Kilton;
Pepino and his companion brought him downstairs and out of the building, and made
him board a car; and the kidnappers demanded ransom in exchange for Edward's
release.
Both the RTC and the CA found the respective testimonies of Edward and
Jocelyn credible and convincing. We affirm the credibility accorded by the trial court
(and affirmed by the CA) to these prosecution witnesses, in the absence of any
showing that this factual finding had been arbitrarily arrived at. There is nothing in
the records that would put the testimonies of Edward and Jocelyn under suspicion. We
recall that Edward had close contacts with Pepino at Kilton Motors and at the safe
house. He also saw Gomez (a) seated at the front seat of the getaway Toyota Corolla
vehicle; (b) at the safe house in Quezon City; and (c) inside the car before the
kidnappers released him.
Jocelyn, for her part, stated that she was very near Pepino while he was taking
away her husband.
In People v. Pavillare, 28 the Court found the testimonies of the private
complainant Sukhjinder Singh and his cousin, Lakhvir Singh, to be credible and
convincing, and reasoned out as follows:
Both witnesses had ample opportunity to observe the kidnappers and
to remember their faces. The complainant had close contact with the
kidnappers when he was abducted and beaten up, and later when the
kidnappers haggled on the amount of the ransom money. His cousin met
Pavillare face to face and actually dealt with him when he paid the ransom
money. The two-hour period that the complainant was in close contact with
his abductors was sufficient for him to have a recollection of their physical
appearance. Complainant admitted in court that he would recognize his
abductors if he sees them again and upon seeing Pavillare he immediately
recognized him as one of the malefactors as he remembers him as the one who
blocked his way, beat him up, haggled with the complainant's cousin and
received the ransom money. . . . It bears repeating that the finding of the trial
 court as to the credibility of witnesses is given utmost respect and as a rule
will not be disturbed on appeal because it had the opportunity to closely
observe the demeanor of the witness in court. 29
b. Admissibility of Identification
We find no merit in Gomez's claim that Edward's identification of her during
trial might have been preconditioned by the "suggestive identification" made during
the police lineup.
In People v. Teehankee, Jr., 30 the Court explained the procedure for out-of-
court identification and the test to determine the admissibility of such identifications
in this manner:
Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various ways.
It is done thru show-ups where the suspect alone is brought face to face with
the witness for identification. It is done thru mug shots where photographs are
shown to the witness to identify the suspect. It is also done thru lineups where
a witness identifies the suspect from a group of persons lined up for the
purpose . . . In resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-of-court
identification of suspects, courts have adopted the totality of circumstances
test where they consider the following factors, viz.: (1) the witness'
opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness'
degree of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description given
by the witness; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the
identification; (5) the length of time between the crime and the identification;
and (6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure. 31
Applying the totality-of-circumstances test, we find Edward's out-of-court
identification to be reliable and thus admissible. To recall, when the three individuals
entered Edward's office, they initially pretended to be customers, 32 and even asked
about the products that were for sale. 33 The three had told Edward that they were
going to pay, but Pepino "pulled out a gun" instead. 34 After Pepino's companion had
taken the money from the cashier's box, the malefactors handcuffed Edward and
forced him to go down to the parked car. From this sequence of events, there was thus
ample opportunity for Edward — before and after the gun had been pointed at him —
to view the faces of the three persons who entered his office. In addition, Edward
stated that Pepino had talked to him "[a]t least once a day" 35 during the four days that
he was detained. cSEDTC

Edward also saw Gomez seated at the front seat of the getaway metallic green
Toyota Corolla vehicle. In addition, the abductors removed the tape from Edward's
eyes when they arrived at the apartment, and among those whom he saw there was
Gomez. According to Edward, he was able to take a good look at the occupants of the
car when he was about to be released.
On the part of Jocelyn, she was firm and unyielding in her identification of
Pepino as the person who pointed a gun at her husband while going down the stairs,
and who brought him outside the premises of Kilton Motors. She maintained that she
was very near when Pepino was taking away her husband; and that she could not
forget Pepino's face. For accuracy, we quote from the records:
ATTY. CORONEL:
Q: You stated that you were able to see one of the persons who kidnapped your
husband, if you see this person again, would you be able to identify him?
JOCELYN SY TAN:
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Can you look around the courtroom and see if the person you are referring to
is here today?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Can you point to him?
A: (WITNESS POINTED TO A MALE PERSON INSIDE THE
COURTROOM WHO WHEN ASKED HIS NAME ANSWERED AS
JERRY PEPINO).
Q: Ms. Witness, what role did this person whom you identified and gave his
name as Jerry Pepino, what role did he play in the kidnapping of your
husband?
A: Siya po bale 'yong nakayakap sa husband ko tapos nakatutok ng baril.
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. ESTRUCO:
Q: When Jerry Pepino was at Kilton Motors, he embraced your husband?
JOCELYN SY TAN:
A: Yes, sir. And pointed a gun at my husband.
Q: And he was not blindfolded at that time?
A: No, he was not blindfolded, he was only wearing a cap.
Q: You are very sure that he is Jerry Pepino?
A: Yes, I am very, very sure. I could not forget his face.
Q: You are very sure?
A: Yes, sir. Kahit sa nightmare ko, kasama siya.
xxx xxx xxx 36
We add that no competing event took place to draw Edward's and Jocelyn's
attention from the incident. Nothing in the records shows the presence of any
distraction that could have disrupted the witnesses' attention at the time of the
incident. 37
 Jurisprudence holds that the natural reaction of victims of criminal violence is
to strive to see the appearance of their assailants and observe the manner the crime
was committed. As the Court held in People v. Esoy: 38
It is known that the most natural reaction of a witness to a crime is to
strive to look at the appearance of the perpetrator and to observe the manner in
which the offense is perpetrated. Most often the face of the assailant and body
movements thereof, create a lasting impression which cannot be easily erased
from a witness's memory. Experience dictates that precisely because of the
unusual acts of violence committed right before their eyes, eyewitnesses can
remember with a high degree of reliability the identity of criminals at any
given time. 39
While this pronouncement should be applied with great caution, there is no
compelling circumstance in this case that would warrant its non-application.
Contrary to what Gomez claimed, the police lineup conducted at the NBI was
not suggestive. We note that there were seven people in the lineup; Edward was not
compelled to focus his attention on any specific person or persons. While it might
have been ideal if there had been more women included in the lineup instead of only
two, or if there had been a separate lineup for Pepino and for Gomez, the fact alone
that there were five males and two females in the lineup did not render the procedure
irregular. There was no evidence that the police had supplied or even suggested to
Edward that the appellants were the suspected perpetrators.
The following exchanges at the trial during Edward's cross-examination prove
this point:
ATTY. ESTURCO:
Q: When they were lined up at the NBI, where were they placed, in a certain
room?
EDWARD TAN:
A: Yes, sir.
Q: With a glass window? One way?
A: No, sir.
Q: You mean to say you were face to face with the alleged kidnappers?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And before you were asked to pinpoint the persons who allegedly kidnapped
you, you conferred with the NBI agents?
A: The NBI agents told me not to be afraid.
Q: No, my question is, you conferred with the NBI agents?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What is the name of the NBI agent?
 A: I cannot remember, sir.
Q: And how many were lined up?
A: Seven, sir.
Q: And the NBI agent gave the names of each of the seven?
A: No, sir. 40
We also note that Jocelyn's and Edward's out-of-court identifications were
made on the same day. While Jocelyn only identified Pepino, the circumstances
surrounding this out-of-court identification showed that the whole identification
process at the NBI was not suggestive. To directly quote from the records:
ATTY. ESTURCO:
Q: How about the alleged kidnappers, where were they placed during that time?
JOCELYN TAN:
A: They were in front of us.
Q: Without any cover?
A: None, sir.
Q: Without any glass cover?
A: See-through glass window.
Q: One-way mirror?
A: Not one way, see-through.
Q: And before you were asked to pinpoint the alleged kidnappers, you were
already instructed by the NBI what to do and was told who are the
persons to be lined up?
A: No, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: And between the alleged length of time, you were still very positive that
it was Gerry (sic) Pepino inside the NBI cell?
A: At first, I did not know that he was Jerry Pepino but we know his face.
Q: At first, you did not know that it was Jerry Pepino?
A: Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: It was the NBI officer who told you that the person is Jerry Pepino, am I
correct?
A: They identified that the person we identified was Jerry Pepino. We first
pinpointed na heto ang mukha at saka sinabi na 'yan si Jerry
Pepino.
 xxx xxx xxx 41
These exchanges show that the lineup had not been attended by any
suggestiveness on the part of the police or the NBI agents; there was no evidence that
they had supplied or even suggested to either Edward or Jocelyn that the appellants
were the kidnappers.
We are not unaware that the Court, in several instances, has acquitted an
accused when the out-of-court identification is fatally flawed. In these cases, however,
it had been clearly shown that the identification procedure was suggestive.
In People v. Pineda, 42 the Court acquitted Rolando Pineda because the police
suggested the identity of the accused by showing only the photographs of Pineda and
his co-accused Celso Sison to witnesses Canilo Ferrer and Jimmy Ramos. According
to the Court, "there was impermissible suggestion because the photographs were only
of appellant and Sison, focusing attention on the two accused." 43
Similarly, the Court in People v. Rodrigo 44 acquitted appellant Lee Rodrigo
since only a lone photograph was shown to the witness at the police station. We thus
held that the appellant's in-court identification proceeded from, and was influenced
by, impermissible suggestions in the earlier photographic identification.
The lack of a prior description of the kidnappers in the present case should not
lead to a conclusion that witnesses' identification was erroneous. The lack of a prior
description of the kidnappers was due to the fact that Jocelyn (together with other
members of Edward's family), for reasons not made known in the records, opted to
negotiate with the kidnappers, instead of immediately seeking police assistance. If
members of Edward's family had refused to cooperate with the police, their refusal
could have been due to their desire not to compromise Edward's safety. 45 In the same
manner, Edward, after he was freed, chose to report the matter to Teresita Ang See,
and not to the police.SDAaTC

Given these circumstances, the lack of prior description of the malefactors in

this case should not in any way taint the identification that Edward and Jocelyn made.
c. The Right to Counsel
The right to counsel is a fundamental right and is intended to preclude the
slightest coercion that would lead the accused to admit something false. The right to
counsel attaches upon the start of the investigation, i.e., when the investigating officer
starts to ask questions to elicit information and/or confessions or admissions from the
accused. 46
Custodial investigation commences when a person is taken into custody and is
singled out as a suspect in the commission of the crime under investigation. 47 As a
rule, a police lineup is not part of the custodial investigation; hence, the right to
counsel guaranteed by the Constitution cannot yet be invoked at this stage. The right
to be assisted by counsel attaches only during custodial investigation and cannot be
claimed by the accused during identification in a police lineup.
Our ruling on this point in People v. Lara 48 is instructive:
. . . The guarantees of Sec. 12 (1), Art. III of the 1987 Constitution, or
the so-called Miranda rights, may be invoked only by a person while he is
under custodial investigation. Custodial investigation starts when the police
investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has
begun to focus on a particular suspect taken into custody by the police who
starts the interrogation and propounds questions to the person to elicit
incriminating statements. Police line-up is not part of the custodial
investigation; hence, the right to counsel guaranteed by the Constitution
cannot yet be invoked at this stage. 49
Defense witness Reynaldo, however, maintained that Pepino and Gomez were
among those already presented to the media as kidnapping suspects by the DOJ a
day before the police lineup was made. In this sense, the appellants were already the
focus of the police and were thus deemed to be already under custodial investigation
when the out-of-court identification was conducted.
Nonetheless, the defense did not object to the in-court identification for
having been tainted by an irregular out-of-court identification in a police lineup.
They focused, instead, on the legality of the appellants' arrests.
Whether Edward and Jocelyn could have seen Pepino and Gomez in various
media fora that reported the presentation of the kidnapping suspects to the media is
not for the Court to speculate on. The records merely show that when defense counsel,
Atty. Caesar Esturco, asked Jocelyn during cross-examination whether she was aware
that there were several kidnap-for-ransom incidents in Metro Manila, the latter
answered that she "can read in the newspapers." 50 At no time did Jocelyn or Edward
ever mention that they saw the appellants from the news reports in print or on
television.
At any rate, the appellants' respective convictions in this case were based on an
independent in-court identification made by Edward and Jocelyn, and not on the
out-of-court identification during the police lineup. We reiterate that the RTC and
the CA found the court testimonies of these witnesses to be positive and credible, and
that there was no showing that their factual findings had been arrived at arbitrarily.
The in-court identification thus cured whatever irregularity might have attended the
police lineup.
As the Court ruled in People v. Algarme: 51
Even assuming arguendo the appellants' out-of-court identification
was defective, their subsequent identification in court cured any flaw that may
have initially attended it. We emphasize that the "inadmissibility of a police
lineup identification . . . should not necessarily foreclose the admissibility of
an independent in-court identification." We also stress that all the accused-
 appellants were positively identified by the prosecution eyewitnesses during
the trial.
It is also significant to note that despite the overwhelming evidence adduced by
the prosecution, Pepino and Gomez did not even testify for their respective defenses.
d. The Presence of Conspiracy
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning
the commission of a crime and decide to commit it. It may be proved by direct or
circumstantial evidence consisting of acts, words, or conduct of the alleged
conspirators before, during and after the commission of the felony to achieve a
common design or purpose.
Proof of the agreement does not need to rest on direct evidence, as the
agreement may be inferred from the conduct of the parties indicating a common
understanding among them with respect to the commission of the offense. Corollarily,
it is not necessary to show that two or more persons met together and entered into an
explicit agreement setting out the details of an unlawful scheme or the details by
which an illegal objective is to be carried out. 52
In the present case, the records establish the following facts: Pepino, Gomez,
and another man entered Edward's office, and initially pretended to be customers; the
three told Edward that they were going to pay, but Pepino pulled out a gun. After
Pepino's companion took the money from the cashier's box, the malefactors
handcuffed him and forced him to go down to the parked car; Gomez sat at the front
passenger seat of the car which brought Edward to a safe house in Quezon City; the
abductors removed the tape from Edward's eyes, placed him in a room, and then
chained his legs upon arrival at the safe house; the abductors negotiated with
Edward's family who eventually agreed to a P700,000.00 ransom to be delivered by
the family driver using Edward's own car; and after four days, three men and Gomez
blindfolded Edward, made him board a car, drove around for 30 minutes, and left him
inside his own car at the UP Diliman campus.
The collective, concerted, and synchronized acts of the accused before, during,
and after the kidnapping constitute undoubted proof that Gomez and her co-accused
conspired with each other to attain a common objective, i.e., to kidnap Edward and
detain him illegally in order to demand ransom for his release.
The Proper Penalty:
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, mandates the imposition
of the death penalty when the kidnapping or detention is committed for the purpose of
extorting ransom from the victim or any other person. Ransom, as employed in the
law, is so used in its common or ordinary sense; meaning, a sum of money or other
thing of value, price, or consideration paid or demanded for redemption of a
kidnapped or detained person, a payment that releases one from captivity. 53
 In the present case, the malefactors not only demanded but received ransom for
Edward's release. The CA thus correctly affirmed the RTC's imposition of the death
penalty on Pepino and Gomez.
With the passage of Republic Act No. 9346, entitled "An Act Prohibiting the
Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines" (signed into law on June 24, 2006),
the death penalty may no longer be imposed. We thus sentence Gomez to the penalty
of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole pursuant to A.M. No. 15-08-02-
SC. 54
The reduced penalty shall likewise apply to the non-appealing party, Pepino,
since it is more favorable to him.
The Awarded Indemnities:
In the case of People v. Gambao 55 (also for kidnapping for ransom), the Court
set the minimum indemnity and damages where facts warranted the imposition of the
death penalty if not for prohibition thereof by R.A. No. 9346, as follows: (1)
P100,000.00 as civil indemnity; (2) P100,000.00 as moral damages which the victim
is assumed to have suffered and thus needs no proof; and (3) P100,000.00 as
exemplary damages to set an example for the public good. These amounts shall earn
interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of the finality of the
Court's Resolution until fully paid.
We thus reduce the moral damages imposed by the CA from P300,000.00 to
P100,000.00 to conform to prevailing jurisprudence on kidnapping cases. This
reduced penalty shall apply to Pepino for being more favorable to him. However, the
additional monetary award (i.e., P100,000.00 civil indemnity) imposed on Gomez
shall not be applied to Pepino. 56
We affirm the P700,000.00 imposed by the courts below as restitution of the
amount of ransom demanded and received by the kidnappers. We also affirm the CA's
award of P100,000.00 as exemplary damages based on Gambao.
WHEREFORE, in the light of all the foregoing, we AFFIRM the challenged
June 16, 2006 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 02026 with
the following MODIFICATIONS:
(1) the penalty imposed on Gomez and Pepino shall be reduced from death to
reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole;
(2) they are jointly and severally ordered to pay the reduced amount of
P100,000.00 as moral damages;
(3) Gomez is further ordered to pay the victim P100,000.00 as civil indemnity;
and
 (4) the awarded amounts shall earn interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per
annum from the date of the finality of the Court's Decision until fully
paid.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-de Castro, Peralta, Del Castillo,
Perez, Mendoza, Reyes, Perlas-Bernabe and JJ., concur.
Bersamin, * Villarama, Jr., * JJ., took no part.
Leonen, J., see dissenting opinion.
Jardeleza, ** J., took no part due to prior OSG action.
||| (People v. Pepino y Rueras, G.R. No. 174471, [January 12, 2016], 777 PHIL 29-98)

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 190798. January 27, 2016.]

RONALD IBAÑEZ, EMILIO IBAÑEZ, and DANIEL "BOBOT"

IBAÑEZ, petitioners, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondent.

DECISION

PEREZ, J : p

On appeal is the September 25, 2009 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CR. No. 31285 which affirmed with modifications the July 17, 2007
Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 255 of Las Piñas City,
convicting Ronald Ibañez (Ronald), Emilio Ibañez (Emilio) and Daniel "Bobot"
Ibañez (Bobot) (collectively, petitioners) of the crime of frustrated homicide.
The Facts
For allegedly stoning, hitting and stabbing Rodolfo M. Lebria (Rodolfo), the
petitioners together with their co-accused, Boyet Ibañez (Boyet) and David Ibañez
(David), who have remained at large, were charged with the crime of frustrated
homicide in an Information 3 dated October 11, 2001. The accusatory portion thereof
reads:
"That on or about 15th day of July, 2001, in the City of Las Piñas,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, conspiring and confederating together, acting in common
 accord and mutually helping and aiding one another, with intent to kill and
without justifiable cause, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault, stone, hit with an spade and stab with bladed
weapons one RODOLFO M. LEBRIA, thereby inflicting upon him physical
injuries, thus performing all the acts of execution which would produce the
crime of Homicide as a consequence but which, nevertheless, did not produce
it by reason of causes independent of the will of the accused, that is, by the
timely and able medical assistance rendered to said RODOLFO M. LEBRIA,
which prevented his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW."
After posting their bail bond at P24,000.00 each, Ronald, Bobot and Emilio
were released on bail. 4 Arraignment of Ronald and Bobot was held on May 9, 2002.
Emilio was, in turn, arraigned on December 10, 2002. All the petitioners entered a
plea of not guilty to the crime charged. 5 After termination of pre-trial on April 23,
2003, 6 trial on the merits immediately followed. In the course of trial, two versions of
what transpired on the early morning of July 15, 2001 surfaced. These conflicting
versions of the incident, as culled from the records, are as follows:
Version of the Prosecution
In his narration, Rodolfo claimed that Ronald and his sons Emilio, Bobot,
Boyet and David were his neighbors in CAA, Las Piñas City. Rodolfo recalled that he
had visitors on the day of the incident. When his guests left at around 1:00 a.m. of
July 15, 2001, Rodolfo accompanied them outside his house. After about thirty
minutes and as he was about to go inside, Rodolfo noticed some garbage in front of
his house. Addressing nobody in particular, Rodolfo uttered in the vernacular "bakit
dito tinambak ang basura sa harap ng aking bahay na malawak naman ang
pagtataponan ng basura?" 7 Emilio and Boyet, who was then present and angered by
what they heard, threw stones at the private complainant hitting him twice on the
forehead. With blood oozing from his forehead, Rodolfo went inside his house to
cleanse his face obscured by blood and emerged again, this time, carrying a 2" x 2"
(dos por dos) piece of wood. Rodolfo was caught off guard when he was hit on the
head with a shovel by another accused, David. 8 Then, Ronald held Rodolfo,
rendering him helpless, as Boyet and Bobot simultaneously stabbed him in the
abdomen. 9 At this point, Rodolfo fell to the ground, lying flat and eventually lost
consciousness. When he regained consciousness, Rodolfo found himself at the Las
Piñas District Hospital (LPDH) but was later on transferred to the Philippine General
Hospital (PGH) for the much-needed surgical procedure. At the PGH, Rodolfo was
operated on, confined for nine days and incurred hospital expenses amounting to
P30,000.00. 10
PO2 Sulit testified that he was the investigating police officer who took the
statements of Rodolfo's daughter Ruth Ann Lebria (Ruth) and Rodolfo's wife,
Salvacion Lebria (Salvacion) when they went to the police station to complain about
the incident. PO2 Sulit disclosed that when he asked Ruth and Salvacion why Rodolfo
was not with them, he was informed that Rodolfo was still undergoing medication and
treatment for the injuries suffered from the petitioners. PO2 Sulit also testified that he
endorsed the complaint against the petitioners to the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Las Piñas for proper disposition. 11
To corroborate Rodolfo's testimony, the prosecution presented Ruth and
Salvacion as witnesses.
Ruth testified that she actually witnessed the entire incident which she admitted
was preceded by the utterance made by his father. 12 Her testimony on how Ronald,
Emilio, Bobot, Boyet and David ganged up on her father and who among them
stoned, hit, held and stabbed Rodolfo perfectly matched the latter's sworn
declarations. 13
Salvacion, who was also home on that fateful morning, confirmed the beating
and stabbing her husband endured in the hands of the petitioners and their co-accused.
Salvacion also submitted receipts in the total amount of P2,174.80, representing the
medical expenses incurred for the treatment of Rodolfo's injuries resulting from the
incident. 14CAIHTE

The prosecution presented the Medico-Legal Certificate issued by the Records

Division of the PGH showing that Rodolfo suffered multiple stab wounds in the
abdomen and underwent an exploratory laparotomy, 15 the standard surgery in
abdominal trauma cases involving life-threatening injuries. 16
Version of the Defense
To refute the accusations against them, the petitioners offered an entirely
different scenario.
Not only did he deny the allegations against him but Ronald even claimed that
he was the one who was stabbed by Rodolfo. Ronald averred that the incident
happened within the vicinity of his home, which was about four meters away from the
house of Rodolfo. 17 When Ronald heard Rodolfo shouting at around 2:00 a.m., he
tried pacifying Rodolfo by telling him that they would just talk later in the day.
Unappeased, Rodolfo allegedly destroyed the bicycle belonging to Ronald's son-in-
law. Rodolfo then attacked Ronald by stabbing him on his right arm. It was during
this time that Ronald's son, Bobot, came to his rescue but was prevented from doing
so as Bobot was also struck with a knife by Rodolfo. Ronald and his son instituted a
criminal complaint against Rodolfo for attempted homicide but nothing came out of
it. In support of his testimony, Ronald presented a picture taken the day after the
incident showing a slipper purportedly belonging to Rodolfo and a balisong. Ronald
further insisted that all the other accused were not around as they were residing
elsewhere at that crucial time.
Bobot testified that he immediately rushed outside his house, which is located
beside his father's, upon hearing Ronald shout, "Tulungan mo ako, ako'y sinaksak." 18
However, he was not able to save his father as he himself was stabbed twice with a
knife by Rodolfo. A struggle for the possession of the knife between Bobot and
Rodolfo ensued and in the process, the latter accidentally sustained a stab wound in
the abdomen. Still, Bobot asserted that it was Rodolfo who ran away from the scene
of the crime. Meanwhile, Ronald had already left for the nearby police detachment to
seek help.
Accused Emilio, for his part, interposed denial and alibi as his defenses. He
emphatically denied that he threw a stone at Rodolfo. On the date and time of the
incident, Emilio claimed that he was working overtime as a laborer in Moonwalk, Las
Piñas City, which is one kilometer away from the crime scene. He argued that he was
just unfortunately dragged into this case which had nothing to do with him at all. 19
The defense likewise proffered two medical certificates to support the
petitioners' claims. The July 15, 2001 medical certificate issued by Dr. Ma. Cecilia
Leyson (Dr. Leyson), of the Ospital ng Maynila, declared that Ronald's body bore
lacerations and hematoma at the time she attended to him. Nevertheless, Dr. Leyson
acknowledged that she had no idea how the injuries were sustained by Ronald. The
other medical certificate dated March 20, 2006 was issued by Dr. Renato Borja (Dr.
Borja), a physician affiliated with the Parañaque Community Hospital where Bobot
was taken after getting injured. Based on the hospital records, Dr. Borja testified that
Bobot had sustained wounds on the head and chest, possibly caused by a sharp
instrument. 20
Petitioners' Representation in the Trial Court Proceedings
In view of the petitioners' allegation that they were denied of right to counsel, a
narration of petitioners' representation in the trial court proceedings is imperative.
During the arraignment on May 9, 2002, Ronald and Bobot were assisted by
Atty. Bibiano Colasito, who was selected as their counsel de oficio only for that
occasion. At his arraignment on December 10, 2002, Emilio appeared with the
assistance of Atty. Antonio Manzano (Atty. Manzano), who was then appointed by
the trial court as counsel de oficio for all the accused. In the pre-trial conference that
followed, Atty. Manzano appeared for the petitioners. Atty. Manzano was informed
that the trial for the presentation of prosecution evidence was set on June 18, 2003.
Both Rodolfo and PO2 Sulit completed their respective testimonies during the
June 18, 2003 hearing. However, Atty. Manzano failed to appear at the said hearing
despite prior notice. Likewise, Ronald, one of the petitioners, absented himself from
the same hearing. As a result, the RTC issued the June 18, 2003 Order, 21 the pertinent
portion of which reads:
Due to the failure of Atty. Manzano to appear in today's proceeding
despite due notice and so as not to delay the proceedings herein, his right to
cross-examine the said two (2) witnesses is deemed waived. At the same time,
Atty. Manzano is hereby fined the amount of P2,000.00 for his absence in
today's proceedings despite the fact that the same has been previously set and
 known to him, without even filing any motion or pleading regarding his
inability to appear herein which clearly indicates a show of disrespect to the
authority of this Court.
Let a warrant of arrest be issued against accused Ronald Ibañez for
failing to appear in today's hearing despite notice and the bond posted by him
for his provisional liberty confiscated in favor of the government. As such, the
bondsman BF General Insurance Company, Inc., is hereby directed to produce
the body of the said accused within thirty (30) days from receipt of this Order
and to show cause why no judgment should be rendered against the bond.
The Director of the National Bureau of Investigation and the Director
of the Criminal Investigation Service Command, PNP, Camp Crame, are
hereby directed to explain within five (5) days from receipt of this Order why
the warrants of arrest issued against Boyet Ibañez and David Ibañez remain
unimplemented and/or no return submitted to this Court.
Thereafter, Atty. Manzano withdrew as petitioners' counsel de oficio. In its
Order 22 dated September 3, 2003, the trial court appointed Atty. Gregorio Cañeda, Jr.
(Atty. Cañeda) as the new counsel de oficio of the petitioners. On the same date, Atty.
Cañeda conducted the cross-examination of Ruth and even expressed his desire to
continue with the cross-examination of said witness on the next scheduled hearing. In
the hearing of September 17, 2003, Atty. Cañeda appeared for the petitioners but
Bobot and Emilio did not show up. This prompted the trial court to issue the
corresponding warrants for their arrest and the bonds posted by them for their
provisional liberty were ordered confiscated in favor of the government. Despite the
continued absence of his clients, Atty. Cañeda religiously attended the succeeding
hearings. On November 5, 2003, upon his request, the trial court relieved Atty.
Cañeda of his designation as counsel de oficio for the petitioners. DETACa

Per the trial court's Order 23 dated February 10, 2004, Atty. Ma. Teresita C.
Pantua (Atty. Pantua), of the Public Attorney's Office, was designated as the
petitioners' counsel de oficio. However, Atty. Pantua's designation was recalled upon
her manifestation that she had previously assisted Rodolfo in initiating the present
case. In her stead, the trial court appointed the petitioners' current counsel de oficio,
Atty. Juan Sindingan (Atty. Sindingan).
Since then, Atty. Sindingan has been representing the petitioners. With his
help, all three petitioners finally appeared before the trial court on May 5, 2005. Atty.
Sindingan handled the cross-examination of another prosecution witness, Salvacion,
as well as the presentation of evidence for the defense.
After both parties had rested their case, they were required to submit their
respective memoranda in thirty (30) days. Atty. Sindingan submitted the
Memorandum for the petitioners while no memorandum was ever filed by the
prosecution. Thereafter, the case was deemed submitted for decision.
The RTC's Ruling
 The RTC accorded more weight to the positive testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses over the declarations of the defense, thus, the dispositive portion of its
judgment reads:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the Court finds accused
Ronald Ibañez, Emilio Ibañez and Daniel "Bobot" Ibañez GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of frustrated homicide and hereby sentences
them to each suffer the penalty of imprisonment of SIX (6) YEARS AND
ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor, as minimum, up to EIGHT (8) YEARS of
prision mayor, as maximum, as well as to suffer the accessory penalties
provided for by law.
Also, accused Ronald Ibañez, Emilio Ibañez and Daniel "Bobot"
Ibañez are ordered to pay to private complainant or victim Rodolfo Lebria the
sum of P2,174.80 representing his actual medical expenses.
With costs de officio.
SO ORDERED. 24
The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the RTC Decision but this
was denied in an Order 25 dated October 11, 2007. Undaunted, the petitioners elevated
their case to the CA. They faulted the trial court for totally disregarding their claim
that Rodolfo was the aggressor and for not recognizing that Bobot was merely acting
in self-defense when Rodolfo was stabbed. The petitioners also asserted that they
were deprived of their constitutional right to counsel.
The CA's Ruling
The CA agreed with the trial court's judgment of conviction but modified the
penalty imposed. The appellate court sentenced the petitioners to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight
(8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum. The CA also found it proper
to award P15,000.00 as temperate damages and P30,000.00 as moral damages to
Rodolfo. The petitioners sought a reconsideration of the CA's decision. Still, their
motion was denied in the Resolution 26 of December 28, 2009.
The Issue
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari raising the lone issue of
whether the petitioners were deprived of their constitutionally guaranteed right to
counsel.
The Court's Ruling
The Court sustains the conviction of the petitioners with modification.
No Deprivation of Right to Counsel
The right invoked by the petitioners is premised upon Article III, Section 14 of
the Constitution which states that:
 Section 14. (1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal
offense without due process of law.
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by
himself and counsel, . . . .
Guided by the constitutionally guaranteed right of an accused to counsel and
pursuant to its rule-making authority, the Court, in promulgating the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, adopted the following provisions:
Rule 115, SEC. 1. Rights of accused at the trial. — In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall be entitled to the following rights:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) To be present and defend in person and by counsel at every stage of
the proceedings, from arraignment to promulgation of the judgment. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Rule 116 of the same Rules makes it mandatory for the trial court to
designate a counsel de oficio for the accused in the absence of private
representation. It provides:
aDSIHc

SEC. 6. Duty of court to inform accused of his right to counsel. —

Before arraignment, the court shall inform the accused of his right to counsel
and ask him if he desires to have one. Unless the accused is allowed to defend
himself in person or has employed counsel of his choice, the court must assign
a counsel de officio to defend him.
SEC. 7. Appointment of counsel de officio. — The court, considering
the gravity of the offense and the difficulty of the questions that may arise,
shall appoint as counsel de officio such members of the bar in good standing
who, by reason of their experience and ability, can competently defend the
accused. But in localities where such members of the bar are not available, the
court may appoint any person, resident of the province and of good repute for
probity and ability, to defend the accused.
The right to be assisted by counsel is an indispensable component of due
process in criminal prosecution. 27 As such, right to counsel is one of the most
sacrosanct rights available to the accused. 28 A deprivation of the right to counsel
strips the accused of an equality in arms resulting in the denial of a level playing field.
29 Simply put, an accused without counsel is essentially deprived of a fair hearing
which is tantamount to a grave denial of due process. 30
On the basis of this ratiocination and as a last ditch effort to be exculpated, the
petitioners insisted that they were denied of their right to counsel when their counsel
de oficio failed to appear on the June 18, 2003 trial court hearing during which
Rodolfo and PO2 Sulit gave their testimonies. As a consequence, the petitioners
argued that they were divested of the opportunity to cross-examine the said two
prosecution witnesses.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), for its part, disputed the petitioners'
claim that they were deprived of their constitutional right to counsel. In their May 5,
2010 Comment 31 on the instant petition, the OSG pointed out that since the beginning
of the proceedings in the trial court until the filing of the present petition before this
Court, three (3) counsel de oficio were appointed and represented the petitioners 32
and to which designation the latter did not raise any protest. 33 The OSG opined that
the trial court judge made sure that the petitioners were adequately assisted by a
counsel de oficio when they failed to engage the services of a lawyer of their own
choice. Thus, the OSG recommended the dismissal of the petition.
The Court agrees with the position taken by the OSG.
There was no denial of right to counsel as evinced by the fact that the
petitioners were not only assisted by a counsel de oficio during arraignment and pre-
trial but more so, their counsel de oficio actively participated in the proceedings
before the trial court including the direct and cross-examination of the witnesses. 34
As aptly found by the CA, the petitioners were duly represented by a counsel de
oficio all throughout the proceedings except for one hearing when their court
appointed lawyer was absent and Rodolfo and PO2 Sulit presented their testimonies.
35 As previously stated, it was during said hearing when the trial court declared that
the cross-examination of the said two prosecution witnesses was deemed waived.
Mere opportunity and not actual cross-examination is the essence of the right
to cross-examine. 36 The case of Savory Luncheonette v. Lakas ng Manggagawang
Pilipino, et al. thoroughly explained the meaning and substance of right to cross-
examine as an integral component of due process with a colatilla that the same right
may be expressly or impliedly waived, to quote:
The right of a party to confront and cross-examine opposing witnesses
in a judicial litigation, be it criminal or civil in nature, or in proceedings
before administrative tribunals with quasi-judicial powers, is a fundamental
right which is part of due process. However, the right is a personal one which
may be waived expressly or impliedly, by conduct amounting to a
renunciation of the right of cross-examination. Thus, where a party has had
the opportunity to cross-examine a witness but failed to avail himself of it, he
necessarily forfeits the right to cross-examine and the testimony given on
direct examination of the witness will be received or allowed to remain in the
record. 37
Such is the scenario in the present case where the reason why Rodolfo and PO2
Sulit were not subjected to cross-examination was not because the petitioners were
not given opportunity to do so. Noticeably, the petitioners' counsel de oficio omitted
to mention that in the June 18, 2003 hearing, Ronald, one of the accused, did not show
up despite prior notice. Thus, the bail bond posted for his provisional liberty was
ordered confiscated in favor of the government. Ironically, Ronald comes to this
Court asserting the very right he seemingly waived and abandoned for not attending
the scheduled hearing without justifiable cause. Moreover, neither did the petitioners
interpose any objection to the presentation of testimony of the prosecution witnesses
during the June 18, 2003 hearing nor did their counsel de oficio subsequently seek a
reconsideration of the June 18, 2003 Order.
Further, the trial court judge, when he issued the June 18, 2003 Order, was
merely exercising a judicial prerogative. No proof was presented by the defense
showing that the exercise of such discretion was either despotic or arbitrary.
Going by the records, there is no indication that any of the counsel de oficio
had been negligent in protecting the petitioners' interests. As a matter of fact, the
counsel de oficio kept on attending the trial court hearings in representation of the
petitioners despite the latter's unjustified absences.
In sum, the Court is not persuaded that the absence of the counsel de oficio in
one of the hearings of this case amounts to a denial of right to counsel. Nor does such
absence warrant the nullification of the entire trial court proceedings and the eventual
invalidation of its ruling. In People v. Manalo, the Court held that the fact that a
particular counsel de oficio did not or could not consistently appear in all the
hearings of the case, is effectively a denial of the right to counsel, especially so
where, as in the instant case, there is no showing that the several appointed counsel
de oficio in any way neglected to perform their duties to the appellant and to the trial
court and that the defense had suffered in any substantial sense therefrom. 38 ETHIDa

Guilt Proven Beyond Reasonable Doubt

At any rate, the factual findings of the RTC as affirmed by the CA, which are
backed up by substantial evidence on record, led this Court to no other conclusion
than that the petitioners are guilty of frustrated homicide.
The elements of frustrated homicide are: (1) the accused intended to kill his
victim, as manifested by his use of a deadly weapon in his assault; (2) the victim
sustained fatal or mortal wound/s but did not die because of timely medical
assistance; and (3) none of the qualifying circumstance for murder under Article 248
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is present. 39 There being no prior
determination by both the trial and appellate courts of any qualifying circumstance
that would elevate the homicide to murder, the Court will simply limit its discussion
to the first two elements.
In ascertaining whether intent to kill exists, the Court considers the presence of
the following factors: (1) the means used by the malefactors; (2) the nature, location
and number of wounds sustained by the victim; (3) the conduct of the malefactors
before, during, or immediately after the killing of the victim; and (4) the
circumstances under which the crime was committed and the motives of the accused.
40
 Here, intent to kill Rodolfo was evident in the manner in which he was
attacked, by the concerted actions of the accused, the weapon used and the nature of
wounds sustained by Rodolfo.
Both the RTC and CA correctly appreciated the presence of conspiracy.
Conspiracy presupposes unity of purpose and unity of action towards the realization
of an unlawful objective among the accused. 41 Its existence can be inferred from the
individual acts of the accused, which if taken as a whole are in fact related, and
indicative of a concurrence of sentiment. 42 In this case, conspiracy was manifested in
the spontaneous and coordinated acts of the accused, where two of them delivered the
initial attack on Rodolfo by stoning, while another struck him with a shovel and the
third held him so that the other two can simultaneously stab Rodolfo. It was only
when Rodolfo laid helpless on the ground and had lost consciousness that the accused
hurriedly left the scene. This chain of events leading to the commission of the crime
adequately established a conspiracy among them.
Plainly, the kind of weapon used for the attack, in this case, a knife and the
vital parts of Rodolfo's body at which he was undeniably stabbed demonstrated
petitioners' intent to kill. The medico-legal certificate revealed that Rodolfo sustained
multiple stab wounds in the epigastrium, left upper quadrant of the abdomen resulting
to internal injuries in the transverse colon (serosal), mesentery and left kidney. 43
Given these injuries, Rodolfo would have succumbed to death if not for the
emergency surgical intervention.
With respect to the petitioners' defenses of denial and alibi, the Court concurs
with the lower courts' rejection of these defenses. An assessment of the defenses of
denial and alibi necessitates looking into the credibility of witnesses and their
testimonies. Well-settled is the rule that in determining who between the prosecution
and defense witnesses are to be believed, the evaluation of the trial court is accorded
much respect for the simple reason that the trial court is in a better position to observe
the demeanor of the witnesses as they deliver their testimonies. 44 As such, the
findings of the trial court is accorded finality unless it has overlooked substantial facts
which if properly considered, could alter the result of the case. 45
In the instant case, the Court finds no cogent reason to deviate from this rule
considering the credibility of the prosecution witnesses.
The trial and appellate courts were right in not giving probative value to
petitioners' denial. Denial is an intrinsically weak defense that further crumbles when
it comes face-to-face with the positive identification and straightforward narration of
the prosecution witnesses. 46 Between an affirmative assertion which has a ring of
truth to it and a general denial, the former generally prevails. 47 The prosecution
witnesses recounted the details of the crime in a clear, detailed and consistent manner,
without any hint of hesitation or sign of untruthfulness, which they could not have
done unless they genuinely witnessed the incident. Besides, the prosecution witnesses
could not have mistakenly identified the petitioners as Rodolfo's perpetrators
considering there is so much familiarity among them. The records are also bereft of
any indication that the prosecution witnesses were actuated by ill motives when they
testified against the petitioners. Thus, their testimonies are entitled to full faith and
credit.
In contrast, the petitioners' testimonies are self-serving and contrary to human
reason and experience.
The Court notes that the defense presented no witnesses, other than themselves,
who had actually seen the incident and could validate their story. Additionally, aside
from the medical certificates of Ronald and that of Bobot which was issued almost
five (5) years since the incident occurred, the defense have not submitted any credible
proof that could efficiently rebut the prosecution's evidence.
Further, the Court finds it contrary to human reason and experience that
Ronald, would just leave his son Bobot, while the latter was being stabbed and
struggling for the possession of the knife with Rodolfo, to go to a police station for
assistance. Logic dictates that a father would not abandon a son in the presence of
actual harm.
For the defense of alibi to prosper, the petitioners must not only prove by clear
and convincing evidence that he was at another place at the time of the commission of
the offense but that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the
crime. 48 Emilio himself admitted that he was just one kilometer away from the crime
scene when the incident happened during the unholy hour of 1:00 a.m. of July 15,
2001. As such, Emilio failed to prove physical impossibility of his being at the crime
scene on the date and time in question. Just like denial, alibi is an inherently weak
defense that cannot prevail over the positive identification by the witnesses of the
petitioners as the perpetrators of the crime. 49 In the present case, Emilio was
positively identified by the prosecution witnesses as one of the assailants. Moreover,
alibi becomes less credible if offered by the accused himself and his immediate
relatives as they are expected to make declarations in his favor, 50 as in this case,
where Emilio, his father and brother insisted that the former was somewhere else
when the incident occurred. For these reasons, Emilio's defense of alibi will not hold.
cSEDTC

Anent Bobot's claim of self-defense, it is undeserving of any serious

consideration or credence. Basic is the rule that the person asserting self-defense must
admit that he inflicted an injury on another person in order to defend himself. 51 Here,
there is nothing on record that will show that Bobot categorically admitted that he
wounded Rodolfo.
Based on the foregoing, the Court upholds the trial and appellate courts'
conviction of the petitioners for frustrated homicide.
Penalty and Civil Liability
 Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the imposable penalty for
homicide is reclusion temporal. Article 50 of the same Code states that the imposable
penalty upon principals of a frustrated crime shall be the penalty next lower in degree
than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony. Hence, frustrated homicide is
punishable by prision mayor. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, there being
no aggravating or mitigating circumstances present in this case, the minimum penalty
to be meted on the petitioners should be anywhere within the range of six (6) months
and one (1) day to six (6) years of prision correccional and the maximum penalty
should be taken from the medium period of prision mayor ranging from eight (8)
years and one (1) day to ten (10) years. Thus, the imposition by the CA of
imprisonment of six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, is proper.
As regards the civil liability of the petitioners, the Court sustains the award of
moral and temperate damages with modification as to the latter's amount.
Pursuant to Article 2224 of the Civil Code,temperate damages may be
recovered when some pecuniary loss has been suffered but the amount of which
cannot be proven with certainty. In People v. Villanueva 52 and Serrano v. People, 53
the Court ruled that in case the amount of actual damages, as proven by receipts
during trial is less than P25,000.00, the victim shall be entitled to P25,000.00
temperate damages, in lieu of actual damages of a lesser amount. In the instant case,
only the amount of P2,174.80 was supported by receipts. Following the prevailing
jurisprudence, the Court finds it necessary to increase the temperate damages from
P15,000.00 to P25,000.00.
The award of moral damages is justified under Article 2219 of the Civil Code
as Rodolfo sustained physical injuries which were the proximate effect of the
petitioners' criminal offense. As the amount is left to the discretion of the court, moral
damages should be reasonably proportional and approximate to the degree of the
injury caused and the gravity of the wrong done. 54 In light of the attendant
circumstances in the case, the Court affirms that P30,000.00 is a fair and reasonable
grant of moral damages.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Court of Appeals Decision dated September 25,
2009 in CA-G.R. CR. No. 31285 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
Petitioners RONALD IBAÑEZ, EMILIO IBAÑEZ and DANIEL "BOBOT"
IBAÑEZ are found guilty of frustrated homicide and sentenced to a prison term of six
(6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor, as maximum. They are also ordered to pay RODOLFO LEBRIA
Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) as temperate damages and Thirty
Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr., Peralta, Reyes and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.
 Footnotes

||| (Ibañez v. People, G.R. No. 190798, [January 27, 2016], 779 PHIL 436-462)

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 167710. June 5, 2009.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. JOVEN DE

GRANO, ARMANDO DE GRANO, DOMINGO LANDICHO and
ESTANISLAO LACABA, respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J : p

This is a petition for review on certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
seeking to annul and set aside the Resolutions 1 dated January 25, 2005 and April 5,
2005, issued by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 88160.
The antecedents are as follows:
On November 28, 1991, an Information for murder committed against
Emmanuel Mendoza was filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 6,
Tanauan, Batangas, against Joven de Grano (Joven), Armando de Grano (Armando),
and Estanislao Lacaba (Estanislao), together with their co-accused Leonides Landicho
(Leonides), Domingo Landicho (Domingo), and Leonardo Genil (Leonardo), who
were at-large. 2 It was docketed as Criminal Case No. 2730, the pertinent portion of
which reads:

That on April 21, 1991, between 9:00 o'clock and 10:00 o'clock in the
evening, in Barangay Balakilong, [M]unicipality of Laurel, [P]rovince of
Batangas, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, all the above
named accused, conspiring, confederating, and helping one another, motivated
by common design and intent to kill, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully,
and feloniously, and by means of treachery and with evident premeditation,
shoot EMMANUEL MENDOZA with firearms, inflicting upon him eight
gunshot wounds and causing his death thereby, thus committing the crime of
MURDER to the damage and prejudice of his heirs in the amount as the
Honorable Court shall determine. 3
 Duly arraigned, Joven, Armando, and Estanislao pleaded "not guilty" to the
crime as charged; while their co-accused Leonides, Leonardo, and Domingo remained
at-large. Thereafter, respondents filed a motion for bail contending that the
prosecution's evidence was not strong. 4
Meanwhile, considering that one of the accused was the incumbent Mayor of
Laurel, Batangas at the time when the crime was committed, Senior State Prosecutor
Hernani T. Barrios moved that the venue be transferred from the RTC, Branch 6,
Tanauan, Batangas to any RTC in Manila. Consequently, the case was transferred to
the RTC Manila for re-raffling amongst its Branches. The case was re-docketed as
Criminal Case No. 93-129988 and was initially re-raffled to Branches 6, 9, and 11
before being finally raffled to Branch 27, RTC, Manila. 5EDCTIa

Before transferring the case to the RTC, Branch 27, Manila, the trial court
deferred the resolution of respondents' motion for bail and allowed the prosecution to
present evidence. Thereafter, the hearing of the application for bail ensued, wherein
the prosecution presented Teresita and Dr. Leonardo Salvador. After finding that the
prosecution's evidence to prove treachery and evident premeditation was not strong,
the RTC, Branch 11, Manila, granted respondents' motion for bail. A motion for
reconsideration was filed, but it was denied. 6
The prosecution then filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 41110, which was denied. Aggrieved, they sought recourse before
this Court in G.R. No. 129604. In a Resolution dated July 12, 1999, this Court granted
the petition and set aside the decision of the CA together with the Order of the RTC
granting bail to the respondents. The RTC was also ordered to immediately issue a
warrant of arrest against the accused. The resolution was also qualified to be
immediately executory. 7 As a result, Estanislao was re-arrested, but Joven and
Armando were not. 8
However, upon respondents' motion for reconsideration, this Court, in a
Resolution dated September 4, 2001, resolved to remand the case to the RTC. We
noted that, in view of the transmittal of the records of the case to this Court in
connection with the petition, the trial court deferred the rendition of its decision.
Consequently, the case was remanded to the RTC for further proceedings, including
the rendition of its decision on the merits.
After the presentation of the parties' respective sets of evidence, the RTC
rendered a Decision 9 dated April 25, 2002, finding several accused guilty of the
offense as charged, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, CONSIDERING ALL THE FOREGOING, this Court

finds the accused JOVEN DE GRANO, ARMANDO DE GRANO, DOMINGO
LANDICHO and ESTANISLAO LACABA, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of MURDER, qualified by treachery, and there being no modifying
circumstance attendant, hereby sentences them to suffer the penalty of
 Reclusion Perpetua, and to indemnify the heirs of Emmanuel Mendoza the sum
of P50,000.00 and to pay the costs.

The case as against accused Leonides Landicho and Leonardo Genil is

hereby sent to the files or archived cases to be revived as soon as said accused
are apprehended.

Let alias warrants of arrest be issued against accused Leonardo Genil

and Leonides Landicho.

Only Estanislao was present at the promulgation despite due notice to the other
respondents.
Respondents, thru counsel, then filed a Joint Motion for Reconsideration dated
May 8, 2002, praying that the Decision dated April 25, 2002 be reconsidered and set
aside and a new one be entered acquitting them based on the following grounds, to
wit:

1. The Honorable Court erred in basing the decision of conviction of all

accused solely on the biased, uncorroborated and baseless testimony of Teresita
Duran, the common-law wife of the victim;

2. The Honorable Court erred in not giving exculpatory weight to the

evidence adduced by the defense, which was amply corroborated on material
points;

3. The Honorable Court erred in not finding that the failure of the
prosecution to present rebuttal evidence renders the position of the defense
unrebutted;

4. The Honorable Court erred in adopting conditional or preliminary

finding of treachery of the Supreme Court in its Resolution dated July 12, 1999;
and

5. The Honorable Court erred in rendering a verdict [sic] of conviction

despite the fact that the guilt of all the accused were not proven beyond
reasonable doubt. 10

In its Opposition, the prosecution pointed out that while the accused jointly
moved for the reconsideration of the decision, all of them, except Estanislao, were at-
large. Having opted to become fugitives and be beyond the judicial ambit, they lost
their right to file such motion for reconsideration and to ask for whatever relief from
the court. 11
Acting on respondents' motion for reconsideration, the RTC issued an Order 12
dated April 15, 2004 modifying its earlier decision by acquitting Joven and Armando,
and downgrading the conviction of Domingo and Estanislao from murder to
homicide. The decretal portion of the Order reads:

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court

modifies its decision and finds accused DOMINGO LANDICHO and
ESTANISLAO LACABA, "GUILTY" beyond reasonable doubt, as principal
of the crime of Homicide, and in default of any modifying circumstance,
sentences them to an indeterminate prison term of SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1)
DAY of Prision Mayor, as minimum, to TWELVE YEARS [and] ONE DAY of
Reclusion Temporal, as maximum. Said accused shall be credited with the full
period of their preventive imprisonment pursuant to B.P. Blg. 85.

Accused ARMANDO DE GRANO and JOVEN DE GRANO are

hereby ACQUITTED on the basis of reasonable doubt. They are likewise
declared free of any civil liability.

To the extent herein altered or modified, the Decision dated April 25,
2002 stands.

SO ORDERED. 13 DSAEIT

Estanislao filed a Notice of Appeal, while the prosecution sought

reconsideration of the Order arguing that:

1. There was absolutely no basis for this Court to have taken cognizance of the
"Joint Motion for Reconsideration" dated May 8, 2002, citing Sec. 6,
Rule 120 of the Rules of Court.

2. The testimony of Teresita Duran deserves credence. The delay in the taking
of Ms. Duran's written statement of the events she witnessed is
understandable considering that Joven de Grano was the mayor of the
municipality where the crime was committed and that another accused,
Estanislao Lacaba, was a policeman in the same municipality.

3. The crime committed is murder.

4. Accused Armando de Grano and Joven de Grano participated in the

conspiracy.

On September 28, 2004, the RTC issued an Order 14 denying the motion and
giving due course to Estanislao's notice of appeal.
Petitioner, thru Assistant City Prosecutor Cesar Glorioso of the Office of the
Manila City Prosecutor, with the assistance of private prosecutor Atty. Michael E.
David, filed a Petition 15 for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the
CA arguing that:
 (a) the private respondents, having deliberately evaded arrest after being denied
bail and deliberately failing to attend the promulgation of the Decision
despite due notice, lost the right to move for reconsideration of their
conviction; and

(b) the grounds relied upon by respondent RTC in modifying its Decision are
utterly erroneous. 16

Petitioner alleged that it had no other plain, adequate, and speedy remedy,
considering that the State could not appeal a judgment of acquittal. However, by way
of exception, a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case may be assailed in a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court upon a showing by the petitioner
that the lower court, in acquitting the accused, committed not only reversible errors of
judgment, but also grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, or a denial of due process, thus rendering the assailed judgment void.
Consequently, the accused cannot be considered at risk of double jeopardy. 17
Respondent de Grano filed a Motion to Dismiss, 18 arguing that the
verification and certification portion of the petition was flawed, since it was signed
only by counsel and not by the aggrieved party. Also, the petition did not contain the
conformity of the Solicitor General. 19

On January 31, 2005, petitioner, through the private prosecutor, filed an

Opposition to Motion to Dismiss. 20 Petitioner explained that, for lack of material
time, it failed to secure the conformity of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
when it filed the petition, but it would nevertheless obtain it. A day after filing the
petition, the private prosecutor sought the OSG's conformity in a letter 21 dated
January 12, 2005. The OSG, in turn, informed the private prosecutor that rather than
affixing its belated conformity, it would rather await the initial resolution of the CA.
22 Also, so as not to preempt the action of the Department of Justice (DOJ) on the
case, the OSG instructed the private prosecutor to secure the necessary endorsement
from the DOJ for it to pursue the case. Anent the verification and certification of the
petition having been signed by the private prosecutor, petitioner explained that private
complainant Teresita was in fear for her life as a result of the acquittal of former
Mayor Joven de Grano, but she was willing to certify the petition should she be given
ample time to travel to Manila. 23
However, in a Resolution 24 dated January 25, 2005, which was received by
the petitioner on the same day it filed its Opposition or on January 31, 2005, the
petition was dismissed outright by the CA on the grounds that it was not filed by the
OSG and that the assailed Orders were only photocopies and not certified true copies.
The dispositive portion of the Resolution reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this petition is hereby

OUTRIGHTLY DISMISSED.
 Petitioner timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration. 25 In addition to the
justifications it raised in its earlier Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, petitioner
argued that the petition was not only signed by the private prosecutor, it was also
signed by the prosecutor who represented the petitioner in the criminal proceedings
before the trial court. Petitioner also maintains that the certified true copies of the
assailed Orders were accidentally attached to its file copy instead of the one it
submitted. To rectify the mistake, it attached the certified true copies of the assailed
Orders. 26 This was opposed by the respondents in their Comment/Opposition to
Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. 27
Meanwhile, in its 1st Indorsement 28 dated March 15, 2005, DOJ Secretary
Raul M. Gonzalez, endorsed the petition filed by the Assistant City Prosecutor, with
the assistance of the private prosecutor, to the Solicitor General for his conformity.
On April 5, 2005, the CA issued a Resolution 29 denying the motion, thus:

WHEREFORE, petitioner's motion for reconsideration is hereby

DENIED.

In denying the motion, the CA opined that the rule on double jeopardy
prohibits the state from appealing or filing a petition for review of a judgment of
acquittal that was based on the merits of the case. If there is an acquittal, an appeal
therefrom, if it will not put the accused in double jeopardy, on the criminal aspect,
may be undertaken only by the State through the Solicitor General. It added that a
special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court may be filed by
the person aggrieved. In such case, the aggrieved parties are the State and the private
offended party or complainant. Moreover, the records reveal that the petition was not
filed in the name of the offended party; and worse, the verification and certification of
non-forum shopping attached to the petition was signed not by the private offended
party, but by her counsel. Notwithstanding the efforts exerted by the petitioner to
secure the confirmation of the OSG and the endorsement of the DOJ, there is no
showing of any subsequent participation of the OSG in the case. IcHSCT

Hence, the petition raising the following issues:

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE

ERROR AND GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK
OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT DISMISSED THE PETITION
FOR CERTIORARI ON THE GROUND OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY.

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE

ERROR AND GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK
OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT DISMISSED THE PETITION
FOR CERTIORARI FOR NOT HAVING BEEN FILED BY THE OFFICE OF
THE SOLICITOR GENERAL NOR IN THE NAME OF THE OFFENDED
PARTY.
 WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR AND GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT DISMISSED
THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI ON THE GROUND THAT THE
VERIFICATION AND CERTIFICATION ATTACHED TO THE PETITION
WAS SIGNED BY THE PRIVATE COUNSEL AND NOT BY THE
OFFENDED PARTY. 30

Petitioner, through the Solicitor General, argues that, except for Estanislao,
none of the respondents appeared at the promulgation of the Decision. Neither did
they surrender after promulgation of the judgment of conviction, nor filed a motion
for leave to avail themselves of the judicial remedies against the decision, stating the
reasons for their absence. The trial court thus had no authority to take cognizance of
the joint motion for reconsideration filed by the respondents as stated in Section 6,
Rule 120 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. As such, the RTC
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Having been issued without jurisdiction, the Order dated April 15, 2004 is void.
Consequently, no double jeopardy attached to such void Order. The CA, therefore,
committed reversible error when it dismissed the petition for certiorari on the ground
of double jeopardy. 31
Petitioner also contends that, with the endorsement of the DOJ and the letter of
the OSG manifesting its intention to pursue the petition, the OSG had in fact
conformed to the filing of the petition and agreed to pursue the same. Had the CA
given the OSG ample time to file the necessary pleading, the petition would not have
been dismissed for the reason that it was filed by the said office. 32
With respect to the verification and certification of non-forum shopping,
petitioner invokes a liberal application of the Rules for private complainant's failure to
personally sign it. Petitioner maintains that out of extreme fear arising from the
unexpected acquittal of Joven, private complainant was reluctant to travel to Manila.
After she was taken out of the witness protection program, she took refuge in the
Visayas and she was there at the time her signature was required. Since the period for
filing the petition for certiorari was about to lapse, and it could not be filed without
the verification and certification of non-forum shopping, the private prosecutor was
left with no option but so * sign it, instead of allowing the deadline to pass without
filing the petition. 33
Moreover, petitioner maintains that the OSG has the authority to sign the
verification and certification of the present petition, because the real party-in-interest
is the OSG itself as the representative of the State. 34
On their part, respondents contend that the petition for certiorari questioning
the order of acquittal is not allowed and is contrary to the principle of double
jeopardy. Respondents argue that, contrary to the OSG's contention, respondents
Joven and Domingo's absence during the promulgation of the Decision dated April
25, 2002 did not deprive the trial court of its authority to resolve their Joint Motion
for Reconsideration, considering that one of the accused, Estanislao, was present
during the promulgation. 35
Joven, Armando, and Domingo maintain that while they were not present
during the promulgation of the RTC Decision, Estanislao, who was under police
custody, attended the promulgation of the said Decision. Thus, when they filed their
Joint Motion for Reconsideration, which included that of Estanislao, the RTC was not
deprived of its authority to resolve the joint motion. 36
Respondents insist that the CA properly dismissed the petition for certiorari, as
it was not instituted by the OSG on behalf of the People of the Philippines, and that
the verification and certification portion thereof was not signed by private
complainant Teresita. 37
Respondents also argue that the petition for certiorari before this Court should
be dismissed, since the verification and certification thereof were signed by a solicitor
of the OSG, not private complainant.
The petition is meritorious.
Before considering the merits of the petition, we will first address the technical
objections raised by respondents.
As regards the issue of the signatory of the verification and certification of
non-forum shopping, a liberal application of the Rules should be applied to the
present case.
The purpose of requiring a verification is to secure an assurance that the
allegations in the petition have been made in good faith; or are true and correct, not
merely speculative. This requirement is simply a condition affecting the form of
pleadings, and noncompliance therewith does not necessarily render it fatally
defective. 38 Truly, verification is only a formal, not a jurisdictional, requirement.
Hence, it was sufficient that the private prosecutor signed the verification. SDAaTC

With respect to the certification of non-forum shopping, it has been held that
the certification requirement is rooted in the principle that a party-litigant shall not be
allowed to pursue simultaneous remedies in different fora, as this practice is
detrimental to an orderly judicial procedure. 39 However, this Court has relaxed,
under justifiable circumstances, the rule requiring the submission of such certification
considering that although it is obligatory, it is not jurisdictional. 40 Not being
jurisdictional, it can be relaxed under the rule of substantial compliance.
In Donato v. Court of Appeals 41 and Wee v. Galvez, 42 the Court noted that
the petitioners were already in the United States; thus, the signing of the certification
by their authorized representatives was deemed sufficient compliance with the Rules.
In Sy Chin v. Court of Appeals, 43 the Court upheld substantial justice and ruled that
the failure of the parties to sign the certification may be overlooked, as the parties'
case was meritorious. In Torres v. Specialized Packaging Development Corporation,
44 the Court also found, among other reasons, that the extreme difficulty to secure all
the required signatures and the apparent merits of the substantive aspects of the case
constitute compelling reasons for allowing the petition.
In Ortiz v. Court of Appeals 45 and similar rulings, the following has always
been pointed out:

The attestation contained in the certification on non-forum shopping

requires personal knowledge by the party who executed the same. To merit the
Court’s consideration, petitioners here must show reasonable cause for failure
to personally sign the certification. The petitioners must convince the court that
the outright dismissal of the petition would defeat the administration of justice.

Thus, petitioners need only show that there was reasonable cause for the failure
to sign the certification against forum shopping, and that the outright dismissal of the
petition would defeat the administration of justice. 46
We find that the particular circumstances of this case advance valid reasons for
private complainant's failure to sign the certification. As pointed out in the petition, it
was out of extreme fear that private complainant failed to personally sign the
certification. It is to be noted that when Armando and Joven were acquitted, Teresita
was already out of the witness protection program and was in hiding in the Visayas.
As such, she could not travel to Manila to personally sign the petition. Moreover, as
maintained by the petitioner, since the period for filing the petition for certiorari was
about to lapse, the private prosecutor was left with no option but to sign the
verification and certification, instead of allowing the period to file the petition to pass
without it being filed. A relaxation of the procedural rules, considering the particular
circumstances, is justified. The requirement was thus substantially complied with.
As summarized in Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Court of Appeals, 47 when
a strict and literal application of the rules on non-forum shopping and verification
would result in a patent denial of substantial justice, they may be liberally construed.
An unforgiving application of the pertinent provisions of the Rules will not be given
premium if it would impede rather than serve the best interests of justice in the light
of the prevailing circumstances in the case under consideration.
We reiterate our holding in City Warden of the Manila City Jail v. Estrella, 48
that the signature of the Solicitor General on the verification and certification of non-
forum shopping in a petition before the CA or with this Court is substantial
compliance with the requirement under the Rules, considering that the OSG is the
legal representative of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and its
agencies and instrumentalities; more so, in a criminal case where the People or the
State is the real party-in-interest and is the aggrieved party. 49
Also, respondents' contention that there is no showing of any subsequent
participation of the OSG in the petition before the CA does not hold water. In the
letter dated January 18, 2004, the OSG instructed the private prosecutor to secure the
necessary endorsement from the DOJ for it to pursue the case. In its 1st Indorsement
dated March 15, 2005, DOJ Secretary Raul M. Gonzalez, endorsed the petition to the
Solicitor General for his conformity. When the CA denied petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration for its outright dismissal of the petition, the OSG filed motions 50 for
extension of time to file the present petition. Moreover, the OSG filed a Comment 51
on respondents' Motion for Reconsideration. 52 Thus, any doubt regarding the
endorsement, conformity, and participation of the OSG in the petitions is dispelled.
Now on the substantive aspect.
A peculiar situation exists in the instant case. Petitioner has sought recourse
before the CA, via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, from an Order of the trial
court drastically modifying its earlier findings convicting the respondents of the crime
of murder, by acquitting Joven and Armando, and downgrading the convictions of
their co-accused from murder to homicide; this, notwithstanding that all the accused,
except Estanislao Lacaba, failed to personally appear at the promulgation of the
Decision despite due notice thereof.
Petitioner contends that its petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court with the CA was the proper remedy, since the RTC committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it entertained the Joint
Motion for Reconsideration with respect to Armando and Joven despite the fact that
they had not regained their standing in court.
Petitioner's recourse to the CA was correct. ISTECA

A writ of certiorari is warranted when (1) any tribunal, board or officer has
acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (2) there is no appeal, nor any plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. 53 An act of a court or
tribunal may be considered as grave abuse of discretion when the same was
performed in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty, or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, as
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner because of passion
or hostility. 54
By way of exception, a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case may be
assailed in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, but only upon
a clear showing by the petitioner that the lower court, in acquitting the accused,
committed not merely reversible errors of judgment but also grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, or to a denial of due process, thus
rendering the assailed judgment void. 55 In which event, the accused cannot be
considered at risk of double jeopardy — the revered constitutional safeguard against
exposing the accused to the risk of answering twice for the same offense.
 Double jeopardy has the following essential elements: (1) the accused is
charged under a complaint or an information sufficient in form and substance to
sustain a conviction; (2) the court has jurisdiction; (3) the accused has been arraigned
and he has pleaded; and (4) he is convicted or acquitted, or the case is dismissed
without his express consent. 56
Although this Court does not absolutely preclude the availment of the remedy
of certiorari to correct an erroneous acquittal, the petitioner must clearly and
convincingly demonstrate that the lower court blatantly abused its authority to a point
so grave and so severe as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice. 57
Under English common law, exceptions to the pleas of prior conviction or
acquittal existed where the trial court lacked jurisdiction, the theory being that a
defendant before such a court was not actually placed in jeopardy. 58 Hence, any
acquittal or conviction before a court having no jurisdiction would not violate the
principle of double jeopardy since it failed to attach in the first place.
Section 14 (2), 59 Article III of the Constitution, authorizing trials in absentia,
allows the accused to be absent at the trial but not at certain stages of the proceedings,
to wit: (a) at arraignment and plea, whether of innocence or of guilt; (b) during trial,
whenever necessary for identification purposes; and (c) at the promulgation of
sentence, unless it is for a light offense, in which case, the accused may appear by
counsel or representative. At such stages of the proceedings,his presence is required
and cannot be waived. 60
Section 6, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Rules
applicable at the time the Decision was promulgated, provides:

Section 6. Promulgation of judgment. — The judgment is promulgated

by reading it in the presence of the accused and any judge of the court in which
it was rendered. However, if the conviction is for a light offense the judgment
may be pronounced in the presence of his counsel or representative. When the
judge is absent or outside the province or city, the judgment may be
promulgated by the clerk of court.

If the accused is confined or detained in another province or city, the

judgment may be promulgated by the executive judge of the Regional Trial
Court having jurisdiction over the place of confinement or detention upon
request of the court which rendered the judgment. The court promulgating the
judgment shall have authority to accept the notice of appeal and to approve the
bail bond pending appeal; provided, that if the decision of the trial court
convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense from non-bailable to
bailable, the application for bail can only be filed and resolved by the appellate
court.

The proper clerk of court shall give notice to the accused, personally or
through his bondsman or warden and counsel, requiring him to be present at the
 promulgation of the decision. If the accused was tried in absentia because he
jumped bail or escaped from prison, the notice to him shall be served at his last
known address.

In case the accused fails to appear at the scheduled date of promulgation

of judgment despite notice, the promulgation shall be made by recording the
judgment in the criminal docket and serving him a copy thereof at his last
known address or thru his counsel.

If the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused to appear
was without justifiable cause, he shall lose the remedies available in these
Rules against the judgment and the court shall order his arrest. Within fifteen
(15) days from promulgation of judgment however, the accused may surrender
and file a motion for leave of court to avail of these remedies. He shall state the
reasons for his absence at the scheduled promulgation and if he proves that his
absence was for a justifiable cause, he shall be allowed to avail of said
remedies within fifteen (15) days from notice. 61

Thus, the accused who failed to appear without justifiable cause shall lose the
remedies available in the Rules against the judgment. However, within 15 days from
promulgation of judgment, the accused may surrender and file a motion for leave of
court to avail of these remedies. He shall state in his motion the reasons for his
absence at the scheduled promulgation, and if he proves that his absence was for a
justifiable cause, he shall be allowed to avail of said remedies within 15 days from
notice. 62
When the Decision dated April 25, 2002 was promulgated, only Estanislao
Lacaba was present. Subsequently thereafter, without surrendering and explaining the
reasons for their absence, Joven, Armando, and Domingo joined Estanislao in their
Joint Motion for Reconsideration. In blatant disregard of the Rules, the RTC not only
failed to cause the arrest of the respondents who were at large, it also took cognizance
of the joint motion. cdtai

The RTC clearly exceeded its jurisdiction when it entertained the joint Motion
for Reconsideration with respect to the respondents who were at large. It should have
considered the joint motion as a motion for reconsideration that was solely filed by
Estanislao. Being at large, Joven and Domingo have not regained their standing in
court. Once an accused jumps bail or flees to a foreign country, or escapes from
prison or confinement, he loses his standing in court; and unless he surrenders or
submits to the jurisdiction of the court, he is deemed to have waived any right to seek
relief from the court. 63
Thus, Joven, Armando, and Domingo, were not placed in double jeopardy
because, from the very beginning, the lower tribunal had acted without jurisdiction.
Verily, any ruling issued without jurisdiction is, in legal contemplation, necessarily
null and void and does not exist. In criminal cases, it cannot be the source of an
acquittal. 64
However, with respect to Estanislao, the RTC committed no reversible error
when it entertained the Motion for Reconsideration. He was in custody and was
present at the promulgation of the judgment. Hence, the RTC never lost jurisdiction
over his person. Consequently, the RTC's ruling downgrading his conviction from
murder to homicide stands. For Estanislao, and for him alone, the proscription against
double jeopardy applies.
Factual matters cannot be inquired into by this Court in a certiorari
proceeding. We can no longer be tasked to go over the proofs presented by the parties
and analyze, assess and weigh them again to ascertain if the trial court was correct in
according superior credit to this or that piece of evidence of one party or the other. 65
The sole office of a writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction,
including the commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction, and does not include a review of the RTC's evaluation of the evidence
and the factual findings based thereon. 66
True, were it not for the procedural lapses of the RTC and its blatant disregard
of the Rules, the finality of respondents' acquittal and their co-accused's conviction of
homicide instead of murder would have been barred by the rule on double jeopardy.
We may tolerate an erroneous acquittal borne from an attempt to protect the
innocent or from an attempt to uphold the accused's treasured right to a fair trial, but
when these concerns are not evident, an erroneous acquittal is a source of substantial
dismay and warrants this Court's corrective action via a special writ of error.
Moreover, although the CA dismissed the appeal filed before it, the RTC Judge
cannot hide behind such fact considering that the dismissal of the appeal was not
based on the validity of the assailed Order of the RTC, but was based on technical
rules and the rule against double jeopardy.
It is to be stressed that judges are dutybound to have more than a cursory
acquaintance with laws and jurisprudence. Failure to follow basic legal commands
constitutes gross ignorance of the law from which no one may be excused, not even a
judge. 67 The Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that "a judge shall be faithful to the
law and maintain professional competence". 68 It bears stressing that competence is
one of the marks of a good judge. When a judge displays an utter lack of familiarity
with the Rules, he erodes the public's confidence in the competence of our courts.
Such is gross ignorance of the law. Having accepted the exalted position of a judge,
he/she owes the public and the court the duty to be proficient in the law. 69
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated January
25, 2005 and April 5, 2005, issued by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
88160, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The pertinent portions of the Order dated
April 15, 2004 issued by the Regional Trial Court, convicting Domingo Landicho of
 the crime of Homicide and acquitting Armando de Grano and Joven de Grano, are
ANNULLED and DELETED. In all other aspects, the Order stands.
To the extent herein altered or modified, the pertinent portions of the Decision
dated April 25, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court are REINSTATED.
The Office of the Court Administrator is DIRECTED to INVESTIGATE
Judge Teresa P. Soriaso for possible violation/s of the law and/or the Code of Judicial
Conduct in issuing the Order dated April 15, 2004 in Criminal Case No. 93-129988.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, C.J., * Ynares-Santiago, Carpio ** and Corona, *** JJ., concur.
||| (People v. De Grano, G.R. No. 167710, [June 5, 2009], 606 PHIL 547-572)

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 200748. July 23, 2014.]

JAIME D. DELA CRUZ, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

SERENO, C.J : p

This is a Petition for Review an Certiorari, filed by petitioner Jaime D. dela Cruz,
from the Decision 1 dated 22 June 2011 issued by the Twentieth Division of the Court of
Appeals (CA) and Resolution 2 dated 2 February 2012 issued by the Former Twentieth
Division of the CA in CA-G.R. C.R. No. 00670.

THE ANTECEDENT FACTS

Petitioner Jaime D. dela Cruz was charged with violation of Section 15, Article II
of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002,
by the Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer of the Office of the Ombudsman —
Visayas, in an Information 3 dated 14 February 2006, which reads:

That on or about the 31st day of January 2006, at Cebu City, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
JAIME D. DE LA CRUZ, a public officer, having been duly appointed and
qualified to such public position as Police Officer 2 of the Philippine National
 Police (PNP) assigned in the Security Service Group of the Cebu City Police
Office, after having been arrested by agents of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) in an entrapment operation, was found positive for use of
METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE commonly known as
"Shabu", the dangerous drug after a confirmatory test conducted on said
accused.TAIaHE

CONTRARY TO LAW.

When arraigned, petitioner, assisted by counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to the
charge. The records do not reveal whether De la Cruz was likewise charged for extortion.

VERSION OF THE PROSECUTION

The evidence of the prosecution reveals that at 8:00 a.m. of 31 January 2006, the
agents and special investigators of the National Bureau of Investigation, Central Visayas
Regional Office (NBI-CEVRO) or simply NBI, received a Complaint from Corazon
Absin (Corazon) and Charito Escobido (Charito). The complainants claimed that at 1:00
a.m. of that same day, Ariel Escobido (Ariel), the live-in partner of Corazon and son of
Charito, was picked up by several unknown male persons believed to be police officers
for allegedly selling drugs. An errand boy gave a number to the complainants, and when
the latter gave the number a ring, they were instructed to proceed to the Gorordo Police
Office located along Gorordo Avenue, Cebu City. In the said police office, they met
"James" who demanded from them PhP100,000, later lowered to PhP40,000, in exchange
for the release of Ariel. After the meeting, the complainants proceeded to the NBI-
CEVRO to file a complaint and narrate the circumstances of the meeting to the
authorities. While at the NBI-CEVRO, Charito even received calls supposedly from
"James" instructing her to bring the money as soon as possible.

The special investigators at the NBI-CEVRO verified the text messages received
by the complainants. A team was immediately formed to implement an entrapment
operation, which took place inside a Jollibee branch at the corner of Gen. Maxilom and
Gorordo Avenues, Cebu City. The officers were able to nab Jaime dela Cruz by using a
pre-marked PhP500 bill dusted with fluorescent powder, which was made part of the
amount demanded by "James" and handed by Corazon. Petitioner was later brought to the
forensic laboratory of the NBI-CEVRO where forensic examination was done by forensic
chemist Rommel Paglinawan. Petitioner was required to submit his urine for drug testing.
It later yielded a positive result for presence of dangerous drugs as indicated in the
confirmatory test result labeled as Toxicology (Dangerous Drugs) Report No. 2006-
TDD-2402 dated 16 February 2006.

VERSION OF THE DEFENSE

 The defense presented petitioner as the lone witness. He denied the charges and
testified that while eating at the said Jollibee branch, he was arrested allegedly for
extortion by NBI agents. When he was at the NBI Office, he was required to extract urine
for drug examination, but he refused saying he wanted it to be done by the Philippine
National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory and not by the NBI. His request was, however,
denied. He also requested to be allowed to call his lawyer prior to the taking of his urine
sample, to no avail.

THE RULING OF THE RTC

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 58 of Cebu City, in its Decision 4 dated 6
June 2007, found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 15,
Article II of R.A. 9165 and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of compulsory
rehabilitation for a period of not less than six (6) months at the Cebu Center for the
Ultimate Rehabilitation of Drug Dependents located at Salinas, Lahug, Cebu City. 5

Petitioner filed an appeal assigning as error the RTC's validation of the result of
the urine test despite its dubiousness having been admitted in spite of the lack of legal
basis for its admission. First, he alleges that the forensic laboratory examination was
conducted despite the fact that he was not assisted by counsel, in clear violation of his
constitutional right. Secondly, he was allegedly held guilty beyond reasonable doubt
notwithstanding the lack of sufficient basis to convict him.

THE RULING OF THE CA

The CA found the appeal devoid of merit and affirmed the ruling of the RTC.

Petitioner filed a timely Motion for Reconsideration. He argued that the CA

overlooked prevailing jurisprudence, which states that drug testing conducted under
circumstances similar to his would violate a person's right to privacy. The appellate court
nevertheless denied the motion.

Petitioner thus filed the present Petition for Review on certiorari. He assigns as
errors the use of hearsay evidence as basis for his conviction and the questionable
circumstances surrounding his arrest and drug test.

Respondent, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed its Comment, 6
saying that "petitioner's arguments cannot be the subject of a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45, as they involve questions of facts which may not be the subject
thereof; after his arraignment, he can no longer contest the validity of his arrest, less so at
this stage of the proceedings; his guilt has been adequately established by direct
evidence; and the manner in which the laboratory examination was conducted was
grounded on a valid and existing law. SCDaET
 THE ISSUE

We deem it proper to give due course to this Petition by confronting head-on the
issue of whether or not the drug test conducted upon the petitioner is legal.

OUR RULING

We declare that the drug test conducted upon petitioner is not grounded upon any
existing law or jurisprudence.

We gloss over petitioner's non-compliance with the Resolution 7 ordering him to

submit clearly legible duplicate originals or certified true copies of the assailed Decision
and Resolution.

Petitioner was charged with use of dangerous drugs in violation of the law, the
pertinent provision of which reads:

Section 15. Use of Dangerous Drugs. — A person apprehended or arrested,

who is found to be positive for use of any dangerous drug, after a
confirmatory test, shall be imposed a penalty of a minimum of six (6) months
rehabilitation in a government center for the first offense, subject to the
provisions of Article VIII of this Act. If apprehended using any dangerous
drug for the second time, he/she shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment
ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years and a fine
ranging from Fifty thousand pesos (PhP50,000.00) to Two hundred thousand
pesos (PhP200,000.00): Provided, That this Section shall not be applicable
where the person tested is also found to have in his/her possession such
quantity of any dangerous drug provided for under Section 11 of this Act, in
which case the provisions stated therein shall apply. 8

The RTC subsequently convicted petitioner, ruling that the following elements of
Section 15 were established: (1) the accused was arrested; (2) the accused was subjected
to drug test; and (3) the confirmatory test shows that he used a dangerous drug.

Disregarding petitioner's objection regarding the admissibility of the evidence, the

lower court also reasoned that "a suspect cannot invoke his right to counsel when he is
required to extract urine because, while he is already in custody, he is not compelled to
make a statement or testimony against himself. Extracting urine from one's body is
merely a mechanical act, hence, falling outside the concept of a custodial investigation."

We find the ruling and reasoning of the trial court, as well as the subsequent
affirmation by the CA, erroneous on three counts.
 The drug test in Section 15 does not
cover persons apprehended or
arrested for any unlawful act, but
only for unlawful acts listed under
Article II of R.A. 9165.

First, "[a] person apprehended or arrested" cannot literally mean any person
apprehended or arrested for any crime. The phrase must be read in context and
understood in consonance with R.A. 9165. Section 15 comprehends persons arrested or
apprehended for unlawful acts listed under Article II of the law.

Hence, a drug test can be made upon persons who are apprehended or arrested for,
among others, the "importation", 9 "sale, trading, administration, dispensation, delivery,
distribution and transportation", 10 "manufacture" 11 and "possession" 12 of dangerous
drugs and/or controlled precursors and essential chemicals; possession thereof "during
parties, social gatherings or meetings"; 13 being "employees and visitors of a den, dive or
resort"; 14 "maintenance of a den, dive or resort"; 15 "illegal chemical diversion of
controlled precursors and essential chemicals"; 16 "manufacture or delivery" 17 or
"possession" 18 of equipment, instrument, apparatus, and other paraphernalia for
dangerous drugs and/or controlled precursors and essential chemicals; possession of
dangerous drugs "during parties, social gatherings or meetings"; 19 "unnecessary" 20 or
"unlawful" 21 prescription thereof; "cultivation or culture of plants classified as
dangerous drugs or are sources thereof"; 22 and "maintenance and keeping of original
records of transactions on dangerous drugs and/or controlled precursors and essential
chemicals." 23 To make the provision applicable to all persons arrested or apprehended
for any crime not listed under Article II is tantamount to unduly expanding its meaning.
Note that accused appellant here was arrested in the alleged act of extortion. cCaIET

A charge for violation of Section 15 of R.A. 9165 is seen as expressive of the

intent of the law to rehabilitate persons apprehended or arrested for the unlawful acts
enumerated above instead of charging and convicting them of other crimes with heavier
penalties. The essence of the provision is more clearly illustrated in People v. Martinez
24 as follows:

On a final note, this Court takes the opportunity to be instructive on Sec.

11 (Possession of Dangerous Drugs) and Sec. 15 (Use of Dangerous Drugs) of
R.A. No. 9165, with regard to the charges that are filed by law enforcers. This
Court notes the practice of law enforcers of filing charges under Sec. 11 in cases
where the presence of dangerous drugs as basis for possession is only and solely
in the form of residue, being subsumed under the last paragraph of Sec. 11.
Although not incorrect, it would be more in keeping with the intent of the
law to file charges under Sec. 15 instead in order to rehabilitate first time
offenders of drug use, provided that there is a positive confirmatory test
result as required under Sec. 15. The minimum penalty under the last
 paragraph of Sec. 11 for the possession of residue is imprisonment of twelve
years and one day, while the penalty under Sec. 15 for first time offenders of
drug use is a minimum of six months rehabilitation in a government center. To
file charges under Sec. 11 on the basis of residue alone would frustrate the
objective of the law to rehabilitate drug users and provide them with an
opportunity to recover for a second chance at life.

In the case at bench, the presence of dangerous drugs was only in the
form of residue on the drug paraphernalia, and the accused were found positive
for use of dangerous drugs. Granting that the arrest was legal, the evidence
obtained admissible, and the chain of custody intact, the law enforcers should
have filed charges under Sec. 15, R.A. No. 9165 or for use of dangerous drugs
and, if there was no residue at all, they should have been charged under Sec. 14
(Possession of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia for
Dangerous Drugs During Parties, Social Gatherings or Meetings). Sec. 14
provides that the maximum penalty under Sec. 12 (Possession of Equipment,
Instrument, Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs) shall be
imposed on any person who shall possess any equipment, instrument, apparatus
and other paraphernalia for dangerous drugs. Under Sec. 12, the maximum
penalty is imprisonment of four years and a fine of PhP50,000.00. In fact, under
the same section, the possession of such equipment, apparatus or other
paraphernalia is prima facie evidence that the possessor has used a dangerous
drug and shall be presumed to have violated Sec. 15.

In order to effectively fulfill the intent of the law to rehabilitate drug

users, this Court thus calls on law enforcers and prosecutors in dangerous
drugs cases to exercise proper discretion in filing charges when the
presence of dangerous drugs is only and solely in the form of residue and
the confirmatory test required under Sec. 15 is positive for use of
dangerous drugs. In such cases, to afford the accused a chance to be
rehabilitated, the filing of charges for or involving possession of dangerous
drugs should only be done when another separate quantity of dangerous drugs,
other than mere residue, is found in the possession of the accused as provided
for in Sec. 15. (Emphasis supplied)

Furthermore, making the phrase "a person apprehended or arrested" in Section 15

applicable to all persons arrested or apprehended for unlawful acts, not only under R.A.
9165 but for all other crimes, is tantamount to a mandatory drug testing of all persons
apprehended or arrested for any crime. To overextend the application of this provision
would run counter to our pronouncement in Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs
Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency, 25 to wit:

. . .[M]andatory drug testing can never be random and suspicionless. The ideas
of randomness and being suspicionless are antithetical to their being made
defendants in a criminal complaint. They are not randomly picked; neither are
they beyond suspicion. When persons suspected of committing a crime are
 charged, they are singled out and are impleaded against their will. The persons
thus charged, by the bare fact of being haled before the prosecutor's office and
peaceably submitting themselves to drug testing, if that be the case, do not
necessarily consent to the procedure, let alone waive their right to privacy. To
impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to
harness a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the
stated objectives of RA 6195. Drug testing in this case would violate a
person's right to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the
Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons are veritably forced to
incriminate themselves. (Emphasis supplied)

The drug test is not covered by

allowable non-testimonial compulsion.

We find that petitioner never raised the alleged irregularity of his arrest before his
arraignment and raises the issue only now before this tribunal; hence, he is deemed to
have waived his right to question the validity of his arrest curing whatever defect may
have attended his arrest. 26 However, "a waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not
mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal warrantless
arrest." 27

We are aware of the prohibition against testimonial compulsion and the allowable
exceptions to such proscription. Cases where non-testimonial compulsion has been
allowed reveal, however, that the pieces of evidence obtained were all material to the
principal cause of the arrest. AIcaDC

The constitutional right of an accused against self-incrimination

proscribes the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications
from the accused and not the inclusion of his body in evidence when it may be
material. Purely mechanical acts are not included in the prohibition as the
accused does not thereby speak his guilt, hence the assistance and guiding hand
of counsel is not required. (People vs. Olvis, 238 Phil. 513 [1987]) The essence
of the right against self-incrimination is testimonial compulsion, that is, the
giving of evidence against himself through a testimonial act. (People vs.
Casinillo, 213 SCRA 777 [1992]; People vs. Tranca, 235 SCRA 455 [1994];
People vs. Rondero, 378 Phil. 123 [1999]) Hence, it has been held that a woman
charged with adultery may be compelled to submit to physical examination to
determine her pregnancy; (Villaflor vs. Summers, 41 Phil. 62 [1920]) and an
accused may be compelled to submit to physical examination and to have a
substance taken from his body for medical determination as to whether he was
suffering from gonorrhea which was contracted by his victim; (U.S. vs. Tan
Teng, 23 Phil. 145 [1912]) to expel morphine from his mouth; (U.S. vs. Ong Siu
Hong, 36 Phil. 735 [1917]) to have the outline of his foot traced to determine its
identity with bloody footprints; (U.S. vs. Salas, 25 Phil. 337 [1913]; U.S. vs.
Zara, 42 Phil. 308 [1921]) and to be photographed or measured, or his garments
 or shoes removed or replaced, or to move his body to enable the foregoing
things to be done. (People vs. Otadora, 86 Phil. 244 [1950]) 28 (Emphasis
supplied)

In the instant case, we fail to see how a urine sample could be material to the
charge of extortion. The RTC and the CA, therefore, both erred when they held that the
extraction of petitioner's urine for purposes of drug testing was "merely a mechanical act,
hence, falling outside the concept of a custodial investigation."

We note a case where a urine sample was considered as admissible. In Gutang v.

People, 29 the petitioner therein and his companions were arrested in connection with the
enforcement of a search warrant in his residence. A PNP-NARCOM team found and
confiscated shabu materials and paraphernalias. The petitioner and his companions in that
case were also asked to give urine samples, which yielded positive results. Later, the
petitioner therein was found guilty of the crime of illegal possession and use of prohibited
drugs. Gutang claimed that the latter's urine sample was inadmissible in evidence, since it
was derived in effect from an uncounselled extrajudicial confession.

In the Gutang, et al. case, the Court clarified that "what the Constitution prohibits
is the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communication from the accused, but
not an inclusion of his body in evidence, when it may be material". The situation in
Gutang was categorized as falling among the exemptions under the freedom from
testimonial compulsion since what was sought to be examined came from the body of the
accused. The Court said:

This was a mechanical act the accused was made to undergo which was
not meant to unearth undisclosed facts but to ascertain physical attributes
determinable by simple observation. In fact, the record shows that petitioner and
his co-accused were not compelled to give samples of their urine but they in fact
voluntarily gave the same when they were requested to undergo a drug test.

Assuming arguendo that the urine samples taken from the petitioner are
inadmissible in evidence, we agree with the trial court that the record is replete
with other pieces of credible evidence including the testimonial evidence of the
prosecution which point to the culpability of the petitioner for the crimes
charged.

We emphasize that the circumstances in Gutang are clearly different from the
circumstances of petitioner in the instant case. First, Gutang was arrested in relation to a
drug case. Second, he volunteered to give his urine. Third, there were other pieces of
evidence that point to his culpability for the crimes charged. In the present case, though,
petitioner was arrested for extortion; he resisted having his urine sample taken; and
finally, his urine sample was the only available evidence that was used as basis for his
conviction for the use of illegal drugs.
 The drug test was a violation of
petitioner's right to privacy and right
against self-incrimination.

It is incontrovertible that petitioner refused to have his urine extracted and tested
for drugs. He also asked for a lawyer prior to his urine test. He was adamant in exercising
his rights, but all of his efforts proved futile, because he was still compelled to submit his
urine for drug testing under those circumstances.

The pertinent provisions in Article III of the Constitution are clear:

Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and
for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest
shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized.AEaSTC

Section 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.

In the face of these constitutional guarantees, we cannot condone drug testing of

all arrested persons regardless of the crime or offense for which the arrest is being made.

While we express our commendation of law enforcement agents as they

vigorously track down offenders in their laudable effort to curb the pervasive and
deleterious effects of dangerous drugs on our society, they must, however, be constantly
mindful of the reasonable limits of their authority, because it is not unlikely that in their
clear intent to purge society of its lawless elements, they may be knowingly or
unknowingly transgressing the protected rights of its citizens including even members of
its own police force.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision dated 22 June 2011

issued by the Twentieth Division, and the Resolution dated 2 February 2012 issued by the
former Twentieth Division of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. C.R. No. 00670 are SET
ASIDE. Petitioner is hereby ACQUITTED.

SO ORDERED.

Leonardo-de Castro, Bersamin, Villarama, Jr. and Reyes, JJ., concur.

||| (Dela Cruz v. People, G.R. No. 200748, [July 23, 2014])
 THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 185527. July 18, 2012.]

HARRY L. GO, TONNY NGO, JERRY NGO AND JANE GO,

petitioners, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and
HIGHDONE COMPANY, LTD., ET AL., respondents.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J : p

The procedure for taking depositions in criminal cases recognizes the prosecution's
right to preserve testimonial evidence and prove its case despite the unavailability of its
witness. It cannot, however, give license to prosecutorial indifference or unseemly
involvement in a prosecution witness' absence from trial. To rule otherwise would
effectively deprive the accused of his fundamental right to be confronted with the
witnesses against him.

In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of
Court, petitioners seek to nullify and set aside the February 19, 2008 Decision 1 and
November 28, 2008 Resolution 2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
99383, which reversed the September 12, 2006 Order 3 issued by the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 27 in Civil Case No. 06-114844 and upheld the grant of
the prosecution's motion to take the testimony of a witness by oral depositions in Laos,
Cambodia.

Petitioners Harry Go, Tonny Ngo, Jerry Ngo and Jane Go were charged before the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila for Other Deceits under Article 318 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC) docketed as Criminal Case No. 396447. The Information 4
dated September 24, 2003, later amended 5 on September 14, 2004, reads:

"That sometime in August 1996, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the

said accused, conspiring, confederating together and helping one another, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud Highdone
Company Ltd. Represented by Li Luen Ping, in the following manner, to wit: all
said accused, by means of false manifestations and fraudulent representations
which they made to said Li Luen Ping to the effect that they have chattels such
as machinery, spare parts, equipment and raw materials installed and fixed in
the premises of BGB Industrial Textile Mills Factory located in the Bataan
Export Processing Zone (BEPZ) in Mariveles, Bataan, executed a Deed of
 Mortgage for a consideration of the amount of $464,266.90 or its peso
equivalent at P20,892,010.50 more or less in favor of ML Resources and
Highdone Company Ltd. Representing that the said deed is a FIRST
MORTGAGE when in truth and in fact the accused well knew that the same had
been previously encumbered, mortgaged and foreclosed by CHINA BANK
CORPORATION as early as September 1994 thereby causing damage and
prejudice to said HIGHDONE COMPANY LTD., in the said amount of
$464,266.90 or its peso equivalent at P20,892,010.50 more or less."
CDESIA

Upon arraignment, petitioners pleaded not guilty to the charge.

The prosecution's complaining witness, Li Luen Ping, a frail old businessman

from Laos, Cambodia, traveled from his home country back to the Philippines in order to
attend the hearing held on September 9, 2004. However, trial dates were subsequently
postponed due to his unavailability.

On October 13, 2005, the private prosecutor filed with the MeTC a Motion to
Take Oral Deposition 6 of Li Luen Ping, alleging that he was being treated for lung
infection at the Cambodia Charity Hospital in Laos, Cambodia and that, upon doctor's
advice, he could not make the long travel to the Philippines by reason of ill health.

Notwithstanding petitioners' Opposition, 7 the MeTC granted 8 the motion after

the prosecution complied with the directive to submit a Medical Certificate of Li Luen
Ping. Petitioners sought its reconsideration which the MeTC denied, 9 prompting
petitioners to file a Petition for Certiorari 10 before the RTC.

On September 12, 2006, the RTC granted the petition and declared the MeTC
Orders null and void. 11 The RTC held that Section 17, Rule 23 on the taking of
depositions of witnesses in civil cases cannot apply suppletorily to the case since there is
a specific provision in the Rules of Court with respect to the taking of depositions of
prosecution witnesses in criminal cases, which is primarily intended to safeguard the
constitutional rights of the accused to meet the witness against him face to face.

Upon denial by the RTC of their motion for reconsideration through an Order
dated March 5, 2006, 12 the prosecution elevated the case to the CA.

On February 19, 2008, the CA promulgated the assailed Decision which held that
no grave abuse of discretion can be imputed upon the MeTC for allowing the deposition-
taking of the complaining witness Li Luen Ping because no rule of procedure expressly
disallows the taking of depositions in criminal cases and that, in any case, petitioners
would still have every opportunity to cross-examine the complaining witness and make
timely objections during the taking of the oral deposition either through counsel or
through the consular officer who would be taking the deposition of the witness.
 On November 28, 2008, the CA denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this petition alleging that —

I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE

METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT INFRINGED THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF THE PETITIONERS TO A PUBLIC
TRIAL IN ALLOWING THE TAKING OF THE DEPOSITION OF
THE COMPLAINING WITNESS IN LAOS, CAMBODIA.

II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE

DEPOSITION TAKING OF THE COMPLAINING WITNESS IN
LAOS, CAMBODIA IS AN INFRINGEMENT OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF THE PETITIONERS TO
CONFRONT THE SAID WITNESS FACE TO FACE.

III. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE

JUDICIAL LEGISLATION COMMITTED BY THE METROPOLITAN
TRIAL COURT IN APPLYING THE RULES ON DEPOSITION-
TAKING IN CIVIL CASES TO CRIMINAL CASES.

IV. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN LIMITING THE

TRADITIONAL DEFINITION OF GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION,
OVERLOOKING THE ESTABLISHED RULE THAT VIOLATION OF
THE CONSTITUTION, THE LAW OR JURISPRUDENCE
SIMILARLY COMES WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION.

We rule in favor of petitioners.

The Procedure for Testimonial

Examination of an Unavailable
Prosecution Witness is Covered
Under Section 15, Rule 119.

The examination of witnesses must be done orally before a judge in open court. 13
This is true especially in criminal cases where the Constitution secures to the accused his
right to a public trial and to meet the witnessess against him face to face. The requirement
is the "safest and most satisfactory method of investigating facts" as it enables the judge
to test the witness' credibility through his manner and deportment while testifying. 14 It is
not without exceptions, however, as the Rules of Court recognizes the conditional
examination of witnesses and the use of their depositions as testimonial evidence in lieu
of direct court testimony.cCSDaI

Even in criminal proceedings, there is no doubt as to the availability of conditional

examination of witnesses — both for the benefit of the defense, as well as the
prosecution. The Court's ruling in the case of Vda. de Manguerra v. Risos 15 explicitly
states that —

". . . As exceptions, Rule 23 to 28 of the Rules of Court provide for the

different modes of discovery that may be resorted to by a party to an action.
These rules are adopted either to perpetuate the testimonies of witnesses or as
modes of discovery. In criminal proceedings, Sections 12, 13 and 15, Rule 119
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which took effect on December 1,
2000, allow the conditional examination of both the defense and prosecution
witnesses." (Underscoring supplied) 16

The procedure under Rule 23 to 28 of the Rules of Court allows the taking of
depositions in civil cases, either upon oral examination or written interrogatories, before
any judge, notary public or person authorized to administer oaths at any time or place
within the Philippines; or before any Philippine consular official, commissioned officer
or person authorized to administer oaths in a foreign state or country, with no additional
requirement except reasonable notice in writing to the other party. 17

But for purposes of taking the deposition in criminal cases, more particularly of a
prosecution witness who would forseeably be unavailable for trial, the testimonial
examination should be made before the court, or at least before the judge, where the case
is pending as required by the clear mandate of Section 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure. The pertinent provision reads thus:

SEC. 15. Examination of witness for the prosecution. — When it satisfactorily

appears that a witness for the prosecution is too sick or infirm to appear at the
trial as directed by the court, or has to leave the Philippines with no definite
date of returning, he may forthwith be conditionally examined before the
court where the case is pending. Such examination, in the presence of the
accused, or in his absence after reasonable notice to attend the examination
has been served on him shall be conducted in the same manner as an
examination at the trial. Failure or refusal of the accused to attend the
examination after notice shall be considered a waiver. The statement taken
may be admitted in behalf of or against the accused.

Since the conditional examination of a prosecution witness must take place at no

other place than the court where the case is pending, the RTC properly nullified the
MeTC's orders granting the motion to take the deposition of Li Luen Ping before the
Philippine consular official in Laos, Cambodia. We quote with approval the RTC's
ratiocination in this wise:

The condition of the private complainant being sick and of advanced age
falls within the provision of Section 15 Rule 119 of the Rules of Court.
However, said rule substantially provides that he should be conditionally
examined before the court where the case is pending. Thus, this Court concludes
 that the language of Section 15 Rule 119 must be interpreted to require the
parties to present testimony at the hearing through live witnesses, whose
demeanor and credibility can be evaluated by the judge presiding at the hearing,
rather than by means of deposition. No where in the said rule permits the taking
of deposition outside the Philippines whether the deponent is sick or not. 18
(Underscoring supplied) STcEIC

Certainly, to take the deposition of the prosecution witness elsewhere and not
before the very same court where the case is pending would not only deprive a detained
accused of his right to attend the proceedings but also deprive the trial judge of the
opportunity to observe the prosecution witness' deportment and properly assess his
credibility, which is especially intolerable when the witness' testimony is crucial to the
prosecution's case against the accused. This is the import of the Court's ruling in Vda. de
Manguerra19 where we further declared that —

While we recognize the prosecution's right to preserve the testimony of

its witness in order to prove its case, we cannot disregard the rules which are
designed mainly for the protection of the accused's constitutional rights. The
giving of testimony during trial is the general rule. The conditional examination
of a witness outside of the trial is only an exception, and as such, calls for a
strict construction of the rules. 20 (Underscoring supplied)

It is argued that since the Rules of Civil Procedure is made explicitly applicable in
all cases, both civil and criminal as well as special proceedings, the deposition-taking
before a Philippine consular official under Rule 23 should be deemed allowable also
under the circumstances. However, the suggested suppletory application of Rule 23 in the
testimonial examination of an unavailable prosecution witness has been categorically
ruled out by the Court in the same case of Vda. de Manguerra, as follows:

It is true that Section 3, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court provides that the
rules of civil procedure apply to all actions, civil or criminal, and special
proceedings. In effect, it says that the rules of civil procedure have suppletory
application to criminal cases. However, it is likewise true that criminal
proceedings are primarily governed by the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure. Considering that Rule 119 adequately and squarely covers the
situation in the instant case, we find no cogent reason to apply Rule 23
suppletorily or otherwise." (Underscoring supplied)

The Conditional Examination of a

Prosecution Witness Cannot Defeat
the Rights of the Accused to Public
Trial and Confrontation of Witnesses

The CA took a simplistic view on the use of depositions in criminal cases and
overlooked fundamental considerations no less than the Constitution secures to the
accused, i.e., the right to a public trial and the right to confrontation of witnesses. Section
14 (2), Article III of the Constitution provides as follows:

Section 14. (1) . . .

(2)In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent

until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and
counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to
have a speedy, impartial and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and
to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the
production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may
proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been
duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable. (Underscoring supplied)
cHITCS

In dismissing petitioners' apprehensions concerning the deprivation of their

constitutional rights to a public trial and confrontation, the CA opined that petitioners
would still be accorded the right to cross-examine the deponent witness and raise their
objections during the deposition-taking in the same manner as in a regular court trial.

We disagree. There is a great deal of difference between the face-to-face

confrontation in a public criminal trial in the presence of the presiding judge and the
cross-examination of a witness in a foreign place outside the courtroom in the absence of
a trial judge. In the aptly cited case of People v. Estenzo, 21 the Court noted the
uniqueness and significance of a witness testifying in open court, thus:

"The main and essential purpose of requiring a witness to appear and

testify orally at a trial is to secure for the adverse party the opportunity of cross-
examination. "The opponent", according to an eminent authority, "demands
confrontation, not for the idle purpose of gazing upon the witness, or of being
gazed upon by him, but for the purpose of cross examination which cannot be
had except by the direct and personal putting of questions and obtaining
immediate answers." There is also the advantage of the witness before the
judge, and it is this — it enables the judge as trier of facts "to obtain the elusive
and incommunicable evidence of a witness' deportment while testifying, and a
certain subjective moral effect is produced upon the witness. It is only when the
witness testifies orally that the judge may have a true idea of his countenance,
manner and expression, which may confirm or detract from the weight of his
testimony. Certainly, the physical condition of the witness will reveal his
capacity for accurate observation and memory, and his deportment and
physiognomy will reveal clues to his character. These can only be observed by
the judge if the witness testifies orally in court. . . ." 22 (Underscoring supplied)

The right of confrontation, on the other hand, is held to apply specifically to

criminal proceedings and to have a twofold purpose: (1) to afford the accused an
opportunity to test the testimony of witnesses by cross-examination, and (2) to allow the
judge to observe the deportment of witnesses. 23 The Court explained in People v.
Seneris 24 that the constitutional requirement "insures that the witness will give his
testimony under oath, thus deterring lying by the threat of perjury charge; it forces the
witness to submit to cross-examination, a valuable instrument in exposing falsehood and
bringing out the truth; and it enables the court to observe the demeanor of the witness and
assess his credibility." 25

As the right of confrontation is intended "to secure the accused in the right to be
tried as far as facts provable by witnesses as meet him face to face at the trial who give
their testimony in his presence, and give to the accused an opportunity of cross-
examination," 26 it is properly viewed as a guarantee against the use of unreliable
testimony in criminal trials. In the American case of Crawford v. Washington, 27 the US
Supreme Court had expounded on the procedural intent of the confrontation requirement,
thus:

Where testimonial statements are involved, we do not think the Framers

meant to leave the Sixth Amendment's [right to confront witness face to face]
protection to the vagaries of the rules of evidence, much less to amorphous
notions of "reliability". Certainly, none of the authorities discussed above
acknowledges any general reliability exception to the common-law rule.
Admitting statements deemed reliable by a judge is fundamentally at odds with
the right of confrontation. To be sure, the Clause's ultimate goal is to ensure
reliability of evidence, but it is a procedural rather than a substantive guarantee.
It commands, not that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a
particular manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-examination. The Clause
thus reflects a judgment, not only about the desirability of reliable evidence (a
point on which there could be little dissent), but about how reliability can best
be determined." (Underscoring supplied) ICAcHE

The Webb Ruling is Not on All Fours

with the Instant Case

The CA found the frail and infirm condition of the prosecution witness as
sufficient and compelling reason to uphold the MeTC Orders granting the deposition-
taking, following the ruling in the case of People v. Webb 28 that the taking of an
unavailable witness' deposition is in the nature of a discovery procedure the use of which
is within the trial court's sound discretion which needs only to be exercised in a
reasonable manner and in consonance with the spirit of the law. 29

But the ruling in the cited case is not instantly applicable herein as the factual
settings are not similar. The accused in the Webb case had sought to take the oral
deposition of five defense witnesses before a Philippine consular agent in lieu of
presenting them as live witnesses, alleging that they were all residents of the United
States who could not be compelled by subpoena to testify in court. The trial court denied
the motion of the accused but the CA differed and ordered the deposition taken. When the
matter was raised before this Court, we sustained the trial court's disallowance of the
deposition-taking on the limited ground that there was no necessity for the procedure as
the matter sought to be proved by way of deposition was considered merely corroborative
of the evidence for the defense. 30

In this case, where it is the prosecution that seeks to depose the complaining
witness against the accused, the stringent procedure under Section 15, Rule 119 cannot be
ignored without violating the constitutional rights of the accused to due process.

Finally, the Court takes note that prosecution witness Li Luen Ping had managed
to attend the initial trial proceedings before the MeTC of Manila on September 9, 2004.
At that time, Li Luen Ping's old age and fragile constitution should have been
unmistakably apparent and yet the prosecution failed to act with zeal and foresight in
having his deposition or testimony taken before the MeTC pursuant to Section 15, Rule
119 of the Revised Rules of Court. In fact, it should have been imperative for the
prosecution to have moved for the preservation of Li Luen Ping's testimony at that first
instance given the fact that the witness is a non-resident alien who can leave the
Philippines anytime without any definite date of return. Obviously, the prosecution
allowed its main witness to leave the court's jurisdiction without availing of the court
procedure intended to preserve the testimony of such witness. The loss of its cause is
attributable to no other party.
ICAcaH

Still, even after failing to secure Li Luen Ping's conditional examination before the
MeTC prior to said witness' becoming sick and unavailable, the prosecution would
capitalize upon its own failure by pleading for a liberal application of the rules on
depositions. It must be emphasized that while the prosecution must provide the accused
every opportunity to take the deposition of witnesses that are material to his defense in
order to avoid charges of violating the right of the accused to compulsory process, the
State itself must resort to deposition-taking sparingly if it is to guard against accusations
of violating the right of the accused to meet the witnesses against him face to face. Great
care must be observed in the taking and use of depositions of prosecution witnesses to the
end that no conviction of an accused will rely on ex parte affidavits and depositions. 31

Thus, the CA ignored the procedure under the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure for taking the deposition of an unavailable prosecution witness when it upheld
the trial court's order allowing the deposition of prosecution witness Li Luen Ping to take
place in a venue other than the court where the case is pending. This was certainly grave
abuse of discretion.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated

February 19, 2008 and the Resolution dated November 28, 2008 of the Court of Appeals
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court which disallowed the deposition-taking in Laos, Cambodia is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

Velasco, Jr., Peralta, Abad and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

||| (Go v. People, G.R. No. 185527, [July 18, 2012], 691 PHIL 440-457)

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 240053. October 9, 2019.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. MARIA CRISTINA

P. SERGIO and JULIUS L. LACANILAO, respondents.

DECISION

HERNANDO, J : p

The peculiar factual circumstances surrounding the present case give rise to a
novel question of law. May a prosecution witness, like Mary Jane Veloso (Mary
Jane), who was convicted of drug trafficking and sentenced to death by the Indonesian
Government and who is presently confined in a prison facility in Indonesia, testify by
way of deposition without violating the constitutional right to confrontation of a
witness by the accused? HTcADC

This petition for review on certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assails the December 13, 2017 Decision 2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
149002 which granted respondent's Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition and
reversed the August 16, 2016 Resolution 3 of the Regional Trial Court (trial court),
Branch 88, of Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija, granting the motion of the prosecution to
take the deposition by written interrogatories of Mary Jane in Indonesia.

The Factual Antecedents

Mary Jane, Maria Cristina P. Sergio (Cristina), and Julius L. Lacanilao (Julius)
were friends and neighbors in Talavera, Nueva Ecija. Taking advantage of her dire
situation and susceptibility, Cristina and Julius offered Mary Jane a job as a domestic
helper in Malaysia. Believing that the job was a ray of hope, Mary Jane scraped
whatever meager money she had and when the amount was not even enough to pay
Cristina and Julius as placement fee, she resorted to borrowing from relatives. Still,
the amount gathered was insufficient prompting Mary Jane's husband to sell even
their precious motorcycle. On April 21, 2010, Mary Jane, together with Cristina,
eventually left the Philippines for Malaysia. However, to Mary Jane's dismay, she was
informed by Cristina upon their arrival in Malaysia that the job intended for her was
no longer available. After spending a few days in Malaysia, Cristina sent Mary Jane to
Indonesia for a seven-day holiday with a promise that she will have a job upon her
return in Malaysia. Cristina gave Mary Jane her plane ticket as well as a luggage to
bring on her trip.
Upon Mary Jane's arrival at the Adisucipto International Airport in
Yogyakarta, Indonesia, she was apprehended by the police officers for allegedly
carrying 2.6 kilograms of heroin inside her luggage. She was accordingly charged
with drug trafficking before the District Court of Sleman, Yogyakarta, Indonesia.
Mary Jane sought comfort from her family in the Philippines and informed
them that she was currently detained in Indonesia. Mary Jane's family immediately
confronted Cristina who instead of helping them even threatened them to keep the
matter to themselves and not to divulge the same especially to the media. She even
told Mary Jane's family that she is part of an international drug syndicate who would
spend millions to get Mary Jane out of prison.
However, in October 2010, the District Court of Sleman, Yogyakarta,
Indonesia, convicted Mary Jane of drug trafficking and sentenced her to death by
firing squad. After the affirmance of her conviction by the High Court and the
Supreme Court of Indonesia, Mary Jane and eight other felons who were similarly
convicted of drug-related offenses were brought to a prison facility in the island of
Nusakambangan, off Central Java, Indonesia, to await their execution by firing squad,
which was originally scheduled on April 9, 2015 but later rescheduled to April 28,
2015. Eventually, the eight companions of Mary Jane were executed by firing squad.
Presently, Mary Jane is detained at the Wirogunan Penitentiary in Yogyakarta,
Indonesia.
Meanwhile, in the Philippines, Cristina and Julius were arrested by the
operatives of the Anti-Human Trafficking Division of the National Bureau of
Investigation. Thereafter, they were charged with qualified trafficking in person in
violation of Section 4 (a) in relation to Sections 3 (a) and 6 of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 9208, otherwise known as "Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003" docketed as
Criminal Case No. SD (15)-3723. 4 Cristina and Julius were likewise charged in two
separate Informations with the crime of illegal recruitment as penalized under Section
6, par. (k) and (l) of R.A. No. 8042, otherwise known as "Migrant Workers and
Overseas Filipino Workers Act of 1995," and estafa in violation of Section 2 (a),
Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code docketed as Criminal Case Nos. SD (15)-3724,
5 and SD (15)-3753, 6 respectively, filed before the trial court. Upon arraignment,
Cristina and Julius entered a plea of "not guilty" on all charges.
On March 31, 2015, representatives from the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency (PDEA), the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory, and the
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) went to Wirugonan Prison to interview Mary
Jane. She executed a document known as "Sinumpaang Salaysay ni Mary Jane Fiesta
Veloso." aScITE

In her Sinumpaang Salaysay, Mary Jane maintained her innocence and narrated
how she was recruited by Cristina and Julius. She alleged that while in Malaysia, she
and Cristina stayed at Sun Inn Lagoon since her supposed employer was not in
Malaysia. Cristina has a boyfriend named Prince whom she conversed only by phone.
Prince has a brother named "Ike." On April 24, 2010, Mary Jane and Cristina went to
the hotel parking lot and met with "Ike" who was on board a white car. They then
went inside the car wherein "Ike" handed the luggage to Cristina. When they returned
to the hotel room, Cristina gave Mary Jane the luggage. Mary Jane noticed that it was
unusually heavy but, upon checking, found nothing inside. She then asked Cristina
why the luggage was heavy but the latter simply replied that because it was new. The
luggage was the same bag she used on her trip to Indonesia. It was only after she was
apprehended at the airport when Mary Jane realized that it contained prohibited drugs.
On the basis of her affidavit, the Philippine Government requested the
Indonesian Government to suspend the scheduled execution of Mary Jane. It informed
the Indonesian Government that the recruiters and traffickers of Mary Jane were
already in police custody, and her testimony is vital in the prosecution of Cristina and
Julius.
Thus, on April 28, 2015, or a few hours before the scheduled execution of
Mary Jane, the President of Indonesia, His Excellency Joko Widodo, granted her an
indefinite reprieve. The Cabinet Secretary of the Indonesian Government informed the
public that President Widodo received reports about the on-going legal proceedings in
the Philippines with respect to the case of Mary Jane, and that her recruiters were
already in police custody.
Hence, pursuant to its obligations under the Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance
in Criminal Matters entered into by Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN Mutual Legal
Assistance Treaty), the Indonesian authorities deferred indefinitely the execution of
Mary Jane to afford her an opportunity to present her case against Cristina, Julius, and
"Ike" who were allegedly responsible for recruiting and exploiting her to engage in
drug trafficking.
The Indonesian authorities however imposed the following conditions relative
to the taking of Mary Jane's testimony, viz.:
(a) Mary Jane shall remain in detention in Yogyakarta, Indonesia;
(b) No cameras shall be allowed;
 (c) The lawyers of the parties shall not be present; and
(d) The questions to be propounded to Mary Jane shall be in writing.
Thereafter, the State filed a "Motion for Leave of Court to Take the Testimony
of Complainant Mary Jane Veloso by Deposition Upon Written Interrogatories." 7 It
averred that the taking of Mary Jane's testimony through the use of deposition upon
written interrogatories is allowed under Rule 23 of the Revised Rules of Court
because she is out of the country and will not be able to testify personally before the
court due to her imprisonment. The prosecution also pointed out that Rule 23 of the
Rules of Court applies suppletorily in criminal proceedings and the use of deposition
upon written interrogatories in criminal cases is not expressly prohibited under the
Rules of Court. Further, it pointed out that the Supreme Court has allowed
dispensation of direct testimony in open court under the Rules of Environmental
Cases and the Judicial Affidavit Rule. Lastly, the OSG averred that Cristina and Julius
will still have an opportunity to examine Mary Jane by propounding their own set of
written interrogatories through the designated consular officer who will be taking the
deposition; moreover, they were not precluded from objecting to the questions and
answers. HEITAD

Cristina and Julius objected to the motion asserting that the deposition should
be made before and not during the trial. The depositions under Rules 23 and 25 of the
Rules of Court are not designed to replace the actual testimony of the witness in open
court and the use thereof is confined only in civil cases. Also, they argued that such
method of taking testimony will violate their right to confront the witness, Mary Jane,
or to meet her face to face as provided under Section 14 (2) of the 1987 Constitution.
Finally, they claimed that the prosecution's reliance on the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases and the Judicial Affidavit Rule was misplaced because the
affiants therein were still subject to cross-examination.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court:

In its Resolution dated August 16, 2016, the trial court granted the
prosecution's motion subject to the following conditions:
1. Considering that the Prosecution has already submitted their proposed
questions in the written interrogatories, the accused, through counsel, is given
a period of ten (10) days from receipt of this Resolution to submit their
comment to the proposed questions on the deposition upon written
interrogatories for the witness Mary Jane Veloso. Upon receipt of the
Comment, the Court shall promptly rule on the objections;
2. The Court shall schedule the taking of the deposition in Yogyakarta,
Indonesia, which shall be presided by the undersigned trial judge. The final
questions for the deposition (after ruling on the Defense objections), shall be
propounded by the Consul of the Philippines in the Republic of Indonesia or
his designated representative. The answers of the deponent to the written
 interrogatories shall be taken verbatim by a competent staff in the Office of
the Philippine Consulate in the Republic of Indonesia;
3. The transcribed copy of the answers of the deponent shall be furnished the
accused, through counsel, who shall thereafter submit their proposed cross
interrogatory questions to the Prosecution within ten (10) days from receipt;
4. The Prosecution is given the same period of ten (10) days from receipt of
the proposed cross interrogatory questions of the Defense stating the ground
for the objections. Upon receipt of the comment, the Court shall promptly rule
on the objections;
5. The Court shall schedule the conduct of the cross interrogatory questions
for the deposition of Mary Jane Veloso in Yogyakarta, Indonesia, which shall
be presided by the undersigned trial judge. The final questions for the written
cross interrogatories (after ruling on the Prosecution's objections) shall be
propounded by the Consul of the Philippines in the Republic of Indonesia or
his designated representative. The answers of the deponent to the written cross
interrogatories shall be taken verbatim by a competent staff in the Office of
the Philippine Consulate in the Republic of Indonesia;
6. Unless the Prosecution opts to conduct re-direct written interrogatories, the
testimony of Mary Jane Veloso by way of deposition upon written
interrogatories shall be deemed terminated. In case the Prosecution propounds
re-direct written interrogatories on the deponent, the above-mentioned
procedure for the conduct of direct and cross interrogatories shall be observed.
8
Cristina and Julius immediately filed their "Omnibus Motion for
Reconsideration and to Suspend Period of Time to File Comments to Proposed
Questions for Deposition of Mary Jane Veloso." 9 However, the trial court denied
their Omnibus Motion in its November 3, 2016 Resolution. 10
Undeterred, Cristina and Julius filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
with Urgent Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction 11
before the Court of Appeals averring that the trial court judge gravely abused her
discretion in the issuance of the assailed Resolutions. ATICcS

Ruling of the Court of Appeals:

Finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, the appellate
court, in its assailed December 13, 2017 Decision, granted the Petition for Certiorari
and reversed the August 16, 2016 Resolution of the trial court. It held that, contrary to
the RTC's findings, the conditional examination of witnesses in criminal proceedings
are primarily governed by Rule 119 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure. According to
the appellate court, the State failed to establish compelling reason to depart from such
rule and to apply instead Rule 23 of the Rules on Civil Procedure which only applies
in civil cases. Thus, pursuant to Rule 119, the taking of deposition of Mary Jane or
her conditional examination must be made not in Indonesia but before the court where
the case is pending, i.e., the Regional Trial Court of Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija,
Branch 88, and that Cristina and Julius, being the accused in the criminal proceedings,
should be notified thereof so they can attend the examination.
The appellate court further reasoned that to allow the prosecution to take the
deposition of Mary Jane through written interrogatories will violate the right of
Cristina and Julius as the accused to confront a witness or to meet the witness face to
face.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) sought for reconsideration 12 but it
was denied by the appellate court in its June 5, 2018 Resolution. 13
Aggrieved, the OSG filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court before this Court alleging mainly that: (a) the Court of
Appeals erred in giving due course to Cristina and Julius's petition for certiorari
because there was another plain, speedy and adequate remedy available in the
ordinary course of law; in addition, the OSG contended that the Petition for
Certiorari should not have been given due course considering the lack of grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court; and; (b)
Rule 23 of the Rules of Court with respect to deposition under written interrogatories
can be applied suppletorily in the taking of the testimony of Mary Jane given her
extraordinary circumstances.
Meantime, spouses Cesar and Celia Veloso, parents of Mary Jane, filed a
"Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Attached Petition-In-Intervention." 14
They prayed to be allowed to intervene, on behalf of Mary Jane, in the instant
proceeding for the purpose of protecting and preserving their daughter's substantial
and immediate interest. Attached to their motion was their Petition-In-Intervention. 15
The OSG, on the other hand, submitted its Manifestation and Motion. 16 It
informed the Court that the trial court proceeded with the hearing of the criminal
cases in accordance with A.M. No. 15-06-10-SC, or the Revised Guidelines for
Continuous Trial of Criminal Cases. The prosecution has only Mary Jane to present as
a witness. Hence, the OSG prays that the Court immediately resolve the instant
Petition for Review and to suspend the application of A.M. No. 15-06-10-SC in the
criminal proceedings before the trial court.
In this Court's March 27, 2019 Resolution, 17 it denied the motion for
intervention of Mary Jane's parents for failure to establish legal interest in the instant
case that is actual and material as well as direct and immediate. The Court likewise
denied the OSG's prayer to suspend the application of A.M. No. 15-06-10-SC in the
criminal proceedings before the trial court for lack of basis.

Issues
 (a) Whether the Court of Appeals erred in granting the writ of certiorari, and;
(b) Whether Mary Jane's testimony may be validly acquired through deposition
by written interrogatories. TIADCc

The Court's Ruling

The Court finds the petition impressed with merit.

On Procedural Matters

The OSG avers that the appellate court erred in giving due course and granting
the respondents' Petition for Certiorari there being other plain, speedy, and adequate
remedies in the ordinary course of law. It further argues that the trial court did not
commit grave abuse of discretion when it granted the State's motion to allow the
taking of Mary Jane's testimony by deposition through written interrogatories.
The Court agrees.

Impropriety of the writ of certiorari

before the Court of Appeals

A writ of certiorari is limited in scope and narrow in character. It is available

only to correct acts rendered without jurisdiction, in excess of jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion. In other words, certiorari is proper to correct errors of
jurisdiction, and not errors of procedure or mistakes in the findings or
conclusions of the lower court. Thus, any alleged errors committed by the trial court
within the bounds of its jurisdiction and in the exercise of its discretion are mere
errors of judgment, correctible by an appeal or a petition for review under Rule 43 of
the Rules of Court, and not by a petition for certiorari. 18
The Supreme Court's pronouncement in Cruz v. People, 19 citing Delos Santos
v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company 20 is instructive on the scope of certiorari:
We remind that the writ of certiorari — being a remedy narrow in
scope and inflexible in character, whose purpose is to keep an inferior court
within the bounds of its jurisdiction, or to prevent an inferior court from
committing such grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of
jurisdiction, or to relieve parties from arbitrary acts of courts (i.e., acts that
courts have no power or authority in law to perform) — is not a general utility
tool in the legal workshop, and cannot be issued to correct every error
committed by a lower court.
In the common law, from which the remedy of certiorari evolved, the
writ of certiorari was issued out of Chancery, or the King's Bench,
commanding agents or officers of the inferior courts to return the record of a
 cause pending before them, so as to give the party more sure and speedy
justice, for the writ would enable the superior court to determine from an
inspection of the record whether the inferior court's judgment was rendered
without authority. The errors were of such a nature that, if allowed to stand,
they would result in a substantial injury to the petitioner to whom no other
remedy was available. If the inferior court acted without authority, the record
was then revised and corrected in matters of law. The writ of certiorari was
limited to cases in which the inferior court was said to be exceeding its
jurisdiction or was not proceeding according to essential requirements of law
and would lie only to review judicial or quasi-judicial acts.
The concept of the remedy of certiorari in our judicial system remains
much the same as it has been in the common law. In this jurisdiction,
however, the exercise of the power to issue the writ of certiorari is largely
regulated by laying down the instances or situations in the Rules of Court in
which a superior court may issue the writ of certiorari to an inferior court or
officer. Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court compellingly provides the
requirements for that purpose[.] AIDSTE

xxx xxx xxx

Pursuant to Section 1, supra, the petitioner must show that, one, the
tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and, two, there is neither an appeal
nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for
the purpose of amending or nullifying the proceeding. (Citations omitted)
It must be emphasized that the errors imputed against the trial court by Cristina
and Julius in their Petition for Certiorari pertained only to its appreciation of the
factual milieu, and the application of pertinent law and rules. Plainly, their Petition
for Certiorari did not contain factual allegations that can support a finding of grave
abuse of discretion. These alleged errors, if at all, amounted only to erroneous
exercise of the lower court's judgment, an error of judgment, not an error of
jurisdiction, which does not justify Cristina's and Julius's resort to a certiorari
proceeding.
Grave abuse of discretion is defined as "capricious or whimsical exercise of
judgment that is patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law." 21 It arises when a lower court or
tribunal violates and contravenes the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence.
22 The Supreme Court explained in Yu v. Judge Reyes-Carpio, 23 viz.:
The term "grave abuse of discretion" has a specific meaning. An act of
a court or tribunal can only be considered as with grave abuse of discretion
when such act is done in a "capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction." The abuse of discretion must be so patent
and gross as to amount to an "evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal
to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as
 where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion and hostility." Furthermore, the use of a petition for certiorari is
restricted only to "truly extraordinary cases wherein the act of the lower court
or quasi-judicial body is wholly void." From the foregoing definition, it is
clear that the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 can only strike an
act down for having been done with grave abuse of discretion if the petitioner
could manifestly show that such act was patent and gross. x x x.
In the case at bench, respondents did not even attempt to show that the trial
court abused its discretion, much less that the exercise thereof was so patent and gross
and to amount to lack of jurisdiction; in fact, even the appellate court simply stated in
its assailed Decision that the trial court merely erred, and not abuse its discretion,
much more grave, in applying Rule 23 of the Rules on Civil Procedure instead of
Rule 119 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, which particularly deals with the
conditional examination of a prosecution witness, like Mary Jane in this case, in
criminal cases. Notably, the appellate court did not specify the circumstances in
support of its conclusion that the trial court arrived at its conclusion in an arbitrary
and despotic manner. On the contrary, a close examination of the trial court's
judgment shows that it was anchored on the peculiar incidents surrounding the case,
and applied jurisprudence and rules which it believed were pertinent. It has in fact
judiciously discussed the rationale for its decision to allow the taking of Mary Jane's
deposition through written interrogatories in this wise: AaCTcI

First, Sec. 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
requiring prosecution witnesses who are either sick or infirm or has left the
Philippines without any date of return, to deliver their testimony in open court
cannot be applied to the private complainant, because her situation as a death
row convict in a foreign country incapacitates her from making decisions, on
her own, to take the witness stand. Such decision to testify and the manner by
which her testimony is to be given depends on the Indonesian authorities
before whom she was sentenced to suffer the supreme penalty of death;
Second, considering the inapplicability of Sec. 15, Rule 119 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Court found it appropriate to apply
in a suppletory manner, Sec. 23 of the Revised Rules of Court for the taking
of the private complainant's deposition upon written interrogatories. Sec. 1,
Rule 23 of the Revised Rules of Court specifically provides that the deposition
of a person confined in prison may be taken only by leave of court upon such
terms as the court prescribes;
Third, in the case of People of the Philippines v. Hubert Jeffrey Webb
x x x, the Supreme Court categorically declared that "due process is not a
monopoly of the defense. The State is entitled to due process as much as the
accused." To deny the motion of the Prosecution would result in a highly
inequitable situation where the sole witness relied upon by the Prosecution to
establish their case would be denied the opportunity to present her case due to
procedural technicalities which are beyond her control;
 Fourth, the deposition sought by the Prosecution is specifically aimed
at perpetuating the testimony of the private complainant, thus said deposition
may be allowed at any stage of the proceedings and even on appeal pursuant
to Rule 24 of the Revised Rules of Court in the separate opinion of former
Chief Justice Hilario Davide in the previously cited case of People vs. Webb,
be affirmed that depositions may be allowed in criminal cases and may be
taken at any time after the commencement of the action whenever necessary
or convenient, x x x;
xxx xxx xxx
Fifth, the offense involved in this case, i.e., qualified human
trafficking, is a major transnational crime committed across continents. Unlike
the previously cited cases of Cuenco and Go where the offenses involved are
non-index crimes (i.e., estafa and other deceits), the subject suit involves a
major transnational crime that cuts across borders and is a principal policy
concern among nations. Thus, the Court believes that the Prosecution should
not be denied the opportunity to prove its case, thus assuring the global
community that the Philippines is committed to fight such modern day
menace[.] 24
Indubitably, there was absence of any proof that the grant of the taking of
deposition through written interrogatories by the trial court was made in an arbitrary,
whimsical, and capricious manner. There was no patent abuse of discretion which was
so gross in nature thereby amounting to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law. 25
What was only apparent in the instant case was that the trial court properly considered
the extraordinary circumstances surrounding the plight of Mary Jane, in relation to
applicable rules and jurisprudence. Suffice it to state that the Decision of the trial
court was not without rhyme or reason. Clearly, there was an honest effort on the part
of the trial court to support its ratiocination and conclusion based on facts and law. EcTCAD

As already adverted, the case at hand is unprecedented. It involves novel issues

and poses difficult questions of law. It is settled jurisprudence that "[a] doubtful or
difficult question of law may become the basis of good faith and, in this regard, the
law always accords to public officials the presumption of good faith and regularity in
the performance of official duties. x x x Any person who seeks to establish otherwise
has the burden of proving bad faith or ill-motive." 26 As such, no abuse of discretion,
much more grave abuse of discretion, may be successfully imputed against the trial
court.
In fine, this Court holds that the Court of Appeals erred in finding grave abuse
of discretion on the part of the trial court and in holding that respondents' resort to a
Petition for Certiorari was proper.
This now brings our discussion to the substantive issues.

On Substantive Matters
 The OSG asserts that the presence of extraordinary circumstances, i.e., Mary
Jane's conviction by final judgment and her detention in a prison facility in
Yogyakarta, Indonesia, while awaiting execution by firing squad; the grant by the
Indonesian President of an indefinite reprieve in view of the ongoing legal
proceedings against Cristina and Julius in the Philippines; and the conditions attached
to the reprieve particularly that Mary Jane should remain in confinement in Indonesia,
and any question propounded to her must only be in writing, are more than enough
grounds to have allowed the suppletory application of Rule 23 of the Rules of Court.
The OSG's contentions are meritorious.
The Court cannot subscribe to the pronouncement by the appellate court that
the State failed to show compelling reasons to justify the relaxation of the Rules and
the suppletory application of Rule 23. The Court also cannot agree to its declaration
that the constitutional rights of Cristina and Julius to confront a witness will be
violated since safeguards were set in place by the trial court precisely to protect and
preserve their rights.

Section 15, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court

is inapplicable in the instant case

In its assailed Decision, the appellate court held that the deposition of Mary
Jane's testimony through written interrogatories in Indonesia is not sanctioned by
Section 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and that the
pronouncements of the Court in Go v. People 27 and Cuenco vda. De Manguerra v.
Risos 28 that Section 23 of the Rules of Civil Procedure should not be given any
suppletory application. It held that "just like a witness who is sick or infirm, Mary
Jane's imprisonment in Indonesia presents a limitation on her mobility." 29 According
to the Court of Appeals, Section 15, Rule 119 which applies to the taking of
depositions of prosecution witnesses in criminal cases, Mary Jane's deposition must
be taken before the court where the case is pending. In other words, the appellate
court opines that Mary Jane's testimony must be taken before the trial court, where the
cases of respondents are being heard, and not in Indonesia.
The Court begs to differ. HSAcaE

Section 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, reads:
Section 15. Examination of witness for the prosecution. — When it
satisfactorily appears that a witness for the prosecution is too sick or infirm
to appear at the trial as directed by the court, or has to leave the
Philippines with no definite date of returning, he may forthwith be
conditionally examined before the court where the case is pending. Such
examination, in the presence of the accused, or in his absence after reasonable
notice to attend the examination has been served on him, shall be conducted in
the same manner as an examination at the trial. Failure or refusal of the
accused to attend the examination after notice shall be considered a waiver.
 The statement taken may be admitted in behalf of or against the accused.
(Emphasis Ours.)
Under the foregoing provision, in order for the testimony of the prosecution
witness be taken before the court where the case is being heard, it must be shown that
the said prosecution witness is either: (a) too sick or infirm to appear at the trial as
directed by the order of the court, or; (b) has to leave the Philippines with no definite
date of returning.
Surely, the case of Mary Jane does not fall under either category. She is neither
too sick nor infirm to appear at the trial nor has to leave the Philippines indefinitely.
To recall, Mary Jane is currently imprisoned in Indonesia for having been convicted
by final judgment of the crime of drug trafficking, a grave offense in the said state. In
fact, she was already sentenced to death and is only awaiting her execution by firing
squad. Her situation is not akin to a person whose limitation of mobility is by reason
of ill-health or feeble age, the grounds cited in Section 15 of Rule 119. In fact, Mary
Jane's predicament does not in way pertain to a restriction in movement from one
place to another but a deprivation of liberty thru detention in a foreign country with
little or no hope of being saved from the extreme penalty of death by firing squad.
It thus necessarily follows that the cases of Go v. People and Cuenco vda. De
Manguera v. Risos are not on all fours with the present case. The circumstances of the
prosecution witnesses in the cases of Go and Cuenco demanded and justified the strict
adherence to Rule 119. The witnesses in both cases anchored their allowance to testify
by way of deposition on their claims that they were too sick or infirm to testify before
the court. In the case of Go, Li Luen Pen who returned to Cambodia claimed that he
was undergoing treatment for lung infection and could not travel back to the
Philippines due to his illness.
Similarly, in the case of Cuenco, Concepcion Cuenco Vda. de Manguerra
averred that she would not be able to testify before the trial court due to weak physical
condition and age. Note, however, that despite the limitation in the mobility of Li
Luen Pen and Concepcion, they can still undoubted voluntarily take the witness stand
and testify before the trial court should they get better or so decide.
This is not the same in the case of Mary Jane. She cannot even take a single
step out of the prison facility of her own volition without facing severe consequences.
Her imprisonment in Indonesia and the conditions attached to her reprieve denied her
of any opportunity to decide for herself to voluntarily appear and testify before the
trial court in Nueva Ecija where the cases of the respondents were pending.
Unfortunately, in denying the State's motion for deposition through written
interrogatories and effectively requiring the presence of Mary Jane before the RTC of
Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija, the Court of Appeals appeared to have strictly and rigidly
applied and interpreted Section 15, Rule 119 without taking into consideration the
concomitant right to due process of Mary Jane and the State as well as the prejudice
that will be caused to Mary Jane or the People with its pronouncement. Considering
the circumstances of Mary Jane, the Court of Appeals demanded for the impossible to
happen and thus impaired the substantial rights of Mary Jane and the State. It was
akin to a denial of due process on the part of Mary Jane as well as of the State to
establish its case against the respondents. The peculiar circumstances obtaining in the
present case made it impossible for Mary Jane to appear before the RTC of Sto.
Domingo, Nueva Ecija. Just like when Mary Jane was recruited by the respondents
and taken advantage of because of her poor condition, the same scenario is being
repeated because the respondents are again taking advantage of Mary Jane's dire
circumstances which they themselves put her in, by depriving her the opportunity to
speak and obtain justice for herself. The Court of Appeals did not take into account
the fact that the case of the prosecution against Cristina and Julius can only be erected
through the testimony of Mary Jane herself.
Moreover, by denying the prosecution's motion to take deposition by written
interrogatories, the appellate court in effect silenced Mary Jane and denied her and the
People of their right to due process by presenting their case against the said accused.
By its belief that it was rendering justice to the respondents, it totally forgot that it in
effect impaired the rights of Mary Jane as well as the People. By not allowing Mary
Jane to testify through written interrogatories, the Court of Appeals deprived her of
the opportunity to prove her innocence before the Indonesian authorities and for the
Philippine Government the chance to comply with the conditions set for the grant of
reprieve to Mary Jane. HESIcT

It is well to remind the Court of Appeals at this point that as held in Secretary
of Justice v. Lantion, 30 "[t]he due process clauses in the American and Philippine
Constitutions are not only worded in exactly identical language and terminology, but
more importantly, they are alike in what their respective Supreme Courts have
expounded as the spirit with which the provisions are informed and impressed, the
elasticity in their interpretation, their dynamic and resilient character which make
them capable of meeting every modern problem, and their having been designed from
earliest time to the present to meet the exigencies of an undefined and expanding
future. The requirements of due process are interpreted in both the United States and
the Philippines as not denying to the law the capacity for progress and improvement.
Toward this effect and in order to avoid the confines of a legal straitjacket, the courts
instead prefer to have the meaning of the due process clause 'gradually ascertained by
the process of inclusion and exclusion in the course of the decisions of cases as they
arise' (Twining vs. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78). Capsulized, it refers to 'the embodiment
of the sporting idea of fair play' (Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Owner's Association
vs. City Mayor of Manila, 20 SCRA 849 [1967]). It relates to certain immutable
principles of justice which inhere in the very idea of free government (Holden vs.
Hardy, 169 U.S. 366)." Thus, it behooved upon the Court of Appeals to have provided
some leeway in its interpretation of the subject provision.
At this juncture, we find the discussion on the matter by Justice Florenz D.
Regalado instructive and relevant, viz.: 31
 1. Rules 23 to 28 provide for the different modes of discovery that may
be resorted to by a party to an action, viz.:
a. Depositions pending action (Rule 23);
b. Depositions before action or pending appeal (Rule 24);
c. Interrogatories to parties (Rule 25);
d. Admission by adverse party (Rule 26);
e. Production or inspection of documents or things (Rule 27); and
f. Physical and mental examination of persons (Rule 28);
Rule 29 provides for the legal consequences for the refusal of a party
to comply with such modes of discovery lawfully resorted to by the adverse
party.
2. In criminal cases, the taking of the deposition of witnesses for the
prosecution was formerly authorized by Sec. 7, Rule 119 for the purpose of
perpetuating the evidence to be presented at the trial, without a similar
provision for defense witnesses. However, in the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, only the conditional examination, and not a deposition, of
prosecution witnesses was permitted (Sec. 7, Rule 119) and this was followed
in the latest revision (Sec. 15, Rule 119).
3. Depositions are classified into:
a. Depositions on oral examination and depositions upon written
interrogatories; or
b. Depositions de bene esse and depositions in perpetuam rei
memoriam.
Depositions de bene esse are those taken for purposes of a pending
action and are regulated by Rule 23, while depositions in perpetuam rei
memoriam are those taken to perpetuate evidence for purposes of an
anticipated action or further proceedings in a case on appeal and are now
regulated by Rule 24.
4. The court may determine whether the deposition should be taken
upon oral examination or written interrogatories to prevent abuse or
harassment (De los Reyes vs. CA, et al., L-27263, Mar. 17, 1975).

The extraordinary factual circumstances

surrounding the case of Mary Jane warrant
the resort to Rule 23 of the Rules of Court

Is the prosecution's resort to Rule 23 of the Rules of Court in taking Mary

Jane's testimony as a prosecution witness proper?
The Court rules in the affirmative.
 At the outset, the Court is always guided by the principle that rules shall be
liberally construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and
inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. 32 Simply put, rules of
procedure should facilitate an orderly administration of justice. They should not be
strictly applied causing injury to a substantive right of a party to case. This precept
has been elucidated by the Supreme Court in De Guzman v. Sandiganbayan, 33 to wit:
[T]he rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate
the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result
in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice,
must always be avoided. Even the Rules of Court envision this liberality. This
power to suspend or even disregard the rules can be so pervasive and
encompassing so as to alter even that which this Court itself has already
declared to be final, as we are now compelled to do in this case. And this is
not without additional basis. x x xICHDca

There are several instances wherein the Court has relaxed procedural rules to
serve substantial justice because of any of the following reasons: (a) matters of life,
liberty, honor or property; (b) the existence of special or compelling circumstances,
(c) the merits of the case, (d) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence
of the party favored by the suspension of the rules, (e) a lack of any showing that the
review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (f) n the other party will not be
unjustly prejudiced thereby. 34
Nonetheless, the Court always reminds party litigants that bare invocation of
"the interest of substantial justice" is not a magic phrase that will automatically oblige
the Court to suspend procedural rules. To stress, "[p]rocedural rules are not to be
belittled or dismissed simply because their non-observance may have prejudiced a
party's substantive rights. Like all rules, they are required to be followed except only
for the most persuasive of reasons when they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an
injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying
with the procedure prescribed." 35
The 2004 Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, also known
as the ASEAN Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty, was entered into by the Southeast
Asian countries namely: Brunei Darussalam, the Kingdom of Cambodia, Republic of
Indonesia, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Malaysia, the Union of Myanmar,
Republic of the Philippines, Republic of Singapore, Kingdom of Thailand, and the
Socialist Republic of Vietnam. The Treaty aims to improve the effectiveness of the
law enforcement authorities of the state parties in the prevention, investigation and
prosecution of offenses through cooperation and mutual legal assistance in criminal
matters.
Article 1, paragraph 2 (a) of the Treaty states that mutual legal assistance can
be rendered by the state parties in case of taking evidence or obtaining voluntary
statements from persons, among others. The legal assistance sought by the
Requesting Party from the Requested Party is not without limitations. In fact, Article
3 of the ASEAN MLAT has laid down guidelines on limitations on assistance. In
particular, paragraph 7 of the said Article states that the Requested Party can render
legal assistance subject to certain conditions which the Requested Party must observe.
To recall, the Indonesia Government imposed the following conditions in
taking the testimony of Mary Jane:
a) Mary Jane shall remain in detention in Yogyakarta, Indonesia;
b) No cameras shall be allowed;
c) The lawyers of the parties shall not be present;
d) The questions to be propounded to Mary Jane shall be in writing.
Interestingly, nowhere in the present Rules on Criminal Procedure does it state
how a deposition, of a prosecution witness who is at the same time convicted of a
grave offense by final judgment and imprisoned in a foreign jurisdiction, may be
taken to perpetuate the testimony of such witness. The Rules, in particular, are silent
as to how to take a testimony of a witness who is unable to testify in open court
because he is imprisoned in another country.
Depositions, however, are recognized under Rule 23 of the Rules on Civil
Procedure. Although the rule on deposition by written interrogatories is inscribed
under the said Rule, the Court holds that it may be applied suppletorily in criminal
proceedings so long as there is compelling reason.
In a catena of cases, the Supreme Court had relaxed the procedural rules by
applying suppletorily certain provisions of the Rules on Civil Procedure in criminal
proceedings. TCAScE

For one, in Canos v. Peralta, 36 the Supreme Court held that the trial court
judge did not abuse his discretion when it ordered the consolidation and joint trial of
the criminal cases that were filed against petitioner Adela J. Canos. It reasoned,
among others, that consolidation of cases is authorized under Section 1, Rule 31 of the
Rules on Civil Procedure.
The same rule was applied in Naguiat v. Intermediate Appellate Court 37 and
Cojuangco, Jr. v. Court of Appeals 38 wherein the Supreme Court upheld the
consolidation of the criminal case and civil case that were respectively filed against
the petitioners therein.
On that score, the Court finds no reason to depart from its practice to liberally
construe procedural rules for the orderly administration of substantial justice.
The conditions with respect to the taking of the testimony of Mary Jane that
were laid down by the Indonesian Government support the allowance of written
interrogatories under Rule 23 of the Rules of Court, the pertinent provisions of which
read:
 Section 1. Depositions pending action, when may be taken. — By
leave of court after jurisdiction has been obtained over any defendant or over
property which is the subject of the action, or without such leave after an
answer has been served, the testimony of any person, whether a party or not,
may be taken, at the instance of any party, by deposition upon oral
examination or written interrogatories. The attendance of witnesses may be
compelled by the use of a subpoena as provided in Rule 21. Depositions shall
be taken only in accordance with these Rules. The deposition of a person
confined in prison may be taken only by leave of court on such terms as the
court prescribes.
Section 11. Persons before whom depositions may be taken in foreign
countries. — In a foreign state or country, depositions may be taken (a) on
notice before a secretary of embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-
consul, or consular agent of the Republic of the Philippines; (b) before such
person or officer as may be appointed by commission or under letters
rogatory; or (c) the person referred to in section 14 hereof.
Section 25. Deposition upon written interrogatories; service of notice
and of interrogatories. — A party desiring to take the deposition of any
person upon written interrogatories shall serve them upon every other party
with a notice stating the name and address of the person who is to answer
them and the name or descriptive title and address of the officer before whom
the deposition is to be taken. Within ten (10) days thereafter, a party so served
may serve cross-interrogatories upon the party proposing to take the
deposition. Within five (5) days thereafter, the latter may serve re-direct
interrogatories upon a party who has served cross-interrogatories. Within three
(3) days after being served with re-direct interrogatories, a party may serve
recross-interrogatories upon the party proposing to take the deposition.
A strict application of the procedural rules will defeat the very purpose for the
grant of reprieve by the Indonesian authorities to Mary Jane. Mary Jane's testimony,
being the victim, is vital in the prosecution of the pending criminal cases that were
filed against Cristina and Julius. This has been recognized by no less than the
Indonesian President, His Excellency Joko Widodo, who granted the reprieve
precisely to afford Mary Jane the opportunity to participate in the legal proceedings
obtaining in the Philippines. cTDaEH

Besides, the disallowance of the written interrogatories is not in congruence

with the aim of ASEAN MLAT, that is to render mutual legal assistance in criminal
matters among signatory states including the Philippines. The ASEAN MLAT is
enforced precisely to be applied in circumstances like in the case of Mary Jane. It
recognizes the significance of cooperation and coordination among the states to
prevent, investigate and prosecute criminal offenses especially if perpetuated not only
in a single state just like in the case of drug and human trafficking, and illegal
recruitment, the very charges that were filed against respondents.
 Verily, in light of the unusual circumstances surrounding the instant case, the
Court sees no reason not to apply suppletorily the provisions of Rule 23 of the Rules
on Civil Procedure in the interest of substantial justice and fairness. Hence, the taking
of testimony of Mary Jane through a deposition by written interrogatories is in order.

The deposition by written interrogatories

is pursuant to Mary Jane's right to due process

Furthermore, to disallow the written interrogatories will curtail Mary Jane's

right to due process.
The benchmark of the right to due process in criminal justice is to ensure that
all the parties have their day in court. It is in accord with the duty of the government
to follow a fair process of decision-making when it acts to deprive a person of his
liberty. But just as an accused is accorded this constitutional protection, so is the State
entitled to due process in criminal prosecutions. It must likewise be given an equal
chance to present its evidence in support of a charge. 39
Here, the trial court acted within its jurisdiction when it granted the taking of
Mary Jane's deposition by written interrogatories. The grant of the written
interrogatories by the Indonesian Government perceives the State's opportunity to
present all its desired witnesses in the prosecution of its cases against Cristina and
Julius. It is afforded fair opportunity to present witnesses and evidence it deem vital to
ensure that the injury sustained by the People in the commission of the criminal acts
will be well compensated and, most of all, that justice be achieved. Hence, the right of
the State to prosecute and prove its case have been fully upheld and protected.
Further, the right of the State to prove the criminal liability of Cristina and
Julius should not be derailed and prevented by the stringent application of the
procedural rules. Otherwise, it will constitute a violation of the basic constitutional
rights of the State and of Mary Jane to due process which this Court cannot disregard.
cSaATC

The fundamental rights of both the accused and the State must be equally
upheld and protected so that justice can prevail in the truest sense of the word. To do
justice to accused and injustice to the State is no justice at all. Justice must be
dispensed to all the parties alike. 40 As aptly held in Dimatulac v. Villon: 41
The judge, on the other hand, "should always be imbued with a high
sense of duty and responsibility in the discharge of his obligation to promptly
and properly administer justice." He must view himself as a priest, for the
administration of justice is akin to a religious crusade. Thus, exerting the same
devotion as a priest "in the performance of the most sacred ceremonies of
religious liturgy," the judge must render service with impartiality
commensurate with the public trust and confidence reposed in him. Although
the determination of a criminal case before a judge lies within his exclusive
jurisdiction and competence, his discretion is not unfettered, but rather must
be exercised within reasonable confines. The judge's action must not impair
 the substantial rights of the accused, nor the right of the State and
offended party to due process of law.
Indeed, for justice to prevail, the scales must balance; justice is not
to be dispensed for the accused alone. The interests of society and the
offended parties which have been wronged must be equally considered.
Verily, a verdict of conviction is not necessarily a denial of justice, and an
acquittal is not necessarily a triumph of justice; for, to the society offended
and the party wronged, it could also mean injustice. Justice then must be
rendered even-handedly to both the accused, on one hand, and the State and
offended party, on the other. (Emphasis Supplied.)

No violation of the constitutional right

to confrontation of a witness

Similarly, the deposition by written interrogatories will not infringe the

constitutional right to confrontation of a witness of Cristina and Julius.
The right to confrontation of a witness is one of the fundamental basic rights of
an accused. It is ingrained in our justice system and guaranteed by no less than the
1987 Constitution as stated under its Article III, Section 14 (2), to wit:
Section 14. (1) x x x
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by
himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him, to have a speedy, impartial and public trial, to meet the
witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the
attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf.
However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of
the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is
unjustifiable. (Emphasis supplied)
The right to confrontation is part of due process not only in criminal
proceedings but also in civil proceedings as well as in proceedings in administrative
tribunals with quasi-judicial powers. 42 It has a two-fold purpose: (1) primarily, to
afford the accused an opportunity to test the testimony of the witness by cross-
examination; and (2) secondarily, to allow the judge to observe the deportment of the
witness. 43
True, Cristina and Julius have no opportunity to confront Mary Jane face to
face in light of the prevailing circumstance. However, the terms and conditions laid
down by the trial court ensure that they are given ample opportunity to cross-examine
Mary Jane by way of written interrogatories so as not to defeat the first purpose of
their constitutional right. To recall, the trial court requires Cristina and Julius, through
their counsel, to file their comment and may raise objections to the proposed
questions in the written interrogatories submitted by the prosecution. The trial court
judge shall promptly rule on the objections. Thereafter, only the final questions would
be asked by the Consul of the Philippines in Indonesia or his designated
representative. The answers of Mary Jane to the propounded questions must be
written verbatim, and a transcribed copy of the same would be given to the counsel of
the accused who would, in turn, submit their proposed cross interrogatory questions to
the prosecution. Should the prosecution raise any objection thereto, the trial court
judge must promptly rule on the same, and the final cross interrogatory questions for
the deposition of Mary Jane will then be conducted. Mary Jane's answers in the cross
interrogatory shall likewise be taken in verbatim and a transcribed copy thereof shall
be given to the prosecution. cHDAIS

The second purpose of the constitutional right to confrontation has likewise

been upheld. As aptly stated in the terms and conditions for the taking of deposition,
the trial court judge will be present during the conduct of written interrogatories on
Mary Jane. This will give her ample opportunity to observe and to examine the
demeanor of the witness closely. Although the deposition is in writing, the trial court
judge can still carefully perceive the reaction and deportment of Mary Jane as she
answers each question propounded to her both by the prosecution and the defense.
Indubitably, the constitutional rights of Cristina and Julius are equally
safeguarded. The parameters laid down by the trial court are sufficient in detail
ensuring that Mary Jane will give her testimony under oath to deter lying by the threat
of perjury charge. She is still subjected to cross-examination so as to determine the
presence of any falsehood in her testimony. Lastly, the guidelines enable the trial
court judge to observe her demeanor as a witness and assess her credibility.
Finally, it must be mentioned that a "dying declaration" is one of the
recognized exceptions to the right to confrontation. 44 In the case at bar, it will not be
amiss to state that Mary Jane's deposition through written interrogatories is akin to her
dying declaration. There is no doubt that Mary Jane will be answering the written
interrogatories under the consciousness of an impending death — or execution by a
firing squad to be exact. To stress, Mary Jane has been convicted by final judgment
and sentenced to death by firing squad. Mary Jane has already availed of all available
legal remedies and there is no expectation that her conviction will be overturned by
the Indonesian authorities. The only purpose for the grant of the reprieve was for
Mary Jane to assist the prosecution in erecting its case against her recruiters and
traffickers. There was nary any mention that the outcome of the legal proceedings
here in the Philippines will have a concomitant effect in Mary Jane's conviction by the
Indonesian authorities. That Mary Jane is facing impending death is undisputed
considering the nature of her reprieve which is merely temporary. It is therefore not a
stretch of imagination to state that Mary Jane's declarations in her deposition "are
made in extremity, [she being] at the point of death, and x x x every hope of this
world is gone; when every motive to falsehood is silenced and the mind is induced by
the most powerful considerations to speak the truth," 45 to vindicate oneself, and to
secure justice to her detractors.
 All told, the Court finds reversible error in the assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals. It erred when it gave due course to the Petition for Certiorari of Cristina and
Julius considering that the errors ascribed therein were mere errors of judgment which
do not lie in a certiorari proceeding. More importantly, the trial court did not gravely
abuse its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it granted the
taking of testimony of Mary Jane by way of deposition through written interrogatories
in light of the conditions of Mary Jane's reprieve and her imprisonment in Indonesia.
These are compelling reasons to liberally construe the procedural rules and apply
suppletorily the Rules on Civil Procedure. Yet still, the fundamental rights, not only
of the State, but also of the accused Cristina and Julius have been fully and equally
protected and preserved in the pursuit of justice.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the instant petition. The December 13,
2017 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 149002 is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The August 16, 2016 Resolution of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 88 of Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija, is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION that the deposition will be taken before our Consular Office and
officials in Indonesia pursuant to the Rules of Court and principles of jurisdiction.
The recommendation by the Office of the Solicitor General for this Court to
promulgate a set of rules for the guidance of the Bench and the Bar in transnational
cases that may arise in the future, where a prosecution's vital witness in a criminal
proceeding is unavailable for reasons other than those listed in Section 15, Rule 119
of the Rules of Criminal Procedure vis-a-vis the enforcement of the accused's
constitutional right to confront witnesses face-to-face is NOTED and REFERRED
to this Court's Committee on Revision of the Rules for its appropriate action. ISHCcT

SO ORDERED.
Peralta, Leonen and A.B. Reyes, Jr., JJ., concur.
Inting, J., is on official leave.
 
||| (People v. Sergio, G.R. No. 240053, [October 9, 2019])

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. Nos. 152864-65. September 27, 2006.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. SPO1 MARIO

MARCIAL, SPO1 MONICO BOLOTANO, SPO1 ANASTACIO
MAGLINTE, SPO1 ALFREDO NUÑEZ, SPO1 RUDY BUNALOS,
and PO3 TOMAS DUHAYLUNSOD, respondents.
 DECISION

AZCUNA, J : p

This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court purportedly
raising a question of law and assailing the orders dated February 6, 2002 1 and March
7, 2002 2 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, of Oroquieta City (the RTC) in
Criminal Case Nos. 798-14-235 and 800-14-237.
The facts appear as follows:
Two informations, one for homicide and one for frustrated homicide, were
filed with the RTC against respondents SPO1 Mario Marcial, SPO1 Monico
Bolotano, SPO1 Anastacio Maglinte, SPO1 Alfredo Nuñez, SPO1 Rudy Bunalos and
PO3 Tomas Duhaylunsod, all members of the Philippine National Police, in
connection with a shooting incident that occurred on December 18, 1999. As a result
of the incident, one Junnyver Dagle died while one Wendell Sales was seriously
injured.
The information for homicide against the respondents reads as follows:

That on 18 December 1999, in Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental, and

within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring together and mutually helping one another, committing the offense in
relation to their office and in grave abuse thereof with intent to kill, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot JUNNYVER DAGLE with
their firearms, thereby inflicting upon the latter a fatal injury to his head, which
caused his instantaneous death.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Oroquieta City, Philippines, May 23, 2001. 3

On the other hand, the information for frustrated homicide reads as follows:

That on or about the 18th December 1999, in the municipality of Lopez

Jaena, province of Misamis Occidental, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping once another, committing the offense in relation to their office
and in grave abuse thereof, with intent to kill, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously shoot WENDELL SALES with their firearms,
thereby inflicting upon the latter an injury which ordinarily would cause the
death of said WENDELL SALES, thus performing all the acts of execution
which would have produced the crime of homicide as a consequence, but
nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of
 the said accused, that is, by the timely and able medical assistance rendered to
the said WENDELL SALES which prevented his death.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Oroquieta City, Philippines, May 23, 2001. 4

On arraignment, respondents pleaded not guilty to the charges filed against

them. Pre-trial was thereafter held and terminated, resulting in the issuance by the
RTC of a pre-trial order 5 which, among others, approved the partial stipulation of
facts, issues and witnesses 6 dated December 20, 2001 entered into by the parties.
The parties stipulated as to the following facts: 7

(1) The identity of all respondents and their affiliation with the PNP-
Lopez Jaena Police Station; HSTAcI

(2) In the evening of December 18, 1999, all respondents were members
of the PNP Team that responded to an alleged or reported call for police
assistance at, and received by, the Lopez Jaena Police Station, coming from an
alleged caller;

(3) The PNP team composed of all respondents proceeded to the

direction of Plaridel, Misamis Occidental;

(4) After the Solsolon Bridge located in Barangay Sibula, Lopez Jaena,

Misamis Occidental, all respondents saw two (2) persons riding astride a
motorcycle going towards the direction of Plaridel, Misamis Occidental, who,
after the incident, were identified to be the late Junnyver Dagle and Wendell
Sales;

(5) While Junnyver Dagle and Wendell Sales were riding on a

motorcycle with the latter driving, there were shots fired, coming from the
direction of respondents;

(6) As a result of the shooting, Junnyver Dagle and Wendell Sales were
hit and injured, the nature of their injuries being described in their respective
Medico-legal Certificates dated December 27, 1999 issued by Dr. Olyzar H.
Recamadas, the attending physician, and attested to by Provincial Health
Officer II Jose M. Salomon, Sr. of the Misamis Occidental Provincial Hospital,
Oroquieta City as follows:

a. Junnyver Dagle:
   "DOA"
  Gunshoot wound left temporal area
  Avulsion left leg
 b. Wendell Sales:
  "Avulsion left leg distal 3rd secondary to alleged
  gunshot wound"

(7) The Lopez Jaena Police Station, through Police Inspector Mario R.

Rubio, issued a Certification dated December 23, 1999 relative to the entries
found on its Police Blotter on December 23, 1999. This certification was
admitted as to its existence only by the prosecution;

(8) The fact of death of Junnyver Dagle is admitted as well as the fact

that Wendell Sales sustained bodily injury;

(9) For the death of Junnyver Dagle, his heirs are entitled to a civil
indemnity in the sum of P50,000;

(10) In relation to the December 18, 1999 incident subject of the present
criminal cases, there was a criminal case for robbery filed against Wendell Sales
by the Provincial Prosecutor's Office of Misamis Occidental before RTC,
Branch 14, of Oroquieta City entitled "People v. Wendell Sales" docketed as
Criminal Case No. 729-14-167. A judgment was subsequently rendered in the
latter case convicting Wendell Sales of the crime charged but this judgment was
appealed to the Court of Appeals where it remains pending to date.

The parties likewise agreed on the following issues: 8

(1) Whether there was a hot pursuit conducted by respondents on the

motorcycle-riding tandem of Junnyver Dagle and Wendell Sales, with
respondents riding on board their police service vehicle in the vicinity of
Barangay Sibula, Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental;

(2) Whether there were warning shots made by respondents, directed in the air,
to cause the motorcycle riders to stop;

(3) Whether Junnyver Dagle or Wendell Sales tried to pull out a short firearm
and (whether Dagle or Sales) fired it at respondents, causing some of
them to fire back;

(4) Assuming a firearm was pulled out, whether it was Junnyver Dagle who
pulled out such gun and aimed and fired it at the direction of
respondents;

(5) Whether there was found near the person of the fallen Junnyver Dagle a .45
caliber pistol without a serial number;

(6) Whether the parents of the late Junnyver Dagle incurred burial and
transportation expenses by reason of the latter's untimely demise;
 (7) Whether Wendell Sales incurred medical expenses by reason of his
hospitalization for the injuries he sustained; and,

(8) Whether the parents of the late Junnyver Dagle and private complainant
Wendell Sales are entitled to moral damages.

During the hearing held on February 6, 2002, petitioner made an oral motion to
reverse the order of the trial upon the ground that respondents admitted committing
the acts for which they were charged in the two informations but interposed lawful
justifying circumstances. The motion was denied by the RTC for lack of merit in the
assailed order dated February 6, 2002. Its motion for reconsideration having been
similarly denied, petitioner filed the present petition.
The issues are:

(a) Whether an order denying a party's motion to modify or reverse the order of

trial in a criminal case is appealable; and,

(b) Assuming that the order is appealable, whether it is mandatory for a trial

court to modify or reverse the order of trial when an accused admits the
offense but interposes a lawful defense.

Petitioner argues as follows:

Firstly, since respondents expressly admitted having committed the acts
charged but are interposing an affirmative defense, a modification or reversal of the
order of trial is warranted under Section 3 (e), 9 Rule 119 of the Rules of Court which
provides as follows:

(e) When the accused admits the act or omission charged in the complaint or
information but interposes a lawful defense, the order of trial may be
modified.

Secondly, an order reversing or modifying the order of trial would also be

consistent with the second paragraph of Section 7 of Republic Act No. 8493 (Speedy
Trial Act) and its implementing Circular No. 38-98, specifically the second paragraph
of Section 3 of the Circular, thus:

Republic Act No. 8493, Section 7:

xxx xxx xxx

If the accused pleads not guilty to the crime charged, he/she shall state
whether he/she interposes a negative or affirmative defense. A negative
defense shall require the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt while an affirmative defense may modify the
 order of trial and require the accused to prove such defense by clear and
convincing evidence.

Circular No. 38-98, Section 3:

xxx xxx xxx

If the accused has pleaded not guilty to the crime charged, he may state
whether he interposes a negative or affirmative defense. A negative
defense shall require the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused
beyong reasonable doubt, while an affirmative defense may modify the
order of trial and require the accused to prove such defense by clear and
convincing evidence.

Thirdly, the reversal or modification of the order of trial in the present case
would promote the intent and objectives of the Speedy Trial Act, preserve the rights
of the parties, and prevent a confusing and disorderly trial.
The assailed orders of the RTC denied the request of the prosecution for a
reverse order of trial basically on the grounds that:

1. There is no clear admission of guilt on the part of the accused, herein

respondents, under the stipulation of facts entered into;

2. A reverse order of trial in these cases would only serve to delay rather
than speed up the proceedings; and,

3. The course of the trial is better governed by the usual order under
Section 11, Rule 119, of the Revised Rules of Court and the sequence set forth
in the pre-trial order, agreed upon by the parties, which did not include an
agreement to a reverse the order of trial.

After considering the arguments of both parties herein, the Court finds that the
RTC did not commit any reversible error in denying the request for a reverse order of
trial, a matter which under the rules is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial
court. In fact, the rule relied upon by petitioner clearly reflects this discretionary
nature of the procedure, thus:

Rules of Court, Rule 119, Section 3(e):

xxx xxx xxx

 (e) When the accused admits the act or omission charged in the
complaint or information but interposes a lawful defense, the order of trial
may be modified. 10 (Emphasis supplied.)

Republic Act No. 8493, Section 7, likewise states:

xxx xxx xxx

If the accused pleads not guilty to the crime charged, he/she shall state
whether he/she interposes a negative or affirmative defense. A negative defense
shall require the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt while an affirmative defense may modify the order of trial and require
the accused to prove such defense by clear and convincing evidence. (Emphasis
supplied.)

So also Circular No. 38-98, Section 3, reads as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

If the accused has pleaded not guilty to the crime charged, he may state
whether he interposes a negative or affirmative defense. A negative defense
shall require the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyong reasonable
doubt, while an affirmative defense may modify the order of trial and require
the accused to prove such defense by clear and convincing evidence. (Emphasis
supplied.)

Accordingly, the RTC correctly exercised its discretion in denying petitioner's

request for a reverse order of trial.
In any event, a denial of a motion to reverse the Order of Trial is interlocutory
in nature and, hence, not appealable. As it turned out, petitioner's appeal has in fact
caused more, a lot more, delay than would have been caused by proceeding with the
trial forthwith as directed by the trial court. No further delay should be countenanced
in these cases.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona and Garcia, JJ., concur.
 
||| (People v. Marcial, G.R. Nos. 152864-65, [September 27, 2006], 534 PHIL 664-672)

SECOND DIVISION
 [G.R. No. 209195. September 17, 2014.]

MANUEL J. JIMENEZ, JR., petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, respondent.

[G.R. No. 209215. September 17, 2014.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. MANUEL J.

JIMENEZ, JR., respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J : p

Before the Court are two consolidated petitions for review on certiorari filed
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the amended decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 121167 entitled Manuel J. Jimenez, Jr. v. Hon. Zaldy
B. Docena, et al.

The CA did not find any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC Branch 170, Malabon) Judge Zaldy B. Docena (Judge Docena) in issuing the
order which granted the People of the Philippines' motion to discharge Manuel A.
Montero (Montero) as a state witness in Criminal Case No. 39225-MN.

The G.R. No. 209195 petition was filed by Manuel J. Jimenez, Jr. (Jimenez). He
prays in this petition for the reversal of the CA's amended decision insofar as it ruled that
Judge Docena did not gravely abuse his discretion in issuing the assailed order.

The People likewise filed its petition, docketed as G.R. No. 209215. This petition
seeks to reverse the amended decision of the CA insofar as it ordered the re-raffle of the
criminal case to another RTC judge for trial on the merits.

The Factual Antecedents

On May 18, 2009 and June 11, 2009, Montero (a former employee of the BSJ
Company owned by the Jimenezes) executed sworn statements confessing his
participation in the killing of Ruby Rose Barrameda (Ruby Rose), and naming petitioner
Jimenez, Lope Jimenez (Lope, the petitioner Jimenez's younger brother), Lennard A.
Descalso (Lennard) alias "Spyke," Robert Ponce (Robert) alias "Obet," and Eric
Fernandez (Eric), as his co-conspirators. 2
 The statements of Montero which provided the details on where the alleged steel
casing containing the body of Ruby Rose was dumped, led to the recovery of a cadaver,
encased in a drum and steel casing, near or practically at the place that Montero pointed
to. 3

On August 20, 2009, the People, through the state prosecutors, filed an
Information before the RTC, charging Jimenez, Lope, Lennard, Robert, Eric and Montero
of murder for the killing of Ruby Rose. 4

Montero thereafter filed a motion for his discharge entitled "Motion for the
Discharge of the Witness as Accused Pursuant to the Witness Protection Program"
pursuant to Republic Act No. 6981. The People also filed a motion to discharge Montero
as a state witness for the prosecution. Jimenez opposed both motions. 5 ITDHSE

The RTC's ruling

On March 19, 2010, the RTC's Acting Presiding Judge Hector B. Almeyda (Judge
Almeyda) denied the motion to discharge Montero as a state witness. 6

Judge Almeyda ruled that the prosecution failed to comply with the requirements
of Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure for the discharge of
an accused as a state witness; it failed to clearly show that Montero was not the most
guilty or, at best, the least guilty among the accused. The judge further ruled that
Montero's statements were not corroborated by the other evidence on record. The
prosecution, too, failed to present evidence to sustain the possibility of conviction against
Jimenez. 7

Montero and the People filed separate motions for reconsideration.

The July 30, 2010 order

On July 30, 2010, Judge Docena, the newly-appointed regular judge, reconsidered
and reversed Judge Almeyda's order and ruled that the prosecution had presented clear,
satisfactory and convincing evidence showing compliance with the requisites of Section
17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

According to Judge Docena, the crime would have remained undiscovered and
unsolved had it not been for Montero's extrajudicial confession that narrated in detail the
manner of the abduction and subsequent murder of Ruby Rose. As the crime was
committed in secret, only one of the co-conspirators, such as Montero, could give direct
evidence identifying the other coconspirators.
 Judge Docena further ruled that Montero is qualified to be discharged as a state
witness as he does not appear to be the most guilty although he is a principal by direct
participation. The principals by inducement are more guilty because, without their orders,
the crime would not have been committed. Finally, Montero has not been convicted of
any crime involving moral turpitude.

Jimenez moved for the reconsideration of Judge Docena's ruling. 8

The December 29, 2010 order

During the pendency of the motion for reconsideration, Jimenez filed a motion for
inhibition, praying that Judge Docena inhibit himself from hearing the case on the ground
of bias and prejudice. Judge Docena denied the motion in his order of December 29,
2010. 9

The June 29, 2011 order

On June 29, 2011, Judge Docena issued an omnibus order: 1) denying the
petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the July 30, 2010 order; 2) denying the
petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the December 29, 2010 order; and 3) granting
Manuel Jimenez III's alternative motion to suspend the proceedings, as his inclusion in
the Information was still pending final determination by the Office of the President.

Jimenez responded to these adverse rulings by filing with the CA a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The petition sought the annulment of
Judge Docena's orders dated July 30, 2010, December 29, 2010, and June 29, 2011. The
petition also prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of
preliminary injunction that the CA both granted in its resolutions of December 8, 2011
and February 6, 2012, respectively. 10

The CA's Decision

On May 22, 2012, the CA's then Tenth Division, through the ponencia of
Associate Justice Agnes Reyes-Carpio (concurred in by Associate Justice Jose C. Reyes,
Jr. and Associate Justice Priscilla J. Baltazar-Padilla) rendered a decision granting
Jimenez' petition. 11

However, on motion for reconsideration filed by the People, the CA reversed its
earlier ruling and issued an Amended Decision penned by Associate Justice Jose Reyes.

The CA's Amended Decision

The CA held that Judge Docena did not gravely abuse his discretion in ordering
Montero's discharge to become a state witness because the prosecution had complied with
the requirements of Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. 12
SIaHDA

First, Judge Docena acted in accordance with settled jurisprudence when he ruled
that there was absolute necessity for the testimony of Montero as no other direct evidence
other than his testimony was available. Additionally, since the determination of the
requirements under Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is
highly factual in nature, Judge Docena did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
largely relying on the recommendation of the prosecution to discharge Montero as a state
witness. 13

Furthermore, the CA agreed with Judge Docena that Montero is not the most
guilty among the accused because the principals by inducement are more guilty than the
principals by direct participation. To the CA, this finding is highly factual in nature and it
would not interfere with the trial court's exercise of discretion on factual issues in the
absence of showing that the court had acted with grave abuse of discretion. 14

On Judge Docena's 'no inhibition' order, the CA held that while the case does not
call for mandatory inhibition, it should still be raffled to another sala for trial on the
merits to avoid any claim of bias and prejudice. 15

The CA likewise dismissed the motion for the issuance of a show cause order
which Jimenez filed against Judge Docena. 16

Both Jimenez and the People moved for partial reconsideration of the CA's order
but these motions were all denied. 17 The denials prompted both parties to file with this
Court the present consolidated petitions for review on certiorari.

The Present Petitions

I. G.R. No. 209195 (The Jimenez Petition)

Jimenez raises the following errors:

First, there is no necessity to discharge Montero as a state witness because: 1) the

voluntary sworn extrajudicial confessions of Montero are all in the possession of the
prosecution which they could readily present in court without discharging Montero; and
2) there was unjust favoritism in the discharge of Montero because all the other
conspirators are equally knowledgeable of the crime. 18

Second, contrary to the CA's ruling, the judge, and not the prosecution, has the
ultimate discretion in ensuring that the requirements under Section 17, Rule 119 are
complied with. 19
 Third, the cases the CA cited are factually different from the present case. Chua v.
CA 20 should not apply as it deals with two accused, one of whom was ordered
discharged. 21

Fourth, Montero's testimony cannot be substantially corroborated in its material

points as the prosecution's own evidence contradicts his declarations.

These inconsistencies include: Montero's statement that a "busal " was placed
inside the mouth of Ruby Rose; this statement is belied by the other prosecution witness;
Montero also never mentioned the presence of a packaging tape wrapped around the head
and neck of the recovered cadaver; in Montero's sinumpaang salaysay, he stated that
Ruby Rose was killed by strangulation using a "lubid" but the death certificate stated
asphyxia by suffocation and not by strangulation; the identification of the cadaver as
Ruby Rose is likewise questionable as there are differences in the height, and the dental
and odontological reports of Ruby Rose and the recovered cadaver.

Jimenez argued that these inconsistencies would require a thorough scrutiny;

hence, the immediate discharge of Montero as a state witness is suspicious. 22

Fifth, Montero appears to be the most guilty. He was the architect who designed
and actively participated in all phases of the alleged crime. 23

Jimenez further argued that there is no authority supporting the ruling that the
principals by inducement are more guilty than the principal by direct participation. On the
contrary, the Revised Penal Code imputes on the principal by direct participation the
heavier guilt; without the latter's execution of the crime, the principal by inducement
cannot be made liable. Even if the principal by inducement is acquitted, the principal by
direct participation can still be held liable and not vice-versa. 24

Sixth, the discharge of Montero was irregular because Judge Docena failed to
conduct a prior hearing. 25

Finally, Montero already executed a notice of withdrawal of consent and

testimony which was submitted to the CA. 26 CSTDEH

Comment of the People

The People argued that Jimenez is now estopped from raising the lack of hearing
as an issue since he raised this issue only after Judge Docena granted the motion to
discharge and not after Judge Almeyda denied the motion — an action that was favorable
to him. 27
 It also argued that Jimenez actively participated in the proceedings for Montero's
discharge as the trial court received evidence for and against the discharge. In this light,
Judge Docena's order granting or denying the motion for discharge is in order,
notwithstanding the lack of actual hearing. 28

The People also agreed with the CA's amended ruling that the requirements for the
discharge of an accused as a state witness were complied with. 29 It added that the
availability of the extrajudicial statements in the prosecution's possession is not a ground
to disqualify an accused from being a state witness. 30

It further maintained that the alleged contradictions between Montero's statements

and other prosecution's evidence are better resolved during trial and are irrelevant to the
issues in the present case. 31

For purposes of the present case, the material allegations of Montero on the
identity of the victim and the manner of her killing were substantially corroborated by the
presence of the recovered original steel casing, the drum containing a cadaver, the place
where it was found, and the cadaver's apparel. 32

The People observed that Montero had already testified on direct examination on
June 28, 2011 and October 25, 2011. He attested and affirmed his statements in his
affidavits dated May 18 and June 11, 2009; he narrated in his statements the murder of
Ruby Rose and Jimenez' participation. 33

Reply of Jimenez

Jimenez reiterated his allegations in the comment. He added that Montero did not
identify or authenticate his sworn statements in support of the motion for his discharge.
34

According to Jimenez, the notice of withdrawal of consent and testimony of

Montero rendered his discharge as a state witness moot and academic. 35

II. G.R. No. 209215 (The People's Petition)

The People, through the Office of the Solicitor General, argue that the CA's order
to re-raffle the case to another sala is not supported by Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules
of Court, either under mandatory or voluntary inhibition. 36

To disqualify a judge from hearing a case, bias and prejudice must be proven, in
the manner being done in cases of voluntary inhibition. 37
 Jurisprudence establishes, too, that affiliation does not necessarily translate to bias.
38 A judge's non-favorable action against the defense is not also necessarily indicative of
bias and prejudice. 39

Finally, the administrative case filed against Judge Docena is not a ground to
disqualify him from hearing the case. 40

Comment of Jimenez

The option for voluntary inhibition does not give judges unlimited discretion to
decide whether or not they will desist from hearing a case. Jimenez enumerated Judge
Docena's acts that allegedly constituted bias and prejudice:

First, Judge Docena granted the motion to discharge even though the legal
requirements under Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
were not factually and legally proven. He also relied on the suggestions and information
of the prosecutors thereby surrendering his duty to ensure that the requirements for a
discharge are duly complied with.

Second, in a previous case where his fraternity brother appeared as counsel, Judge
Docena inhibited himself from hearing the case. Thus, no reason exists for him not to
similarly act in the present case where Jimenez is his fraternity brother and State
Prosecutor Villanueva was his classmate.

Third, Judge Docena granted the prosecution's motion for cancellation of the
September 29, 2011 hearing because the state prosecutor would be attending a legal
forum. This was improper since other prosecutors were available and other prosecution
witnesses could be presented. TaCEHA

Fourth, Judge Docena has an uncontrolled temper and unexplainable attitude. In

Jimenez' bail hearing, Judge Docena immediately shouted at Jimenez' counsel when he
made a mistake. 41

The Issues

1) Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that Judge Docena did not
commit grave abuse of discretion in granting the motion to
discharge Montero as a state witness; and

2) Whether or not the CA erred in ordering the re-raffle of Criminal Case

No. 39225-MN to another RTC branch for trial on the merits.

THE COURT'S RULING:

 G.R. No. 209195

We agree with the CA's ruling that Judge Docena did not gravely abuse his
discretion when he granted the motion to discharge Montero as a state witness.

The well-settled rule is that a petition for certiorari against a court which has
jurisdiction over a case will prosper only if grave abuse of discretion is clear and patent.
The burden is on the part of the petitioner to prove not merely reversible error, but grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the public
respondent issuing the impugned order.

Notably, mere abuse of discretion is not enough; the abuse must be grave.
Jurisprudence has defined "grave abuse of discretion" as the capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or
a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner because of passion or hostility. 42

We agree with the CA that the prosecution has complied with the requisites under
Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides that:

In the discharge of an accused in order that he may be a state witness,

the following conditions must be present, namely:

(1) Two or more accused are jointly charged with the commission of an offense;

(2) The motion for discharge is filed by the prosecution before it rests its case;

(3) The prosecution is required to present evidence and the sworn statement of

each proposed state witness at a hearing in support of the discharge;

(4) The accused gives his consent to be a state witness; and

(5) The trial court is satisfied that:

a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose

discharge is requested;

b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution

of the offense committed, except the testimony of said accused;

c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its

material points;

d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and,

 e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense
involving moral turpitude.

No issues have been raised with respect to conditions (1), (2), (4), and 5 (e). The
parties dispute the compliance with conditions (3) and 5 (a) to (d) as the issues before us.
We shall discuss these issues separately below.

Absolute necessity of the testimony

of Montero

We see no merit in Jimenez's allegation that no absolute necessity exists for

Montero's testimony.

Absolute necessity exists for the testimony of an accused sought to be discharged

when he or she alone has knowledge of the crime. In more concrete terms, necessity is
not there when the testimony would simply corroborate or otherwise strengthen the
prosecution's evidence. 43 aCcEHS

We do not agree with Jimenez that the Court's pronouncement in Chua v. CA, et
al. is inapplicable in the present case simply because more than two accused are involved
in the present case. The requirement of absolute necessity for the testimony of a state
witness depends on the circumstances of each case regardless of the number of the
participating conspirators.

In People v. Court of Appeals and Perez, et al., 44 the Court ordered the discharge
of the accused Roncesvalles, ruling that his testimony is absolutely necessary to prove
conspiracy with his other co-accused. The Court agreed with the Solicitor General that
considering the circumstances of the case and that the other accused could not be
compelled to testify, certain facts necessary for the conviction of the accused would not
come to light unless the accused Roncesvalles was allowed to testify for the State.
Specifically, unless accused Roncesvalles was allowed to testify for the government,
there would be no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the
offense charged, particularly on the role of his co-accused in the preparation and
completion of the falsified loan application and its supporting papers.

Similarly in People v. Court of Appeals and Tan, 45 the Court reinstated the ruling
of the trial court which ordered the discharge of accused Ngo Sin from among the five
accused. The record justified his discharge as a state witness considering the absolute
necessity of his testimony to prove that the accused Luciano Tan had planned and
financed the theft.

In the present case, not one of the accused-conspirators, except Montero, was
willing to testify on the alleged murder of Ruby Rose and their participation in her
killing. Hence, the CA was correct in ruling that Judge Docena acted properly and in
accordance with jurisprudence in ruling that there was absolute necessity for the
testimony of Montero. He alone is available to provide direct evidence of the crime.

That the prosecution could use the voluntary statements of Montero without his
discharge as a state witness is not an important and relevant consideration. To the
prosecution belongs the control of its case and this Court cannot dictate on its choice in
the discharge of a state witness, save only when the legal requirements have not been
complied with.

The prosecution's right to prosecute gives it "a wide range of discretion — the
discretion of whether, what and whom to charge, the exercise of which depends on a
smorgasbord of factors which are best appreciated by prosecutors." Under Section 17,
Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the court is given the power to
discharge a state witness only after it has already acquired jurisdiction over the crime and
the accused. 46

Montero's testimony can be substantially corroborated

We also do not find merit in Jimenez' argument that Montero's testimony cannot
be substantially corroborated in its material points and is even contradicted by the
physical evidence of the crime.

As the trial court properly found, the evidence consisting of the steel casing where
the cadaver was found; the drum containing the cadaver which the prosecution
successfully identified (and which even the acting Judge Almeyda believed) to be Ruby
Rose; the spot in the sea that Montero pointed to (where the cadaver was retrieved); the
apparel worn by the victim when she was killed as well as her burned personal effects, all
partly corroborate some of the material points in the sworn statements of Montero. 47 ASICDH

With these as bases, Judge Docena's ruling that Montero's testimony found
substantial corroboration cannot be characterized as grave abuse of discretion.

Jimenez points to the discrepancies in Montero's statements and the physical

evidence, such as the absence of "busal" in the mouth of the retrieved cadaver; his failure
to mention that they used packaging tape wrapped around the head down to the neck of
the victim; and his declaration that the victim was killed through strangulation using a
rope (lubid).

However, the corroborated statements of Montero discussed above are far more
material than the inconsistencies pointed out by Jimenez, at least for purposes of the
motion to discharge.
 The alleged discrepancies in the physical evidence, particularly on the height and
dental records of Ruby Rose, are matters that should properly be dealt with during the
trial proper.

We emphasize at this point that to resolve a motion to discharge under Section 17,
Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Rules only require that that the
testimony of the accused sought to be discharged be substantially corroborated in its
material points, not on all points. CIaDTE

This rule is based on jurisprudential line that in resolving a motion to discharge

under Section 17, Rule 119, a trial judge cannot be expected or required, at the start of the
trial, to inform himself with absolute certainty of everything that may develop in the
course of the trial with respect to the guilty participation of the accused. If that were
practicable or possible, there would be little need for the formality of a trial. 48

Montero is not the most guilty

We also do not agree with Jimenez that the CA erred in finding that Montero is not
the most guilty.

By jurisprudence, "most guilty" refers to the highest degree of culpability in terms

of participation in the commission of the offense and does not necessarily mean the
severity of the penalty imposed. While all the accused may be given the same penalty by
reason of conspiracy, yet one may be considered to have lesser or the least guilt taking
into account his degree of participation in the commission of the offense. 49

What the rule avoids is the possibility that the most guilty would be set free while
his co-accused who are less guilty in terms of participation would be penalized. 50

Before dwelling on the parties' substantive arguments, we find it necessary to first

correct the rulings of the CA that are not exactly correct.

Contrary to the CA's findings, a principal by inducement is not automatically the

most guilty in a conspiracy. The decision of the Court in People v. Baharan 51 did not
involve the resolution of a motion to discharge an accused to become a state witness.
Instead, the pronouncement of the Court related to the culpability of a principal by
inducement whose co-inducement act was the determining cause for the commission of
the crime.

Thus viewed, Baharan cannot be the basis of a peremptory pronouncement that a

principal by inducement is more guilty than the principal by direct participation.
 In Chua v. People, 52 which involved a motion to discharge an accused, the Court
declared that if one induces another to commit a crime, the influence is the determining
cause of the crime. Without the inducement, the crime would not have been committed; it
is the inducer who sets into motion the execution of the criminal act.

To place the Chua ruling in proper perspective, the Court considered the principal
by inducement as the most guilty based on the specific acts done by the two accused
and bearing in mind the elements constitutive of the crime of falsification of private
documents where the element of "damage" arose through the principal by
inducement's encashment of the falsified check. This led the Court to declare that the
principal by inducement is the "most guilty" (or properly, the more guilty) between the
two accused.

Thus, as a rule, for purposes of resolving a motion to discharge an accused as a

state witness, what are controlling are the specific acts of the accused in relation to the
crime committed.

We cannot also agree with Jimenez' argument that a principal by direct

participation is more guilty than the principal by inducement as the Revised Penal Code
penalizes the principal by inducement only when the principal by direct participation has
executed the crime.

We note that the severity of the penalty imposed is part of the substantive criminal
law which should not be equated with the procedural rule on the discharge of the
particeps criminis. The procedural remedy of the discharge of an accused is based on
other considerations, such as the need for giving immunity to one of several accused in
order that not all shall escape, and the judicial experience that the candid admission of an
accused regarding his participation is a guaranty that he will testify truthfully. 53

On the substantive issues of the present case, we affirm the CA ruling that no
grave abuse of discretion transpired when Judge Docena ruled that Montero is not the
most guilty.

We draw attention to the requirement that a state witness does not need to be
found to be the least guilty; he or she should not only "appear to be the most guilty."
54

From the evidence submitted by the prosecution in support of its motion to

discharge Montero, it appears that while Montero was part of the planning, preparation,
and execution stage as most of his co-accused had been, he had no direct participation in
the actual killing of Ruby Rose.
 While Lope allegedly assigned to him the execution of the killing, the records do
not indicate that he had active participation in hatching the plan to kill Ruby Rose, which
allegedly came from accused Lope and Jimenez, and in the actual killing of Ruby Rose
which was executed by accused Lennard. 55 Montero's participation was limited to
providing the steel box where the drum containing the victim's body was placed, welding
the steel box to seal the cadaver inside, operating the skip or tug boat, and, together with
his co-accused, dropping the steel box containing the cadaver into the sea.

At any rate, the discharge of an accused to be utilized as a state witness because he

does not appear to be the most guilty is highly factual in nature as it largely depends on
the appreciation of who had the most participation in the commission of the crime. The
appellate courts do not interfere in the discretionary judgment of the trial court on this
factual issue except when grave abuse of discretion intervenes. 56

In light of these considerations, we affirm the ruling of the CA that Judge Docena
did not commit grave abuse of discretion in ruling that Montero is not the most guilty. cCHETI

The discharge of Montero as a state

witness was procedurally sound

We agree with the People that Jimenez is estopped from raising the issue of lack
of hearing prior to the discharge of Montero as a state witness. Jimenez did not raise this
issue when Acting Judge Almeyda denied the motion to discharge. This denial, of course,
was favorable to Jimenez. If he found no reason to complain then, why should we
entertain his hearing-related complaint now?

The People even supported its argument that Jimenez actively participated in the
proceedings of the motion to discharge such as his filing of a 20-page opposition to the
motion; filing a reply to the People's comment; submitting his memorandum of
authorities on the qualification of Montero as state witness; and filing a consolidated
opposition on the People's and Montero's motion for reconsideration of Judge Almeyda's
order. 57

In these lights, Jimenez cannot impute grave abuse of discretion on Judge Docena
for not conducting a hearing prior to his grant of the motion to discharge. In People v. CA
and Pring, 58 the Court ruled that with both litigants able to present their sides, the lack
of actual hearing is not sufficiently fatal to undermine the court's ability to determine
whether the conditions prescribed for the discharge of an accused as a state witness have
been satisfied.

Contrary to Jimenez' argument, the Pring ruling is applicable in the present case.
In Pring, the sworn statements of the accused sought to be discharged (Nonilo Arile),
together with the prosecution's other evidence, were already in the possession of the court
and had been challenged by the respondent in his Opposition to Discharge Nonilo Arile
and in his Petition for Bail. The issue in that case was the propriety of the trial court's
resolution of the motion to discharge Nonilo Arile without conducting a hearing pursuant
Section 9, Rule 119 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure (now Section 17, Rule 119
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure).

With Jimenez' active participation in the proceeding for the motion to discharge as
outlined above, the ruling of the Court in Pring should squarely apply.

Montero's Notice of Withdrawal of

Consent is not material in the
resolution of the present case

We find no merit in Jimenez' argument that Montero's submission of his notice of

withdrawal of consent and testimony of Manuel dated February 26, 2013 rendered the
present case moot, since the Court cannot consider this document in this petition.

It must be recalled that the present case involves an appellate review of the CA's
decision which found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of Judge Docena in
granting the motion to discharge.

Under the present recourse now before this Court, we cannot rule on the notice of
withdrawal and consider it in ruling on the absence or presence of grave abuse of
discretion in the issuance of the assailed orders. The present case is not the proper venue
for the determination of the value of the notice.

This conclusion is all the more strengthened by the fact that Montero already
testified on direct examination on June 28, 2011 and October 25, 2011. He attested and
affirmed his statements in his affidavits dated May 18 and June 11, 2009; he not only
narrated the grisly murder of Ruby Rose, but also revealed Jimenez' participation in the
murder.

With this development, the notice may partake of the nature of a recantation,
which is usually taken ex parte and is considered inferior to the testimony given in open
court. It would be a dangerous rule to reject the testimony taken before a court of justice
simply because the witness who gave it later changed his/her mind. 59

In sum on this point, the appreciation of the notice of withdrawal properly belongs
to the trial court.

Interplay between the judge and

prosecutor in the motion to discharge
an accused to become a state witness
 As a last point, we find it necessary to clarify the roles of the prosecution and the
trial court judge in the resolution of a motion to discharge an accused as a state witness.
This need arises from what appears to us to be a haphazard use of the statement that the
trial court judge must rely in large part on the prosecution's suggestion in the resolution
of a motion to discharge. IEaCDH

In the present case, the CA cited Quarto v. Marcelo 60 in ruling that the trial court
must rely in large part upon the suggestions and the information furnished by the
prosecuting officer, thus:

A trial judge cannot be expected or required to inform himself with

absolute certainty at the very outset of the trial as to everything which may be
developed in the course of the trial in regard to the guilty participation of the
accused in the commission of the crime charged in the complaint. If that were
practicable or possible there would be little need for the formality of a trial. He
must rely in large part upon the suggestions and the information furnished by
the prosecuting officer in coming to his conclusions as to the "necessity for the
testimony of the accused whose discharge is requested"; as to the availability or
non-availability of other direct or corroborative evidence; as to which of the
accused is "most guilty," and the like.

We deem it important to place this ruling in its proper context lest we create the
wrong impression that the trial court is a mere "rubber stamp" of the prosecution, in the
manner that Jimenez now argues.

In Quarto, we emphasized that it is still the trial court that determines whether the
prosecution's preliminary assessment of the accused-witness' qualifications to be a state
witness satisfies the procedural norms. This relationship is in reality a symbiotic one as
the trial court, by the very nature of its role in the administration of justice, largely
exercises its prerogative based on the prosecutor's findings and evaluation. 61

Thus, we ruled in People v. Pring 62 that in requiring a hearing in support of the

discharge, the essential objective of the law is for the court to receive evidence for or
against the discharge, which evidence shall serve as the court's tangible and concrete
basis — independently of the fiscal's or prosecution's persuasions — in granting or
denying the motion for discharge. We emphasize, in saying this, that actual hearing is not
required provided that the parties have both presented their sides on the merits of the
motion.

We likewise do not agree with Jimenez that Quarto should not apply to the present
case, since the principles laid down in that case similarly operate in the present case,
specifically, on issue of the procedural processes required in the discharge of the accused
as a state witness.
 G.R. No. 209215

We find the People's petition meritorious.

We note at the outset that the CA did not provide factual or legal support when it
ordered the inhibition of Judge Docena. Additionally, we do not find Jimenez' arguments
sufficiently persuasive.

The second paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 137 does not give judges the unlimited
discretion to decide whether or not to desist from hearing a case. The inhibition must be
for just and valid causes. The mere imputation of bias or partiality is likewise not enough
ground for their inhibition, especially when the charge is without basis. 63

It is well-established that inhibition is not allowed at every instance that a

schoolmate or classmate appears before the judge as counsel for one of the parties. A
judge, too, is not expected to automatically inhibit himself from acting in a case involving
a member of his fraternity, such as Jimenez in the present case. 64

In the absence of clear and convincing evidence to prove the charge of bias and
prejudice, a judge's ruling not to inhibit oneself should be allowed to stand. 65
AacDHE

In attributing bias and prejudice to Judge Docena, Jimenez must prove that the
judge acted or conducted himself in a manner clearly indicative of arbitrariness or
prejudice so as to defeat the attributes of the cold neutrality that an impartial judge must
possess. Unjustified assumptions and mere misgivings that the judge acted with
prejudice, passion, pride and pettiness in the performance of his functions cannot
overcome the presumption that a judge shall decide on the merits of a case with an
unclouded vision of its facts. 66

In the present case, Jimenez' allegation of bias and prejudice is negated by the CA
finding in its amended decision, as affirmed by this Court, that Judge Docena did not
gravely abuse his discretion in granting the motion to discharge. We support this
conclusion as the cancellation of the September 29, 2011 hearing is not clearly indicative
of bias and prejudice.

On the allegation that Judge Docena's uncontrollable temper and unexplainable

attitude should be considered as a factor, we note that the allegations and perceptions of
bias from the mere tenor and language of a judge is insufficient to show prejudgment.
Allowing inhibition for these reasons would open the floodgates to abuse. Unless there is
concrete proof that a judge has a personal interest in the proceedings, and that his bias
stems from an extra-judicial source, the Court would uphold the presumption that a
magistrate shall impartially decide the merits of a case. 67
 WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition in G.R. No. 209195 and affirm the CA's
amended decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 121167 insofar as it found no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of Judge Docena in granting the People's motion to discharge
Montero as a state witness.

We GRANT the petition in G.R. No. 209215 and modify the CA's amended
decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 121167 in accordance with our ruling that Judge Docena's
denial of the motion for inhibition was proper.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, Del Castillo, Villarama, Jr. * and Leonen, JJ., concur.

(Jimenez, Jr. v. People, G.R. Nos. 209195 & 209215, [September 17, 2014], 743 PHIL
|||

468-494)

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 197953. August 5, 2015.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

(2nd Division), QUINTIN SALUDAGA y BORDEOS, ARTHUS
ADRIATICO y ERUDA and ROMEO DE LUNA, respondents.

DECISION

BRION, J : p

The People of the Philippines (the People) filed this petition for certiorari 1 to
annul and set aside the Sandiganbayan's resolution 2 dated June 21, 2011, granting
Quintin B. Saludaga, Arthus E. Adriatico and Romeo De Luna's joint demurrer to
evidence 3 (demurrer) in Criminal Case No. 28261.
The Antecedents
On March 30, 2005, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman (Ombudsman) for
Visayas charged Mayor Quintin B. Saludaga (Mayor Saludaga) and Revenue
Collection Clerk Arthus E. Adriatico (Adriatico) of Lavezares, Northern Samar,
together with Romeo De Luna (De Luna), a private individual, for falsification of
public documents penalized under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). 4
The accused (respondents) pleaded not guilty. 5
During the pre-trial, the parties submitted their joint stipulations, to wit:
JOINT STIPULATION OF FACTS

1.1 That at the time material to this case, as alleged in the information, accused
Quintin Saludaga was a public officer being then a [sic] Municipal
Mayor of the Municipality of Lavezares, Northern Samar, and Arthus
Adriatico was then the Revenue Collection Clerk of the Office of the
Municipal Treasurer of the abovementioned municipality.

1.2 That accused Romeo de Luna entered into a Pakyaw Contract with the
Municipality of Lavezares, Northern Samar for the construction of 3
Units Shallow Well Hand pump on December 9, 1997 and the
construction of 3 units Jetmatic Shallow Well Hand pump on December
17, 1997.

1.3 That from the time the Pakyaw Contract was entered into by the
Municipality of Lavezares and accused Romeo de Luna and up to the
completion of said project in 1997, private complainant Armando F.
Chan was the Vice Mayor of the said Municipality.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

2.1 Whether or not Accused Quintin B. Saludaga, Arthus E. Adriatico, and

Romeo de Luna falsified the Official Receipt and the Mayor's Permit
issued in favor of Romeo de Luna, the subject of the instant case. 6

The prosecution alleged 7 that sometime in January 1999, Adriatico issued

Official Receipt No. 7921300-D (subject OR) dated August 27, 1997, to De Luna
representing the latter's payment (P200.00) for his mayor's permit 8 to operate as a
pakyaw contractor. 9
Conniving with Adriatico and De Luna, Mayor Saludaga allegedly issued and
signed the mayor's permit also sometime in January 1999. 10 The mayor's permit
allowed De Luna to engage in business as a pakyaw contractor for the period August
27, 1997 to December 30, 1997.
The prosecution averred that Mayor Saludaga antedated the mayor's permit to
confer on De Luna the status of a bona fide pakyaw contractor when the contracts
were executed on December 9 and 17, 1997. Both Mayor Saludaga and Adriatico
purportedly knew that De Luna was not a licensed pakyaw contractor when they
issued the mayor's permit and the subject OR. AIDSTE
 The prosecution further claimed that the provincial treasurer only issued the
Official Receipt Booklet containing the subject OR to the municipality in October
1998, and thus, it could not have been used as an official receipt for a transaction
completed in 1997.
Ultimately, the prosecution submitted that the respondents connived,
confederated with, and mutually helped one another in falsifying the subject OR and
the mayor's permit to make it appear that De Luna was a bona fide pakyaw contractor.
11

The prosecution presented the following witnesses during trial:

Armando F. Chan 12 (Vice Mayor) — Chan took the stand to prove that the
respondents conspired with each other in falsifying the mayor's permit and the subject
OR. He testified that as the presiding officer of the Sangguniang Bayan, he received
from the Commission on Audit (COA) a copy of the COA Audit Report for the
calendar year 1998. The report found that the municipality failed to conduct public
bidding for several projects, which included the pakyaw contracts entered into by De
Luna and the municipality. As a consequence, a committee was formed to investigate
the alleged irregularities. The committee later found that irregularities had indeed
been committed. Thus, a complaint for violation of the anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019) was filed against Mayor Saludaga, De Luna,
and a certain SPO2 Negro.
In this regard, Chan testified that while the subject OR was issued only in
1999, it was dated August 27, 1997, to make it appear that De Luna was a licensed
contractor and to give a semblance of legality to the award of the contracts. Finally, he
claimed that Mayor Saludaga used as evidence the falsified subject OR and the
mayor's permit in the graft case filed against him.
Bonifacio M. So 13 (Provincial Treasurer) — So testified that he was the
custodian of the booklet which contained the subject OR and that he issued the said
booklet to the municipality only in October 1998.
Jose Y. Lim 14 (Municipal Treasurer) — Lim testified that the booklet
containing the subject OR was issued to the municipality only in October 1998. He
also claimed that De Luna was not a contractor but an employee of the municipality
hired by Mayor Saludaga.
Carlos G. Fornelos (COA Auditor) — Fornelos testified that he received a letter
from the municipal treasurer requesting a duplicate copy of the subject OR and that
despite best efforts, he could not locate the same.
The prosecution then rested its case and submitted its formal offer of evidence
15 which the Sandiganbayan admitted. 16

The respondents filed a joint motion for leave to file a demurrer to evidence on
December 2, 2008. The Sandiganbayan granted the said motion; thus, on May 15,
2006, the respondents filed the demurrer.
 In praying for the dismissal of the criminal case for insufficiency of evidence,
the respondents argued that the prosecution failed to prove conspiracy. Conspiracy,
the respondents asserted, cannot be presumed; it must be proved by positive and
conclusive evidence and shown to exist as clearly and convincingly as the
commission of the offense itself.
The respondents further argued that even implied conspiracy was not proved
because, while conspiracy need not be established by direct evidence (for it may be
inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during, and after the commission of
the crime), it still cannot be based on mere conjectures but must be established as fact.
Since conspiracy was not shown to exist, the respondents urged the
Sandiganbayan to evaluate the prosecution's evidence vis-à-vis their individual
participation in the crime alleged to have been committed. They denied their personal
liability as follows:
Mayor Saludaga's Defense 17
Mayor Saludaga maintained that the prosecution failed to prove he had a hand
in the preparation and issuance of the subject OR; nor did he personally make the
entries in the mayor's permit. He insisted that all that could be inferred from the face
of the mayor's permit was that he signed it. In the absence of evidence that he knew
the mayor's permit to be spurious, Mayor Saludaga claimed that he could not be held
guilty of knowingly making untruthful statements in a narration of facts.
To support this theory, Mayor Saludaga invoked the case of Magsuci v.
Sandiganbayan 18 which supposedly held that when the infraction consists in the
reliance in good faith, albeit misplaced, by a head of office on a subordinate upon
whom the primary responsibility rests, absent a clear case of conspiracy, the Arias
doctrine 19 must be upheld.
The Arias doctrine held that all heads of offices have to rely to a reasonable
extent on their subordinates and on the good faith of those who prepare bids, purchase
supplies, or enter into negotiations. There has to be some added reason why the head
of office should examine each of the documents he is supposed to sign.
Adriatico's Defense 20
Adriatico argued that the prosecution failed to show that he signed or executed
the subject OR. He noted that even the prosecution's witness admitted that it was the
name of a certain A.L. Moncada, described in the subject OR as the Collecting
Officer, that appeared on the subject OR; and that neither Adriatico's nor any of his
co-respondents' names or signatures appeared thereon.
Adriatico also argued that assuming he executed the subject OR, the
prosecution failed to show that he willingly and knowingly made an untruthful
statement in the narration of facts; that the OR was dated August 27, 1997, and that it
was received by the municipality only in 1998, do not exclude each other. Adriatico
insisted that he did not necessarily make an untruthful statement of facts when he
antedated the subject OR there being the truth that the payment received was for a
past transaction.AaCTcI

De Luna's Defense 21
De Luna argued that the prosecution failed to prove he was not a bona fide
pakyaw contractor. He alleged that the falsified documents neither affirmed nor
contradicted his legal status as a bona fide pakyaw contractor. He reasoned that with
or without the subject OR and the mayor's permit, he was either a bona fide pakyaw
contractor or not.
Moreover, De Luna emphasized that he did not sign nor execute the subject
OR and the mayor's permit and that any alleged falsification could not be attributed to
him for failure of the prosecution to prove conspiracy.
The Sandiganbayan Ruling 22
The Sandiganbayan granted the demurrer. It held that in criminal prosecutions
for offenses under the RPC, the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that
the accused had criminal intent to commit the offense charged. 23
In this regard, the prosecution failed to prove some of the elements of
falsification of documents under Article 171 (4) of the RPC, namely: (1) the offender
is a public officer, employee, or notary public; (2) the offender takes advantage of his
official position; and (3) the offender falsifies a document by making untruthful
statements in a narration of facts. In particular, the Sandiganbayan found that the
prosecution failed to prove the second and third elements. The graft court resolved to
grant the demurrer as follows:
First, the Sandiganbayan was not persuaded by the prosecutions' evidence that
Mayor Saludaga had a hand in the preparation and issuance of the subject OR. Thus,
he could not have taken advantage of his position as Mayor and knowingly made
untruthful narration of facts.
Second, the Sandiganbayan is unconvinced that the subject OR was falsified
despite Adriatico's admission that he antedated it upon De Luna's request. It held that
although Adriatico prepared and issued the subject OR, he did not make untruthful
statements in a narration of facts; because the statements were not altogether false
since there was some recognizable truth in these.
Thus, the Sandiganbayan took the view that Adriatico did not necessarily make
an untruthful statement as to the date since it was a fact that the payment received was
for a previous transaction.
The Sandiganbayan also found that Adriatico acted in good faith when he
issued the subject OR for the payment of a past transaction in his belief that the
municipality would derive additional revenue therefrom.
 Finally, the Sandiganbayan ruled that the prosecution failed to prove that De
Luna was not a bona fide pakyaw contractor from August 27 to December 30, 1997,
or during the time the questioned pakyaw contracts were awarded. The graft court
gave no weight to the prosecution's evidence, i.e., the Time Book and Payroll
covering the period September 15 to September 30, 1997, which purportedly proved
that De Luna was a hired municipal laborer and not a pakyaw contractor.
The dispositive portion of the Sandiganbayan resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, the Joint Demurrer to Evidence filed by the accused,
Saludaga, Adriatico and De Luna, is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly,
Criminal Case No. 28261 is hereby ordered DISMISSED.
The Petition
The People impute grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the Sandiganbayan when it granted the demurrer. The
People disagree that the prosecution failed to establish the respondents' guilt with
moral certainty. Specifically, the People refute the Sandiganbayan's conclusion that
the prosecution failed to prove certain elements of the falsification charged.
With respect to the element that the offenders must have taken advantage of
their official position, the People emphasized Adriatico's own admission 24 that he
antedated the subject OR upon De Luna's request, a fact that the latter confirmed. 25
Such act, according to the People, already constitutes falsification of a public
document and thereby untruthful.
The People cite the case of Relucio v. Civil Service Commission, 26 which laid
down the elements of falsification of public documents, to wit: (i) the offender makes
in a document untruthful statements in a narration of facts; (ii) the offender has a legal
obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated; (iii) the facts narrated by the
offender are absolutely false; and (iv) the perversions of truth in the narration of facts
was made with the wrongful intent to injure a third person.
As regards the element that the offender must have falsified a document by
making untruthful statements in a narration of facts, the People dispute the
Sandiganbayan's reasoning that the narration of facts be absolutely false to constitute
falsification.
The People argue that the Sandiganbayan erred when it held that there can be
no conviction of falsification of public document if the acts of the accused are
consistent with good faith. 27 Good faith does not apply in this case because Adriatico
was not confronted with a difficult question of law and he should have known better
that it was illegal to issue an antedated receipt.
Further, the People posit that Mayor Saludaga cannot invoke the Arias
doctrine, maintaining that Mayor Saludaga may be deemed a knowing participant in
the conspiracy when he affixed his signature despite the patent irregularities thereon.
28

In fine, the People insist that Mayor Saludaga and Adriatico took advantage of
their positions in falsifying the subject OR and mayor's permit; that the falsifications
were intended to evade their prosecution under the Anti-Corrupt and Practices Act;
and that the respondents' acts were so concerted it may be inferred that Mayor
Saludaga, together with his subordinates Adriatico and dummy De Luna, conspired to
commit the crime. EcTCAD

The Respondents' Case 29

The respondents reiterate their arguments to support the demurrer. In summary,
they argue that the People failed to: (1) prove conspiracy, (2) show that Mayor
Saludaga took advantage of his official position to cause the falsification of the
subject OR and the mayor's permit, (3) show that Adriatico executed the subject OR,
(4) adduce evidence that antedating the subject OR is prohibited by law, (5) submit
evidence that De Luna was not a bona fide pakyaw contractor, and (6) prove that De
Luna had any hand in the execution of the subject OR and mayor's permit.
The respondents further argue that in a petition for certiorari, the Court does
not reexamine the trial or appellate court's appreciation of facts unless the evidence on
record does not support their findings or the judgment is based on misappreciation of
facts; and that the jurisdiction of the Court in a petition for certiorari does not include
a correction of the Sandiganbayan's evaluation of the prosecution's evidence but is
confined to the issue of grave abuse of discretion.
Issue
The sole issue before the Court is whether the Sandiganbayan gravely abused
its discretion when it granted the respondents' demurrer.
Our Ruling
We dismiss the petition.
We stress at the outset that the People assail the Sandiganbayan's grant of
demurrer through certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. To put our
discussions in proper perspective, a review of the nature and purpose of a petition for
certiorari is in order.
Section 1 of Rule 65 reads:
Section 1. Petition for certiorari. — When any tribunal, board or
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in
excess of [its or his] jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of its or his jurisdiction, and there is no appeal,
or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a
person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court,
alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
 annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and
granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require. . . . . [Emphasis
supplied.]
A petition for certiorari is intended to correct errors of jurisdiction only or
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Its principal
office is to keep the inferior court within the parameters of its jurisdiction or to
prevent it from committing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. 30
Further, mere abuse of discretion is not enough; the abuse must be grave.
Jurisprudence defines "grave abuse of discretion" as the capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty
or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, as where the power is exercised
in an arbitrary and despotic manner because of passion or hostility. 31
The office of demurrer and the
effect of its grant
Section 23, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
Sec. 23. Demurrer to evidence. — After the prosecution rests its case,
the court may dismiss the case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence: (1)
on its own initiative after giving the prosecution an opportunity to be heard; or
(2) on motion of the accused with prior leave of court.
A demurrer to evidence is an objection by one of the parties in an action to the
effect that the evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of law to
make out a case or sustain the issue. 32 The party filing the demurrer challenges the
sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence. The Court's task is to ascertain if there is
competent or sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case to sustain the
indictment or support a verdict of guilt. 33
In criminal cases, the grant of a demurrer amounts to an acquittal, and the
dismissal order may not be appealed as this would place the accused in double
jeopardy. 34 Although the dismissal order is not subject to appeal, it may be reviewed
through certiorari under Rule 65. 35
For the writ to issue, the trial court must be shown to have acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction such as where the
prosecution was denied the opportunity to present its case or where the trial was a
sham thus rendering the assailed judgment void. 36
The burden is on the petitioner to clearly demonstrate that the trial court
blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to
dispense justice. 37
The People failed to overcome this burden.
Falsification and Conspiracy
 In brief, the respondents allegedly committed falsification under paragraph 4,
Article 171 of the RPC, and that they connived, confederated with, and mutually
helped one another in committing the said crime.
Article 171, paragraph 4 of the RPC provides:
Art. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee or notary or
ecclesiastical minister. — The penalty of prision mayor and a fine not to
exceed 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer, employee, or
notary who, taking advantage of his official position, shall falsify a document
by committing any of the following acts: HSAcaE

xxx xxx xxx

4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;
xxx xxx xxx.
Reduced to its elements, a violation under this provision requires that:
(1) The offender makes in a public document untruthful statements in a
narration of facts;
(2) He has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him;
and
(3) The facts narrated by him are absolutely false. 38
The prosecution must likewise prove that the public officer or employee had
taken advantage of his official position in making the falsification. The offender is
considered to have taken advantage of his official position when (1) he has the duty to
make or prepare or otherwise to intervene in the preparation of a document; or (2) he
has the official custody of the document which he falsifies. 39
Moreover, in falsification of public or official documents, it is not necessary
that there be present the idea of gain or the intent to injure a third person because in
the falsification of a public document, what is punished is the violation of the public
faith and the destruction of the truth as therein solemnly proclaimed. 40
Conspiracy
A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it; it may be alleged as a
mode of committing a crime or as constitutive of the crime itself. 41 It need not be
shown by direct proof of an agreement of the parties to commit the crime 42 as it can
be inferred from the acts of the accused which clearly manifest a concurrence of
wills, a common intent or design to commit a crime. 43
More significant, conspiracy as a basis for conviction must rest on nothing less
than a moral certainty. While conspiracy need not be established by direct evidence,
it is, nonetheless, required to be proved by clear and convincing evidence by showing
a series of acts done by each of the accused in concert and in pursuance of a common
unlawful purpose. 44
Guided by the foregoing principles, we hold that the Sandiganbayan did
not gravely abuse its discretion when it granted the respondents' demurrer.
The People's evidence vis-à-vis
the Sandiganbayan's findings
The People submit that the Sandiganbayan exercised its judicial functions in
arbitrary and despotic manner because it completely disregarded the prosecution's
evidence and ignored settled jurisprudence. 45
We disagree with this contention.
A scrutiny of the assailed resolution shows that the Sandiganbayan thoroughly
passed upon the prosecution's testimonial and documentary pieces of evidence.
Finding them insufficient to support the charge vis-à-vis the elements of the crime, the
graft court granted the demurrer and dismissed the criminal case.
In a nutshell, the Sandiganbayan dismissed the case because the prosecution
failed to prove some elements of the crime, namely: (i) that the offenders take
advantage of their official positions and (ii) that they falsify a document by making
untruthful statements in a narration of facts.
The Sandiganbayan justified its grant of the demurrer as follows:
First, the Sandiganbayan was not convinced that Mayor Saludaga took
advantage of his official position to falsify the subject OR. It held that the
prosecution's evidence failed to establish that he was in any way involved in the
execution and issuance of the subject OR.
Although Mayor Saludaga signed the mayor's permit, the Sandiganbayan ruled
that it is the issuance of the subject OR to support the mayor's permit which is crucial
in determining his culpability for the crime charged against him. As it was not shown
that Mayor Saludaga had any involvement in its issuance, he could not have taken
advantage of his position as Mayor and knowingly made untruthful narration of facts
in the said document.
Second, the Sandiganbayan was not persuaded that the subject OR was in fact
falsified.
While Adriatico admitted that he issued the subject OR and that he antedated it
to August 27, 1997, the Sandiganbayan held that such act does not constitute
falsification. It held that if the statements are not altogether false, there being some
colorable truth in them, the crime of falsification is deemed not to have been
committed. Adriatico did not necessarily make an untruthful statement of fact as to
the date, there being truth that the payment received was for a past transaction.
 Finally, the Sandiganbayan held that the prosecution failed to prove that De
Luna was not a bona fide pakyaw contractor when the contracts were executed in
December 1997. The graft court did not give credence to the prosecution's evidence
(i.e., Time Book and Payroll for the period September 15 to September 30, 1997) that
De Luna was a mere laborer employed by the municipality. It also dismissed the
insinuations made by the prosecution's witnesses Chan and Lim that De Luna was not
a qualified contractor, holding that they were mere insinuations and nothing more.
To our mind, the foregoing disquisitions sufficiently counter the People's claim
that the Sandiganbayan completely ignored the prosecution's evidence and that it
disregarded settled jurisprudence.HESIcT

On the contrary, we find that the Sandiganbayan, by examining the

prosecution's evidence vis-à-vis the elements of the crime, adequately laid the basis in
resolving to grant the demurrer. We do not see how this method of arriving at a
decision or resolution can be deemed a grave abuse of discretion. Simply put, we are
not convinced that the Sandiganbayan acted in a capricious, arbitrary, and whimsical
manner when it granted the respondents' demurrer.
This is not to say that the Sandiganbayan correctly applied the law to the facts
of the case. Our finding is limited to the issue of grave abuse of discretion; we do not
rule on the legal soundness of the Sandiganbayan resolution.
To reiterate, certiorari shall lie only when the respondent court gravely
abuses its discretion such as when it blatantly ignores facts or denies a party due
process. Certiorari does not correct errors of judgment.
Thus, even if the Sandiganbayan erred in weighing the sufficiency of the
prosecution's evidence, such error does not necessarily amount to grave abuse of
discretion. 46 It is merely an error of judgment which may no longer be appealed
because it would place the respondents in double jeopardy.
In the case of People v. Sandiganbayan, 47 we found the Sandiganbayan to
have erred in applying certain provisions of the Government Auditing Code of the
Philippines when it granted the accused's demurrer to evidence. Nonetheless, we held
that even if the Sandiganbayan proceeded from an erroneous interpretation of the law,
the error committed was an error of judgment and not of jurisdiction.
We found therein that the People failed to establish that the dismissal order was
tainted with grave abuse of discretion. In fine, we held that the error committed by the
Sandiganbayan is of such a nature that could no longer be rectified on appeal by the
prosecution because it would place the accused in double jeopardy.
In another case, after the prosecution had presented its evidence and rested its
case, the accused filed a motion to dismiss for insufficiency of evidence. The trial
court granted the motion and dismissed the case. On appeal by the prosecution to this
Court, we were of the view that the dismissal order was erroneous and resulted in a
 miscarriage of justice. However, we ruled that such error could not be corrected
because double jeopardy had already set in. 48
In sum, although the Sandiganbayan, in the absence of grave abuse of
discretion, may have erred in dismissing the criminal case, such error may no longer
be annulled or set aside because it would place the respondents in double jeopardy.
At any rate, even if we go beyond the function of certiorari and dissect the
prosecution's theory that the respondents conspired to commit the crime, we still
sustain the Sandiganbayan.
Three acts are undisputed: (1) Adriatico issued the antedated subject OR in
1999, (2) De Luna requested Adriatico to antedate the OR, and (3) Mayor Saludaga
signed in 1999 the mayor's permit which allowed De Luna to engage as pakyaw
contractor for the period August 27-December 30, 1997.
As a rule, conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the accused.
However, it is required that said acts must clearly manifest a concurrence of
wills, a common intent or design to commit a crime.
The concurrence of will and common intent or design to commit a crime is not
clearly manifest in the present case. The charge of conspiracy simply does not hold
water.
No convincing evidence was presented to show how the respondents conspired
to commit the crime. We find no credible proof that links or gives unifying purpose to
the respondents' individual acts. Without such proof, we cannot conclude with moral
certainty that they conspired, connived, and mutually helped one another to commit
the crime. These acts, on their own and nothing more, do not support the allegation of
conspiracy.
As a final point, we note the People's suggestion that the Sandiganbayan, in
granting the demurrer, tried to exculpate Mayor Saludaga and thereby abetted the
freeing of a corrupt public official. 49 While we recognize the prosecutors' efforts in
bringing unscrupulous public officials to justice, we find these comments unwarranted
and unfair to the Sandiganbayan. Besides, unfounded accusations such as these have
no place in a pleading.
WHEREFORE, in the light of these findings and legal premises, we find no
grave abuse of discretion in the June 21, 2011 Sandiganbayan resolution granting the
respondents' joint demurrer to evidence in Criminal Case No. 28261 and therefore,
accordingly, DISMISS the petition.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Del Castillo, Mendoza and Leonen, JJ., concur.
||| (People v. Sandiganbayan (2nd Division), G.R. No. 197953, [August 5, 2015])
 FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 184658. March 6, 2013.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. JUDGE RAFAEL R.

LAGOS, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, QUEZON CITY, BRANCH 79, JONATHAN DY y
RUBIC, CASTEL VINCI ESTACIO y TOLENTINO, AND CARLO
CASTRO y CANDO, respondents.

DECISION

SERENO, C.J : p

Before this Court is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 seeking to
reverse the following Orders in Criminal Case No. Q-07-146628 issued by public
respondent Judge Rafael R. Lagos (Judge Lagos), presiding judge of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 79:

1. The Order issued on 23 April 2008, granting respondents' Petition for

Bail and Motion for Leave to File Demurrer to Evidence; 1

2. The Order issued on 24 June 2008 granting the demurrer to evidence

filed by respondents and acquitting them of the crime of illegal
sale of drugs punishable under Section 5, Article II, Republic Act
9165; 2

3. The Order issued on 24 July 2008, which: a) denied petitioner's Motion

for Inhibition, b) denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of
the 24 July 2008 Order; and c) granted respondents' Motion to
withdraw their cash bonds. 3

On 30 March 2007, at 11:00 a.m., a confidential informant (CI) appeared before

the Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operations Task Force (AIDSOTF) of the Philippine
National Police (PNP) in Camp Crame, Quezon City. The CI relayed to Police Senior
Inspector Fidel Fortaleza, Jr. (P S/Insp. Fortaleza) that an individual using the alias
"Brian" was engaged in the illegal sale of the prohibited drug "ecstasy" in BF Homes,
Parañaque City. 4 The CI further reported that "Brian," who was later identified as herein
private respondent Castel Vinci Estacio y Tolentino (Estacio), promised a commission
from any transaction the former would help arrange. P S/Insp. Fortaleza, as team leader
of the AIDSOTF, assembled and briefed the team that would conduct the buy-bust
operation. Police Officer (PO) 2 Marlo V. Frando (PO2 Frando) was assigned to act as
the poseur-buyer and PO2 Ruel P. Cubian (PO2 Cubian) as back-up, while the rest of the
team members were to serve as perimeter security. P S/Insp. Fortaleza and PO2 Leonard
So prepared and dusted two P500 bills for use as buy-bust money. The CI then called
respondent Estacio, informing him that a prospective buyer wished to purchase thirty (30)
tablets of ecstasy with a total value of P50,000. 5 That afternoon, respondent Estacio
instructed them to proceed to Tandang Sora Avenue, Quezon City, where the transaction
was to take place. 6aIcDCT

At 11:00 p.m. of the same day, Estacio alighted from a Toyota Vios car at the
Jollibee branch located at the corner of Commonwealth Avenue and Tandang Sora. PO2
Frando, accompanied by the CI, approached Estacio. After PO2 Frando was introduced to
Estacio as the prospective buyer, the latter demanded to see the payment. However, PO2
Frando asked him to first show the ecstasy pills. 7 Estacio then opened the doors of the
vehicle and introduced his two companions, Carlo and Jonathan (later identified as herein
respondents Jonathan Dy and Carlo Castro), to PO2 Frando and the CI. Respondent
Castro handed PO2 Frando one sealed plastic sachet containing several pink pills. The
latter gave the "boodle" money to respondent Dy and immediately removed his baseball
cap. The removal of the cap was the prearranged signal to the rest of the buy-bust team
that the transaction was complete. 8

PO2 Frando introduced himself as a police officer and informed respondents of

their constitutional rights. 9 PO2 Cubian frisked respondent Dy and was able to recover
the buy-bust money. 10 Respondents were then escorted to the AIDSOTF office in Camp
Crame, where they identified themselves as Castel Vinci Estacio y Tolentino, Carlo
Castro y Cando, and Jonathan Dy y Rubic. As officer in charge of the inventory of the
evidence seized, PO2 Cubian turned over the plastic sachet to PO3 Jose Rey Serrona,
who was in charge of the investigation. 11 On 31 March 2007, forensic chemist and
Police Senior Inspector Yelah C. Manaog (P S/Insp. Manaog) conducted a laboratory
examination of the contents of the sachet, which was completed at 10:50 a.m. that same
day. 12 The 30 pink pills were found positive for methylenedioxymethamphetamine
(MDMA) hydrochloride, commonly known as ecstasy, a dangerous drug. 13

An Information dated 3 April 2007 was filed against respondents for the sale of
dangerous drugs, in violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 9165.
The case was raffled to the sala of Judge Fernando Sagum, Jr. of the Quezon City RTC.
Upon arraignment, respondents pleaded not guilty to the charges. Trial ensued, and the
prosecution presented its evidence, including the testimonies of four witnesses: PO2
Marlo V. Frando, PO2 Ruel P. Cubian, Police Senior Inspector Yelah C. Manaog, and
PO3 Jose Rey Serrona. After the prosecution submitted its Formal Offer of Evidence on
17 November 2007, respondents filed a Motion for leave of court to file their demurrer,
as well as a Motion to resolve their Petition for Bail. On 2 January 2008, Judge Sagum
issued a Resolution denying both the Petition for Bail and the Motion for leave of court to
file a demurrer. Respondent Estacio then sought the inhibition of Judge Sagum, a move
subsequently adopted by respondents Dy and Castro. On 15 January 2008, Presiding
Judge Sagum inhibited himself from the case. On 31 January 2008, the case was re-
raffled to public respondent Judge Lagos. SHaATC

Judge Lagos issued the first assailed Order on 23 April 2008 granting respondents'
Petition for Bail and allowing them to file their demurrer. On 24 June 2008, he issued the
second assailed Order, acquitting all the accused. On Motion for Reconsideration filed
by the People, he issued the third assailed Order denying the above motion and granting
the Motion to Withdraw Cash Bonds filed by the accused.

Before this Court, the prosecution argues that Judge Lagos committed grave abuse
of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction in granting the demurrer despite
clear proof of the elements of the illegal sale, the existence of the corpus delicti, and the
arrest in flagrante delicto. 14 Private respondents counter that the Petition is dismissible
on the ground of double jeopardy and is violative of the principle of hierarchy of courts.

We grant the petition.

Respondent judge committed grave

abuse of discretion in granting the
demurrer.

It has long been settled that the grant of a demurrer is tantamount to an acquittal.
An acquitted defendant is entitled to the right of repose as a direct consequence of the
finality of his acquittal. 15 This rule, however, is not without exception. The rule on
double jeopardy is subject to the exercise of judicial review by way of the extraordinary
writ of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The Supreme Court is endowed
with the power to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the government. 16 Here, the party asking for the review must show the presence of a
whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; a patent
and gross abuse of discretion amounting to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual
refusal to perform a duty imposed by law or to act in contemplation of law; an exercise of
power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility; or a blatant
abuse of authority to a point so grave and so severe as to deprive the court of its very
power to dispense justice. 17 In such an event, the accused cannot be considered to be at
risk of double jeopardy. 18 cHSTEA

The trial court declared that the testimonies of PO2 Frando, PO2 Cubian, P S/Insp.
Manaog, and AIDSOTF Chief Leonardo R. Suan were insufficient to prove the
culmination of the illegal sale, or to show their personal knowledge of the offer to sell
and the acceptance thereof. In granting the demurrer filed by the accused, respondent
judge surmised that it was the CI who had initiated the negotiation of the sale and should
have thus been presented at trial.

Accused were caught in flagrante

delicto; AIDSOTF police officers
witnessed the actual sale.

The trial court's assessment that the witnesses had no personal knowledge of the
illegal sale starkly contrasts with the facts borne out by the records. PO2 Frando was
present during the negotiation and the actual buy-bust operation. PO2 Frando himself
acted as the poseur-buyer and testified in open court. PO2 Cubian frisked the accused and
recovered the buy-bust money; he also testified in court. P S/Insp. Manaog testified as to
the corpus delicti of the crime; and the 30 pills of ecstasy were duly marked, identified,
and presented in court. The validity of buy-bust transactions as an effective way of
apprehending drug dealers in the act of committing an offense is well-settled. 19

The only elements necessary to consummate the crime of illegal sale of drugs is
proof that the illicit transaction took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the
corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence. 20 In buy-bust operations, the delivery of the
contraband to the poseur-buyer and the seller's receipt of the marked money successfully
consummate the buy-bust transaction between the entrapping officers and the accused.
Unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the members of the buy-bust team
were inspired by any improper motive or were not properly performing their duty, their
testimonies on the operation deserve faith and credit. 21 The Court has held that when
police officers have no motive to testify falsely against the accused, courts are inclined to
uphold the presumption of regularity accorded to them in the performance of their official
duties. 22 In the present case, there is no contention that the members of AIDSOTF who
conducted the buy-bust operation were motivated by ill will or malice. Neither was there
evidence adduced to show that they neglected to perform their duties properly. Hence,
their testimonies as to the conduct of the buy-bust operation deserves full faith and
credence. SEDICa

Respondent judge harps on the fact that it was the CI who had personal knowledge
of the identity of the seller, the initial offer to purchase the ecstasy pills, and the
subsequent acceptance of the offer. It is clear from the testimonies of PO2 Frando and the
other arresting officers that they conducted the buy-bust operation based on the
information from the CI. However, the arrest was made, not on the basis of that
information, but of the actual buy-bust operation, in which respondents were caught in
flagrante delicto engaged in the illegal sale of dangerous drugs. Due to the investigative
work of the AIDSOTF members, the illegal sale was consummated in their presence, and
the elements of the sale — the identity of the sellers, the delivery of the drugs, and the
payment therefor — were confirmed. That the CI initially provided this information or
"tip" does not negate the subsequent consummation of the illegal sale.

In the Court's Resolution on People v. Utoh, the accused was caught in flagrante
delicto selling P36,000 worth of shabu in a buy-bust operation conducted by the
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA). The accused argued that mere reliable
information from the CI was an insufficient ground for his warrantless arrest. The Court
stated:

Utoh was arrested not, as he asserts, on the basis of "reliable

information" received by the arresting officers from a confidential informant.
His arrest came as a result of a valid buy-bust operation, a form of entrapment
in which the violator is caught in flagrante delicto. The police officers
conducting a buy-bust operation are not only authorized but also duty-bound to
apprehend the violators and to search them for anything that may have been part
of or used in the commission of the crime.

The testimonies of arresting officers IO1 Apiit and IO1 Mosing were
straightforward, positive, and categorical. From the time they were tipped off by
the confidential informant at around 9:00 a.m. of November 22, 2008 or up to
the time until the informant confirmed Utoh's impending arrival at a very late
hour that night, and the latter's eventual arrest, the intelligence officers credibly
accounted for the briefings held, the preparations, and actions taken by them. 23

It is well-settled that the testimony of

the CI in the sale of illegal drugs is
not indispensable. EAICTS

Given the foregoing, respondent Judge Lagos erred in requiring the testimony of
the CI. Respondent judge based his ruling on a 2004 case, People v. Ong, the facts of
which purportedly "mirror" those of the present case. However, there is no basis for this
conclusion, as Ong involved a conviction based on the lone testimony of one
apprehending officer, Senior Police Officer (SPO1) Gonzales. The Court found that
SPO1 Gonzales was merely the deliveryman, while the CI was the one who acted as the
poseur-buyer. In this case, one of the witnesses, PO2 Frando, was a buy-bust team
member who also acted as the poseur-buyer. He participated in the actual sale
transaction. His testimony was a firsthand account of what transpired during the buy-bust
and thus stemmed from his personal knowledge of the arrest in flagrante delicto.

Requiring the CI to testify is an added imposition that runs contrary to

jurisprudential doctrine, since the Court has long established that the presentation of an
informant is not a requisite for the prosecution of drug cases. The testimony of the CI is
not indispensable, since it would be merely corroborative of and cumulative with that of
the poseur-buyer who was presented in court, and who testified on the facts and
circumstances of the sale and delivery of the prohibited drug. 24

Informants are usually not presented in court because of the need to hide their
identities and preserve their invaluable services to the police. Except when the accused
vehemently denies selling prohibited drugs and there are material inconsistencies in the
testimonies of the arresting officers, or there are reasons to believe that the officers had
motives to falsely testify against the accused, or that it was the informant who acted as
the poseur-buyer, the informant's testimony may be dispensed with, as it will merely be
corroborative of the apprehending officers' eyewitness accounts. 25 In People v. Lopez,
the Court ruled that the "informant's testimony, then, would have been merely
corroborative and cumulative because the fact of sale of the prohibited drug was already
established by the direct testimony of SPO4 Jamisolamin who actively took part in the
transaction. If the prosecution has several eyewitnesses, as in the instant case, it need not
present all of them but only as many as may be needed to meet the quantum of proof
necessary to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt." 26

Similarly, in the present case, the fact of the illegal sale has already been
established by testimonies of the members of the buy-bust team. Judge Lagos need not
have characterized the CI's testimony as indispensable to the prosecution's case. We find
and so hold that the grant of the demurrer for this reason alone was not supported by
prevailing jurisprudence and constituted grave abuse of discretion. The prosecution's
evidence was, prima facie, sufficient to prove the criminal charges filed against
respondents, subject to the defenses they may present in the course of a full-blown trial.
IESTcD

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Orders of the Regional Trial

Court dated 23 April 2008, 24 June 2008, and 24 July 2008 are ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE. The RTC is ORDERED to reinstate Criminal Case No. Q-07-146628 to the
court's docket and proceed with trial.

SO ORDERED.

||| (People v. Lagos, G.R. No. 184658, [March 6, 2013], 705 PHIL 570-582)

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 188560. December 15, 2010.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RICKY

ALFREDO y NORMAN, accused-appellant.
 DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J : p

The Case

This is an appeal from the September 30, 2008 Decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02135 entitled People of the Philippines v.
Ricky Alfredo y Norman, which affirmed an earlier decision 2 in Criminal Case Nos.
01-CR-4213 and 01-CR-4214 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 62 in La
Trinidad, Benguet. The RTC found accused-appellant Ricky Alfredo y Norman guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of rape.

The Facts

Accused-appellant was charged in two (2) separate Informations, the

accusatory portions of which read:

Criminal Case No. 01-CR-4213

That sometime in the period from April 28-29, 2001, at Cadian, Topdac,
Municipality of Atok, Province of Benguet, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of
force, intimidation and threats, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge with one [AAA], 3 a thirty six (36) year old
woman, against her will and consent, to her damage and prejudice.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 4

Criminal Case No. 01-CR-4214

That sometime in the period from April 28-29, 2001, at Cadian, Topdac,
Municipality of Atok, Province of Benguet, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of
force, intimidation and threats, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously commit an act of sexual assault by inserting a flashlight into the
vagina of one [AAA], a thirty six (36) year old woman, against her will and
consent, to her damage and prejudice.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 5 TSIDaH

On June 21, 2001, accused-appellant, with the assistance of counsel, pleaded

not guilty to both charges. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
 During the trial, the prosecution offered the oral testimonies of the victim,
AAA; her 10-year old son, BBB; Ernesto dela Cruz; Police Officer 3 James Ruadap;
and Dr. Alma Ged-ang. On the other hand, the defense presented as its witnesses
accused-appellant himself; his mother, Remina; his sister, Margaret; Hover Cotdi;
Jona Canuto; and Pina Mendoza. 6

The Prosecution's Version of Facts

In March 2001, AAA, who was six months pregnant, went home to Butiyao,
Benguet, along with her family, to harvest the peppers planted in their garden. On
April 27, 2001, AAA and her son, BBB, returned to their sayote plantation in Cadian,
Topdac, Atok, Benguet to harvest sayote. The following day, or on April 28, 2001,
AAA had the harvested sayote transported to Baguio City. Later that night, she and
her son stayed at their rented shack and retired early to bed. 7
In the middle of the night, AAA was awakened by a beam of light coming
from the gaps in the walls of the shack directly illuminating her face. She then
inquired who the person was, but nobody answered. Instead, the light was switched
off. After a few minutes, the light was switched on again. 8 Thereafter, a male voice
shouted, "Rumwar kayo ditta no saan kayo nga rumwar paletpeten kayo iti bala!" 9
AAA remained seated. Then, the male voice uttered, "Lukatam daytoy no saan mo
nga lukatan bilangan ka, maysa, duwa . . ." 10 AAA immediately woke BBB up. Just
then, the male voice said, "Pabitaken kayo iti bala." 11 AAA cried out of fear. 12
Anxious that the person outside would kill her and her son, AAA lit the gas
lamp placed on top of the table, and opened the door while her son stood beside it. As
the door opened, she saw accused-appellant directly in front of her holding a
flashlight. AAA did not immediately recognize accused-appellant, as his hair was
long and was covering his face. She invited him to come inside the shack, but the
latter immediately held her hair and ordered her to walk uphill. 13 Helpless and
terrified, AAA obeyed him. All the while, accused-appellant was behind her. 14
Upon reaching a sloping ground, accused-appellant ordered AAA to stop.
Thereafter, accused-appellant placed the lit flashlight in his pocket and ordered AAA
to remove her clothes. When she refused, accused-appellant boxed her left eye and
removed her clothes. When she also attempted to stop accused-appellant, the latter
angrily slapped her face. Completely naked, AAA was again ordered to walk uphill.
15
Upon reaching a grassy portion and a stump about one foot high, accused-
appellant ordered AAA to stop and lie on top of the stump, after accused-appellant
boxed her thighs. Accused-appellant then bent down and spread open AAA's legs.
After directing the beam of the flashlight on AAA's naked body, accused-appellant
removed his pants, lowered his brief to his knees, went on top of her, and inserted his
penis into her vagina. Accused-appellant threatened to box her if she moves. 16
 Accused-appellant also held AAA's breast, as well as the other parts of her
body. He shifted the flashlight from one hand to another while he moved his buttocks
up and down. AAA cried as she felt severe pain in her lower abdomen. Accused-
appellant stood up and directed the beam of the flashlight on her after he was
satisfied. 17
Ten minutes later, accused-appellant went on top of AAA again and inserted
his penis into her vagina and moved his buttocks up and down. After being satisfied,
accused-appellant stood up and lit a cigarette. 18
Afterwards, accused-appellant went on top of AAA again and tried to insert his
penis in the latter's vagina. His penis, however, has already softened. Frustrated,
accused-appellant knelt and inserted his fingers in her vagina. After removing his
fingers, accused-appellant held a twig about 10 inches long and the size of a small
finger in diameter which he used to pierce her vagina. Dissatisfied, accused-appellant
removed the twig and inserted the flashlight in her vagina. 19 IaEASH

After accused-appellant removed the flashlight from AAA's vagina, he went on

top of her again, pressing his elbows on her upper breasts and boxing her shoulders
and thighs. Subsequently, accused-appellant stood up and warned her not to report the
incident to the authorities. Immediately after, he left her at the scene. 20
Since she was too weak to walk, AAA rested for about 15 minutes before she
got up and went back to the shack where she immediately woke her son up.
Thereafter, they proceeded to the highway and boarded a jeep to Camp 30, Atok,
Benguet. She also went to Sayangan, Atok, Benguet the following day to report the
incident to the police authorities. 21
Upon medical examination, Dr. Ged-ang found that AAA had a
subconjunctival hemorrhage on the right eye and multiple head injuries, which may
have been caused by force such as a blow, a punch, or a hard object hitting the eye.
There was also tenderness on the upper part of the back of AAA, as well as on her left
infraclavicular area below the left clavicle, left flank area or at the left side of the
waist, and medial aspect on the inner part of the thigh. Moreover, there were also
multiple linear abrasions, or minor straight open wounds on the skin of her forearms
and legs caused by sharp objects with rough surface. 22
Apart from the external examination, Dr. Ged-ang also conducted an internal
examination of the genitalia of AAA. Dr. Ged-ang found that there was confluent
abrasion on the left and medial aspects of her labia minora about five centimeters
long and a confluent circular abrasion caused by a blunt, rough object that has been
forcibly introduced into the genitalia. 23

Version of the Defense

In the morning of April 28, 2001, accused-appellant was allegedly working in

the sayote plantation near his house. At noontime, he went home to eat his lunch.
After having lunch, his mother told him to bring the pile of sayote she harvested to the
edge of the road. Accused-appellant went to the place where the pile of harvested
sayote was placed. However, when he reached that place, he claimed that he saw
AAA gathering the sayote harvested by his mother and placing them in a sack. 24
Upon seeing what AAA was doing, accused-appellant shouted at her,
prompting AAA to run away with her son and leave the sack of sayote. When they
left, accused-appellant started placing the harvested sayote in the sack. He was able to
fill eight sacks. Remembering that his mother told him that he would be able to fill 10
sacks all in all, accused-appellant went to the shack of AAA after bringing the eight
sacks near the road. He suspected that she and her son were the ones who took the two
missing sacks of sayote. 25
When he arrived at the place where AAA and her son were staying, accused-
appellant allegedly saw them packing sayote, and he also supposedly saw a sack of
sayote with the name of his father printed on it. For this reason, accused-appellant got
mad and told AAA to go away and leave the place because what they were doing was
wrong. AAA replied by saying that she would wait for Hover Cotdi, the owner of the
sayote plantation and the shack, to ask for permission to leave. All this time, accused-
appellant was allegedly speaking in an angry but non-threatening voice. Nonetheless,
while he was confronting AAA, her son ran into the shack and stayed there. 26
Before leaving the place, accused-appellant told AAA that the sacks of sayote
belonged to his family, although he decided not to take them back anymore. He
supposedly left after five o'clock in the afternoon and arrived at their house at around
seven o'clock in the evening. During this time, all his family members were watching
television on Channel 3. Accused-appellant joined them in watching a Tagalog movie.
He then allegedly went to bed at 10 o'clock in the evening, while his parents
continued to watch television until 11 o'clock in the evening. 27
The following morning, on April 29, 2001, accused-appellant woke up
between six to seven o'clock in the morning. After having breakfast, he helped his
mother clean the sayote farm. At around eight o'clock in the morning, he saw AAA by
the road waiting for a ride with a baggage placed in a carton box. His mother then
went down the road and talked to AAA, leaving accused-appellant behind. He
claimed to pity AAA upon seeing her but could not do anything. 28 aAcHCT 

Ruling of the Trial Court

Between the two conflicting versions of the incident, the trial court gave
credence to the version of the prosecution and rendered its Decision dated February
17, 2006, finding accused-appellant guilty of two counts of rape. The decretal portion
reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds RICKY

ALFREDO y NORMAN guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape
 in Criminal Case No. 01-CR-4213 and sentences him to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua including all the accessory penalties imposed by law.

The Court, likewise, finds him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Rape in Criminal Case No. 01-CR-4214 and sentences him to suffer
the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of three (3) years, two (2) months
and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, and eight (8) years, two
(2) months and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.

For each count of rape, he shall pay [AAA] the sum of Fifty Thousand
Pesos (Php50,000.00) by way of civil indemnity and the sum of Fifty Thousand
Pesos (P50,000.00) by way of moral damages.

Pursuant to Administrative Circular No. 4-92-A of the Court

Administrator, the Provincial Jail Warden of Benguet Province is directed to
immediately transfer the said accused, Ricky Alfredo y Norman to the custody
of the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City, Metro Manila after the
expiration of fifteen (15) days from date of promulgation unless otherwise
ordered by the court.

Let a copy of this Judgment be furnished the Provincial Jail Warden of

Benguet Province for his information, guidance and compliance.

SO ORDERED. 29

Pursuant to our pronouncement in People v. Mateo, 30 modifying the pertinent

provisions of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure insofar as they provide for
direct appeals from the Regional Trial Court to this Court in cases in which the
penalty imposed by the trial court is death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment,
the case was transferred, for appropriate action and disposition, to the CA.
On August 17, 2006, accused-appellant filed his Brief for Accused-Appellant,
31 while the People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General,
filed its Brief for the Plaintiff-Appellee 32 on January 18, 2007.

Ruling of the Appellate Court

As stated above, the CA, in its Decision dated September 30, 2008, affirmed
the judgment of conviction by the trial court. 33
Undaunted, accused-appellant filed a motion for reconsideration, which was
denied by the CA in its Resolution dated March 19, 2009. 34
On April 21, 2009, accused-appellant filed his Notice of Appeal 35 from the
CA Decision dated September 30, 2008.
 In our Resolution dated September 14, 2009, 36 we notified the parties that
they may file their respective supplemental briefs if they so desired. On November 9,
2009, the People of the Philippines manifested that it is no longer filing a
supplemental brief, as it believed that all the issues involved in the present
controversy have been succinctly discussed in the Brief for the Appellee. 37 On the
other hand, on January 26, 2010, accused-appellant filed his supplemental brief. CIcEHS

The Issues

Accused-appellant contends in his supplemental brief that:

I.

BY THE NATURE OF THE OFFENSE IN THE TWO (2) INFORMATIONS

FILED AGAINST ACCUSED-APPELLANT, THE LATTER HAS NO
OTHER PLAUSIBLE DEFENSE EXCEPT ALIBI THAT SHOULD NOT
JUST BE BRUSHED ASIDE IF THERE ARE MATERIAL
INCONSISTENSIES IN THE CLAIMS OF THE WITNESSES FOR THE
PROSECUTION;

II.

THE DECISION CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT HEAVILY

RELIED ON THE DEMEANOR OF THE WITNESSES FOR THE
PROSECUTION DURING THE TRIAL WHEN THE PONENTE OF THE
DECISION DID NOT HAVE ANY OPPORTUNITY TO HEAR THE
WITNESSES;

III.

THE THEN AND THERE CONDUCT OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT IS

UNLIKELY TO YIELD A GUILTY VERDICT. 38

The Court's Ruling

We sustain accused-appellant's conviction.

Alibi is an inherently weak defense

In his supplemental brief, accused-appellant contends that he could not offer

any other defense except denial and alibi, as he could not distort the truth that he was
in his house at the time of the alleged rape in the evening of April 28, 2001 up to the
wee hours of April 29, 2001. He contends that although denial and alibi are the
weakest defenses in criminal cases, consideration should also be given to the fact that
denial becomes the most plausible line of defense considering the nature of the crime
of rape where normally only two persons are involved. 39

It should be noted that for alibi to prosper, it is not enough for the accused to
prove that he was in another place when the crime was committed. He must likewise
prove that it was physically impossible for him to be present at the crime scene or its
immediate vicinity at the time of its commission. 40
A review of the records in the instant case would reveal that accused-appellant
failed to present convincing evidence that he did not leave his house, which is only
about 150 meters away from the shack of AAA, in the evening of April 28, 2001.
Significantly, it was also not physically impossible for accused-appellant to be present
on the mountain where he allegedly raped AAA at the time it was said to have been
committed.
Moreover, it has been held, time and again, that alibi, as a defense, is
inherently weak and crumbles in light of positive identification by truthful witnesses.
41 It is evidence negative in nature and self-serving and cannot attain more credibility
than the testimonies of prosecution witnesses who testify on clear and positive
evidence. 42 Thus, there being no strong and credible evidence adduced to overcome
the testimony of AAA, no weight can be given to the alibi of accused-appellant.
In addition, even if the alibi of accused-appellant appears to have been
corroborated by his mother, Remina, and his sister, Margaret, said defense is
unworthy of belief not only because accused-appellant was positively identified by
AAA, but also because it has been held that alibi becomes more unworthy of merit
where it is established mainly by the accused himself and his or her relatives, friends,
and comrades-in-arms, 43 and not by credible persons. 44 ATcaID

As between the statement made in an affidavit and that given in

open court, the latter is superior

Accused-appellant contends also that there were material inconsistencies in the

testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and in the latter's respective affidavits, to wit:
(1) whether accused-appellant's penis was erect or not; and (2) whether AAA indeed
recognized accused-appellant when they were already on the mountain or while they
were still in the shack. 45
AAA testified in open court that accused-appellant tried to insert his penis into
her vagina several times but was unable to do so since his penis has already softened.
46 On the other hand, AAA stated in her affidavit that "the suspect ordered me to lay
[sic] flatly on the ground and there he started to light and view my whole naked body
while removing his pant [sic] and tried to insert his pennis [sic] on [sic] my vagina but
I wonder it does not errect [sic]." 47 There is no inconsistency between AAA's
testimony and her affidavit. The only difference is that she failed to state in her
affidavit that before accused-appellant unsuccessfully tried to insert his penis into
AAA's vagina, he had already succeeded twice in penetrating her private organ.
There is likewise no incompatibility between AAA's affidavit stating that she
came to know of accused-appellant as the culprit when they were on the mountain and
his flashlight illuminated his face as he lay on top of her, and her testimony that while
they were still in the shack, AAA was "not then sure" but already suspected that her
rapist was accused-appellant "because of his hair." 48 In other words, AAA was not
yet sure whether accused-appellant was the culprit while they were still in the shack,
as she only became positively certain that it was him when the flashlight illuminated
his face while they were on the mountain. 49
Nevertheless, discrepancies do not necessarily impair the credibility of a
witness, for affidavits, being taken ex parte, are almost always incomplete and often
inaccurate for lack of searching inquiries by the investigating officer or due to partial
suggestions, and are, thus, generally considered to be inferior to the testimony given
in open court. 50

The validity of conviction is not adversely affected by the fact that

the judge who rendered judgment was not the one who heard the
witnesses

Accused-appellant contends further that the judge who penned the appealed
decision is different from the judge who heard the testimonies of the witnesses and
was, thus, in no position to render a judgment, as he did not observe firsthand their
demeanor during trial.
We do not agree. The fact that the trial judge who rendered judgment was not
the one who had the occasion to observe the demeanor of the witnesses during trial,
but merely relied on the records of the case, does not render the judgment erroneous,
especially where the evidence on record is sufficient to support its conclusion. 51 As
this Court held in People v. Competente:

The circumstance that the Judge who rendered the judgment was
not the one who heard the witnesses, does not detract from the validity of
the verdict of conviction. Even a cursory perusal of the Decision would show
that it was based on the evidence presented during trial and that it was carefully
studied, with testimonies on direct and cross examination as well as questions
from the Court carefully passed upon. 52 (Emphasis supplied.)

Further, the transcripts of stenographic notes taken during the trial were extant
and complete. Hence, there was no impediment for the judge to decide the case. DAESTI

The guilt of accused-appellant has been established beyond

reasonable doubt 
 After a careful examination of the records of this case, this Court is satisfied
that the prosecution's evidence established the guilt of accused-appellant beyond
reasonable doubt.
In reviewing the evidence in rape cases, the following considerations should be
made: (1) an accusation for rape can be made with facility, it is difficult to prove but
more difficult for the person, though innocent, to disprove; (2) in view of the intrinsic
nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are usually involved, the
testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) the
evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be
allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. 53
Nonetheless, it is also worth noting that rape is essentially committed in relative
isolation or secrecy; thus, it is most often only the victim who can testify with regard
to the fact of forced coitus. 54
In the instant case, accused-appellant is charged with two counts of rape — one
under paragraph 1 (a) of Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code and the other under
par. 2 of Art. 266-A.
Pertinently, the elements of rape under par. 1 (a) of Art. 266-A of the Code are
the following: (1) that the offender is a man; (2) that the offender had carnal
knowledge of a woman; and (3) that such act is accomplished by using force or
intimidation. 55
On the other hand, the elements of rape under par. 2 of Art. 266-A of the Code
are as follows: (1) that the offender commits an act of sexual assault; (2) that the act
of sexual assault is committed by inserting his penis into another person's mouth or
anal orifice or by inserting any instrument or object into the genital or anal orifice of
another person; and that the act of sexual assault is accomplished by using force or
intimidation, among others. 56
Notably, the prosecution has sufficiently established the existence of the
foregoing elements. When AAA was called to the witness stand, she gave a detailed
narration of the incident that transpired in the evening of April 28, 2001 and early
morning of April 29, 2001. AAA categorically asserted that accused-appellant had
carnal knowledge of her and even sexually assaulted her against her will with the use
of force, threat, or intimidation.
Particularly, AAA testified that accused-appellant threatened to riddle her and
her son with bullets if they do not open the door of their shack. Accused-appellant
thereafter forcibly pulled her hair and dragged her to the mountains. AAA pleaded for
her life. Nonetheless, accused-appellant boxed her every time she did not yield to his
demands. He boxed her thighs forcing AAA to sit, and he threatened to box her if she
moves while he carried out his bestial desires. 57
AAA testified further that after accused-appellant satisfied his lust, he sexually
assaulted her. He inserted his fingers into her vagina and then he tried to pierce the
same with a twig. Subsequently, he inserted his flashlight into her vagina. 58 AAA
was too weak to stop him. She had struggled to free herself from accused-appellant
from the moment she was dragged from the shack until they reached the mountains.
However, accused-appellant still prevailed over her. Notably, AAA was six months
pregnant at that time. She was frightened and hopeless. 59
Also, it should be noted that the findings in the medical examination of Dr.
Ged-ang corroborated the testimony of AAA. While a medical examination of the
victim is not indispensable in the prosecution of a rape case, and no law requires a
medical examination for the successful prosecution of the case, the medical
examination conducted and the medical certificate issued are veritable corroborative
pieces of evidence, which strongly bolster AAA's testimony. 60 CScTDE

Moreover, the police found the red t-shirt and blue shorts of AAA in the place
where accused-appellant was said to have removed her clothes. In addition, AAA's
son, BBB, testified as to how accused-appellant threatened them in the evening of
April 28, 2001, how he was able to identify accused-appellant as the perpetrator, and
what his mother looked like when she returned home in the early morning of April 29,
2001. According to BBB, his mother was naked except for a dirty white jacket she
was wearing. He also noticed that his mother had wounds and blood all over her body.
All these are consistent with the testimony of AAA. 61

All told, we accordingly sustain accused-appellant's conviction.

Award of Damages

The decision of the CA as to the damages awarded must be modified. For rape
under Art. 266-A, par. 1 (d) of the Revised Penal Code, the CA was correct in
awarding PhP50,000 as civil indemnity and PhP50,000 as moral damages. However,
for rape through sexual assault under Art. 266-A, par. 2 of the Code, the award of
damages should be PhP30,000 as civil indemnity and PhP30,000 as moral damages.
62
We explained in People v. Cristobal that "for sexually assaulting a pregnant
married woman, the accused has shown moral corruption, perversity, and wickedness.
He has grievously wronged the institution of marriage. The imposition then of
exemplary damages by way of example to deter others from committing similar acts
or for correction for the public good is warranted." 63 Notably, there were instances
wherein exemplary damages were awarded despite the absence of an aggravating
circumstance. As we held in People v. Dalisay:

Prior to the effectivity of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,

courts generally awarded exemplary damages in criminal cases when an
aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, had been proven to
have attended the commission of the crime, even if the same was not alleged in
the information. This is in accordance with the aforesaid Article 2230.
However, with the promulgation of the Revised Rules, courts no longer consider
the aggravating circumstances not alleged and proven in the determination of
the penalty and in the award of damages. Thus, even if an aggravating
circumstance has been proven, but was not alleged, courts will not award
exemplary damages. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

Nevertheless, People v. Catubig laid down the principle that courts may
still award exemplary damages based on the aforementioned Article 2230, even
if the aggravating circumstance has not been alleged, so long as it has been
proven, in criminal cases instituted before the effectivity of the Revised Rules
which remained pending thereafter. Catubig reasoned that the retroactive
application of the Revised Rules should not adversely affect the vested rights of
the private offended party.

Thus, we find, in our body of jurisprudence, criminal cases, especially

those involving rape, dichotomized: one awarding exemplary damages, even if
an aggravating circumstance attending the commission of the crime had not
been sufficiently alleged but was consequently proven in the light of Catubig;
and another awarding exemplary damages only if an aggravating circumstance
has both been alleged and proven following the Revised Rules. Among those in
the first set are People v. Laciste, People v. Victor, People v. Orilla, People v.
Calongui, People v. Magbanua, People of the Philippines v. Heracleo Abello y
Fortada, People of the Philippines v. Jaime Cadag Jimenez, and People of the
Philippines v. Julio Manalili. And in the second set are People v. Llave, People
of the Philippines v. Dante Gragasin y Par, and People of the Philippines v.
Edwin Mejia. Again, the difference between the two sets rests on when the
criminal case was instituted, either before or after the effectivity of the Revised
Rules.

xxx xxx xxx

Nevertheless, by focusing only on Article 2230 as the legal basis for the
grant of exemplary damages — taking into account simply the attendance of an
aggravating circumstance in the commission of a crime, courts have lost sight of
the very reason why exemplary damages are awarded. Catubig is enlightening
on this point, thus — DaACIH

Also known as "punitive" or "vindictive" damages,

exemplary or corrective damages are intended to serve as a
deterrent to serious wrong doings, and as a vindication of undue
sufferings and wanton invasion of the rights of an injured or a
punishment for those guilty of outrageous conduct. These terms are
generally, but not always, used interchangeably. In common law,
 there is preference in the use of exemplary damages when the award
is to account for injury to feelings and for the sense of indignity and
humiliation suffered by a person as a result of an injury that has
been maliciously and wantonly inflicted, the theory being that there
should be compensation for the hurt caused by the highly
reprehensible conduct of the defendant — associated with such
circumstances as willfulness, wantonness, malice, gross negligence
or recklessness, oppression, insult or fraud or gross fraud — that
intensifies the injury. The terms punitive or vindictive damages are
often used to refer to those species of damages that may be awarded
against a person to punish him for his outrageous conduct. In either
case, these damages are intended in good measure to deter the
wrongdoer and others like him from similar conduct in the future.

Being corrective in nature, exemplary damages, therefore, can be

awarded, not only in the presence of an aggravating circumstance, but also
where the circumstances of the case show the highly reprehensible or
outrageous conduct of the offender. In much the same way as Article 2230
prescribes an instance when exemplary damages may be awarded, Article 2229,
the main provision, lays down the very basis of the award. Thus, in People v.
Matrimonio, the Court imposed exemplary damages to deter other fathers with
perverse tendencies or aberrant sexual behavior from sexually abusing their own
daughters. Also, in People v. Cristobal, the Court awarded exemplary damages
on account of the moral corruption, perversity and wickedness of the accused in
sexually assaulting a pregnant married woman. Recently, in People of the
Philippines v. Cristino Cañada, People of the Philippines v. Pepito Neverio and
The People of the Philippines v. Lorenzo Layco, Sr., the Court awarded
exemplary damages to set a public example, to serve as deterrent to elders who
abuse and corrupt the youth, and to protect the latter from sexual abuse. 

It must be noted that, in the said cases, the Court used as basis Article
2229, rather than Article 2230, to justify the award of exemplary damages.
Indeed, to borrow Justice Carpio Morales' words in her separate opinion in
People of the Philippines v. Dante Gragasin y Par, "[t]he application of
Article 2230 of the Civil Code strictissimi juris in such cases, as in the
present one, defeats the underlying public policy behind the award of
exemplary damages — to set a public example or correction for the public
good." 64 (Emphasis supplied.)

Concomitantly, exemplary damages in the amount of PhP30,000 should be

awarded for each count of rape, in line with prevailing jurisprudence. 65
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The CA Decision dated September
30, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02135 finding accused-appellant Ricky Alfredo
guilty of rape is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. As thus modified, accused-
appellant in Criminal Case No. 01-CR-4213 is ordered to pay PhP50,000 as civil
 indemnity, PhP50,000 as moral damages, and PhP30,000 as exemplary damages. In
Criminal Case No. 01-CR-4214, accused-appellant is likewise ordered to pay
PhP30,000 as civil indemnity, PhP30,000 as moral damages, and PhP30,000 as
exemplary damages.

SO ORDERED.

Corona, C.J., Leonardo-de Castro, Del Castillo and Perez, JJ., concur.

(People v. Alfredo y Norman, G.R. No. 188560, [December 15, 2010], 653 PHIL 435-
|||

456)

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 111610. February 27, 2002.]

ROMEO P. NAZARENO, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF

APPEALS, HON. ENRIQUE M. ALMARIO, in his capacity as
Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 15, Naic, Cavite, and PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Dominguez Tan & Associates for petitioner.

Carlos Bagbagin Tercero & Associates for respondents.

SYNOPSIS

Petitioner Romeo Nazareno and his wife, Eliza Nazareno, were charged with
Serious Physical Injuries in the Municipal Trial Court of Naic, Cavite. After trial on the
merits, the said court set the promulgation of judgment for April 24, 1986, but the same
was postponed due to petitioner's filing of a motion to re-open the case on the ground of
non-presentation of a vital witness. However, the said motion was denied. Petitioner
brought the matter to the Court of Appeals. Meanwhile, on April 15, 1988, Acting
Municipal Trial Court Judge Icasiano, Jr. promulgated the decision dated November 8,
1985 of Judge Manuel C. Diosomito acquitting Eliza Nazareno but convicting the
petitioner as charged. In this petition, petitioner alleged mainly that the decision is void
since at the time of the promulgation of the decision, Judge Diosomito who signed the
subject decision, had already retired from office.

In granting this petition, the Court ruled that a judgment promulgated after the
judge who signed the decision had ceased to hold office is not valid and binding. In like
manner, a decision penned by a judge during his incumbency cannot be validly
promulgated after his retirement. When a judge retired, all his authority to decide any
case, i.e., to write, sign and promulgate the decision thereon also "retired" with him. In
other words, he had lost entirely his power and authority to act on all cases assigned to
him prior to his retirement. In the instant case, therefore, Judge Icasiano, Jr. could not
validly promulgate the decision of another judge, Judge Diosomito, who had long
"retired" from the service. The decision dated November 8, 1985 of Judge Diosomito, as
promulgated by Judge Icasiano, Jr., is a void judgment. Thus, a void judgment is no
judgment at all.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; PROMULGATION OF

JUDGMENT; DECISION PENNED BY A JUDGE AFTER HIS RETIREMENT
CANNOT BE VALIDLY PROMULGATED. — A judgment promulgated after the
judge who signed the decision has ceased to hold office is not valid and binding. Such a
doctrine goes back to a 1917 decision, Lino Luna v. Rodriguez and De Los Angeles. We
reiterated this doctrine in the case of People v. Labao wherein we held that for a
judgment to be valid, it must be duly signed and promulgated during the incumbency of
the judge who signed it. Thus, a decision penned by a judge after his retirement cannot be
validly promulgated; it cannot acquire a binding effect as it is null and void. Quod ab
initio non valet, in tractu temporis non convalescit.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; APPLIED IN CASE AT BAR. — In like manner, a decision
penned by a judge during his incumbency cannot be validly promulgated after his
retirement. When a judge retired all his authority to decide any case, i.e., to write, sign
and promulgate the decision thereon also "retired" with him. In other words, he had lost
entirely his power and authority to act on all cases assigned to him prior to his retirement.
In the instant case, therefore, Judge Icasiano, Jr., could not validly promulgate the
decision of another judge, Judge Diosomito, who has long "retired" from the service. The
decision dated November 8, 1985 of Judge Diosomito, as promulgated by Judge Icasiano,
Jr., in Criminal Case No. 2335 of the Municipal Trial Court of Naic, Cavite is a void
judgment.

3. ID.; ID.; JUDGMENT; VOID JUDGMENT NEVER ACQUIRES FINALITY.

— A void judgment never acquires finality. Hence, while admittedly, the petitioner in the
case at bar failed to appeal timely the aforementioned decision of the Municipal Trial
Court of Naic, Cavite, it cannot be deemed to have become final and executory. In
contemplation of law, that void decision is deemed non-existent. Thus, there was no
effective or operative judgment to appeal from. In Metropolitan Waterworks & Sewerage
System vs. Sison, this Court held that: ". . . [A] void judgment is not entitled to the respect
accorded to a valid judgment, but may be entirely disregarded or declared inoperative by
any tribunal in which effect is sought to be given to it. It is attended by none of the
consequences of a valid adjudication. It has no legal or binding effect or efficacy for any
purpose or at any place. It cannot affect, impair or create rights. It is not entitled to
enforcement and is, ordinarily, no protection to those who seek to enforce. All
proceedings founded on the void judgment are themselves regarded as invalid. In other
words, a void judgment is regarded as a nullity, and the situation is the same as it would
be if there were no judgment. It, accordingly, leaves the parties-litigants in the same
position they were in before the trial."

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CANNOT BE SOURCE OF ANY RIGHT NOR OF ANY
OBLIGATION. — [A] void judgment is no judgment at all. It cannot be the source of
any right nor of any obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating
from it have no legal effect. Hence, it can never become final and any writ of execution
based on it is void: ". . . it may be said to be a lawless thing which can be treated as an
outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its head."

5. ID.; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; RULES OF PROCEDURE ARE

INTENDED TO PROMOTE, NOT DEFEAT, SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE. —
Admittedly, petitioner made possible the failure of the prior petition for review (G.R. No.
97812) before this Court to proceed by reason of its late filing as well as his choices of
remedial measures. However, oft-repeated is the dictum that courts should not place
undue importance on technicalities, when by so doing, substantial justice is sacrificed.
Rules of procedure are intended to promote, not defeat, substantial justice. It is within the
power of this Court to temper rigid rules of procedure in favor of substantial justice.
While it is desirable that the Rules of Court be faithfully observed, courts should not be
so strict about procedural lapses that do not really impair the proper administration of
justice. If the rules are intended to ensure the proper and orderly conduct of litigation, it is
because of the higher objective they seek which is the attainment of justice and the
protection of substantive rights of the parties. Thus, the relaxation of procedural rules, or
saving a particular case from the operation of technicalities when substantial justice
requires it, as in the case at bar, should no longer be subject to cavil.cHaDIA

DECISION

DE LEON, JR., J : p

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision 1 of the Court of

Appeals dated June 30, 1993 in CA-G.R. SP No. 30306 which found and declared that no
grave abuse of discretion attended the issuance of the Decision 2 dated October 12, 1992
of Judge Enrique M. Almario of the Regional Trial Court of Naic, Cavite, Branch 15 in
Criminal Case No. NC-564 dismissing, for having been filed out of time, petitioner's
appeal from a judgment 3 dated November 8, 1985, of conviction for serious physical
injuries, rendered by the Municipal Trial Court of Naic, Cavite.

It appears that in an Information dated December 1, 1983 petitioner Romeo

Nazareno and his wife, Elisa Nazareno, were charged with Serious Physical Injuries in
the Municipal Trial Court of Naic, Cavite and that upon arraignment, both pleaded "not
guilty" to the offense charged.

After trial on the merits, the said court set the promulgation of judgment for April
24, 1986, but the same was postponed due to petitioner's filing of a motion to re-open the
case on the ground of non-presentation of a vital witness who could not be produced
during the trial proper. 4 Said motion was opposed by the prosecution. On November 27,
1987, after Presiding Judge Manuel C. Diosomito was suspended, Acting Municipal Trial
Court Judge Aurelio Icasiano, Jr. issued a resolution denying the motion to re-open. 5

Petitioner brought the matter up to the Court of Appeals on certiorari with a

prayer for a temporary restraining order/preliminary injunction, docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 14329. 6 In the meantime, Acting Municipal Trial Court Judge Icasiano, Jr. set the
promulgation of judgment on April 15, 1988. On April 15, 1988, Acting Municipal Trial
Court Judge Icasiano, Jr. promulgated the Decision 7 dated November 8, 1985 of Judge
Manuel C. Diosomito acquitting Elisa Nazareno but convicting the petitioner as charged.
However, on the same date, the Court of Appeals in said CA-G.R. SP No. 14329 issued a
temporary restraining order 8 enjoining Judge Icasiano, Jr. from proceeding with the
promulgation of said judgment since a copy of the same resolution containing the
temporary restraining order was received by the Metropolitan Trial Court only after said
date.

Petitioner thereafter filed in the Court of Appeals a supplemental petition in said

CA-G.R. SP No. 14329 to declare the nullity of judgment, on the ground that the
decision, having been signed by Judge Diosomito, should have also been promulgated by
him, and not by Acting Judge Icasiano, Jr. 9 Petitioner also alleged that the decision is
void since at the time of the promulgation of the decision by Judge Icasiano, Jr., Judge
Diosomito who signed the subject decision has already retired from office. Said
supplemental petition, however, was denied by the Court of Appeals in its decision dated
February 11, 1991. 10 Reconsideration of the said decision of the appellate court was
denied in a Resolution promulgated on March 13, 1991. 11

Petitioner interposed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court
questioning the February 11, 1991 decision of the Court of Appeals but the same failed
for having been filed out of time, more specifically twelve (12) days late. Petitioner's
motion for reconsideration was denied by the Supreme Court in a Resolution dated
September 18, 1991. 12 On October 3, 1991, petitioner received a copy of the resolution
denying his motion for reconsideration, and on the same date he filed his notice of appeal
with the said Municipal Trial Court of Naic, appealing its decision to the Regional Trial
Court. 13

On October 10, 1991, the records of the case were forwarded to the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 15, Naic, Cavite, presided by the respondent Judge Enrique M. Almario
who, in a decision dated October 12, 1992, dismissed the appeal of petitioner for having
been filed out of time. 14 Reconsideration was sought 15 by petitioner but the same was
denied by respondent Judge Almario in his Order dated February 4, 1993. 16

Undaunted, petitioner interposed a Petition for Mandamus and Certiorari with the
Court of Appeals upon the premise that respondent Judge Almario, in dismissing the
appeal, unlawfully neglected to perform a duty resulting from his office to give due
course to petitioner's appeal which was already approved. 17 The appellate court
dismissed the petition. 18 Petitioner sought 19 reconsideration of the decision but the
same was denied in a Resolution 20 promulgated on August 10, 1993.

Hence, this petition, which raises four (4) issues for resolution, to wit: 21

THE APPEAL INTERPOSED BY PETITIONER AS ACCUSED IN CRIMINAL CASE NO.

2335 OF THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT, PRESIDED BY THE RESPONDENT JUDGE
WAS FILED ON TIME.

II

THE FILING OF A SUPPLEMENTAL PETITION, FOLLOWED BY A MOTION FOR

RECONSIDERATION, IN CA-G.R. NO. 14329 (CRIMINAL CASE NO. 2335, MTC OF
NAIC), AS WELL AS THE FILING OF A PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI
WITH THE SUPREME COURT IN G.R. NO. 97812 AND FOLLOWED BY A MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION INTERRUPTED THE RUNNING OF THE 15-DAY PERIOD WITHIN
WHICH TO PERFECT PETITIONER'S APPEAL FROM THE COURT DECISION OF THE
MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OF NAIC IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 2335.

III

THE RESPONDENT COURT AS WELL AS THE RESPONDENT JUDGE, CLEARLY

COMMITTED OR EXCEEDED THEIR AUTHORITY OR ACTED IN EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION WHEN THEY DISMISSED PETITIONER'S APPEAL FROM THE
DECISION OF THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OF NAIC IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 2335
TO THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. NC-564, AS WELL AS
THEIR MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION FILED IN CRIM. CASE NO. NC-564 AND IN
CA-G.R. NO. 14329 OF THE RESPONDENT JUDGE AND THE RESPONDENT COURT
RESPECTIVELY.
 IV

UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE AND IN THE EXERCISE OF ITS SOUND
DISCRETION IN ORDER TO DISPENSE JUSTICE TO PETITIONER, THIS HONORABLE
TRIBUNAL MAY VALIDLY AND LEGALLY GIVE DUE COURSE TO THE PRESENT
PETITION AND TO DECLARE THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT AS NULL AND
VOID AS THE TRIAL JUDGE WHO PENNED THE DECISION HAD LONG RETIRED
FROM THE SERVICE AT THE TIME OF THE PROMULGATION OF THE SAID
JUDGMENT ON APRIL 15, 1988.

At the outset, we note that, apparently, the crucial argument raised by the
petitioner is but a repetition of his main assertion in his prior petition for review in G.R.
No. 97812 before this Court which, unfortunately, was dismissed on a technicality —
failure to file the petition within the prescribed period. Considering the transcendental
importance of the issues herein raised which involve the precious liberty of a person and
to finally settle this cycle of unsettled questions of law, justice dictates that this Court
resolve this petition on the merits.

There is one vital fact that renders the instant petition meritorious, which is
petitioner's last issue for consideration, namely, the error committed by the trial judge,
Judge Icasiano, Jr., in promulgating a decision penned by another judge, Judge
Diosomito, who has ceased to be a member of the judiciary at the time of the
promulgation of the decision.

A judgment promulgated after the judge who signed the decision has ceased to
hold office is not valid and binding. 22 Such a doctrine goes back to a 1917 decision,
Lino Luna v. Rodriguez and De los Angeles. 23 We reiterated this doctrine in the case of
People v. Labao 24 wherein we held that for a judgment to be valid, it must be duly
signed and promulgated during the incumbency of the judge who signed it. 25 Thus, a
decision penned by a judge after his retirement cannot be validly promulgated; it cannot
acquire a binding effect as it is null and void. 26 Quod ab initio non valet, in tractu
temporis non convalescit. 27

In like manner, a decision penned by a judge during his incumbency cannot be

validly promulgated after his retirement. When a judge retired all his authority to decide
any case, i.e., to write, sign and promulgate the decision thereon also "retired" with him.
In other words, he had lost entirely his power and authority to act on all cases assigned to
him prior to his retirement. 28 In the instant case, therefore, Judge Icasiano, Jr. could not
validly promulgate the decision of another judge, Judge Diosomito, who has long
"retired" from the service. 29 The decision dated November 8, 1985 of Judge Diosomito,
as promulgated by Judge Icasiano, Jr., in Criminal Case No. 2335 of the Municipal Trial
Court of Naic, Cavite is a void judgment.
 A void judgment never acquires finality. 30 Hence, while admittedly, the
petitioner in the case at bar failed to appeal timely the aforementioned decision of the
Municipal Trial Court of Naic, Cavite, it cannot be deemed to have become final and
executory. In contemplation of law, that void decision is deemed non-existent. Thus,
there was no effective or operative judgment to appeal from. In Metropolitan Waterworks
& Sewerage System vs. Sison, 31 this Court held that:

". . . [A] void judgment is not entitled to the respect accorded to a valid
judgment, but may be entirely disregarded or declared inoperative by any
tribunal in which effect is sought to be given to it. It is attended by none of the
consequences of a valid adjudication. It has no legal or binding effect or
efficacy for any purpose or at any place. It cannot affect, impair or create rights.
It is not entitled to enforcement and is, ordinarily, no protection to those who
seek to enforce. All proceedings founded on the void judgment are themselves
regarded as invalid. In other words, a void judgment is regarded as a nullity, and
the situation is the same as it would be if there were no judgment. It,
accordingly, leaves the parties-litigants in the same position they were in before
the trial." 32

Thus, a void judgment is no judgment at all. It cannot be the source of any right
nor of any obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it
have no legal effect. Hence, it can never become final and any writ of execution based on
it is void: ". . . it may be said to be a lawless thing which can be treated as an outlaw and
slain at sight, or ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its head." 33

Admittedly, petitioner made possible the failure of the prior petition for review
(G.R. No. 97812) before this Court to proceed by reason of its late filing as well as his
choices of remedial measures. However, oft-repeated is the dictum that courts should not
place undue importance on technicalities, when by so doing, substantial justice is
sacrificed. Rules of procedure are intended to promote, not defeat, substantial justice. It is
within the power of this Court to temper rigid rules of procedure in favor of substantial
justice. While it is desirable that the Rules of Court be faithfully observed, courts should
not be so strict about procedural lapses that do not really impair the proper administration
of justice. If the rules are intended to ensure the proper and orderly conduct of litigation,
it is because of the higher objective they seek which is the attainment of justice and the
protection of substantive rights of the parties. Thus, the relaxation of procedural rules, or
saving a particular case from the operation of technicalities when substantial justice
requires it, as in the case at bar, should no longer be subject to cavil. 34

WHEREFORE, in the interest of justice, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED.

The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 30, 1993 in CA-G.R. SP No.
30306 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision dated November 8, 1985 of retired
Judge Manuel C. Diosomito as promulgated by Judge Aurelio Icasiano, Jr. in Criminal
Case No. 2335 of the Municipal Trial Court of Naic, Cavite is hereby declared NULL
and VOID. The said criminal case is remanded to the court of origin, Municipal Trial
Court of Naic, Cavite, Branch 15, for adjudication and promulgation of a new decision.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Mendoza, Quisumbing and Buena, JJ., concur.

||| (Nazareno v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 111610, [February 27, 2002], 428 PHIL 32-43)

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 189272. January 21, 2015.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. CHI CHAN LIU

a.k.a. CHAN QUE and HUI LAO CHUNG a.k.a. LEOFE SENGLAO,
appellants.

DECISION

PERALTA, J : p

For this Court's consideration is the Decision 1 dated January 9, 2009 and
Resolution 2 dated April 24, 2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC No.
00657 affirming the Decision 3 dated June 21, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 44, Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, in Criminal Case No. Z-1058, finding
appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 14, Article III, in relation
to Section 21 (a), Article IV of Republic Act (RA) No. 6425, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by RA No. 7659.

The facts, as culled from the records, are the following:

At 10:00 a.m. of December 3, 1998, SPO2 Lazaro Paglicawan and SPO3 Isagani
Yuzon, the officers-on-duty at the Philippine National Police (PNP) Station, Looc,
Occidental Mindoro, received a radio message from the Barangay Captain of Ambil
Island, Looc, Maximo Torreliza, that a suspicious looking boat was seen somewhere
within the vicinity of said island. 4 Immediately thereafter, the police officers headed
towards the specified location wherein they spotted two (2) boats anchored side by side,
one of which resembled a fishing boat and the other, a speedboat. They noticed one (1)
person on board the fishing boat and two (2) on board the speed boat who were
transferring cargo from the former to the latter. As they moved closer to the area, the
fishing boat hurriedly sped away. Due to the strong waves, the police officers were
prevented from chasing the same and instead, went towards the speed boat, which
seemed to be experiencing engine trouble. On board the speed boat, the officers found the
appellants Chi Chan Liu a.k.a. Chan Que and Hui Lao Chung a.k.a. Leofe Senglao with
several transparent plastic bags containing a white, crystalline substance they instantly
suspected to be the regulated drug, methamphetamine hydrochloride, otherwise known as
"shabu." They requested the appellants to show their identification papers but appellants
failed to do so. 5 Thus, the police officers directed appellants to transfer to their service
boat and thereafter towed appellants' speed boat to the shore behind the Municipal Hall of
Looc, Occidental Mindoro. On their way, the police officers testified that appellant Chi
Chan Liu repeatedly offered them "big, big amount of money" which they ignored. 6

Upon reaching the shore, the police officers led the appellants, together with the
bags containing the crystalline substance, to the police station. In the presence of the
appellants and Municipal Mayor Felesteo Telebrico, they conducted an inventory of the
plastic bags which were forty-five (45) in number, weighing about a kilo each. 7 Again,
SPO3 Yuson requested proper documentation from the appellants as to their identities as
well as to the purpose of their entry in the Philippine territory. 8 However, the appellants
did not answer any of SPO3 Yuson's questions. 9 Immediately thereafter, SPO3 Yuson
reported the incident to their superiors, PNP Provincial Command in San Jose, Occidental
Mindoro and PNP Regional Command IV in Camp Vicente Lim, Calamba, Laguna. The
PNP Regional Director General Reynaldo Acop advised them to await his arrival the
following day. 10 HSIDTE

On December 4, 1998, General Acop arrived together with Colonel Damian on a

helicopter. They talked with Mayor Telebrico and the arresting officers and then brought
the appellants with the suspected illegal drugs to Camp Vicente Lim, Calamba, Laguna,
for further investigation. 11 There, the appellants and the suspected prohibited drugs
were turned over to Police Inspector Julieto B. Culili, of the Intelligence and
Investigation Division, PNP, Regional Office IV, who attempted to communicate with
the appellants using "broken" English. According to Inspector Culili, appellant Chi Chan
Liu only kept saying the phrase "call China, big money," giving him a certain cellular
phone number. 12 He allowed appellants to call said number in which they spoke with
someone using their native language, which he could not understand. 13 Because of this
difficulty, Inspector Culili sought the assistance of Inspector Carlito Dimalanta in finding
an interpreter who knew either Fookien or Cantonese.

On December 5, 1998, the interpreter arrived. With the assistance of said

interpreter, Inspector Culili informed and explained to the appellants their rights under
Philippine laws inclusive of the right to remain silent, the right to counsel, as well as the
right to be informed of the charges against them, and the consequences thereof. 14
Inspector Culili also requested the interpreter to ask the appellants whether they wanted
to avail of said constitutional rights. However, appellants only kept repeating the phrase
"big money, call China." Apart from their names, aliases and personal circumstances, the
appellants did not divulge any other information. 15 Inspector Culili, with the assistance
of the arresting officers, then prepared the Booking Sheet and Arrest Report of the
appellants, requested for their physical and medical examination, as well as the laboratory
examination of the white, crystalline substance in the bags seized from them. 16 He also
assisted the arresting officers in the preparation of their affidavits. 17 According to
Inspector Culili, moreover, he was able to confirm that the appellants are Chinese
nationals from Guandong, China, based on an earlier intelligence report that foreign
nationals on board extraordinary types of vessels were seen along the sealine of Lubang
Island in Cavite, and Quezon Province. 18

Thereafter, Police Inspector Mary Jean Geronimo, PNP Chief Forensic

Chemist/Physical Examiner assigned at the PNP Regional Crime Laboratory Service
Office, Camp Vicente Lim, Laguna conducted an examination of the white, crystalline
substance in the forty-five (45) bags seized from the appellants. 19 After performing
three (3) tests thereon, she positively confirmed in her Chemistry Report that the same is,
indeed, methamphetamine hydrochloride, otherwise known as "shabu." 20

On December 8, 1998, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Occidental

Mindoro filed an Information 21 with the RTC of Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro,
against appellants for violation of Section 14, Article III, in relation to Section 21 (a),
Article IV of RA No. 6425 as amended by RA No. 7659, committed as follows:

That on or about 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon of December 3, 1998 at

the coast of Brgy. Tambo, Ambil Island in the Municipality of Looc Province of
Occidental Mindoro, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused being then the persons not authorized by law
conspiring and mutually helping one another, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully, feloniously import and bring through the use of sea vessel into the
above-mentioned place, Methamphetamine Hydrochloride known as Shabu
contained in forty-five (45) heat-sealed transparent plastic bags having a total
weight of 46,600 grams (46.60 kilograms) placed inside another forty-five (45)
separate self-seling (sic) transparent plastic bags which is prohibited by law, to
the damage and prejudice of public interest.

Appellants pleaded not guilty to the charges against them. Thereafter, trial on the
merits ensued, where the facts earlier stated were testified to by the witnesses for the
prosecution, specifically: SPO2 Paglicawan, SPO3 Yuson, Police Inspector Culili, and
Police Inspector Geronimo.

The testimonies of the witnesses for the defense, namely: Jesus Astorga and
Fernando Oliva, both residents of Ambil Island, Leopoldo S. J. Lozada, a former
Supervising Crime Photographer of the PNP, and Godofredo de la Fuente Robles, a
Member of the Looc Municipal Council, essentially maintain that the subject crystalline
substance was merely recovered by the apprehending police officers from the house of
Barangay Captain Maximo Torreliza and not actually from the speed boat the appellants
were on. 22

The trial court found appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt in its Decision
dated June 21, 2004, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, finding both accused CHI CHAN LIU @ "CHAN

QUE" AND HIU LAO CHUNG @ "LEOFE SENG LAO" GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF VIOLATING Section 14, Article III, in relation to
Section 21 (a), Article IV as amended by R.A. 7659 known as the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972, as amended, the Court hereby sentences each of them
to suffer the penalty of IMPRISONMENT OF RECLUSION PERPETUA
and to each pay the FINE of One Million (Php1,000,000.00) Pesos
Philippine Currency, with cost de officio.

SO ORDERED. 23

On appeal, the CA affirmed in toto the Decision of the RTC in its Decision dated
January 9, 2009. On April 24, 2009, it further denied the appellants' Motion for
Reconsideration in its Resolution finding no cogent reason to make any revision,
amendment, or reversal of its assailed Decision. Hence, the present appeal raising the
following issues:aETASc

I.

WHETHER OR NOT ALL THE ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME OF

IMPORTATION OF REGULATED DRUGS PUNISHABLE UNDER
SECTION 14, ARTICLE III, IN RELATION TO SECTION 21 (A),
ARTICLE IV OF REPUBLIC ACT 6425, AS AMENDED BY REPUBLIC
ACT 7659, ARE PRESENT IN THIS CASE.

II.

WHETHER OR NOT THE CORPUS DELICTI OF THE CRIME

CHARGED HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.

III.

WHETHER OR NOT THE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY IN THE

PERFORMANCE OF OFFICIAL DUTIES CAN PREVAIL OVER THE
GUARANTEES ENSHRINED AND KEPT SACRED BY THE PHILIPPINE
CONSTITUTION IN THIS CASE.
 IV.

WHETHER OR NOT THE ARRAIGNMENT OF ACCUSED-

APPELLANTS IS VALID.

V.

WHETHER OR NOT THE GUILT OF ACCUSED-APPELLANTS WAS

PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. 24

Appellants maintain that there is no importation of regulated drugs in the instant

case since the elements of the crime of importation, namely: (1) the importation or
bringing into the Philippines of any regulated or prohibited drug; and (2) the importation
or bringing into the Philippines of said drugs was without authority of law, were not
established herein. Appellants assert that unless there is proof that a ship on which illegal
drugs came from a foreign country, the offense does not fall within the ambit of illegal
importation of said drugs. Thus, considering the prosecution's failure to prove the place
of origin of the boat on which appellants were apprehended, appellants cannot be
convicted of the crime charged herein.

Appellants also claim that the prosecution failed to substantiate beyond reasonable
doubt the corpus delicti of the crime charged for the chain of custody of the illegal drugs
subject of this case was not sufficiently established. In addition, they emphasize the
irregularities attendant in their arrest and seizure of the illegal drugs in violation of their
constitutionally protected rights. Appellants further call attention to the invalidity of their
arraignment for they were not represented by a counsel of their choice.

This Court finds merit on appellants' first argument.

The information filed by the prosecutor against appellants charged appellants with
violation of Section 14, Article III, in relation to Section 21 (a), Article IV of RA No.
6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by RA No.
7659, which provide:

ARTICLE III
Regulated Drugs

Section 14. Importation of Regulated Drugs. — The penalty of

imprisonment ranging from six years and one day to twelve years and a fine
ranging from six thousand to twelve thousand pesos shall be imposed upon any
person who, unless authorized by law, shall import or bring any regulated drug
into the Philippines.

xxx xxx xxx

 ARTICLE IV
Provisions of Common Application to Offenses Penalized
under Articles II and III

xxx xxx xxx

Section 21. Attempt and Conspiracy. — The same penalty prescribed by

this Act for the commission of the offense shall be imposed in case of any
attempt or conspiracy to commit the same in the following cases:

a) importation of dangerous drugs;

On the basis of the foregoing provisions, the crime of importation of regulated

drugs is committed by importing or bringing any regulated drug into the Philippines
without being authorized by law. According to appellants, if it is not proven that the
regulated drugs are brought into the Philippines from a foreign origin, there is no
importation. In support of this, they cite our ruling in United States v. Jose, 25 wherein
We said that:TAcCDI

There can be no question that, unless a ship on which opium is alleged

to have been illegally imported comes from a foreign country, there is no
importation. If the ship came to Olongapo from Zamboanga, for example,
the charge that opium was illegally imported on her into the port of
Olongapo, i.e., into the Philippine Islands, could not be sustained no matter
how much opium she had on board or how much was discharged. In order
to establish the crime of importation as defined by the Opium Law, it must
be shown that the vessel from which the opium is landed or on which it
arrived in Philippine waters came from a foreign port. Section 4 of Act No.
2381 provides that:

Any person who shall unlawfully import or bring any

prohibited drug into the Philippine Islands, or assist in so
doing, shall be punished . . . .

It is clear that a breach of this provision involves the bringing of

opium into the Philippine Islands from a foreign country. Indeed, it is a
prime essential of the crime defined by that section. Without it, no crime
under that section can be established. 26

Moreover, the Black's Law Dictionary defines importation as "the act of bringing
goods and merchandise into a country from a foreign country." 27 As used in our tariff
and customs laws, imported articles, those which are brought into the Philippines from
any foreign country, are subject to duty upon each importation. 28 Similarly, in a statute
controlling the entry of toxic substances and hazardous and nuclear wastes, importation
was construed as the entry of products or substances into the Philippines through the
seaports or airports of entry. 29 Importation then, necessarily connotes the introduction of
something into a certain territory coming from an external source. Logically, if the article
merely came from the same territory, there cannot be any importation of the same.

The CA, in finding that there was importation in the present case, stated:

The prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that

appellants were, indeed, guilty of importing regulated drugs into the country in
violation of aforesaid law. Appellants were caught by police authorities in
flagrante delicto on board a speedboat carrying forty-five (45) plastic bags of
shabu. The drugs seized were properly presented and identified in court.
Appellants' admission that they were Chinese nationals and their penchant
for making reference during custodial investigation to China where they
could obtain money to bribe the police officers lead this Court to no other
reasonable conclusion but that China is the country of origin of the
confiscated drugs. All elements of the crime of illegal importation of regulated
drugs being present in this case, conviction thereof is in order. 30

We disagree. The mere fact that the appellants were Chinese nationals as well as
their penchant for making reference to China where they could obtain money to bribe the
apprehending officers does not necessarily mean that the confiscated drugs necessarily
came from China. The records only bear the fact that the speed boat on which the
appellants were apprehended was docked on the coast of Ambil Island in the
Municipality of Looc, Occidental Mindoro. But it could have easily come from some
other locality within the country, and not necessarily from China or any foreign port, as
held by the CA. This Court notes that for a vessel which resembles a speed boat, it is
rather difficult to suppose how appellants made their way to the shores of Occidental
Mindoro from China. Moreover, an earlier intelligence report that foreign nationals on
board extraordinary types of vessels were seen along the sealine of Lubang Island in
Cavite, and Quezon Province, does not sufficiently prove the allegation that appellants
herein were, in fact, importing illegal drugs in the country from an external source. This,
notwithstanding, had the prosecution presented more concrete evidence to convince this
Court that the prohibited drugs, indeed, came from a source outside of the Philippines,
the importation contention could have been sustained.

Appellants' exoneration from illegal importation of regulated drugs under Section

14, Article III of RA No. 6425 does not, however, free them from all criminal liability for
their possession of the same is clearly evident.

At the outset, appellants may argue that as We have ruled in United States v. Jose,
31 possession is not necessarily included in the charge of importation and thus, they
cannot be held liable thereof, to wit:
 Counsel for neither of the parties to this action have discussed the
question whether, in case the charge of illegal importation fails, the accused
may still be convicted, under the information, of the crime of illegal possession
of opium. We, therefore, have not had the aid of discussion of this proposition;
but, believing that it is a question which might fairly be raised in the event of an
acquittal on the charge of illegal importation, we have taken it up and decided it.
Section 29 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that: ECTIcS

The court may find the defendant guilty of any offense, or of

any frustrated or attempted offense, the commission of which is
necessarily included in the charge in the complaint or
information.

As will be seen from this provision, to convict of an offense included

in the charge in the information it is not sufficient that the crime may be
included, but it must necessarily be included. While, the case before us, the
possession of the opium by the appellants was proved beyond question and
they might have been convicted of that offense if they have been charged
therewith, nevertheless, such possession was not an essential element of the
crime of illegal importation and was not necessarily included therein. The
importation was complete, to say the least, when the ship carrying it anchored in
Subic Bay. It was not necessary that the opium be discharged or that it be taken
from the ship. It was sufficient that the opium was brought into the waters of the
Philippine Islands on a boat destined for a Philippine port and which
subsequently anchored in a port of the Philippine Islands with intent to
discharge its cargo. That being the case it is clear that possession, either
actual or constructive, is not a necessary element of the crime of illegal
importation nor is it necessarily included therein. Therefore, in acquitting
the appellants of the charge of illegal importation, we cannot legally convict
them of the crime of illegal possession. 32

However, in our more recent ruling in People v. Elkanish, 33 this Court held that
possession is inherent in importation. In that case, the accused, who was suspected of
being the owner of sixty-five (65) large boxes of blasting caps found aboard a ship of
American registry docked inside Philippine territory, was charged with illegal
importation of the articles under Section 2702 of the Revised Administrative Code and
illegal possession of the same articles under Section 1 of Act No. 3023, in two (2)
separate informations. Ruling that double jeopardy exists in view of the fact that
possession is necessarily included in importation, this Court affirmed the dismissal of the
information on illegal importation, in the following wise:

Section 9 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court reads:

When a defendant shall have been convicted or acquitted, or the

case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express
consent of the defendant, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a
 valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form
and substance to sustain a conviction, and after the defendant had
pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the defendant or the
dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense
charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or
for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in
the offense charged in the former complaint or information.

With reference to the importation and possession of blasting caps, it

seems plain beyond argument that the latter is inherent in the former so as
to make them juridically identical. There can hardly be importation
without possession. When one brings something or causes something to be
brought into the country, he necessarily has the possession of it. The
possession ensuing from the importation may not be actual, but legal, or
constructive, but whatever its character, the importer, in our opinion, is a
possessor in the juristic sense and he is liable to criminal prosecution. If he
parts with the ownership of interest in the article before it reaches Philippine
territory, he is neither an importer nor a possessor within the legal meaning of
the term, and he is not subject to prosecution for either offense under the
Philippine Laws. The owner of the merchandise at the time it enters Philippine
water is its importer and possessor. He who puts merchandise on board a vessel
and alienates the title thereto while it is in transit does not incur criminal
liability. Possession on ownership of a prohibited article on a foreign vessel on
the high seas outside the jurisdiction of the Philippines does not constitute a
crime triable by the courts of this country. (U.S. vs. Look Chaw, 18 Phil., 573).
34

As We have explained in our more recent ruling above, there is double jeopardy
therein since the offense charged in the information on possession is necessarily included
in the information on importation in view of the fact that the former is inherent in the
latter. Thus, this Court sustained the dismissal of one of the two informations which
charged the accused with importation to avoid the implications of double jeopardy for
possession is necessarily included in the charge of importation.

Applying the aforequoted ruling, this Court finds that while appellants cannot be
held liable for the offense of illegal importation charged in the information, their criminal
liability for illegal possession, if proven beyond reasonable doubt, may nevertheless be
sustained. As previously mentioned, the crime of importation of regulated drugs is
committed by importing or bringing any regulated drug into the Philippines without being
authorized by law. Indeed, when one brings something or causes something to be brought
into the country, he necessarily has possession of the same. Necessarily, therefore,
importation can never be proven without first establishing possession, affirming the fact
that possession is a condition sine qua non for it would rather be unjust to convict one of
illegal importation of regulated drugs when he is not proven to be in possession thereof.
CETIDH
 At this point, this Court notes that charging appellants with illegal possession
when the information filed against them charges the crime of importation does not violate
their constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation brought
against them. The rule is that when there is a variance between the offense charged in the
complaint or information, and that proved or established by the evidence, and the offense
as charged necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the
offense proved included in that which is charged. 35 An offense charged necessarily
includes that which is proved, when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the
former, as this is alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter. 36

Indeed, We have had several occasions in the past wherein an accused, charged
with the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, was convicted of illegal possession thereof. In
those cases, this Court upheld the prevailing doctrine that the illegal sale of dangerous
drugs absorbs the illegal possession thereof except if the seller was also apprehended in
the illegal possession of another quantity of dangerous drugs not covered by or not
included in the illegal sale, and the other quantity of dangerous drugs was probably
intended for some future dealings or use by the accused. 37 Illegal possession of
dangerous drugs is therefore an element of and is necessarily included in illegal sale.
Hence, convicting the accused with the former does not violate his right to be informed of
the accusation against him for it is an element of the latter.

In a similar manner, considering that illegal possession is likewise an element of

and is necessarily included in illegal importation of dangerous drugs, convicting
appellants of the former, if duly established beyond reasonable doubt, does not amount to
a violation of their right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against
them. Indeed, where an accused is charged with a specific crime, he is duly informed not
only of such specific crime but also of lesser crimes or offenses included therein. 38

Thus, in view of the fact that illegal possession is an element of and is necessarily
included in the illegal importation of regulated drugs, this Court shall determine
appellants' culpability under Section 16, 39 Article III of RA No. 6425.

The elements of illegal possession of regulated drugs are as follows: (a) the
accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a regulated drug;
(b) such possession is not authorized by law; and (c) the accused freely and consciously
possessed the regulated drug. 40

The evidence on record clearly established that appellants were in possession of

the bags containing the regulated drugs without the requisite authority. As mentioned
previously, on the date of appellants' arrest, the apprehending officers were conducting a
surveillance of the coast of Ambil Island in the Municipality of Looc, Occidental
Mindoro, upon being informed by the Municipality's Barangay Captain that a suspicious-
looking boat was within the vicinity. Not long after, they spotted two (2) boats anchored
side by side, the persons on which were transferring cargo from one to the other.
Interestingly, as they moved closer to the area, one of the boats hurriedly sped away.
Upon reaching the other boat, the police officers found the appellants with several
transparent plastic bags containing what appeared to be shabu which were plainly
exposed to the view of the officers. Clearly, appellants were found to be in possession of
the subject regulated drugs.

Moreover, this Court is not legally prepared to accept the version of the appellants
that they had nothing to do with the incident and that they were being framed up as the
drugs seized from them were merely planted by the apprehending officers. At the outset,
this Court observes that appellants did not provide any explanation as to how the
apprehending officers were actually able to plant forty-five (45) bags of regulated drugs
weighing about one (1) kilo each in the speed boat of appellants in the middle of the
ocean without their knowledge. Also, as the trial court noted, they did not even give any
explanation as to the purpose of their presence in the coast of Ambil, Looc, Occidental
Mindoro. More importantly, aside from saying that the confiscated bags of regulated
drugs were merely implanted in their speed boat, they did not provide the court with
sufficient evidence to substantiate their claim. In the words of the lower court:

Moreover, the story of defense witnesses Jesus Astorga, Fernando Oliva,

and Godofredo Robles that the subject shabu were taken only by the police
authority from the house of Barangay Captain Maximo Torreliza taxes only
one's credulity. Their testimonies appear to be merely a product of an
[afterthought]. They have not executed any prior affidavit on the matters
concerning their testimonies unlike the prosecution witnesses SPO3 Yuson and
SPO2 Paglicawan who executed their joint affidavit almost immediately after
their arrest. It is so apparent from the testimonies of these three (3) above-
named defense witnesses that they [did not] know anything about the case.
What is even worse is that Atty. Evasco, the former counsel of the accused,
procured the testimonies of Jesus Astorga, Fernando Oliva, and Godofredo
Reyes. Clear enough their intent or motivation is not for the truth to come out
but for the monetary consideration in exchange of their testimony. 41
CAScIH

This Court has consistently noted that denial or frame up is a standard defense
ploy in most prosecutions for violations of the Dangerous Drugs Law. This defense has
been invariably viewed with disfavor for it can easily be concocted. In order to prosper,
the defense of denial and frame-up must be proved with strong and convincing evidence.
42 Without proof of any intent on the part of the police officers to falsely impute to
appellants the commission of a crime, the presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duty and the principle that the findings of the trial court on the credibility of
witnesses are entitled to great respect, deserve to prevail over the bare denials and self-
serving claims of frame up by appellants. 43
 Going now to appellants' arguments that their criminal liability is negated by
certain irregularities in the proceedings of this case. First and foremost, appellants allege
a violation of their constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures. Due
to the absence of probable cause, their warrantless arrest and consequent search and
seizure on their persons and possession is unjustified and hence, the confiscated bags of
regulated drugs therefrom are inadmissible against them.

Section 2, Article III of the Philippine Constitution provides:

Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,

papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant
of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized.

A settled exception, however, to the above guaranteed right is an arrest made

during the commission of a crime, which does not require a previously issued warrant,
under Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, to wit:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer of a

private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is

actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

This Court has ruled that for an arrest to fall under the above exception, two (2)
elements must be present: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act
indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a
crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting
officer. 44

In this case, appellants were actually committing a crime and were caught by the
apprehending officers in flagrante delicto. As previously stated, the records reveal that on
the date of their arrest, the apprehending officers, while acting upon a report from the
Barangay Captain, spotted appellants transferring cargo from one boat to another.
However, one of the boats hastily sped away when they drew closer to the appellants,
naturally arousing the suspicion of the officers. Soon after, the police officers found them
with the illegal drugs plainly exposed to the view of the officers. When they requested
appellants to show proper documentation as to their identity as well as their purpose for
being there, appellants refused to show them anything much less respond to any of their
questions. In fact, when the officers were transporting appellants and the illegal drugs to
the shore, the appellant Chi Chan Liu even repeatedly offered the arresting officers "big,
big amount of money." Hence, the circumstances prior to and surrounding the arrest of
appellants clearly show that they were arrested when they were actually committing a
crime within the view of the arresting officers, who had reasonable ground to believe that
a crime was being committed.

In addition, this Court does not find the consequent warrantless search and seizure
conducted on appellants unreasonable in view of the fact that the bags containing the
regulated drugs were in plain view of the arresting officers, one of the judicially
recognized exceptions to the requirement of obtaining a search warrant. HcaDTE

Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the "plain view" of an officer,
who has a right to be in the position to have that view, are subject to seizure and may be
presented as evidence. 45 It applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law
enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is
in a position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of the evidence
in plain view is inadvertent; and (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item
he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure. The
law enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a
position from which he can particularly view the area. In the course of such lawful
intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused.
The object must be open to eye and hand, and its discovery inadvertent. 46

In the case at hand, the apprehending officers were performing their duty of
ascertaining whether a criminal activity was indeed happening at the time and place
reported by the Barangay Captain. In broad daylight, appellants were seen in the act of
transferring bags of illegal drugs from one boat to another and thereafter caught in
possession of the same, which became inadvertently and immediately apparent from the
point of view of the arresting officers. It is undeniably clear, therefore, that the seizure of
illegal drugs conducted by the officers falls within the purview of the "plain view"
doctrine. Consequently, the confiscated drugs are admissible as evidence against
appellants.

As to appellants' assignment of failure on the part of the prosecution to

substantiate beyond reasonable doubt the corpus delicti of the crime charged for the chain
of custody of the illegal drugs was not sufficiently established, the same cannot be
sustained as a review of the records of the case provides otherwise. From the time of
appellants' arrest, the seized bags of regulated drugs were properly marked and
photographed. Proper inventory was also conducted in the presence of the appellants and
Mayor Telebrico, who signed a receipt evidencing that the confiscated drugs were turned
over to the PNP Regional Headquarters. 47 There, the evidence was sent to the Regional
Crime Laboratory Service Office for an examination which yielded positive results. The
laboratory report, photographs, and receipts were all made part of the records of this case.
In fact, the bags containing the crystalline substance were presented before the trial court
during the hearing held on October 12, 1999 which was identified by SPO3 Yuson, the
officer who confiscated the same. Evidently, an unbroken chain of custody of the
confiscated drugs was established by the prosecution.

Appellants also assail the legality of their detention for being formally charged in
an Information on December 8, 1998 or five (5) days after their arrest on December 3,
1998, beyond the thirty-six (36)-hour period in Article 125 48 of the Revised Penal Code.
But while the law subjects such public officers who detain persons beyond the legal
period to criminal liability, it must be remembered that the proceeding taken against the
detained persons for the act the committed remains unaffected, for the two acts are
distinct and separate. 49 This Court is nevertheless mindful of the difficult circumstances
faced by the police officers in this case, such as the language barrier, the
unresponsiveness of the appellants, the fact that one of the days fell on a Sunday, as well
as the disparity in the distances between the different offices. But even assuming that the
police officers intentionally delayed the filing of the Information, appellants should have
taken steps to report or file charges against the officers. Unfortunately, they cannot now
rely on administrative shortcomings of police officers to get a judgment of acquittal for
these do not diminish the fact that illegal drugs were found in appellants' possession. 50

Anent appellants' claim that their constitutional rights were further violated for
during custodial investigation, they did not have counsel of their choice nor were they
provided with one, this deserves scant consideration since the same is relevant and
material only when an extrajudicial admission or confession extracted from an accused
becomes the basis of his conviction. 51 In this case, neither one of the appellants
executed an admission or confession. In fact, as the records clearly show, appellants
barely even spoke and merely kept repeating the phrase "call China, big money." The
trial court convicted them not on the basis of anything they said during custodial
investigation but on other convincing evidence such as the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses. Verily, there was no violation of appellants' constitutional right to counsel
during custodial investigation.

In this relation, appellants further criticize the legality of the proceedings in saying
that during their arraignment, they were not represented by a counsel of their choice but
were merely represented by a court-appointed government lawyer. Appellants assert that
the trial court likewise appointed a special interpreter, who merely understood a little
Chinese language. As such, considering the absence of any assurance that the interpreter
was able to explain to appellants the charges against them in the language they
understood, appellants therefore did not validly enter their plea. SDHITE

The facts borne by the records of the case, however, militate against the contention
of the appellants. This Court does not find a violation of appellants' right to counsel for
even in their own narration of facts, appellants stated that when they appeared without
counsel when the case was called for arraignment on January 19, 1999, the trial court
gave appellants time to secure the services of counsel of their choice. It was only when
appellants again appeared without counsel on February 23, 1999 that the court appointed
a counsel from the Public Attorney's Office. 52 It is clear, therefore, that appellants had
ample opportunity to secure the services of a counsel of their own choice. They cannot
now assign error in the proceedings conducted by the trial court for the fact remains that
they were appointed with counsel in full compliance with the law.

In much the same way, appellants had every opportunity to secure the services of a
Chinese interpreter with such competence at par with their standards. As pointed out by
the CA, the trial court gave appellants the authorization to seek, through their counsel, the
Chinese Embassy's assistance for purposes of procuring a Chinese interpreter. 53
Appellants were even given time, through several postponements, to properly secure the
services of one. If appellants were unsatisfied with the competence of the court-appointed
interpreter, it should have taken the opportunities given by the trial court. In this relation,
the trial court's observations are worth mentioning, to wit:

Another factor that militates against the accused is their failure to testify
on their own behalf, the defense is trying to justify for want of Chinese
interpreter. The instant case has been filed in Court since December 8, 1998 or
six years more or less until now. It is highly unbelievable that for such period
of time that this case has been pending in court, accused could not still
secure the services of a Chinese interpreter when as borne out by the
records, they were able to secure the services of several lawyers one after
the other. The accused on two (2) occasions have even submitted written
requests in English (Exhibit "N" and Exhibit "O") which were granted by the
Court allowing them to call their relatives but still they failed to secure the
services of an interpreter. To the mind of the Court, accused can also understand
English as proven by their letters. . . . 54

Indeed, this Court accords the highest degree of respect to the findings of the
lower court as to appellants' guilt of the offense charged against them, especially when
such findings are adequately supported by documentary as well as testimonial evidence.
It is a settled policy of this Court, founded on reason and experience, to sustain the
findings of fact of the trial court in criminal cases, on the rational assumption that it is in
a better position to assess the evidence before it, having had the opportunity to make an
honest determination of the witnesses' deportment during the trial. 55

Moreover, in view of the well-entrenched rule that the findings of facts of the trial
court, as affirmed by the appellate court, are conclusive on this Court, absent any
evidence that both courts ignored, misconstrued, or misinterpreted cogent facts and
circumstances of substance which, if considered, would warrant a modification or
reversal of the outcome of the case, this Court finds no cogent reason to deviate from the
above findings. 56 It is clear, therefore, that based on the findings of the courts below,
appellants were, in fact, in possession of regulated drugs without the requisite authority.
 As to the penalty imposed on appellants, Sections 16 and 17 of RA No. 7659,
amending RA No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, provide:

Sec. 16. Section 16 of Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended,

known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, is amended to read as follows:

Section 16. Possession or Use of Regulated Drugs. — The

penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five
hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any
person who shall possess or use any regulated drug without the
corresponding license or prescription, subject to the provisions of
Section 20 hereof.

xxx xxx xxx

Section 17. Section 20, Article IV of Republic Act No. 6425, as

amended, known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, is hereby amended to
read as follows:

Sec. 20. Application of Penalties, Confiscation and Forfeiture of

the Proceeds or Instruments of the Crime. — The penalties for offenses
under Sections 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9 of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15
and 16 of Article III of this Act shall be applied if the dangerous drugs
involved is in any of the following quantities:

xxx xxx xxx

3. 200 grams or more of shabu or methylamphetamine

hydrochloride;

From the foregoing, considering that appellants were found to have possessed
forty-five (45) kilograms of methylamphetamine hydrochloride, which is more than the
two hundred (200) grams stipulated above, the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua,
in accordance with R.A. No. 9346, otherwise known as "An Act Prohibiting the
Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines." As regards the fine, We find that the
amount of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) for each appellant imposed by the RTC is
proper, in view of the quantity seized from them. ISDHcT

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DENIED. The

Decision dated January 9, 2009 and Resolution dated April 24, 2009 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00657 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that
appellants herein are found GUILTY of the crime of illegal possession of regulated
drugs.

SO ORDERED.
 Velasco, Jr., Villarama, Jr., Reyes and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.

||| (People v. Chi Chan Liu, G.R. No. 189272, [January 21, 2015], 751 PHIL 146-175)

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. Nos. 183152-54. January 21, 2015.]

REYNALDO H. JAYLO, WILLIAM VALENZONA and ANTONIO

G. HABALO, petitioners, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (FIRST DIVISION),
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and HEIRS OF COL. ROLANDO
DE GUZMAN, FRANCO CALANOG and AVELINO MANGUERA,
respondents.

DECISION

SERENO, C.J : p

What are the repercussions of the failure of the accused to appear, without
justifiable cause, at the promulgation of a judgment of conviction? With the resolution of
this singular issue, the Court writes finis to the 24-year-old controversy before us.

Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court is the Decision 1 of the Sandiganbayan finding petitioners guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide. Petitioners also challenge the Resolution
dated 29 November 2007 2 issued by the same court, which took no action on the motion
for reconsideration filed by petitioners, and the Resolution dated 26 May 2008 3 denying
the motion for reconsideration of the earlier Resolution.

ANTECEDENT FACTS

Petitioners Reynaldo Jaylo (Jaylo), William Valenzona (Valenzona) and Antonio

Habalo (Habalo), together with Edgardo Castro (Castro), 4 were officers of the Philippine
National Police Western Police District placed on special detail with the National Bureau
of Investigation (NBI). 5

In June of 1990, the United States Drug Enforcement Agency (US DEA)
approached the NBI with information on the sale of a considerable amount of heroin in
the Philippines. Jaylo was assigned by then NBI Director Alfredo Lim to head the team
that would conduct a buy-bust operation with the aid of US DEA undercover agent Philip
Needham (Needham).

From 3 to 8 July 1990, Needham, posing as a member of an international drug

syndicate, conducted negotiations for the purchase of 10 kilos of heroin from Estella
Arrastia (Arrastia), Franco Calanog (Calanog) and Rolando De Guzman (De Guzman).
The exchange was scheduled on the evening of 10 July 1990 at the parking lot of the
Magallanes Commercial Center.

Needham arrived at the parking lot on board a taxicab with Arrastia and Philip
Manila (Manila), an undercover NBI operative who posed as Needham's bodyguard. 6
The taxicab was driven by Romeo Noriega (Noriega), another undercover NBI operative.
7

At the parking lot, Needham and Arrastia met Calanog and Avelino Manguera
(Manguera), who both alighted from a blue Volkswagen Beetle; and De Guzman, who
alighted from a brown Saab. 8 Needham approached the Volkswagen and examined the
heroin in the backseat. 9 After some time, he straightened up and walked back towards
the taxicab, while executing the prearranged signal of taking out his handkerchief and
blowing his nose. 10

It is at this point that the versions of the prosecution and the defense diverged,
particularly on the manner of the arrest.

Version of the Prosecution

On board two vehicles, Jaylo, Castro, Valenzona, Habalo, and at least 15 other
operatives, rushed in and surrounded De Guzman, Calanog, and Manguera. 11

Jaylo pointed his gun at De Guzman. Two other operatives instructed Calanog and
Manguera to lie face down on the ground and placed a foot on their backs while training
a gun at them. The rest cordoned the area.

Later, a car with passengers Needham, US DEA country attaché Andrew Fenrich
(Fenrich), and two armed bodyguards moved out of the cordoned area. When the car was
safely on its way, Jaylo and his men shot De Guzman, Calanog, and Manguera. They
waited 15 minutes for the victims to bleed out and thereafter loaded them into the
vehicles under the ruse of bringing them to the hospital. 12

Version of the Defense

When he saw Needham executing the prearranged signal, Manila executed the
second signal of wiping the right side of his face as confirmation. 13
 Castro, who was driving a Lancer car with Jaylo as his passenger, stepped on the
accelerator to block the path of the Volkswagen. 14 Both of them immediately alighted
from the vehicle. Jaylo confronted De Guzman in the Saab, while Castro arrested
Calanog in the Volkswagen. Meanwhile, Valenzona and Habalo approached Manguera.
15 EaISTD

A speeding blue-green car and a burst of gunfire caught the attention of the
operatives while they were approaching their quarries. 16 Taking advantage of the
distraction, De Guzman, Calanog, and Manguera reached for their firearms and tried to
shoot.

Jaylo was able to move away, so only the window on the driver's side of the Saab
was hit and shattered. 17 He retaliated and shot De Guzman twice, hitting him in the left
eye and chest. 18

Out of instinct, Castro shoved the gun of Calanog upward and shot him twice. 19
Calanog staggered, but again aimed the gun at him. It was then that Castro shot Calanog
two times more, causing the latter to finally fall down.

Valenzona and Habalo saw Manguera in the act of drawing his firearm. 20 Both of
them fired and hit him.

The operatives brought De Guzman, Calanog, and Manguera to the hospital. 21

Upon verifying their identities, the victims were found to be soldiers: Colonel Rolando de
Guzman and Major Franco Calanog. 22 Manguera was the driver/security aide of Major
Calanog. 23

The Elma Committee

President Corazon Aquino issued Administrative Order No. 182 24 on 13 July

1990 creating the "Elma Committee." Headed by Presidential Assistant for Legal and
Judicial Affairs Magdangal Elma, with Undersecretary of National Defense Leonardo
Quisumbing and Undersecretary of Justice Eduardo Montenegro as members, the Elma
Committee was tasked to conduct an investigation of all the facts and circumstances
surrounding the seizure of heroin and the shooting incident.

Pursuant to its mandate to submit its findings and recommendations to the

President after the completion of its investigation, the Elma Committee recommended the
prosecution of Jaylo for the killing of De Guzman, Castro for that of Calanog, and
Valenzona and Habalo for that of Manguera. 25

However, in three separate Amended Informations dated 8 September 1992 and

filed before the Sandiganbayan, Jaylo, Castro, Valenzona and Habalo, together with
several John Does, were charged with conspiracy in the murder of De Guzman, 26
Calanog, 27 and Manguera. 28

RULING OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN

In a Decision dated 17 April 2007, the Sandiganbayan found Jaylo, Castro,

Valenzona, and Habalo guilty of homicide. Jaylo was convicted for the killing of De
Guzman under Criminal Case No. 17984; Castro for that of Calanog under Criminal Case
No. 17985; and Valenzona and Habalo for Manguera's under Criminal Case No. 17986.
29 Each of the accused was sentenced to imprisonment of six years and one day of
prision mayor as minimum to 14 years, eight months and one day of reclusion temporal
as maximum, and perpetual disqualification from public office. Each was likewise
ordered to pay P50,000 as damages to the heirs of their respective victims, and a
proportionate share in the costs of suit.

The Sandiganbayan noted that the prosecution and the defense were in agreement
that the four accused shot and killed the three victims. 30 With this established fact, it
was only necessary to determine the following:

a) Whether the accused conspired to kill the victims;

b) Whether the killing was attended by treachery, evident premeditation

and taking advantage of superior strength; and

c) Whether the killing was justified by the circumstance of fulfillment of

duty or lawful exercise of a right or office.

According to the Sandiganbayan, the evidence presented did not show conspiracy
or any intention on the part of the four accused to aid one another in the shooting. 31
They did not demonstrate a preconceived common plan or scheme to liquidate the
suspected drug dealers.

The prosecution was also unable to prove the attendance of any of the qualifying
circumstances. 32 Treachery was not established. The Sandiganbayan ruled that it could
not take judicial notice of the statements given before the Elma Committee by Dr.
Desiderio Moraleda, who had conducted the autopsy on the victims. Dr. Moraleda died
before he could testify before the Sandiganbayan, and his testimony on the trajectory of
the bullets and the positions of the assailants relative to those of the victims could not be
admitted in evidence without violating the rules on hearsay evidence.

On the allegation that the four accused took advantage of superior strength, the
court ruled that there was no evidence showing the use of excessive force out of
proportion to the defense available to the victims. In particular, the shooting of Manguera
by Valenzona and Habalo only showed numerical superiority, not superior strength.

The prosecution also failed to prove evident premeditation. It was not able to
indicate the time when the four accused determined to commit the killing; neither was it
able to pinpoint the overt act demonstrating that they adhered to their resolve to commit
the crime even after the lapse of enough time "to allow their conscience to overcome the
resolution of their will." 33

For their part, the accused also failed to prove their defense of fulfillment of a duty
or lawful exercise of a right or office. 34 The Sandiganbayan was not convinced that they
had acted within the bounds allowed for an arrest in a buy-bust operation.

For one, the Sandiganbayan highly doubted the existence of the speeding car that
distracted the operatives while they were arresting the suspected drug dealers. In this
regard, it took note of the inconsistent testimonies of Manila and Noriega on one hand
and of Needham on the other.

According to Manila, when he heard the gunfire from the speeding car, he covered
Needham and ran with him towards the South Superhighway, away from the taxicab
driven by Noriega. 35 Needham got into the diplomatic car that approached them. When
the shooting subsided, he went back to the scene.

According to Noriega, he saw the speeding car going towards the Maranaw
Building parking lot and heard three gunshots. Thereafter, he saw Needham run towards
his taxi and board it. While Noriega was trying to get Needham away from the area, a
diplomatic car blocked their taxicab, and the latter transferred to that car.

According to Needham, however, he immediately walked back to the taxi after

executing the prearranged signal for the arrest, got in the cab and left the scene. As the
taxicab was leaving, he saw the "rescue" coming in. 36 Other than that, he did not notice
any commotion or gunfire. He was then picked up by Fenrich, and they went on their
way.

The Sandiganbayan also noted that the slugs or shells recovered from the scene all
came from short firearms, contrary to Jaylo's testimony that the shots from the speeding
car were from a rifle (an "armalite").

Further militating against the existence of the speeding car was Jaylo's incident
Report dated 10 July 1990, in which he stated that when they rushed in for the arrest, they
were met by a volley of gunfire from the three cars of the suspected drug dealers. 37
There was no mention at all of any speeding car.
 Considering the failure of the prosecution to prove conspiracy and the attendance
of any of the alleged qualifying circumstances, as well as the failure of the defense to
prove the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of a duty or lawful exercise of a right or
office, the Sandiganbayan ruled that the crime committed was homicide.

During the promulgation of the Sandiganbayan's judgment on 17 April 2007, none

of the accused appeared despite notice. 38 The court promulgated the Decision in
absentia, and the judgment was entered in the criminal docket. The bail bonds of the
accused were cancelled, and warrants for their arrest issued.IaEACT

On 30 April 2007, counsel for Jaylo, Valenzona, and Habalo filed a Motion for
Partial Reconsideration 39 of the Decision. In the assailed Resolution dated 29 November
2007, the Sandiganbayan took no action on the motion and ordered the implementation of
the warrants for the arrest of the convicted accused. 40 The court ruled that the 15-day
period from the promulgation of the judgment had long lapsed without any of the accused
giving any justifiable cause for their absence during the promulgation. Under Section 6 of
Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, 41 Jaylo, Valenzona and Habalo have lost the remedies
available under the Rules against the Sandiganbayan's judgment of conviction, including
the filing of a motion for reconsideration.

In an Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration 42 dated 25 January 2008, counsel

for the three urged the Sandiganbayan to give due course to and resolve the Motion for
Partial Reconsideration. The Sandiganbayan issued the second assailed Resolution dated
26 May 2008. The court ruled that for the failure of the three to surrender and move for
leave to avail themselves of a motion for reconsideration within 15 days from the date of
promulgation, the judgment has become final and executory, and no action on the motion
for reconsideration can be taken. 43 It then reiterated its order to implement the warrants
for the arrest of the three.

ISSUE

On 19 June 2008, petitioners Jaylo, Valenzona and Habalo, by counsel, filed the
instant petition assailing the Sandiganbayan Decision dated 17 April 2007 and
Resolutions dated 29 November 2007 and 26 May 2008. Regarding the Decision dated 17
April 2007, petitioners argue that the Sandiganbayan erred in ruling as follows:

1. The negative finding of a conspiracy did not lead to the positive finding
of the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty.

2. There was a contradiction between the testimonies of Manila and

Noriega on one hand and Needham on the other.

3. The existence of the speeding car was highly doubtful.

 4. The inconsistency in the testimony of Jaylo was determinative of his
lack of credibility.

5. There should be conclusive physical evidence to prove the justifying

circumstance of fulfillment of duty.

6. The admissions of petitioners before the Elma Committee were

admissible in evidence. HSCATc

7. Petitioners are guilty of homicide even in the absence of their positive

identification as the ones who committed the crimes charged.

Anent the Resolutions dated 29 November 2007 and 26 May 2008, petitioners
argue:

1. Section 6 of Rule 120 of the Rules of Court cannot diminish, increase

or modify substantive rights like the filing of a motion for
reconsideration provided under Presidential Decree No. (P.D.)
1606. 44

2. The conditions under Section 6 Rule 120 of the Rules of Court do not
obtain in the instant case.

As stated at the outset, the resolution of the instant case hinges on the question
regarding the effects of the nonappearance of the accused, without justifiable cause, in the
promulgation of the judgment of conviction. In the interest of judicial economy, we shall
proceed with a discussion on this question. For reasons that will be expounded on below,
the application in this case of the law and rules on the nonappearance of the accused,
without justifiable cause, in the promulgation of the judgment of conviction shall
determine for us the propriety of conducting a review of the Sandiganbayan Decision
dated 17 April 2007.

OUR RULING

Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of

Court provides that an accused who
failed to appear at the promulgation
of the judgment of conviction shall
lose the remedies available against
the said judgment.

Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court states:

 SECTION 6. Promulgation of judgment. — The judgment is
promulgated by reading it in the presence of the accused and any judge of the
court in which it was rendered. However, if the conviction is for a light offense,
the judgment may be pronounced in the presence of his counsel or
representative. When the judge is absent or outside the province or city, the
judgment may be promulgated by the clerk of court.

If the accused is confined or detained in another province or city, the

judgment may be promulgated by the executive judge of the Regional Trial
Court having jurisdiction over the place of confinement or detention upon
request of the court which rendered the judgment. The court promulgating the
judgment shall have authority to accept the notice of appeal and to approve the
bail bond pending appeal; provided, that if the decision of the trial court
convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense from non-bailable to
bailable, the application for bail can only be filed and resolved by the appellate
court.

The proper clerk of court shall give notice to the accused personally or
through his bondsman or warden and counsel, requiring him to be present at the
promulgation of the decision. If the accused was tried in absentia because he
jumped bail or escaped from prison, the notice to him shall be served at his last
known address.

In case the accused fails to appear at the scheduled date of promulgation

of judgment despite notice, the promulgation shall be made by recording the
judgment in the criminal docket and serving him a copy thereof at his last
known address or thru his counsel.

If the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused to

appear was without justifiable cause, he shall lose the remedies available in
these rules against the judgment and the court shall order his arrest.
Within fifteen (15) days from promulgation of judgment, however, the
accused may surrender and file a motion for leave of court to avail of these
remedies. He shall state the reasons for his absence at the scheduled
promulgation and if he proves that his absence was for a justifiable cause,
he shall be allowed to avail of said remedies within fifteen (15) days from
notice. (6a) (Emphasis supplied)

Except when the conviction is for a light offense, in which case the judgment may
be pronounced in the presence of the counsel for the accused or the latter's representative,
the accused is required to be present at the scheduled date of promulgation of judgment.
Notice of the schedule of promulgation shall be made to the accused personally or
through the bondsman or warden and counsel.

The promulgation of judgment shall proceed even in the absence of the accused
despite notice. The promulgation in absentia shall be made by recording the judgment in
the criminal docket and serving a copy thereof to the accused at their last known address
or through counsel. The court shall also order the arrest of the accused if the judgment is
for conviction and the failure to appear was without justifiable cause. 45 SDEHIa

If the judgment is for conviction and the failure to appear was without justifiable
cause, the accused shall lose the remedies available in the Rules of Court against the
judgment. Thus, it is incumbent upon the accused to appear on the scheduled date of
promulgation, because it determines the availability of their possible remedies against the
judgment of conviction. When the accused fail to present themselves at the promulgation
of the judgment of conviction, they lose the remedies of filing a motion for a new trial or
reconsideration (Rule 121) and an appeal from the judgment of conviction (Rule 122). 46

The reason is simple. When the accused on bail fail to present themselves at the
promulgation of a judgment of conviction, they are considered to have lost their standing
in court. 47 Without any standing in court, the accused cannot invoke its jurisdiction to
seek relief. 48

Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of

Court, does not take away
substantive rights; it merely provides
the manner through which an
existing right may be implemented.

Petitioners claim that their right to file a motion for reconsideration or an appeal
has a statutory origin, as provided under Section 7 of P.D. 1606, to wit:

Section 7. Form, Finality and Enforcement of Decisions. — All

decisions and final orders determining the merits of a case or finally disposing
of the action or proceedings of the Sandiganbayan shall contain complete
findings of the facts and the law on which they are based, on all issues properly
raised before it and necessary in deciding the case.

A petition for reconsideration of any final order or decision may be

filed within fifteen (15) days from promulgation or notice of the final order
or judgment, and such motion for reconsideration shall be decided within
thirty (30) days from submission thereon. (Emphasis supplied)

xxx xxx xxx

According to petitioners, Section 7 of P.D. 1606 did not provide for any situation
as to when the right to file a motion for reconsideration may be deemed lost. Thus, it is
available at all times and the Rules promulgated by the Supreme Court cannot operate to
diminish or modify the right of a convicted accused to file a motion for reconsideration.
49 Furthermore, they argue, the right to file a motion for reconsideration is a statutory
grant, and not merely a remedy "available in [the] Rules," as provided under Section 6 of
Rule 120 of the Rules of Court. Thus, according to them, their absence at the
promulgation of judgment before the Sandiganbayan cannot be deemed to have resulted
in the loss of their right to file a motion for reconsideration.

Petitioners' argument lacks merit.

Like an appeal, the right to file a motion for reconsideration is a statutory grant or
privilege. As a statutory right, the filing of a motion for reconsideration is to be exercised
in accordance with and in the manner provided by law. Thus, a party filing a motion for
reconsideration must strictly comply with the requisites laid down in the Rules of Court.
50

It bears stressing that the provision on which petitioners base their claim states that
"[a] petition for reconsideration of any final order or decision may be filed within fifteen
(15) days from promulgation or notice of the final order or judgment." 51 In Social
Security Commission v. Court of Appeals, 52 we enunciated that the term "may" denotes
a mere possibility, an opportunity, or an option. Those granted this opportunity may
choose to exercise it or not. If they do, they must comply with the conditions attached
thereto. 53

Aside from the condition that a motion for reconsideration must be filed within 15
days from the promulgation or notice of the judgment, the movant must also comply with
the conditions laid down in the Rules of Court, which applies to all cases and proceedings
filed with the Sandiganbayan. 54

Petitioners insist that the right to file a motion for reconsideration under Section 7
of P.D. 1606 is a guarantee, and no amount of Rules promulgated by the Supreme Court
can operate to diminish or modify this substantive right. Aptly citing Fabian v. Desierto,
55 the Sandiganbayan was correct in rejecting the argument of petitioners in this wise:

Fabian v. Desierto lays down the test for determining whether a rule
prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the practice and procedure of the lower
courts, abridges, enlarges or modifies any substantive right, to wit:

". . . whether the rule really regulates procedure, that is, the
judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by
substantive law and for justly determining remedy and redress for a
disregard or infraction of them. If the rule takes away a vested right, it is
not procedural. If the rule creates a right such as the right to appeal, it
may be classified as a substantive matter; but if it operates as a means of
implementing an existing right then the rule deals merely with
procedure.
 Applying the Fabian v. Desierto test, it appears indubitable that Section
6, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court (ROC) clearly applies to the Sandiganbayan.
DHcEAa

Section 6, Rule 120, ROC as well as Section 4, Rule VIII of the Revised
Rules of the Sandiganbayan (which makes applicable Section 6, Rule 120, ROC
when the accused is absent during promulgation of judgment) merely regulates
the right to file a motion for reconsideration under P.D. 1606. These are mere
rules of procedure which the Supreme Court is competent to adopt pursuant to
its rule-making power under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the Constitution. And,
contrary to the view espoused by the accused, said rules do not take away,
repeal or alter the right to file a motion for reconsideration as said right still
exists. The Supreme Court merely laid down the rules on promulgation of a
judgment of conviction done in absentia in cases when the accused fails to
surrender and explain his absence within 15 days from promulgation. The
Supreme Court can very well do this as the right to file a motion for
reconsideration under P.D. 1606 is not preclusive in character. Indeed, there is
nothing in P.D. 1606 which prevents the Supreme Court from regulating the
procedure for promulgation of decisions in criminal cases done in absentia. 56

Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court, does not take away per se the right of
the convicted accused to avail of the remedies under the Rules. It is the failure of the
accused to appear without justifiable cause on the scheduled date of promulgation of the
judgment of conviction that forfeits their right to avail themselves of the remedies against
the judgment.

It is not correct to say that Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court diminishes or
modifies the substantive rights of petitioners. It only works in pursuance of the power of
the Supreme Court to "provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy
disposition of cases." 57 This provision protects the courts from delay in the speedy
disposition of criminal cases — delay arising from the simple expediency of
nonappearance of the accused on the scheduled promulgation of the judgment of
conviction.

In this case, petitioners have just shown their lack of faith in the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan by not appearing before it for the promulgation of the judgment on their
cases. Surely they cannot later on expect to be allowed to invoke the Sandiganbayan's
jurisdiction to grant them relief from its judgment of conviction.

It is incumbent upon the accused to

show justifiable cause for their
absence at the promulgation of the
judgment of conviction.
 According to petitioners, even if we were to apply Section 6, Rule 120, the
conditions under which an accused loses the remedies available in the Rules of Court do
not obtain in this case. It is argued that for the provision to apply, it must be shown that
1) the accused was notified of the scheduled date of promulgation, and that 2) the accused
failed to appear at the promulgation of the judgment of conviction without justifiable
cause. IcDHaT

Petitioners insist that the Sandiganbayan did not bother to determine whether their
absence at the promulgation of judgment was without justifiable cause. In other words, as
petitioners would have it, it was incumbent upon the Sandiganbayan to take pains to find
out whether their absence at the promulgation was without justifiable cause, and only
then could the court conclude that petitioners have lost the remedies available in the
Rules of Court against the judgment of conviction.

It is well to note that Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court also provides the
remedy by which the accused who were absent during the promulgation may reverse the
forfeiture of the remedies available to them against the judgment of conviction. In order
to regain their standing in court, the accused must do as follows: 1) surrender and 2) file a
motion for leave of court to avail of the remedies, stating the reasons for their absence,
within 15 days from the date of the promulgation of judgment. 58

In Villena v. People, 59 we stated that the term "surrender" contemplates the act
by the convicted accused of physically and voluntarily submitting themselves to the
jurisdiction of the court to suffer the consequences of the judgment against them. Upon
surrender, the accused must request permission of the court to avail of the remedies by
making clear the reasons for their failure to attend the promulgation of the judgment of
conviction.

Clearly, the convicted accused are the ones who should show that their reason for
being absent at the promulgation of judgment was justifiable. If the court finds that the
reasons proffered justify their nonappearance during the promulgation of judgment, it
shall allow them to avail of the remedies. 60 Thus, unless they surrender and prove their
justifiable reason to the satisfaction of the court, their absence is presumed to be
unjustified.

On the scheduled date of promulgation on 17 April 2007, the Sandiganbayan

noted that only Atty. Francisco Chavez, counsel for petitioners, appeared. 61 Jaylo was
not served notice of the promulgation, because he was no longer residing at his given
address. Valenzona and Habalo were duly notified. Castro had died on 22 December
2006. 62

Petitioners did not surrender within 15 days from the promulgation of the
judgment of conviction. Neither did they ask for leave of court to avail themselves of the
remedies, and state the reasons for their absence. Even if we were to assume that the
failure of Jaylo to appear at the promulgation was due to failure to receive notice thereof,
it is not a justifiable reason. He should have filed a notice of change of address before the
Sandiganbayan.

The Sandiganbayan was correct in not taking cognizance of the Motion for Partial
Reconsideration filed by counsel for petitioners. While the motion was filed on 30 April
2007, it did not operate to regain the standing of petitioners in court. For one, it is not an
act of surrender that is contemplated by Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court.
Moreover, nowhere in the Motion for Partial Reconsideration was it indicated that
petitioners were asking for leave to avail of the remedies against the judgment of
conviction, or that there were valid reasons for their absence at the promulgation.

For the failure of petitioners to regain their standing in court and avail themselves
of the remedies against the judgment of conviction, the Decision of the Sandiganbayan
attained finality 15 days reckoned from 17 April 2007.

In view thereof, this Court no longer has the power to conduct a review of the
findings and conclusions in the Decision of the Sandiganbayan. The Decision is no longer
subject to change, revision, amendment, or reversal. 63 Thus, there is no need to pass
upon the issues raised by petitioners assailing it.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Sandiganbayan Resolutions dated

29 November 2007 and 26 May 2008 in Criminal Case Nos. 17984-86 are AFFIRMED.
The Sandiganbayan Decision dated 17 April 2007, having attained finality, stands.

SO ORDERED.

Velasco, Jr., * Bersamin, Perez and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.

(Jaylo v. Sandiganbayan (First Division), G.R. Nos. 183152-54, [January 21, 2015], 751
|||

PHIL 123-145)

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 212865. July 15, 2015.]

HORACIO SALVADOR, petitioner, vs. LISA CHUA, respondent.

DECISION
BERSAMIN, J : p

This appeal proposes to undo the decision promulgated on December 12, 2013
in CA-G.R. SP No. 131486, 1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) granted the
respondent's petition for certiorari and nullified the orders dated October 26, 2011
and August 8, 2013 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Pasay City respectively
giving due course to the petitioner's notice of appeal, and allowing him to post bail for
his provisional liberty; and the resolution the CA promulgated on June 4, 2014
denying his Motion for Reconsideration. 2
Antecedents
The petitioner and his wife Marinel Salvador were charged in the RTC with
estafa penalized under Article 315 (a) of the Revised Penal Code docketed as
Criminal Case No. R-PSY-08-04689-CR. 3 On March 30, 2011, the date scheduled for
the promulgation of the judgment, their counsel moved for the deferment of the
promulgation inasmuch as the petitioner was then suffering from hypertension. 4
Unconvinced of the reason, the RTC proceeded to promulgate its decision, 5 and
disposed as follows:
IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, accused spouses Horacio Salvador
and Marinel Salvador are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Estafa and sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of four
(4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to twenty
(20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum. Both spouses are further
ordered to indemnify the victim Lisa Chua the sum of P17,371,780.00 with
interest of eight percent (8%) per annum until fully paid, plus the amount of
P50,000.00, as and by way of moral damages, and P50,000 as attorney's fees.
xxx xxx xxx
Costs against accused spouses Horacio Salvador and Marinel
Salvador.
SO ORDERED. 6
The RTC then issued a warrant for the petitioner's arrest. He was apprehended
on April 7, 2011, or eight days from the promulgation of the judgment finding him
guilty. 7
SaCIDT

The petitioner filed his Motion for Leave to file Notice of Appeal dated April
13, 2011, 8 and attached thereto the medical certificate dated March 30, 2011
purportedly issued by Dr. Paulo Miguel A. David, 9 certifying that the petitioner had
submitted himself to a medical consultation at the Rizal Medical Center on March 30,
2011 and had been found to be suffering from hypertension. 10
In his order dated July 1, 2011, 11 RTC Judge Eugenio G. Dela Cruz initially
denied the petitioner's Motion for Leave to file Notice of Appeal on the ground of non-
compliance with Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure.
 Thereafter, the respondent, who was the complainant in Criminal Case No. R-
PSY-08-04689-CR, filed her Motion for Execution dated July 29, 2011 praying for the
issuance of the writ of execution on the civil aspect. 12
The petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the July 1, 2011 order. 13 Judge
Dela Cruz granted the petitioner's motion for reconsideration on October 26, 2011,
thereby giving due course to his notice of appeal. 14
On October 27, 2011, the RTC, acting on the respondent's Motion for
Execution, issued another order, 15 to wit:
IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the subject Motion for Execution
and Motion to Commit the Person of Accused Horacio Salvador to the
National Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City, to Serve his Sentence are both
granted and hereby orders as follows:

1) Let Writ of Execution issue to implement the following, to wit:

a) Indemnify the victim Lisa Chua the sum of P17,371,780.00 with

interest of 8% per annum until fully paid;

b) Pay the victim Lisa Chua P50,000.00 as moral damages and P50,000
as attorney's fees.

2) The Motion to Commit the Person of Accused Horacio Salvador to the

National Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City, to Serve his Sentence is
hereby granted without prejudice to the appropriate action of the
Executive Judge where the accused is detained pursuant to
Administrative Circular No. 68-2005. 16

On its part, the Prosecution, represented by the private prosecutor, filed its
Motion for Reconsideration against the order issued on October 26, 2011, 17 attaching
to the motion the affidavit executed by Dr. Paolo Miguel A. David 18 affirming that he
had not examined the petitioner on March 30, 2011; that he had not issued any
medical certificate in favor of the petitioner; that his name of Paolo had been
misspelled Paulo in the medical certificate submitted by the petitioner; that the
signature appearing in the medical certificate was not his; and that the Rizal Medical
Center did not officially issue the medical certificate in question.
The petitioner opposed the Prosecution's Motion for Reconsideration, 19 and
prayed that he be allowed to post bail pending appeal. He submitted another medical
certificate issued by Dr. Ma. Concepcion Santos-Enriquez, an OB-Gynecologist, 20 to
the effect that she had seen the petitioner on March 28, 2011 for headache and
dizziness; and that she had advised him to see a cardiologist because of his elevated
blood pressure.
 Meanwhile, Criminal Case No. R-PSY-08-04689-CR was re-raffled to Judge
Francisco G. Mendiola, Presiding Judge of Branch 115, due to Judge Dela Cruz's
inhibition. 21 In his order dated August 8, 2013, 22 Judge Mendiola denied the
Prosecution's Motion for Reconsideration, and fixed bail of P80,000.00 for the
provisional liberty of the petitioner.
Consequently, the respondent commenced a special civil action for certiorari
in the CA to nullify the October 26, 2011 order (giving due course to the petitioner's
notice of appeal), and the August 8, 2013 order (allowing him to post bail for his
provisional liberty). 23
In the decision promulgated on December 12, 2013, the CA granted the
respondent's certiorari petition, viz.:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is
GRANTED. The assailed Orders dated October 26, 2011 and August 8, 2013
giving due course to respondent's Notice of Appeal and allowing him to post
bail, respectively, are NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE for having been issued
with grave abuse of discretion. The Order dated July 1, 2011 is
REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED. 24
The CA denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration in its resolution
promulgated on June 4, 2014. 25
Issues
Hence, this appeal, whereby the petitioner contends that the CA erred in
rendering its December 12, 2013 decision because: (1) the respondent had no legal
personality to challenge the assailed orders of the RTC because only the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) could appeal in a criminal case in behalf of the State; (2) she
had no legal personality to file the petition for certiorari in the CA because her
Motion for Execution in respect of the civil aspect of the criminal case had already
been granted by the RTC; and (3) his hypertension on the date of the promulgation of
the decision by the RTC constituted a justifiable cause for him to regain the right to
avail himself of the remedies under the Rules of Court against the judgment of
conviction.
The issues are, therefore: (1) whether the respondent as the complainant in the
criminal case had the legal personality to file the petition for certiorari in the CA to
assail the orders of the RTC despite the lack of consent of the OSG; and (2) whether
the petitioner had lost his standing in court for his failure to appear at the
promulgation of his conviction. cHECAS

Ruling of the Court

We DENY the petition for its lack of merit.
1.
 The respondent had legal standing to assail
the questioned orders through certiorari
The OSG is the appellate counsel of the State in criminal proceedings pending
in this Court and in the CA. This is explicitly provided in Section 35 (1), Chapter 12,
Title III, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code, viz.:
Section 35. Powers and Functions. — The Office of the Solicitor
General shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and
instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding,
investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers . . . . It shall have the
following specific powers and functions:
(1) Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the
Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings; represent the Government
and its officers in the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals, and all other
courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in which the
Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a party.
xxx xxx xxx
The Court has stressed that the People of the Philippines, being the real party in
interest in every criminal proceedings, can be represented only by the OSG in
criminal proceedings in the CA or in this Court. 26 Yet, this rule admits of exceptions,
for as pronounced in Rodriguez v. Gadiane: 27
A special civil action for certiorari may be filed by an aggrieved party
alleging grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction
on the part of the trial court. In a long line of cases, this Court construed the
term aggrieved parties to include the State and the private offended party or
complainant.
As early as in the case of Paredes v. Gopengco, it was held that the
offended parties in criminal cases have sufficient interest and personality as
"person(s) aggrieved" to file the special civil action of prohibition and
certiorari under Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 65. Apropos thereto is the case cited
by petitioner, De la Rosa v. Court of Appeals, wherein it was categorically
stated that the aggrieved parties are the State and the private offended party or
complainant.
It was further held in De la Rosa that the complainant has such an
interest in the civil aspect of the case that he may file a special civil action
questioning the decision or action of the respondent court on jurisdictional
grounds. In so doing, complainant should not bring the action in the name of
the People of the Philippines. He should do so and prosecute it in his name as
such complainant. In the same vein, the cases of Martinez v. Court of Appeals,
Santos v. Court of Appeals, and Chua v. Court of Appeals adhere to the
doctrines mentioned above.
 Yet, although the respondent's Motion for Execution had already been granted
by the RTC, the CA still held that she continued to have an interest in the litigation,
observing as follows:
. . . [W]ith the public respondents' questioned Orders both granting him leave
to appeal the Decision dated March 30, 2011, the whole case is rendered open
for review by Us, including the civil aspect of the case. An appeal throws the
case open for review. Under Section 11, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court, the
Court of Appeals may reverse, affirm or modify the judgment. An appeal in a
criminal case opens the entire case for review on any question, including one
not raised by the parties.
A mere cursory reading of the herein Petition will readily reveal that
petitioner desires to question the propriety of public respondents' ruling giving
due course to private respondent's appeal and subsequently allowing him to
post bail. We do not, however, perceive the same as a procedural misstep thus
divesting the petitioner the personality to file the instant Petition. We still lean
towards giving due course to the instant Petition in the interest of substantial
justice and considering what to Us are abuse of discretion committed by
public respondents resulting to denial of due process. As ordained by the
Supreme Court in Carmencita G. Cariño vs. Merlin De Castro, there can be
cases where a private offended party is allowed to prosecute as an aggrieved
party in the interest of substantial justice for a party cannot be left without
recourse to address a substantive issue in law.
As to whether or not there was a clear disregard of basic precepts
pertaining to an accused who did not appear for promulgation of judgment
despite notice is a query of substance both factual and legal. 28
We affirm the CA's holding on the respondent's legal standing to institute the
special civil action for certiorari in order to annul the questioned orders of the RTC.
For sure, her interest in the criminal case did not end upon the granting of her Motion
for Execution because the questioned orders opened the possibility of defeating the
judgment in her favor should the CA reverse or modify his conviction. She remained
an aggrieved party like the State in every sense, and, consequently, she had as much
right as anyone else in the criminal proceedings to adopt and to take the necessary
procedural steps within the bounds of the Rules of Court to serve and protect her
substantial interest. Although it is true that she could be represented by the OSG if it
wanted to, she would be reckless at that point to be disinterested in the appellate
proceedings. Moreover, we would violate her fundamental right to due process of law
if we were to deny her the opportunity to assail and set aside the improperly
resurrected appeal of the petitioner. AHDacC

2.
Petitioner has lost his right to appeal his conviction
Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure pertinently states:
 Section 6. Promulgation of judgment. — The judgment is promulgated
by reading it in the presence of the accused and any judge of the court in
which it was rendered. However, if the conviction is for a light offense, the
judgment may be pronounced in the presence of his counsel or representative.
When the judge is absent or outside the province or city, the judgment may be
promulgated by the clerk of court.
xxx xxx xxx
In case the accused fails to appear at the scheduled date of
promulgation of judgment despite notice, the promulgation shall be made by
recording the judgment in the criminal docket and serving him a copy thereof
at his last known address or thru his counsel.
If the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused to
appear was without justifiable cause, he shall lose the remedies available
in these rules against the judgment and the court shall order his arrest.
Within fifteen (15) days from promulgation of judgment, however, the
accused may surrender and file a motion for leave of court to avail of
these remedies. He shall state the reasons for his absence at the scheduled
promulgation and if he proves that his absence was for a justifiable cause,
he shall be allowed to avail of said remedies within fifteen (15) days from
notice.
As the rule expressly indicates, the promulgation of the judgment of conviction
may be done in absentia. The accused in such case is allowed a period of 15 days
from notice of the judgment to him or his counsel within which to appeal; otherwise,
the decision becomes final. 29 The accused who fails to appear at the promulgation of
the judgment of conviction loses the remedies available under the Rules of Court
against the judgment, specifically: (a) the filing of a motion for new trial or for
reconsideration (Rule 121), and (b) an appeal from the judgment of conviction (Rule
122). However, the Rules of Court permits him to regain his standing in court in order
to avail himself of these remedies within 15 days from the date of promulgation of the
judgment conditioned upon: (a) his surrender; and (b) his filing of a motion for leave
of court to avail himself of the remedies, stating therein the reason for his absence.
Should the trial court find that his absence was for a justifiable cause, he should be
allowed to avail himself of the remedies within 15 days from notice of the order
finding his absence justified and allowing him the available remedies from the
judgment of conviction. 30
Under Section 6, supra, the personal presence of the petitioner at the
promulgation of the judgment in Criminal Case No. R-PSY-08-04689-CR was
mandatory because the offense of which he was found guilty was not a light felony or
offense. 31 He was charged with and actually found guilty of estafa, and meted the
indeterminate sentence of four years and two months of prision correccional, as
minimum, to 20 years of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
 Based on the records, the promulgation of the judgment was on March 30,
2011; hence, the petitioner had only until April 14, 2011 within which to meet the
mandatory requirements under Section 6, supra.
In the attempt to regain his right to avail himself of the remedies under the
Rules of Court, the petitioner filed a Motion for Leave to File a Notice of Appeal, and
attached thereto the medical certificate issued by Dr. Paulo Miguel David. Yet, he did
not thereby establish that his absence had been for a justifiable cause because the
purported issuer himself, Dr. Paolo Miguel A. David, directly impugned the
credibility of this certificate by denying to have issued the certificate, and to have
examined the petitioner on March 30, 2011, or to have signed the certificate, or that
the Rizal Medical Center issued the certificate. The petitioner later submitted another
medicate certificate, which, aside from being belatedly issued, went unsupported and
unauthenticated by the testimony of the alleged issuing physician, who turned out to
be an OB-Gynecologist. The CA justly discredited the certificates. 32
Even assuming that he had suffered hypertension, which could have validly
excused his absence from the promulgation, the petitioner did not fulfill the other
requirement of Section 6, supra, to surrender himself to the trial court. The term
surrender used in the rule visibly necessitated his physical and voluntary submission
to the jurisdiction of the court to suffer any consequences of the verdict against him. 33
In its assailed decision, therefore, the CA unavoidably declared the petitioner
to have lost his standing in court because of his non-compliance with Section 6,
supra. His failure to fulfill the requirements rendered the conviction final and
immutable. 34 He ought to be reminded that the right to appeal, being neither a natural
right nor a part of due process, is a merely statutory privilege that should be exercised
in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law establishing the right;
otherwise, it is lost. 35
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on December
12, 2013; and ORDERS the petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., Leonardo-de Castro, Perez and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.
||| (Salvador v. Chua, G.R. No. 212865, [July 15, 2015], 764 PHIL 244-256)

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 182748. December 13, 2011.]

ARNEL COLINARES, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, respondent.
 DECISION

ABAD, J : p

This case is about a) the need, when invoking self-defense, to prove all that it
takes; b) what distinguishes frustrated homicide from attempted homicide; and c)
when an accused who appeals may still apply for probation on remand of the case to
the trial court.

The Facts and the Case

The public prosecutor of Camarines Sur charged the accused Arnel Colinares
(Arnel) with frustrated homicide before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Jose,
Camarines Sur, in Criminal Case T-2213. 1
Complainant Rufino P. Buena (Rufino) testified that at around 7:00 in the
evening on June 25, 2000, he and Jesus Paulite (Jesus) went out to buy cigarettes at a
nearby store. On their way, Jesus took a leak by the roadside with Rufino waiting
nearby. From nowhere, Arnel sneaked behind and struck Rufino twice on the head
with a huge stone, about 15 1/2 inches in diameter. Rufino fell unconscious as Jesus
fled.
Ananias Jallores (Ananias) testified that he was walking home when he saw
Rufino lying by the roadside. Ananias tried to help but someone struck him with
something hard on the right temple, knocking him out. He later learned that Arnel had
hit him.aHICDc

Paciano Alano (Paciano) testified that he saw the whole incident since he
happened to be smoking outside his house. He sought the help of a barangay tanod
and they brought Rufino to the hospital.
Dr. Albert Belleza issued a Medico-Legal Certificate 2 showing that Rufino
suffered two lacerated wounds on the forehead, along the hairline area. The doctor
testified that these injuries were serious and potentially fatal but Rufino chose to go
home after initial treatment.
The defense presented Arnel and Diomedes Paulite (Diomedes). Arnel claimed
self-defense. He testified that he was on his way home that evening when he met
Rufino, Jesus, and Ananias who were all quite drunk. Arnel asked Rufino where he
supposed the Mayor of Tigaon was but, rather than reply, Rufino pushed him, causing
his fall. Jesus and Ananias then boxed Arnel several times on the back. Rufino tried to
stab Arnel but missed. The latter picked up a stone and, defending himself, struck
Rufino on the head with it. When Ananias saw this, he charged towards Arnel and
tried to stab him with a gaff. Arnel was able to avoid the attack and hit Ananias with
 the same stone. Arnel then fled and hid in his sister's house. On September 4, 2000, he
voluntarily surrendered at the Tigaon Municipal Police Station.
Diomedes testified that he, Rufino, Jesus, and Ananias attended a pre-wedding
party on the night of the incident. His three companions were all drunk. On his way
home, Diomedes saw the three engaged in heated argument with Arnel.
On July 1, 2005 the RTC rendered judgment, finding Arnel guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of frustrated homicide and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment
from two years and four months of prision correccional, as minimum, to six years and
one day of prision mayor, as maximum. Since the maximum probationable
imprisonment under the law was only up to six years, Arnel did not qualify for
probation.
Arnel appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), invoking self-defense and,
alternatively, seeking conviction for the lesser crime of attempted homicide with the
consequent reduction of the penalty imposed on him. The CA entirely affirmed the
RTC decision but deleted the award for lost income in the absence of evidence to
support it. 3 Not satisfied, Arnel comes to this Court on petition for review.
TEAICc

In the course of its deliberation on the case, the Court required Arnel and the
Solicitor General to submit their respective positions on whether or not, assuming
Arnel committed only the lesser crime of attempted homicide with its imposable
penalty of imprisonment of four months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years
and four months of prision correccional, as maximum, he could still apply for
probation upon remand of the case to the trial court.
Both complied with Arnel taking the position that he should be entitled to
apply for probation in case the Court metes out a new penalty on him that makes his
offense probationable. The language and spirit of the probation law warrants such a
stand. The Solicitor General, on the other hand, argues that under the Probation Law
no application for probation can be entertained once the accused has perfected his
appeal from the judgment of conviction.

The Issues Presented

The case essentially presents three issues:

1. Whether or not Arnel acted in self-defense when he struck Rufino on the head
with a stone;

2. Assuming he did not act in self-defense, whether or not Arnel is guilty of

frustrated homicide; and
 3. Given a finding that Arnel is entitled to conviction for a lower offense and a
reduced probationable penalty, whether or not he may still apply for probation on remand
of the case to the trial court.

The Court's Rulings

One. Arnel claims that Rufino, Jesus, and Ananias attacked him first and that
he merely acted in self-defense when he hit Rufino back with a stone.
When the accused invokes self-defense, he bears the burden of showing that he
was legally justified in killing the victim or inflicting injury to him. The accused must
establish the elements of self-defense by clear and convincing evidence. When
successful, the otherwise felonious deed would be excused, mainly predicated on the
lack of criminal intent of the accused. 4ADCETI

In homicide, whether consummated, frustrated, or attempted, self-defense

requires (1) that the person whom the offender killed or injured committed unlawful
aggression; (2) that the offender employed means that is reasonably necessary to
prevent or repel the unlawful aggression; and (3) that the person defending himself
did not act with sufficient provocation. 5
If the victim did not commit unlawful aggression against the accused, the latter
has nothing to prevent or repel and the other two requisites of self-defense would have
no basis for being appreciated. Unlawful aggression contemplates an actual, sudden,
and unexpected attack or an imminent danger of such attack. A mere threatening or
intimidating attitude is not enough. The victim must attack the accused with actual
physical force or with a weapon. 6
Here, the lower courts found that Arnel failed to prove the element of unlawful
aggression. He alone testified that Jesus and Ananias rained fist blows on him and that
Rufino and Ananias tried to stab him. No one corroborated Arnel's testimony that it
was Rufino who started it. Arnel's only other witness, Diomedes, merely testified that
he saw those involved having a heated argument in the middle of the street. Arnel did
not submit any medical certificate to prove his point that he suffered injuries in the
hands of Rufino and his companions. 7
In contrast, the three witnesses — Jesus, Paciano, and Ananias — testified that
Arnel was the aggressor. Although their versions were mottled with inconsistencies,
these do not detract from their core story. The witnesses were one in what Arnel did
and when and how he did it. Compared to Arnel's testimony, the prosecution's version
is more believable and consistent with reality, hence deserving credence. 8
Two. But given that Arnel, the accused, was indeed the aggressor, would he be
liable for frustrated homicide when the wounds he inflicted on Rufino, his victim,
were not fatal and could not have resulted in death as in fact it did not?
 The main element of attempted or frustrated homicide is the accused's intent to
take his victim's life. The prosecution has to prove this clearly and convincingly to
exclude every possible doubt regarding homicidal intent. 9 And the intent to kill is
often inferred from, among other things, the means the offender used and the nature,
location, and number of wounds he inflicted on his victim. 10 cEaCAH

Here, Arnel struck Rufino on the head with a huge stone. The blow was so
forceful that it knocked Rufino out. Considering the great size of his weapon, the
impact it produced, and the location of the wounds that Arnel inflicted on his victim,
the Court is convinced that he intended to kill him.
The Court is inclined, however, to hold Arnel guilty only of attempted, not
frustrated, homicide. In Palaganas v. People, 11 we ruled that when the accused
intended to kill his victim, as shown by his use of a deadly weapon and the wounds he
inflicted, but the victim did not die because of timely medical assistance, the crime is
frustrated murder or frustrated homicide. If the victim's wounds are not fatal, the
crime is only attempted murder or attempted homicide.
Thus, the prosecution must establish with certainty the nature, extent, depth,
and severity of the victim's wounds. While Dr. Belleza testified that "head injuries are
always very serious," 12 he could not categorically say that Rufino's wounds in this
case were "fatal." Thus:

Q: Doctor, all the injuries in the head are fatal?

A: No, all traumatic injuries are potentially treated.

Q: But in the case of the victim when you treated him the wounds actually
are not fatal on that very day?

A: I could not say, with the treatment we did, prevent from becoming fatal.
But on that case the patient preferred to go home at that time.

Q: The findings also indicated in the medical certificate only refers to the
length of the wound not the depth of the wound?

A: When you say lacerated wound, the entire length of the layer of scalp.

Q: So you could not find out any abrasion?

A: It is different laceration and abrasion so once the skin is broken up the
label of the frontal lo[b]e, we always call it lacerated wound, but in
that kind of wound, we did not measure the depth. 13 ADCTac

Indeed, Rufino had two lacerations on his forehead but there was no indication
that his skull incurred fracture or that he bled internally as a result of the pounding of his
head. The wounds were not so deep, they merely required suturing, and were estimated to
heal in seven or eight days. Dr. Belleza further testified: 

Q: So, in the medical certificate the wounds will not require surgery?

A: Yes, Madam.

Q: The injuries are slight?

A: 7 to 8 days long, what we are looking is not much, we give antibiotics
and antit[e]tanus — the problem the contusion that occurred in the
brain.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: What medical intervention that you undertake?

A: We give antibiotics, Your Honor, antit[e]tanus and suturing the wounds.

Q: For how many days did he stay in the hospital?

A: Head injury at least be observed within 24 hours, but some of them

would rather go home and then come back.

Q: So the patient did not stay 24 hours in the hospital?

A: No, Your Honor.

Q: Did he come back to you after 24 hours?

A: I am not sure when he came back for follow-up. 14

Taken in its entirety, there is a dearth of medical evidence on record to support

the prosecution's claim that Rufino would have died without timely medical
intervention. Thus, the Court finds Arnel liable only for attempted homicide and
entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
Three. Ordinarily, Arnel would no longer be entitled to apply for probation, he
having appealed from the judgment of the RTC convicting him for frustrated
homicide. ESaITA

But, the Court finds Arnel guilty only of the lesser crime of attempted
homicide and holds that the maximum of the penalty imposed on him should be
lowered to imprisonment of four months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years
and four months of prision correccional, as maximum. With this new penalty, it
would be but fair to allow him the right to apply for probation upon remand of the
case to the RTC.
Some in the Court disagrees. They contend that probation is a mere privilege
granted by the state only to qualified convicted offenders. Section 4 of the probation
law (PD 968) provides: "That no application for probation shall be entertained or
granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction." 15
Since Arnel appealed his conviction for frustrated homicide, he should be deemed
permanently disqualified from applying for probation.
But, firstly, while it is true that probation is a mere privilege, the point is not
that Arnel has the right to such privilege; he certainly does not have. What he has is
the right to apply for that privilege. The Court finds that his maximum jail term
should only be 2 years and 4 months. If the Court allows him to apply for probation
because of the lowered penalty, it is still up to the trial judge to decide whether or not
to grant him the privilege of probation, taking into account the full circumstances of
his case.
Secondly, it is true that under the probation law the accused who appeals "from
the judgment of conviction" is disqualified from availing himself of the benefits of
probation. But, as it happens, two judgments of conviction have been meted out to
Arnel: one, a conviction for frustrated homicide by the regional trial court, now set
aside; and, two, a conviction for attempted homicide by the Supreme Court.
If the Court chooses to go by the dissenting opinion's hard position, it will
apply the probation law on Arnel based on the trial court's annulled judgment against
him. He will not be entitled to probation because of the severe penalty that such
judgment imposed on him. More, the Supreme Court's judgment of conviction for a
lesser offense and a lighter penalty will also have to bend over to the trial court's
judgment — even if this has been found in error. And, worse, Arnel will now also be
made to pay for the trial court's erroneous judgment with the forfeiture of his right to
apply for probation. Ang kabayo ang nagkasala, ang hagupit ay sa kalabaw (the horse
errs, the carabao gets the whip). Where is justice there? AEDCHc

The dissenting opinion also expresses apprehension that allowing Arnel to

apply for probation would dilute the ruling of this Court in Francisco v. Court of
Appeals 16 that the probation law requires that an accused must not have appealed his
conviction before he can avail himself of probation. But there is a huge difference
between Francisco and this case.
In Francisco, the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Makati found the
accused guilty of grave oral defamation and sentenced him to a prison term of one
year and one day to one year and eight months of prision correccional, a clearly
probationable penalty. Probation was his to ask! Still, he chose to appeal, seeking an
acquittal, hence clearly waiving his right to apply for probation. When the acquittal
did not come, he wanted probation. The Court would not of course let him. It served
him right that he wanted to save his cake and eat it too. He certainly could not have
both appeal and probation.
The Probation Law, said the Court in Francisco, requires that an accused must
not have appealed his conviction before he can avail himself of probation. This
requirement "outlaws the element of speculation on the part of the accused — to
wager on the result of his appeal — that when his conviction is finally affirmed on
appeal, the moment of truth well-nigh at hand, and the service of his sentence
inevitable, he now applies for probation as an 'escape hatch' thus rendering nugatory
the appellate court's affirmance of his conviction." 17
Here, however, Arnel did not appeal from a judgment that would have allowed
him to apply for probation. He did not have a choice between appeal and probation.
He was not in a position to say, "By taking this appeal, I choose not to apply for
probation." The stiff penalty that the trial court imposed on him denied him that
choice. Thus, a ruling that would allow Arnel to now seek probation under this Court's
greatly diminished penalty will not dilute the sound ruling in Francisco. It remains
that those who will appeal from judgments of conviction, when they have the option
to try for probation, forfeit their right to apply for that privilege.
Besides, in appealing his case, Arnel raised the issue of correctness of the
penalty imposed on him. He claimed that the evidence at best warranted his
conviction only for attempted, not frustrated, homicide, which crime called for a
probationable penalty. In a way, therefore, Arnel sought from the beginning to bring
down the penalty to the level where the law would allow him to apply for probation.
In a real sense, the Court's finding that Arnel was guilty, not of frustrated
homicide, but only of attempted homicide, is an original conviction that for the first
time imposes on him a probationable penalty. Had the RTC done him right from the
start, it would have found him guilty of the correct offense and imposed on him the
right penalty of two years and four months maximum. This would have afforded
Arnel the right to apply for probation.
aTEADI

The Probation Law never intended to deny an accused his right to probation
through no fault of his. The underlying philosophy of probation is one of liberality
towards the accused. Such philosophy is not served by a harsh and stringent
interpretation of the statutory provisions. 18 As Justice Vicente V. Mendoza said in
his dissent in Francisco, the Probation Law must not be regarded as a mere privilege
to be given to the accused only where it clearly appears he comes within its letter; to
do so would be to disregard the teaching in many cases that the Probation Law should
be applied in favor of the accused not because it is a criminal law but to achieve its
beneficent purpose. 19
One of those who dissent from this decision points out that allowing Arnel to
apply for probation after he appealed from the trial court's judgment of conviction
would not be consistent with the provision of Section 2 that the probation law should
 be interpreted to "provide an opportunity for the reformation of a penitent offender."
An accused like Arnel who appeals from a judgment convicting him, it is claimed,
shows no penitence.
This may be true if the trial court meted out to Arnel a correct judgment of
conviction. Here, however, it convicted Arnel of the wrong crime, frustrated
homicide, that carried a penalty in excess of 6 years. How can the Court expect him to
feel penitent over a crime, which as the Court now finds, he did not commit? He only
committed attempted homicide with its maximum penalty of 2 years and 4 months.
Ironically, if the Court denies Arnel the right to apply for probation under the
reduced penalty, it would be sending him straight behind bars. It would be robbing
him of the chance to instead undergo reformation as a penitent offender, defeating the
very purpose of the probation law.
At any rate, what is clear is that, had the RTC done what was right and
imposed on Arnel the correct penalty of two years and four months maximum, he
would have had the right to apply for probation. No one could say with certainty that
he would have availed himself of the right had the RTC done right by him. The idea
may not even have crossed his mind precisely since the penalty he got was not
probationable.
The question in this case is ultimately one of fairness. Is it fair to deny Arnel
the right to apply for probation when the new penalty that the Court imposes on him
is, unlike the one erroneously imposed by the trial court, subject to probation?
WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the petition, MODIFIES
the Decision dated July 31, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR 29639,
FINDS petitioner Arnel Colinares GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of attempted
homicide, and SENTENCES him to suffer an indeterminate penalty from four
months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years and four months of prision
correccional, as maximum, and to pay Rufino P. Buena the amount of P20,000.00 as
moral damages, without prejudice to petitioner applying for probation within 15 days
from notice that the record of the case has been remanded for execution to the
Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Camarines Sur, in Criminal Case T-2213. HSEcTC 

SO ORDERED.

Corona, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-de Castro, Del Castillo, Perez,
Mendoza and Reyes, JJ., concur.

Brion and Bersamin, JJ., join Justice Peralta's concurring and dissenting opinion.

Peralta, J., see concurring and dissenting opinion.

Villarama, Jr., J., see concurring and dissenting opinion.

 Sereno, J., I join Justice Peralta and Villarama.

Perlas-Bernabe, J., I join Justice Villarama.

||| (Colinares v. People, G.R. No. 182748, [December 13, 2011], 678 PHIL 482-512)

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 178925. June 1, 2011.]

MANUEL YBIERNAS, VICENTE YBIERNAS, MARIA CORAZON

ANGELES, VIOLETA YBIERNAS, and VALENTIN YBIERNAS,
petitioners, vs. ESTER TANCO-GABALDON, MANILA BAY
SPINNING MILLS, INC., and THE SHERIFF OF THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF PASIG CITY, BRANCH 163, respondents.

DECISION

NACHURA, J : p

This petition for review on certiorari assails the Court of Appeals (CA)
Resolutions 1 dated January 31, 2007 and July 16, 2007. The assailed Resolutions
granted respondents' motion for new trial of a case for quieting of title and damages,
decided in petitioners' favor by the trial court in a summary judgment.
CTaSEI

The facts of the case are, as follows:

Estrella Mapa Vda. de Ybiernas (Estrella) owned a parcel of land located in
Talisay, Negros Occidental, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-
83976. On April 28, 1988, Estrella executed a Deed of Absolute Sale 2 over the
property in favor of her heirs, Dionisio Ybiernas (Dionisio) and petitioners Manuel
Ybiernas, Vicente Ybiernas, and Maria Corazon Angeles.
On June 30, 1989, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 47, Bacolod City
issued an Order in Cadastral Case No. 10, LRC (G.L.R.O.) Rec. No. 97, Lot 713-C-B,
Psd-220027, Talisay Cadastre, directing the registration and annotation of the Deed of
Absolute Sale on the title. Thus, on July 5, 1989, the Deed of Absolute Sale and the
said RTC Order were annotated on the title, as follows:

Entry No. 334150; Order; Dionisio M. Ybiernas; Order issued by the

RTC of Negros Occ. to register and annotate the deed of sale on this title
 without need of presenting the owner's duplicate. Date of order-June 30, 1989;
Date of prescription-July 5, 1989 at 10:45 a.m.

Entry No. 334151; Sale; Dionisio Ybiernas, et al.; Deed of absolute sale
of this property for the sum of P650,000.00 in favor of Dionisio Ybiernas,
Vicente M. Ybiernas, Manuel M. Ybiernas and Maria Corazon Y. Angeles in
undivided equal share to each; doc. no. 437, page 89, book VI, series of 1988 of
the not. reg. of Mr. Indalecio P. Arriola of Iloilo City. Date of instrument-April
28, 1988; Date of inscription-July 5, 1989 at 10:45 a.m. 3

On October 29, 1991, respondents Ester Tanco-Gabaldon and Manila Bay

Spinning Mills, Inc. filed with the RTC of Pasig City a Complaint 4 for sum of money
and damages, amounting to P6,000,000.00, against Estrella and three other
individuals. The Complaint alleged that the defendants were guilty of fraud when they
misrepresented to herein respondents that they own a parcel of land in Quezon City,
and that the title over the said property is free from liens and encumbrances. IcTEaC

Upon respondents' motion, the Pasig City RTC, in an Order 5 dated November
6, 1991, ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment upon filing of a
bond. The sheriff issued the corresponding writ of attachment and levied the subject
property. 6 On November 13, 1991, the notice of attachment was annotated on TCT
No. T-83976 as Entry No. 346816. 7
When Estrella's heirs learned about the levy, Dionisio filed, on January 14,
1992, an Affidavit of Third-Party Claim, asserting the transfer of ownership to them.
8 Respondents, however, filed an indemnity bond; thus, the sheriff refused to lift the
levy.
The Pasig City RTC resolved the Complaint for sum of money in favor of
respondents, and Estrella, et al., were ordered to pay P6,000,000.00, plus legal interest
and damages. Respondents, however, elevated the case all the way up to this Court,
questioning the interest rate. This Court eventually denied the appeal in a Minute
Resolution dated November 20, 2002, which became final and executory on April 14,
2003. 9
In the meantime, Dionisio died and was succeeded by his heirs, petitioners
Valentin Ybiernas and Violeta Ybiernas.
On November 28, 2001, petitioners filed with the RTC of Bacolod City a
Complaint for Quieting of Title and Damages, 10 claiming that the levy was invalid
because the property is not owned by any of the defendants in the Pasig City RTC
case. They averred that the annotation of the RTC Order and the Deed of Absolute
Sale on TCT No. T-83976 serves as notice to the whole world that the property is no
longer owned by Estrella.
In their Answer with Counterclaims, 11 respondents contended that (a) the case
constituted an interference in the proceeding of the Pasig City RTC, a co-equal court;
(b) petitioners should have filed their claims against the indemnity bond filed by
respondents; and (c) petitioners were guilty of forum-shopping, considering that the
case actually sought a relief similar to the third-party claim.
During pre-trial, the parties admitted, among others, the "[e]xistence of the
Order dated June 30, 1989 by RTC Branch 47, Bacolod City, in Cad. Case No. 10
concerning the same TCT No. T-83976." 12
On July 30, 2004, petitioners filed a motion for summary judgment. The RTC
initially denied the motion in the Order dated December 23, 2004. 13 Upon
petitioners' motion for reconsideration, the RTC granted the motion for summary
judgment in the decision 14 dated December 27, 2005. The RTC made the following
pronouncement:

A consideration of the issues defined by the parties during the pre-trial . .

. shows quite clearly that they are issues that may already be properly resolved
now at this stage of the proceedings in this case, as they, other than the amount
of damages, are quite apparently pure questions of law, the factual antecedents
for these issues having already been admitted by the parties. aAHISE

As to issue No. 1 [whether ownership has been transferred to

petitioners], it is a fact well-established, as admitted by the parties and shown by
the annotation as Entry No. 334151 on said TCT No. T-8[39]76, that the said
Deed of Absolute Sale, dated April 28, 1988 over the subject property by
Estrella Mapa Vda. de Ybiernas in favor of Dionisio Ybiernas, Vicente
Ybiernas, Manuel Ybiernas and Maria Corazon Y. Angeles, was validly
annotated as such Entry No. 334151, inscribed on July 5, 1989, on said TCT
No. T-83976 registered in the name of Estrella M. Ybiernas.

Neither the defendants nor anyone else has challenged the validity of the
judicial proceedings before RTC, Branch 47, Bacolod City, which issued in
Cadastral Case No. 10, the said Order dated June 30, 1989, which directed the
registration and annotation of the said Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 28,
1988 on said TCT No. T-83976, and which led to the annotation under said
Entry No. 334151 on said TCT No. T-83976. 15

Thus, the dispositive portion of the December 27, 2005 RTC decision reads:

WHEREFORE, except as to the amount of damages, a summary

judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the
defendants, and as prayed for by the plaintiffs in their complaint:

1. The levy on attachment made by herein defendant Sheriff of RTC,

Branch 163, Pasig City on said TCT No. T-83976, issued by the
Registrar of Deeds of the Province of Negros Occidental,
 covering the Subject Property, is hereby DECLARED
INVALID; and, consequently,

2. Entry No. 346816 on the same TCT No. T-83976 is hereby

CANCELLED and DISSOLVED.

SO ORDERED. 16

Respondents filed a notice of appeal, 17 and it was granted by the RTC.

While the appeal was pending in the CA, respondents filed a motion for new
trial, 18 claiming that they have discovered on May 9, 2006 that Cadastral Case No.
10 did not exist and the April 28, 1988 Deed of Sale was simulated. Attached to the
motion were the affidavit 19 of Atty. Gerely C. Rico, who conducted the research in
Bacolod City in behalf of the law office representing respondents, and the following
certifications:

a. Certification dated 09 May 2006 issued by Ildefonso M. Villanueva, Jr., Clerk

of Court VI of the RTC of Bacolod City, stating that: "no cadastral case
involving Lot 713-C-1-B, Psd-220027, Talisay Cadastre, was filed with
this office sometime on 30 June 1989 and raffled to Branch 47 of this
court which was then presided by Judge Enrique T. Jocson." 20

b. Certification dated 09 May 2006 isssued by Atty. Mehafee G. Sideno, Clerk

of Court V of the RTC of Bacolod City, Branch 47, stating that: "as per
records of this court, no Cadastral Case No. 10, LRC, GLRO Rec. 97,
Lot No. 713-C-1-B, Psd 220027, filed by Dionisio Ybiernas was filed
and docketed in this office." 21

c. Certification dated 11 July 2006 issued by Estrella M. Domingo, OIC

Archives Division of the National Archives Office, stating that: "no
copy is on file with this Office of a DEED OF SALE allegedly executed
by and among ESTRELLA MAPA VDA. DE YBIERNAS, DIONISIO
YBIERNAS, VICENTE M. YBIERNAS, JR., MANUEL YBIERNAS
and MARIA CORAZON ANGELES, ratified on April 28, 1988 before
INDALECIO P. ARRIOLA, a notary public for and within Iloilo City
and acknowledged as Doc. No. 437; Page No. 89; Book No. VI; Series
of 1988." 22HESCcA

Respondents argued that they have satisfied all the requisites for the grant of a
new trial based on newly discovered evidence: (1) they discovered the evidence after
the trial court rendered its judgment on December 27, 2005; (2) they could not have
discovered and produced the evidence during the trial with reasonable diligence; and
(3) the evidence was material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching,
and was of such weight that, if admitted, would probably change the judgment. On the
 second requisite, respondents explained that they could not have discovered the
evidence with reasonable diligence because they relied in good faith on the veracity of
the RTC Order dated June 30, 1989, based on the principle that the issuance of a court
order, as an act of a public officer, enjoys the presumption of regularity. On the third
requisite, respondents pointed out that, if the nonexistence of Cadastral Case No. 10
and the invalidity of the Order dated June 30, 1989 were allowed to be proven by the
newly discovered evidence, the action for quieting of title would probably be
dismissed, as respondents' levy would be declared superior to petitioners' claim. 23  
In their Comment/Opposition, petitioners argued that (a) the questioned
decision was a partial summary judgment which could not be the subject of a motion
for new trial; (b) the existence of Cadastral Case No. 10 was an admitted fact which
could not be questioned in a motion for new trial; and (c) there was no newly
discovered evidence that would warrant a new trial. 24
The CA did not agree with petitioners. Hence, on January 31, 2007, it granted
respondents' motion for new trial, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the defendants-appellants having

satisfied all the elements necessary to justify the filing of a Motion for New
Trial which appears to be meritorious and in the higher interest of substantial
justice, the said motion is GRANTED. ACCORDINGLY, let a new trial of the
Quieting of Title case be held and let said case be REMANDED to the Court a
quo for said purpose.

SO ORDERED. 25

At the outset, the CA noted that the RTC summary judgment was a proper
subject of an appeal because it was a final adjudication on the merits of the case,
having completely disposed of all the issues except as to the amount of damages. The
CA concluded that respondents properly availed of a motion for new trial because
such remedy could be availed of at any time after the appeal from the lower court had
been perfected and before the CA loses jurisdiction over the case. According to the
CA, respondents were able to show that they obtained the new evidence only after the
trial of the case and after the summary judgment had been rendered. The CA also held
that respondents never admitted during the pre-trial the existence of Cadastral Case
No. 10; they only admitted the existence of the Order dated June 30, 1989 in
Cadastral Case No. 10.

On July 16, 2007, the CA denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration. 26

Petitioners subsequently filed this petition for review on certiorari, raising the
following issues:

A.
 WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN
RULING THAT THE QUESTIONED DECISION OF THE RTC IS A
PROPER SUBJECT OF AN APPEAL AND A MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
UNDER RULE 53 OF THE RULES OF COURT.

B.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN

FAILING TO RULE THAT A MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL IS AN
IMPROPER REMEDY TO QUESTION ADMITTED FACTS. STHDAc

C.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN

FAILING TO RULE THAT NO NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE WAS
ADDUCED TO WARRANT A NEW TRIAL. 27

Petitioners posit that no appeal could be taken from the trial court's decision
because it did not completely dispose of all the issues in the case; it failed to settle the
issue on damages. Petitioners categorize the decision as a partial summary judgment,
which in Guevarra, et al. v. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., 28 reiterated in GSIS v.
Philippine Village Hotel, Inc., 29 the Court pronounced as not a final and an
appealable judgment, hence, interlocutory and clearly an improper subject of an
appeal. Petitioners theorize then that the appeal could not have been perfected and the
CA could not have acquired jurisdiction over the case, including the motion for new
trial. Accordingly, they conclude that the motion for new trial should have been
denied outright for being violative of Section 1, 30 Rule 53 of the Rules of Court,
which provides that the motion for new trial may be filed after the appeal has been
perfected. Petitioners argue that, pursuant to Section 4, Rule 35 of the Rules of Court,
trial should proceed instead to settle the issue on damages. Petitioners point out that
the case cited by the CA in its Decision, Bell Carpets International Trading
Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 31 is not applicable to the case because, unlike in
the present case, the trial court's ruling completely disposed of all the issues in that
case.
In addition, petitioners insist that respondents already admitted the existence of
Cadastral Case No. 10 by its admission of the existence of the Order dated June 30,
1989. They maintain that respondents cannot admit the existence of an order and yet
deny the existence of the proceedings from which the order emanates. Respondents'
judicial admission that the court Order existed necessarily carried with it the
admission that the cadastral proceedings where the Order was issued likewise existed.
Petitioners aver that respondents are bound by their judicial admission and they
cannot be allowed to present evidence to contradict the same.
 Petitioners next argue that the purported newly discovered pieces of evidence
have no probative value. Petitioners say that the certifications are self-serving and
inconclusive opinions of court employees, who did not even indicate the period when
they occupied their positions and state whether they had the authority to issue such
certifications and whether they had personal knowledge of the documents archived
during the year that the deed of sale was executed. According to petitioners, the
certifications cannot overcome the presumption of regularity in the issuance of the
Order dated June 30, 1989. At most, the certifications would simply show that the
records of Cadastral Case No. 10 could no longer be found in the records; hence, they
would have no bearing on the result of the case.
Petitioners also emphasize that respondents failed to meet the burden of
proving that the newly discovered pieces of evidence presented comply with the
requisites to justify the holding of a new trial. They contend that respondents could
have discovered and presented in court the certifications during trial had they
exercised reasonable diligence. HScCEa

Petitioners' arguments are untenable.

The issue of whether the RTC judgment is a final judgment is indeed crucial. If
the judgment were not final, it would be an improper subject of an appeal. Hence, no
appeal would have been perfected before the CA, and the latter would not have
acquired jurisdiction over the entire case, including the motion for new trial. But more
importantly, only a final judgment or order, as opposed to an interlocutory order, may
be the subject of a motion for new trial.
A final judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing
more for the court to do in respect thereto, such as an adjudication on the merits
which, on the basis of the evidence presented at the trial, declares categorically what
the rights and obligations of the parties are and which party is in the right, or a
judgment or order that dismisses an action on the ground of res judicata or
prescription, for instance. 32 Just like any other judgment, a summary judgment that
satisfies the requirements of a final judgment will be considered as such.
A summary judgment is granted to settle expeditiously a case if, on motion of
either party, there appears from the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits
that no important issues of fact are involved, except the amount of damages. 33 The
RTC judgment in this case fully determined the rights and obligations of the parties
relative to the case for quieting of title and left no other issue unresolved, except the
amount of damages. Hence, it is a final judgment.
In leaving out the determination of the amount of damages, the RTC did not
remove its summary judgment from the category of final judgments. In fact, under
Section 3, 34 Rule 35 of the Rules of Court, a summary judgment may not be
rendered on the amount of damages, although such judgment may be rendered on the
issue of the right to damages. 35
 In Jugador v. De Vera, 36 the Court distinguished between the determination
of the amount of damages and the issue of the right to damages itself in case of a
summary judgment. The Court elucidated on this point, thus:

[A] summary judgment may be rendered except as to the amount of

damages. In other words, such judgment may be entered on the issue relating to
the existence of the right to damages. Chief Justice Moran pertinently observes
that "if there is any real issue as to the amount of damages, the c[o]urt, after
rendering summary judgment, may proceed to assess the amount recoverable."
37

It is therefore reasonable to distinguish the present case from GSIS v.

Philippine Village Hotel, Inc. 38 In that case, the summary judgment specifically
stated that "[t]rial on the issu[e] of damages shall resume." Evidently, there remained
an unresolved issue on the right to damages. Here, the trial court, in stating that
"except as to the amount of damages, a summary judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants," had, in effect, resolved all issues,
including the light to damages in favor of the plaintiffs (petitioners). What remained
undetermined was only the amount of damages. DACIHc

On the issue of whether respondents are proscribed from presenting evidence

that would disprove the existence of Cadastral Case No. 10, we likewise sustain the
CA.
A judicial admission is an admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the
course of the proceedings in the same case, which dispenses with the need for proof
with respect to the matter or fact admitted. It may be contradicted only by a showing
that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. 39
During the pre-trial, respondents categorically admitted the existence of the
Order dated June 30, 1989 only. The Court cannot extend such admission to the
existence of Cadastral Case No. 10, considering the circumstances under which the
admission was made. In construing an admission, the court should consider the
purpose for which the admission is used and the surrounding circumstances and
statements. 40 Respondents have constantly insisted that, in making the admission,
they relied in good faith on the veracity of the Order which was presented by
petitioners. Moreover, they relied on the presumption that the Order has been issued
by Judge Enrique T. Jocson in the regular performance of his duties. It would
therefore be prejudicial and unfair to respondents if they would be prevented from
proving that the Order is in fact spurious by showing that there was no Cadastral Case
No. 10 before the RTC, Branch 47, of Bacolod City. 
Finally, we find that a new trial based on newly discovered evidence is
warranted. New trial is a remedy that seeks to "temper the severity of a judgment or
prevent the failure of justice." Thus, the Rules allows the courts to grant a new trial
when there are errors of law or irregularities prejudicial to the substantial rights of the
accused committed during the trial, or when there exists newly discovered evidence.
41 The grant or denial of a new trial is, generally speaking, addressed to the sound
discretion of the court which cannot be interfered with unless a clear abuse thereof is
shown. 42
This Court has repeatedly held that before a new trial may be granted on the
ground of newly discovered evidence, it must be shown (1) that the evidence was
discovered after trial; (2) that such evidence could not have been discovered and
produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (3) that it is
material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching; and (4) the evidence is
of such weight that it would probably change the judgment if admitted. If the alleged
newly discovered evidence could have been very well presented during the trial with
the exercise of reasonable diligence, the same cannot be considered newly discovered.
43
The only contentious element in the case is whether the evidence could have
been discovered with the exercise of reasonable diligence. In Custodio v.
Sandiganbayan, 44 the Court expounded on the due diligence requirement, thus:

The threshold question in resolving a motion for new trial based on

newly discovered evidence is whether the [proffered] evidence is in fact a
"newly discovered evidence which could not have been discovered by due
diligence." The question of whether evidence is newly discovered has two
aspects: a temporal one, i.e., when was the evidence discovered, and a
predictive one, i.e., when should or could it have been discovered. It is to the
latter that the requirement of due diligence has relevance. We have held that in
order that a particular piece of evidence may be properly regarded as newly
discovered to justify new trial, what is essential is not so much the time when
the evidence offered first sprang into existence nor the time when it first came
to the knowledge of the party now submitting it; what is essential is that the
offering party had exercised reasonable diligence in seeking to locate such
evidence before or during trial but had nonetheless failed to secure it.

The Rules do not give an exact definition of due diligence, and whether
the movant has exercised due diligence depends upon the particular
circumstances of each case. Nonetheless, it has been observed that the phrase is
often equated with "reasonable promptness to avoid prejudice to the defendant."
In other words, the concept of due diligence has both a time component and a
good faith component. The movant for a new trial must not only act in a timely
fashion in gathering evidence in support of the motion; he must act reasonably
and in good faith as well. Due diligence contemplates that the defendant acts
reasonably and in good faith to obtain the evidence, in light of the totality of the
circumstances and the facts known to him. 45

As previously stated, respondents relied in good faith on the veracity of the

Order dated June 30, 1989 which petitioners presented in court. It was only practical
 for them to do so, if only to expedite the proceedings. Given this circumstance, we
hold that respondents exercised reasonable diligence in obtaining the evidence. The
certifications therefore qualify as newly discovered evidence.CaSHAc

The question of whether the certifications presented by respondents have any

probative value is left to the judgment and discretion of the trial court which will be
hearing the case anew.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Court of
Appeals Resolutions dated January 31, 2007 and July 16, 2007 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

||| (Ybiernas v. Tanco-Gabaldon, G.R. No. 178925, [June 1, 2011], 665 PHIL 297-312)

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 192914. January 11, 2016.]

NAPOLEON D. SENIT, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

REYES, J : p

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court assailing the Decision 2 dated November 20, 2009 and the Resolution 3
dated June 17, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 00390-MIN
which affirmed with modification the Decision 4 dated April 26, 2006 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Malaybalay City, Bukidnon, Branch 10, in Criminal Case No.
10717-00 convicting Napoleon D. Senit (petitioner) guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of Reckless Imprudence resulting to Multiple Serious Physical Injuries and Damage
to Property.
The Antecedents
The facts as narrated are culled from the Comments 5 of the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) and from the assailed decision of the CA:
In the morning of September 2, 2000, private complainant Mohinder
Toor, Sr. was driving north along Aglayan from the direction of Valencia on
board his Toyota pick-up with his wife Rosalinda Toor, their three-year-old
son Mohinder Toor, Jr., and househelper Mezelle Jane Silayan. He turned left
and was coming to the center of Aglayan when a speeding Super 5 bus driven
by petitioner and coming from Malaybalay headed south towards Valencia,
suddenly overtook a big truck from the right side. Petitioner tried to avoid the
accident by swerving to the right towards the shoulder of the road and
applying the brakes, but he was moving too fast and could not avoid a
collision with the pick-up. The bus crashed into the right side of private
complainant's pick-up at a right angle.
All passengers of the pick-up were injured and immediately brought to
Bethel Baptist Hospital, Sumpong, Malaybalay City. However, because of
lack of medical facilities, they were transferred to the Bukidnon Doctor's
Hospital in Valencia City, Bukidnon. Rosalinda Toor sustained an open
fracture of the humerus of the right arm and displaced, closed fracture of the
proximal and distal femur of the right lower extremity which required two
surgical operations. She was paralyzed as a result of the accident and was
unable to return to her job as the Regional Manager of COSPACHEM Product
Laboratories. Mohinder Toor, Sr. spent about P580,000.00 for her treatment
and P3,000.00 for Mezelle Jean Silayan, who suffered frontal area swelling as
a result of the accident. Mohinder Toor, Sr. suffered a complete fracture of the
scapular bone of his right shoulder while his son Mohinder Toor, Jr. sustained
abdominal injury and a wound on the area of his right eye which required
suturing. The damage sustained by the pick-up reached P106,155.00. CAIHTE

Thus, on May 30, 2001, Carlo B. Mejia, City Prosecutor of

Malaybalay City, charged petitioner with Reckless Imprudence Resulting to
Multiple Serious Physical Injuries and Damage to Property in an Amended
Information which was filed with Branch 10 of the [RTC] in Malaybalay City.
The information reads:
"That on or about September 2, 2000 in the morning at
[sic] Barangay Aglayan, Malaybalay City, Province of
Bukidnon, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully, and criminally in violation of the Land
Transportation and Traffic Code, in negligent, careless,
imprudent manner and without precaution to prevent accident
[to] life and property, drive a Super Five Nissan Bus, color
white/red bearing plate No. MVD-776 owned by PAUL
PADAYHAG of Rosario Heights, Iligan City, as a result hit
and bumped the [sic] motor vehicle, Toyota Pick-up color blue
with plate No. NEF-266 driven and owned by MOHINDER S.
TOO[R,] SR., and with his wife Rosalinda Toor, son Mohinder
Toor, Jr., 3 years old and househelp Mezelle Jane Silayan, 17
years old, riding with him. The Toyota pick-up was damaged in
the amount of [P]105,300.00 and spouses Mohinder Toor[,] Sr.
and Rosalinda Toor, Mohinder Toor[,] Jr[.] and Mezelle Jane
Silayan sustained the following injuries to wit:
 MOHINDER TOOR[,] SR.
= complete fracture of superior scapular bone right shoulder
MOHINDER TOOR[,] JR.
= MPI secondary to MVA r/o Blunt abdominal injury
= Saturing [sic] right eye area
ROSALINDA TOOR
= Fracture, open type 11, supracondylar, humerus right
= Fracture, closed, Complete, displaced, subtrochanter
= and supracondylar femur right
MEZELLE JANE SILAYAN
= Frontal area swelling 20 vehicular accident
to the damage and prejudice of the complainant victim in such
amount that they are entitled to under the law.
CONTRARY TO and in Violation of Article 365 in
relation to 263 of the Revised Penal Code. IN RELATION TO
THE FAMILY CODE." 6 (Citations omitted) DETACa

Upon being arraigned on June 21, 2001, the petitioner, with the assistance of
his counsel, pleaded not guilty to the Information in this case. 7
Trial ensued. However, after the initial presentation of evidence for the
petitioner, he resigned from his employment and transferred residence. His
whereabouts allegedly became unknown so he was not presented as a witness by his
new counsel. 8
On April 26, 2006, the RTC rendered its Decision in absentia convicting the
petitioner of the crime charged. The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered and finding the accused
NAPOLEON SENIT y Duhaylungsod guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime as charged, he is hereby sentenced to an imprisonment of an
indeterminate penalty of Four [4] months and One [1] day of Arresto Mayor
maximum as minimum and to Four [4] years and Two [2] months Prision
Correc[c]ional medium as maximum. The accused is further ordered to
indemnify the private complainant the amount of Fifty Thousand [P50,000.00]
Pesos as moral damages, the amount of Four Hundred Eighty Thousand
[P480,000.00] [Pesos] for the expenses incurred in the treatment and
hospitalization of Rosalinda Toor, Mohinder Toor, Jr[.] and Mezelle Jean
Silayan and the amount of Eighty Thousand [P80,000.00] [Pesos] for the
expenses incurred in the repair of the damaged Toyota pick-up vehicle.
SO ORDERED. 9
 The RTC issued a Promulgation 10 dated August 4, 2006, which included an
order for the arrest of the petitioner.
The petitioner then filed a motion for new trial via registered mail on the
ground that errors of law or irregularities have been committed during trial that are
allegedly prejudicial to his substantial rights. He claimed that he was not able to
present evidence during trial because he was not notified of the schedule. Likewise,
he mistakenly believed that the case against him has been dismissed as private
complainant Mohinder Toor, Sr. (Toor, Sr.) purportedly left the country. 11
On September 22, 2006, the public prosecutor opposed the motion for new trial
filed by the petitioner. 12
On October 26, 2006, the motion for new trial was denied by the lower court
pronouncing that notices have been duly served the parties and that the reason given
by the petitioner was self-serving. 13
Dissatisfied with the RTC decision, the petitioner filed his Notice of Appeal
dated November 6, 2006 by registered mail to the CA, on both questions of facts and
laws. 14
Ruling of the CA
On November 20, 2009, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC with
modification as to the penalty imposed, the dispositive portion thereof reads:
ACCORDINGLY, with MODIFICATION that [the petitioner] should
suffer the penalty of three (3) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, the
Court AFFIRMS in all other respects the appealed 26 April 2006 Decision of
the [RTC] of Malaybalay City, Branch 10, in Criminal Case No. 10717-00. aDSIHc

No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. 15
In affirming with modification the decision of the RTC, the CA ratiocinated as
follows: first, the evidence presented by OSG overwhelmingly points to the petitioner
as the culprit. A scrutiny of the records further reveals that the pictures taken after the
accident and the Traffic Investigation Report all coincide with the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses, which are in whole consistent and believable thus, debunking
the claim of the petitioner that he was convicted on the mere basis of allegedly biased
and hearsay testimonies which do not establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In
addition, there was no existing evidence to show that there was an improper motive
on the part of the eyewitnesses. 16
Second, it found the arguments of the petitioner to move for a new trial as
baseless. 17
Lastly, it rendered that the proper imposable penalty is the maximum period of
arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods that is — imprisonment for three
(3) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor since the petitioner has, by reckless
imprudence, committed an act which, had it been intentional, would have constituted
a less grave felony, based on the first paragraph of Article 365 in relation to Article 48
of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). 18
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the CA,
in its Resolution 19 dated June 17, 2010.
As a final recourse, the petitioner filed the petition for review before this Court,
praying that the applicable law on the matter be reviewed, and the gross
misappreciation of facts committed by the court a quo and by the CA be given a
second look.
The Issues
I. WHETHER OR NOT THE RTC AND THE CA ERRED IN DENYING
THE MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL OR TO RE-OPEN THE SAME IN
ORDER TO ALLOW THE PETITIONER TO PRESENT EVIDENCE ON
HIS BEHALF; AND
II. WHETHER OR NOT THE RTC ERRED IN CONVICTING THE
PETITIONER DESPITE THE APPARENT FAILURE ON THE PART OF
THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE THE GUILT OF THE PETITIONER
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. 20
Ruling of the Court
The petition lacks merit.
The RTC and CA did not err in
denying the petitioner's motion for
new trial or to re-open the same.
The Court finds that no errors of law or irregularities, prejudicial to the
substantial rights of the petitioner, have been committed during trial.
The petitioner anchors his motion for new trial on Rule 121, Section 2 (a) of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, to wit:
Sec. 2. Grounds for a new trial. — The Court shall grant a new trial on
any of the following grounds:
(a) That errors of law or irregularities prejudicial to the
substantial rights of the accused have been committed
during the trial;
(b) That new and material evidence has been discovered which
the accused could not with reasonable diligence have
discovered and produced at the trial and which if introduced
and admitted would probably change the judgment. (Emphasis
ours) ETHIDa
 To sum up the claims of the petitioner, he theorizes that there was an error of
law or irregularities committed when the RTC promulgated a decision in absentia and
deemed that he had waived his right to present evidence resulting to denial of due
process, a one-sided decision by the RTC, and a strict and rigid application of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure against him.
First, it must be noted that the petitioner had already been arraigned and
therefore, the court a quo had already acquired jurisdiction over him. In fact, there
was already an initial presentation of evidence for the defense when his whereabouts
became unknown.
The petitioner's claims that he had not testified because he did not know the
schedule of the hearings, and mistakenly believed that the case had already been
terminated with the departure of Toor, Sr., do not merit our consideration. 21
The holding of trial in absentia is authorized under Section 14 (2), Article III
of the 1987 Constitution which provides that after arraignment, trial may proceed
notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified
and his failure to appear is unjustifiable. 22 It is established that notices have been
served to the counsel of the petitioner and his failure to inform his counsel of his
whereabouts is the reason for his failure to appear on the scheduled date. Thus, the
arguments of the petitioner against the validity of the proceedings and promulgation
of judgment in absentia for being in violation of the constitutional right to due process
are doomed to fail. 23
In Estrada v. People, 24 the Court ruled that:
Due process is satisfied when the parties are afforded a fair and
reasonable opportunity to explain their respective sides of the controversy.
In the present case, petitioner was afforded such opportunity. The trial
court set a hearing on May 14, 1997 for reception of defense evidence, notice
of which was duly sent to the addresses on record of petitioner and her
counsel, respectively. When they failed to appear at the May 14, 1997 hearing,
they later alleged that they were not notified of said setting. Petitioner's
counsel never notified the court of any change in her address, while petitioner
gave a wrong address from the very beginning, eventually jumped bail and
evaded court processes. Clearly, therefore, petitioner and her counsel were
given all the opportunities to be heard. They cannot now complain of alleged
violation of petitioner's right to due process when it was by their own fault
that they lost the opportunity to present evidence. 25 (Citation omitted)
Similarly in the present case, the petitioner clearly had previous notice of the
criminal case filed against him and was given the opportunity to present evidence in
his defense. The petitioner was not in any way deprived of his substantive and
constitutional right to due process as he was duly accorded all the opportunities to be
heard and to present evidence to substantiate his defense, but he forfeited this right,
through his own negligence, by not appearing in court at the scheduled hearings. 26
 The negligence of the petitioner in believing that the case was already
terminated resulting to his failure to attend the hearings, is inexcusable. The Court has
ruled in many cases that:
It is petitioner's duty, as a client, to be in touch with his counsel so as to be
constantly posted about the case. It is mandated to inquire from its counsel
about the status and progress of the case from time to time and cannot expect
that all it has to do is sit back, relax and await the outcome of the case. It is
also its responsibility, together with its counsel, to devise a system for the
receipt of mail intended for them. 27 (Citations omitted) cSEDTC

The Court finds that the negligence exhibited by the petitioner, towards the
criminal case against him in which his liberty is at risk, is not borne of ignorance of
the law as claimed by his counsel rather, lack of concern towards the incident, and the
people who suffered from it. While there was no showing in the case at bar that the
counsel of the petitioner was grossly negligent in failing to inform him of the notices
served, the Court cannot find anyone to blame but the petitioner himself in not
exercising diligence in informing his counsel of his whereabouts.
The Court also agrees with the Comment of the OSG that there is neither rule
nor law which specifically requires the trial court to ascertain whether notices
received by counsel are sufficiently communicated with his client. 28
In GCP-Manny Transport Services, Inc. v. Judge Principe, 29 the Court held
that:
[W]hen petitioner is at fault or not entirely blameless, there is no reason to
overturn well-settled jurisprudence or to interpret the rules liberally in its
favor. Where petitioner failed to act with prudence and diligence, its plea that
it was not accorded the right to due process cannot elicit this Court's approval
or even sympathy. It is petitioner's duty, as a client, to be in touch with his
counsel so as to be constantly posted about the case. . . . 30 (Citations omitted)
Even if the Court assumed that the petitioner anchors his claim on Section 2 (b)
of Rule 121 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the argument still has no
merit.
"A motion for new trial based on newly-discovered evidence may be granted
only if the following requisites are met: (a) that the evidence was discovered after
trial; (b) that said evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial
even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (c) that it is material, not merely
cumulative, corroborative or impeaching; and (d) that the evidence is of such weight
that, if admitted, it would probably change the judgment. It is essential that the
offering party exercised reasonable diligence in seeking to locate the evidence before
or during trial but nonetheless failed to secure it." 31 The Court agrees with the CA in
its decision which held that "a new trial may not be had on the basis of evidence
which was available during trial but was not presented due to its negligence.
Likewise, the purported errors and irregularities committed in the course of the trial
against [the petitioner's] substantive rights do not exist." 32
In Lustaña v. Jimena-Lazo, 33 the Court ruled that:
Rules of procedure are tools designed to promote efficiency and
orderliness as well as to facilitate attainment of justice, such that strict
adherence thereto is required. Their application may be relaxed only when
rigidity would result in a defeat of equity and substantial justice, which is not
present here. Utter disregard of the Rules cannot just be rationalized by
harking on the policy of liberal construction. 34 (Citations omitted and italics
in the original)
In the instant case, the Court finds no reason to waive the procedural rules in
order to grant the motion for new trial of the petitioner. There is just no legal basis for
the grant of the motion for new trial. The Court believes that the petitioner was given
the opportunity to be heard but he chose to put this opportunity into waste by not
being diligent enough to ask about the status of the criminal case against him and
inform his counsel of his whereabouts.
The RTC did not err in convicting
the petitioner.
The law applicable to the case at bar is Article 365 of the RPC, which provides
that:
Art. 365. Imprudence and negligence. — . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing
or failing to do an act from which material damage results by reason of
inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing
to perform such act, taking into consideration his employment or occupation,
degree of intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding
persons, time and place.
xxx xxx xxx
The elements of reckless imprudence are: (1) that the offender does or fails to
do an act; (2) that the doing or the failure to do that act is voluntary; (3) that it be
without malice; (4) that material damage results from the reckless imprudence; and
(5) that there is inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the offender, taking into
consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical
condition, and other circumstances regarding persons, time, and place. 35
All elements for the crime of reckless imprudence have been established in the
present case.
The petitioner questions the credibility of the prosecution witnesses and claims
that their testimonies are biased. He also claims that Toor, Sr. is the real culprit when
he turned left without looking for an incoming vehicle, thus violating traffic rules
resulting to the mishap.
The Court believes that the RTC and CA correctly appreciated the evidence
and testimonies presented in the instant case. AaCTcI

The Court agrees with the OSG that not only were the witnesses' narrations of
the accident credible and worthy of belief, their accounts were also consistent and
tallied on all significant and substantial points. 36 These witnesses' testimonies are as
follows:
PO3 Jesus Delfin testified that he investigated the accident at Aglayan. He
made the following findings in his accident report: the pick-up owned and driven by
Toor, Sr., together with his family and a househelper as his passengers, was turning
left along Aglayan when it was hit at a right angle position by a Super 5 bus driven by
the petitioner. He noted skid marks made by the bus and explained that the petitioner
was overtaking but was not able to do so because of the pick-up. The petitioner could
not swerve to the left to avoid the pick-up because there was a ten-wheeler truck. He
swerved to the right instead and applied breaks to avoid the accident. The investigator
clearly testified that, on the basis of data gathered, the collision was due to the error of
the bus driver who was driving too fast, as evinced by the distance from the skid
marks towards the axle. 37
Albert Alon testified that he saw Toor, Sr.'s pick-up turn left along Aglayan.
He also saw a big truck and a Super 5 bus both coming from Malaybalay. The truck
was running slowly while the Super 5 bus was running fast and overtaking the big
truck from the right side. The bus crashed into the pick-up and pushed the smaller
vehicle due to the force of the impact. He went nearer the area of collision and saw
that the four passengers of the pick-up were unconscious. 38
Mezelle Jane Silayan testified that while moving towards the center of Aglayan
on board her employer's pick-up, she saw a Super 5 bus overtaking a big truck from
the right side. Their vehicle was hit by the bus. She was thrown out of the pick-up and
hit her head on the ground. 39
Toor, Sr. testified that while he was driving his pick-up at the corner of the
center of Aglayan, a Super 5 bus, moving fast, overtook a big truck from the right
side. The bus then hit the pick up, injuring him and all his passengers. 40
Taken all together, the testimonies of the witnesses conclusively suggest that:
(1) the Super 5 bus was moving fast; (2) the bus overtook a big truck which was
moving slowly from the right side; and (3) when the petitioner saw the pick-up truck
turning left, he applied the brakes but because he was moving fast, the collision
became inevitable.
"Well-entrenched is the rule that the a trial court's assessment of the credibility
of witnesses is entitled to great weight and is even conclusive and binding, if not
tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of significance
and influence. This rule is based on the fact that the trial court had the opportunity to
observe the demeanor and the conduct of the witnesses." 41 The Court finds in the
instant case that there is no reason for this Court to deviate from the rule.
The Court finds the testimonies of the witnesses not biased. There was no
evidence of ill motive of the witnesses against the petitioner.
Lastly, the petitioner claims that Toor, Sr. committed a traffic violation and
thus, he should be the one blamed for the incident. The Court finds this without merit.
The prosecution sufficiently proved that the Super 5 bus driven by the
petitioner recklessly drove on the right shoulder of the road and overtook another
south-bound ten-wheeler truck that slowed at the intersection, obviously to give way
to another vehicle about to enter the intersection. It was impossible for him not to
notice that the ten-wheeler truck in front and traveling in the same direction had
already slowed down to allow passage of the pick-up, which was then negotiating a
left turn to Aglayan public market. Seeing the ten-wheeler truck slow down, it was
incumbent upon the petitioner to reduce his speed or apply on the brakes of the bus in
order to allow the pick-up to safely make a left turn. Instead, he drove at a speed too
fast for safety, then chose to swerve to the right shoulder of the road and overtake the
truck, entering the intersection and directly smashing into the pick-up. In flagrantly
failing to observe the necessary precautions to avoid inflicting injury or damage to
other persons and things, the petitioner was recklessly imprudent in operating the
Super 5 bus. 42EcTCAD

In Dumayag v. People, 43 the Court held:

Section 37 of R.A. No. 4136, as amended, mandates all motorists to drive and
operate vehicles on the right side of the road or highway. When overtaking
another, it should be made only if the highway is clearly visible and is free
from oncoming vehicle. Overtaking while approaching a curve in the
highway, where the driver's view is obstructed, is not allowed. Corollarily,
drivers of automobiles, when overtaking another vehicle, are charged
with a high degree of care and diligence to avoid collision. The obligation
rests upon him to see to it that vehicles coming from the opposite
direction are not taken unaware by his presence on the side of the road
upon which they have the right to pass. 44 (Citations omitted and emphasis
ours)
Thus, the petitioner cannot blame Toor, Sr. for not noticing a fast-approaching
bus, as the cited law provides that the one overtaking on the road has the obligation to
let other cars in the opposite direction know his presence and not the other way
around as the petitioner suggests.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the Decision dated
November 20, 2009 and the Resolution dated June 17, 2010 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR No. 00390-MIN are AFFIRMED.
 SO ORDERED.
||| (Senit v. People, G.R. No. 192914, [January 11, 2016], 776 PHIL 372-388)

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 170979. February 9, 2011.]

JUDITH YU, petitioner, vs. HON. ROSA SAMSON-TATAD, Presiding

Judge, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 105, and the
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

DECISION

BRION, J : p

We resolve the petition for prohibition filed by petitioner Judith Yu to enjoin

respondent Judge Rosa Samson-Tatad of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 105,
Quezon City, from taking further proceedings in Criminal Case No. Q-01-105698,
entitled "People of the Philippines v. Judith Yu, et al." 1

The Factual Antecedents

The facts of the case, gathered from the parties' pleadings, are briefly summarized
below.

Based on the complaint of Spouses Sergio and Cristina Casaclang, an

information for estafa against the petitioner was filed with the RTC.
In a May 26, 2005 decision, the RTC convicted the petitioner as charged. It
imposed on her a penalty of three (3) months of imprisonment (arresto mayor), a fine
of P3,800,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment, and the payment of an indemnity to
the Spouses Casaclang in the same amount as the fine. 2
Fourteen (14) days later, or on June 9, 2005, the petitioner filed a motion for
new trial with the RTC, alleging that she discovered new and material evidence that
would exculpate her of the crime for which she was convicted. 3
In an October 17, 2005 order, respondent Judge denied the petitioner's motion
for new trial for lack of merit. 4
On November 16, 2005, the petitioner filed a notice of appeal with the RTC,
alleging that pursuant to our ruling in Neypes v. Court of Appeals, 5 she had a "fresh
 period" of 15 days from November 3, 2005, the receipt of the denial of her motion for
new trial, or up to November 18, 2005, within which to file a notice of appeal. 6
On November 24, 2005, the respondent Judge ordered the petitioner to submit
a copy of Neypes for his guidance. 7 HEDSCc

On December 8, 2005, the prosecution filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for
being filed 10 days late, arguing that Neypes is inapplicable to appeals in criminal
cases. 8
On January 4, 2006, the prosecution filed a motion for execution of the
decision. 9
On January 20, 2006, the RTC considered the twin motions submitted for
resolution.
On January 26, 2006, the petitioner filed the present petition for prohibition
with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary
injunction to enjoin the RTC from acting on the prosecution's motions to dismiss the
appeal and for the execution of the decision. 10

The Petition

The petitioner argues that the RTC lost jurisdiction to act on the prosecution's
motions when she filed her notice of appeal within the 15-day reglementary period
provided by the Rules of Court, applying the "fresh period rule" enunciated in Neypes.

The Case for the Respondents

The respondent People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), filed a manifestation in lieu of comment, stating that Neypes applies
to criminal actions since the evident intention of the "fresh period rule" was to set a
uniform appeal period provided in the Rules. 11
In view of the OSG's manifestation, we required the Spouses Casaclang to
comment on the petition. 12
In their comment, the Spouses Casaclang aver that the petitioner cannot seek
refuge in Neypes to extend the "fresh period rule" to criminal cases because Neypes
involved a civil case, and the pronouncement of "standardization of the appeal periods
in the Rules" referred to the interpretation of the appeal periods in civil cases, i.e.,
Rules 40, 41, 42 and 45, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure among others; nowhere
in Neypes was the period to appeal in criminal cases, Section 6 of Rule 122 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, mentioned. 13

Issue
 The core issue boils down to whether the "fresh period rule" enunciated in Neypes
applies to appeals in criminal cases.

The Court's Ruling

We find merit in the petition.

The right to appeal is not a constitutional, natural or inherent right — it is a

statutory privilege and of statutory origin and, therefore, available only if granted or
as provided by statutes. It may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by the
provisions of the law. 14 The period to appeal is specifically governed by Section 39
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (BP 129), 15 as amended, Section 3 of Rule 41 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure.
Section 39 of BP 129, as amended, provides:

SEC. 39. Appeals. — The period for appeal from final orders,

resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of any court in all cases shall be
fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the final order, resolution, award,
judgment, or decision appealed from: Provided, however, That in habeas
corpus cases, the period for appeal shall be forty-eight (48) hours from the
notice of the judgment appealed from.

Section 3, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states: CAIaHS

SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. — The appeal shall be taken within

fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from.
Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal
and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or
final order.

The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for

new trial or reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a motion
for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed.

Section 6, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure reads:

SEC. 6. When appeal to be taken. — An appeal must be taken within

fifteen (15) days from promulgation of the judgment or from notice of the final
order appealed from. This period for perfecting an appeal shall be suspended
from the time a motion for new trial or reconsideration is filed until notice
of the order overruling the motion has been served upon the accused or his
counsel at which time the balance of the period begins to run.
 In Neypes, the Court modified the rule in civil cases on the counting of the 15-
day period within which to appeal. The Court categorically set a fresh period of 15
days from a denial of a motion for reconsideration within which to appeal, thus:

The Supreme Court may promulgate procedural rules in all courts. It has
the sole prerogative to amend, repeal or even establish new rules for a more
simplified and inexpensive process, and the speedy disposition of cases. In the
rules governing appeals to it and to the Court of Appeals, particularly Rules 42,
43 and 45, the Court allows extensions of time, based on justifiable and
compelling reasons, for parties to file their appeals. These extensions may
consist of 15 days or more.

To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford

litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to
allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the
Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for
a new trial or motion for reconsideration.

Henceforth, this "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 40

governing appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial
Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the Regional Trial Courts to
the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to
the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the
Supreme Court. The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period
uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new
trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or
resolution. 16

The Court also reiterated its ruling that it is the denial of the motion for
reconsideration that constituted the final order which finally disposed of the issues
involved in the case.
The raison d'être for the "fresh period rule" is to standardize the appeal period
provided in the Rules and do away with the confusion as to when the 15-day appeal
period should be counted. Thus, the 15-day period to appeal is no longer interrupted
by the filing of a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration; litigants today
need not concern themselves with counting the balance of the 15-day period to appeal
since the 15-day period is now counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion
for new trial or motion for reconsideration or any final order or resolution.
While Neypes involved the period to appeal in civil cases, the Court's
pronouncement of a "fresh period" to appeal should equally apply to the period for
appeal in criminal cases under Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, for the following reasons:
 First, BP 129, as amended, the substantive law on which the Rules of Court is
based, makes no distinction between the periods to appeal in a civil case and in a
criminal case. Section 39 of BP 129 categorically states that "[t]he period for appeal
from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of any court in all
cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the final order, resolution,
award, judgment, or decision appealed from." Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos
distinguere debemos. When the law makes no distinction, we (this Court) also ought
not to recognize any distinction. 17 DCASIT

Second, the provisions of Section 3 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil

Procedure and Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
though differently worded, mean exactly the same. There is no substantial difference
between the two provisions insofar as legal results are concerned — the appeal period
stops running upon the filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration and starts to
run again upon receipt of the order denying said motion for new trial or
reconsideration. It was this situation that Neypes addressed in civil cases. No reason
exists why this situation in criminal cases cannot be similarly addressed. 
Third, while the Court did not consider in Neypes the ordinary appeal period in
criminal cases under Section 6, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
since it involved a purely civil case, it did include Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure on petitions for review from the RTCs to the Court of Appeals (CA), and
Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure governing appeals by certiorari to this
Court, both of which also apply to appeals in criminal cases, as provided by Section 3
of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, thus:

SEC. 3. How appeal taken. — . . .

(b) The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional

Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall be by petition for
review under Rule 42.

xxx xxx xxx

Except as provided in the last paragraph of section 13, Rule 124, all
other appeals to the Supreme Court shall be by petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45.

Clearly, if the modes of appeal to the CA (in cases where the RTC exercised its
appellate jurisdiction) and to this Court in civil and criminal cases are the same, no
cogent reason exists why the periods to appeal from the RTC (in the exercise of its
original jurisdiction) to the CA in civil and criminal cases under Section 3 of Rule 41
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure should be treated differently.
 Were we to strictly interpret the "fresh period rule" in Neypes and make it
applicable only to the period to appeal in civil cases, we shall effectively foster and
encourage an absurd situation where a litigant in a civil case will have a better right to
appeal than an accused in a criminal case — a situation that gives undue favor to civil
litigants and unjustly discriminates against the accused-appellants. It suggests a
double standard of treatment when we favor a situation where property interests are at
stake, as against a situation where liberty stands to be prejudiced. We must
emphatically reject this double and unequal standard for being contrary to reason.
Over time, courts have recognized with almost pedantic adherence that what is
contrary to reason is not allowed in law — Quod est inconveniens, aut contra
rationem non permissum est in lege. 18
Thus, we agree with the OSG's view that if a delay in the filing of an appeal
may be excused on grounds of substantial justice in civil actions, with more reason
should the same treatment be accorded to the accused in seeking the review on appeal
of a criminal case where no less than the liberty of the accused is at stake. The
concern and the protection we must extend to matters of liberty cannot be overstated.
In light of these legal realities, we hold that the petitioner seasonably filed her
notice of appeal on November 16, 2005, within the fresh period of 15 days, counted
from November 3, 2005, the date of receipt of notice denying her motion for new
trial.
CDTSEI

WHEREFORE, the petition for prohibition is hereby GRANTED.

Respondent Judge Rosa Samson-Tatad is DIRECTED to CEASE and DESIST from
further exercising jurisdiction over the prosecution's motions to dismiss appeal and for
execution of the decision. The respondent Judge is also DIRECTED to give due
course to the petitioner's appeal in Criminal Case No. Q-01-105698, and to elevate the
records of the case to the Court of Appeals for review of the appealed decision on the
merits.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio Morales, Bersamin, Villarama, Jr. and Sereno, JJ., concur.

||| (Yu v. Samson-Tatad, G.R. No. 170979, [February 9, 2011], 657 PHIL 431-441)

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 184320. July 29, 2015.]

 CLARITA ESTRELLADO-MAINAR, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J : p

Before this Court is the Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 filed by petitioner
Clarita Estrellado-Mainar assailing the resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated
November 28, 2007, 2 and July 29, 2008, 3 respectively, in CA-G.R. CR No. 00429.
ANTECEDENT FACTS
Sometime in February 2005, the petitioner offered for sale to Eric Naval
(Naval) portions of land located in Matina Aplaya, Davao City. During the
negotiations for this sale, the petitioner told Naval that the title to the land she was
selling had no problems. The petitioner also informed Naval that the area subject of
the proposed sale would "still be segregated from the mother title." 4
On March 24, 2003, the parties executed an Agreement to Buy and Sell 5 where
the petitioner agreed to sell to Naval a 200-square meter portion of the land covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-19932 representing a portion of the
petitioner's share in the estate of her deceased father, Nicolas Estrellado. 6 Naval paid
a down payment totaling P100,000.00, 7 and then asked permission from the
petitioner if he could construct his house on the land he bought. After the petitioner
issued an Authorization dated March 24, 2003, Naval built his house on the subject
land.
On June 3, 2005, representatives from JS Francisco & Sons, Inc. (JS
Francisco) demolished Naval's house. It was only then that Naval discovered that the
lot sold to him had been the subject of a dispute between the petitioner's family and JS
Francisco. Naval demanded from the petitioner the return of the amount he paid for
the land, as well as to pay the value of the house demolished, but the latter refused to
heed these demands.
The prosecution charged the petitioner with the crime of other forms of
swindling under Article 316, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 2, Davao City 8 in an
Information that provides:
That sometime in February 2005, in the city of Davao, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused,
with deceit and intent to defraud, pretending to be the lawful owner of a two
hundred (200) square meters lot portion of a lot covered by TCT-19932
located at Cogon, Matina Aplaya, this City, with deceit and intent to gain,
 wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously succeeded in selling the same to one Eric
C. Naval for which the said Eric C. Naval paid to the accused the total amount
of P123,000.00, as partial payment of the said lot when in truth and in fact and
despite her knowledge that the entire property covered by TCT No. 19931
[sic] had been sold and was already owned by JS Francisco and Sons, Inc.,
thereby defrauding the said Eric C. Naval in the aforesaid amount of
P123,000.00. AaCTcI

CONTRARY TO LAW. 9
In its decision 10 dated December 27, 2006, the MTCC found the petitioner
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of other forms of swindling under Article 316,
paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and sentenced her to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment of two (2) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor.
The MTCC essentially ruled that the petitioner "represented to the complainant
that the property is free from lien and encumbrance." 11 It added that Naval relied on
the first page of the title that had been shown to him, and that the petitioner
deliberately did not inform him of the fact that she (petitioner) no longer owned the
area sold.
Accordingly, the MTCC directed the petitioner to pay the following amounts to
the offended party: (a) P123,000.00 fine with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency; (b) P123,000.00 civil indemnity; (c) P65,755.45 as actual expenses
incurred and proven; (d) P10,000.00 attorney's fees; and (e) P10,000.00 moral
damages.
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 16, Davao City, affirmed
the MTCC decision in toto. 12 The RTC essentially adopted the factual findings and
the conclusions of the MTCC.
The petitioner moved to reconsider this decision, but the RTC denied her
motion in its Order of May 29, 2007.
The petitioner challenged the RTC rulings before the CA via a petition for
review, docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 00429. In its resolution 13 dated August 16,
2007, the CA directed the petitioner to "show cause why the petition should not be
dismissed for its failure to: (1) allege the date of receipt of the assailed decision in the
petition; (2) allege the date of receipt of the denial of the petitioner's motion for
reconsideration with the court a quo; and (3) attach Exhibits "03" to "05" referred to
on pages 8 and 9 of the petition."
In her Compliance and Manifestation, 14 the petitioner specified the date when
her counsel's messenger received the assailed RTC decision and order. She, however,
manifested that her petition for review bore no Exhibits "03" to "05" on pages 8-9.
In its resolution of November 28, 2007, 15 the CA dismissed the petition for the
petitioner's failure to attach the exhibits that would support the allegations of her
petition in violation of Section 2, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court.
 The petitioner moved to reconsider this decision, but the CA denied her motion
in its resolution dated July 29, 2008.
THE PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI
In the present petition, 16 the petitioner claimed that the CA erred in dismissing
her petition for review on mere technicalities. She further argued that the courts a quo
erred in convicting her of violation of Article 316, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal
Code because the Information charged her with violation of paragraph 1 of the same
article. The petitioner also maintained that she did not misrepresent the subject land to
be free from any lien or encumbrance. acEHCD

OUR RULING
After due consideration, we resolve to grant the petition.
Noncompliance with Section 2, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court
The right to appeal is not a natural right and is not part of due process, but
merely a statutory privilege to be exercised only in accordance with the law. As the
appealing party, the petitioner must comply with the requirements of the relevant
rules; otherwise, she loses the statutory right to appeal. We emphasize that the
procedures regulating appeals as laid down in the Rules of Court must be followed
because strict compliance with them is indispensable for the orderly and speedy
disposition of justice. 17
Section 2, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 2. Form and contents. — The petition shall be filed in seven
(7) legible copies, with the original copy intended for the court being
indicated as such by the petitioner, and shall (a) state the full names of the
parties to the case, without impleading the lower courts or judges thereof
either as petitioners or respondents; (b) indicate the specific material dates
showing that it was filed on time; (c) set forth concisely a statement of the
matters involved, the issues raised, the specification of errors of fact or law, or
both, allegedly committed by the Regional Trial Court, and the reasons or
arguments relied upon for the allowance of the appeal; (d) be accompanied
by clearly legible duplicate originals or true copies of the judgments or
final orders of both lower courts, certified correct by the clerk of court of
the Regional Trial Court, the requisite number of plain copies thereof
and of the pleadings and other material portions of the record as would
support the allegations of the petition. (emphasis ours)
Corollarily, Section 3 of this Rule states that "[t]he failure of the petitioner to
comply with any of the foregoing requirements regarding, among others, the contents
of and the documents which should accompany the petition shall be sufficient
ground for the dismissal thereof."
We note that the CA exercised liberality in its treatment of the petitioner's
petition for review when — instead of dismissing it outright — it still directed her to
show cause why hear petition should not be dismissed for failing to strictly comply
with Section 2 of Rule 42, particularly for failure to: (1) allege the date of receipt of
the assailed decision in the petition; (2) allege the date of receipt of the denial of
petitioner's motion for reconsideration; and (3) attach exhibits "03" to "05" referred to
on pages 8 and 9 of the petition. 18
Instead of complying with the third directive, however, the petitioner stated
that the petition had no exhibits "03" and "05" on pages 8-9. An examination of the
records revealed that, indeed, exhibits "03" to "05" were stated on pages 4 to 5. The
CA itself admitted that it inadvertently stated in its directive that exhibits "03" to "05"
were on pages 8 and 9, instead of on pages 4 to 5.
Notwithstanding the CA's inadvertence, the petitioner ought to have complied
with the latter's third directive, considering that there could have been no other
exhibits "03" to "05" referred to other than those mentioned on pages 4 and 5 of the
petition, namely TCT No. T-364319 (Exh. "03"); Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate
with Renunciation of Shares, Donation and Deed of Absolute Sale (Exh. "04"); and
Agreement to Buy and Sell (Exh. "05").
Without doubt, these documents would have supported the material allegations
in the petitioner's petition for review. The petitioner should have been more prudent
and vigilant in pursuing her petition, instead of capitalizing on the CA's misquotation
of the pages. The CA already gave the petitioner the opportunity to rectify the
procedural infirmities in her petition, but the latter did not take advantage of this
liberality by exerting utmost diligence to comply with the CA's directives.
The records likewise showed that the petitioner did attach Exhibits "03" to "05"
in her motion for reconsideration before the CA. The CA, nonetheless, disregarded
these annexes due to the petitioner's failure to offer any explanation why she did not
attach these documents to her petition. While the CA could have stretched the limits
of its liberality a bit more, we could not fault it for ruling the way it did at that point
since the petitioner did not even bother to offer any explanation why she did not
attach these relevant documents to her petition. As the CA held:
Despite petitioner's second attempt to rectify the procedural infirmities
in the motion for reconsideration by attaching therein the exhibits, yet,
petitioner did not even proffer any explanation why she failed in the first
instance to attach the same in the petition.
xxx xxx xxx
Finally, concomitant to petitioner's plea for liberal application of the
rules of procedure is her obligation to exert her utmost to comply therewith.
Sadly, petitioner is wanting of the traits that could qualify her to invoke
liberality in the application of the Rules. 19
What constitutes a good and sufficient cause that will merit a reconsideration
of the dismissal of the petition is a discretionary call by the CA, and the Court will not
interfere with the exercise of this prerogative unless there has been a grave abuse of
discretion. Following the clear provisions of Section 2, in relation with Section 3, of
Rule 42, we hold that the CA did not act in a whimsical, arbitrary, or capricious
manner that amounted to an evasion or refusal to perform a positive duty enjoined by
law or to act at all in contemplation of law.
The petitioner's improper conviction
under Article 316, paragraph 2 of the RPC
Notwithstanding the petitioner's noncompliance with Section 2, Rule 42, we
resolve the substantive issue raised by the petitioner in the interest of justice. This
Court has, on occasion, suspended the application of technical rules of procedure
where matters of life, liberty, honor or property, among other instances, are at stake. It
has allowed some meritorious cases to proceed despite inherent procedural defects
and lapses on the principle that rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate
the attainment of justice. The strict and rigid application of rules that tends to frustrate
rather than promote substantial justice must always be avoided. 20
Section 14 (2) of Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that an accused
has the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
Indeed, Section 6, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that
the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense must be alleged in the
Information. Section 8 of said rule provides that the Information shall state the
designation of the offense given by the statute and aver the acts or omissions
constituting the offense. The real nature of the crime charged is determined by the
facts alleged in the Information and not by the title or designation of the offense
contained in the caption of the Information. It is fundamental that every element of
which the offense is comprised must be alleged in the Information. 21
To recall, the prosecution charged the petitioner with the crime of other forms
of swindling under Article 316, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
which punishes "[a]ny person who, pretending to be the owner of any real property,
shall convey, sell, encumber, or mortgage the same."
The trial courts, however, convicted the petitioner under Article 316, paragraph
2 which punishes the act of any person who, knowing that real property is
encumbered, shall dispose of the same, although such encumbrance is not recorded.
The elements of other forms of swindling under Article 316, paragraph 2 of the
Revised Penal Code are as follows: (1) that the thing disposed of be real property; (2)
that the offender knew that the real property was encumbered, whether the
encumbrance is recorded or not; (3) that there must be express representation by the
offender that the real property is free from encumbrance; and (4) that the act of
disposing of the real property be made to the damage of another. 22
The Information in the present case, aside from expressly indicating in its
caption that it is charging the petitioner under Article 316, paragraph 1 of the Revised
Penal Code, alleged that the petitioner "with deceit and intent to defraud," pretended
to be the lawful owner of a 200-square meter portion of a lot covered by TCT No. T-
19932 despite her knowledge that the entire property had already been sold and was
owned by JS Francisco. Notably, it had not been alleged that the petitioner expressly
represented to Naval that the subject property was free from any encumbrance.
In Naya v. Abing, 23 the Court set aside the petitioner's conviction for estafa
under Article 316 (2) of the Revised Penal Code since there had been no allegation in
the Information that he (petitioner) expressly represented in the sale of the subject
property to William Po that the said property was free from any encumbrance. We
explained that the gravamen of the crime is the disposition of legally encumbered real
property by the offender under the express representation that there is no
encumbrance thereon; and that the accused must make an express representation in
the deed of conveyance that the property sold or disposed of is free from any
encumbrance for one to be criminally liable. The Court explained that:
. . . there is no allegation in the Information that petitioner expressly
represented in the sale of the subject property to William Po that the said
property was free from any encumbrance. Irrefragably, then, petitioner was
not charged with estafa under Article 316, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal
Code. Hence, the trial court committed a reversible error in finding petitioner
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of estafa under said provision and that the
Court of Appeals likewise erred in affirming the decision of the trial court on
appeal. 24
We reiterate that the Information in the present case did not allege that the
petitioner made an express representation that the property sold is free from any
encumbrance. This Information was crafted in such a way that only one particular
crime was charged (i.e., Article 316, paragraph 1), and the alleged manner through
which such offense was committed (that is, by pretending to be the lawful owner . . .)
did not constitute ground for conviction under paragraph 2, which may be committed
even by the owner of the property.
Significantly, the Agreement to Buy and Sell between the petitioner and Naval
also did not contain any representation by the petitioner that the property being sold
was free from any encumbrance.
It is not disputed that TCT No. T-19932 bore the following annotations:
xxx xxx xxx
Entry No. 1131326 — AFFIDAVIT OF ADVERSE CLAIM — filed
by J.S. Francisco and Sons, Inc. represented by Joselito Franscisco affecting
the property covered by this Certificate of Title which is the subject of Deed
of Sale executed between the said corporation and the registered owner. This
instrument was executed before Notary Public of Davao City Francis Arnold
de Vera, as Doc. No. . . .
Date of instrument : Oct. 28, 1998;
 Date of inscription : Oct. 29, 1998 at 8:10 a.m.
At any rate, paragraph 2 of Article 316 does not prohibit the sale of an
encumbered property; the vendor must have represented to the buyer that the property
was free from encumbrance. 25 What brings about criminal liability is the deceit in
selling the property. Corollarily, the deed must have a statement of warranty that is
false in order to commit the offense. 26 The petitioner's passive attitude regarding the
presence of an adverse claim (she assumed that Naval became aware of this
inscription after showing to him a copy of TCT No. T-19932 and "never complained")
is not sufficient to constitute fraud within the meaning of the law. The fraud and/or
deceit by misrepresentation contemplated by law must be the result of overt acts; they
cannot be implied or presumed.
In the light of these considerations, we hold that the trial courts erroneously
convicted the petitioner of other forms of swindling under Article 316, paragraph 2 of
the Revised Penal Code. To uphold the petitioner's conviction for an offense other
than that charged in the Information would be a violation of her right to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation against her. HSAcaE

Violation of Article 316, paragraph 1

of the Revised Penal Code not proven
The presented pieces of evidence do not also warrant a conviction for the crime
for which the petitioner had been charged, that is, Article 316, paragraph 1 of the
Revised Penal Code.
For a successful prosecution of the crime of swindling under Article 316,
paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, the following essential elements of this crime
must be established: (1) that the thing be immovable, such as a parcel of land or a
building; (2) that the offender who is not the owner of said property should represent
that he is the owner thereof; (3) that the offender should have executed an act of
ownership, e.g., selling, leasing, encumbering, or mortgaging the property; and (4)
that the act be made to the prejudice of the owner or a third person. 27
The presence of the first and third elements are beyond question, as the parties
admitted that the petitioner sold to Naval a 200-square meter parcel of land located in
Matina Aplaya, Davao City. The fourth element is likewise settled, as the petitioner
did not deny that Naval paid her a total of P123,000.00. The fact of destruction of
Naval's house by the representatives of JS Francisco is also not disputed.
With regard to the second element, we hold that the prosecution failed to prove
the allegation in the Information that the petitioner pretended to be the lawful owner
of a 200-square meter portion of a lot covered by TCT No. 19932.
It is not disputed that the petitioner was one of the nine (9) children of Nicolas
and Narcisa, who was the registered owner of TCT No. T-19932 entered at the
Registry of Deeds of Davao City on October 31, 1967. The Register of Deeds of
Davao City eventually cancelled TCT No. T-19932 and issued a new title (TCT No.
T-364319) in the name of "Nicolas Estrellado, married to Narcisa Trono, both of legal
age, Filipinos and residents of Davao City, Philippines." 28
Naval's court testimony showed that he was aware that the title to the land
being sold to him was still under the name of Nicolas, thus:
ATTY. PERCY JANE ABIAN-FUÑE:
Q: Mr. Naraval (sic), how long have you known the accused Clarita Mainar?
ERIC NAVAL:
A: We knew each other in 1999 for three years.
Q: And you personally know that she is the daughter of the late Mr. Nicolas
Estrellado?
A: Yes, ma'am.
Q: And that you approached sometime in February, you said you approached
her and made known your intent to buy the property?
A: Yes, ma'am.
Q: And that you knew that the property that you are buying will still be
segregated from the mother title?
A: Yes, ma'am.
Q: And at that time the accused had shown you copy of the owner's
duplicate of title?
A: Correct.
Q: Under the name of the late Nicolas Estrellado?
A: Yes, ma'am.
Q: And at that time you knew you were buying a titled property, right?
A: Correct.
Q: And at that time you did not verify with the Register of Deeds?
A: Yes, I did not.
Q: Because you have already seen the duplicate copy of the title, right?
A: I just seen [sic] the front page of the title.
Q: And knowing that you have only seen the front title, you did not check with
the Register of Deeds?
A: I did not.
Q: And did you find any other burden on the property other than what is stated
in the title?
A: None. 29
xxx xxx xxx
 In Naval's own complaint-affidavit, he stated that the petitioner informed him
during the negotiations for the sale "that the area that I will buy would still be
segregated from the mother title." 30 In this same complaint-affidavit, Naval also
stated that he caused the property to be surveyed in order to determine the boundaries
of the area he bought, and to separate it from the mother title. These statements were
corroborated by Naval's wife, Josephine, who stated in her own affidavit that the
petitioner told her and Naval that the subject property was still part of the mother title.
In addition, stipulation no. 3 of the Agreement to Buy and Sell provides that ". . . the
SELLER shall cause the subdivision of the title and take out two hundred (200)
square meters portion of the BUYER from the SELLER's nine hundred thirty six (936)
square meters share."
Under these circumstances, it is clear that the petitioner did not pretend to be
the owner of the property sold. From the very start, the petitioner made it clear to
Naval that the subject property was still under the name of her (petitioner's) father;
and that the area subject of the sale would still be segregated from the mother title.
Naval also admitted that he saw the front page of the land's title showing Nicolas to be
its registered owner. The element of deceit — central to prosecutions for swindling —
is therefore wanting. We additionally point out that Nicolas' heirs (Narcisa and his
nine legitimate children) eventually executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate
with Renunciation of Shares, Donation and Deed of Absolute Sale 31 where they
agreed, among others, to give a portion (totalling 1,236-square meters) of the land
covered by TCT No. T-364319 to the petitioner.
In the light of these considerations, we cannot hold the petitioner liable for
other forms of swindling under Article 316, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code
absent a finding that she employed fraud or deceit in the form of false pretenses with
regard to her ownership of the real property sold.
We are aware that a decision 32 (attached to the records) had been issued by the
MTCC, Branch 3, Davao City, on April 26, 1999, in Civil Case No. 6, 297-C-98,
where the trial court ruled in favor of JS Francisco (plaintiff) against Nicolas
Estrellado and Narcisa Trono-Estrellado (Estrellado spouses). In this case, the MTCC
ordered the Estrellado spouses, their successors-in-interest, and other persons acting
on their behalf, to immediately vacate Lot 377-A-1-B-4-B (LRC) Psd-78004 (covered
by TCT No. T-19932) and to restore its peaceful possession to the plaintiff.
This MTCC decision, however, bears no relevance on the issue whether the
petitioner misrepresented to be the owner of the property covered by TCT No. T-
19932. We point out that this case arose from an action for forcible entry filed by J.S.
Francisco against the petitioner's parents, the Estrellado spouses. The issue in an
ejectment case is the right to physical possession of the premises or possession de
facto, and the court may pass upon such issue but only to determine the question of
possession especially if the former is inseparably linked with the latter. Corollarily, a
party who can prove prior possession de facto may recover the possession even from
 the owner himself, since such cases proceed independently of any claim of ownership.
HESIcT

In its April 26, 1999 decision in Civil Case No. 6, 297-C-98, the MTCC merely
resolved the issue of prior physical possession or possession de facto, and did not
resolve the issue of ownership of the disputed property. The MTCC, in fact,
recognized that the title (TCT No. T-19932) to the disputed property was registered
under the name of Nicolas.
We also point out that the petitioner sought the assistance of the Office of the
Ombudsman-Mindanao to require the Register of Deeds of Davao City to produce the
deed of absolute sale between Nicolas and JS Francisco referred to in the affidavit of
adverse claim. While the Register of Deeds could not yet certify with finality as to the
nonexistence of this deed, 33 the petitioner's act of seeking the aid of the Ombudsman
shows her honest and earnest desire to protect her family's interest over the subject
property (she claims that the deed of sale between her father and JS Francisco was
spurious), and that she had no intention to deceive Naval. Naval and Josephine, in
fact, lived on the subject property for two years, more or less, before their house was
destroyed by the representatives of JS Francisco. Josephine even intimated that she
had been hoping that the petitioner's family would be able to settle the dispute with JS
Francisco over the subject property while she (Josephine) and Naval were living
there.
On a final note, we stress that it is the prosecution who determines the charges
to be filed and how the legal and factual elements in the case shall be utilized as
components of the information. Fairness demands that the petitioner should not be
convicted of a crime which she has not been charged with or which is not necessarily
included therein.
WHEREFORE, in the light of these considerations, we GRANT the petition,
and SET ASIDE the resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated November 28, 2007,
and July 29, 2008, respectively, in CA-G.R. CR No. 00429. Accordingly, we
ACQUIT petitioner Clarita Estrellado-Mainar of the crime of other forms of
swindling under Article 316 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. AcICHD

SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Mendoza, Perlas-Bernabe * and Leonen, JJ., concur.
||| (Estrellado-Mainar v. People, G.R. No. 184320, [July 29, 2015])

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 183652. February 25, 2015.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and AAA, petitioners, vs. COURT

OF APPEALS, 21st DIVISION, MINDANAO STATION, RAYMUND
 CARAMPATANA, JOEFHEL OPORTO, and MOISES ALQUIZOLA,
respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J : p

Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari questioning the Decision 1 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) dated June 6, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00422-MIN. The CA
reversed and set aside the Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kapatagan,
Lanao del Norte, Branch 21, dated February 28, 2006 in Criminal Case No. 21-1211, and
acquitted private respondents Raymund Carampatana, Joefhel Oporto, and Moises
Alquizola of the crime of rape for the prosecution's failure to prove their guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.

In a Second Amended Information dated June 23, 2004, private respondents

Carampatana, Oporto and Alquizola were charged, together with Christian John Lim,
Emmanuel dela Cruz, Samuel Rudinas, Jansen Roda, Harold Batoctoy, and Joseph
Villame, for allegedly raping AAA, 3 to wit:

That on or about 10:30 o'clock in the evening of March 25, 2004 at

Alson's Palace, Maranding, Lala, Lanao del Norte, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with lewd designs forcefully drunk AAA, a 16-
year-old minor, with an intoxicating liquor and once intoxicated, brought said
AAA at about dawn of March 26, 2004 at Alquizola Lodging house, Maranding,
Lala, Lanao del Norte and also within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
and once inside said lodging house, accused RAYMUND CARAMPATANA
and JOEPHEL OPORTO took turns in having carnal knowledge against the will
of AAA while accused MOISES ALQUIZOLA, with lewd designs, kissed her
against her will and consent.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 4

Upon arraignment, accused, assisted by their respective counsels, entered a plea of

not guilty to the offense charged. 5

Following pre-trial, 6 trial on the merits ensued. Accused Christian John Lim,
however, remains at-large.

The factual antecedents follow:

 On March 25, 2004, around 8:00 a.m., AAA attended her high school graduation
ceremony. Afterwards, they had a luncheon party at their house in Maranding, Lala,
Lanao del Norte. AAA then asked permission from her mother to go to the Maranding
Stage Plaza because she and her bandmates had to perform for an election campaign. She
went home at around 4:00 p.m. from the plaza. At about 7:00 p.m., AAA told her father
that she would be attending a graduation dinner party with her friends. AAA, together
with Lim, Oporto, and Carampatana, ate dinner at the house of one Mark Gemeno at
Purok, Bulahan, Maranding. After eating, Lim invited them to go to Alson's Palace,
which was merely a walking distance away from Gemeno's house. Outside the Alson's
Palace, they were greeted by Aldrin Montesco, Junver Alquizola, and Cherry Mae Fiel.
After a while, they went inside and proceeded to a bedroom on the second floor where
they again saw Montesco with Harold Batoctoy, Jansen Roda, Emmanuel dela Cruz,
Samuel Rudinas, a certain Diego, and one Angelo. Rudinas suggested that they have a
drinking session to celebrate their graduation, to which the rest agreed.
HaECDI

They all contributed and it was Joseph Villame who bought the drinks — two (2)
bottles of Emperador Brandy. Then they arranged themselves in a circle for the drinking
spree. Two (2) glasses were being passed around: one glass containing the sweetener
(Pepsi) and the other glass containing the liquor. At first, AAA refused to drink because
she had never tried hard liquor before. During the session, they shared their problems
with each other. When it was AAA's turn, she became emotional and started crying. It
was then that she took her first shot. The glasses were passed around and she consumed
more or less five (5) glasses of Emperador Brandy.

Thereafter, she felt dizzy so she laid her head down on Oporto's lap. Oporto then
started kissing her head and they would remove her baseball cap. This angered her so she
told them to stop, and simply tried to hide her face with the cap. But they just laughed at
her. Then, Roda also kissed her. At that time, AAA was already sleepy, but they still
forced her to take another shot. They helped her stand up and make her drink. She even
heard Lim say, "Hubuga na, hubuga na," (You make her drunk, you make her drunk). She
likewise heard someone say, "You drink it, you drink it." She leaned on Oporto's lap
again, then she fell asleep. They woke her up and Lim gave her the Emperador Brandy
bottle to drink the remaining liquor inside. She tried to refuse but they insisted, so she
drank directly from the bottle. Again, she fell asleep.

The next thing she knew, Roda and Batoctoy were carrying her down the stairs,
and then she was asleep again. When she regained consciousness, she saw that she was
already at the Alquizola Lodging House. She recognized that place because she had been
there before. She would thereafter fall back asleep and wake up again. And during one of
the times that she was conscious, she saw Oporto on top of her, kissing her on different
parts of her body, and having intercourse with her. She started crying. She tried to resist
when she felt pain in her genitals. She also saw Carampatana and Moises Alquizola
inside the room, watching as Oporto abused her. At one point, AAA woke up while
Carampatana was inserting his penis into her private organ. She cried and told him to
stop. Alquizola then joined and started to kiss her. For the last time, she fell unconscious.

When she woke up, it was already 7:00 a.m. of the next day. She was all alone.
Her body felt heavy and exhausted. She found herself with her shirt on but without her
lower garments. The upper half of her body was on top of the bed but her feet were on the
floor. There were also red stains on her shirt. After dressing up, she hailed a trisikad and
went home. When AAA reached their house, her father was waiting for her and was
already furious. When she told them that she was raped, her mother started hitting her.
They brought her to the Lala Police Station to make a report. Thereafter, they proceeded
to the district hospital for her medical examination.

Dr. Cyrus Acusta of the Kapatagan District Hospital examined AAA in the
morning of March 26, 2004, and found an old hymenal laceration at 5 o'clock position
and hyperemia or redness at the posterior fornices. The vaginal smear likewise revealed
the presence of sperm.

On the other hand, accused denied that they raped AAA. According to the defense
witnesses, in the evening of March 25, 2004, Oporto, Carampatana, Lim, and AAA had
dinner at Gemeno's house. Gemeno then invited Oporto to attend the graduation party
hosted by Montesco at Alson's Palace, owned by the latter's family. When they reached
the place, Oporto told Montesco that they had to leave for Barangay Tenazas to fetch one
Arcie Ariola. At about 11:30 p.m., Oporto and Carampatana returned to Alson's Palace
but could not find AAA and Lim. The party subsequently ended, but the group agreed to
celebrate further. AAA, Rudinas, Dela Cruz, Lim, and Oporto contributed for two (2)
bottles of Emperador Brandy and one (1) liter of Pepsi.

Several persons were in the room at that time: AAA, Carampatana, Oporto, Dela
Cruz, Rudinas, Roda, Batoctoy, Villame, and Lim. Also present but did not join the
drinking were Gemeno, Montesco, Angelo Ugnabia, Al Jalil Diego, Mohamad Janisah
Manalao, one Caga, and a certain Bantulan. Gemeno told AAA not to drink but the latter
did not listen and instead told him not to tell her aunt. During the drinking session, AAA
rested on Oporto's lap. She even showed her scorpion tattoo on her buttocks. And when
her legs grazed Batoctoy's crotch, she remarked, "What was that, penis?" Roda then
approached AAA to kiss her, and the latter kissed him back. Oporto did the same and
AAA also kissed him. After Oporto, Roda and AAA kissed each other again.

Meanwhile, earlier that evening, at around 9:00 p.m., Moises Alquizola was at the
Alquizola Lodging House drinking beer with his cousin, Junver, and Fiel. They stopped
drinking at around midnight. Fiel then requested Alquizola to accompany her to Alson's
Palace to see her friends there. They proceeded to the second floor and there they saw
AAA lying on Oporto's lap. Fiel told AAA to go home because her mother might get
angry. AAA could not look her in the eye, just shook her head, and said, "I just stay
here." Alquizola and Fiel then went back to the lodging house.

After thirty minutes, they went to Alson's Palace again, and saw AAA and Oporto
kissing each other. AAA was lying on his lap while holding his neck. Subsequently, they
went back to the lodging house to resume drinking.

After drinking, Batoctoy offered to bring AAA home. But she refused and instead
instructed them to take her to the Alquizola Lodging House because she has a big
problem. AAA, Lim, and Carampatana rode a motorcycle to the lodging house. When
they arrived, AAA approached Alquizola and told him, "Kuya, I want to sleep here for
the meantime." Alquizola then opened Room No. 4 where AAA, Oporto, and
Carampatana stayed. There were two beds inside, a single bed and a double-sized bed.
AAA lay down on the single bed and looked at Carampatana. The latter approached her
and they kissed. He then removed her shirt and AAA voluntarily raised her hands to give
way. Carampatana likewise removed her brassiere. All the while, Oporto was at the foot
of the bed. Thereafter, Oporto also removed her pants. AAA even lifted her buttocks to
make it easier for him to pull her underwear down. Oporto then went to AAA and kissed
her on the lips. Carampatana, on the other hand, placed himself in between AAA's legs
and had intercourse with her. When he finished, he put on his shorts and went back to
Alson's Palace to get some sleep. When he left, Oporto and AAA were still kissing.
Alquizola then entered the room. When AAA saw him, she said, "Come Kuya, embrace
me because I have a problem." Alquizola thus started kissing AAA's breasts. Oporto
stood up and opened his pants. AAA held his penis and performed fellatio on him. Then
Oporto and Alquizola changed positions. Oporto proceeded to have sexual intercourse
with AAA. During that time, AAA was moaning and calling his name. Afterwards,
Oporto went outside and slept with Alquizola on the carpet. Oporto then had intercourse
with AAA two more times. At 3:00 a.m., he went back to Alson's Palace to sleep. At
around 6:00 a.m., Oporto and Carampatana went back to the lodging house. They tried to
wake AAA up, but she did not move so they just left and went home. Alquizola had gone
outside but he came back before 7:00 a.m. However, AAA was no longer there when he
arrived.

On February 28, 2006, the RTC found private respondents Carampatana, Oporto
and Alquizola guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape. It, however, acquitted
Dela Cruz, Rudinas, Roda, Batoctoy, and Villame for failure of the prosecution to prove
their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads: CAaSHI

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is

hereby rendered:

a) Finding accused Raymund Carampatana GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt

of the crime charged, and the Court hereby sentences him to suffer the
 indivisible prison term of reclusion perpetua; to pay AAA the amount of
P50,000.00 for and by way of civil indemnity;

b) Finding accused Joefhel Oporto GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the

crime charged, and the court hereby sentences him to suffer a prison
term of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to
twelve (12) years also of prision mayor as maximum; to pay AAA the
sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages and another amount of P50,000.00
as civil indemnity;

c) Finding accused Moises Alquizola GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as

ACCOMPLICE in the commission of the crime charged, and the court
hereby sentences him to suffer an indeterminate prison term of six (6)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years
and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum; to pay AAA the
amount of P30,000.00 as moral damages and another sum of P30,000.00
for and by way of civil indemnity;

d) Finding accused Emmanuel dela Cruz, Samuel Rudinas, Jansen Roda, Harold
Batoctoy and Joseph Villame NOT GUILTY of the crime charged for
failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt therefor beyond reasonable
doubt. Accordingly, the Court acquits them of said charge; and

e) Ordering accused Carampatana, Oporto and Alquizola to pay, jointly and

severally, the amount of P50,000.00 as attorney's fees and expenses of
litigations; and the costs of suit.

The full period of the preventive imprisonment of accused Carampatana,

Oporto and Alquizola shall be credited to them and deducted from their prison
terms provided they comply with the requirements of Article 29 of the Revised
Penal Code.

Accused Raymund Carampatana surrendered voluntarily on 26 March

2004 and detained since then up to the present. Accused Alquizola also
surrendered voluntarily on 26 March 2004 and detained since then up to this
time, while accused Joefhel Oporto who likewise surrendered voluntarily on 26
March 2004 was ordered released to the custody of the DSWD, Lala, Lanao del
Norte on 31 March 2004, and subsequently posted cash bond for his provisional
liberty on 17 September 2004 duly approved by this court, thus resulted to an
order of even date for his release from the custody of the DSWD.

Let the records of this case be sent to the archive files without prejudice
on the prosecution to prosecute the case against accused Christian John Lim as
soon as he is apprehended.

SO ORDERED. 7
 Aggrieved by the RTC Decision, private respondents brought the case to the CA.
On June 6, 2008, the appellate court rendered the assailed Decision reversing the trial
court's ruling and, consequently, acquitted private respondents. The decretal portion of
said decision reads:

WHEREFORE, finding reversible errors therefrom, the Decision on

appeal is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. For lack of proof beyond
reasonable doubt, accused-appellants RAYMUND CARAMPATANA,
JOEFHEL OPORTO and MOISES ALQUIZOLA are instead ACQUITTED of
the crime charged.

SO ORDERED. 8

In sum, the CA found that the prosecution failed to prove private respondents' guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. It gave more credence to the version of the defense and ruled
that AAA consented to the sexual congress. She was wide awake and aware of what
private respondents were doing before the intercourse. She never showed any physical
resistance, never shouted for help, and never fought against her alleged ravishers. The
appellate court further relied on the medical report which showed the presence of an old
hymenal laceration on AAA's genitalia, giving the impression that she has had some
carnal knowledge with a man before. The CA also stressed that AAA's mother's unusual
reaction of hitting her when she discovered what happened to her daughter was more
consistent with that of a parent who found out that her child just had premarital sex rather
than one who was sexually assaulted.

On July 29, 2008, AAA, through her private counsel, filed a Petition for
Certiorari 9 under Rule 65, questioning the CA Decision which reversed private
respondents' conviction and ardently contending that the same was made with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Thus, AAA raises this lone issue in her petition:

THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ACTED WITH GRAVE

ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ACQUITTING THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS. 10

The private respondents present the following arguments in their Comment dated
November 7, 2008 to assail the petition: cEHITA

I.

A JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL IS IMMEDIATELY FINAL AND

EXECUTORY AND THE PROSECUTION CANNOT APPEAL THE
 ACQUITTAL BECAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITION
AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY.

II.

THE PETITIONER FAILED TO PROVE THAT THERE IS GRAVE ABUSE

OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION ON THE PART OF PUBLIC RESPONDENT.

III.

CERTIORARI WILL NOT LIE UNLESS A MOTION FOR

RECONSIDERATION IS FIRST FILED.

IV.

THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL IS THE APPELLATE

COUNSEL OF THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES IN ALL CRIMINAL
CASES. 11

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed its own Comment on April 1,
2009. It assigns the following errors:

I.

THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT MAY VALIDLY APPEAL AN ORDER OF

ACQUITTAL AS TO THE CIVIL ASPECT OF THE CRIME.

II.

THE APPELLATE DECISION OF ACQUITTAL IS NULL AND VOID FOR

HAVING BEEN RENDERED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, AN
EXCEPTION TO THE PRINCIPLE OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY. 12

The Court will first resolve the procedural issues.

At the onset, the Court stresses that rules of procedure are meant to be tools to
facilitate a fair and orderly conduct of proceedings. Strict adherence thereto must not get
in the way of achieving substantial justice. As long as their purpose is sufficiently met
and no violation of due process and fair play takes place, the rules should be liberally
construed. 13 Liberal construction of the rules is the controlling principle to effect
substantial justice. The relaxation or suspension of procedural rules, or the exemption of
a case from their operation, is warranted when compelling reasons exist or when the
purpose of justice requires it. Thus, litigations should, as much as possible, be decided on
their merits and not on sheer technicalities. 14

As a general rule, the prosecution cannot appeal or bring error proceedings from a
judgment rendered in favor of the defendant in a criminal case. The reason is that a
judgment of acquittal is immediately final and executory, and the prosecution is barred
from appealing lest the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy be violated. 15
Section 21, Article III of the Constitution provides:

Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for

the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or
acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same
act.

Despite acquittal, however, either the offended party or the accused may appeal,
but only with respect to the civil aspect of the decision. Or, said judgment of acquittal
may be assailed through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
showing that the lower court, in acquitting the accused, committed not merely reversible
errors of judgment, but also exercised grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, or a denial of due process, thereby rendering the assailed judgment
null and void. 16 If there is grave abuse of discretion, granting petitioner's prayer is not
tantamount to putting private respondents in double jeopardy. 17

As to the party with the proper legal standing to bring the action, the Court said in
People v. Santiago: 18

It is well-settled that in criminal cases where the offended party is the

State, the interest of the private complainant or the private offended party is
limited to the civil liability. Thus, in the prosecution of the offense, the
complainant's role is limited to that of a witness for the prosecution. If a
criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, an appeal
therefrom on the criminal aspect may be undertaken only by the State through
the Solicitor General. Only the Solicitor General may represent the People of
the Philippines on appeal. The private offended party or complainant may not
take such appeal. However, the said offended party or complainant may appeal
the civil aspect despite the acquittal of the accused.

In a special civil action for certiorari filed under Section 1, Rule 65 of

the Rules of Court wherein it is alleged that the trial court committed a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction or on other jurisdictional
grounds, the rules state that the petition may be filed by the person aggrieved.
In such case, the aggrieved parties are the State and the private offended
party or complainant. The complainant has an interest in the civil aspect of the
case so he may file such special civil action questioning the decision or
action of the respondent court on jurisdictional grounds. In so doing,
 complainant should not bring the action in the name of the People of the
Philippines. The action may be prosecuted in [the] name of said
complainant. 19 acCTSE

Private respondents argue that the action should have been filed by the State
through the OSG. True, in criminal cases, the acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of
the case against him can only be appealed by the Solicitor General, acting on behalf of
the State. This is because the authority to represent the State in appeals of criminal cases
before the Supreme Court and the CA is solely vested in the OSG. 20

Here, AAA filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, albeit at the instance of
her private counsel, primarily imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA
when it acquitted private respondents. As the aggrieved party, AAA clearly has the right
to bring the action in her name and maintain the criminal prosecution. She has an
immense interest in obtaining justice in the case precisely because she is the subject of
the violation. Further, as held in Dela Rosa v. CA, 21 where the Court sustained the
private offended party's right in a criminal case to file a special civil action for certiorari
to question the validity of the judgment of dismissal and ruled that the Solicitor General's
intervention was not necessary, the recourse of the complainant to the Court is proper
since it was brought in her own name and not in that of the People of the Philippines. In
any event, the OSG joins petitioner's cause in its Comment, 22 thereby fulfilling the
requirement that all criminal actions shall be prosecuted under the direction and control
of the public prosecutor. 23

Private respondents further claim that even assuming, merely for the sake of
argument, that AAA can file the special civil action for certiorari without violating their
right against double jeopardy, still, it must be dismissed for petitioner's failure to
previously file a motion for reconsideration.

True, a motion for reconsideration is a condicio sine qua non for the filing of a
petition for certiorari. Its purpose is for the court to have an opportunity to correct any
actual or perceived error attributed to it by re-examination of the legal and factual
circumstances of the case. This rule, however, is not absolute and admits well-defined
exceptions, such as: (a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has
no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been
duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and
passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of
the question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of
the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable; (d) where, under the
circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner was
deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal
case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial
court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of
due process; (h) where the proceedings were ex parte or in which the petitioner had no
opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public
interest is involved. 24

Here, petitioner's case amply falls within the exception. AAA raises the same
questions as those raised and passed upon in the lower court, essentially revolving on the
guilt of the private respondents. There is also an urgent necessity to resolve the issues, for
any further delay would prejudice the interests, not only of the petitioner, but likewise
that of the Government. And, as will soon be discussed, the CA decision is a patent
nullity for lack of due process and for having been rendered with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

For the writ of certiorari to issue, the respondent court must be shown to have
acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. An
acquittal is considered tainted with grave abuse of discretion when it is shown that the
prosecution's right to due process was violated or that the trial conducted was a sham.
The burden is on the petitioner to clearly demonstrate and establish that the respondent
court blatantly abused its authority such as to deprive itself of its very power to dispense
justice. 25

AAA claims in her petition that the CA, in evident display of grave abuse of
judicial discretion, totally disregarded her testimony as well as the trial court's findings of
fact, thereby adopting hook, line, and sinker, the private respondents' narration of facts.

The term "grave abuse of discretion" has a specific meaning. An act of a court or
tribunal can only be considered as with grave abuse of discretion when such act is done in
a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. It
must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion
and hostility. 26 There is grave abuse of discretion when the disputed act of the lower
court goes beyond the limits of discretion thus effecting an injustice. 27

The Court finds that the petitioner has sufficiently discharged the burden of
proving that the respondent appellate court committed grave abuse of discretion in
acquitting private respondents.

It appears that in reaching its judgment, the CA merely relied on the evidence
presented by the defense and utterly disregarded that of the prosecution. At first, it may
seem that its narration of the facts 28 of the case was meticulously culled from the
evidence of both parties. But a more careful perusal will reveal that it was simply lifted, if
not altogether parroted, from the testimonies of the accused, especially that of Oporto, 29
Carampatana, 30 and Alquizola, 31 the accused-appellants in the case before it. The
appellate court merely echoed the private respondents' testimonies, particularly those as
to the specific events that transpired during the crucial period — from the dinner at
Gemeno's house to the following morning at the Alquizola Lodging House. As a result, it
presented the private respondents' account and allegations as though these were the
established facts of the case, which it later conveniently utilized to support its ruling of
acquittal.IDEHCa

Due process requires that, in reaching a decision, a tribunal must consider the
entire evidence presented, regardless of the party who offered the same. 32 It simply
cannot acknowledge that of one party and turn a blind eye to that of the other. It cannot
appreciate one party's cause and brush the other aside. This rule becomes particularly
significant in this case because the parties tendered contradicting versions of the incident.
The victim is crying rape but the accused are saying it was a consensual sexual
rendezvous. Thus, the CA's blatant disregard of material prosecution evidence and
outward bias in favor of that of the defense constitutes grave abuse of discretion resulting
in violation of petitioner's right to due process. 33

Moreover, the CA likewise easily swept under the rug the observations of the RTC
and made its own flimsy findings to justify its decision of acquittal.

First, the appellate court held that AAA was, in fact, conscious during the whole
ordeal. The fact that she never showed any physical resistance, never cried out for help,
and never fought against the private respondents, bolsters the claim of the latter that the
sexual acts were indeed consensual.

But the CA seemed to forget that AAA was heavily intoxicated at the time of the
assault. Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) provides:

Art. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. — Rape is committed —

1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of
the following circumstances:

a. Through force, threat or intimidation;

b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise

unconscious;

c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;

d. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is

demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be
present;
 2. By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in
paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis
into another person's mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the
genital or anal orifice of another person.

Under the aforecited provision, the elements of rape are: (1) the offender had
carnal knowledge of the victim; and (2) such act was accomplished through force or
intimidation; or when the victim is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or when
the victim is under twelve years of age. 34 Here, the accused intentionally made AAA
consume hard liquor more than she could handle. They still forced her to drink even
when she was already obviously inebriated. They never denied having sexual intercourse
with AAA, but the latter was clearly deprived of reason or unconscious at the time the
private respondents ravished her. The CA, however, readily concluded that she agreed to
the sexual act simply because she did not shout or offer any physical resistance,
disregarding her testimony that she was rendered weak and dizzy by intoxication, thereby
facilitating the commission of the crime. 35 The appellate court never provided any
reason why AAA's testimony should deserve scant or no weight at all, or why it cannot
be accorded any credence. In reviewing rape cases, the lone testimony of the victim is
and should be, by itself, sufficient to warrant a judgment of conviction if found to be
credible. Also, it has been established that when a woman declares that she has been
raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to mean that she has been raped, and where
her testimony passes the test of credibility, the accused can be convicted on that basis
alone. This is because from the nature of the offense, the sole evidence that can usually
be offered to establish the guilt of the accused is the complainant's testimony itself. 36
The trial court correctly ruled that if AAA was not truthful to her accusation, she would
not have opened herself to the rough and tumble of a public trial. AAA was certainly not
enjoying the prying eyes of those who were listening as she narrated her harrowing
experience. 37

AAA positively identified the private respondents as the ones who violated her.
She tried to resist, but because of the presence of alcohol, her assaulters still prevailed.
The RTC found AAA's testimony simple and candid, indicating that she was telling the
truth. The trial court likewise observed that her answers to the lengthy and humiliating
questions were simple and straightforward, negating the possibility of a rehearsed
testimony. 38 Thus:

Atty. Jesus M. Generalao (on direct):

xxx xxx xxx

Q: Now, you said also when the Court asked you that you went asleep, when did
you regain your consciousness?
A: They woke me up and wanted me to drink the remaining wine inside the
bottle of Emperador Brandy. TAEDcS

xxx xxx xxx

Q: What do you mean that they hide you (sic) to drink the remaining contained
(sic) of the bottle of Emperador Brandy?

A: They gave me the bottle, sir, and I was trying to refuse but they insisted.

Q: Who handed over to you that bottle, if you can remember?

A: It was Christian John Lim, sir.

Q: Did you drink that Emperador directly from the bottle?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What happened after that?

A: I fell asleep again, sir.

Q: When did you regain your consciousness?

A: When somebody was carrying me down to the spiral stairs.

Q: Can you remember the person or persons who was or who were carrying
you?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Who?

A: They were Jansen Roda and Harold Batoctoy.

Q: If you can still remember, how did Jansen Roda and Harold Batoctoy carry
you?

A: I placed my hands to their shoulder (sic), sir:

xxx xxx xxx

Q: After that, what happened, if any?

A: I was already asleep, sir, when we went downstairs.

Q: You mean to say that you cannot remember anymore?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Now, when again did you regain your consciousness?

A: When we entered the room and the light was switch (sic) on, I was awakened
by the flash of light.

Q: Do you have any idea, where were you when you were awakened that (sic)
flash of light.

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Where?

A: Alquizola Lodging House, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: When you regained your consciousness from the flash of light, what
happened?

A: I loss (sic) my consciousness again, sir.

Q: So, you fell asleep again?

A: Yes, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: When did you wake-up (sic) again?

A: When I feel (sic) heavy on top of me, sir.

Q: So you wake-up (sic) again, whom did you see?

A: It was Joefhel Oporto, sir.

Q: He was on top of you?

A: Yes, sir. (Witness is crying while answering)

Q: What was you (sic) reaction when you found that Joefhel Oporto was on top
of you?
A: I was starting to cry, sir.

Q: Aside from starting to cry, what else is (sic) your reaction?

A: I was saying don't because I feel pain my private organ (sic).

Q: What did Joefhel Oporto do, when you (sic) those words?

A: He was kissing on the different part (sic) of my body then he sexually abused
me.

ATTY. GENERALAO:

 We want to make it on record, Your Honor, that the witness is crying. IATSHE

xxx xxx xxx

ATTY. GENERALAO:

 May I continue, Your Honor.

COURT: Continue.

ATTY. GENERALAO:

 Aside from Joefhel Oporto was found (sic) on top of you, who else was there
inside that room?

A: Moises Alquizola and Raymund Carampatana, sir.

Q: With respect to Raymund Carampatana, what was he doing?

A: He was at my feet while looking at us.

Q: Was it dress (sic) up or undressed?

A: Dressed up, sir.

Q: What about Moises Alquizola, what was he doing?

A: He was beside us standing and looking at me, sir.

Q: Was he dressed up or undressed?

A: I could not remember, sir.

 xxx xxx xxx

Q: After that, what happened?

A: I went asleep again, sir.

Q: Then, when again did you or when again did you wake up?

A: When I feel (sic) pain something inside my private part (sic), I saw Raymund
Carampatana, sir.

Q: On top of you?

A: No, sir, because he was in between my legs, sir.

Q: What was your reaction?

A: I was starting to cry again, sir, and told him don't.

Q: At that point, who else was inside that room when you found Raymund
Carampatana?

A: Only the three of them, sir.

Q: Including Moises Alquizola?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What was he doing?

A: He was started (sic) to kiss me.

Q: Where in particular?

A: In my face, sir.

Q: Then after that, what happened?

A: I fell asleep again, sir.

Q: Now, before you went asleep again (sic), what did you feel when you said
that you feel (sic) something in your private part when you saw
Raymund Carampatana?

A: He inserted his penis in my private organ, sir.

 Q: Then after that you fell asleep again?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: When did you wake-up (sic)?

A: I woke up at about 7:00 o'clock a.m in the next (sic) day, sir. 39

On the other hand, the RTC was not convinced with the explanation of the
defense. It noted that their account of the events was seemingly unusual and incredible.
40 Besides, the defense of consensual copulation was belatedly invoked and seemed to
have been a last ditch effort to avoid culpability. The accused never mentioned about the
same at the pre-trial stage. The trial court only came to know about it when it was their
turn to take the witness stand, catching the court by surprise. 41 More importantly, it
must be emphasized that when the accused in a rape case claims that the sexual
intercourse between him and the complainant was consensual, as in this case, the burden
of evidence shifts to him, such that he is now enjoined to adduce sufficient evidence to
prove the relationship. Being an affirmative defense that needs convincing proof, it must
be established with sufficient evidence that the intercourse was indeed consensua1. 42
Generally, the burden of proof is upon the prosecution to establish each and every
element of the crime and that it is the accused who is responsible for its commission. This
is because in criminal cases, conviction must rest on a moral certainty of guilt. 43 Burden
of evidence is that logical necessity which rests on a party at any particular time during
the trial to create a prima facie case in his favor or to overthrow one when created against
him. A prima facie case arises when the party having the burden of proof has produced
evidence sufficient to support a finding and adjudication for him of the issue in litigation.
44 However, when the accused alleges consensual sexual congress, he needs convincing
proof such as love notes, mementos, and credible witnesses attesting to the romantic or
sexual relationship between the offender and his supposed victim. Having admitted to
carnal knowledge of the complainant, the burden now shifts to the accused to prove his
defense by substantial evidence. 45 caCEDA

Here, the accused themselves admitted to having carnal knowledge of AAA but
unfortunately failed to discharge the burden required of them. Carampatana narrated that
upon reaching the room at the lodging house, AAA lay down on the bed and looked at
him. He then approached her and they kissed. He removed her shirt and brassiere.
Thereafter, Oporto also removed AAA's lower garments and then went to kiss AAA.
Carampatana then placed himself in between AAA's legs and had intercourse with her. 46
On the other hand, Oporto himself testified that he had sexual intercourse with AAA
three times. While Carampatana was removing AAA's shirt and brassiere, Oporto was
watching at the foot of the bed. Then he removed her pants and underwear, and AAA
even lifted her buttocks to make it easier for him to pull the clothes down. When
Carampatana left after having sexual intercourse with AAA, according to Oporto, he then
stood up, opened his pants, and took out his penis so that AAA could perform fellatio on
him. Then he proceeded to have sexual intercourse with AAA. Afterwards, Oporto went
outside and slept with Alquizola on the carpet. After a few minutes, he woke up and went
back to the room and again had intercourse with AAA. He went back to sleep and after
some time, he woke up to the sound of AAA vomitting. Shortly thereafter, he made love
with AAA for the third and last time. 47 Despite said shameless admission, however, the
accused failed to sufficiently prove that the lack of any physical resistance on AAA's part
amounts to approval or permission. They failed to show that AAA had sexual intercourse
with them out of her own volition, and not simply because she was seriously intoxicated
at that time, and therefore could not have given a valid and intelligent consent to the
sexual act.

The RTC also noticed that Fiel, one of the defense witnesses, was showy and
exaggerated when testifying, even flashing a thumbs-up to some of the accused after her
testimony, an indication of a rehearsed witness. 48 To be believed, the testimony must
not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness; it must be credible in itself such
as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under
the attending circumstances. 49

When it comes to credibility, the trial court's assessment deserves great weight,
and is even conclusive and binding, if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some
fact or circumstance of weight and influence. The reason is obvious. Having the full
opportunity to observe directly the witnesses' deportment and manner of testifying, the
trial court is in a better position than the appellate court to properly evaluate testimonial
evidence. 50 Matters of credibility are addressed basically to the trial judge who is in a
better position than the appellate court to appreciate the weight and evidentiary value of
the testimonies of witnesses who have personally appeared before him. 51 The appellate
courts are far detached from the details and drama during trial and have to rely solely on
the records of the case in its review. On the matter of credence and credibility of
witnesses, therefore, the Court acknowledges said limitations and recognizes the
advantage of the trial court whose findings must be given due deference. 52 Since the CA
and the private respondents failed to show any palpable error, arbitrariness, or
capriciousness on the findings of fact of the trial court, these findings deserve great
weight and are deemed conclusive and binding. 53

The CA continued, belaboring on the fact that the examining physician found old
hymenal laceration on AAA's private organ. The lack of a fresh hymenal laceration,
which is expected to be present when the alleged sexual encounter is involuntary, could
mean that AAA actually consented to the fornication. According to Dr. Acusta, when sex
is consensual, the vagina becomes lubricated and the insertion of the penis will not cause
any laceration. It presumed that complainant, therefore, was no longer innocent
considering the presence of old hymenal laceration that could have resulted from her
previous sexual encounters. The defense, however, failed to show that AAA was sexually
promiscuous and known for organizing or even joining sex orgies. It must be noted that
AAA was a minor, barely 17 years old at the time of the incident, having just graduated
from high school on that same day. In a similar case, 54 the Court held:

. . . Indeed, no woman would have consented to have sexual

intercourse with two men — or three, according to Antonio Gallardo — in
the presence of each other, unless she were a prostitute or as morally
debased as one. Certainly, the record before Us contains no indication that
Farmacita, a 14-year old, first-year high school student, can be so characterized.
On the contrary, her testimony in court evinced the simplicity and candor
peculiar to her youth. In fact, appellants could not even suggest any reason why
Farmacita would falsely impute to them the commission of the crime charged.
55

No woman, especially one of tender age, would concoct a story of defloration,

allow an examination of her private parts, and be subjected to public trial and humiliation
if her claim were not true. 56 And even if she were indeed highly promiscuous at such a
young age, the same could still not prove that no rape was actually committed. Even a
complainant who was a woman of loose morals could still be the victim of rape. Even a
prostitute may be a victim of rape. The victim's moral character in rape is immaterial
where, as in this case, it is shown that the victim was deprived of reason or was rendered
unconscious through intoxication to enable the private respondents to have sex with her.
Moreover, the essence of rape is the carnal knowledge of a woman against her consent.
57 A freshly broken hymen is not one of its essential elements. Even if the hymen of the
victim was still intact, the possibility of rape cannot be ruled out. Penetration of the penis
by entry into the lips of the vagina, even without rupture or laceration of the hymen, is
enough to justify a conviction for rape. To repeat, rupture of the hymen or laceration of
any part of the woman's genitalia is not indispensable to a conviction for rape. 58 acCITS

Neither does AAA's mother's act of hitting her after learning about the rape prove
anything. It is a truism that "the workings of the human mind when placed under
emotional stress are unpredictable, and the people react differently." 59 Different people
react differently to a given type of situation, and there is no standard form of behavioral
response when one is confronted with a strange, startling or frightful experience. 60 At
most, it merely indicates the frustration and dismay of a mother upon learning that her
daughter had been defiled after partying late the night before. It is a settled rule that when
there is no showing that private complainant was impelled by improper motive in making
the accusation against the accused, her complaint is entitled to full faith and credence. 61
So if AAA in fact consented to the sexual act, why did she still need to immediately tell
her parents about it when she could have just kept it to herself? Why did she ever have to
shout rape? She was not caught in the act of making love with any of the private
respondents, 62 nor was she shown to have been in a relationship with any of them of
which her family disapproved. 63 She never became pregnant as a result of the deed. And
if AAA cried rape to save her reputation, why would she have to drag the private
respondents into the case and identify them as her rapists? Absent any circumstance
indicating the contrary, she brought the charge against the private respondents simply
because she was, in fact, violated and she wants to obtain justice. Her zeal in prosecuting
the case, even after the CA had already acquitted the private respondents, evinces the
truth that she merely seeks justice for her honor that has been debased. 64 Unfortunately,
the CA chose to ignore these telling pieces of evidence. Its findings are against the logic
and effect of the facts as presented by AAA in support of her complaint, 65 contrary to
common human experience, and in utter disregard of the relevant laws and jurisprudence
on the crime of rape.

Lastly, the trial court pronounced that Alquizola was not part of the conspiracy
because his participation in the crime was uncertain, 66 citing People v. Lobrigo. 67 It
found that his participation was not in furtherance of the plan, if any, to commit the crime
of rape. 68 The Court, however, finds that the RTC erred in ruling that Alquizola's
liability is not of a conspirator, but that of a mere accomplice. To establish conspiracy, it
is not essential that there be proof as to previous agreement to commit a crime, it being
sufficient that the malefactors shall have acted in concert pursuant to the same objective.
Conspiracy is proved if there is convincing evidence to sustain a finding that the
malefactors committed an offense in furtherance of a common objective pursued in
concert. 69 Proof of conspiracy need not even rest on direct evidence, as the same may be
inferred from the collective conduct of the parties before, during or after the commission
of the crime indicating a common understanding among them with respect to the
commission of the offense. 70

In Lobrigo, the Court declared:

We note that the testimonies of witnesses with respect to Gregorio's and

Dominador's participation in the crime conflict on material points.

Doubt exists as to whether Gregorio and Dominador were carrying

weapons during the mauling and whether they participated in the mauling by
more than just boxing the victim. Noel stated that they did not, Domingo
stated that they did.

In conspiracy, evidence as to who administered the fatal blow is not

necessary. In this case, the rule is not applicable because conspiracy with
respect to Gregorio and Dominador is not proven. Their exact participation in
the crime is uncertain. 71 (Emphasis Supplied)

In People v. Dela Torre, 72 the Court upheld the findings of the lower courts that
there was conspiracy:

The RTC held that:

 While [it] is true that it was only Leo Amoroso who actually ravished
the victim based on the testimony of the private complainant that Amoroso
succeeded in inserting his penis to her private parts and that Reynaldo dela
Torre and Ritchie Bisaya merely kissed her and fondled her private parts,
accused [D]ela Torre can likewise be held liable for the bestial acts of Amoroso
as it is quite apparent that the three of them conspired and mutually helped one
another in raping the young victim.

The Court of Appeals held that:

[W]hile [Dela Torre] did not have carnal knowledge with [AAA], his
tacit and spontaneous participation and cooperation of pulling her towards the
parked jeep, molesting her and doing nothing to prevent the commission of the
rape, made him a co-conspirator. As such, he was properly adjudged as a
principal in the commission of the crime. 73

Here, unlike in the foregoing case of Lobrigo, Alquizola's participation in the

crime is not at all uncertain. As the caretaker of the Alquizola Lodging House, he
provided a room so the rape could be accomplished with ease and furtiveness. He was
likewise inside the room, intently watching, while Oporto and Carampatana sexually
abused AAA. He did not do anything to stop the bestial acts of his companions. He even
admitted to kissing AAA's lips, breasts, and other parts of her body. Indubitably, there
was conspiracy among Carampatana, Oporto, and Alquizola to sexually abuse AAA.
Hence, the act of any one was the act of all, and each of them, Alquizola including, is
equally guilty of the crime of rape. While it is true that the RTC found Alquizola guilty as
mere accomplice, when he appealed from the decision of the trial court, 74 he waived the
constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and threw the whole case open to the
review of the appellate court, which is then called upon to render such judgment as law
and justice dictate, whether favorable or unfavorable to the accused-appellant. 75 IcDHaT

Finally, the Court notes that although the prosecution filed only a single
Information, it, however, actually charged the accused of several rapes. As a general rule,
a complaint or information must charge only one offense, otherwise, the same is
defective. 76 The rationale behind this rule prohibiting duplicitous complaints or
informations is to give the accused the necessary knowledge of the charge against him
and enable him to sufficiently prepare for his defense. The State should not heap upon the
accused two or more charges which might confuse him in his defense. 77 Non-
compliance with this rule is a ground 78 for quashing the duplicitous complaint or
information under Rule 117 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure and the accused may
raise the same in a motion to quash before he enters his plea, 79 otherwise, the defect is
deemed waived. 80 The accused herein, however, cannot avail of this defense simply
because they did not file a motion to quash questioning the validity of the Information
during their arraignment. Thus, they are deemed to have waived their right to question the
same. Also, where the allegations of the acts imputed to the accused are merely different
counts specifying the acts of perpetration of the same crime, as in the instant case, there is
no duplicity to speak of. 81 There is likewise no violation of the right of the accused to be
informed of the charges against them because the Information, in fact, stated that they
"took turns in having carnal knowledge against the will of AAA" on March 25, 2004. 82
Further, allegations made and the evidence presented to support the same reveal that
AAA was indeed raped and defiled several times. Here, according to the accused
themselves, after undressing AAA, Carampatana positioned himself in between her legs
and had intercourse with her. On the other hand, Oporto admitted that he had sexual
intercourse with AAA three times. When two or more offenses are charged in a single
complaint or information but the accused fails to object to it before trial, the court may
convict him of as many offenses as are charged and proved, and impose upon him the
proper penalty for each offense. 83 Carampatana, Oporto, and Alquizola can then be held
liable for more than one crime of rape, or a total of four (4) counts in all, with conspiracy
extant among the three of them during the commission of each of the four violations.
Each of the accused shall thus be held liable for every act of rape committed by the other.
But while Oporto himself testified that he inserted his sexual organ into AAA's mouth,
the Court cannot convict him of rape through sexual assault therefor because the same
was not included in the Information. This is, however, without prejudice to the filing of a
case of rape through sexual assault as long as prescription has not yet set in.

Anent the appropriate penalty to be imposed, rape committed by two or more

persons is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death under Article 266-B of the RPC. But
in view of the presence of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender and the
absence of an aggravating circumstance to offset the same, the lighter penalty of
reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon them, 84 for each count. With regard to Oporto,
appreciating in his favor the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority, the proper
imposable penalty upon him is reclusion temporal, being the penalty next lower to
reclusion perpetua to death. Being a divisible penalty, the Indeterminate Sentence Law is
applicable. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, Oporto can be sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty the minimum of which shall be within the range of prision mayor
(the penalty next lower in degree to reclusion temporal) and the maximum of which shall
be within the range of reclusion temporal in its minimum period, there being the ordinary
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, and there being no aggravating
circumstance. 85 With that, the Court shall impose the indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment from six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to twelve
(12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum, for each count of rape
committed. 86 However, Oporto shall be entitled to appropriate disposition under Section
51, R.A. No. 9344, 87 which extends even to one who has exceeded the age limit of
twenty-one (21) years, so long as he committed the crime when he was still a child, 88
and provides for the confinement of convicted children as follows: 89

Sec. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps

and Other Training Facilities. — A child in conflict with the law may, after
 conviction and upon order of the court, be made to serve his/her sentence, in
lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution, in an agricultural camp and
other training facilities that may be established, maintained, supervised and
controlled by the BUCOR, in coordination with the DSWD.

Hence, in the proper execution of judgment by the lower court, the foregoing
provision should be taken into consideration by the judge in order to accord children in
conflict with the law, who have already gone beyond twenty-one (21) years of age, the
proper treatment envisioned by law.

As to their civil liability, all of them shall pay AAA the amount of P50,000.00 as
civil indemnity and another P50,000.00 as moral damages, in each case. Exemplary
damages of P30,000.00 shall likewise be imposed by way of an example and to deter
others from committing the same bestial acts.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is GRANTED. The

assailed Decision dated June 6, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No.
00422-MIN is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Court hereby renders judgment: TASCDI

a) Finding accused-respondent Raymund Carampatana GUILTY beyond

reasonable doubt of four (4) counts of rape, and the Court hereby
sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua in each
case;

b) Finding accused-respondent Joefhel Oporto GUILTY beyond

reasonable doubt of four (4) counts of rape, and the Court hereby
sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment
from six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to
twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as
maximum, in each case; and

c) Finding accused-respondent Moises Alquizola GUILTY beyond

reasonable doubt of four (4) counts of rape, and the Court hereby
sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua in each
case.

The Court hereby ORDERS the accused-respondents to pay AAA, jointly and
severally, the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages,
and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, for each of the four (4) counts of rape. The case
is REMANDED to the court of origin for its appropriate action in accordance with
Section 51 of Republic Act No. 9344.

Let the records of this case be forwarded to the court of origin for the execution of
judgment.
 SO ORDERED.

Velasco, Jr., Del Castillo, * Villarama, Jr. and Reyes, JJ., concur.

||| (People v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 183652, [February 25, 2015], 755 PHIL 80-120)

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 127444. September 13, 2000.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. TIRSO D. C.

VELASCO in his capacity as the Presiding Judge, RTC-Br. 88, Quezon
City, and HONORATO GALVEZ, respondents.

Solicitor General for petitioner.

Acosta Rueda-Acosta Law office and Associates for petitioners-intervenors.

Lazaro Law Firm for private respondent Mayor Honorato Galves.

SYNOPSIS

For insufficiency of evidence, private respondent Honorato Galvez was acquitted

in the cases for murder and frustrated of murder. Further, he was absolved from the
charge of illegal carrying of firearm. In this petition for certiorari, however, the State
would want his acquittal reversed. IaEHSD

As mandated by the Constitution, statutes and cognate jurisprudence, an acquittal

is final and unappealable on the ground of double jeopardy, whether it happens the at the
trial court level or before the Court of Appeals. Thus, the rule is that a judgment of
acquittal brought before the Supreme Court on certiorari cannot be had unless there is a
finding of mistrial as in the case of Galman v. Sandiganbayan. In the instant case, the
petition for certiorari seeks the nullity of the decision of the respondent judge acquitting
the accused. However, the questioned decision showed that respondent judge considered
and passed upon the evidence received at the trial. Thus, this exempts the act from the
writ's limiting requirement of excess or lack of jurisdiction. Errors of judgment are not to
be confused with errors in the exercise of jurisdiction.

SYLLABUS
 1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT AGAINST DOUBLE
JEOPARDY; APPEAL FROM DISMISSALS OF CRIMINAL CASES ALLOWED IN
AMERICAN RULES OF PROCEDURE DOES NOT OBTAIN IN THE PHILIPPINES.
— The contextual situation in which appeals from dismissals of criminal cases are
allowed under American rules of procedure does not obtain in the Philippines. To be sure,
United States v. Scott positively spelled out that if an acquittal was based on an
appreciation of the evidence adduced, no appeal would lie. Mr. Justice Rehnquist
explained that what may seem superficially to be a "disparity in the rules governing a
defendant's liability to be tried again" refers to the underlying purposes of the Double
Jeopardy Clause. He elaborated that "(a)s Kepner and Fong Fee [cases] illustrate, the law
attaches particular significance to an acquittal. To permit a second trial after an acquittal
however mistaken . . . would present an unacceptably high risk that the Government, with
its vastly superior resources, might wear down the defendant so that even though
innocent he may be found guilty. . . . On the other hand, to require a criminal defendant
to stand trial again after he has successfully invoked the statutory right of appeal to upset
his first conviction is not an act of governmental oppression of the sort against which
the . . . Clause was intended to protect."
aHSTID

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; PROPOSED RE-EVALUATION OF PHILIPPINE

JURISPRUDENCE ON DOUBLE JEOPARDY THAT APPEALS OF ACQUITTAL
ARE POSSIBLE PROVIDED ACCUSED WILL NOT BE SUBJECTED TO SECOND
TRIAL; NOT APPRECIATED IN CASE AT BAR. — In proposing a re-evaluation of
Philippine jurisprudence on double jeopardy, petitioner insists that Wilson and Scott
[cases] have unquestionably altered the seascape of double jeopardy previously navigated
by Kepner and Ball [cases]. Using as its flagship the pronouncement in Wilson that
appeals of acquittal are possible provided the accused will not be subjected to a second
trial, it argues that this should apply to the case at bar because, anyway, a review of the
acquittal of private respondent Honorato Galvez will not result in another trial inasmuch
as the Court will only have to examine the evidence adduced below to pass final
judgment on the culpability of the accused. Petitioner's own hermeneutic sense of the
phrase "another trial" is that solely adverts to a proceeding before a competent trial court
that rehears the case and receives evidence anew to establish the facts after the case has
been finally disposed of by the Supreme Court. Obviously, it adheres to the Holmesian
hypothesis in Kepner and for that matter, the concept under Spanish law then applicable
in the Philippines before the American colonization, that a trial consists of one whole
continuing process from reception of evidence by a trier of facts up to its final disposition
by the Supreme Court. But petitioner conveniently forgets that this theory has been
consistently spurned by both American and Philippine jurisprudence that has faithfully
adhered to the doctrine that an appeal of a judgment after the defendant has been
acquitted by the court in a bench trial is, quintessentially, a new trial. In Kepner, the
Court regarded the two (2) events, i.e., trial by the lower court and the appellate
proceedings, as equivalent to two (2) separate trials, and the evil that the Court saw in
the procedure was plainly that of multiple prosecutions. Although Kepner technically
involved only one proceeding, the Court deemed the second fact-finding, that is, the
review by the appellate court, as the equivalent of a second trial. Accordingly, in
subsequent cases, the Court has treated the Kepner principle as being addressed to the
evil of successive trials. No less than the case of Wilson, petitioner's main anchor for its
propositions, affirms this rule. There, the Court emphasized that it has, up to the present,
rejected the theory espoused by the dissenting Mr. Justice Holmes in Kepner that "a man
cannot be said to be more than once in jeopardy in the same cause however often he may
be tried. The jeopardy is one continuing jeopardy, from its beginning to the end of the
cause." It declared unequivocally that "we continue to be of the view that the policies
underlying the Double Jeopardy Clause militate against permitting the Government to
appeal after a verdict of acquittal." Wilson therefore pronounced that if acquittal is
declared on the basis of evidence adduced, double jeopardy attaches for that particular
cause. The Court is insufficiently persuaded to adopt petitioner's concept of "another
trial" because, it disregards the contextual interpretation of the term in light of the legal
and factual morphology of the double jeopardy principle obtaining in Wilson and Scott.
To sum up, in the cause before us, the records show that respondent trial judge based his
finding of acquittal, no matter how erroneous it might seem to petitioner, upon the
evidence presented by both parties. The judgment here was no less than a factual
resolution of the case. Thus, to the extent that the post-verdict acquittal in Wilson was
based on a ruling of law and not on a resolution of facts, Wilson is not pertinent to nor
persuasive in the case at bar. The same observation holds true for Scott. That it was the
defendant who secured the dismissal of the charges against him without any submission
to either judge or jury as to his guilt or innocence, but on a ground totally outside
evidentiary considerations, i.e., pre-indictment delay, definitely forecloses the
applicability, if not relevance, of Scott to the instant case.

3. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND

ITS EFFECT ON ACQUITTALS; ELUCIDATED. — The Rules of Court on Criminal
Procedure relative to double jeopardy and the effect thereon of acquittals adhere strictly
to constitutional provisions. Under Sec. 1 of Rule 117 providing for former conviction or
acquittal and double jeopardy, there can be no mistaking the requisites for invoking
double jeopardy: (a) a valid complaint or information; (b) before a competent court
before which the same is filed; (c) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and, (d) the
defendant was acquitted, or convicted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent. It bears repeating that where acquittal is
concerned, the rules do not distinguish whether it occurs at the level of the trial court or
on appeal from a judgment of conviction. This firmly establishes the finality-of-acquittal
rule in our jurisdiction. Therefore, as mandated by our Constitution, statutes and cognate
jurisprudence, an acquittal is final and unappealable on the ground of double jeopardy,
whether it happens at the trial court level or before the Court of Appeals.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; WHEN REVIEW OF ACQUITTAL PROPER. — In general, the

rule is that a remand to a trial court of a judgment of acquittal brought before the
Supreme Court on certiorari cannot be had unless there is a finding of mistrial, as in
Galman v. Sandiganbayan. The doctrine that "double jeopardy may not be invoked after
trial" may apply only when the Court finds that the "criminal trial was a sham" because
the prosecution representing the sovereign people in the criminal case was denied due
process. The Court in People v. Bocar rationalized that the "remand of the criminal case
for further hearing and/or trial before the lower courts amounts merely to a continuation
of the first jeopardy, and does not expose the accused to a second jeopardy." The
fundamental philosophy highlighting the finality of an acquittal by the trial court cuts
deep into "the humanity of the laws and in a jealous watchfulness over the rights of the
citizen, when brought in unequal contest with the State . . . ." Thus Green expressed the
concern that "(t)he underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-
American system of jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources and power
should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged
offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling
him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the
possibility that even though innocent, he may be found guilty."

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; FINALITY OF ACQUITTAL, DISCUSSED. — It is axiomatic

that on the basis of humanity, fairness and justice, an acquitted defendant is entitled to the
right of repose as a direct consequence of the finality of his acquittal. The philosophy
underlying this rule establishing the absolute nature of acquittals is "part of the
paramount importance criminal justice system attaches to the protection of the innocent
against wrongful conviction." The interest in the finality-of-acquittal rule, confined
exclusively to verdicts of not guilty, is easy to understand: it is a need for "repose," a
desire to know the exact extent of one's liability. With this right of repose, the criminal
justice system has built in a protection to insure that the innocent, even those whose
innocence rests upon a jury's leniency, will not be found guilty in a subsequent
proceeding. Related to his right of repose is the defendant's interest in his right to have
his trial completed by a particular tribunal. This interest encompasses his right to have his
guilt or innocence determined in a single proceeding by the initial jury empanelled to try
him, for society's awareness of the heavy personal strain which the criminal trial
represents for the individual defendant is manifested in the willingness to limit
Government to a single criminal proceeding to vindicate its very vital interest in
enforcement of criminal laws. The ultimate goal is prevention of government oppression;
the goal finds its voice in the finality of the initial proceeding. As observed in Lockhart v.
Nelson, "(t)he fundamental tenet animating the Double Jeopardy Clause is that the State
should not be able to oppress individuals through the abuse of the criminal process."
Because the innocence of the accused has been confirmed by a final judgment, the
Constitution conclusively presumes that a second trial would be unfair. Thus, "emerging
American consensus on jury acquittals" notwithstanding, on solid constitutional bedrock
is well engraved our own doctrine that acquittals by judges on evidentiary considerations
cannot be appealed by government. The jurisprudential metes and bounds of double
jeopardy having been clearly defined by both constitution and statute, the issue of the
effect of an appeal of a verdict of acquittal upon a determination of the evidence on the
constitutionally guaranteed right of an accused against being twice placed in jeopardy
should now be finally put to rest. DaAIHC

6. ID.; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; WRIT OF CERTIORARI; WHEN THE

STATE IS APPLYING FOR WRIT TO APPEAL ACQUITTAL. — The office of the
common law writ of certiorari is to bring before the court for inspection the record of the
proceedings of an inferior tribunal in order that the superior court may determine from
the face of the record whether the inferior court has exceeded its jurisdiction, or has not
proceeded according to the essential requirements of the law. However, the original
function and purpose of the writ have been so modified by statutes and judicial decisions.
It is particularly so in the field of criminal law when the state is applying for the writ and
problems arise concerning the right of the state to appeal in a criminal case. As a general
rule, the prosecution cannot appeal or bring error proceedings from a judgment in favor
of the defendant in a criminal case in the absence of a statute clearly conferring that right.
The problem comes into sharper focus when the defendant contends, in effect, that the
prosecution is attempting to accomplish by the writ what it could not do by appeal, and
that his constitutional rights are being thus encroached upon. Generally, under modern
constitutions and statutes, provisions are available as guides to the court in determining
the standing of the prosecution to secure by certiorari a review of a lower court decision
in a criminal case which has favored the defendant. In most instances, provisions setting
forth the scope and function of certiorari are found together with those relating to the
right of the state to appeal or bring error in criminal matters. There is some indication that
courts view the writ of certiorari as an appeal in itself where the applicant shows that
there is no other adequate remedy available, and it is not uncommon to find language in
cases to the effect that the state should not be permitted to accomplish by certiorari what
it cannot do by appeal. Thus, if a judgment sought to be reviewed was one entered after
an acquittal by a jury or the discharge of the accused on the merits by the trial court, the
standing of the prosecution to review it by certiorari is far more likely to be denied than
if it were such an order as one sustaining a demurrer to, or quashing the indictment, or
granting a motion for arrest of judgment after a verdict of guilty. Philippine jurisprudence
has been consistent in its application of the Double Jeopardy Clause such that it has
viewed with suspicion, and not without good reason, applications for the extraordinary
writ questioning decisions acquitting an accused on ground of grave abuse of discretion.

7. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT PROPER WHERE TRIAL COURT'S APPRECIATION

AND EVALUATION OF EVIDENCE IS REAL ISSUE. — The petition at hand which
seeks to nullify the decision of respondent judge acquitting the accused Honorato Galvez
goes deeply into the trial court's appreciation and evaluation in esse of the evidence
adduced by the parties. A reading of the questioned decision shows that respondent judge
considered the evidence received at trial. These consisted among others of the testimonies
relative to the positions of the victims vis-à-vis the accused and the trajectory, location
and nature of the gunshot wounds, and the opinion of the expert witness for the
prosecution. While the appreciation thereof may have resulted in possible lapses in
evidence evaluation, it nevertheless does not detract from the fact that the evidence was
considered and passed upon. This consequently exempts the act from the writ's limiting
requirement of excess or lack of jurisdiction. As such, it becomes an improper object of
and therefore non-reviewable by certiorari. To reiterate, errors of judgment are not to be
confused with errors in the exercise of jurisdiction.
SaHTCE

PANGANIBAN, J., Separate Opinion:

1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; CERTIORARI; DISMISSAL

MADE PROPER BY THE DEATH OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT, AND FAILURE TO
SHOW ABUSE OF JURISDICTION OF PUBLIC RESPONDENT IN ASSAILED
DECISION. — [Mr. Justice, Artemio V. Panganiban] concur with Mr. Justice Josue N.
Bellosillo that the petition [for certiorari under Rule 65] should be dismissed on two
grounds: (1) the private respondent (defendant in the criminal case below) is already
dead, so this Petition has become moot and academic; and, in any event, (2) the petitioner
has failed to show that public respondent, in issuing the assailed Decision, has acted
without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; PROPER REMEDY TO CHALLENGE ACQUITTAL ON THE

GROUND OF ABUSE OF DISCRETION. — Petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court is a proper remedy to challenge an acquittal on the ground that the trial
court had acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction. This is a hornback doctrine.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT VIOLATIVE OF RIGHT AGAINST DOUBLE

JEOPARDY. — By contending that the challenged Decision is void for having been
issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the
petition does not violate the right of the accused against double jeopardy. It is elementary
that double jeopardy attaches only when the following elements concur: (1) the accused
are charged under a complaint or information sufficient in form and substance to sustain
their conviction; (2) the court has jurisdiction; (3) the accused have been arraigned and
have pleaded; and (4) they are convicted or acquitted, or the case is dismissed without
their consent. Thus, even assuming that a writ of certiorari is granted, the accused would
not be placed in double jeopardy because, from the very beginning, the lower tribunal had
acted without jurisdiction. Precisely, any ruling issued without jurisdiction is, in legal
contemplation, necessarily null and void and does not exist. In criminal cases, it cannot
be the source of an acquittal.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT PROPER FROM RE-EVALUATION OF TRIAL COURT'S

APPRECIATION OF EVIDENCE. — The instant Petition for Certiorari, however, fails
to show grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of the trial court. Rather, it effectively urges this Court to re-evaluate the lower court's
appreciation of the evidence, which cannot be done by certiorari. EICDSA

DECISION

BELLOSILLO, J : p

This case nudges the Court to revisit the doctrine on double jeopardy, a revered
constitutional safeguard against exposing the accused to the risk of answering twice for
the same offense. In this case, after trial on the merits, the accused was acquitted for
insufficiency of the evidence against him in the cases for murder and frustrated murder
(although his co-accused was convicted), and finding in the illegal carrying of firearm
that the act charged did not constitute a violation of law. But the State through this
petition for certiorari would want his acquittal reversed.

We narrate a brief factual backdrop.

The idyllic morning calm in San Ildefonso, Bulacan, a small town north of Manila,
was shattered by gunshots fired in rapid succession. The shooting claimed the life of
young Alex Vinculado and seriously maimed his twin brother Levi who permanently lost
his left vision. Their uncle, Miguel Vinculado, Jr. was also shot. A slug tunneled through
his right arm, pierced the right side of his body and burrowed in his stomach where it
remained until extracted by surgical procedure.

As a consequence, three (3) criminal Informations — one (1) for homicide and
two (2) for frustrated homicide — were originally filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Malolos, Bulacan, against Honorato Galvez, Mayor of San Ildefonso, and Godofredo
Diego, a municipal employee and alleged bodyguard of the mayor. On 14 December
1993, however, the charges were withdrawn and a new set filed against the same accused
upgrading the crimes to murder (Crim. Case No. 4004-M-93) and frustrated murder
(Crim. Cases Nos. 4005-M-93 and 4006-M-93). Mayor Galvez was charged, in addition,
with violation of PD 1866 (Crim. Case No. 4007-M-94) for unauthorized carrying of
firearm outside his residence; hence, a fourth Information had to be filed. ICDcEA

After a series of legal maneuvers by the parties, venue of the cases was transferred
to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Metro Manila. There the cases were stamped
with new docket numbers (Nos. Q-94-55484, Q-94-55485, Q-94-55486 and Q-94-55487,
respectively), and raffled to Branch 103 presided over by Judge Jaime Salazar, Jr. In the
course of the proceedings, the judge inhibited himself and the cases were re-raffled to
respondent Judge Tirso D.C. Velasco of Branch 89.
 On 8 October 1996 a consolidated decision on the four (4) cases was promulgated.
The trial court found the accused Godofredo Diego guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crimes of murder and double frustrated murder. However, it acquitted Mayor Honorato
Galvez of the same charges due to insufficiency of evidence. It also absolved him from
the charge of illegal carrying of firearm upon its finding that the act was not a violation of
law.

The acquittal of accused Honorato Galvez is now vigorously challenged by the

Government before this Court in a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court and Sec. 1, Art. VIII, of the Constitution. It is the submission of petitioner that the
exculpation of the accused Galvez from all criminal responsibility by respondent Judge
Tirso Velasco constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
Allegedly, in holding in favor of Galvez, the judge deliberately and wrongfully
disregarded certain facts and evidence on record which, if judiciously considered, would
have led to a finding of guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Petitioner proposes
that this patently gross judicial indiscretion and arbitrariness should be rectified by a re-
examination of the evidence by the Court upon a determination that a review of the case
will not transgress the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy. It is urged that
this is necessary because the judgment of acquittal should be nullified and substituted
with a verdict of guilt.

The main hypothesis of the Government is that elevating the issue of criminal
culpability of private respondent Galvez before this Tribunal despite acquittal by the trial
court should not be considered violative of the constitutional right of the accused against
double jeopardy, for it is now settled constitutional doctrine in the United States that the
Double Jeopardy Clause permits a review of acquittals decreed by US trial magistrates
where, as in this case, no retrial is required should judgment be overturned. 1 Since
Philippine concepts on double jeopardy have been sourced from American constitutional
principles, statutes and jurisprudence, particularly the case of Kepner v. United States, 2
and because similarly in this jurisdiction a retrial does not follow in the event an acquittal
on appeal is reversed, double jeopardy should also be allowed to take the same
directional course. Petitioner in this regard urges the Court to take a second look at
Kepner, it being the "cornerstone of the battlement of the Double Jeopardy Clause" in the
Philippines 3 and seriously examine whether the precedents it established almost a
century ago are still germane and useful today in view of certain modifications wrought
on the doctrine by the succeeding American cases of United States v. Wilson 4 and
United States v. Scott. 5

Two (2) threshold issues therefore, interlocked as they are, beg to be addressed.
One is the propriety of certiorari as an extraordinary mode of review under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court where the result actually intended is the reversal of the acquittal of
private respondent Galvez. The other is the permissibility of a review by the Court of a
judgment of acquittal in light of the constitutional interdict against double jeopardy.
 The recent untimely demise of respondent Galvez at the hands of alleged assassins
(not discounting to the earlier dismissal of respondent judge from the service) may
arguably have rendered these matters moot and academic, thus calling for a dismissal of
the petition on this basis alone. The Court however is not insensitive to nor oblivious of
the paramount nature and object of the pleas forcefully presented by the Government
considering especially the alleged new directions in American jurisprudence taken by the
doctrine of double jeopardy. We are thus impelled to respond to the issues advanced by
petitioner for these bear unquestionably far-reaching contextual significance and
implications in Philippine juristic philosophy and experience, demanding no less, explicit
and definitive rulings.

For it may be argued from a historico-analytical perspective that perhaps none of

the constitutionally ensconced rights of men has followed a more circuitous and tortuous
route in the vast sea of jurisprudence than the right of a person not to be tried or
prosecuted a second time for the same offense. 6 This prohibition does not consist merely
of one rule but several, each rule applying to a different situation, each rule marooned in
a sea of exceptions. 7 It must have been this unique transpiration that prompted even the
redoubtable Mr. Justice Rehnquist of the U.S. Supreme Court to remark in Albernaz v.
United States 8 that "the decisional law (in the area of double jeopardy) is a veritable
Sargasso Sea which could not fail to challenge the most intrepid judicial navigator." It is
therefore necessary that, in forming a correct perspective and full understanding of the
doctrine on double jeopardy and the rules so far established relative to the effect thereon
of appeals of judgments of acquittal, a compendious review of its historical growth and
development be undertaken. This approach is particularly helpful in properly situating
and analyzing landmark interpretive applications of the doctrine in light of the varying
legal and factual milieu under which it evolved.IcaHTA

Jeopardy, itself "a fine poetic word," 9 derives from the Latin "jocus" meaning
joke, jest or game, 10 and also from the French term "jeu perdre" which denotes a game
that one might lose. Similarly, the Middle English word "iuparti" or "jupartie" means an
uncertain game. 11 The genesis of the concept itself however rests deep in the ancient
Grecian view of tragedy and suffering and in the old Roman legal concepts of
punishment. Greek law bound prosecutor and judge to the original verdict as can be seen
in the remark of Demosthenes in 355 B. C. that "the laws forbid the same man to be tried
twice on the same issue." 12 The Justinian Digest 13 providing that "(a) governor should
not permit the same person to be again accused of crime of which he has been acquitted,"
14 suggests certain philosophical underpinnings believed to have been influenced by
works of the great Greek tragedians of the 5th century B.C. reflecting man's "tragic
vision" or the tragic view of life. For the ancient Greeks believed that man was
continuously pitted against a superior force that dictated his own destiny. But this
prevailing view was not to be taken in the sense of man passing from one misfortune to
another without relief, as this idea was repugnant to Greek sensibilities. Rather, it
expressed a universal concept of catharsis or vindication that meant misfortune resolving
itself into a final triumph, and persecution, into freedom and liberation. To suffer twice
for the same misfortune was anathema to ancient thought.

The 18th century B. C. Babylonian king and lawgiver Hammurabi recognized that
humans could err in prosecuting and rendering judgment, thus limits were needed on
prosecutors and judges. A gruesome but effective way of preventing a second trial by the
same prosecutor after an acquittal can be found in the first law of the Hammurabic Code:
"If a man has accused a man and has charged him with manslaughter and then has not
proved [it against him], his accuser shall be put to death." 15

The repugnance to double trials strongly expressed by the Catholic Church is

consistent with the interpretation by St. Jerome in 391 A. D. of the promise by God to his
people through the prophet Nahum that "(a)ffliction shall not rise up the second time" 16
and "(t)hough I have afflicted thee, I will afflict thee no more." 17 Taken to mean that
God does not punish twice for the same act, the maxim insinuated itself into canon law as
early as 847 A. D., succinctly phrased as "(n)ot even God judges twice for the same act."
18

The most famous cause célèbre on double jeopardy in the Middle Ages was the
dispute between the English King Henry II and his good friend, Thomas á Becket,
Archbishop of Canterbury. Henry wished to continue the observance of certain customs
initiated by his predecessors called "avitae consuetudines," one of the known purposes of
which was that clerics convicted of crimes before Church courts be delivered to lay
tribunals for punishment. He asserted in the Constitutions of Clarendon that the clergy
were also subject to the king's punishment. This was met with stinging criticism and stiff
opposition by the Archbishop who believed that allowing this practice would expose the
clergy to double jeopardy. The issue between the two erstwhile friends was never
resolved and remained open-ended, for Thomas was later on mercilessly murdered in his
cathedral, allegedly at the instance of his king. 19

It was in England though, a century ago, that double jeopardy was formally
institutionalized "as a maxim of common law" 20 based on the universal principles of
reason, justice and conscience, about which the Roman Cicero commented: "Nor is it one
thing at Rome and another at Athens, one now and another in the future, but among all
nations, it is the same." 21 But even as early as the 15th century, the English courts
already began to use the term "jeopardy" in connection with the doctrine against multiple
trials. 22 Thereafter, the principle appeared in the writings of Hale (17th c.), Lord Coke
(17th c.) and Blackstone (18th c.). 23 Lord Coke for instance described the protection
afforded by the rule as a function of three (3) related common law pleas: autrefois acquit,
autrefois convict and pardon. 24 In Vaux's Case, 25 it was accepted as established that
"the life of a man shall not be twice put in jeopardy for one and the same offense, and that
is the reason and cause that autrefois acquitted or convicted of the same offense is a good
plea . . ." Blackstone likewise observed that the plea of autrefois acquit or a formal
acquittal is grounded on the universal maxim of the common law of England that "(n)o
man is to be brought into jeopardy of his life more than once for the same offense. And
hence, it is allowed as a consequence that when a man is once fairly found not guilty
upon any indictment, or other prosecution before any court having competent jurisdiction
of the offense, he may plead such acquittal in bar of any subsequent accusation for the
same crime." 26

The English dogma on double jeopardy, recognized as an "indispensable

requirement of a civilized criminal procedure," became an integral part of the legal
system of the English colonies in America. The Massachusetts Body of Liberties of 1641,
an early compilation of principles drawn from the statutes and common law of England,
grandly proclaimed that "(n)o man shall be twice sentenced by Civil Justice for one and
the same crime, offence or Trespasse" and that "(e)verie Action between partie and
partie, and proceedings against delinquents in Criminal causes shall be briefly and
distinctly entered on the Rolles of every Court by the Recorder thereof." 27 Ineluctably,
this pronouncement became the springboard for the proposal of the First Congress of the
United States that double jeopardy be included in the Bill of Rights. It acknowledged that
the tradition against placing an individual twice in danger of a second prosecution for the
same offense followed ancient precedents in English law and legislation derived from
colonial experiences and necessities. Providing abundant grist for impassioned debate in
the US Congress, the proposal was subsequently ratified as part of the Fifth Amendment
to the Constitution.

In 1817 the Supreme Court of Tennessee dismissed an appeal by the State after an
acquittal from perjury, declaring that: "A writ of error, or appeal in the nature of a writ of
error, will not lie for the State in such a case. It is a rule of common law that no one shall
be brought twice into jeopardy for one and the same offense. Were it not for this salutary
rule, one obnoxious to the government might be harassed and run down by repeated
attempts to carry on a prosecution against him. Because of this rule, a new trial cannot be
granted in a criminal case where the defendant is acquitted. A writ of error will lie for the
defendant, but not against him." 28 Verily, these concepts were founded upon that great
fundamental rule of common law, "Nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem causa," in
substance expressed in the Constitution of the United States as: "Nor shall any person be
subject for the same offense, to be twice put into jeopardy of life or limb." It is in the
spirit of this benign rule of the common law, embodied in the Federal Constitution — a
spirit of liberty and justice, tempered with mercy — that, in several states of the Union, in
criminal cases, a writ of error has been denied to the State. 29

The relationship between the prohibition against second jeopardy and the power to
order a new trial following conviction or dismissal stirred a no small amount of
controversy in United States v. Gibert. 30 There, Mr. Justice Story, on circuit, declared
that "the court had no power to grant a new trial when the first trial had been duly had on
a valid indictment before a court of competent jurisdiction." The opinion formulated was
that the prohibition against double jeopardy applied equally whether the defendant had
been acquitted or convicted.

But it must be noted that even in those times, the power to grant a new trial in the
most serious cases was already being exercised by many American courts, the practice
having been observed from an early date, inspite of provisions of law against double
jeopardy. 31 For this reason, the rule in Gibert was stoutly resisted. 32 As if to taunt
Gibert, the 1839 case of United States v. Keen 33 declared that the constitutional
provision did not prohibit a new trial on defendant's motion after a conviction. In Hopt v.
Utah, 34 the defendant was retried three (3) times following reversals of his convictions.

Then in 1896 the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. Ball 35 affirmed that the
double jeopardy rule did not prevent a second trial when, on appeal, a conviction had
been set aside. It declared that a defendant who procured on appeal a reversal of a
judgment against him could be tried anew upon the same indictment or upon another
indictment for the same offense of which he had been convicted. This principle of
autrefois convict was expanded nine (9) years later in Trono v. United States 36 where the
Court affirmed the judgment of the Supreme Court of the Philippines by holding that
"since the plaintiffs in error had appealed their convictions of the lower offense in order
to secure a reversal, there was no bar to convicting them of the higher offense in
proceedings in the appellate court that were tantamount to a new trial." Mr. Justice
Peckham, holding for the Court, concluded that "the better doctrine is that which does not
limit the court or the jury upon a new trial, to a consideration of the question of guilt of
the lower offense of which the accused was convicted on the first trial, but that the
reversal of the judgment of conviction opens up the whole controversy and acts upon the
original judgment as if it had never been." 37 It was ratiocinated that the result was
justified not only on the theory that the accused had waived their right not to be retried
but also on the ground that "the constitutional provision was really never intended to . . .
cover the case of a judgment . . . which has been annulled at the request of the
accused . . ."
cDTaSH

It must be stressed though that Ball also principally ruled that it had long been
settled under the Fifth Amendment that a verdict of acquittal is final, ending a defendant's
jeopardy, and, even when "not followed by any judgment, is a bar to a subsequent
prosecution for the same offense. It is one of the elemental principles of our criminal law
that the Government cannot secure a new trial by means of an appeal, even though an
acquittal may appear to be erroneous."

In 1891 the United States Judiciary Act was passed providing that appeals or writs
of error may be taken from the district court or from the existing circuit courts direct to
the Supreme Court in any case that involved the construction of the Constitution. The
following year an issue was raised in United States v. Sanges 38 on whether this Act
conferred upon the government the right to sue out a writ of error in any criminal case. In
that case, existing rules on double jeopardy took a significant turn when the United States
Supreme Court observed that while English law was vague on the matter, it had been
settled by overwhelming American authority that the State had no right to sue out a writ
of error upon a judgment in favor of the defendant in a criminal case, except under and in
accordance with express statutes, whether that judgment was rendered upon a verdict of
acquittal, or upon the determination by the court of a question of law. The Court noted
that in a few states, decisions denying a writ of error to the State after a judgment for the
defendant on a verdict of acquittal proceeded upon the ground that to grant it would be to
put him twice in jeopardy, in violation of the constitutional provision. 39 Sanges therefore
fixed the rule that absent explicit legislative authority, the United States Government had
no right of appeal in criminal cases in case of an acquittal as it would expose the
defendant twice to jeopardy.

Notably, however, in 1892 the Attorneys General of the United States began to
recommend the passage of legislation allowing the Government to appeal in criminal
cases. Their primary objective was to resist the power of a single district judge (under the
law then obtaining) by dismissing an indictment to defeat any criminal prosecution
instituted by the Government. No action was taken on the proposal until 1906 when
President Theodore Roosevelt in his annual message to the US Congress demanded the
enactment of legislation on the matter. Consequently, on 2 March 1907 such legislative
authority was provided when the Criminal Appeals Act became a law 40 permitting the
United States to seek a writ of error from the Supreme Court from any decision
dismissing all indictment on the basis of the "invalidity or construction of the statute
upon which the indictments is founded." 41 The law narrowed the right to appeal by the
Government to cases in which the ground of the District Court's decision was invalidity
or construction of the statute upon which the charge was founded, and that a verdict in
favor of the defendant based on evidence could not be set aside on appeal no matter how
erroneous the legal theory upon which it may be based. For these purposes, it made no
difference whether the verdict be the result of the jury's decision or that of the judge. In
other words, Government could appeal from a decision dismissing an indictment or
arresting judgment on the basis of the statutory invalidity or misconstruction of the
pertinent criminal statute and from a decision sustaining a special plea in bar, so long as
the defendant would not be put in jeopardy. 42

On 10 December 1898 the Philippine Islands was ceded by Spain to the United
States by virtue of the Treaty of Paris of 1898 which was ratified by the State Parties on
11 April 1899. The Islands was placed under military rule until the establishment of the
Philippine Commission in 1902. On 23 April 1900 the military government issued
General Order No. 58 which amended the Code of Criminal Procedure then in force by,
among others, extending to the Islands the double jeopardy provision under the Fifth
Amendment of the US Constitution. This was pursuant to the 7 April 1900 Instructions of
President McKinley issued to the Philippine Commission headed by William Howard
Taft. The Instructions read in part: " . . . the Commission should bear in mind, and the
people of the Islands should be made to understand, that there are certain great principles
of government which have been made the basis of our governmental system, which we
deem essential to the rule of law . . . and maintained in their islands for the sake of their
liberty and happiness, however much they may conflict with the customs or laws of
procedure with which they are familiar . . . Upon every division and branch of the
Government of the Philippines therefore must be imposed these inviolable rules: . . . that .
. . no person shall be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense . . ." 43

General Order No. 58 was amended by Act No. 194 which permitted an appeal by
the government after acquittal. The Philippine Civil Government Act of 1 July 1902 of
the U.S. Congress repealed the Act, adopted and restored the same principle in Gen.
Order No. 58 as enunciated in the Fifth Amendment and in McKinley's Instructions by
providing immunity from second jeopardy for the same criminal offense. It did not take
long however for the meaning and significance of the doctrine held forth in McKinley's
Instructions to be placed under severe test and scrutiny.

In 1901 Mr. Thomas E. Kepner, a practicing lawyer in Manila, Philippines, was

charged with embezzlement of funds (estafa). He was tried by a court of first instance,
minus a jury, and was acquitted of the crime. The U.S. Government appealed to the
Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands and judgment was reversed. Kepner was
sentenced with imprisonment and suspended from public office or place of trust.

Questioning his conviction before the US Supreme Court, Kepner argued that the
appeal by the US government to the Philippine Supreme Court of his judgment of
acquittal constituted double jeopardy construed in light of existing US jurisprudence. On
the other hand, the Attorney General for the Philippines and the Solicitor General of the
United States jointly contended that the Philippine Bill of 1 July 1902 which included the
prohibition against double jeopardy should be construed from the perspective of the
system of laws prevailing in the Philippines prior to its cession to the United States.
Under this system, the Audiencia (Supreme Court) could entertain an appeal of a
judgment of acquittal since the proceedings before it were regarded not as a new trial but
an extension of preliminary proceedings in the court of first instance. The entire
proceedings constituted one continuous trial and the jeopardy that attached in the court of
first instance did not terminate until final judgment had been rendered by the Audiencia,
Double jeopardy was described not only in the Spanish law Fuero Real 44 as: "After a
man accused of any crime has been acquitted by the court, no one can afterwards accuse
him of the same offense (except in certain specified cases), but also in the Siete Partidas
45 which provided that: "If a man is acquitted by a valid judgment of any offense of
which he has been accused, no other person can afterwards accuse him of the offense . . ."
Under this system of law, a person was not regarded as jeopardized in the legal sense
until there had been a final judgment in the court of last resort. The lower courts then
were deemed examining courts, exercising preliminary jurisdiction only, and the accused
was not finally convicted or acquitted until the case had been passed upon in the
Audiencia or Supreme Court, whose judgment was subject to review by the Supreme
Court in Madrid (Spain) for errors of law, with power to grant a new trial.

The U.S. Supreme Court however threw out the Government's argument and held
that the proceedings after acquittal had placed the accused Kepner twice in jeopardy. It
declared in no uncertain terms that the appeal of the judgment of conviction was in
essence a trial de novo and that, whatever the Spanish tradition was, the purpose of
Congress was to carry some at least of the essential principles of American constitutional
jurisprudence to the Islands and to engraft them upon the law of these people newly
subject to its jurisdiction. There was little question therefore that Kepner soldered into
American jurisprudence the precedent that as to the defendant who had been acquitted by
the verdict duly returned and received, the court could take no other action than to order
his discharge. ". . . (I)t is then the settled law of this court that former jeopardy includes
one who has been acquitted by a verdict duly rendered, although no judgment be entered
on the verdict, and it was found upon a defective indictment. The protection is not . . .
against the peril of second punishment, but against being tried again for the same
offense." 46

This doctrine was echoed in United States v. Wills 47 where the Court further
clarified that "jeopardy implies an exposure to a lawful conviction for an offense of
which a person has already been acquitted . . ." It was reiterated in 1957 in Green v.
United States 48 in which Mr. Justice Black, writing for the Court, professed that the
constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy was designed to protect an individual
from being subjected to the hazards of trial and possible conviction more than once for an
alleged offense. Thus, under the Fifth Amendment, a verdict of acquittal was considered
final, ending the accused's jeopardy and that once a person has been acquitted of an
offense, he cannot be prosecuted again on the same charge.

American jurisprudence on the effect of appealed acquittals on double jeopardy

since then sailed on, following the main sea lanes charted by Kepner, but not without
encountering perturbance along the way. For it may be mentioned, albeit en passant, that
the case of Bartkus v. Illinois 49 did cause some amount of judicial soul-shaking in 1959
when it burst into the scene. Alfonse Bartkus was tried before a federal district court in
Illinois and was later acquitted by the jury. Less than a year later, Bartkus was indicted
this time by an Illinois grand jury on facts substantially identical to those of the federal
charge and was subsequently convicted. His conviction was affirmed by the Illinois
Supreme Court.

On certiorari, the U.S. Supreme Court, by a close vote of 5 to 4, affirmed the

conviction. The Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Frankfurter, declared that the Fifth
Amendment's double jeopardy provision was inapplicable to states so that an acquittal of
a federal indictment was no bar to a prosecution by a state based on the same charge.
Since there was no proof offered to show that the participation of the federal authorities
in the Illinois state prosecution was of such nature as to render the state proceedings a
mere cover for a federal prosecution to render the state indictment essentially a
constitutionally prohibited second prosecution, no double jeopardy attached.

Mr. Justice Black dissented, joined in by Mr. Chief Justice Warren and Mr. Justice
Douglas, with Mr. Justice Brennan writing a separate dissenting opinion. Black rued that
the Court's ruling by a majority of one only resulted in "further limiting the already
weakened constitutional guarantees against double prosecution," citing the earlier case of
United States v. Lanza, 50 where the Court allowed the federal conviction and
punishment of a man previously convicted and punished for identical acts by a state
court. The dissent called attention to the fact that in Bartkus, for the first time in its
history, the Court allowed the state conviction of a defendant already acquitted of the
same offense in the federal court. This, Mr. Justice Black asserted, was unacceptable, for
as the Court previously found in Palko v. Connecticut, 51 "double prosecutions for the
same offense are so contrary to the spirit of our free country that they violate even the
prevailing view of the Fourteenth Amendment since some of the privileges and
immunities of the Bill of Rights . . . have been taken over and brought within the
Fourteenth Amendment by process of absorption . . . One may infer, from the fewness of
the cases, that retrials after acquittal have been considered particularly obnoxious, worse
even, in the eyes of many, than retrials after conviction."
HASTCa

Whether such forceful pronouncements steered back into course meandering views
on double jeopardy is open to question. Nonetheless, the case of Fong Foo v. United
States, 52 decided per curiam, reaffirmed the pronouncements in Ball and Kepner that
"the verdict of acquittal was final, and could not be reviewed . . . without putting (the
petitioners) twice in jeopardy, and thereby violating the Constitution."

In the meantime, from 1907 up to 1970 the Criminal Appeals Act underwent
significant alterations. The 1942 amendment of its Section 682 permitted for the first time
appeals to the circuit appeals court from orders sustaining demurrer to indictment in cases
not directly appealable to the Supreme Court. 53 However, due to the many modifications
the law was subjected to, construction and interpretation became more laborious,
effectively transforming appeals into highly technical procedures. As such, the Criminal
Appeals Act developed into a judicial "bete noire," for even the U.S. Supreme Court
itself had "to struggle in a number of occasions with the vagaries of the said Act." 54 In
one of those unhappy efforts, it concluded that the Act was "a failure . . . a most unruly
child that has not improved with age." 55

The U.S. Congress finally got rid of the dismal statute in 1970 and replaced it with
a new Criminal Appeals Act intended to broaden the right of Government to appeal
whenever the Constitution would permit. It was apparent that the legislative body left to
the courts the prerogative to draw the constitutional limits of double jeopardy rather than
define them itself. Since then, pronouncements by the courts on the double jeopardy
guarantee of the Fifth Amendment focused on three (3) related protections: against a
second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; against a second prosecution for
the same offense after conviction; and, against multiple punishments for the same
offense. 56

In Wilson, 57 the Court expressed that the interests underlying these three (3)
protections are quite similar. Thus, when a defendant has been once convicted and
punished for a particular crime, principles of fairness and finality require that he be not
subjected to the possibility of further punishment by being tried or sentenced for the same
offense. 58 And when a defendant has been acquitted of an offense, the Clause guarantees
that the State shall not be permitted to make repeated attempts to convict him, "thereby
subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a
continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even
though innocent he may be found guilty." 59 It can thus be inferred from these cases that
the policy of avoiding multiple trials has been considered paramount so that exceptions to
the rule have been permitted only in few instances and under rigid conditions.

Accordingly, in United States v. Scott 60 the US Supreme Court synthesized two

(2) venerable principles of double jeopardy jurisprudence: first, the successful appeal of a
judgment of conviction on any ground other than the insufficiency of the evidence to
support the verdict poses no bar to further prosecution on the same charge; and second, a
judgment of acquittal, whether based on a jury verdict of not guilty or on a ruling by the
court that the evidence is insufficient to convict, may not be appealed and terminates the
prosecution when a second trial would be necessitated by a reversal. 61 It would seem
that the conditionality of "when a second trial would be necessitated by a reversal" was
attached thereto because ordinarily, the procedure obtaining was that if on appeal a
judgment of acquittal is reversed, i.e., a finding is had against the defendant, a remand of
the case for another trial may be allowed if needed.

At this juncture, it must be explained that under existing American law and
jurisprudence, appeals may be had not only from criminal convictions but also, in some
limited instances, from dismissals of criminal charges, sometimes loosely termed
"acquittals." But this is so as long as the judgments of dismissals do not involve
determination of evidence, such as when the judge: (a) issues a post-verdict acquittal, i.e.,
acquits the defendant on a matter of law after a verdict of guilty has been entered by a
trier of facts (a jury); (b) orders the dismissal on grounds other than insufficiency of
evidence, as when the statute upon which the indictment was based is defective; (c)
conducts a judicial process that is defective or flawed in some fundamental respect, such
as incorrect receipt or rejection of evidence, incorrect instructions, or prosecutorial
misconduct; (d) issues an order arresting judgment, i.e., an act of a trial judge refusing to
enter judgment on the verdict because of an error appearing on the face of the record that
rendered the judgment; 62 or, (e) pronounces judgment on a special plea in bar (a non
obstante plea) — one that does not relate to the guilt or innocence of the defendant, but
which is set up as a special defense relating to an outside matter but which may have
been connected with the case. 63 Interestingly, the common feature of these instances of
dismissal is that they all bear on questions of law or matters unrelated to a factual
resolution of the case which consequently, on appeal, will not involve a review of
evidence. Its logical effect in American law is to render appeals therefrom non-repugnant
to the Double Jeopardy Clause.

This contextual situation in which appeals from dismissals of criminal cases are
allowed under American rules of procedure does not obtain in the Philippines. To be sure,
United States v. Scott positively spelled out that if an acquittal was based on an
appreciation of the evidence adduced, no appeal would lie. Mr. Justice Rehnquist
explained that what may seem superficially to be a "disparity in the rules governing a
defendant's liability to be tried again" refers to the underlying purposes of the Double
Jeopardy Clause. He elaborated that "(a)s Kepner and Fong Foo illustrate, the law
attaches particular significance to an acquittal. To permit a second trial after an acquittal
however mistaken . . . would present an unacceptably high risk that the Government, with
its vastly superior resources, might wear down the defendant so that even though
innocent he may be found guilty. . . . On the other hand, to require a criminal defendant
to stand trial again after he has successfully invoked the statutory right of appeal to upset
his first conviction is not an act of governmental oppression of the sort against which
the . . . Clause was intended to protect."

In proposing a re-evaluation of Philippine jurisprudence on double jeopardy,

petitioner insists that Wilson and Scott have unquestionably altered the seascape of
double jeopardy previously navigated by Kepner and Ball. Using as its flagship the
pronouncement in Wilson that appeals of acquittal are possible provided the accused will
not be subjected to a second trial, it argues that this should apply to the case at bar
because, anyway, a review of the acquittal of private respondent Honorato Galvez will
not result in another trial inasmuch as the Court will only have to examine the evidence
adduced below to pass final judgment on the culpability of the accused.

Petitioner's own hermeneutic sense of the phrase "another trial" is that which
solely adverts to a proceeding before a competent trial court that rehears the case and
receives evidence anew to establish the facts after the case has been finally disposed of
by the Supreme Court. Obviously, it adheres to the Holmesian hypothesis in Kepner and,
for that matter, the concept under Spanish law then applicable in the Philippines before
the American colonization, that a trial consists of one whole continuing process from
reception of evidence by a trier of facts up to its final disposition by the Supreme Court.
But petitioner conveniently forgets that this theory has been consistently spurned by both
American and Philippine jurisprudence that has faithfully adhered to the doctrine that an
appeal of a judgment after the defendant had been acquitted by the court in a bench trial
is, quintessentially, a new trial. In Kepner, the Court regarded the two (2) events, i.e., trial
by the lower court and the appellate proceedings, as equivalent to two (2) separate trials,
and the evil that the Court saw in the procedure was plainly that of multiple prosecutions.
64 Although Kepner technically involved only one proceeding, the Court deemed the
second fact finding, that is, the review by the appellate court, as the equivalent of a
second trial. Accordingly, in subsequent cases, the Court has treated the Kepner principle
as being addressed to the evil of successive trials. 65

No less than the case of Wilson, 66 petitioner's main anchor for its propositions,
affirms this rule. There, the Court emphasized that it has, up to the present, rejected the
theory espoused by the dissenting Mr. Justice Holmes in Kepner that "a man cannot be
said to be more than once in jeopardy in the same cause however often he may be tried.
The jeopardy is one continuing jeopardy, from its beginning to the end of the cause." It
declared unequivocally that "we continue to be of the view that the policies underlying
the Double Jeopardy Clause militate against permitting the Government to appeal after a
verdict of acquittal." Wilson therefore pronounced that if acquittal is declared on the basis
of evidence adduced, double jeopardy attaches for that particular cause.

To explain further, Wilson involved an appeal by Government of a post-verdict

ruling of law issued by the trial judge resulting in the acquittal of the defendant due to
pre-indictment delay (a delay between the offense and the indictment prejudiced the
defendant) after a verdict of guilty had been entered by the jury. But it was not an
acquittal that involved "factual resolution." It was one anchored on an extraneous cause.
Factual resolution is defined in United States v. Sorenson 67 following the rulings in Ball,
Fong Foo and Sisson as "the finding that government failed to prove all the elements of
the offense " It is clear therefore that the acquittal of Wilson, not being based on evidence,
could be appealed. The rule therefore fixed in Wilson is that where a judge holds for the
defendant on a ruling of law, and not on the basis of evidence, after a jury entered a
verdict of guilty, the prosecution may appeal the acquittal without violating double
jeopardy, as this is allowed under the pertinent law. 68 This is so since no second trial
will ensue, as a reversal on appeal would merely reinstate the jury's verdict. 69 And if the
prosecution is upheld, the case simply goes back to the trial court for disposition of the
remaining matters. It bears emphasis that in Wilson, no double jeopardy problem was
presented because the appellate court, upon reviewing the asserted legal errors of the trial
judge, could simply order the jury's guilty verdict reinstated, no new fact-finding would
be necessary, and the defendant would not be put twice in jeopardy. 70

The case of Scott, also considerably relied upon by petitioner, involved an

accused who, having been indicted for several offenses, himself moved for the
dismissal of two (2) counts of the charges on the ground that his defense was
prejudiced by pre-indictment delay. The trial judge granted the motion. Government
appealed the dismissals but the appellate court rejected the appeal on the basis of
double jeopardy. This time the US Supreme Court reversed, holding that "(w)here a
defendant himself seeks to avoid his trial prior to its conclusion by a motion for a
mistrial, the Double Jeopardy Clause is not offended by a second prosecution. Such a
motion by the defendant is deemed to be a deliberate election on his part to forego his
valued right to have his guilt or innocence determined by the first trier of facts."

The inapplicability of this ruling to the case at bar is at once discernible. The
dismissal of the charges against private respondent Galvez was not upon his own
instance; neither did he seek to avoid trial, as it was in Scott, to be considered as
having waived his right to be adjudged guilty or innocent. Here, trial on the merits
was held during which both government and accused had their respective day in court.

We are therefore insufficiently persuaded to adopt petitioner's concept of

"another trial" because, as discussed above, it disregards the contextual interpretation
of the term in light of the legal and factual morphology of the double jeopardy
principle obtaining in Wilson and Scott. To sum up, in the cause before us, the records
show that respondent trial judge based his finding of acquittal, no matter how
erroneous it might seem to petitioner, upon the evidence presented by both parties.
The judgment here was no less than a factual resolution of the case. Thus, to the
extent that the post-verdict acquittal in Wilson was based on a ruling of law and not on
a resolution of facts, Wilson is not, to reiterate, pertinent to nor persuasive in the case
at bar. The same observation holds true for Scott. That it was the defendant who
secured the dismissal of the charges against him without any submission to either
judge or jury as to his guilt or innocence, but on a ground totally outside evidentiary
considerations, i.e., pre-indictment delay, definitely forecloses the applicability, if not
relevance, of Scott to the instant case.

Wilson, Scott and all other pertinent American case law considered, it still
behooves us to examine if at this time there is need to rethink our juristic philosophy
on double jeopardy vis-a-vis acquittals. In this respect, it would be instructive to see
how Philippine law and jurisprudence have behaved since Kepner. Has the principle
since then beneficially evolved, or has it remained an "unruly child that has not
improved with age?"

The moorings of double jeopardy in the Philippines, as Mr. Justice Manuel

Moran observed in People v. Tarok, 71 are not indigenous but are a matter of
constitutional or statutory history. Enunciated in the Constitution of the United States,
from there it found its way into this country, first, in the Philippine Bill of 1902, then
in the Jones Law of 1916, and finally, in the 1935 Philippine Constitution. Being thus
a mere recognition of the maxim of the common law, and adopted from the
Constitution of the United States, the principle of double jeopardy followed in this
jurisdiction the same line of development — no narrower nor wider — as in the
Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence.

While some reservations may be had about the contemporary validity of this
observation considering the variety of offsprings begotten, at least in the United
States, by the mother rule since then, perhaps it is safer to say that not much deviation
has occurred from the general rule laid out in Kepner. For Kepner may be said to have
been the lighthouse for the floundering issues on the effect of acquittals on jeopardy
as they sail safely home. The cases of People v. Bringas, 72 People v. Hernandez, 73
People v. Montemayor, 74 City Fiscal of Cebu v. Kintanar, 75 Republic v. Court of
Appeals, 76 and Heirs of Tito Rillorta v. Firme, 77 to name a few, are illustrative.
Certainly, the reason behind this has not been due to a stubborn refusal or reluctance
to "keep up with the Joneses," in a manner of speaking, but to maintain fidelity to the
principle carefully nurtured by our Constitution, statutes and jurisprudence. As early
as Julia v. Sotto 78 the Court warned that without this safeguard against double
jeopardy secured in favor of the accused, his fortune, safety and peace of mind would
be entirely at the mercy of the complaining witness who might repeat his accusation
as often as dismissed by the court and whenever he might see fit, subject to no other
limitation or restriction than his own will and pleasure.

The 1935 Philippine Constitution provided in its Sec. 20, Art. III, that "(n)o
person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is
punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall
constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act." The discussions by the
members of the Constitutional Convention of 1934 on the effect on double jeopardy
of an appeal from a judgment of acquittal are enlightening. Foreclosing appeal on a
judgment of acquittal was recognized by the Convention and the proposal to make an
appeal from acquittal permissible even only "on questions of law provided that a
verdict in favor of the defendant shall not be set aside by reason thereof" was strongly
voted down. Thus —

MR. GULLAS:

 Dear Colleagues . . . I wish to summarize our points. The amendment is

commendable but we submit that the reason against far outweighs the
reason in favor of it. In the first place it would tend to multiplicity of
suits and thus increase the burden of the Supreme Court. Second, suits
will be expensive if we meet fiscals who have an exaggerated opinion of
themselves, who have more ego than gray matter or more amor propio.
In the third place, as has been stated by a certain Gentleman, the
provision would convert the Supreme Court into a sort of academy of
consulting body. In the fourth place, as pointed out by Mr. Sevilla, fights
in the Supreme Court would be one-sided. In the fifth place, as
demonstrated by Delegate Labrador, the matter should be procedural
rather than constitutional. And lastly, as explained by Delegate Singson
Encarnacion, should the Supreme Court reverse the judgment of the
lower court, the defendant would suffer morally for the rest of his life.
He would walk around under a veil of humiliation, carrying with him a
stigma.
 For all these reasons, Mr. President, we oppose the amendment.

PRESIDENT:

 We can vote on the amendment. (Various delegates: YES). Those who are in
favor of the amendment please say YES. (A minority: YES). Those
against the amendment say NO. (A majority: NO). The amendment is
rejected . . .

(1934 Constitutional Convention Record, Journal No. 95, November 24, 1934,
p. 361)

The case of People v. Bringas 79 was the first case to be decided under this
Constitution pertinent to the matter at hand. There the Supreme Court, guided by
Kepner, cited its finding in United States v. Tam Yung Way 80 against the right of
appeal by the government from a judgment discharging the defendant in a criminal
case after he has been brought to trial, whether defendant was acquitted on the merits
or whether his discharge was based upon the trial court's conclusion of law that the
trial had failed for some reason to establish his guilt as charged. cTADCH

The Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution, specifically Sec. 22, Art. IV
thereof, reproduced verbatim the same double jeopardy provision of the 1935
Constitution. So did the 1987 Freedom Constitution drafted by the 1986
Constitutional Commission.

Noteworthy is that during the deliberations by the 1986 Constitutional

Commission attempts were made to introduce into the Fundamental Law the right of
government to appeal verdicts of acquittal promulgated by trial courts. The proposed
text for Sec. 14, Art. VIII, on the Judicial Department read as follows —

SECTION 12. . . . An appeal by the State and/or offended party from a

judgment of acquittal may be allowed in the discretion of the Supreme Court by
a petition for review on certiorari on the ground that it is manifestly against the
evidence with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. 81

This proposal was strongly opposed, the controlling consideration as expressed

by Commissioner Rustico de los Reyes being the "inequality of the parties in power,
situation and advantage in criminal cases where the government, with its unlimited
resources, trained detectives, willing officers and counsel learned in the law, stands
arrayed against a defendant unfamiliar with the practice of the courts, unacquainted
with their officers or attorneys, often without means and frequently too terrified to
make a defense, if he had one, while his character and his life, liberty or property
rested upon the result of the trial." 82
 Commissioner Joaquin Bernas likewise articulated his fear that "we could be
subjecting an accused individual to a very serious danger of harassment from a
prosecutor . . . The harm, however, which will follow from waving this flag of
possibility of appeal . . . could be much more than letting a guilty person go." 83 Put
to a vote, the proposal was defeated. 84

Then again, during the debates on double jeopardy under Sec. 23, Art. III, on
the Bill of Rights of the Constitution, Commissioner Ambrosio B. Padilla reopened
the matter already settled at the deliberations on the article on the Judiciary. The
following exchanges ensued:

MR. PADILLA:

 . . . On Section 23, on double jeopardy there was Davide resolution which

allowed an appeal in a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case that
states: An acquittal by a trial court is however appealable provided that
in such event the accused shall not be detained or put up bad. This has
been deleted by the Commission . . .

FR. BERNAS:

 Yes.

MR. PADILLA:

 I recall that when this same idea, but in different phraseology, was presented
and approved by the Committee on the Judiciary, the great objection
was that it would violate the immunity against double jeopardy. But I
recall the sponsor admitted, after I had explained the day before that it
did not violate double jeopardy but it was unnecessary and harmful.
What is the real position, Mr. Presiding Officer? Is it in violation of
double jeopardy or is it just because it need not be stated in the Bill of
Rights nor in the Article on the Judiciary?

FR. BERNAS:

 I explained my position on that Mr. Presiding Officer, when we considered the

matter in the Article on the Judiciary. The position I took was that it was
not a departure from existing jurisprudence. In fact, it was more strict
than existing jurisprudence in that it required not just abuse of
discretion but it also required that the judgment be clearly against the
evidence.

MR. PADILLA:
  That is correct Mr. Presiding Officer because we want to make the exercise of
that right by the state or offended party restrictive not only through a
petition for review on certiorari in the discretion of the Supreme Court
which may dismiss it outright, but also on certain grounds that are
really covered by "in excess or lack of jurisdiction.

 But my common impression Mr. Presiding Officer, is that most lawyers are of
the opinion that when a judgment of acquittal is rendered by a trial
court, that is final, executory and not appealable.

 Does not the sponsor think, Mr. Presiding Officer, an appeal from an arbitrary
judgment of acquittal rendered by a few corrupt judges of the offended
party or the state will improve the administration of justice?

FR. BERNAS:

 Mr. Presiding Officer, I have expressed my position on this when we voted on

Third Reading on the Article on the Judiciary. But if the Commissioner
wants to raise the matter for reconsideration, he can present a motion
on the floor.

Padilla did not ask for a reconsideration. 85

The Rules of Court on Criminal Procedure relative to double jeopardy and the
effect thereon of acquittals adhere strictly to constitutional provisions. The pertinent
portions of Sec. 7 of Rule 117 thereof provide —

SECTION 7.  Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. —

When an accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of
competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal
charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the
accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or
the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense
charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for
any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense
charged in the former complaint or information . . .

From this procedural prescription alone, there can be no mistaking the

requisites for invoking double jeopardy: (a) a valid complaint or information; (b)
before a competent court before which the same is filed; (c) the defendant had pleaded
to the charge; and, (d) the defendant was acquitted, or convicted, or the case against
him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. 86 It bears
repeating that where acquittal is concerned, the rules do not distinguish whether it
occurs at the level of the trial court or on appeal from a judgment of conviction. This
firmly establishes the finality-of-acquittal rule in our jurisdiction. Therefore, as
mandated by our Constitution, statutes and cognate jurisprudence, an acquittal is final
and unappealable on the ground of double jeopardy, whether it happens at the trial
court level or before the Court of Appeals.

In general, the rule is that a remand to a trial court of a judgment of acquittal

brought before the Supreme Court on certiorari cannot be had unless there is a
finding of mistrial, as in Galman v. Sandiganbayan. 87 Condemning the trial before
the Sandiganbayan of the murder of former Senator Benigno "Ninoy" Aquino, which
resulted in the acquittal of all the accused, as a sham, this Court minced no words in
declaring that "[i]t is settled doctrine that double jeopardy cannot be invoked against
this Court's setting aside of the trial court's judgment of acquittal where the
prosecution which represents the sovereign people in criminal cases is denied due
process . . . . [T]he sham trial was but a mock trial where the authoritarian president
ordered respondents Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan to rig the trial, and closely
monitored the entire proceedings to assure the predetermined final outcome of
acquittal and absolution as innocent of all the respondent-accused . . . . Manifestly, the
prosecution and the sovereign people were denied due process of law with a partial
court and biased Tanodbayan under the constant and pervasive monitoring and
pressure exerted by the authoritarian president to assure the carrying out of his
instructions. A dictated, coerced and scripted verdict of acquittal, such as that in the
case at bar, is a void judgment. In legal contemplation, it is no judgment at all. It
neither binds nor bars anyone. Such a judgment is 'a lawless thing which can be
treated as an outlaw.' It is a terrible and unspeakable affront to the society and the
people. 'To paraphrase Brandeis: If the authoritarian head of government becomes the
lawbreaker, he breeds contempt for the law; he invites every man to become a law
unto himself; he invites anarchy.' The contention of respondent-accused that the
Sandiganbayan judgment of acquittal ended the case and could not be appealed or
reopened without being put in double jeopardy was forcefully disposed of by the
Court in People v. Court of Appeals: 88

. . . That is the general rule and presupposes a valid judgment. As earlier

pointed out, however, respondent Court's Resolution of acquittal was a void
judgment for having been issued without jurisdiction. No double jeopardy
attaches, therefore. A void judgment is, in legal effect, no judgment at all. By it
no rights are divested. Through it, no rights can be attained. Being worthless, all
proceedings founded upon it are equally worthless. It neither binds nor bars
anyone. All acts performed under it and all claims flowing out of it are
void . . . . Private respondents invoke 'justice for the innocent.' For justice to
prevail the scales must balance. It is not to be dispensed for the accused alone.
The interests of the society which they have wronged, must also be equally
considered. A judgment of conviction is not necessarily a denial of justice. A
verdict of acquittal neither necessarily spells a triumph of justice. To the party
 wronged, to the society offended, it could also mean injustice. This is where the
Courts play a vital role. They render justice where justice is due.

Thus, the doctrine that "double jeopardy may not be invoked after trial" may apply
only when the Court finds that the "criminal trial was a sham" because the
prosecution representing the sovereign people in the criminal case was denied due
process. 89 The Court in People v. Bocar 90 rationalized that the "remand of the
criminal case for further hearing and/or trial before the lower courts amounts merely
to a continuation of the first jeopardy, and does not expose the accused to a second
jeopardy." 91

The fundamental philosophy highlighting the finality of an acquittal by the trial

court cuts deep into "the humanity of the laws and in a jealous watchfulness over the
rights of the citizen, when brought in unequal contest with the State. . . ." 92 Thus
Green expressed the concern that "(t)he underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained
in at least the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is that the State with all its
resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an
individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense
and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity,
as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent, he may be found
guilty." 93

It is axiomatic that on the basis of humanity, fairness and justice, an acquitted

defendant is entitled to the right of repose as a direct consequence of the finality of his
acquittal. The philosophy underlying this rule establishing the absolute nature of
acquittals is "part of the paramount importance criminal justice system attaches to the
protection of the innocent against wrongful conviction." 94 The interest in the finality-
of-acquittal rule, confined exclusively to verdicts of not guilty, is easy to understand:
it is a need for "repose," a desire to know the exact extent of one's liability. 95 With
this right of repose, the criminal justice system has built in a protection to insure that
the innocent, even those whose innocence rests upon a jury's leniency, will not be
found guilty in a subsequent proceeding. 96

Related to his right of repose is the defendant's interest in his right to have his
trial completed by a particular tribunal. 97 This interest encompasses his right to have
his guilt or innocence determined in a single proceeding by the initial jury empanelled
to try him, for society's awareness of the heavy personal strain which the criminal trial
represents for the individual defendant is manifested in the willingness to limit
Government to a single criminal proceeding to vindicate its very vital interest in
enforcement of criminal laws. 98 The ultimate goal is prevention of government
oppression; the goal finds its voice in the finality of the initial proceeding. 99 As
observed in Lockhart v. Nelson, 100 "(t)he fundamental tenet animating the Double
Jeopardy Clause is that the State should not be able to oppress individuals through the
abuse of the criminal process." Because the innocence of the accused has been
confirmed by a final judgment, the Constitution conclusively presumes that a second
trial would be unfair. 101

Petitioner resists the applicability of the finality-of-acquittal doctrine to the

Philippine adjudicative process on the ground that the principle is endemic to the
American justice system as it has specific application only to jury verdicts of
acquittal, and thus finds no valid use in our jurisdiction since the "underlying rationale
of jury acquittals, a special feature of American constitutional law, has no parallel nor
analogy in the Philippine legal system." This is a rather strained if not facile approach
to the issue at hand, for it attempts to introduce the theory that insofar as the objective
of fact-finding is concerned, fact-finding forming the core of the philosophy behind
double jeopardy, there exists a difference between a jury acquittal and a "judge
acquittal, Philippine version." To support its contention, petitioner sedulously explains
that in the United States there is an "emerging consensus to differentiate the
constitutional impact of jury verdicts of acquittal vis-a-vis judgments of acquittal
rendered by the bench." While this consensus may have emerged in the United States,
it is not difficult to surmise that it must have been so because of countless instances of
conflict between jury verdicts and judgments of trial judges in the same case.
Resultantly, procedural statutes and jurisprudence have been wont to draw lines of
distinction between the two, hopefully to keep each other at bay. Since this
phenomenon does not occur in our jurisdiction, as we have no juries to speak of,
petitioner's hypothesis is inappropriate. STIcaE

Be that as it may, the invalidity of petitioner's argument lies in its focus on the
instrumentality empowered to rule against the evidence, i.e., the American jury versus
the Philippine judge, no matter how emphatic it qualifies its proposition with the
phrase "underlying rationale of jury acquittals," rather than on the essential function
of fact-finding itself which consists of reception, sifting and evaluation of evidence.
Where the main task of fact-finding is concerned, there exists no difference between
the American jury and the Philippine trial judge. Both are triers of facts. This much
petitioner has to concede. The attempt therefore to close the door on the applicability
of the finality rule to our legal system abjectly fails when one considers that,
universally, the principal object of double jeopardy is the protection from being tried
for the second time, whether by jury or judge. Thus, "emerging American consensus
on jury acquittals" notwithstanding, on solid constitutional bedrock is well engraved
our own doctrine that acquittals by judges on evidentiary considerations cannot be
appealed by government. The jurisprudential metes and bounds of double jeopardy
having been clearly defined by both constitution and statute, the issue of the effect of
an appeal of a verdict of acquittal upon a determination of the evidence on the
constitutionally guaranteed right of an accused against being twice placed in jeopardy
should now be finally put to rest.
 Petitioner assails the decision rendered by the court a quo as blatantly
inconsistent with the material facts and evidence on record, reason enough to charge
respondent judge with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction
resulting in a denial of due process. Citing People v. Pablo, 102 it alleges that
"respondent aggravated his indiscretion by not . . . reviewing the evidence already
presented for a proper assessment. . . . It is in completely ignoring the evidence
already presented . . . that the respondent judge committed a grave abuse of
discretion." It adds that "discretion must be exercised regularly, legally and within the
confines of procedural due process, i.e., after evaluation of the evidence submitted by
the prosecution. Any order issued in the absence thereof is not a product of sound
judicial discretion but of whim and caprice and outright arbitrariness." 103

Private respondent remonstrates against the propriety of petitioner's certiorari

as a mode of impugning the judgment of acquittal not only as a strategy to
camouflage the issue of double jeopardy but also for the fact that, contrary to
petitioner's assertions, evidence in the case at bar was subjected to scrutiny, review,
assessment and evaluation by respondent trial judge. By reason thereof, there cannot
be perceived grave abuse of discretion on the part of the judge to warrant issuance of
the great writ of certiorari.

We agree. The office of the common law writ of certiorari is to bring before
the court for inspection the record of the proceedings of an inferior tribunal in order
that the superior court may determine from the face of the record whether the inferior
court has exceeded its jurisdiction, or has not proceeded according to the essential
requirements of the law. However, the original function and purpose of the writ have
been so modified by statutes and judicial decisions. It is particularly so in the field of
criminal law when the state is applying for the writ and problems arise concerning the
right of the state to appeal in a criminal case. As a general rule, the prosecution cannot
appeal or bring error proceedings from a judgment in favor of the defendant in a
criminal case in the absence of a statute clearly conferring that right. The problem
comes into sharper focus when the defendant contends, in effect, that the prosecution
is attempting to accomplish by the writ what it could not do by appeal, and that his
constitutional rights are being thus encroached upon. 104

Generally, under modern constitutions and statutes, provisions are available as

guides to the court in determining the standing of the prosecution to secure by
certiorari a review of a lower court decision in a criminal case which has favored the
defendant. In most instances, provisions setting forth the scope and function of
certiorari are found together with those relating to the right of the state to appeal or
bring error in criminal matters. There is some indication that courts view the writ of
certiorari as an appeal in itself where the applicant shows that there is no other
adequate remedy available, 105 and it is not uncommon to find language in cases to
the effect that the state should not be permitted to accomplish by certiorari what it
 cannot do by appeal. 106 Thus, if a judgment sought to be reviewed was one entered
after an acquittal by a jury or the discharge of the accused on the merits by the trial
court, the standing of the prosecution to review it by certiorari is far more likely to be
denied than if it were such an order as one sustaining a demurrer to, or quashing the
indictment, or granting a motion for arrest of judgment after a verdict of guilty. 107

Philippine jurisprudence has been consistent in its application of the Double

Jeopardy Clause such that it has viewed with suspicion, and not without good reason,
applications for the extraordinary writ questioning decisions acquitting an accused on
ground of grave abuse of discretion.

The petition at hand which seeks to nullify the decision of respondent judge
acquitting the accused Honorato Galvez goes deeply into the trial court's appreciation
and evaluation in esse of the evidence adduced by the parties. A reading of the
questioned decision shows that respondent judge considered the evidence received at
trial. These consisted among others of the testimonies relative to the positions of the
victims vis-a-vis the accused and the trajectory, location and nature of the gunshot
wounds, and the opinion of the expert witness for the prosecution. While the
appreciation thereof may have resulted in possible lapses in evidence evaluation, it
nevertheless does not detract from the fact that the evidence was considered and
passed upon. This consequently exempts the act from the writ's limiting requirement
of excess or lack of jurisdiction. As such, it becomes an improper object of and
therefore non-reviewable by certiorari. To reiterate, errors of judgment are not to be
confused with errors in the exercise of jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., concurs and also with Mr. Justice Panganiban in his separate
opinion.

Puno, J., I also agree with J. Panganiban's separate opinion.

Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes

and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Melo, J., in the result in view of the death of Mayor Galvez, although I must say
that the discussion on double jeopardy and the separate opinion of Justice Panganiban are
well taken.
 Panganiban, J., Please see separate opinion.

Ynares-Santiago, J., is on leave.

||| (People v. Velasco, G.R. No. 127444, [September 13, 2000], 394 PHIL 517-564)

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 200302. April 20, 2016.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. GERRY LIPATA y

ORTIZA, appellant.

DECISION

CARPIO, J : p

The Case
G.R. No. 200302 is an appeal 1 assailing the Decision 2 promulgated on 31
May 2011 by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04461. The CA
affirmed the Decision 3 dated 23 March 2010 of Branch 85 of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City (RTC) in Criminal Case No. Q-05-136584. The RTC found
appellant Gerry Lipata y Ortiza (appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Murder and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The
RTC also ordered appellant to pay damages to the heirs of Rolando Cueno (Cueno). 4
The Facts
Appellant was charged with the crime of Murder in an Information which reads
as follows:
That on or about the 1st day of September, 2005, in Quezon City,
Philippines, the said accused, conspiring, confederating with two (2) other
persons whose true names, identities and definite whereabouts have not as yet
been ascertained and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill and with
evident premeditation and treachery, and taking advantage of superior
strength, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and employ personal violence upon the person of one RONALDO
CUENO Y BONIFACIO, by then and there stabbing him repeatedly with
bladed weapons, hitting him on the different parts of his body, thereby
inflicting upon him serious and mortal stab wounds which were the direct and
 immediate cause of his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of
Ronaldo Cueno y Bonifacio.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 5
Appellant was arraigned on 11 October 2005, and entered a plea of not guilty
to the charge. Pre-trial conference was terminated on 26 October 2005, and trial on
the merits ensued.
The CA summarized the parties' evidence as follows:
The Prosecution['s] Evidence
Mercelinda Valzado, sister-in-law of the victim Rolando Cueno,
testified that on September 1, 2005 at around 6:00 p.m., she was in her house
located in [sic] Lot 34, Block 4, Sipna Compound, Bagong Silangan, Quezon
City. She was about to leave the house to go to the market when she saw
appellant, his brother Larry Lipata and a certain [Rudy] attacking the victim
by repeatedly stabbing him. She was at a distance of more or less ten (10)
meters from the incident. Shocked at what she had just witnessed, she shouted
for help and pleaded the assailants to stop, but they did not stop stabbing the
victim. In her account, she recalled that the assailants, including appellant,
used a tres cantos, an ice pick and a broken piece of glass of Red Horse
[bottle]. At one point, the victim managed to take the knife away from
appellant and brandished the same at his attackers. Thereafter, the victim fell
on the ground. Upon seeing the victim fall, appellant and the other assailants
left the scene. Through the help of some neighbors, Mercelinda rushed the
victim to a hospital but he was pronounced dead on arrival. CAIHTE

Criz Reymiluz Cueno, daughter of the victim, testified that she saw
appellant together with Larry Lipata and Rudy Lipata [stab] her father to death
in front of their house. She recounted that upon arriving at home from work
on September 1, 2005 at around 6:00 p.m., her father immediately went to the
house of her aunt Mercelinda Valzado, which was located only a block away
from their house, to ask for malunggay leaves. Upon coming home from her
aunt's house, the victim was attacked by the Lipatas which prompted the
victim to run away. Thinking that his assailants were no longer around, the
victim proceeded to their [sic] house but then the Lipatas stabbed him to
death. She was at a distance of six (6) to eight (8) meters away from the scene.
She further testified that she had no knowledge of any reason why the Lipatas
would kill her father, but her father's death brought her pain and sadness and
anger against the perpetrators of her father's killing.
The Defense['s] Evidence
The defense presented a sole witness in the person of appellant
himself. According to appellant, he was resting in his house in Sipna
Compound, Brgy. Bagong Silangan, Quezon City on September 1, 2005 at
around 6:00 p.m. when two children, namely John Paul Isip and a certain
Rommel, called him and told him to help his brother, Larry Lipata. He
immediately rushed to his brother and upon arrival he saw Larry being
 stabbed by the victim. He instantaneously assisted his brother but the victim
continued stabbing Larry, causing Larry to fall to the ground. Thereafter,
appellant managed to grab the knife from the victim and stab the victim. Then
he fled from the scene [of the crime] because he was wounded. Appellant's
sister-in-law, a certain Lenlen, brought him to the Amang Medical Center for
treatment of his stab wound where he was apprehended by police officers. 6
The RTC's Ruling
The RTC noted that since appellant raised the justifying circumstance of
defense of a relative, he hypothetically admitted the commission of the crime. Hence,
the burden of proving his innocence shifted to appellant. The RTC found that the
defense failed to adequately establish the element of unlawful aggression on the part
of Cueno. There was no actual or imminent danger to the life of appellant or of his
brother Larry. On the contrary, the three Lipata brothers (appellant, Larry, and Rudy)
7 employed treachery and took advantage of their superior strength when they
attacked Cueno after Cueno left the house of his sister-in-law. Cueno suffered 17 stab
wounds on his trunk from the Lipata brothers. The existence of multiple stab wounds
on the trunk of the unarmed Cueno is inconsistent with appellant's theory of defense
of a relative. The RTC, however, ruled that the prosecution failed to show conclusive
proof of evident premeditation.
The dispositive portion of the RTC's decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, the Court
here[b]y renders judgment finding the accused GERRY LIPATA Y ORTIZA
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and he is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of reclusion perpetua from
twenty (20) years and one (1) day to forty (40) years.
The accused is hereby adjudged to pay the heirs of Rolando Cueno the
following amounts:
(a) Php50,000.00 representing civil indemnity ex delicto of the
accused;
(b) Php120,550.00 representing the actual damages incurred by
the heirs of Rolando Cueno, incident to his death plus 12%
interest per annum computed from 6 September 2005 until
fully paid;
(c) Php50,000.00 as moral damages for the mental and
emotional anguish suffered by the heirs arising from the death
of Rolando Cueno; and
(d) Php25,000[.00] as exemplary damages.
The accused shall be credited with the full period of his preventive
imprisonment, subject to the conditions imposed under Article 29 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended.
SO ORDERED. 8
 Appellant, through the Public Attorney's Office (PAO), filed a notice of appeal
9on 6 April 2010. The RTC granted appellant's notice in an Order 10 dated 19 April
2010.
The CA's Ruling
The CA dismissed appellant's appeal and affirmed the decision of the RTC.
The CA agreed with the RTC's ruling that appellant's claim of defense of a relative
must fail. There was no actual or imminent threat on the life of appellant or of his
brother Larry. There was also no reason for appellant to stab Cueno. Cueno was
outnumbered by the Lipata brothers, three to one. The requirement of lack of
provocation on the part of appellant is negated by the multiple stab wounds that
Cueno sustained.
The CA disagreed with appellant's contention that the prosecution failed to
establish treachery. The CA pointed out that Cueno was not forewarned of any
impending threat to his life. Cueno was unarmed, and went to his sister-in-law's house
to gather malunggay leaves. The Lipata brothers, on the other hand, were readily
armed with tres cantos, an icepick, and a broken piece of glass from a Red Horse
bottle. The execution of the Lipata brothers' attack made it impossible for Cueno to
retaliate.
The CA also disagreed with appellant's contention that there was no abuse of
superior strength. The three Lipata brothers were all armed with bladed weapons
when they attacked the unarmed Cueno. The Lipata brothers refused to stop stabbing
Cueno until they saw him unconscious.
The dispositive portion of the CA's decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the appeal to be bereft of merit, the same is
hereby DISMISSED. The appealed decision of the trial court convicting
appellant of the crime of murder is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED. 11
The PAO filed a notice of appeal 12 on behalf of appellant on 10 June 2011.
The CA ordered the immediate elevation of the records to this Court in its 30 June
2011 Resolution. 13DETACa

Appellant's Death Prior to Final Judgment

This Court, in a Resolution dated 13 June 2012, 14 noted the records forwarded
by the CA and required the Bureau of Corrections (BuCor) to confirm the
confinement of appellant. The BuCor, in a letter dated 26 July 2012, informed this
Court that there is no record of confinement of appellant as of date. In a Resolution
dated 10 September 2012, 15 this Court required the Quezon City Jail Warden to
transfer appellant to the New Bilibid Prison and to report compliance within ten days
from notice. The Quezon City Jail Warden, in a letter dated 22 October 2012, 16
informed this Court that appellant passed away on 13 February 2011. The former
Quezon City Jail Warden wrote to the RTC about appellant's demise in a letter dated
23 February 2011. Attached to the 22 October 2012 letter were photocopies of
appellant's death certificate and medical certificate, as well as the former Quezon City
Jail Warden's letter. 17 In a Resolution dated 7 January 2013, 18 this Court noted the 22
October 2012 letter from the Quezon City Jail Warden, and required the parties to
submit their supplemental briefs on the civil aspect of the case if they so desire.
The Office of the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation dated 18 March 2013,
19 which stated that it had already exhaustively argued the relevant issues in its
appellee's brief. The PAO, on the other hand, filed a supplemental brief on 26 March
2013. 20
In view of appellant's death prior to the promulgation of the CA's decision, this
Court issued a Resolution dated 25 September 2013 which ordered the PAO "(1) to
SUBSTITUTE the legal representatives of the estate of the deceased appellant as
party; and (2) to COMMENT on the civil liability of appellant within ten (10) days
from receipt of this Resolution." 21
The PAO filed its Manifestation with Comment on the Civil Liability of the
Deceased Appellant on 29 November 2013. 22 According to the Public Attorney's
Office-Special and Appealed Cases Service, the relatives of the deceased appellant
have not communicated with it since the case was assigned to its office on 29
September 2010. The PAO sent a letter on 4 November 2013 to Lilia Lipata, who was
appellant's next of kin per official records. Despite receipt of the letter, the relatives of
appellant still failed to communicate with the PAO.
In its Manifestation, the PAO stated that:
xxx xxx xxx
9. Considering that the civil liability in the instant case arose from and is
based solely on the act complained of, i.e., murder, the same does not survive
the death of the deceased appellant. Thus, in line with the abovecited ruling
[People v. Jamie Ayochok, G.R. No. 175784, 25 August 2010, 629 SCRA 324,
citing People v. Rogelio Bayotas, G.R. No. 102007, 2 September 1994, 236
SCRA 239], the death of the latter pending appeal of his conviction
extinguished his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely
thereon.
10. This being so, it is respectfully submitted that the necessity to substitute
the legal representatives of the estate of the deceased as party does not arise.
23

On 9 July 2014, this Court issued a Resolution which declared that "the [PAO]
shall continue as the legal representative of the estate of the deceased [appellant] for
purposes of representing the estate in the civil aspect of this case." 24
The Court's Ruling
 At the outset, we declare that because of appellant's death prior to the
promulgation of the CA's decision, there is no further need to determine appellant's
criminal liability. Appellant's death has the effect of extinguishing his criminal
liability. Article 89 (1) of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Article 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. — Criminal liability
is totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary
penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender
occurs before final judgment;
xxx xxx xxx
What this Court will discuss further is the effect of appellant's death with
regard to his civil liability. In 1994, this Court, in People v. Bayotas, 25 reconciled the
differing doctrines on the issue of whether the death of the accused pending appeal of
his conviction extinguishes his civil liability. We concluded that "[u]pon death of the
accused pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is extinguished
inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action
instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished,
grounded as it is on the criminal." 26
We also ruled that "if the private offended party, upon extinction of the civil
liability ex delicto desires to recover damages from the same act or omission
complained of, he must subject to Section 1, Rule 111 ([of the then applicable] 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended) file a separate civil action, this time
predicated not on the felony previously charged but on other sources of obligation.
The source of obligation upon which the separate civil action is premised determines
against whom the same shall be enforced." 27
We proceeded to distinguish the defendants among the different causes of
action. If the act or omission complained of arises from quasi-delict or, by provision
of law, results in an injury to person or real or personal property, the separate civil
action must be filed against the executor or administrator of the estate pursuant to
Section 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court. 28 On the other hand, if the act or omission
complained of arises from contract, the separate civil action must be filed against the
estate of the accused pursuant to Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court. 29
We summarized our ruling in Bayotas as follows:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his
criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As
opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to
final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability
directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil
liability ex delicto in senso strictiore."
 2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the
death of accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of
obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these
other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result
of the same act or omission: aDSIHc

a) Law

b) Contracts

c) Quasi-contracts

d) . . .

e) Quasi-delicts

3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an

action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a
separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules
on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be
enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused,
depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as
explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to
file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the
prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-
offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the
statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the
pendency of the criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of
the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible
deprivation of right by prescription. 30 (Emphases supplied)
The promulgation of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure in 2000
provided for the effect of the death of the accused after arraignment and during the
pendency of the criminal action to reflect our ruling in Bayotas:
Sec. 4. Effect of death on civil actions. — The death of the accused
after arraignment and during the pendency of the criminal action shall
extinguish the civil liability arising from the delict. However, the independent
civil action instituted under Section 3 of this Rule or which thereafter is
instituted to enforce liability arising from other sources of obligation may be
continued against the estate or legal representative of the accused after proper
substitution or against said estate, as the case may be. The heirs of the accused
may be substituted for the deceased without requiring the appointment of an
executor or administrator and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for
the minor heirs.
 The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or
representatives to appear and be substituted within a period of thirty (30) days
from notice.
A final judgment entered in favor of the offended party shall be
enforced in the manner especially provided in these rules for prosecuting
claims against the estate of the deceased.
If the accused dies before arraignment, the case shall be dismissed
without prejudice to any civil action the offended party may file against the
estate of the deceased.
Contrary to the PAO's Manifestation with Comment on the Civil Liability of
the Deceased Appellant, 31 Cueno died because of appellant's fault. Appellant caused
damage to Cueno through deliberate acts. 32 Appellant's civil liability ex quasi delicto
may now be pursued because appellant's death on 13 February 2011, before the
promulgation of final judgment, extinguished both his criminal liability and civil
liability ex delicto.
Despite the recognition of the survival of the civil liability for claims under
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, as well as from sources of obligation
other than delict in both jurisprudence and the Rules, and our subsequent designation
of the PAO as the "legal representative of the estate of the deceased [appellant] for
purposes of representing the estate in the civil aspect of this case," 33 the current
Rules, pursuant to our pronouncement in Bayotas, 34 require the private offended
party, or his heirs, in this case, to institute a separate civil action to pursue their claims
against the estate of the deceased appellant. The independent civil actions in Articles
32, 33, 34 and 2176, as well as claims from sources of obligation other than delict, are
not deemed instituted with the criminal action but may be filed separately by the
offended party even without reservation. 35 The separate civil action proceeds
independently of the criminal proceedings and requires only a preponderance of
evidence. 36 The civil action which may thereafter be instituted against the estate or
legal representatives of the decedent is taken from the new provisions of Section 16 of
Rule 3 37 in relation to the rules for prosecuting claims against his estate in Rules 86
and 87. 38
Upon examination of the submitted pleadings, we found that there was no
separate civil case instituted prior to the criminal case. Neither was there any
reservation for filing a separate civil case for the cause of action arising from quasi-
delict. Under the present Rules, the heirs of Cueno should file a separate civil case in
order to obtain financial retribution for their loss. The lack of a separate civil case for
the cause of action arising from quasi-delict leads us to the conclusion that, a decade
after Cueno's death, his heirs cannot recover even a centavo from the amounts
awarded by the CA.
However, for similar cases in the future, we refer to the Committee on the
Revision of the Rules of Court for study and recommendation to the Court En Banc
appropriate amendments to the Rules for a speedy and inexpensive resolution of such
similar cases with the objective of indemnifying the private offended party or his heirs
in cases where an accused dies after conviction by the trial court but pending appeal.
In Lumantas v. Calapiz, 39 this Court declared that our law recognizes that an
acquittal based on reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused does not exempt the
accused from civil liability ex delicto which may be proved by preponderance of
evidence. This Court's pronouncement in Lumantas is based on Article 29 of the Civil
Code:
Art. 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the
ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil
action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted. Such action
requires only a preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the defendant, the
court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for damages in case the
complaint should be found to be malicious.
If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable
doubt, the court shall so declare. In the absence of any declaration to that
effect, it may be inferred from the text of the decision whether or not the
acquittal is due to that ground.ETHIDa

We also turn to the Code Commission's justification of its recognition of the

possibility of miscarriage of justice in these cases:
The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case also
releases him from civil liability is one of the most serious flaws in the
Philippine legal system. It has given rise to numberless instances of
miscarriage of justice, where the acquittal was due to a reasonable doubt in the
mind of the court as to the guilt of the accused. The reasoning followed is that
inasmuch as the civil responsibility is derived from the criminal offense, when
the latter is not proved, civil liability cannot be demanded.
This is one of those cases where confused thinking leads to
unfortunate and deplorable consequences. Such reasoning fails to draw a clear
line of demarcation between criminal liability and civil responsibility, and to
determine the logical result of the distinction. The two liabilities are separate
and distinct from each other. One affects the social order and the other, private
rights. One is for the punishment or correction of the offender while the other
is for reparation of damages suffered by the aggrieved party. The two
responsibilities are so different from each other that article 1813 of the present
(Spanish) Civil Code reads thus: "There may be a compromise upon the civil
action arising from a crime; but the public action for the imposition of the
legal penalty shall not thereby be extinguished." It is just and proper that, for
the purpose of the imprisonment of or fine upon the accused, the offense
should be proved beyond reasonable doubt. But for the purpose of
indemnifying the complaining party, why should the offense also be proved
beyond reasonable doubt? Is not the invasion or violation of every private
right to be proved only by a preponderance of evidence? Is the right of the
 aggrieved person any less private because the wrongful act is also punishable
by the criminal law?
For these reasons, the Commission recommends the adoption of the
reform under discussion. It will correct a serious defect in our law. It will
close up an inexhaustible source of injustice — a cause for disillusionment on
the part of innumerable persons injured or wronged. 40
In similar manner, the reform in procedure in these cases to be recommended
by the Committee on the Revision of the Rules of Court shall aim to provide the
aggrieved parties relief, as well as recognition of their right to indemnity. This reform
is of course subject to the policy against double recovery.
WHEREFORE, we SET ASIDE the Decision promulgated on 31 May 2011
by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04461. The criminal and civil
liabilities ex delicto of appellant Gerry Lipata y Ortiza are declared
EXTINGUISHED by his death prior to final judgment.
Let a copy of this Decision be forwarded to the Committee on the Revision of
the Rules of Court.
SO ORDERED.
Brion, Del Castillo, Mendoza and Leonen, JJ., concur.
||| (People v. Lipata y Ortiza, G.R. No. 200302, [April 20, 2016], 785 PHIL 520-537)

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 164974. August 5, 2015.]

CHARLIE TE, petitioner, vs. HON. AUGUSTO V. BREVA, IN HIS

CAPACITY AS THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, 11TH JUDICIAL REGION, BRANCH 10, DAVAO
CITY; U R. BAHINTING, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SPECIAL
INVESTIGATOR OF THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, SARANGGANI DISTRICT OFFICE; and
PRYCE GASES, INC., respondents.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J : p

The issue for resolution is whether the People of the Philippines should be
impleaded as respondents in the petition for certiorari filed in the Court of Appeals
(CA) to annul and set aside the order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) denying the
petitioner's motion to quash the search warrant issued against him. HTcADC

Antecedents
It appears that respondent Presiding Judge issued a search warrant against the
petitioner upon the application of respondent Special Investigator U R. Bahinting of
the Saranggani District Office of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI SARDO)
on the basis of his finding of probable cause for a violation of Section 2 (b) of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 33, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1865, for hoarding large
quantities of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) in steel cylinders belonging to respondent
Pryce Gases, Inc. (Pryce Gases). The application for the search warrant was filed at
the instance of Pryce Gases through its letter dated September 28, 2003 to the NBI
SARDO complaining about the collection and hoarding by the petitioner of embossed
or name-plated Pryce Gases' LPG cylinders in violation of Sections 155, 156, 168 and
169 of Republic Act No. 8293 (Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines).
On October 14, 2003, the petitioner presented his Omnibus Motion to Quash
Warrant and/or Suppress Evidence and to Order Return of Seized Items, raising
therein the lack of probable cause, failure to specify the single offense committed,
illegality of the nighttime search, improper application of the plain view doctrine, and
inclusion of other offenses.
In his order of November 20, 2003, 1 respondent Presiding Judge denied the
petitioner's Omnibus Motion to Quash Warrant and/or Suppress Evidence and to
Order Return of Seized Items by observing that he had issued the search warrant for
one specific offense; that there was probable cause to issue the search warrant; that
the search began late in the day and continued into the night, but the actual seizure
was carried out in the daytime of the next day; and that the seizure of the blue
cylinders with the markings and logo of Pryce Gases was justified under the plain
view doctrine because they were found among the large stockpile of cylinders in the
petitioner's warehouse.
The petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied on January 5, 2004. 2
Decision of the CA
The petitioner assailed the order of November 20, 2003 on certiorari, 3 mainly
positing that respondent Presiding Judge had committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction:
. . . in issuing the November 20, 2003 Order by ruling that the search
warrant was issued based on the existence of probable cause in connection
with a specified offense and validly implemented even if the same was served
starting at nighttime and including the seizure of blue colored steel cylinders
and steel cylinders of different brand names despite the fact that the steel
cylinders were either empty or effectively empty having been received and
possessed by petitioner in the ordinary course of his business being a
 legitimate dealer of Shellane brand LPG, a petroleum product of the Pilipinas
Shell Petroleum Corp. and thereafter in issuing the Order dated January 5,
2004 denying the motion for reconsideration. 4
However, the CA promulgated the first assailed order on March 25, 2004, 5
dismissing the petition for certiorari for failure to implead the People of the
Philippines as respondents, and for lack of any showing that a copy of the petition had
been served on the OSG, to wit:
We resolve to DISMISS the petition pursuant to Section 3, Rule 46 of
the Revised Rules of Court for the following reasons:

1. the People of the Philippines is not impleaded as a respondent;

2. no proof that a copy of the petition was served on the Office of the
Solicitor General.

SO ORDERED.
The petitioner moved for reconsideration, 6 arguing that impleading the People
of the Philippines as respondents was premature because no criminal case had yet
been filed against him with only the application for the issuance of the search warrant
having been made; and that serving the copy of the petition on the OSG pursuant to
Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court was not indispensable. Nevertheless, he
attached to his motion for reconsideration the affidavit of service executed by one
Salvador R. Dumaop, Jr. presumably to conform with the rule on proof of service to
the respondents, whereby the affiant attested that the copy of the petition and the
motion for reconsideration were served on the OSG by registered mail. aScITE

On July 21, 2004, the CA denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration 7
on the ground that although the petitioner had served on the OSG copies of the
petition and the motion for reconsideration he did not file the appropriate motion or
manifestation to amend the petition and to actually amend the petition in order to
implead the People of the Philippines as respondents. The CA ratiocinated that:
We call the petitioner's attention to the fact that Section 1, Rule 126 of
the Revised Rules of Court provides that "a search warrant is an order in
writing issued in the name of the People of the Philippines signed by a judge
and directed to a peace officer commanding him to search for personal
property described therein and bring it before the Court." A search warrant is
issued in the name of the People of the Philippines because there is a finding
of probable cause in connection with one specific offense that the object
sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.
In legal contemplation, the crime or offense had been committed against the
State — the People of the Philippines — and this is the State interest in the
proceedings. If the petitioner wishes to contest the finding of probable cause
or any other aspect of the issuance of the search warrant, then he must
implead the entity who in legal contemplation made the finding and in whose
 name the finding was made; otherwise, there can be no final determination of
the case because the party indispensable to its resolution had been omitted. 8
Hence, according to the CA, it was left with no choice but to deny the motion
for reconsideration.
Not satisfied, the petitioner has come to the Court on appeal to reverse and set
aside the aforesaid resolutions by insisting that the failure to implead the People of the
Philippines was not a fatal defect.
Issue
In this appeal, the petitioner relevantly avers in his petition for review on
certiorari, 9 as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
20. It is humbly submitted that the Court of Appeals committed a
reversible error in grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess of
jurisdiction in dismissing the petition by ruling that the failure to implead the
People of the Philippines as an indispensable party is a fatal defect. The
petition has shown a grave violation of a constitutional right that must
necessarily override a rule on technicality, assuming it is applicable and
correct.HEITAD

21. Specifically, it is submitted that it is not a necessary requisite and

an indispensable condition that the People of the Philippine (sic) be impleaded
in a petition filed assailing the denial of a motion to quash a search warrant.
And that such failure to so include it as an indispensable party is not a fatal
defect more so with the fact that there was a showing of a gross violation of a
constitutional right. 10
xxx xxx xxx
However, on November 8, 2004, the Court denied the petition for review, 11
viz.:
G.R. No. 164974 (Charlie Te vs. Augusto Breva, etc., et al.). — The
Court Resolves to DENY the motion of petition for an extension of thirty (30)
days from the expiration of reglementary period within which to file petition
for review on certiorari, for failing to pay the balance of P330.00 representing
docket and other legal fees and deposit for costs within the reglementary
period under Secs. 2 and 3, Rule 45 in relation to Sec. 5(c), Rule 56, 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure.
The Court further Resolves to DENY the ex-parte motion of petitioner
to accept payment of fee amounting to P300.00, the payment being
insufficient.
Pursuant to Rule 45 and other related provisions of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, as amended, governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme
Court, only petitions which are accompanied by or which comply strictly with
 the requirements specified therein shall be entertained. On the basis thereof,
the Court further more Resolves to DENY the instant petition for review on
certiorari of the resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated March 25, 2004 and
July 21, 2004 for late filing as the petition was filed beyond the reglementary
period of fifteen (15) days fixed in Sec. 2, Rule 45 in relation to Sec. 5(a),
Rule 56. 12
Upon the petitioner's motion for reconsideration, 13 the Court reinstated the
petition for review and required the respondents herein to comment within 10 days
from notice on February 9, 2005. 14 On May 19, 2005, the respondents filed their
compliance, 15 and attached thereto their comment dated April 20, 2005, 16 with
annexes. On July 4, 2005, the Court noted the compliance of the respondents and the
submission of the comment on the petition for review on certiorari; and required the
petitioner to file his reply within 10 days from notice. 17
Ruling of the Court
The petition lacks merit. ATICcS

The petitioner argues that his petition for certiorari did not need to implead the
People of the Philippines because there was yet no criminal case commenced in court,
averring:
To restate, a search warrant proceedings is not a criminal action, much
less a civil action (WASHINGTON DISTILLERS, INC. VS. COURT OF
APPEALS, 260 SCRA 821, quoting Malaloan vs. Court of Appeals, 232
SCRA 249). While a search warrant is issued in the name of the People of the
Philippines, the application is made not by the People of the Philippines but
by the interested party or parties. In this instant case, it is the NBI-SARDO
(through respondent SI Bahinting) and Pryce Gases, Inc. It is humbly
submitted that since there is no criminal case filed and pending when the
search warrant application was made, the People of the Philippines is not yet a
proper party to be impleaded as respondent as required under Section 3 of
Rule 46 of the Rules of Court. 18
The argument of the petitioner is untenable.
Impleading the People of the Philippines in the petition for certiorari did not
depend on whether or not an actual criminal action had already been commenced in
court against the petitioner. It cannot be denied that the search warrant in question had
been issued in the name of the People of the Philippines, and that fact rendered the
People of the Philippines indispensable parties in the special civil action for certiorari
brought to nullify the questioned orders of respondent Presiding Judge. We also note
that the impleading is further expressly demanded in Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules
of Court, to wit:
Section 3. Contents and filing of petition; effect of non-compliance
with requirements. — The petition shall contain the full names and actual
addresses of all the petitioners and respondents, a concise statement of the
 matters involved, the factual background of the case, and the grounds relied
upon for the relief prayed for.
xxx xxx xxx
The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing
requirements shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition.
(n) (emphasis supplied)
Accordingly, the omission of the People of the Philippines from the petition
was fatal.
The requirement that the search warrant be issued in the name of the People of
the Philippines is imposed by Section 1, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Section 1. Search warrant defined. — A search warrant is an order in
writing issued in the name of the People of the Philippines, signed by a
judge and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for personal
property described therein and bring it before the court.
TIADCc

We may agree with the petitioner that the application for the search warrant
was not a criminal action; and that the application for the search warrant was not of
the same form as that of a criminal action. Verily, the search warrant is not similar to
a criminal action but is rather a legal process that may be likened to a writ of
discovery employed by no less than the State to procure relevant evidence of a crime.
In that respect, it is an instrument or tool, issued under the State's police power, and
this is the reason why it must issue in the name of the People of the Philippines. 19
Equally clear is that the sworn application for the search warrant 20 and the
search warrant itself 21 were upon the behest of the People of the Philippines. It defies
logic and common sense for the petitioner to contend, therefore, that the application
against him was not made by the People of the Philippines but by the interested party
or parties. The immutable truth is that every search warrant is applied for and issued
by and under the authority of the State, regardless of who initiates its application or
causes its issuance.
The petitioner could have quickly rectified his omission by the immediate
amendment of the petition. However, although made aware of the omission as a fatal
defect, he did not cause the amendment but continued to ignore the need to amend. He
thereby exhibited his adamant refusal to recognize the People of the Philippines as
indispensable parties, which impelled the CA to aptly remark in its denial of his
motion for reconsideration, thusly:
We note that while the petitioner furnished the OSG with copies of the
petition and the motion for reconsideration, he did not attempt to cure the
defect of the petition — i.e., the failure to implead the People of the
Philippines — by filing the appropriate motion or manifestation to amend the
petition and by amending the petition to implead the Republic of the
Philippines as a party to the proceedings. Hence, the first ground upon which
 we based our dismissal of the petition still holds and we are left with no
choice but to deny the present motion. 22 (emphasis supplied)
AIDSTE

With its dismissal of the petition for certiorari being proper and in accord with
the pertinent rules of procedure, the CA did not abuse its discretion, least of all
gravely. Grave abuse of discretion, as the ground for the issuance of the writ of
certiorari, connotes whimsical and capricious exercise of judgment as is equivalent to
excess, or lack of jurisdiction. 23 The abuse must be so patent and gross as to amount
to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by
law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility. 24
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari;
AFFIRMS the resolution of the Court of Appeals promulgated on March 25, 2004
(dismissing the petition for certiorari in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 82797); and ORDERS the
petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Te v. Breva, G.R. No. 164974 , [August 5, 2015])

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 189669. February 16, 2015.]

PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION and PETRON

CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. ROMARS INTERNATIONAL
GASES CORPORATION, respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J : p

This deals with the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court praying that the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated March 13, 2009,
and the Resolution 2 dated September 14, 2009, denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration thereof, be reversed and set aside.

The antecedent facts are:

Petitioners received information that respondent was selling, offering for sale, or
distributing liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) by illegally refilling the steel cylinders
manufactured by and bearing the duly registered trademark and device of respondent
Petron. Petron then obtained the services of a paralegal investigation team who sent their
people to investigate. The investigators went to respondent's premises located in San
Juan, Baao, Camarines Sur, bringing along four empty cylinders of Shellane, Gasul, Total
and Superkalan and asked that the same be refilled. Respondent's employees then refilled
said empty cylinders at respondent's refilling station. The refilled cylinders were brought
to the Marketing Coordinator of Petron Gasul who verified that respondent was not
authorized to distribute and/or sell, or otherwise deal with Petron LPG products, and/or
use or imitate any Petron trademarks. Petitioners then requested the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) to investigate said activities of respondent for the purpose of
apprehending and prosecuting establishments conducting illegal refilling, distribution
and/or sale of LPG products using the same containers of Petron and Shell, which acts
constitute a violation of Section 168, 3 in relation to Section 170 4 of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 8293, otherwise known as the Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines,
and/or Section 2 5 of R.A. No. 623, otherwise known as An Act to Regulate the Use of
Duly Stamped or Marked Bottles, Boxes, Casks, Kegs, Barrels and Other Similar
Containers.

The NBI proceeded with their investigation and reportedly found commercial
quantities of Petron Gasul and Shellane cylinders stockpiled at respondent's warehouse.
They also witnessed trucks coming from respondent's refilling facility loaded with Gasul,
Shellane and Marsflame cylinders, which then deposit said cylinders in different places,
one of them a store called "Edrich Enterprises" located at 272 National. Highway, San
Nicolas, Iriga City. The investigators then bought Shellane and Gasul cylinders from
Edrich Enterprises, for which they were issued an official receipt.ADcEST

Thus, the NBI, in behalf of Petron and Shell, filed with the Regional Trial Court
of Naga City (RTC-Naga), two separate Applications for Search Warrant for
Violation of Section 155.1, 6 in relation to Section 170 7 of R.A. No. 8293 against
respondent and/or its occupants. On October 23, 2002, the RTC-Naga City issued an
Order granting said Applications and Search Warrant Nos. 2002-27 and 2002-28 were
issued. On the same day, the NBI served the warrants at the respondent's premises in an
orderly and peaceful manner, and articles or items described in the warrants were seized.

On November 4, 2002, respondent filed a Motion to Quash Search Warrant Nos.

2002-27 and 2002-28, where the only grounds cited were: (a) there was no probable
cause; (b) there had been a lapse of four weeks from the date of the test-buy to the date of
the search and seizure operations; (c) most of the cylinders seized were not owned by
respondent but by a third person; and (d) Edrich Enterprises is an authorized outlet of
Gasul and Marsflame. In an Order dated February 21, 2003, the RTC-Naga denied the
Motion to Quash.
 However, on March 27, 2003, respondent's new counsel filed an Appearance with
Motion for Reconsideration. It was only in said motion where respondent raised for the
first time, the issue of the impropriety of filing the Application for Search Warrant at the
RTC-Naga City when the alleged crime was committed in a place within the
territorial jurisdiction of the RTC-Iriga City. Respondent pointed out that the
application filed with the RTC-Naga failed to state any compelling reason to justify
the filing of the same in a court which does not have territorial jurisdiction over the place
of the commission of the crime, as required by Section 2 (b), Rule 126 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure. Petitioner opposed the Motion for Reconsideration, arguing
that it was already too late for respondent to raise the issue regarding the venue of the
filing of the application for search warrant, as this would be in violation of the Omnibus
Motion Rule.

In an Order dated July 28, 2003, the RTC-Naga issued an Order granting
respondent's Motion for Reconsideration, thereby quashing Search Warrant Nos. 2002-27
and 2002-28.

Petitioner then appealed to the CA, but the appellate court, in its Decision dated
March 13, 2009, affirmed the RTC Order quashing the search warrants. Petitioner's
motion for reconsideration of the CA Decision was denied per Resolution dated
September 14, 2009.

Elevating the matter to this Court via a petition for review on certiorari, petitioner
presents herein the following issues:

A.

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT VENUE

IN AN APPLICATION FOR SEARCH WARRANT IS JURISDICTIONAL.
THIS IS BECAUSE A SEARCH WARRANT CASE IS NOT A CRIMINAL
CASE.

B.

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT

RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO QUASH IS NOT SUBJECT TO THE
OMNIBUS MOTION RULE AND THAT THE ISSUE OF LACK OF
JURISDICTION MAY NOT BE WAIVED AND MAY EVEN BE RAISED
FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL. 8

Petitioner's arguments deserve closer examination.

Section 2, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides thus:
 SEC. 2. Court where applications for search warrant shall be filed. —
An application for search warrant shall be filed with the following:

(a) Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was

committed.

(b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any

court within the judicial region where the crime was committed if
the place of the commission of the crime is known, or any court
within the judicial region where the warrant shall be enforced. SDIaHE

However, if the criminal action has already been filed, the application
shall only be made in the court where the criminal action is pending. (Emphasis
supplied)

The above provision is clear enough. Under paragraph (b) thereof, the application
for search warrant in this case should have stated compelling reasons why the same was
being filed with the RTC-Naga instead of the RTC-Iriga City, considering that it is the
latter court that has territorial jurisdiction over the place where the alleged crime was
committed and also the place where the search warrant was enforced. The wordings of
the provision is of a mandatory nature, requiring a statement of compelling reasons if the
application is filed in a court which does not have territorial jurisdiction over the place of
commission of the crime. Since Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution guarantees
the right of persons to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, and search
warrants constitute a limitation on this right, then Section 2, Rule 126 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure should be construed strictly against state authorities who
would be enforcing the search warrants. On this point, then, petitioner's application for a
search warrant was indeed insufficient for failing to comply with the requirement to state
therein the compelling reasons why they had to file the application in a court that did not
have territorial jurisdiction over the place where the alleged crime was committed.

Notwithstanding said failure to state the compelling reasons in the application, the
more pressing question that would determine the outcome of the case is, did the RTC-
Naga act properly in taking into consideration the issue of said defect in resolving
respondent's motion for reconsideration where the issue was raised for the very first time?
The record bears out that, indeed, respondent failed to include said issue at the first
instance in its motion to quash. Does the omnibus motion rule cover a motion to quash
search warrants?

The omnibus motion rule embodied in Section 8, Rule 15, in relation to Section 1,
Rule 9, demands that all available objections be included in a party's motion, otherwise,
said objections shall be deemed waived; and, the only grounds the court could take
cognizance of, even if not pleaded in said motion are: (a) lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter; (b) existence of another action pending between the same parties for the
same cause; and (c) bar by prior judgment or by statute of limitations. 9 It should be
stressed here that the Court has ruled in a number of cases that the omnibus motion rule is
applicable to motions to quash search warrants. 10 Furthermore, the Court distinctly
stated in Abuan v. People, 11 that "the motion to quash the search warrant which the
accused may file shall be governed by the omnibus motion rule, provided, however,
that objections not available, existent or known during the proceedings for the
quashal of the warrant may be raised in the hearing of the motion to suppress . . . ."
12

In accordance with the omnibus motion rule, therefore, the trial court could only
take cognizance of an issue that was not raised in the motion to quash if, (1) said issue
was not available or existent when they filed the motion to quash the search warrant; or
(2) the issue was one involving jurisdiction over the subject matter. Obviously, the issue
of the defect in the application was available and existent at the time of filing of the
motion to quash. What remains to be answered then is, if the newly raised issue of the
defect in the application is an issue of jurisdiction.

In resolving whether the issue raised for the first time in respondent's motion for
reconsideration was an issue of jurisdiction, the CA ratiocinated, thus:

It is jurisprudentially settled that the concept of venue of actions in

criminal cases, unlike in civil cases, is jurisdictional. The place where the crime
was committed determines not only the venue of the action but is an essential
element of jurisdiction. It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be
acquired by courts in criminal cases, the offense should have been committed or
any one of its essential ingredients should have taken place within the territorial
jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory
where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense
allegedly committed therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction
over a person charged with an offense allegedly committed outside of that
limited territory. 13aIHSEc

Unfortunately, the foregoing reasoning of the CA, is inceptionally flawed, because

as pronounced by the Court in Malaloan v. Court of Appeals, 14 and reiterated in the
more recent Worldwide Web Corporation v. People of the Philippines, 15 to wit:

. . . as we held in Malaloan v. Court of Appeals, an application for a

search warrant is a "special criminal process," rather than a criminal
action:

The basic flaw in this reasoning is in erroneously equating

the application for and the obtention of a search warrant with the
institution and prosecution of a criminal action in a trial court. It
would thus categorize what is only a special criminal process, the
power to issue which is inherent in all courts, as equivalent to a
 criminal action, jurisdiction over which is reposed in specific courts of
indicated competence. It ignores the fact that the requisites, procedure
and purpose for the issuance of a search warrant are completely different
from those for the institution of a criminal action.

For, indeed, a warrant, such as a warrant of arrest or a search

warrant, merely constitutes process. A search warrant is defined in our
jurisdiction as an order in writing issued in the name of the People of the
Philippines signed by a judge and directed to a peace officer,
commanding him to search for personal property and bring it before the
court. A search warrant is in the nature of a criminal process akin to a
writ of discovery. It is a special and peculiar remedy, drastic in its
nature, and made necessary because of a public necessity.

In American jurisdictions, from which we have taken our

jural concept and provisions on search warrants, such warrant is
definitively considered merely as a process, generally issued by a
court in the exercise of its ancillary jurisdiction, and not a criminal
action to be entertained by a court pursuant to its original
jurisdiction. . . . (Emphasis supplied)

Clearly then, an application for a search warrant is not a criminal

action. . . . 16 (Emphasis supplied)

The foregoing explanation shows why the CA arrived at the wrong conclusion. It
gravely erred in equating the proceedings for applications for search warrants with
criminal actions themselves. As elucidated by the Court, proceedings for said
applications are not criminal in nature and, thus, the rule that venue is jurisdictional does
not apply thereto. Evidently, the issue of whether the application should have been filed
in RTC-Iriga City or RTC-Naga, is not one involving jurisdiction because, as stated in
the afore-quoted case, the power to issue a special criminal process is inherent in all
courts.

Inferring from the foregoing, the Court deems it improper for the RTC-Naga to
have even taken into consideration an issue which respondent failed to raise in its motion
to quash, as it did not involve a question of jurisdiction over the subject matter. It is quite
clear that the RTC-Naga had jurisdiction to issue criminal processes such as a search
warrant.

Moreover, the Court must again emphasize its previous admonition in Spouses
Anunciacion v. Bocanegra, 17 that:

We likewise cannot approve the trial court's act of entertaining

supplemental motions . . . which raise grounds that are already deemed waived.
To do so would encourage lawyers and litigants to file piecemeal objections to a
 complaint in order to delay or frustrate the prosecution of the plaintiff's cause of
action. 18

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of

Appeals, dated March 13, 2009, and the Resolution dated September 14, 2009 in CA-
G.R. CV No. 80643 are REVERSED. The Order dated February 21, 2003 issued by the
Regional Trial Court of Naga, Camarines Sur, Branch 24, denying respondent's motion to
quash, is REINSTATED. cCaSHA

SO ORDERED.

(Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Romars International Gases Corp., G.R. No. 189669,
|||

[February 16, 2015], 753 PHIL 707-719)

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 161106. January 13, 2014.]

WORLDWIDE WEB CORPORATION and CHERRYLL L. YU,

petitioners, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and PHILIPPINE
LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY, respondents.

[G.R. No. 161266. January 13, 2014.]

PLANET INTERNET CORP., petitioner, vs. PHILIPPINE LONG

DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY, respondent.

DECISION

SERENO, C.J : p

Petitioners filed the present Petitions under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to set
aside the Decision 1 dated 20 August 2003 and the Resolution 2 dated 27 November
2003 of the Court of Appeals (CA) reversing the quashal of the search warrants
previously issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC).
Police Chief Inspector Napoleon Villegas of the Regional Intelligence Special
Operations Office (RISOO) of the Philippine National Police filed applications for
warrants 3 before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 78, to search the office premises
of petitioner Worldwide Web Corporation (WWC) 4 located at the 11th floor, IBM
Plaza Building, No. 188 Eastwood City, Libis, Quezon City, as well as the office
premises of petitioner Planet Internet Corporation (Planet Internet) 5 located at UN
2103, 21/F Orient Square Building, Emerald Avenue, Barangay San Antonio, Pasig
City. The applications alleged that petitioners were conducting illegal toll bypass
operations, which amounted to theft and violation of Presidential Decree No. 401
(Penalizing the Unauthorized Installation of Water, Electrical or Telephone
Connections, the Use of Tampered Water or Electrical Meters and Other Acts), to the
damage and prejudice of the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT).
6
On 25 September 2001, the trial court conducted a hearing on the applications
for search warrants. The applicant and Jose Enrico Rivera (Rivera) and Raymund Gali
(Gali) of the Alternative Calling Pattern Detection Division of PLDT testified as
witnesses. IEcaHS

According to Rivera, a legitimate international long distance call should pass

through the local exchange or public switch telephone network (PSTN) on to the toll
center of one of the international gateway facilities (IGFs) 7 in the Philippines. 8 The
call is then transmitted to the other country through voice circuits, either via fiber
optic submarine cable or microwave radio using satellite facilities, and passes the toll
center of one of the IGFs in the destination country. The toll center would then meter
the call, which will pass through the PSTN of the called number to complete the
circuit. In contrast, petitioners were able to provide international long distance call
services to any part of the world by using PLDT's telephone lines, but bypassing its
IGF. This scheme constitutes toll bypass, a "method of routing and completing
international long distance calls using lines, cables, antenna and/or wave or frequency
which connects directly to the local or domestic exchange facilities of the originating
country or the country where the call is originated." 9
On the other hand, Gali claimed that a phone number serviced by PLDT and
registered to WWC was used to provide a service called GlobalTalk, "an internet-
based international call service, which can be availed of via prepaid or billed/post-
paid accounts." 10 During a test call using GlobalTalk, Gali dialed the local PLDT
telephone number 6891135, the given access line. After a voice prompt required him
to enter the user code and personal identification number (PIN) provided under a
GlobalTalk pre-paid account, he was then requested to enter the destination number,
which included the country code, phone number and a pound (#) sign. The call was
completed to a phone number in Taiwan. However, when he checked the records, it
showed that the call was only directed to the local number 6891135. This indicated
that the international test call using GlobalTalk bypassed PLDT's IGF.
Based on the records of PLDT, telephone number 6891135 is registered to
WWC with address at UN 2103, 21/F Orient Square Building, Emerald Avenue,
Barangay San Antonio, Pasig City. 11 However, upon an ocular inspection conducted
by Rivera at this address, it was found that the occupant of the unit is Planet Internet,
which also uses the telephone lines registered to WWC. 12 These telephone lines are
interconnected to a server and used as dial-up access lines/numbers of WWC. AcSIDE

Gali further alleged that because PLDT lines and equipment had been illegally
connected by petitioners to a piece of equipment that routed the international calls and
bypassed PLDT's IGF, they violated Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 401 as amended,
13 on unauthorized installation of telephone connections. Petitioners also committed
theft, because through their misuse of PLDT phone lines/numbers and equipment and
with clear intent to gain, they illegally stole business and revenues that rightly belong
to PLDT. Moreover, they acted contrary to the letter and intent of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 7925, because in bypassing the IGF of PLDT, they evaded the payment of access
and bypass charges in its favor while "piggy-backing" on its multi-million dollar
facilities and infrastructure, thus stealing its business revenues from international long
distance calls. Further, petitioners acted in gross violation of Memorandum Circular
No. 6-2-92 of the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) prohibiting the
use of customs premises equipment (CPE) without first securing type approval license
from the latter.
Based on a five-day sampling of the phone line of petitioners, PLDT computed
a monthly revenue loss of P764,718.09. PLDT likewise alleged that petitioners
deprived it of foreign exchange revenues, and evaded the payment of taxes, license
fees, and charges, to the prejudice of the government.
During the hearing, the trial court required the identification of the office
premises/units to be searched, as well as their floor plans showing the location of
particular computers and servers that would be taken. 14
On 26 September 2001, the RTC granted the application for search warrants.
15 Accordingly, the following warrants were issued against the office premises of
petitioners, authorizing police officers to seize various items:
1.Search Warrant No. Q-01-3856, 16 issued for violation of paragraph one (1)
of Article 308 (theft) in relation to Article 309 of the Revised Penal Code against
WWC, Adriel S. Mirto, Kevin L. Tan, Cherryll L. Yu, Carmelo J. Canto, III,
Ferdinand B. Masi, Message One International Corporation, Adriel S. Mirto, Nova
Christine L. Dela Cruz, Robertson S. Chiang, and Nolan B. Sison with business
address at 11/F IBM Plaza Building, No. 188 Eastwood City, Cyberpark Libis,
Quezon City:

a)Computers or any equipment or device capable of accepting information,

applying the process of the information and supplying the results of this
process;

b)Software, Diskettes, Tapes or equipment or device used for recording or

storing information; and
 c)Manuals, application forms, access codes, billing statements, receipts,
contracts, communications and documents relating to securing and using
telephone lines and/or equipment. AEcIaH

2.Search Warrant No. Q-01-3857, 17 issued for violation of P.D. 401 against
Planet Internet Corporation/Mercury One, Robertson S. Chiang, Nikki S. Chiang,
Maria Sy Be Chiang, Ben C. Javellana, Carmelita Tuason with business address at
UN 2103, 21/F Orient Square Building, Emerald Avenue, Barangay San Antonio,
Pasig City:

a)Modems or Routers or any equipment or device that enables data terminal

equipment such as computers to communicate with other data terminal
equipment via a telephone line;

b)Computers or any equipment or device capable of accepting information

applying the prescribed process of the information and supplying the results of
this process;

c)Lines, Cables and Antennas or equipment or device capable of transmitting

air waves or frequency, such as an IPL and telephone lines and equipment;

d)Multiplexers or any equipment or device that enables two or more signals

from different sources to pass through a common cable or transmission line;

e)PABX or Switching Equipment, Tapes or equipment or device capable of

connecting telephone lines;

f)Software, Diskettes, Tapes or equipment or device used for recording or

storing information; and

g)Manuals, application forms, access codes, billing statement, receipts,

contracts, checks, orders, communications and documents, lease and/or
subscription agreements or contracts, communications and documents relating
to securing and using telephone lines and/or equipment.

3.Search Warrant No. Q-01-3858, 18 issued for violation of paragraph one (1)
of Article 308 (theft) in relation to Article 309 of the Revised Penal Code against
Planet Internet Corporation/Mercury One, Robertson S. Chiang, Nikki S. Chiang,
Maria Sy Be Chiang, Ben C. Javellana, Carmelita Tuason with business address at
UN 2103, 21/F Orient Square Building, Emerald Avenue, Barangay San Antonio,
Pasig City:

a)Modems or Routers or any equipment or device that enables data terminal

equipment such as computers to communicate with other data terminal
equipment via a telephone line;
 b)Computers or any equipment or device capable of accepting information
applying the prescribed process of the information and supplying the results of
this process;

c)Lines, Cables and Antennas or equipment or device capable of transmitting

air waves or frequency, such as an IPL and telephone lines and equipment;

d)Multiplexers or any equipment or device that enables two or more signals

from different sources to pass through a common cable or transmission line;
HEITAD

e)PABX or Switching Equipment, Tapes or equipment or device capable of

connecting telephone lines;

f)Software, Diskettes, Tapes or equipment or device used for recording or

storing information; and

g)Manuals, application forms, access codes, billing statement, receipts,

contracts, checks, orders, communications and documents, lease and/or
subscription agreements or contracts, communications and documents relating
to securing and using telephone lines and/or equipment.

The warrants were implemented on the same day by RISOO operatives of the
National Capital Region Police Office.
Over a hundred items were seized, 19 including 15 central processing units
(CPUs), 10 monitors, numerous wires, cables, diskettes and files, and a laptop
computer. 20 Planet Internet notes that even personal diskettes of its employees were
confiscated; and areas not devoted to the transmission of international calls, such as
the President's Office and the Information Desk, were searched. Voltage regulators, as
well as reserve and broken computers, were also seized.
Petitioners WWC and Cherryll Yu, 21 and Planet Internet 22 filed their
respective motions to quash the search warrants, citing basically the same grounds:
(1) the search warrants were issued without probable cause, since the acts complained
of did not constitute theft; (2) toll bypass, the act complained of, was not a crime; (3)
the search warrants were general warrants; and (4) the objects seized pursuant thereto
were "fruits of the poisonous tree."
PLDT filed a Consolidated Opposition 23 to the motions to quash.
In the hearing of the motions to quash on 19 October 2001, the test calls
alluded to by Gali in his Affidavit were shown to have passed the IGF of Eastern
Telecommunications (Philippines), Inc. (Eastern) and of Capital Wireless (Capwire).
24 Planet Internet explained that Eastern and Capwire both provided international
direct dialing services, which Planet Internet marketed by virtue of a "Reseller
Agreement." Planet Internet used PLDT lines for the first phase of the call; but for the
second phase, it used the IGF of either Eastern or Capwire. Planet Internet religiously
paid PLDT for its domestic phone bills and Eastern and Capwire for its IGF usage.
None of these contentions were refuted by PLDT.
The RTC granted the motions to quash on the ground that the warrants issued
were in the nature of general warrants. 25 Thus, the properties seized under the said
warrants were ordered released to petitioners.
PLDT moved for reconsideration, 26 but its motion was denied 27 on the
ground that it had failed to get the conformity of the City Prosecutor prior to filing the
motion, as required under Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure. aEDCSI

THE CA RULING

PLDT appealed to the CA, where the case was docketed as CA-G.R. No.
26190. The CA reversed and set aside the assailed RTC Resolutions and declared the
search warrants valid and effective. 28
Petitioners separately moved for reconsideration of the CA ruling. 29 Among
the points raised was that PLDT should have filed a petition for certiorari rather than
an appeal when it questioned the RTC Resolution before the CA. The appellate court
denied the Motions for Reconsideration. 30
Rule 45 Petitions were separately filed by petitioners WWC and Cherryll Yu,
31 and Planet Internet 32 to assail the CA Decision and Resolution. The Court
consolidated the two Petitions. 33

ISSUES

I.Whether the CA erred in giving due course to PLDT's appeal despite the
following procedural infirmities:

1.PLDT, without the conformity of the public prosecutor, had no

personality to question the quashal of the search warrants;

2.PLDT assailed the quashal orders via an appeal rather than a

petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

II.Whether the assailed search warrants were issued upon probable cause,
considering that the acts complained of allegedly do not constitute
theft.

III.Whether the CA seriously erred in holding that the assailed search

warrants were not general warrants.

OUR RULING
 I.

1. An application for a search warrant is not a criminal

action; conformity of the public prosecutor is not necessary to
give the aggrieved party personality to question an order
quashing search warrants.

Petitioners contend that PLDT had no personality to question the quashal of the
search warrants without the conformity of the public prosecutor. They argue that it
violated Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, to wit:

SEC. 5.Who must prosecute criminal actions. — All criminal actions

commenced by a complaint or information shall be prosecuted under the
direction and control of the prosecutor.STIEHc

The above provision states the general rule that the public prosecutor has
direction and control of the prosecution of "(a)ll criminal actions commenced by a
complaint or information." However, a search warrant is obtained, not by the filing of
a complaint or an information, but by the filing of an application therefor. 34
Furthermore, as we held in Malaloan v. Court of Appeals, 35 an application for
a search warrant is a "special criminal process," rather than a criminal action:

The basic flaw in this reasoning is in erroneously equating the

application for and the obtention of a search warrant with the institution and
prosecution of a criminal action in a trial court. It would thus categorize what is
only a special criminal process, the power to issue which is inherent in all
courts, as equivalent to a criminal action, jurisdiction over which is reposed in
specific courts of indicated competence. It ignores the fact that the requisites,
procedure and purpose for the issuance of a search warrant are completely
different from those for the institution of a criminal action.

For, indeed, a warrant, such as a warrant of arrest or a search warrant,

merely constitutes process. A search warrant is defined in our jurisdiction as an
order in writing issued in the name of the People of the Philippines signed by a
judge and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for personal
property and bring it before the court. A search warrant is in the nature of a
criminal process akin to a writ of discovery. It is a special and peculiar remedy,
drastic in its nature, and made necessary because of a public necessity.

In American jurisdictions, from which we have taken our jural

concept and provisions on search warrants, such warrant is definitively
considered merely as a process, generally issued by a court in the exercise
of its ancillary jurisdiction, and not a criminal action to be entertained by a
court pursuant to its original jurisdiction. We emphasize this fact for
 purposes of both issues as formulated in this opinion, with the catalogue of
authorities herein. 36 (Emphasis supplied)

Clearly then, an application for a search warrant is not a criminal action.

Meanwhile, we have consistently recognized the right of parties to question orders
quashing those warrants. 37 Accordingly, we sustain the CA's ruling that the
conformity of the public prosecutor is not necessary before an aggrieved party moves
for reconsideration of an order granting a motion to quash search warrants.

2. An order quashing a search warrant, which was issued

independently prior to the filing of a criminal action, partakes
of a final order that can be the proper subject of an appeal.

Petitioners also claim that since the RTC ruling on the motions to quash was
interlocutory, it cannot be appealed under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. PLDT
should have filed a Rule 65 petition instead. Petitioners cite, as authority for their
position, Marcelo v. de Guzman. 38 The Court held therein as follows:

But is the order of Judge de Guzman denying the motion to quash the
search warrant and to return the properties seized thereunder final in character,
or is it merely interlocutory? In Cruz vs. Dinglasan, this Court, citing American
jurisprudence, resolved this issue thus:

Where accused in criminal proceeding has petitioned for the

return of goods seized, the order of restoration by an inferior court is
interlocutory and hence, not appealable; likewise, a denial, by the US
District Court, of defendant's petition for the return of the articles seized
under a warrant is such an interlocutory order. (56 C.J. 1253).

A final order is defined as one which disposes of the whole subject

matter or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing to be
done but to enforce by execution what has been determined; on the other hand
an order is interlocutory if it does not dispose of a case completely, but leaves
something more to be done upon its merits. Tested against this criterion, the
search warrant issued in Criminal Case No. 558 is indisputably of interlocutory
character because it leaves something more to be done in the said criminal case,
i.e., the determination of the guilt of the accused therein. 39

Petitioners' reliance upon Marcelo is misplaced.

An application for a search warrant is a judicial process conducted either as an
incident in a main criminal case already filed in court or in anticipation of one yet to
be filed. 40 Whether the criminal case (of which the search warrant is an incident) has
already been filed before the trial court is significant for the purpose of determining
the proper remedy from a grant or denial of a motion to quash a search warrant. DAETcC
 Where the search warrant is issued as an incident in a pending criminal case, as
it was in Marcelo, the quashal of a search warrant is merely interlocutory. There is
still "something more to be done in the said criminal case, i.e., the determination of
the guilt of the accused therein." 41
In contrast, where a search warrant is applied for and issued in anticipation of a
criminal case yet to be filed, the order quashing the warrant (and denial of a motion
for reconsideration of the grant) ends the judicial process. There is nothing more to be
done thereafter.
Thus, the CA correctly ruled that Marcelo does not apply to this case. Here, the
applications for search warrants were instituted as principal proceedings and not as
incidents to pending criminal actions. When the search warrants issued were
subsequently quashed by the RTC, there was nothing left to be done by the trial court.
Thus, the quashal of the search warrants were final orders, not interlocutory, and an
appeal may be properly taken therefrom.

II.

Trial judges determine probable cause in the exercise of their

judicial functions. A trial judge's finding of probable cause
for the issuance of a search warrant is accorded respect by
reviewing courts when the finding has substantial basis.

Petitioners claim that no probable cause existed to justify the issuance of the
search warrants.
The rules pertaining to the issuance of search warrants are enshrined in Section
2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution:

Section 2.The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and
for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. (Emphasis
supplied)

In the issuance of a search warrant, probable cause requires "such facts and
circumstances that would lead a reasonably prudent man to believe that an offense has
been committed and the objects sought in connection with that offense are in the place
to be searched." 42
There is no exact test for the determination of probable cause 43 in the
issuance of search warrants. It is a matter wholly dependent on the finding of trial
judges in the process of exercising their judicial function. 44 They determine probable
cause based on "evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been
committed and that it was committed" by the offender. 45
When a finding of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is made
by a trial judge, the finding is accorded respect by reviewing courts:

. . . . It is presumed that a judicial function has been regularly performed,

absent a showing to the contrary. A magistrate's determination of probable
cause for the issuance of a search warrant is paid great deference by a reviewing
court, as long as there was substantial basis for that determination. Substantial
basis means that the questions of the examining judge brought out such facts
and circumstances as would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed, and the objects in connection with
the offense sought to be seized are in the place sought to be searched. 46

The transcript of stenographic notes during the hearing for the application for
search warrants on 25 September 2001 shows that Judge Percival Mandap Lopez
asked searching questions to the witnesses and particularly sought clarification on the
alleged illegal toll bypass operations of petitioners, as well as the pieces of evidence
presented. Thus, the Court will no longer disturb the finding of probable cause by the
trial judge during the hearing for the application for the search warrants. ADHcTE

However, petitioners insist that the determination of the existence of probable

cause necessitates the prior determination of whether a crime or an offense was
committed in the first place. In support of their contention that there was no probable
cause for the issuance of the search warrants, petitioners put forward the adage
nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege — there is no crime when there is no law
punishing it. Petitioners argue that there is no law punishing toll bypass, the act
complained of by PLDT. Thus, no offense was committed that would justify the
issuance of the search warrants.
According to PLDT, toll bypass enables international calls to appear as local
calls and not overseas calls, thus effectively evading payment to the PLDT of access,
termination or bypass charges, and accounting rates; payment to the government of
taxes; and compliance with NTC regulatory requirements. PLDT concludes that toll
bypass is prohibited, because it deprives "legitimate telephone operators, like
PLDT. . . of the compensation which it is entitled to had the call been properly routed
through its network." 47 As such, toll bypass operations constitute theft, because all of
the elements of the crime are present therein.
On the other hand, petitioners WWC and Cherryll Yu argue that there is no
theft to speak of, because the properties allegedly taken from PLDT partake of the
nature of "future earnings and lost business opportunities" and, as such, are uncertain,
anticipative, speculative, contingent, and conditional. PLDT cannot be deprived of
such unrealized earnings and opportunities because these do not belong to it in the
first place.
Upon a review of the records of the case, we understand that the Affidavits of
Rivera and Gali that accompanied the applications for the search warrants charge
petitioners with the crime, not of toll bypass per se, but of theft of PLDT's
international long distance call business committed by means of the alleged toll
bypass operations.
For theft to be committed in this case, the following elements must be shown
to exist: (1) the taking by petitioners (2) of PLDT's personal property (3) with intent
to gain (4) without the consent of PLDT (5) accomplished without the use of violence
against or intimidation of persons or the use of force upon things. 48 DaTICE

Petitioners WWC and Cherryll Yu only take issue with categorizing the
earnings and business as personal properties of PLDT. However, in Laurel v.
Abrogar, 49 we have already held that the use of PLDT's communications facilities
without its consent constitutes theft of its telephone services and business:

. . . "[I]nternational long distance calls," the matter alleged to be stolen

in the instant case, take the form of electrical energy, it cannot be said that such
international long distance calls were personal properties belonging to PLDT
since the latter could not have acquired ownership over such calls. PLDT
merely encodes, augments, enhances, decodes and transmits said calls using its
complex communications infrastructure and facilities. PLDT not being the
owner of said telephone calls, then it could not validly claim that such telephone
calls were taken without its consent. It is the use of these communications
facilities without the consent of PLDT that constitutes the crime of theft,
which is the unlawful taking of the telephone services and business.

Therefore, the business of providing telecommunication and the

telephone service are personal property under Article 308 of the Revised
Penal Code, and the act of engaging in ISR is an act of "subtraction"
penalized under said article. However, the Amended Information describes
the thing taken as, "international long distance calls," and only later mentions
"stealing the business from PLDT" as the manner by which the gain was derived
by the accused. In order to correct this inaccuracy of description, this case must
be remanded to the trial court and the prosecution directed to amend the
Amended Information, to clearly state that the property subject of the theft
are the services and business of respondent PLDT. Parenthetically, this
amendment is not necessitated by a mistake in charging the proper offense,
which would have called for the dismissal of the information under Rule 110,
Section 14 and Rule 119, Section 19 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure. To be sure, the crime is properly designated as one of theft. The
purpose of the amendment is simply to ensure that the accused is fully and
sufficiently apprised of the nature and cause of the charge against him, and thus
guaranteed of his rights under the Constitution. (Emphasis supplied)
 In Laurel, we reviewed the existing laws and jurisprudence on the generally
accepted concept of personal property in civil law as "anything susceptible of
appropriation." 50 It includes ownership of telephone services, which are protected by
the penal provisions on theft. We therein upheld the Amended Information charging
the petitioner with the crime of theft against PLDT inasmuch as the allegation was
that the former was engaged in international simple resale (ISR) or "the unauthorized
routing and completing of international long distance calls using lines, cables,
antennae, and/or air wave frequency and connecting these calls directly to the local or
domestic exchange facilities of the country where destined." 51 We reasoned that
since PLDT encodes, augments, enhances, decodes and transmits telephone calls
using its complex communications infrastructure and facilities, the use of these
communications facilities without its consent constitutes theft, which is the unlawful
taking of telephone services and business. We then concluded that the business of
providing telecommunications and telephone services is personal property under
Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, and that the act of engaging in ISR is an act of
"subtraction" penalized under said article.
Furthermore, toll bypass operations could not have been accomplished without
the installation of telecommunications equipment to the PLDT telephone lines. Thus,
petitioners may also be held liable for violation of P.D. 401, to wit:

Section 1.Any person who installs any water, electrical, telephone or piped
gas connection without previous authority from the Metropolitan
Waterworks and Sewerage System, the Manila Electric Company, the
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, or the Manila Gas
Corporation, as the case may be, tampers and/or uses tampered water,
electrical or gas meters, jumpers or other devices whereby water, electricity or
piped gas is stolen; steals or pilfers water, electric or piped gas meters, or
water, electric and/or telephone wires, or piped gas pipes or conduits;
knowingly possesses stolen or pilfered water, electrical or gas meters as well
as stolen or pilfered water, electrical and/or telephone wires, or piped gas
pipes and conduits, shall, upon conviction, be punished with prision
correccional in its minimum period or a fine ranging from two thousand
to six thousand pesos, or both. (Emphasis supplied)

The peculiar circumstances attending the situation compel us to rule further on

the matter of probable cause. During the hearing of the motions to quash the search
warrants, the test calls conducted by witnesses for PLDT were shown to have
connected to the IGF of either Eastern or Capwire to complete the international calls.
acITSD

A trial judge's finding of probable cause may be set aside and the search
warrant issued by him based on his finding may be quashed if the person against
whom the warrant is issued presents clear and convincing evidence that when the
police officers and witnesses testified, they committed a deliberate falsehood or
reckless disregard for the truth on matters that are essential or necessary to a showing
of probable cause. 52 In that case, the finding of probable cause is a nullity, because
the trial judge was intentionally misled by the witnesses. 53
On the other hand, innocent and negligent omissions or misrepresentation of
witnesses will not cause the quashal of a search warrant. 54 In this case, the
testimonies of Rivera and Gali that the test calls they conducted did not pass through
PLDT's IGF are true. They neglected, however, to look into the possibility that the
test calls may have passed through other IGFs in the Philippines, which was exactly
what happened. Nevertheless, the witnesses did not commit a deliberate falsehood.
Even Planet Internet stated that the conclusion that the test calls bypassed all IGFs in
the country was made "carelessly and haphazardly." 55
On this score, the quashal of the search warrants is not in order. It must be
noted that the trial judge did not quash the warrants in this case based on lack of
probable cause. Instead, the issue before us is whether the CA erred in reversing the
RTC, which ruled that the search warrants are general warrants.

III.

The requirement of particularity in the description of things to

be seized is fulfilled when the items described in the search
warrant bear a direct relation to the offense for which the
warrant is sought.

Petitioners claim that the subject search warrants were in the nature of general
warrants because the descriptions therein of the objects to be seized are so broad and
all-encompassing as to give the implementing officers wide discretion over which
articles to seize. In fact, the CA observed that the targets of the search warrants were
not illegalper se, and that they were "innocuous goods." Thus, the police officers were
given blanket authority to determine whether the objects were legal or not, as in fact
even pieces of computer equipment not involved in telecommunications or Internet
service were confiscated.
On the other hand, PLDT claims that a search warrant already fulfills the
requirement of particularity of description when it is as specific as the circumstances
will ordinarily allow. 56 Furthermore, it cites Kho v. Makalintal, 57 in which the
Court allowed leeway in the description of things to be seized, taking into
consideration the effort and the time element involved in the prosecution of criminal
cases.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in its Comment 58 filed with the
CA, likewise prayed for the reversal of the quashal of the search warrants in view of
the OSG's position that the scheme was a case of electronic theft, and that the items
sought to be seized could not be described with calibrated precision. According to the
OSG, assuming that the seized items could also be used for other legitimate
businesses, the fact remains that the items were used in the commission of an offense.
A general warrant is defined as "(a) search or arrest warrant that is not
particular as to the person to be arrested or the property to be seized." 59 It is one that
allows the "seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another" and gives the
officer executing the warrant the discretion over which items to take. 60
Such discretion is abhorrent, as it makes the person, against whom the warrant
is issued, vulnerable to abuses. Our Constitution guarantees our right against
unreasonable searches and seizures, and safeguards have been put in place to ensure
that people and their properties are searched only for the most compelling and lawful
reasons. IHCDAS

Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Sec. 2.The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for
any purpose shall be inviolable, and no such search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.

In furtherance of this constitutional provision, Sections 3 and 4, Rule 126 of

the Rules of Court, amplify the rules regarding the following places and items to be
searched under a search warrant:

SEC. 3.Personal property to be seized. — A search warrant may be issued for

the search and seizure of personal property:

a)Subject of the offense;

b)Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of the offense; or

c)Used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense.

SEC. 4.Requisites for issuing search warrant. — A search warrant shall not
issue except upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized
which may be anywhere in the Philippines.

Within the context of the above legal requirements for valid search warrants,
the Court has been mindful of the difficulty faced by law enforcement officers in
describing the items to be searched, especially when these items are technical in
nature, and when the extent of the illegal operation is largely unknown to them.
Vallejo v. Court of Appeals 61 ruled as follows:

The things to be seized must be described with particularity. Technical

precision of description is not required. It is only necessary that there be
reasonable particularity and certainty as to the identity of the property to be
searched for and seized, so that the warrant shall not be a mere roving
commission. Indeed, the law does not require that the things to be seized must
be described in precise and minute detail as to leave no room for doubt on the
part of the searching authorities. If this were the rule, it would be virtually
impossible for the applicants to obtain a warrant as they would not know exactly
what kind of things to look for. Any description of the place or thing to be
searched that will enable the officer making the search with reasonable
certainty to locate such place or thing is sufficient. (Emphasis supplied)

Furthermore, the Court also had occasion to rule that the particularity of the
description of the place to be searched and the things to be seized is required
"wherever and whenever it is feasible." 62 A search warrant need not describe the
items to be seized in precise and minute detail. 63 The warrant is valid when it
enables the police officers to readily identify the properties to be seized and leaves
them with no discretion regarding the articles to be seized. 64
In this case, considering that items that looked like "innocuous goods" were
being used to pursue an illegal operation that amounts to theft, law enforcement
officers would be hard put to secure a search warrant if they were required to pinpoint
items with one hundred percent precision. In People v. Veloso, we pronounced that
"[t]he police should not be hindered in the performance of their duties, which are
difficult enough of performance under the best of conditions, by superficial adherence
to technicality or far-fetched judicial interference." 65
A search warrant fulfills the requirement of particularity in the description of
the things to be seized when the things described are limited to those that bear a direct
relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued. 66
To our mind, PLDT was able to establish the connection between the items to
be searched as identified in the warrants and the crime of theft of its telephone
services and business. Prior to the application for the search warrants, Rivera
conducted ocular inspection of the premises of petitioners and was then able to
confirm that they had "utilized various telecommunications equipment consisting of
computers, lines, cables, antennas, modems, or routers, multiplexers, PABX or
switching equipment, and support equipment such as software, diskettes, tapes,
manuals and other documentary records to support the illegal toll bypass operations."
67
In HPS Software and Communication Corp. v. PLDT, 68 we upheld a similarly
worded 69 description of items to be seized by virtue of the search warrants, because
 these items had been sufficiently identified physically and shown to bear a relation to
the offenses charged. cDSaEH

WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision

dated 20 August 2003 and Resolution dated 27 November 2003 in CA-G.R. CR No.
26190 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Leonardo-de Castro, Bersamin, Villarama, Jr. and Reyes, JJ., concur.
 
(Worldwide Web Corp. v. People, G.R. Nos. 161106 & 161266, [January 13, 2014], 724
|||

PHIL 18-46)

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 204419. November 7, 2016.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. EDMAR P.

CASTILLO, SR., as Presiding Judge of Branch 6, Regional Trial
Court, Aparri, Cagayan and JEOFREY JIL RABINO y TALOZA,
respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, ** J : p

This is to resolve the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court dated November 12, 2012 of petitioner People of the Philippines as represented
by Second Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Carlos B. Sagucio, that seeks to reverse
and set aside the Regional Trial Court's (RTC, Branch 6, Aparri, Cagayan) Joint
Resolution 1 dated May 14, 2012 quashing Search Warrant No. 45 issued by the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Gattaran, Cagayan and eventually dismissing
Criminal Case No. II-10881 against private respondent Jeofrey Jil Rabino y Taloza.
The facts follow.
On January 13, 2012, Judge Marcelo C. Cabalbag of the MTC of Gattaran,
Cagayan issued Search Warrant No. 45, which reads, in part, as follows:
SEARCH AND SEIZURE ORDER
TO ANY OFFICER OF THE LAW:
 It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned, after examining
under oath SPO1 RONEL P. SATURNO of the Regional Intelligence
Division based at Regional Office 2, Camp Adduru, Tuguegarao City, the
applicant herein, and his witness that there is probable cause to believe that a
Violation [of] R.A. 9165 Comprehensive Dangerous Drug, has been and is
being committed and there are good and sufficient reasons to believe that
JOEFREY JIL RABINO @ JEFF/JEO, a resident of Rizal Street, Maura,
Aparri, Cagayan has in his possession or control the following items, to wit:
SHABU (Methamphetamine and PARAPHERNALIAS
you are hereby ordered to make an immediate search at any time of the day or
night but preferably at daytime at the afore-stated residential place of
JEOFREY JIL RABINO @ JEFF/JEO and its premises and forthwith seize
and take possession of the above-described items to immediately bring him,
thereafter, to the undersigned to be dealt with in accordance with Section 12,
Rule 126 of the December 1, 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure.
WITNESS MY HAND and SEAL this 13th day of January 2012, at
Gattaran, Cagayan. 2
Thereafter, to effect the above Search and Seizure Order, a search was
conducted by elements of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) and
officers of the Philippine National Police (PNP) yielding one (1) sachet containing
residue of suspected methamphetamine hydrochloride inside the house of private
respondent Rabino located in Aparri, Cagayan. When the confiscated item was
submitted to the Regional Crime Laboratory Office No. 2 of the PNP in Tuguegarao
City for qualitative examination, the test gave positive result for the presence of
methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. 3
Thus, an Information 4 dated January 15, 2012 was filed against private
respondent Rabino for violation of Section 11 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165, which
reads as follows:AcICHD

That on or about January 14, 2012, in the Municipality of Aparri,

[P]rovince of Cagayan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, without any legal authority thereof, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession and under
his control and custody one (1) big zip-lock transparent plastic sachet
containing two (2) pieces of transparent plastic sachets containing white
crystalline substance, one sachet with traces of said substance gave
POSITIVE results to the tests for the presence of Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride, commonly known as Shabu, a dangerous drug, while the other
sachet gave negative results to said tests, the said accused knowing fully well
and aware that it is prohibited for any person to possess or use any dangerous
drug regardless of the quality of the purity thereof, unless authorized by law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
 Docketed as Criminal Case No. II-10881, the case was raffled to the RTC,
Branch 6, Aparri, Cagayan, presided by respondent Judge Castillo.
Before the case was set for arraignment, or on March 13, 2012, private
respondent Rabino filed a Motion to Quash Search Warrant and for Suppression of
Illegally Acquired Evidence with the following grounds:
Search Warrant; Issuing Court must have territorial jurisdiction over the place
to be searched; No compelling reason for MTC Gattaran to issue warrant
xxx xxx xxx
No probable cause to issue Search Warrant
xxx xxx xxx
No searching question elicited from deponent
xxx xxx xxx
No particularity in the places to be searched
xxx xxx xxx
Irregularity in the implementation of the search
xxx xxx xxx
Suppression of Evidence Just and Proper 5
The RTC, through respondent Judge Castillo, granted the above motion in its
Joint Resolution dated May 14, 2012, which partly reads as follows:
It is indubitable from the foregoing that the minimum penalty for
illegal possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu is
imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years,
which penalty is way beyond imprisonment of six (6) years. A fortiori, MTC
Gattaran did not have jurisdiction to entertain the application for and to issue
Search Warrant No. 45. As such, Search Warrant No. 45 is null and void.
[Corollary] thereto, all proceedings had in virtue thereof are likewise null and
void.
With the foregoing conclusion, any further discussion on the grounds
relied upon by the accused to buttress his motion and the opposition
interposed by the public prosecutor are deemed mere surplusage. TAIaHE

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the motion is

GRANTED. Search Warrant No. 45 is hereby ordered QUASHED.
Consequently, all evidence obtained in the execution of Search Warrant No.
45 are likewise ordered SUPPRESSED. There being no more evidence to
support them, the Informations in the above-captioned cases are hereby
dismissed.
SO ORDERED. 6
 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the same
court in its Joint Order 7 dated September 24, 2012.
Hence, the present petition.
The issue and arguments raised by petitioner are as follows:
With all due respect, the assailed Resolution of May 14, 2012 was
issued by respondent Judge Castillo with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of jurisdiction and/or is patently erroneous. It is respectfully submitted
that the Municipal Trial Court of Gattaran, Cagayan has the authority to issue
Search Warrant No. 45 earlier mentioned to search and seize the shabu stated
therein in Aparri, Cagayan a place which is within the same second judicial
region in violation of R.A. 9165, notwithstanding the fact that the power to
hear and try the offense is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional
Trial Court.
Private respondent, on the other hand, in his Comment 8 dated January 25,
2016, claims that the petition was filed in violation of the doctrine of hierarchy of
courts. He also argues that the petition should have been filed by the State, through
the Office of the Solicitor General, and not petitioner Second Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor Carlos B. Sagucio. Lastly, private respondent insists that the petition does
not show that the assailed Joint Resolution of the RTC was issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
This Court finds merit to the petition.
Before proceeding with the discussion on the substantial issue raised in the
petition, certain procedural issues have been pointed out by private respondent that
need to be tackled. According to the private respondent, the petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 filed by petitioner before this Court must be struck down as it violates
the doctrine on hierarchy of courts. Private respondent further argues that petitioner
did not provide any compelling reason that would merit the direct filing with this
Court of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. It is also averred that the petition
should have been filed by the Office of the Solicitor General and not the Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor because the petition is in the nature of an appeal and the former
is vested with the power of representing the people before any court.
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides as follows:
Section 1. Petition for certiorari. — When any tribunal, board or
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in
excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby
may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty
and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the
proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental
reliefs as law and justice may require. cDHAES
 A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is proper when (1)
any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, and (2) there is no appeal, nor plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the purpose of annulling or
modifying the proceeding. 9 Grave abuse of discretion exists when there is an
arbitrary or despotic exercise of power due to passion, prejudice or personal hostility;
or a whimsical, arbitrary, or capricious exercise of power that amounts to an evasion
or refusal to perform a positive duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation
of law. For an act to be struck down as having been done with grave abuse of
discretion, the abuse of discretion must be patent and gross. 10 On the other hand, a
remedy is considered "plain, speedy and adequate" if it will promptly relieve the
petitioner from the injurious effects of the judgment and the acts of the lower court or
agency. 11 Its principal office is only to keep the inferior court within the parameters
of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing such a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. 12
The special civil action for certiorari is the proper recourse availed of by
petitioner in questioning the quashal of the search warrant as the petition alleges grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the judge that ordered the said quashal. In his
allegation that the judge misapplied the rules on jurisdiction or on the proper courts
authorized to issue a search warrant, petitioner has shown that the quashal of the
search warrant was patently and grossly done. In any case, the Court had allowed
even direct recourse to this Court 13 or to the Court of Appeals 14 via a special civil
action for certiorari from a trial court's quashal of a search warrant. 15 The general
rule is that a party is mandated to follow the hierarchy of courts. However, in
exceptional cases, the Court, for compelling reasons or if warranted by the nature of
the issues raised, may take cognizance of petitions filed directly before it. 16 In this
case, since the pivotal issue raised by petitioner involves an application of a rule
promulgated by this Court in the exercise of its rule-making power under the
Constitution 17 regarding the jurisdiction of courts in the proper issuance of a search
warrant, this Court deems it proper to resolve the present petition.
As such, even if the petitioner in this case, representing the People, is only the
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor and not the Office of the Solicitor General, such
technicality can be relaxed in the interest of justice. The Court has allowed some
meritorious cases to proceed despite inherent procedural defects and lapses. This is in
keeping with the principle that rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate
the attainment of justice and that strict and rigid application of rules which would
result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice
must always be avoided. 18 It is a far better and more prudent cause of action for the
court to excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties a review of the case to attain
the ends of justice, rather than dispose of the case on technicality and cause grave
injustice to the parties, giving a false impression of speedy disposal of cases while
actually resulting in more delay, if not a miscarriage of justice. 19 In certain cases, this
Court even allowed private complainants to file petitions for certiorari and considered
the said petitions as if filed by the Office of the Solicitor General. In United
Laboratories, Inc. v. Isip, 20 this Court ruled that an exception exists to the general
rule that the proper party to file a petition in the CA or Supreme Court assailing any
adverse order of the RTC in the search warrant proceedings is the People of the
Philippines, through the OSG, thus: ASEcHI

The general rule is that the proper party to file a petition in the CA or
Supreme Court to assail any adverse order of the RTC in the search warrant
proceedings is the People of the Philippines, through the OSG. However, in
Columbia Pictures Entertainment, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, the Court allowed
a private corporation (the complainant in the RTC) to file a petition for
certiorari, and considered the petition as one filed by the OSG. The Court in
the said case even held that the petitioners therein could argue its case in lieu
of the OSG:
From the records, it is clear that, as complainants,
petitioners were involved in the proceedings which led to the
issuance of Search Warrant No. 23. In People v. Nano, the
Court declared that while the general rule is that it is only the
Solicitor General who is authorized to bring or defend actions
on behalf of the People or the Republic of the Philippines once
the case is brought before this Court or the Court of Appeals, if
there appears to be grave error committed by the judge or a
lack of due process, the petition will be deemed filed by the
private complainants therein as if it were filed by the Solicitor
General. In line with this ruling, the Court gives this petition
due course and will allow petitioners to argue their case against
the questioned order in lieu of the Solicitor General.
The general rule is that a party is mandated to follow the hierarchy of
courts. However, in exceptional cases, the Court, for compelling reasons or if
warranted by the nature of the issues raised, may take cognizance of petitions
filed directly before it. In this case, the Court has opted to take cognizance of
the petition, considering the nature of the issues raised by the parties. 21
Therefore, if this Court had previously considered the petitions filed by private
complainants and deemed them as if filed by the Office of the Solicitor General, there
is no reason to disallow the petition herein filed by the Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor.
Anent the main issue as to whether a municipal trial court has the authority to
issue a search warrant involving an offense in which it has no jurisdiction, this Court
answers in the affirmative.
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution provides:
 SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
ITAaHc

The requisites for the issuance of a search warrant are: (1) probable cause is
present; (2) such probable cause must be determined personally by the judge; (3) the
judge must examine, in writing and under oath or affirmation, the complainant and the
witnesses he or she may produce; (4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on the
facts personally known to them; and (5) the warrant specifically describes the place to
be searched and the things to be seized. 22 Necessarily, a motion to quash a search
warrant may be based on grounds extrinsic of the search warrant, such as (1) the place
searched or the property seized are not those specified or described in the search
warrant; and (2) there is no probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant. 23
The respondent RTC judge, in this case, quashed the search warrant and
eventually dismissed the case based merely on the fact that the search warrant was
issued by the MTC of Gattaran, Cagayan proceeding from a suspected violation of
R.A. 9165 or The Dangerous Drugs Act, an offense which is beyond the jurisdiction
of the latter court. It is therefore safe to presume that the other grounds raised by the
private respondent in his motion to quash are devoid of any merit. By that alone, the
respondent judge gravely abused his discretion in quashing the search warrant on a
basis other than the accepted grounds. It must be remembered that a search warrant is
valid for as long as it has all the requisites set forth by the Constitution and must only
be quashed when any of its elements are found to be wanting.
This Court has provided rules to be followed in the application for a search
warrant. Rule 126 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
Sec. 2. Court where application for search warrant shall be filed. —
An application for search warrant shall be filed with the following:
(a) Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed.
(b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any court within the
judicial region where the crime was committed if the place of the commission
of the crime is known, or any court within the judicial region where the
warrant shall be enforced.
However, if the criminal action has already been filed, the application
shall only be made in the court where the criminal action is pending.
Apparently, in this case, the application for a search warrant was filed within
the same judicial region where the crime was allegedly committed. For compelling
reasons, the Municipal Trial Court of Gattaran, Cagayan has the authority to issue a
search warrant to search and seize the dangerous drugs stated in the application
 thereof in Aparri, Cagayan, a place that is within the same judicial region. The fact
that the search warrant was issued means that the MTC judge found probable cause to
grant the said application after the latter was found by the same judge to have been
filed for compelling reasons. Therefore, Sec. 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court was
duly complied with.
It must be noted that nothing in the above-quoted rule does it say that the court
issuing a search warrant must also have jurisdiction over the offense. A search
warrant may be issued by any court pursuant to Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of
Court and the resultant case may be filed in another court that has jurisdiction over the
offense committed. What controls here is that a search warrant is merely a process,
generally issued by a court in the exercise of its ancillary jurisdiction, and not a
criminal action to be entertained by a court pursuant to its original jurisdiction. 24
Thus, in certain cases when no criminal action has yet been filed, any court may issue
a search warrant even though it has no jurisdiction over the offense allegedly
committed, provided that all the requirements for the issuance of such warrant are
present.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, dated November 12, 2012, of petitioner People of the Philippines is
GRANTED. Consequently, the Joint Resolution dated May 14, 2012 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 6, Aparri, Cagayan, insofar as it quashed Search Warrant No. 45
issued by the Municipal Trial Court of Gattaran, Cagayan, is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE, and Criminal Case No. 11-10881 against private respondent Jeofrey Jil
Rabino y Taloza is REINSTATED. CHTAIc

SO ORDERED.
||| (People v. Castillo, Sr., G.R. No. 204419, [November 7, 2016], 798 PHIL 77-90)

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 199032. November 19, 2014.]

RETIRED SPO4 BIENVENIDO LAUD, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF

THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM : p
 Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari 1 are the Decision 2 dated April
25, 2011 and the Resolution 3 dated October 17, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP. No. 113017 upholding the validity of Search Warrant No. 09-14407. 4

The Facts

On July 10, 2009, the Philippine National Police (PNP), through Police Senior
Superintendent Roberto B. Fajardo, applied with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila, Branch 50 (Manila-RTC) for a warrant to search three (3) caves located inside
the Laud Compound in Purok 3, Barangay Ma-a, Davao City, where the alleged remains
of the victims summarily executed by the so-called "Davao Death Squad" may be found.
5 In support of the application, a certain Ernesto Avasola (Avasola) was presented to the
RTC and there testified that he personally witnessed the killing of six (6) persons in
December 2005, and was, in fact, part of the group that buried the victims. 6DSAacC

Judge William Simon P. Peralta (Judge Peralta), acting as Vice Executive Judge of
the Manila-RTC, found probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant, and thus,
issued Search Warrant No. 09-14407 7 which was later enforced by the elements of the
PNP-Criminal Investigation and Detection Group, in coordination with the members of
the Scene of the Crime Operatives on July 15, 2009. The search of the Laud Compound
caves yielded positive results for the presence of human remains. 8

On July 20, 2009, herein petitioner, retired SPO4 Bienvenido Laud (Laud), filed
an Urgent Motion to Quash and to Suppress Illegally Seized Evidence 9 premised on the
following grounds: (a) Judge Peralta had no authority to act on the application for a
search warrant since he had been automatically divested of his position as Vice Executive
Judge when several administrative penalties were imposed against him by the Court; 10
(b) the Manila-RTC had no jurisdiction to issue Search Warrant No. 09-14407 which was
to be enforced in Davao City; 11 (c) the human remains sought to be seized are not a
proper subject of a search warrant; 12 (d) the police officers are mandated to follow the
prescribed procedure for exhumation of human remains; 13 (e) the search warrant was
issued despite lack of probable cause; 14 (f) the rule against forum shopping was violated;
15 and (g) there was a violation of the rule requiring one specific offense and the proper
specification of the place to be searched and the articles to be seized. 16

The Manila-RTC Ruling

In an Order 17 dated July 23, 2009, the Manila-RTC granted the motion of Laud
"after a careful consideration [of] the grounds alleged [therein]." Aside from this general
statement, the said Order contained no discussion on the particular reasons from which
the Manila-RTC derived its conclusion.
 Respondent, the People of the Philippines (the People), filed a Motion for
Reconsideration 18 which was, however, denied in an Order 19 dated December 8, 2009,
wherein the Manila-RTC, this time, articulated its reasons for the warrant's quashal,
namely: (a) the People failed to show any compelling reason to justify the issuance of a
search warrant by the Manila-RTC which was to be implemented in Davao City where
the offense was allegedly committed, in violation of Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of
Court; 20 (b) the fact that the alleged offense happened almost four (4) years before the
search warrant application was filed rendered doubtful the existence of probable cause;
21 and (c) the applicant, i.e., the PNP, violated the rule against forum shopping as the
subject matter of the present search warrant application is exactly the same as the one
contained in a previous application 22 before the RTC of Davao City, Branch 15 (Davao-
RTC) which had been denied. 23 DISaEA

Unconvinced, the People filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, docketed as
CA-G.R. SP. No. 113017.

The CA Ruling

In a Decision 24 dated April 25, 2011, the CA granted the People's petition and
thereby annulled and set aside the Orders of the Manila-RTC for having been tainted with
grave abuse of discretion.

It held that the requirements for the issuance of a search warrant were satisfied,
pointing out that an application therefor involving a heinous crime, such as Murder, is an
exception to the compelling reasons requirement under Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules
of Court as explicitly recognized in A.M. No. 99-20-09-SC 25 and reiterated in A.M. No.
03-8-02-SC, 26 provided that the application is filed by the PNP, the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI), the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOC-TF) or
the Reaction Against Crime Task Force (REACT-TF), 27 with the endorsement of its
head, before the RTC of Manila or Quezon City, and the warrant be consequently issued
by the Executive Judge or Vice-Executive Judge of either of the said courts, as in this
case. 28

Also, the CA found that probable cause was established since, among others,
witness Avasola deposed and testified that he personally witnessed the murder of six (6)
persons in December 2005 and was actually part of the group that buried the victims —
two bodies in each of the three (3) caves. 29 Further, it observed that the Manila-RTC
failed to consider the fear of reprisal and natural reluctance of a witness to get involved in
a criminal case, stating that these are sufficient reasons to justify the delay attending the
application of a search warrant. 30 Accordingly, it deemed that the physical evidence of a
protruding human bone in plain view in one of the caves, and Avasola's first-hand eye
witness account both concur and point to the only reasonable conclusion that the crime of
Murder had been committed and that the human remains of the victims were located in
the Laud Compound. 31

Finally, the CA debunked the claim of forum shopping, finding that the prior
application for a search warrant filed before the Davao-RTC was based on facts and
circumstances different from those in the application filed before the Manila-RTC. 32 aEcDTC

Dissatisfied, Laud moved for reconsideration which was, however, denied in a

Resolution 33 dated October 17, 2011, hence, this petition.

The Issues Before the Court

The issues for the Court's resolution are as follows: (a) whether the administrative
penalties imposed on Judge Peralta invalidated Search Warrant No. 09-14407; (b)
whether the Manila-RTC had jurisdiction to issue the said warrant despite non-
compliance with the compelling reasons requirement under Section 2, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court; (c) whether the requirements of probable cause and particular description
were complied with and the one-specific-offense rule under Section 4, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court was violated; and (d) whether the applicant for the search warrant, i.e., the
PNP, violated the rule against forum shopping.

The Court's Ruling

The petition has no merit.

A. Effect of Judge Peralta's Administrative Penalties.

Citing Section 5, Chapter III of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC which provides that "[t]he
imposition upon an Executive Judge or Vice-Executive Judge of an administrative
penalty of at least a reprimand shall automatically operate to divest him of his position as
such," Laud claims that Judge Peralta had no authority to act as Vice-Executive Judge
and accordingly issue Search Warrant No. 09-14407 in view of the Court's Resolution in
Dee C. Chuan & Sons, Inc. v. Judge Peralta 34 wherein he was administratively
penalized with fines of PhP15,000.00 and PhP5,000.00. 35 cHESAD

While the Court does agree that the imposition of said administrative penalties did
operate to divest Judge Peralta's authority to act as Vice-Executive Judge, it must be
qualified that the abstraction of such authority would not, by and of itself, result in the
invalidity of Search Warrant No. 09-14407 considering that Judge Peralta may be
considered to have made the issuance as a de facto officer whose acts would, nonetheless,
remain valid.
 Funa v. Agra 36 defines who a de facto officer is and explains that his acts are just
as valid for all purposes as those of a de jure officer, in so far as the public or third
persons who are interested therein are concerned, viz.:

A de facto officer is one who derives his appointment from one having
colorable authority to appoint, if the office is an appointive office, and whose
appointment is valid on its face. He may also be one who is in possession of an
office, and is discharging [his] duties under color of authority, by which is
meant authority derived from an appointment, however irregular or informal, so
that the incumbent is not a mere volunteer. Consequently, the acts of the de
facto officer are just as valid for all purposes as those of a de jure officer, in so
far as the public or third persons who are interested therein are concerned. 37

The treatment of a de facto officer's acts is premised on the reality that third
persons cannot always investigate the right of one assuming to hold an important office
and, as such, have a right to assume that officials apparently qualified and in office are
legally such. 38 Public interest demands that acts of persons holding, under color of title,
an office created by a valid statute be, likewise, deemed valid insofar as the public — as
distinguished from the officer in question — is concerned. 39 Indeed, it is far more
cogently acknowledged that the de facto doctrine has been formulated, not for the
protection of the de facto officer principally, but rather for the protection of the public
and individuals who get involved in the official acts of persons discharging the duties of
an office without being lawful officers. 40

In order for the de facto doctrine to apply, all of the following elements must
concur: (a) there must be a de jure office; (b) there must be color of right or general
acquiescence by the public; and (c) there must be actual physical possession of the office
in good faith. 41EHcaDT

The existence of the foregoing elements is rather clear in this case. Undoubtedly,
there is a de jure office of a 2nd Vice-Executive Judge. Judge Peralta also had a colorable
right to the said office as he was duly appointed to such position and was only divested of
the same by virtue of a supervening legal technicality — that is, the operation of Section
5, Chapter III of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC as above-explained; also, it may be said that there
was general acquiescence by the public since the search warrant application was regularly
endorsed to the sala of Judge Peralta by the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Manila-
RTC under his apparent authority as 2nd Vice Executive Judge. 42 Finally, Judge
Peralta's actual physical possession of the said office is presumed to be in good faith, as
the contrary was not established. 43 Accordingly, Judge Peralta can be considered to have
acted as a de facto officer when he issued Search Warrant No. 09-14407, hence, treated
as valid as if it was issued by a de jure officer suffering no administrative impediment.
 B. Jurisdiction of the Manila-RTC to Issue Search Warrant No. 09-14407;
Exception to the Compelling Reasons Requirement under Section 2, Rule
126 of the Rules of Court.

Section 12, Chapter V of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC states the requirements for the
issuance of search warrants in special criminal cases by the RTCs of Manila and
Quezon City. These special criminal cases pertain to those "involving heinous crimes,
illegal gambling, illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions, as well as violations of
the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, the Intellectual Property Code, the
Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001, the Tariff and Customs Code, as amended, and
other relevant laws that may hereafter be enacted by Congress, and included herein by the
Supreme Court." Search warrant applications for such cases may be filed by "the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the Philippine National Police (PNP) and the
Anti-Crime Task Force (ACTAF)," and "personally endorsed by the heads of such
agencies." As in ordinary search warrant applications, they "shall particularly describe
therein the places to be searched and/or the property or things to be seized as prescribed
in the Rules of Court." "The Executive Judges [of these RTCs] and, whenever they are on
official leave of absence or are not physically present in the station, the Vice-Executive
Judges" are authorized to act on such applications and "shall issue the warrants, if
justified, which may be served in places outside the territorial jurisdiction of the said
courts." IcEaST

The Court observes that all the above-stated requirements were complied with in
this case.

As the records would show, the search warrant application was filed before the
Manila-RTC by the PNP and was endorsed by its head, PNP Chief Jesus Ame Versosa,
44 particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized (as will be
elaborated later on) in connection with the heinous crime of Murder. 45 Finding probable
cause therefor, Judge Peralta, in his capacity as 2nd Vice-Executive Judge, issued Search
Warrant No. 09-14407 which, as the rules state, may be served in places outside the
territorial jurisdiction of the said RTC.

Notably, the fact that a search warrant application involves a "special criminal
case" excludes it from the compelling reason requirement under Section 2, Rule 126 of
the Rules of Court which provides:

SEC. 2. Court where application for search warrant shall be filed. —

An application for search warrant shall be filed with the following:

a) Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was

committed.
 b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any court within
the judicial region where the crime was committed if the place of the
commission of the crime is known, or any court within the judicial region
where the warrant shall be enforced.

However, if the criminal action has already been filed, the application
shall only be made in the court where the criminal action is pending. (Emphasis
supplied) EDaHAT

As explicitly mentioned in Section 12, Chapter V of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC, the

rule on search warrant applications before the Manila and Quezon City RTCs for the
above-mentioned special criminal cases "shall be an exception to Section 2 of Rule 126
of the Rules of Court." Perceptibly, the fact that a search warrant is being applied for in
connection with a special criminal case as above-classified already presumes the
existence of a compelling reason; hence, any statement to this effect would be
superfluous and therefore should be dispensed with. By all indications, Section 12,
Chapter V of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC allows the Manila and Quezon City RTCs to issue
warrants to be served in places outside their territorial jurisdiction for as long as the
parameters under the said section have been complied with, as in this case. Thus, on these
grounds, the Court finds nothing defective in the preliminary issuance of Search Warrant
No. 09-14407. Perforce, the RTC-Manila should not have overturned it.

C. Compliance with the Constitutional Requirements for the Issuance of Search

Warrant No. 09-14407 and the One-Specific-Offense Rule under Section 4,
Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.

In order to protect the people's right against unreasonable searches and seizures,
Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Philippine Constitution (Constitution) provides that no
search warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and
the persons or things to be seized: STDEcA

SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,

papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant
of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized.

Complementarily, Section 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court states that a search
warrant shall not be issued except upon probable cause in connection with one specific
offense:
 SEC. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. — A search warrant shall
not issue except upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense
to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized
which may be anywhere in the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied)

In this case, the existence of probable cause for the issuance of Search Warrant
No. 09-14407 is evident from the first-hand account of Avasola who, in his deposition,
stated that he personally witnessed the commission of the afore-stated crime and was, in
fact, part of the group that buried the victims:

Q9 - Who are these six (6) male victims who were killed and buried in the caves
in December 2005 at around 9:00 p.m.? TcEDHa

A9 - I heard Tatay Laud calling the names of the two victims when they were
still alive as Pedro and Mario. I don't know the names of the other four
victims.

Q10 - What happened after Pedro, Mario and the other four victims were killed?

A10 - Tatay Laud ordered me and the six (6) killers to bring and bury equally
the bodies in the three caves. We buried Pedro and Mario altogether in
the first cave, located more or less 13 meters from the makeshift house
of Tatay Laud, the other two victims in the second cave and the
remaining two in the third cave.

Q11 - How did you get there at Laud Compound in the evening of December
2005?

A11 - I was ordered by Tatay Laud to go [to] the place. I ran errands [for] him.
46

Avasola's statements in his deposition were confirmed during the hearing on July
10, 2009, where Judge Peralta conducted the following examination:

Court:

 . . . Anong panandaan mo? Nandoon ka ba noong naghukay, nakatago o

kasama ka?

Mr. Avasola:

 Kasama po ako sa pagbuhat ng mga tao, sir. ScEaAD

Court:
  Mga ilang katao?

Mr. Avasola:

 Anim (6) po.

Court:

 May mass grave ba na nahukay?

Mr. Avasola:

 May tatlong kweba po na maliliit yung isa malaki. . . . . 47

Verily, the facts and circumstances established from the testimony of Avasola,
who was personally examined by Judge Peralta, sufficiently show that more likely than
not the crime of Murder of six (6) persons had been perpetrated and that the human
remains in connection with the same are in the place sought to be searched. In Santos v.
Pryce Gases, Inc., 48 the Court explained the quantum of evidence necessary to establish
probable cause for a search warrant, as follows:

Probable cause for a search warrant is defined as such facts and

circumstances which would lead a reasonably discrete and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in
connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. A finding of
probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than
not, a crime has been committed and that it was committed by the accused.
Probable cause demands more than bare suspicion; it requires less than evidence
which would justify conviction. The existence depends to a large degree upon
the finding or opinion of the judge conducting the examination. However, the
findings of the judge should not disregard the facts before him nor run counter
to the clear dictates of reason. 49
DAHEaT

In light of the foregoing, the Court finds that the quantum of proof to establish the
existence of probable cause had been met. That a "considerable length of time" attended
the search warrant's application from the crime's commission does not, by and of itself,
negate the veracity of the applicant's claims or the testimony of the witness presented. As
the CA correctly observed, the delay may be accounted for by a witness's fear of reprisal
and natural reluctance to get involved in a criminal case. 50 Ultimately, in determining
the existence of probable cause, the facts and circumstances must be personally examined
by the judge in their totality, together with a judicious recognition of the variable
complications and sensibilities attending a criminal case. To the Court's mind, the
supposed delay in the search warrant's application does not dilute the probable cause
finding made herein. In fine, the probable cause requirement has been sufficiently met.
 The Court similarly concludes that there was compliance with the constitutional
requirement that there be a particular description of "the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized."

"[A] description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the

warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended and
distinguish it from other places in the community. Any designation or description known
to the locality that points out the place to the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry leads
the officers unerringly to it, satisfies the constitutional requirement." 51

Search Warrant No. 09-14407 evidently complies with the foregoing standard
since it particularly describes the place to be searched, namely, the three (3) caves located
inside the Laud Compound in Purok 3, Barangay Ma-a, Davao City: ESTCDA

You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search at any time

[of] the day of the premises above describe[d] particularly the three (3) caves
(as sketched) inside the said Laud Compound, Purok 3, Brgy. Ma-a, Davao
City and forthwith seize and take possession of the remains of six (6) victims
who were killed and buried in the just said premises.

xxx xxx xxx 52 (Emphases supplied)

For further guidance in its enforcement, the search warrant even made explicit
reference to the sketch 53 contained in the application. These, in the Court's view, are
sufficient enough for the officers to, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the
place to be searched, which they in fact did.

The things to be seized were also particularly described, namely, the remains of
six (6) victims who were killed and buried in the aforesaid premises. Laud's posturing
that human remains are not "personal property" and, hence, could not be the subject of a
search warrant deserves scant consideration. Section 3, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court
states:

SEC. 3. Personal property to be seized. — A search warrant may be

issued for the search and seizure of personal property:

(a) Subject of the offense;

(b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of the offense; or

cHAaCE

(c) Used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense.

(Emphases supplied)
 "Personal property" in the foregoing context actually refers to the thing's mobility,
and not to its capacity to be owned or alienated by a particular person. Article 416 of the
Civil Code, 54 which Laud himself cites, 55 states that in general, all things which can be
transported from place to place are deemed to be personal property. Considering that
human remains can generally be transported from place to place, and considering further
that they qualify under the phrase "subject of the offense" given that they prove the
crime's corpus delicti, 56 it follows that they may be valid subjects of a search warrant
under the above-cited criminal procedure provision.

Neither does the Court agree with Laud's contention that the term "human
remains" is too all-embracing so as to subvert the particular description requirement. As
the Court sees it, the description points to no other than the things that bear a direct
relation to the offense committed, i.e., of Murder. It is also perceived that the description
is already specific as the circumstances would ordinarily allow given that the buried
bodies would have naturally decomposed over time. These observations on the
description's sufficient particularity square with the Court's pronouncement in Bache and
Co., (Phil.), Inc. v. Judge Ruiz, 57 wherein it was held:

A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to

be seized when the description therein is as specific as the circumstances
will ordinarily allow (People v. Rubio, 57 Phil. 384 [1932]); or when the
description expresses a conclusion of fact — not of law by which the warrant
officer may be guided in making the search and seizure (idem., dissent of Abad
Santos, J.); or when the things described are limited to those which bear
direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued (Sec. 2,
Rule 126, Revised Rules of Court) . . . If the articles desired to be seized have
any direct relation to an offense committed, the applicant must necessarily have
some evidence, other than those articles, to prove the said offense; and the
articles subject of search and seizure should come in handy merely to strengthen
such evidence. (Emphases supplied) 58

Consequently, the Court finds that the particular description requirement — both
as to the place to be searched and the things to be seized — had been complied with. DTEIaC

Finally, the Court finds no violation of the one-specific-offense rule under Section
4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court as above-cited which, to note, was intended to prevent
the issuance of scattershot warrants, or those which are issued for more than one specific
offense. The defective nature of scatter-shot warrants was discussed in the case of People
v. CA 59 as follows:

There is no question that the search warrant did not relate to a specific offense,
in violation of the doctrine announced in Stonehill v. Diokno and of Section 3
[now, Section 4] of Rule 126 providing as follows:
 SEC. 3. Requisites for issuing search warrant. — A search
warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one
specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the things to be seized.

Significantly, the petitioner has not denied this defect in the search
warrant and has merely said that there was probable cause, omitting to continue
that it was in connection with one specific offense. He could not, of course, for
the warrant was a scatter-shot warrant that could refer, in Judge Dayrit's own
words, "to robbery, theft, qualified theft or estafa." On this score alone, the
search warrant was totally null and void and was correctly declared to be so by
the very judge who had issued it. 60ACETID

In Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. CA, 61 the Court, however, settled that a search
warrant that covers several counts of a certain specific offense does not violate the one-
specific-offense rule, viz.:

That there were several counts of the offense of copyright infringement

and the search warrant uncovered several contraband items in the form of
pirated video tapes is not to be confused with the number of offenses
charged. The search warrant herein issued does not violate the one-specific-
offense rule. (Emphasis supplied) 62

Hence, given that Search Warrant No. 09-14407 was issued only for one specific
offense — that is, of Murder, albeit for six (6) counts — it cannot be said that Section 4,
Rule 126 of the Rules of Court had been violated.

That being said, the Court now resolves the last issue on forum shopping.

D. Forum Shopping.

There is forum shopping when a litigant repetitively avails of several judicial

remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on
the same transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising
substantially the same issues either pending in or already resolved adversely by some
other court to increase his chances of obtaining a favorable decision if not in one court,
then in another. 63

Forum shopping cannot be said to have been committed in this case considering
the various points of divergence attending the search warrant application before the
Manila-RTC and that before the Davao-RTC. For one, the witnesses presented in each
application were different. Likewise, the application filed in Manila was in connection
with Murder, while the one in Davao did not specify any crime. Finally, and more
importantly, the places to be searched were different — that in Manila sought the search
of the Laud Compound caves, while that in Davao was for a particular area in the Laud
Gold Cup Firing Range. There being no identity of facts and circumstances between the
two applications, the rule against forum shopping was therefore not violated. cTEICD

Thus, for all the above-discussed reasons, the Court affirms the CA Ruling which
upheld the validity of Search Warrant No. 09-14407.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated April 25, 2011 and
the Resolution dated October 17, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No.
113017 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

||| (Laud v. People, G.R. No. 199032, [November 19, 2014], 747 PHIL 503-527)

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 199087. November 11, 2015.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JERRY

PUNZALAN and PATRICIA PUNZALAN, accused-appellants. **

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J : p

Accused-appellants Jerry Punzalan and Patricia Punzalan seek the reversal of

the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated October 28, 2011 in CA-G.R. CR
HC No. 04557 which affirmed the Joint Decision 2 dated March 29, 2010 and the
Order 3 dated June 21, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City, Branch
116 in Crim. Case No. R-PSY-09-01162-CR convicting them of violation of Section
11, Article II of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 (R.A. No. 9165).
Accused-appellants were charged under the Information 4 docketed as Crim.
Case No. R-PSY-09-01162-CR for violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No.
9165, which reads as follows:
That on or about the 03rd day of November 2009, in Pasay City, Metro
Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, without authority of law did then and there willfully,
 unlawfully and feloniously have in their possession, custody and control 40.78
grams of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, (shabu) a dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon arraignment, accused-appellants pleaded not guilty to the charge.
During the trial, the prosecution presented Intelligence Officer 1 Aldwin
Pagaragan (IO1 Pagaragan), Special Investigator 2 Juancho Esteban (SI2 Esteban),
Barangay Chairman Reynaldo Flores and Barangay Kagawad Larry Fabella as
witnesses.
The prosecution established that on November 3, 2009, at around 4:30 in the
morning, Intelligence Agent 1 Liwanag Sandaan (IA1 Sandaan) and her team
implemented a search warrant 5 issued on October 28, 2009 by then Manila RTC
Judge Eduardo B. Peralta, Jr. to (i) make an immediate search of the premises/house
of accused-appellants Jerry and Patricia Punzalan, Vima Punzalan, Jaime Punzalan,
Arlene Punzalan-Razon and Felix Razon who are all residents of 704 Apelo Cruz
Compound, Barangay 175, Malibay, Pasay City; and (ii) to seize and take possession
of an undetermined quantity — of assorted dangerous drugs, including the proceeds
or fruits and bring said property to the court.
Since there are three houses or structures inside the compound believed to be
occupied by the accused-appellants, a sketch 6 of the compound describing the house
to be searched was prepared and attached to the search warrant.
The Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) Team tasked to conduct the
search was composed of IA1 Sandaan as team leader, SI2 Esteban and IO2 Jessica
Alvarado (IO2 Alvarado) as arresting officers and IO1 Pagaragan as seizing officer. 7
IO1 Pagaragan made lateral coordination with the Southern Police District, Tactical
Operations Unit, as evidenced by the Pre-Operation Report 8 dated November 3, 2009
and Authority to Operate. 9
Before proceeding to the target area, they passed by the barangay hall to
coordinate with Barangay Chairman Reynaldo Flores, Kagawad Larry Fabella and
Kagawad Edwin Razon. The team likewise brought with them a media representative
affiliated with "Sunshine Radio" to cover the operation. From the barangay hall, they
walked toward the target place using as a guide the sketch they prepared.
When they were already outside the house of Jerry and Patricia Punzalan,
which is a three-storey structure, IA1 Sandaan knocked on the door. A woman, later
identified as accused-appellant Patricia Punzalan, slightly opened the door. When they
introduced themselves as PDEA agents and informed the occupant that they have a
search warrant, Patricia immediately tried to close the door but was not successful
since the PDEA agents pushed the door open. The team was able to enter the house of
Jerry and Patricia Punzalan who were both surprised when found inside the house.
IO1 Pagaragan showed and read the search warrant infront of accused-appellants. CAIHTE
 Inside the house, the team immediately saw plastic sachets placed on top of the
table. IO1 Pagaragan was able to seize nine (9) heat-sealed plastic sachets, two (2)
square-shaped transparent plastic containers and a small round plastic container. All
three (3) plastic containers contained smaller heat-sealed plastic sachets of white
crystalline substance of suspected shabu. There were also other paraphernalia, guns,
money and a digital weighing scale. Accordingly, SI2 Esteban and IO2 Alvarado
effected the arrest of accused-appellants Jerry and Patricia Punzalan after informing
them of their constitutional rights. IO1 Pagaragan immediately marked the seized
items by placing the marking "ADP". After searching and marking the evidence found
on the first floor, the team, together with the barangay officials and accused-
appellants, proceeded to, and conducted the search on the second and third floors but
found nothing. They went downstairs where they conducted the inventory of
recovered items. IO1 Pagaragan prepared the Receipt/Inventory of Property Seized 10
and a Certification of Orderly Search 11 which were later signed by the barangay
officials.
After their arrest, accused-appellants Jerry and Patricia Punzalan were brought
to the PDEA Office in Quezon City for investigation. IO1 Pagaragan presented the
seized evidence to Atty. Benjamin Gaspe, who prepared the Booking Sheet and Arrest
Report, 12 Request for Drug Test/Physical and Medical Examination. They likewise
caused the preparation of their respective affidavits. Photographs were also taken
during the actual search and inventory. Laboratory examination of the seized pieces of
drug evidence gave positive results for the presence of methamphetamine
hydrochloride, otherwise known as shabu, a dangerous drug. 13
Thereafter, the accused-appellants were charged with violation of Section 11,
Article II of R.A. No. 9165 for illegal possession of 40.78 grams of methamphetamine
hydrochloride otherwise known as shabu, a dangerous drug.
In denying the charge, accused-appellant Jerry Punzalan testified that at around
5:45 in the morning of November 3, 2009, he was at his store located at 704, A-44
Apelo Cruz Street, Pasay City. Their house and store are two separate structures
which are 70 meters apart. Patricia was inside the store fixing the grains. Jerry was
about to open the store when he saw men running toward their main house, carrying a
tank with hose attached to it. Jerry followed them and saw the men applying acetylene
on their steel gate. Jerry shouted at them but the men poked their guns at him and
when he answered in the affirmative after being asked if he is Jerry, they placed him
in metal handcuffs, held him at the back of his shirt and brought him to his garage,
about 30 meters from their house. He was later made to board a van, which is about
five meters away from the garage. Inside the van, his wife Patricia was already there
with her hands bound in plastic. They stayed there for more or less three hours. Then,
Barangay Chairman Reynaldo Flores arrived. They were brought by the PDEA agents
to their main house. Upon reaching the house, accused-appellants noticed that their
belongings were already scattered. Inside their house, there were two kagawads, two
female and two male PDEA agents, whom they later identified as IO1 Pagaragan, IA1
Sandaan, SI2 Esteban and IO2 Alvarado, Kagawad Larry Fabella and Kagawad
Edwin Razon. Their pieces of jewelry, cash amounting to P985,000 or almost a
million pesos, 3,711 US dollars, 3,100 Holland, Euro, Malaysian Ringgit, things
belonging to their children like PSP, gameboy, video camera, 14 units of cellphone,
licensed gun, and three kilos of gold were likewise missing. Jerry testified that he kept
a huge amount of cash in the house because he is engaged in "5-6" money-lending
business. He also sells rice from Bulacan.
From the van, the PDEA agents made them go up to the 4th floor. He heard his
children crying inside the room of his eldest child at the third floor. Accused-
appellants explained that they sleep in the store because they close late at night and
wake up very early. Their things were already scattered but no search was conducted
upstairs. They were led down, brought out of the house and boarded the van. They
were later brought to the PDEA office in Quezon City.
The defense also presented as witness accused-appellants' daughter, Jennifer
Punzalan, to corroborate their claim. She testified that on November 3, 2009, between
5:45 and 6:00 o'clock in the morning, she was inside her room, together with her
younger siblings. Her parents were at the store. The last time she saw her parents was
on the night of November 2, 2009. In the morning of the following day, there were
people searching their house. She was inside the room together with her siblings when
somebody entered and searched the room. They just covered themselves with a
blanket. She left the room at noontime when the persons who entered the room and
her parents were no longer inside the house. They left the house only when Kagawad
Edwin Razon fetched them.
Another witness presented by the defense is Kagawad Edwin Razon who
testified that when he arrived at the house of accused-appellants, after he was
summoned by Barangay Chairman Reynaldo Flores for the purpose of conducting a
search in the house of the Punzalans, the door was open, there was a .45 pistol on top
of the table, an agent of PDEA was marking the exhibits which seem to be shabu, and
the cabinets were already opened. There were four PDEA agents when he reached the
house. He also noticed a reporter and a photographer. He sat for a while and then
accused-appellants were brought inside the house, who came from the van. Later, he
signed a document containing the list of evidence spread on the table. He said that
they did not conduct any search because they just made a house tour up to the third
floor.DETACa

Lastly, accused-appellant Patricia Punzalan testified that on November 3, 2009,

between 5:45 and 6:00 o'clock in the morning, she was inside the store located at 704-
A44 Apelo Cruz Street, Pasay City. Their house is 50 meters away from the store.
Then, she noticed that there were many gun-carrying men, so her husband, Jerry,
followed them. She went out to check what is going on. Two armed men then
approached her and asked for her name. After she gave her name, Pat, they tied her
hands with plastic. Then a van passed by and she was asked to board the van. After
 the van had run a few meters, it was parked for more or less three hours. Thereafter,
the driver alighted and then the door was opened. She saw her husband who was
already in handcuffs and was made to board the van. They also saw Barangay
Chairman Reynaldo Flores. They were made to alight from the van and were brought
inside the house. The door was already open and some PDEA agents, Kagawad
Edwin Razon, Kagawad Larry Fabella and a reporter were there. One lady was sitting
and another woman was standing. The reporter was sitting. The male PDEA agent
was marking some plastic sachets, which they claimed to be shabu. They stayed
inside the house for more or less one hour during which photographs were taken by
the PDEA agents. She further said that while she was in her store, her four children
were inside their house. PDEA agents brought them out and they were made to board
the van.

In a Joint Decision 14 dated March 29, 2010, the trial court convicted accused-
appellants for violation of Section 11, Article II, R.A. No. 9165 and sentenced them to
suffer a penalty of imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day, as minimum,
to fourteen (14) years, as maximum, and to pay a fine of P300,000.00.
The trial court held that the issuance of a search warrant against the premises
of different persons named therein is valid as there is no requirement that only one
search warrant for one premise to be searched is necessary for its validity. Also, the
address of the accused-appellants Jerry and Patricia Punzalan was clearly and
adequately described. A sketch that specifically identifies the places to be searched
was attached to the records and such description of the place was unquestionably
accurate that the PDEA agents were led to, and were able to successfully conduct their
operation in the premises described in the search warrant.
The trial court also ruled that the implementation of the search warrant
sufficiently complied with the requirements of the law. Despite accused-appellants'
assertion that they were arrested outside their house and were made to board a van
parked along the street beside the river and were not allowed by the PDEA agents to
witness the search conducted inside the house, the trial court was convinced that
accused-appellants Jerry and Patricia Punzalan were in fact inside their house and
were physically present during the conduct of the search.
The trial court gave weight to the prosecution's version and found no reason to
doubt the credibility of IO1 Pagaragan, whose testimony was sufficiently
corroborated by SI2 Esteban. The court found no showing of any improper or ill
motive on the part of both PDEA agents to testify against the accused-appellants and
neither was there evidence that the two PDEA agents were not properly performing
their official duties and functions at that time. On the other hand, the defense merely
offered alibi and bare denials which cannot overcome the presumption of regularity of
performance of functions accorded to IO1 Pagaragan's and SI2 Esteban's detailed
declarations under oath.
In its findings, the trial court observed that there were actually two phases of
the search done in the Punzalan house. The first or initial search was done at the
ground floor of the house, immediately after the PDEA agents gained entry and was
beyond doubt made in the presence of both accused. This is where the bulk of illegal
drugs were found, confiscated and consequently marked. The trial court further stated
that it is of no moment that the barangay officials were not able to witness the said
initial search and their failure to arrive on time to witness the first or initial search at
the ground floor of the Punzalan house, or even their total absence thereat, will not
render the subject search invalid and unlawful inasmuch as their presence is not
required. The trial court held that the prosecution successfully and sufficiently
established that the two accused were present during the initial search, thus, satisfying
the requirement of a lawful and valid search.
The second phase of the search was conducted at the upper floors of the house
after the markings on the 293 sachets of confiscated specimens were completed by
IO1 Pagaragan. This was witnessed and participated in by the barangay officials.
Finally, after the search of the entire house was concluded, it is not disputed that an
inventory of all the items seized was conducted by IO1 Pagaragan in compliance with
the provisions of Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. In fact, it was admitted by
the barangay officials that they were requested to wait for the DOJ representative, to
which they willingly acceded. aDSIHc

Accused-appellants filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied in the

Order 15 dated June 21, 2010. The trial court modified the Joint Decision by
increasing the penalty to life imprisonment and the fine to P400,000.00.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction of accused-appellants. The CA held
that there was a valid search and seizure conducted and the seized items are
admissible in evidence. The prosecution was able to prove all the elements of illegal
possession of dangerous drugs: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object
which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by
law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.
The pertinent portion of the CA Decision states:
Given the foregoing, We do not find any error committed by the trial
court in convicting accused-appellants for Violation of Section 11, Article II
of RA 9165. From the evidence adduced, their guilt to the crime charged have
been proved beyond reasonable doubt. Since the seized shabu weighs 40.78
grams, the modified penalty of life imprisonment and fine of P400,000.00 is
maintained pursuant to Section 11, Article II of RA 9165.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DENIED.
The assailed Joint Decision dated March 29, 2010 and the Order dated June
 21, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 116, Pasay City are here
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED. 16
Hence, this appeal. Accused-appellants set forth the following errors allegedly
committed by the CA:

1. That the SEARCH WARRANT NO. 09-14814 issued by JUDGE

ED[U]ARDO PERALTA, Jr., of Branch 17-RTC Manila, was in fact
illegally procured and unlawfully implemented.

2. The Prosecution miserably failed to establish the guilt of accused-appellants

for alleged possession of illegal drugs as the requirement demanded by
Chain-in-Custody [chain of custody] Rule were never met.

3. The Prosecution failed to establish the guilt of the accused-appellants beyond

reasonable doubt. 17

In assailing the validity of the search warrant, accused-appellants claim that the
PDEA agents who applied for a search warrant failed to comply with the requirements
for the procurement of a search warrant particularly the approval of the PDEA
Director General. Accused-appellants also contended that the court which issued the
search warrant, the RTC of Manila, Branch 17, had no authority to issue the search
warrant since the place where the search is supposed to be conducted is outside its
territorial jurisdiction.
We are not persuaded. A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC, entitled "Guidelines on the
Selection and Appointment of Executive Judges and Defining their Powers,
Prerogatives and Duties" as approved by the Court in its Resolution of January 27,
2004, as amended, provides:
SEC. 12. Issuance of search warrants in special criminal cases by the
Regional Trial Courts of Manila and Quezon City. — The Executive Judges
and, whenever they are on official leave of absence or are not physically
present in the station, the Vice-Executive Judges of the RTCs of Manila and
Quezon City shall have authority to act on applications filed by the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the Philippine National Police (PNP) and the
Anti-Crime Task Force (ACTAF), for search warrants involving heinous
crimes, illegal gambling, illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions as
well as violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, the
Intellectual Property Code, the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001, the
Tariff and Customs Code, as amended, and other relevant laws that may
hereafter be enacted by Congress, and included herein by the Supreme Court.
The applications shall be endorsed by the heads of such agencies or
their respective duly authorized officials and shall particularly describe therein
the places to be searched and/or the property or things to be seized as
 prescribed in the Rules of Court. The Executive Judges and Vice-Executive
Judges concerned shall issue the warrants, if justified, which may be served
outside the territorial jurisdiction of the said courts.
xxx xxx xxx 18
In the instant case, aside from their bare allegation, accused-appellants failed to
show that the application for search warrant of the subject premises was not approved
by the PDEA Regional Director or his authorized representative. On the contrary, the
search warrant issued by the RTC of Manila, Branch 17 satisfactorily complies with
the requirements for the issuance thereof as determined by the issuing court, thus: ETHIDa

Pursuant to Section 2, Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution, Sections 2 to

5, Rule 126 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure, modified by Section 12
of Supreme Court En Banc Resolution in A.M. No. 03-08-02-SC dated
January 27, 2004, and Certification dated October 28, 2009, it appearing to the
satisfaction of the undersigned after personally examining under oath Agent
Liwanag B. Sandaan and Agent Derween Reed both of Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency Metro Manila Regional Office, that there is probable
cause, there are good and sufficient reasons, to believe that undetermined
quantity of assorted dangerous drugs, particularly shabu, including the
proceeds or fruits and those used or intended to be used by the respondents as
a means of committing the offense, you are hereby commanded to make an
immediate search at any time in the day or night of the premises above
described and forthwith seize and take possession of the undetermined
quantity of assorted dangerous drugs including the proceeds of fruits and
bring said property to the undersigned to be dealt with as the law directs. 19
Moreover, we find no merit in accused-appellants' claim that the RTC of
Manila, Branch 17, had no authority to issue the assailed search warrant since the
place to be searched is outside its territorial jurisdiction. As aforecited, Section 12,
Chapter V of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC clearly authorizes the Executive Judges and the
Vice-Executive Judges of the RTC of Manila and Quezon City to issue search
warrants to be served in places outside their territorial jurisdiction in special criminal
cases such as those involving heinous crimes, illegal gambling, illegal possession of
firearms and ammunitions as well as violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002, as in this case, for as long as the parameters under the said section
have been complied with.

In the issuance of a search warrant, probable cause requires such facts and
circumstances that would lead a reasonably prudent man to believe that an offense has
been committed and the objects sought in connection with that offense are in the place
to be searched. There is no exact test for the determination of probable cause in the
issuance of search warrants. It is a matter wholly dependent on the finding of trial
judges in the process of exercising their judicial function. When a finding of probable
cause for the issuance of a search warrant is made by a trial judge, the finding is
accorded respect by reviewing courts. 20
Accused-appellants insist that they were not inside their house and were inside
the closed van when their house was searched. They allege that upon forcibly
breaking into their house through the use of an acetylene torch, the members of the
raiding party handcuffed them, dragged them outside and held them for three hours
inside a van while conducting the search of the premises. They thus argue that the
shabu seized by the PDEA agents were inadmissible in evidence.
We affirm the conviction of accused-appellants. TIADCc

It is a fundamental rule that findings of the trial court which are factual in
nature and which involve the credibility of witnesses are accorded with respect, more
so, when no glaring errors, gross misapprehension of facts, and speculative, arbitrary,
and unsupportive conclusions can be gathered from such findings. 21 The reason
behind this rule is that the trial court is in a better position to decide the credibility of
witnesses having heard their testimonies and observed their deportment and manner
of testifying during the trial. This rule finds an even more stringent application where
the trial court's findings are sustained by the CA. 22
After carefully reviewing the records of the case, we find no cogent reason to
overturn the findings of both the lower courts, which were adequately supported by
the evidence on record. It cannot be overemphasized that in cases involving violations
of the Dangerous Drugs Act, credence should be given to the narration of the incident
by the prosecution witnesses especially when they are police officers who are
presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there is evidence
to the contrary. 23
In the instant case, like the trial and the appellate courts, we are not persuaded
by accused-appellants' claim that they were not inside their house but were inside a
closed van when their house was searched. In weighing the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses vis-a-vis that of the defense, we find that the former is more
worthy of credit. Both IO1 Pagaragan and SI2 Esteban clearly narrated how the search
on the house of accused-appellants was conducted. As aptly noted by the trial court
and concurred in by the appellate court, there were actually two phases of the search
done in the house of accused-appellants. The first or initial search was done at the
ground floor of the house, immediately after the PDEA agents gained entry. IO1
Sandaan knocked on the house and a woman, later identified as Patricia Punzalan
slightly opened the door and when they introduced themselves as PDEA agents and
informed the occupant that they have a search warrant, Patricia immediately tried to
close the door but was prevented by the PDEA agents from closing it and they were
able to enter the premises. IO1 Pagaragan showed and read the search warrant in front
of the accused-appellants and the agents searched the house and immediately found
several heat-sealed transparent sachets of white crystalline substance of suspected
shabu. Immediately, the seized items were marked "ADP" in the presence of accused-
appellants and media practitioner Jimmy Mendoza. It has been sufficiently shown by
the prosecution that accused-appellants were present when their house was searched.
The pictures taken during the marking and inventory and showing the accused-
appellants in their house are clear proof that they were present when their house was
searched and the illegal drugs found were seized. It was only after the marking of the
drugs and while the PDEA agents waited for the barangay officials to arrive that
accused-appellants were made to board the van. This explains the testimony of
Kagawad Edwin Razon that accused-appellants were not inside their house when he
arrived. After the barangay officials arrived, accused-appellants were brought back to
the house for the continuation of the search of the upper floors but they found no
additional contrabands. They then went back to the ground floor to conduct inventory
of the seized items.
The testimonies of the police officers who caught accused-appellants in
flagrante delicto in possession of illegal drugs during the conduct of a valid search are
usually credited with more weight and credence, in the absence of evidence that they
have been inspired by an improper or ill motive. Here, there is no proof of any ill
motive or odious intent on the part of the police officers to impute such a serious
crime to accused-appellants.
On the other hand, accused-appellants hammer on the supposed inconsistencies
in the testimonies of the witnesses such as whether barangay officials were present at
the time of the conduct of the search. The latter was sufficiently explained by the
prosecution while the other inconsistencies pertain to minor details and are so
inconsequential that they do not affect the credibility of the witnesses nor detract from
the established fact of illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
We have previously held that discrepancies and inconsistencies in the
testimonies of witnesses referring to minor details, and not in actuality touching upon
the central fact of the crime, do not impair their credibility. Testimonies of witnesses
need only corroborate each other on important and relevant details concerning the
principal occurrence. In fact, such minor inconsistencies may even serve to strengthen
the witnesses' credibility as they negate any suspicion that the testimonies have been
rehearsed. 24
Notably, Section 8, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides:
SEC. 8. Search of house, room, or premises to be made in presence of
two witnesses. — No search of a house, room, or any other premises shall be
made except in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of
his family or in the absence of the latter, two witnesses of sufficient age and
discretion residing in the same locality.
As correctly ruled by the CA, even if the barangay officials were not present
during the initial search, the search was witnessed by accused-appellants themselves,
hence, the search was valid since the rule that "two witnesses of sufficient age and
discretion residing in the same locality" must be present applies only in the absence of
either the lawful occupant of the premises or any member of his family.
To successfully prosecute a case of illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the
following elements must be established: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or
object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not
authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.
25 In the case at bench, the prosecution was able to establish with moral certainty the
guilt of the accused-appellants for the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
Accused-appellants were caught in actual possession of the prohibited drugs during a
valid search of their house. It bears stressing that aside from assailing the validity of
the search, accused-appellants did not deny ownership of the illegal drugs seized.
They have not proffered any valid defense in the offense charged for violation of the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. AIDSTE

As to accused-appellants' assertion that the chain of custody rule has not been
complied with when no inventory or acknowledgment receipt signed by Atty. Gaspe
was submitted in evidence and that no evidence was shown as to the condition of the
specimen upon its presentation to Atty. Gaspe, who was not presented in court to
explain the discrepancy, we are also not persuaded.
This Court has time and again adopted the chain of custody rule, a method of
authenticating evidence which requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded
by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the
proponent claims it to be. This would include testimony about every link in the chain,
from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered in evidence, in such
a way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom
it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness' possession,
the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to
the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken
to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no
opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same. 26
The Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 9165 on the handling
and disposition of seized dangerous drugs provides as follows:
SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or
Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs,
Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia
and/or Laboratory Equipment. — The PDEA shall take charge and have
custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled
precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia
and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for
proper disposition in the following manner:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control
of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically
 inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the
person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department
of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign
the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof; Provided, that the
physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the
search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office
of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of
warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these
requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of
and custody over said items[.]

It is essential for the prosecution to prove that the prohibited drug confiscated
or recovered from the suspect is the very same substance offered in court as exhibit.
Its identity must be established with unwavering exactitude for it to lead to a finding
of guilt. 27 In this case, the chain of custody of the seized illegal drugs was duly
established from the time the heat-sealed plastic sachets were seized and marked by
IO1 Pagaragan to its subsequent turnover to Atty. Gaspe of the PDEA Office in
Quezon City. IO1 Pagaragan was also the one who personally delivered and
submitted the specimens composed of 293 sachets of shabu to the PNP Crime
Laboratory for laboratory examination. The specimens were kept in custody until they
were presented as evidence before the trial court and positively identified by IO1
Pagaragan as the very same specimens he marked during the inventory.
The fact that the Receipt/Inventory of Property Seized was not signed by Atty.
Gaspe does not undermine the integrity and evidentiary value of the illegal drugs
seized from accused-appellants. The failure to strictly comply with the prescribed
procedures in the inventory of seized drugs does not render an arrest of the accused
illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. 28 What is of utmost
importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized
items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of
the accused. 29
With regard to the handling of the seized drugs, there are no conflicting
testimonies or glaring inconsistencies that would cast doubt on the integrity thereof as
evidence presented and scrutinized in court. It is therefore safe to conclude that, to the
unprejudiced mind, the testimonies show without a doubt that the evidence seized
from the accused-appellants at the time of the search was the same one tested,
introduced and testified to in court. In other words, there is no question as to the
integrity of the evidence against accused-appellants.
 In fine, we find no error on the part of the CA in affirming the trial court's
conviction of accused-appellants of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. The
prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of accused-appellants Jerry
Punzalan and Patricia Punzalan of the crime charged. We likewise find proper the
modification by the trial court of the penalty imposed to life imprisonment and a fine
of P400,000.00.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The
Decision dated October 28, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No.
04557 is hereby AFFIRMED. AaCTcI

With costs against the accused-appellants.

SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-de Castro, * Peralta and Reyes, JJ., concur.
||| (People v. Punzalan, G.R. No. 199087, [November 11, 2015], 773 PHIL 72-93)

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 205414. April 4, 2016.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. EDUARDO DELA

CRUZ y GUMABAT @ "EDDIE", appellant.

DECISION

PERALTA, J : p

For the Court's consideration is the Decision 1 dated March 19, 2012 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 04587 affirming the Decision 2 dated
August 2, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 2, in Criminal
Case No. 09-271907, finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Section 5, Article II of Republic Act (RA) No. 9165, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
In an information filed on November 5, 2009, appellant Eduardo dela Cruz y
Gumabat was charged with illegal sale of dangerous drugs under Section 5 of Article
II of RA No. 9165, the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about October 23, 2009, in the City of Manila, Philippines,
the said accused, not having been authorized by law to sell, trade, deliver or
give away to another any dangerous drug, did then and there wilfully,
 unlawfully and knowingly sell or offer for sale to poseur-buyer, one (1)
Blister pack with label "Valium" containing Ten (10) round blue tablets
weighing ONE POINT SEVEN TWO ZERO (1.720) grams which after a
qualitative examination, gave positive result to the test of diazepam, a
dangerous drug.
Contrary to law. 3
Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.
Consequently, trial on the merits ensued. 4
The factual antecedents, as narrated by the witnesses of the prosecution,
namely, PO1 Jaycee John Galotera, who acted as the poseur-buyer; PO1 Roderick
Magpale, who was the investigator-on-duty at the Special Operation and Task Unit;
and PO3 Ryan Sulayao, who acted as the perimeter back-up, are as follows:
At around 7:30 p.m. on October 22, 2009, a confidential informant arrived at
the Jose Abad Santos Police Station, Manila Police District and informed PO1 Ronnie
Tan, PO3 Ryan Sulayao and PO3 Eric Guzman about the illegal drug activities being
conducted by appellant along Solis Street, Tondo, Manila. Said informant claimed to
have gained access to appellant. Consequently, the police officers immediately
informed their station commander, P/Supt. Remigio Sedanto, who tasked the unit to
conduct a buy-bust operation, to be led by P/Inspector Jeffrey Dallo, with PO1
Galotera acting as poseur-buyer, and the rest of the team to serve as back-up.
P/Inspector Dallo gave PO1 Galotera three (3) pieces of One Hundred Peso (P100.00)
bills to be utilized as buy-bust money, which PO1 Galotera marked with his initials
"JJG." The team also agreed that PO1 Galotera's removal of his ball cap constitutes
the signal indicating that the transaction has been consummated and that the appellant
may be arrested. After a thorough briefing and coordination with the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA), the team left the station and proceeded to the target
area at around 12:20 a.m. 5
PO1 Galotera and the confidential informant went straight to the destination
aboard a motorcycle, while PO1 Tan, PO3 Sulayao, and PO3 Guzman, aboard a
separate motorcycle, positioned themselves about ten (10) meters away from PO1
Galotera and the informant. PO1 Galotera and the informant then walked along an
alley on Solis Street towards Villanueva Street and saw two (2) men standing at a
dark portion thereof. As they approached said men, the confidential informant
whispered to PO1 Galotera that the person on the right was appellant. Thereafter,
appellant asked the informant what he needed. 6 In reply, the informant told appellant
that he and his companion, PO1 Galotera, needed "Valium," which contains
Diazepam, a dangerous drug. Appellant then asked how much Valium they need, to
which PO1 Galotera answered, "Isang banig lang." PO1 Galotera then handed the
marked money in the amount of Three Hundred Pesos (P300.00) to appellant, who
placed the same in his front left pocket. Thereafter, appellant pulled out one blister
pack containing ten (10) pieces of round, blue tablets from his right pocket and
handed the same to PO1 Galotera. Believing that what he received was Valium based
on its appearance, PO1 Galotera executed the pre-arranged signal. Upon seeing the
signal, PO3 Guzman proceeded to assist PO1 Galotera, who immediately grabbed
appellant. Appellant's companion, who tried to escape, was also subdued by PO3
Guzman. PO1 Galotera then apprised appellant of the nature of his arrest and read
him his constitutional rights. He also marked the seized tablets with the initials
"EDG" corresponding to appellant's name. AcICHD

Afterwards, he turned over the appellant and the seized evidence to PO1
Roderick Magpale, an investigator of the Anti-Illegal Special Operation Task Unit at
the Police Station. PO1 Magpale then took pictures of appellant and the seized
evidence, prepared the Booking and Information Sheet, and forwarded the seized
tablets to the forensic laboratory for examination. Accordingly, Forensic Chemist
Erickson L. Calabocal, conducted a chemistry examination and in his Chemistry
Report No. D-787-09, found that the ten (10) round, blue tablets seized from appellant
tested positive for Diazepam, a dangerous drug. 7 During trial, however, Calabocal's
testimony was dispensed with after the parties stipulated on the existence and due
execution of Chemistry Report No. D-787-09. 8
Against the foregoing charges, appellant testified on his own version of facts,
and further presented the testimonies of his mother, Leonora dela Cruz, and one
Roberto Balatbat. 9
Appellant testified that he was a jeepney driver by profession and a resident at
Solis Street, Tondo, Manila. At around 3:00 p.m. on October 23, 2009, he went to see
his friend, Nicanor Guevarra, to convince him to place a bet on the "karera." He
found him at the tricycle terminal at Solis Street corner Callejon Villanueva, playing
cara y cruz and joined him. Suddenly, the policemen arrived. They tried to run but
were eventually arrested. Appellant requested that he be brought to the barangay hall,
but the policemen brought him directly to the police station. He thought that he was
only being accused of illegal gambling for playing cara y cruz. It turned out, however,
that he was being charged with illegal sale of dangerous drugs. 10
After appellant, the defense presented appellant's mother who denied that her
son was into selling dangerous drugs. According to her, at around 3:00 p.m. on
October 23, 2009, appellant asked her permission to leave the house to place a bet.
However, she later learned from her granddaughter that her son had been arrested.
Next was Roberto Balatbat, a tricycle driver residing at Solis Street, Tondo,
Manila, who testified that on that day, he was at the tricycle terminal on Solis Street
playing cara y cruz. When the four (4) police officers arrived, he quickly ran away
leaving behind appellant and Guevarra, who were arrested. He denied that any sale of
dangerous drugs transpired at the time and place of appellant's arrest. 11
In its Decision dated August 2, 2010, the RTC gave credence to the testimonies
of the police officers as they were given in a clear and convincing manner showing
that the officers were at the place of the incident to accomplish exactly what they had
set out to do, which was to conduct a legitimate buy-bust operation on appellant. 12 It
found that unless the members of the buy-bust team were inspired by any ill motive to
testify falsely against appellant, their testimonies deserve full faith and credit,
particularly in light of the presumption that they have performed their duties regularly.
Indeed, the positive identification of appellant by the prosecution witnesses prevails
over appellant's denial, which is inherently a weak defense. 13 The trial court,
therefore, disposed of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, from the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered,
finding the accused, Eduardo dela Cruz y Gumabat @ Eddie, GUILTY,
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. He is hereby sentenced to life
imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,000.00 without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.
The specimen is forfeited in favor of the government and the Branch
Clerk of Court, accompanied by the Branch Sheriff, is directed to turn over
with dispatch and upon receipt the said specimen to the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA) for proper disposal in accordance with the law
and rules.
SO ORDERED. 14
Appellant appealed his conviction arguing that his warrantless arrest was
unlawful for he was not, in fact, caught selling dangerous drugs but was merely
committing the offense of illegal gambling. Thus, the ten (10) tablets of Valium
allegedly seized from him is inadmissible as evidence. 15 Appellant also argued that
there was no showing that he was informed of the reason for his arrest, of his
constitutional right to remain silent and to be assisted by a counsel of his choice. 16
Appellant further faulted the prosecution for not only failing to present the buy-bust
money as evidence in court 17 but also failing to show proof that the confiscated
Valium was subjected to a qualitative examination. 18 He noted that the chemist who
supposedly conducted the laboratory examination on the drug did not know the source
from which it came. 19
On March 19, 2012, the CA sustained appellant's conviction. At the outset, it
noted that it was only in appellant's appeal that appellant raised for the first time the
issue of the irregularity of his arrest. At no time before or during his arraignment did
he object to the same. As such, jurisprudence dictates that he should be estopped from
assailing said irregularity, for issues not raised in the lower courts cannot be raised for
the first time on appeal without offending the basic rules of fair play. 20 Even
assuming that the police officers failed to inform appellant of his rights under
custodial investigation, the appellate court held that such would not necessarily result
in appellant's acquittal because his conviction was based not on any extrajudicial
confession but on the testimony of PO1 Galotera who clearly and convincingly
narrated the material details of the buy-bust operation that led to appellant's arrest. 21
TAIaHE
 On appellant's main contention that the police officers should have obtained a
judicial warrant to validly effect his arrest, the appellate court held that the instant
case falls within one of the settled exceptions: an arrest made after an entrapment
operation. This is because such warrantless arrest is considered valid under Section 5
(a), 22 Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. The CA explained that
buy-bust operations, such as the one conducted herein, is a form of entrapment where
means are resorted to for the purpose of capturing lawbreakers in the execution of
their own, criminal plan. In upholding the validity of the operation, the "objective
test" demands that the details of the purported transaction be clearly shown, beginning
from the initial contact between the poseur-buyer and the pusher, the offer to
purchase, the promise or payment of the consideration, until the consummation of the
sale by the delivery of the illegal drug subject of the sale. 23 Here, the appellate court
found that said requirements were adequately met for as observed by the trial court,
the testimonies presented by the prosecution were given in a clear, straightforward
and convincing manner.
As for the failure by the prosecution to offer as evidence the marked money,
the CA cited jurisprudence holding that the absence of the marked money does not
create a hiatus in the prosecution's evidence, as long as the sale of the dangerous drug
is adequately proved. 24 Furthermore, the appellate court rejected appellant's
contention that there was no proof that the Valium that was subjected to qualitative
examination was the same Valium seized from him during the buy-bust operation.
According to the appellate court, the unbroken chain of custody of the ten (10)
Valium tablets was established by the prosecution through the testimonies of PO1
Galotera and PO1 Magpale. Thus, in the absence of any bad faith or proof that the
evidence has been tampered with, the integrity of the evidence is presumed to have
been preserved. 25
Aggrieved, appellant filed a Notice of Appeal 26 on April 4, 2012. Thereafter,
in compliance with the Resolution of the Court, dated March 13, 2013, notifying the
parties that they may file their respective supplemental briefs, if they so desire, within
thirty (30) days from notice, appellant filed his Supplemental Brief on June 14, 2013
raising the following errors:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE NON-
COMPLIANCE BY THE ARRESTING OFFICERS OF THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE PROPER CUSTODY OF SEIZED
DANGEROUS DRUGS UNDER R.A. NO. 9165.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE THE
 PROSECUTION'S FAILURE TO PROVE THE IDENTITY OF THE
CORPUS DELICTI. 27
Appellant maintains that the instant case does not fall under the exceptions to
the requirement of obtaining a judicial warrant prior to making an arrest under Section
5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. According to appellant, for
in flagrante warrantless arrests to be lawful, the following elements must concur: (1)
the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such
overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. But here,
appellant asserts that he was not exhibiting any strange actuation at the time of his
arrest, merely playing cara y cruz with a friend. Thus, absent any physical act on the
part of the accused, positively indicating that he had just committed a crime or was
committing or attempting to commit one, no reasonable suspicion would be sufficient
enough to justify his arrest and subsequent search without a warrant. 28
Next, appellant asseverates that the prosecution failed to establish, with moral
certainty, that the item seized from him was the very same item presented and proved
in court because of its non-compliance with the requirements under Section 21 of RA
No. 9165 mandating the arresting team to conduct a physical inventory of the items
seized and photograph the same in the presence of: (1) the accused; (2) a
representative from the media; (3) a representative from the Department of Justice
(DOJ); and (4) any elected public official who shall further be required to sign the
copies of the said inventory. According to appellant, no physical inventory nor
photograph was ever taken in this case. 29
Furthermore, while appellant recognizes the jurisprudential teaching that non-
compliance with Section 21 of RA No. 9165 is not fatal so long as: (1) there is
justifiable ground therefor; and (2) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
items were properly preserved by the apprehending team, he stressed that said
conditions were not established in this case. Not only did the prosecution fail to
adequately explain its failure to comply with said requirements, it likewise failed to
show the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items.
Appellant asserts that this is due to a gaping hole in the chain of custody of the seized
items arising from the prosecution's failure to show how the seized drugs were
transported from the place of arrest to the police station, or from the time they were
delivered to the laboratory until their eventual presentation in court.
The appeal is unmeritorious. cDHAES

To secure a conviction for the crime of illegal sale of regulated or prohibited

drugs, the following elements under Section 5, Article II of RA No. 9165 should be
satisfactorily proven: (1) the identities of the buyer and the seller, the object, and
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. What is
material to the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the
transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of
evidence of corpus delicti. 30
The Court finds that the prosecution sufficiently proved the preceding
requisites warranting appellant's conviction. As appropriately found by the lower
courts, the prosecution presented clear and convincing testimonies of the police
officers categorically recounting, in detail, how they conducted the buy-bust
operation, beginning from the receipt of the tip from the confidential informant, then
to the marking of the buy-bust money with the initials of PO1 Galotera, and then to
the meeting of the appellant as seller and PO1 Galotera as buyer, and next to the
actual exchange of the blister pack containing the Valium tablets with the marked
money, and then finally to the appellant's eventual arrest and turn over to the police
station where his arrest was duly recorded. Moreover, the prosecution further
presented before the trial court Chemistry Report No. D-787-09 on the seized tablets
revealing positive results for Diazepam, a dangerous drug under RA No. 9165. It is
clear, therefore, that the prosecution's evidence adequately established beyond
reasonable doubt the identity of the buyer and seller, the ten (10) tablets of Valium as
the object of the sale, the marked money as the consideration, as well as the exchange
of the Valium and the marked money signifying the consummation of the sale.
In this regard, the Court cannot give credence to appellant's insistence on the
illegality of his warrantless arrest due to an alleged absence of any overt act on his
part positively indicating that he was committing a crime. He asserts that he was
merely playing cara y cruz and denies any participation in the crime charged. Section
5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court enumerates the circumstances by which a
warrantless arrest are considered reasonable: TCAScE

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant, when lawful. — A peace officer or a

private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable
cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that
the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from
a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another. 31
Contrary to appellant's claims, there is overwhelming evidence that he was
actually committing a crime in the presence of the police officers who arrested him
without a warrant. To repeat, straightforward and unwavering testimonies were
presented by the prosecution narrating, in detail, how the police officers personally
witnessed the sale by appellant of the dangerous drug, being actual participants of the
buy-bust operation. Indeed, a buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment, in which the
violator is caught in flagrante delicto and the police officers conducting the operation
are not only authorized, but duty-bound, to apprehend the violator and to search him
for anything that may have been part of or used in the commission of the crime. 32
Against the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, appellant's plain denial
of the offense charged, unsubstantiated by any credible and convincing evidence,
must simply fail. 33
As for appellant's contention that the prosecution failed to establish that the
items seized from him were the very same items presented and proved in court due to
its non-compliance with the requirements under Section 21 of RA No. 9165
mandating the arresting officers to take photographs and conduct a physical inventory
of the items seized, the Court is not convinced. Section 21, Paragraph 1, Article II of
RA No. 9165 provides: ASEcHI

Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or

Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled
Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or
Laboratory Equipment. — The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of
all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors
and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or
laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper
disposition in the following manner:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the

drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation,
physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence
of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice
(DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to
sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof[.]

Notwithstanding the foregoing, and as admitted by appellant, the failure to

conduct a physical inventory of the seized items, as well as to take photographs of the
same in the presence of the persons required above, will not automatically render an
arrest illegal or the seized items inadmissible in evidence, 34 pursuant to the following
Section 21 (a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA No. 9165:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the
drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory
and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from
whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ),
and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory
and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is
served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the
 apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless
seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements
under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary
value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and
custody over said items[.] 35
In view of the preceding, the Court has, time and again, ruled that non-
compliance with Section 21 of RA No. 9165 shall not necessarily render the arrest of
an accused as illegal or the items seized as inadmissible if the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved in compliance with the
chain of custody rule. 36 The Court explained the rule on the chain of custody to be as
follows:
The rule on chain of custody expressly demands the identification of
the persons who handle the confiscated items for the purpose of duly
monitoring the authorized movements of the illegal drugs and/or drug
paraphernalia from the time they are seized from the accused until the time
they are presented in court. Moreover, as a method of authenticating evidence,
the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded
by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what
the proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about every link in
the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered in
evidence, in such manner that every person who touched the exhibit would
describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what
happened to it while in the witness' possession, the condition in which it was
received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the
chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure
that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity
for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same. 37
It is evident from the records of this case that the prosecution sufficiently
complied with the chain of custody rule. Contrary to the claims of appellant, the
unbroken chain of custody of the tablets seized from him was categorically
established by the testimonies presented by the prosecution's witnesses. PO1 Galotera
gave a clear and detailed account of the events that transpired from the moment he
handed the marked money to appellant, to the time appellant pulled out the blister
pack containing ten (10) pieces of round, blue tablets from his right pocket, all the
way up to his execution of the pre-arranged signal and subsequent arrest of appellant.
He testified that he informed appellant of his constitutional rights, apprised him of the
nature of his arrest, and marked the seized tablets with appellant's initials. He also
attested to the process by which he turned appellant and the seized items over to PO1
Magpale, who in turn, clearly narrated how he took photographs thereof, prepared the
Booking and Information Sheet, and eventually turned over appellant and the seized
items to Forensic Chemist Calabocal. ITAaHc
 In an attempt to further assign breaks in the chain of custody, appellant claimed
that the prosecution did not present any testimony of the persons who took charge of
the safekeeping and custody of the illicit drugs from the time they were delivered to
the laboratory. It bears stressing, however, that such point had already been addressed
by the appellate court in the following wise:
The testimony of Forensic Chemist PS I. Erickson L. Calabocal
was dispensed with after the parties had stipulated on the existence and
due execution of Chemistry Report No. D-787-09 (Exhibit "C").
xxx xxx xxx
. . . Quoting from their testimonies, the Solicitor General aptly traced
the unbroken chain of custody of the valium tablets seized from appellant,
thus:
xxx xxx xxx
Worthy of note, as well is the fact that the parties
stipulated during pre-trial that the forensic chemist who
conducted the qualitative examination of the seized item
received a letter request dated October 23, 2009 from PO1
Magpale. Attached to said letter was the specimen with
markings EDG. 38
In like manner, the trial court similarly noted appellant's admission, during pre-
trial, of the parties' stipulation as to the qualification of PS I. Erickson L. Calabocal as
a Forensic Chemist, as well as the genuineness and due execution of the documents he
brought together with the specimen, part of which were his Final Chemistry Report
and his Findings and Conclusions resulting from the laboratory examination he
conducted on the seized tablets, which yielded positive results for dangerous drugs. 39
Due to these stipulations, the testimony of Forensic Chemist Calabocal was not
presented at trial not because the prosecution failed to do so, but because the same
was dispensed with as expressly agreed to by the parties.
Unfazed, appellant further faults the police officers not only for failing to
comply with the requirements of Section 21 of RA No. 9165 but also for failing to
provide any explanation constituting justifiable ground therefor. It bears stressing,
however, that said objection was never raised in the trial court, and not even on appeal
before the appellate court. Appellant cannot belatedly raise its questions as to the
evidence presented at trial, too late in the day and, at the same time, expect the
prosecution to have provided justifiable grounds for its non-compliance with RA No.
9165. People of the Philippines v. Jimmy Gabuya y Adlawan 40 explains:
It is well to note that the records of the case are bereft of evidence that
appellant, during trial, interposed any objection to the non-marking of the
seized items in his presence and the lack of information on the whereabouts of
the shabu after it was examined by P/Insp. Calabocal. While he questioned the
chain of custody before the CA, the alleged defects appellant is now alluding
 to were not among those he raised on appeal. The defects he raised before the
CA were limited to the alleged lack of physical inventory, non-taking of
photographs of the seized items, and the supposed failure of the police officers
to mark the sachets of shabu at the crime scene. But even then, it was already
too late in the day for appellant to have raised the same at that point since he
should have done so early on before the RTC. It bears stressing that the
Court has already brushed aside an accused's belated contention that the
illegal drugs confiscated from his person is inadmissible for failure of the
arresting officers to comply with Section 21 of R.A. 9165. This is
considering that "[w]hatever justifiable grounds may excuse the police
officers from literally complying with Section 21 will remain unknown,
because [appellant] did not question during trial the safekeeping of the
items seized from him. Objection to evidence cannot be raised for the first
time on appeal; when a party desires the court to reject the evidence
offered, he must so state in the form of an objection. Without such
objection, he cannot raise the question for the first time on appeal. . . ."
Be that as it may, the Court has always reiterated that "what is of utmost
importance is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of
the accused." 41 Here, the Court opines that said requirement was sufficiently
complied with. It is evidently clear, therefore, that there exists no gap in the chain of
custody of the dangerous drug seized from appellant for all the links thereof
beginning from the moment the item was obtained from appellant up to the time the
same was presented in court were sufficiently accounted for. Thus, it is because the
apprehending team properly preserved the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized items that the Court excuses their failure to strictly comply with Section 21 of
RA No. 9165 for on said failure, alone, appellant cannot automatically be exonerated.
CHTAIc

All things considered, the Court finds no compelling reason to disturb the
findings of the courts below for the prosecution adequately established, with moral
certainty, all the elements of the crime charged herein. It is hornbook doctrine that the
factual findings of the appellate court affirming those of the trial court are binding on
this Court unless there is a clear showing that such findings are tainted with
arbitrariness, capriciousness or palpable error. 42 Thus, there exists no reason to
overturn the conviction of appellant.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The
Decision dated March 19, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No.
04587, affirming the Decision dated August 2, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 2, Manila, in Criminal Case No. 09-271907, finding appellant Eduardo Dela
Cruz y Gumabat guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 5, Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165, is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr., Perez and Reyes, JJ., concur.
 Perlas-Bernabe, * J., is on leave.
||| (People v. Dela Cruz y Gumabat, G.R. No. 205414, [April 4, 2016])

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 203984. June 18, 2014.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MEDARIO

CALANTIAO y DIMALANTA, accused-appellant.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J : p

This is an appeal from the January 17, 2012 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 04069, affirming in toto the July 23, 2009 Decision 2 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City, Branch 127, finding accused-appellant
Medario Calantiao y Dimalanta (Calantiao) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act of 2002.

On November 13, 2003, Calantiao was charged before the RTC of violation of
Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 in an Information, 3 the pertinent portion
of which reads:

That on or about the 11th day of November, 2003 in Caloocan City,

Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, without any authority of law, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession custody and control
two (2) bricks of dried marijuana fruiting tops with a total weight of 997.9
grams, knowing the same to be a dangerous drug. aTEACS

The facts, as synthesized by the RTC and adopted by the Court of Appeals, are as
follows:

EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION

On November 13, 2003[,] at around 5:30 . . . in the afternoon, while PO1

NELSON MARIANO and PO3 EDUARDO RAMIREZ were on duty, a certain
EDWIN LOJERA arrived at their office and asked for police assistance
regarding a shooting incident. Per report of the latter, it appears that while
driving a towing truck and traversing along EDSA, Balintawak, Quezon City,
he had a traffic dispute (gitgitan) with a white taxi cab prompting him to follow
said vehicle until they reached along 8th Avenue Street corner C-3 Road,
Caloocan City. Thereat, the passengers of said taxi cab, one of them was
accused Calantiao, alighted and fired their guns. Surprised, Lojera could not do
anything but continued his driving until he reached a police station nearby
where he reported the incident.

The police officers on duty then were PO1 NELSON MARIANO and
PO3 EDUARDO RAMIREZ. PO1 Mariano testified that they immediately
responded to said complaint by proceeding to 5th Avenue corner 8th Street,
Caloocan City where they found the white taxi. While approaching said vehicle,
two armed men alighted therefrom, fired their guns towards them (police
officers) and ran away. PO1 Mariano and PO3 Ramirez chased them but they
were subdued. PO1 Mariano recovered from Calantiao a black bag containing
two (2) bricks of dried marijuana fruiting tops and a magazine of super 38
stainless with ammos, while PO3 Ramirez recovered from Calantiao's
companion [a] .38 revolver.

The suspects and the confiscated items were then turned over to SPO3
PABLO TEMENA, police investigator at Bagong Barrio Police Station for
investigation. Thereat, PO1 Mariano marked the bricks of marijuana contained
in a black bag with his initials, "NM". Thereafter, said specimen were
forwarded to the PNP Crime Laboratory for chemical analysis. The result of the
examination conducted by P/SINSP. JESSSE DELA ROSA revealed that the
same was positive for marijuana, a dangerous drug. CSaIAc

The foregoing testimony of PO1 MARIANO was corroborated by PO3

RAMIREZ who testified that he personally saw those bricks of marijuana
confiscated from the accused. He confirmed that he was with PO1 Mariano
when they apprehended said accused and his companion and testified that while
PO1 Mariano recovered from the accused a black bag containing marijuana, on
his part, he confiscated from accused's companion a .38 revolver.

MR. CRISENDO AMANSEC, the driver of the taxi where the suspects
boarded was also presented in open court and testified as to what he knows
about the incident. He confirmed that on that date, two (2) persons boarded on
his taxi and upon reaching C-3 Road, they alighted and fired three (3) shots and
ran away.

Aside from the oral testimonies of the witnesses, the prosecution also
offered the following documentary evidence to boost their charge against the
accused:
 Exh. "A" — Request for Laboratory Examination dated
November 12, 2003

Exh. "B" — Physical Sciences Report No. D-1423-03 dated

November 12, 2003

Exh. "C-1" — Picture of First brick of marijuana fruiting tops

Exh. "C-2" — Picture of Second brick of marijuana fruiting tops

Exh. "D" — Referral Slip dated November 12, 2003

Exh. "E" — Pinagsamang Sinumpaang Salaysay dated

November 12, 2003 of PO3 Eduardo Ramirez and PO1 Nelson Mariano

Exh. "E-1" — Their respective signatures

Exh. "F" — Sinumpaang Salaysay of Crisendo Amansec

(Erroneously marked as Exh. "E")

EVIDENCE OF THE DEFENSE

The accused offered a different version of the story. According to his

testimony, this instant case originated from a traffic mishap where the taxi he
and his companion Rommel Reyes were riding almost collided with another car.
Reyes then opened the window and made a "fuck you" sign against the persons
on board of that car. That prompted the latter to chase them and when they were
caught in a traffic jam, PO1 Nelson Mariano, one of the persons on board of that
other car alighted and kicked their taxi. Calantiao and Reyes alighted and PO1
Mariano slapped the latter and uttered, "Putang ina mo bakit mo ako pinakyu
hindi mo ba ako kilala?" Said police officer poked his gun again[st] Reyes and
when Calantiao tried to grab it, the gun fired. Calantiao and Reyes were then
handcuffed and were brought to the police station. Thereat, they were subjected
to body frisking and their wallets and money were taken. PO1 Mariano then
prepared some documents and informed them that they will be charged for
drugs. A newspaper containing marijuana was shown to them and said police
officer told them that it would be sufficient evidence against them. They were
detained and subjected to medical examination before they were submitted for
inquest at the prosecutor's office. 4

Ruling of the RTC

On July 23, 2009, the RTC rendered its Decision giving credence to the
prosecution's case. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
 WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
declaring accused MEDARIO CALANTIAO y DIMALANTA, GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the offense of Violation of Section 11,
Article II, R.A. 9165, for illegally possessing 997.9 grams of marijuana fruiting
tops. Henceforth, this Court hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment and a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php500,000.00). 5

In convicting Calantiao, the RTC held that the illegal drug seized was admissible
in evidence as it was discovered during a body search after Calantiao was caught in
flagrante delicto of possessing a gun and firing at the police officers. Moreover, the RTC
found all the elements of the offense to have been duly established by the prosecution. 6
IaHSCc

Aggrieved, Calantiao appealed 7 his conviction to the Court of Appeals, assigning

the following errors:

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-

APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT FOR
VIOLATION OF SECTION 11, ARTICLE II, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165,
NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT THE ALLEGEDLY SEIZED
ITEMS ARE INADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE.

II

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE

ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE THE ARRESTING OFFICERS'
PATENT NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
PROPER CUSTODY OF SEIZED DANGEROUS DRUGS. ACcHIa

III

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE

ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE THE PROSECUTION'S FAILURE TO
PROVE THE PROPER CHAIN OF CUSTODY OF THE SEIZED
DANGEROUS DRUGS. 8

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals found no reason to overturn Calantiao's conviction. It found

that there was sufficient reason to justify a warrantless arrest, as the police officers were
acting on a legitimate complaint and had a reasonable suspicion that the persons
identified at the scene were the perpetrators of the offense. Likewise, the Court of
Appeals held that the search and subsequent seizure of the marijuana in question was
lawful and valid, being incidental to a lawful arrest. 9 HaECDI
 Finding that all the elements of the charge of illegal possession of dangerous drugs
to be present and duly proven, 10 the Court of Appeals, on January 17, 2012,
promulgated its Decision, affirming in toto the RTC's ruling.

Undaunted, Calantiao is now before this Court praying for an acquittal, adding the
following arguments in support of his position:

First, the plain view doctrine is not an exception to a search incident to a

valid warrantless arrest.

xxx xxx xxx

Second, Calantiao did not waive the inadmissibility of the seized items.

xxx xxx xxx

Finally, the seized items' custodial chain is broken. 11

In essence, Calantiao is questioning the admissibility of the marijuana found in his

possession, as evidence against him on the grounds of either it was discovered via an
illegal search, or because its custodial chain was broken.

Ruling of this Court

This Court finds no merit in Calantiao's arguments.

Search and Seizure of

Marijuana valid

This Court cannot subscribe to Calantiao's contention that the marijuana in his
possession cannot be admitted as evidence against him because it was illegally
discovered and seized, not having been within the apprehending officers' "plain view." 12

Searches and seizure incident to a lawful arrest are governed by Section 13, Rule
126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, to wit:

Section 13. Search incident to lawful arrest. — A person lawfully

arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have
been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search
warrant.

The purpose of allowing a warrantless search and seizure incident to a lawful

arrest is "to protect the arresting officer from being harmed by the person arrested, who
might be armed with a concealed weapon, and to prevent the latter from destroying
evidence within reach." 13 It is therefore a reasonable exercise of the State's police power
to protect (1) law enforcers from the injury that may be inflicted on them by a person
they have lawfully arrested; and (2) evidence from being destroyed by the arrestee. It
seeks to ensure the safety of the arresting officers and the integrity of the evidence under
the control and within the reach of the arrestee.

In People v. Valeroso, 14 this Court had the occasion to reiterate the permissible
reach of a valid warrantless search and seizure incident to a lawful arrest, viz.:

When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to

search the person arrested in order to remove any weapon that the latter might
use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape. Otherwise, the officer's safety
might well be endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated. In addition, it is
entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence
on the arrestee's person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction.

Moreover, in lawful arrests, it becomes both the duty and the right of the
apprehending officers to conduct a warrantless search not only on the person of
the suspect, but also in the permissible area within the latter's reach. Otherwise
stated, a valid arrest allows the seizure of evidence or dangerous weapons either
on the person of the one arrested or within the area of his immediate control.
The phrase "within the area of his immediate control" means the area from
within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence. A
gun on a table or in a drawer in front of one who is arrested can be as dangerous
to the arresting officer as one concealed in the clothing of the person arrested.
(Citations omitted.)AICEDc

In Valeroso, however, the Court held that the evidence searched and seized from
him could not be used against him because they were discovered in a room, different
from where he was being detained, and was in a locked cabinet. Thus, the area searched
could not be considered as one within his immediate control that he could take any
weapon or destroy any evidence against him. 15

In the case at bar, the marijuana was found in a black bag in Calantiao's
possession and within his immediate control. He could have easily taken any weapon
from the bag or dumped it to destroy the evidence inside it. As the black bag containing
the marijuana was in Calantiao's possession, it was within the permissible area that the
apprehending officers could validly conduct a warrantless search. EIAHcC

Calantiao's argument that the marijuana cannot be used as evidence against him
because its discovery was in violation of the Plain View Doctrine, is misplaced.

The Plain View Doctrine is actually the exception to the inadmissibility of

evidence obtained in a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest outside the suspect's
person and premises under his immediate control. This is so because "[o]bjects in the
'plain view' of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are
subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence." 16 "The doctrine is usually applied
where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless
inadvertently comes across an incriminating object . . . . [It] serves to supplement the
prior justification — whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search
incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being present unconnected
with a search directed against the accused — and permits the warrantless seizure." 17

The Plain View Doctrine thus finds no applicability in Calantiao's situation

because the police officers purposely searched him upon his arrest. The police officers
did not inadvertently come across the black bag, which was in Calantiao's possession;
they deliberately opened it, as part of the search incident to Calantiao's lawful arrest.

Inventory and Chain of

Custody of Evidence

Calantiao claims that even if the search and seizure were validly effected, the
marijuana is still inadmissible as evidence against him for failure of the apprehending
officers to comply with the rules on chain of custody, as the item was marked at the
police station. 18

The pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 9165 provide as follows:

Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or

Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled
Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or
Laboratory Equipment. — The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all
dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and
essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory
equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in
the following manner:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the

drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom
such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel,
a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any
elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory
and be given a copy thereof[.]

Its Implementing Rules and Regulations state:

SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or

Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled
Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or
Laboratory Equipment. — The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all
 dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and
essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory
equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in
the following manner:

(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of

the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory
and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from
whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ),
and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy thereof; Provided, that the physical inventory and
photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served;
or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending
officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures;
Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under
justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the
seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall
not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items[.]
(Emphasis supplied.)

This Court has held that the failure to strictly comply with Section 21, Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165, such as immediately marking seized drugs, will not
automatically impair the integrity of chain of custody because what is of utmost
importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized
items, as these would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the
accused. 19

Section 21 and its IRR do not even mention "marking." What they require are (1)
physical inventory, and (2) taking of photographs. As this Court held in People v.
Ocfemia: 20

What Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 and its implementing rule do not
expressly specify is the matter of "marking" of the seized items in warrantless
seizures to ensure that the evidence seized upon apprehension is the same
evidence subjected to inventory and photography when these activities are
undertaken at the police station rather than at the place of arrest. Consistency
with the "chain of custody" rule requires that the "marking" of the seized items
— to truly ensure that they are the same items that enter the chain and are
eventually the ones offered in evidence — should be done (1) in the presence of
the apprehended violator (2) immediately upon confiscation.

The prosecution was able to establish the chain of custody of the seized marijuana
from the time the police officers confiscated it, to the time it was turned over to the
investigating officer, up to the time it was brought to the forensic chemist for laboratory
examination. 21 This Court has no reason to overrule the RTC and the Court of Appeals,
which both found the chain of custody of the seized drugs to have not been broken so as
to render the marijuana seized from Calantiao inadmissible in evidence.

Furthermore, unless it can be shown that there was bad faith, ill will, or tampering
of the evidence, the presumption that the integrity of the evidence has been preserved will
remain. The burden of showing the foregoing to overcome the presumption that the
police officers handled the seized drugs with regularity, and that they properly discharged
their duties is on Calantiao. Unfortunately, Calantiao failed to discharge such burden. 22

It is worthy to note that these arguments were only raised by Calantiao on his
appeal. He himself admits this. 23 His theory, from the very beginning, was that he did
not do it, and that he was being framed for having offended the police officers. Simply
put, his defense tactic was one of denial and frame-up. However, those defenses have
always been frowned upon by the Court, to wit:

The defenses of denial and frame-up have been invariably viewed by

this Court with disfavor for it can easily be concocted and is a common and
standard defense ploy in prosecutions for violation of Dangerous Drugs Act. In
order to prosper, the defenses of denial and frame-up must be proved with
strong and convincing evidence. In the cases before us, appellant failed to
present sufficient evidence in support of his claims. Aside from his self-serving
assertions, no plausible proof was presented to bolster his allegations. 24

Hence, as Calantiao failed to show clear and convincing evidence that the
apprehending officers were stirred by illicit motive or failed to properly perform their
duties, their testimonies deserve full faith and credit. 25 TaDAHE

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby AFFIRMS the January

17, 2012 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 04069.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C.J., Bersamin, Villarama, Jr. and Reyes, JJ., concur.

||| (People v. Calantiao y Dimalanta, G.R. No. 203984, [June 18, 2014], 736 PHIL 661-676)

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 162808. April 22, 2008.]

 FELICIANO GALVANTE, petitioner, vs. HON. ORLANDO C.
CASIMIRO, Deputy Ombudsman for the Military and Other Law
Enforcement Offices, BIENVENIDO C. BLANCAFLOR, Director,
DENNIS L. GARCIA, Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer,
SPO4 RAMIL AVENIDO, PO1 EDDIE DEGRAN, PO1 VALENTINO
RUFANO, and PO1 FEDERICO BALOLOT, respondents.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J : p

Assailed herein by Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court are the October 30, 2003 Resolution 1 of the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for the Military and Other Law Enforcement Offices — Office of the
Ombudsman (Ombudsman) which dismissed for lack of probable cause the criminal
complaint, docketed as OMB-P-C-02-0109-B, filed by Feliciano Galvante 2
(petitioner) against SPO4 Benjamin Conde, PO1 Ramil Avenido, PO1 Eddie Degran,
PO1 Valentino Rufano, and PO1 Federico Balolot (private respondents) for arbitrary
detention, illegal search and grave threats; and the January 20, 2004 Ombudsman
Order 3 which denied his motion for reconsideration.
The facts are of record.
In the afternoon of May 14, 2001 at Sitio Cahi-an, Kapatungan, Trento,
Agusan del Sur, private respondents confiscated from petitioner one colt pistol super .
38 automatic with serial no. 67973, one short magazine, and nine super .38 live
ammunitions. 4 The confiscated materials were covered by an expired Memorandum
Receipt dated September 2, 1999. 5
Consequently, the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor filed against petitioner an
Information 6 for Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions in Relation to
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Resolution No. 3258, docketed as Criminal
Case No. 5047, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur.
Pending resolution of Criminal Case No. 5047, petitioner filed against private
respondents an administrative case, docketed as Administrative Case No. IASOB-
020007 for Grave Misconduct, before the Internal Affairs Service (IAS), Region XIII,
Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG); 7 and a criminal case,
docketed as OMB-P-C-02-0109-B for Arbitrary Detention, Illegal Search and Grave
Threats, before the Ombudsman. 8
In the June 21, 2001 Affidavit-Complaint he filed in both cases, petitioner
narrated how, on May 14, 2001, private respondents aimed their long firearms at him,
arbitrarily searched his vehicle and put him in detention, thus:
1. That sometime on May 14, 2001 I left my house at around 1:00 o'clock
in the afternoon after having lunch for Sitio Cahi-an, Brgy.
Kapatungan, Trento, Agusan del Sur to meet retired police Percival
Plaza and inquire about the retirement procedure for policemen;

2. That upon arrival at the house of retired police Percival Plaza, together
with Lorenzo Sanoria, Delfin Ramirez and Pedro Ramas who
asked for a ride from the highway in going to Sitio Cahi-an, I
immediately went down of the jeep but before I could call Mr.
Plaza, four policemen in uniform blocked my way;

3. That the four policemen were [private respondents] PO1 Romil

Avenido PNP, PO1 Valentino Rufano, PNP both member of 142nd
Company, Regional Mobile Group and PO1 Eddie Degran PNP
and PO1 Federico Balolot PNP members of 1403 Prov'l. Mobile
Group, all of Bunawan Brook, Bunawan, Agusan del Sur; who all
pointed their long firearms ready to fire [at] me, having heard the
sound of the release of the safety lock;

4. That raising my arms, I heard [private respondent] PO1 Avenido

saying, "ANG IMONG PUSIL, IHATAG" which means "Give me
your firearm", to which I answered, "WALA MAN KO'Y PUSIL"
translated as "I have no firearm", showing my waistline when I
raised my T-shirt;

5. That my other companions on the jeep also went down and raised their
arms and showed their waistline when the same policemen and a
person in civilian attire holding an armalite also pointed their
firearms to them to which Mr. Percival Plaza who came down from
his house told them not to harass me as I am also a former police
officer but they did not heed Mr. Plaza's statements;

6. That while we were raising our arms [private respondent] SPO4

Benjamin Conde, Jr. went near my owner type jeep and conducted
a search. To which I asked them if they have any search warrant;

7. That after a while they saw my super .38 pistol under the floormat of
my jeep and asked me of the MR of the firearm but due to fear that
their long arms were still pointed to us, I searched my wallet and
gave the asked [sic] document;

8 That immediately the policemen left me and my companions without

saying anything bringing with them the firearm;
 9. That at about 2:30 p.m., I left Mr. Percival's house and went to Trento
Police Station where I saw a person in civilian attire with a
revolver tucked on his waist, to which I asked the police officers
including those who searched my jeep to apprehend him also;

10. That nobody among the policemen at the station made a move to

apprehend the armed civilian person so I went to the office of
Police Chief Rocacorba who immediately called the armed civilian
to his office and when already inside his office, the disarming was
done;

11. That after the disarming of the civilian I was put to jail with the said
person by Police Chief Rocacorba and was released only at 4:00
o'clock in the afternoon of May 16, 2001 after posting a bailbond;

12. That I caused the execution of this document for the purpose of filing
cases of Illegal Search, Grave Misconduct and Abuse of Authority
against SPO4 Benjamin Conde, Jr., of Trento Police Station; PO1
Ramil Avenido, PO1 Velantino Rufano, PO1 Federico Balolot and
PO1 Eddie Degran. 9

Petitioner also submitted the Joint Affidavit 10 of his witnesses, Lorenzo

Sanoria and Percival Plaza.
Private respondent Conde filed a Counter-Affidavit dated March 20, 2002,
where he interposed the following defenses:
First, he had nothing to do with the detention of petitioner as it was Chief of
Police/Officer-in-Charge Police Inspector Dioscoro Mehos Rocacorba who ordered
the detention. Petitioner himself admitted this fact in his own Complaint-Affidavit; 11
and
Second, he denies searching petitioner's vehicle, 12 but admits that even
though he was not armed with a warrant, he searched the person of petitioner as the
latter, in plain view, was committing a violation of COMELEC Resolutions No. 3258
and No. 3328 by carrying a firearm in his person.
Private respondents Avenido, Degran, Rufano and Balolot filed their Joint-
Affidavit dated March 25, 2002, which contradicts the statements of private
respondent Conde, viz.:

1. that we executed a joint counter-affidavit dated August 28, 2001 where

we stated among other things, that "we saw Feleciano "Nani"
Galvante armed with a handgun/pistol tucked on his waist";
 2. that this statement is not accurate because the truth of the matter is that
the said handgun was taken by SPO4 BENJAMIN CONDE, JR.,
who was acting as our team leader during the May 14, 2001
Elections, from the jeep of Mr. Galvante after searching the same;
and

3. that we noticed the aforementioned discrepancy in our affidavit dated

August 28, 2001 after we have already affixed our signatures
thereon. 13

Consequently, petitioner filed an Affidavit of Desistance dated March 25, 2002

with both the IAS and Ombudsman, absolving private respondents Avenido, Degran,
Rufano and Balolot, but maintaining that private respondent Conde alone be
prosecuted in both administrative and criminal cases. 14
On July 17, 2002, the IAS issued a Decision in Administrative Case No.
IASOB-020007, finding all private respondents guilty of grave misconduct but
penalized them with suspension only. The IAS noted however that private
respondents were merely being "[enthusiastic] in the conduct of the arrest in line of
duty." 15
Meanwhile, in Criminal Case No. 5047, petitioner filed with the RTC a Motion
for Preliminary Investigation and to Hold in Abeyance the Issuance of or Recall the
Warrant of Arrest. 16 The RTC granted the same in an Order 17 dated August 17,
2001. Upon reinvestigation, Prosecutor II Eliseo Diaz, Jr. filed a "Reinvestigation
with Motion to Dismiss" dated November 22, 2001, recommending the dismissal of
Criminal Case No. 5047 on the ground that "the action of the policemen who
conducted the warrantless search in spite of the absence of any circumstances
justifying the same intruded into the privacy of the accused and the security of his
property." 18 Officer-in-Charge Prosecutor II Victoriano Pag-ong approved said
recommendation. 19
The RTC granted the prosecution's motion to dismiss in an Order 20 dated
January 16, 2003.
Apparently unaware of what transpired in Criminal Case No. 5047,
Ombudsman Investigation & Prosecution Officer Dennis L. Garcia issued in OMB-P-
C-02-0109-B, the October 30, 2003 Resolution, to wit:

After a careful evaluation, the undersigned prosecutor finds no probable

cause for any of the offenses charged against above-named respondents.

The allegations of the complainant failed to establish the factual basis of

the complaint, it appearing from the records that the incident stemmed from a
valid warrantless arrest. The subsequent execution of an affidavit of desistance
by the complainant rendered the complaint even more uncertain and subject to
 doubt, especially so since it merely exculpated some but not all of the
respondents. These circumstances, coupled with the presumption of regularity in
the performance of duty, negates any criminal liability on the part of the
respondents.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby recommended that the

above-captioned case be dismissed for lack of probable cause. 21 (Emphasis
supplied)

Upon the recommendation of Director Bienvenido C. Blancaflor, Deputy

Ombudsman for the Military Orlando C. Casimiro (Deputy Ombudsman) approved
the October 30, 2003 Resolution. 22

In his Motion for Reconsideration, 23 petitioner called the attention of the

Ombudsman to the earlier IAS Decision, the Reinvestigation with Motion to Dismiss
of Prosecutor II Eliseo Diaz, Jr. and the RTC Order, all of which declared the
warrantless search conducted by private respondents illegal, 24 which are contradicted
by the October 30, 2003 Ombudsman Resolution declaring the warrantless search
legal.
The Ombudsman denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration on the ground
that the latter offered "no new evidence or errors of law which would warrant the
reversal or modification" 25 of its October 30, 2003 Resolution.
Petitioner filed the present petition, attributing to Deputy Ombudsman
Casimiro, Director Blancaflor and Prosecutor Garcia (public respondents) the
following acts of grave abuse of discretion:

I. Public respondents acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction

and/or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
when, in their Resolution dated October 30, 2003, public respondents found that
the incident upon which petitioner's criminal complaint was based stemmed
from a valid warrantless arrest and dismissed petitioner's complaint despite the
fact that:

A. Petitioner has clearly shown that the search conducted by the

private respondents was made without a valid warrant, nor does it fall
under any of the instances of valid warrantless searches.

B. Notwithstanding the absence of a valid warrant, petitioner was

arrested and detained by the private respondents.

II. Public respondents acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction

and/or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
when, in their Order dated January 20, 2004, public respondents denied the
 petitioner's motion for reconsideration in a capricious, whimsical, despotic and
arbitrary manner. 26

In its Memorandum, 27 the Office of the Solicitor General argued that public
respondents acted within the bounds of their discretion in dismissing OMB-P-C-02-
0109-B given that private respondents committed no crime in searching petitioner and
confiscating his firearm as the former were merely performing their duty of enforcing
the law against illegal possession of firearms and the COMELEC ban against the
carrying of firearms outside of one's residence.
Private respondent Conde filed a Comment 28 and a Memorandum for himself.
29 Private respondents Avenido, Degran, Rufano and Balolot filed their separate
Letter-Comment dated June 25, 2004. 30
The petition lacks merit.
The Constitution vests in the Ombudsman the power to determine whether
there exists reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the
accused is probably guilty thereof and, thereafter, to file the corresponding
information with the appropriate courts. 31 The Court respects the relative autonomy
of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute, and refrains from interfering when
the latter exercises such powers either directly or through the Deputy Ombudsman, 32
except when the same is shown to be tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction. 33
Grave abuse of discretion is an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law or to act in contemplation of law as when judgment
rendered is not based on law and evidence but on caprice, whim and despotism. 34
This does not obtain in the present case.
It is noted that the criminal complaint which petitioner filed with the
Ombudsman charges private respondents with warrantless search, arbitrary detention,
and grave threats.
The complaint for warrantless search charges no criminal offense. The
conduct of a warrantless search is not a criminal act for it is not penalized under the
Revised Penal Code (RPC) or any other special law. What the RPC punishes are only
two forms of searches:

Art. 129. Search warrants maliciously obtained and abuse in the service

of those legally obtained. — In addition to the liability attaching to the offender
for the commission of any other offense, the penalty of arresto mayor in its
maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period and a fine not
exceeding P1,000.00 pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer or
employee who shall procure a search warrant without just cause, or, having
legally procured the same, shall exceed his authority or use unnecessary severity
in executing the same.
 Art. 130. Searching domicile without witnesses. — The penalty of
arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed upon a
public officer or employee who, in cases where a search is proper, shall search
the domicile, papers or other belongings of any person, in the absence of the
latter, any member of his family, or in their default, without the presence of two
witnesses residing in the same locality.

Petitioner did not allege any of the elements of the foregoing felonies in his
Affidavit-Complaint; rather, he accused private respondents of conducting a search on
his vehicle without being armed with a valid warrant. This situation, while
lamentable, is not covered by Articles 129 and 130 of the RPC.
The remedy of petitioner against the warrantless search conducted on his
vehicle is civil, 35 under Article 32, in relation to Article 2219 36 (6) and (10) of the
Civil Code, which provides:

Art. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who

directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or
impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable
to the latter for damages:

xxx xxx xxx

(9) The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and effects

against unreasonable searches and seizures;

xxx xxx xxx

The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may

also be adjudicated.

and/or disciplinary and administrative, under Section 41 of Republic Act No. 6975. 37

To avail of such remedies, petitioner may file against private respondents a

complaint for damages with the regular courts 38 or an administrative case with the
PNP/DILG, 39 as petitioner did in Administrative Case No. IASOB-020007, and not
a criminal action with the Ombudsman.
Public respondents' dismissal of the criminal complaint for illegal search which
petitioner filed with the Ombudsman against private respondents was therefore
proper, although the reasons public respondents cited for dismissing the complaint are
rather off the mark because they relied solely on the finding that the warrantless
search conducted by private respondents was valid and that the Affidavit of
Desistance which petitioner executed cast doubt on the veracity of his complaint. 40
Public respondents completely overlooked the fact that the criminal complaint was
not cognizable by the Ombudsman as illegal search is not a criminal offense.
 Nevertheless, the result achieved is the same: the dismissal of a groundless criminal
complaint for illegal search which is not an offense under the RPC. Thus, the Court
need not resolve the issue of whether or not public respondents erred in their finding
on the validity of the search for that issue is completely hypothetical under the
circumstance.
The criminal complaint for arbitrary detention was likewise properly dismissed
by public respondents. To sustain a criminal charge for arbitrary detention, it must be
shown that (a) the offender is a public officer or employee, (b) the offender detained
the complainant, and (c) the detention is without legal grounds. 41 The second
element was not alleged by petitioner in his Affidavit-Complaint. As pointed out by
private respondent Conde in his Comment 42 and Memorandum, 43 petitioner himself
identified in his Affidavit-Complaint that it was Police Chief Rocacorba who caused
his detention. Nowhere in said affidavit did petitioner allege that private respondents
effected his detention, or were in any other way involved in it. 44 There was,
therefore, no factual or legal basis to sustain the criminal charge for arbitrary
detention against private respondents.
Finally, on the criminal complaint for grave threats, the Solicitor General aptly
pointed out that the same is based merely on petitioner's bare allegation that private
respondents aimed their firearms at him. 45 Such bare allegation stands no chance
against the well-entrenched rule applicable in this case, that public officers enjoy a
presumption of regularity in the performance of their official function. 46 The IAS
itself observed that private respondents may have been carried away by their
"enthusiasm in the conduct of the arrest in line of duty". 47 Petitioner expressed the
same view when, in his Affidavit of Desistance, he accepted that private respondents
may have been merely following orders when they pointed their long firearms at him.
All said, public respondents did not act with grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing the criminal complaint against private respondents.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago, Chico-Nazario, Nachura and Reyes, JJ., concur.
||| (Galvante v. Casimiro, G.R. No. 162808, [April 22, 2008], 575 PHIL 324-338)